



**Landmine Monitor Report**  
Toward a Mine-Free World  
Executive Summary

**2006**

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# Landmine Monitor

Toward a Mine-Free World

Executive Summary  
2006



## **Landmine Monitor Editorial Board**

Mines Action Canada  
Handicap International  
Human Rights Watch  
Norwegian People's Aid

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# 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

## Table Key

States Parties: ratified or acceded as of 1 July 2006.

Signatories: signed but not yet ratified.

Non-Signatories: not yet acceded.

### The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Argentina
Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Bolivia
Brazil	Canada
Chile	Colombia
Costa Rica	Dominica
Dominican Rep.	Ecuador
El Salvador	Grenada
Guatemala	Guyana
Haiti	Honduras
Jamaica	Mexico
Nicaragua	Panama
Paraguay	Peru
St. Kitts & Nevis	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia	Trinidad & Tobago
Suriname	Venezuela
Uruguay	United States
Cuba	

### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Andorra	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Bosnia&Herzegovina
Bulgaria	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia
France	Germany	Greece
Holy See	Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy	Latvia
Liechtenstein	Lithuania	Luxembourg
Macedonia, FYR	Malta	Moldova
Monaco	Netherlands	Norway
Portugal	Romania	San Marino
Serbia & Montenegro	Slovakia	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
Tajikistan	Turkey	Turkmenistan
Ukraine	United Kingdom	Poland
Armenia	Azerbaijan	Finland
Georgia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Russia	Uzbekistan	

### Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Jordan	Qatar
Tunisia	Yemen	Bahrain
Egypt	Iran	Iraq
Israel	Kuwait	Lebanon
Libya	Morocco	Oman
Saudi Arabia	Syria	United Arab Emirates

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Benin	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Central African Rep.	Chad
Comoros	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire	Djibouti	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Kenya	Lesotho
Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
Mali	Mauritania	Mauritius
Mozambique	Namibia	Niger
Nigeria	Rwanda	São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone
South Africa	Sudan	Swaziland
Tanzania	Togo	Uganda
Zambia	Zimbabwe	Somalia

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Australia
Bangladesh	Bhutan
Brunei	Cambodia
Cook Islands	Fiji
Japan	Kiribati
Malaysia	Maldives
Nauru	New Zealand
Niue	Papua New Guinea
Philippines	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Thailand
Timor-Leste	Vanuatu
Indonesia	Marshall Islands
Burma/Myanmar	China
India	Korea, North
Korea, South	Laos
Micronesia	Mongolia
Nepal	Pakistan
Palau	Singapore
Sri Lanka	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vietnam



# About Landmine Monitor

This is the eighth Landmine Monitor report, the annual product of an unprecedented initiative by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to monitor and report on implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally, to assess the international community's response to the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines. For the first time in history, non-governmental organizations have come together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

Seven previous annual reports have been released since 1999, each presented to the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique; in September 2000 in Geneva, Switzerland; in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua; in September 2002 in Geneva; in September 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand; in November-December 2004 at the First Review Conference in Nairobi, Kenya; and in November-December 2005 in Zagreb, Croatia.

The Landmine Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 71 Landmine Monitor researchers from 62 countries gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL's campaigning coalition and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics and research institutions.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines. This is done through extensive collection, analysis and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Landmine Monitor is designed to complement the States Parties' transparency reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It reflects the shared

view that transparency, trust and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for successful eradication of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor and its annual reports aim to promote and advance discussion on mine-related issues, and to seek clarifications, in order to help reach the goal of a mine-free world. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

*Landmine Monitor Report 2006* contains information on 126 countries and areas with respect to landmine ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, mine action funding, mine clearance, mine risk education, landmine casualties, and survivor assistance. *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* focuses on mine-affected countries, States Parties with major outstanding treaty implementation obligations, and non-States Parties. Information on mine action donor countries is included in a funding overview.

As was the case in previous years, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report has



*Landmine Monitor is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines.*

*Landmine Monitor Thematic Research Coordinators at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Switzerland.*



© Mary Wareham/Next Step Productions, May 2006

ICBL Executive Director  
Sylvie Brigot meets with  
campaigner and researcher  
Moaffak Tawfek Hashim to  
discuss campaign activities.



© Jackie Hansen, 3 April 2006

its shortcomings. The Landmine Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on a difficult subject.

#### **Landmine Monitor 2006 Process**

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. A four-member Editorial Board coordinates the Landmine Monitor system: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People's Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system.

Research grants for *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* were awarded in December 2005, following a meeting of the Editorial Board in Zagreb, Croatia from 3-4 December 2005. Thematic Research Coordinators met in Ottawa, Canada from 9-10 February 2006 to exchange information, assess what research and data gathering had already taken place, identify gaps, and ensure common research methods and reporting mechanisms for Landmine Monitor. In March and April 2006, draft research reports were submitted to Thematic Research Coordinators for review and comment.

From 2-4 April 2006 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, over sixty researchers and Thematic Research Coordinators met for the 2006 Landmine Monitor Global Research Meeting to discuss research findings, further build capacity in research and mine ban advocacy, and participate in exposure visits to Cambodian mine action field projects. The meeting was an integral part of the Landmine Monitor process and

provided the only face-to-face opportunity for researchers to discuss their research findings with Thematic Research Coordinators.

In May 2006, Thematic Research Coordinators and a small group of researchers participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, to conduct interviews and discuss final reports and major findings. From April to July, Landmine Monitor's team of Thematic Research Coordinators verified sources and edited country reports, with a team at Mines Action Canada taking responsibility for final fact-checking, editing, and assembly of the entire report. This report was printed during August and presented to the Seventh Meeting of States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland from 18 to 22 September 2006.

*Landmine Monitor Report 2006* is available online at [www.icbl.org/lm](http://www.icbl.org/lm).

Last, but never least, we extend our gratitude to Landmine Monitor donors and supporters. Landmine Monitor's contributors are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. It was only possible to carry out this work with the aid of grants from:

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We also thank the donors who have contributed to the individual members of the Landmine Monitor Editorial Board and other participating organizations.



# Major Findings

**L**andmine Monitor Report 2006 reveals that the Mine Ban Treaty and the mine ban movement continue to make good progress toward eradicating antipersonnel landmines and saving lives and limbs in every region of the world. Significant challenges remain, however.

This edition of the Landmine Monitor reports in detail on progress and challenges remaining in over 120 countries, including mine-affected countries and those with substantial stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, and the dwindling minority of states which have not yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty. *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* provides an annual update to *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*.

The reporting period for *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* is May 2005 to May 2006. Editors have where possible added important information that arrived later. Statistics for mine action and landmine casualties are usually given for calendar year 2005, with comparisons to 2004.

## ▲ Increased international rejection of antipersonnel mines

As of 1 July 2006, 151 countries were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and another three had signed but not yet ratified, constituting well over three-quarters of the world's nations. Four signatory states ratified the treaty since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*: Ukraine, Haiti, the Cook Islands and Brunei. Ukraine possesses 6.7 million antipersonnel mines, the world's fourth largest stockpile. Several states indicated they would accede in the near future, including Indonesia, Kuwait, Palau and Poland. Many states that are not party took steps consistent with the treaty.

## ▲ Increased support for the goal of eliminating antipersonnel mines

UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, was adopted on 8 December 2005, with 158 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions; this was the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution

and the lowest number of abstentions since 1997 when it was first introduced. Twenty-four states not party to the treaty voted in favor, including Azerbaijan and China for the first time.

## ▲ Non-State Armed Groups committing to a ban on antipersonnel mines

The Polisario Front in Western Sahara signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines in November 2005 and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) signed in July 2006.

## ▼ Universalization challenges

None of the 40 non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty acceded in the past year. Some major stockpilers, producers and users remain outside the treaty, including Burma, China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States. Some countries that were reported to be making progress toward the treaty in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* did not report any further progress, such as Bahrain, Oman, Kyrgyzstan, Libya and the United Arab Emirates.

## ▲ No use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties or signatories

There is no evidence—or even serious allegation—of use of antipersonnel mines by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories. This is notable because many were users in the recent past before becoming States Parties or signatories.

## ▼ Three governments using antipersonnel mines

In this reporting period, at least three governments continued using antipersonnel mines—Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia—with the most extensive use in Myanmar. However, in May 2006, the government of Nepal and Maoist rebels agreed to a cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. These three governments and Georgia were identified as users in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* and previous reports, establishing themselves as the only ongoing state-users of antipersonnel mines.

### ▼ **Non-State Armed Groups using antipersonnel mines**

Non-state armed groups are using antipersonnel mines in more countries than government forces, but NSAG use is also on the decline. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like improvised explosive devices in at least 10 countries, including in three States Parties (Burundi, Colombia and Guinea-Bissau) and in seven non-States Parties (Burma, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia/Chechnya and Somalia). *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 13 countries. Guinea-Bissau, where Senegalese rebels used mines against the Guinea-Bissau Army, was added to the list, while Georgia, the Philippines, Turkey and Uganda were removed this year.

### ▼ **Production of antipersonnel mines by 13 countries**

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 countries as producers of antipersonnel mines, the same as last year: Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. Some of these countries are not actively producing, but reserve the right to do so. The United States, which has not produced since 1997, has been developing new landmine systems that may be incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. Vietnamese officials told a Canadian delegation in November 2005 that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines, a statement Landmine Monitor is attempting to confirm and clarify. At least 38 countries have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including five states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

### ▲ **De facto global ban on trade in antipersonnel mines**

For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines.

### ▼ **UN panel allegation of transfer of antipersonnel mines**

A UN panel leveled the most serious and specific allegation ever of a transfer of antipersonnel mines by a Mine Ban Treaty State Party. In May 2006, a UN arms embargo monitoring group reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia in March 2006. Eritrea denied the claims as “baseless and unfounded” and labeled the report as “outrageous and regrettable.”

### ▲ **Millions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed**

In this reporting period, four States Parties completed destruction of their stockpiles: Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Seventy-four States Parties have completed destruction, and another 64 never possessed mines, leaving 13 States Parties with stocks to destroy. Some 700,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed by States Parties since the last Landmine Monitor report. States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 39.5 million antipersonnel mines.

### ▼ **Millions of mines stockpiled by non-States Parties**

Landmine Monitor estimates that non-States Parties stockpile over 160 million antipersonnel mines, with the vast majority held by just five states: China (est. 110 million), Russia (26.5 million), US (10.4 million), Pakistan (est. 6 million) and India (est. 4-5 million). South Korea for the first time reported a stockpile total (407,800); officials previously indicated a stock of some two million antipersonnel mines. Signatory Poland holds nearly one million antipersonnel mines.

### ▼ **Too many mines retained for training, too few explanations why**

Over 227,000 antipersonnel mines are retained by 69 States Parties under the exception granted by Article 3 of the treaty. Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Brazil, Turkey, Algeria, Bangladesh and Sweden. Too few States Parties have reported in any detail on why they are retaining mines, and in many cases it does not appear the mines are being utilized at all. Only 11 States Parties made use of the new format to report on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines that was agreed at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in December 2005.

### ▲ **Decreased numbers of mines retained for training and development**

The number of retained mines decreased by about 21,000 in this reporting period. An additional five states chose not to retain any mines and/or destroyed existing retained stocks: DR Congo, Eritrea, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Moldova. At least 71 States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel mines.

### ▲ **Continued high-rate of initial transparency reporting**

States Parties' compliance with the treaty requirement to submit an initial transparency report held steady at 96 percent in 2005, with Cameroon and Latvia providing reports.

### ▼ **Late transparency reporting**

As of 1 July 2006, six States Parties had not submitted overdue initial Article 7 reports: Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Gambia, Sao Tome e Principe, Guyana and Ethiopia. For the second year in a row, there was a decrease in compliance with the requirement to submit an annual update Article 7 report. As of 1 July 2006, 90 states had submitted updated reports due 30 April 2006, or 62 percent.

▲ **An increasing number of States Parties are making their views known on key matters of treaty interpretation and implementation**

Albania, Chad, Cyprus, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Yemen provided their national understandings of the Article 1 prohibition on assisting banned acts, particularly with respect to joint military operations with non-States Parties; all were in basic agreement with the views of the ICBL. Albania, Croatia, Germany, Estonia, Guatemala, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Yemen expressed the view, shared by the ICBL, that any mine (even if labeled an antivehicle mine) capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is prohibited, and/or expressed the view, also shared by the ICBL, that any mine with a tripwire, break wire, or tilt rod is prohibited.

▲ **A reduction in the number of mine-affected countries**

Landmine Monitor research identified at least 78 nations as being affected to some degree by landmines in mid-2006, of which 51 are party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as eight areas not internationally recognized as independent states or over which jurisdiction is contested. Two States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Guatemala and Suriname—reported completing clearance of all mined areas in 2005.

▲ **Increased demining productivity**

In 2005, a total of more than 740 square kilometers was demined, the highest annual productivity since modern demining started in the late 1980s. Three major mine action programs alone—in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Yemen—reduced the extent of suspected contamination by almost 340 square kilometers. Over 470,000 landmines—the great majority (450,000) were antipersonnel mines—and more than 3.75 million explosive devices were destroyed.

▼ **Too many States Parties not on course to meet Article 5 deadlines for completing mine clearance**

Too many States Parties appear not to be on course to meet their Article 5 deadlines, including at least 13 of the 29 States Parties with 2009 or 2010 deadlines—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom (Falklands), Yemen and Zimbabwe.

▲ **Expanded mine risk education**

Mine risk education programs expanded in many countries with new projects and activities in 28 countries, a notable development from 2004 (15 countries). For the first time, MRE activities were recorded in China. The number of community volunteers and of national NGOs implementing community-based MRE increased. Landmine Monitor recorded MRE in 60 countries and eight areas in 2005-2006; 39 of the countries are States Parties, and 21 are non-States Parties.

▼ **Increased casualties in 2005-2006**

Reported casualties increased to 7,328 in 2005—11 percent more than in 2004. In 2005-2006, there were new casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war recorded in 58 countries (the same as last year) and seven areas (one less). (However, Landmine Monitor continues to estimate there are 15,000-20,000 new casualties each year – *see below*). In 2005, casualties were reported in seven countries that did not report casualties in 2004: Chile, Honduras, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia and Peru. In 2005-2006, intensified conflict resulted in both more civilian and more military (national and foreign) mine and ERW casualties in several countries including: Chad, Colombia, Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

▼ **ERW casualties in more countries**

Landmine Monitor has identified another 16 countries (up from 12) and one area (none in 2004) with no new landmine casualties in 2005-2006 but with casualties caused exclusively by explosive remnants of war: Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guatemala, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Republic of Congo, Tunisia, Ukraine and Zambia, as well as Kosovo. In 11 of these countries Landmine Monitor did not record ERW casualties in 2004.

▼ **Increasing number of mine survivors and mine victims**

Progress in data collection indicates there are approximately 350,000 to 400,000 mine survivors in the world today; there may well be as many as 500,000. With only 10 of the 58 countries and seven areas that had casualties in 2005-2006 able to provide complete full-year data, and with significant under-reporting, Landmine Monitor continues to estimate there are between 15,000 and 20,000 new landmine/ERW casualties each year. There are some preliminary indications this estimate may be revised downward in future years. More importantly, the number of survivors *continues to grow—and their needs are long-term*.

▲ **Increased attention to victim assistance**

States Parties increased support to 24 countries with significant numbers of survivors, leading to the development of tools, objectives and action plans, better follow-up of progress, accountability, best practices for increased survivor inclusion, better coordination, and integration with development. However, in 2005 existing programs were far from meeting the needs of landmine survivors; in 49 of 58 countries with casualties in 2005-2006 one or more aspect of assistance remains inadequate. Providers continue to face many of the same problems as in previous years including inadequate access to care, variety and effectiveness of assistance, capacity, rights implementation and funding.

### ▲ Significant international mine action funding in 2005

International funding of mine action totaled US\$376 million in 2005, the second highest funding to date and \$37 million more than two years ago. The top four donors were: United States (\$81.9 million), European Commission (\$51.5 million), Japan (\$39.3 million) and Norway (\$36.5 million). Of the top 20 donors, half provided *more* mine action funding in 2005: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

### ▼ Decrease in international funding of mine action

The 2005 total of \$376 million was down \$23 million, almost six percent, from 2004. This is the first time that global mine action funding has decreased meaningfully since 1992, when states first began to devote significant resources to mine action. Of the top 20 donors, half provided *less* mine action funding in 2005: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, United States and the European Commission. The global decrease largely reflects big reductions from the two most significant donors: the European Commission (down \$14.9 million) and the United States (down \$14.6 million).

### Recipients of mine action funding

Countries receiving the most mine action funding in 2005 were: Afghanistan (\$66.8 million), Sudan (\$48.4 million), Angola (\$35.8 million), Iraq (\$27.8 million) and Cambodia (\$23.9 million). The largest *increase* in funding was received by Sudan (up \$33.4 million, over three times the 2004 total). Other recipients with increases of at least \$1 million included: Abkhazia, Albania, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Uganda.

### ▼ Decreased funding to many mine-affected countries

Drastic reductions in mine action funding occurred in Iraq (down \$30.9 million, 53 percent), Afghanistan (\$25 million, 27 percent) and Cambodia (\$17.7 million, 43 percent). Other countries with substantial decreases in 2005 included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Jordan, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan.

### ▼ Some major mine action programs hit by funding shortfalls

Mine action programs in at least five mine-affected countries were limited by major funding shortfalls: Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, and Tajikistan; in Croatia, parliamentarians called for increased government funding for mine action.

### ▼ Inadequate funding of mine victim assistance

Several survivor assistance programs had serious funding shortfalls in 2005, preventing the delivery of essential services to mine survivors, their families and communities—despite an increase of about 29 percent in funding identified for victim assistance, to \$37 million. Much of this gain may be attributed to changes in reporting. Much greater levels of sustained funding are needed for mine survivor assistance programs.

### ▲ More national funding by mine-affected countries

Some mine-affected countries invested more national resources in mine action in 2005, notably Croatia (\$32.4 million, or 57 percent of mine action expenditure) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$11.3 million, or 44 percent of expenditure). Larger contributions were also made by Azerbaijan and Chile. In 2005, some mine-affected countries reported decreases in national contributions to mine action, including: Colombia, Mozambique and Thailand.

# Introduction

**T**he Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty”) entered into force on 1 March 1999. Signed by 122 governments in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty had 151 States Parties as of 1 July 2006.<sup>1</sup> An additional three states have signed but not yet ratified. A total of 40 states remain outside the treaty.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) considers the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty the only viable comprehensive framework for achieving a mine-free world.<sup>2</sup> The treaty and the global effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines have yielded impressive results. A new international norm is emerging, as many governments not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are taking steps consistent with the treaty, and an increasing number of non-state armed groups are also embracing a ban. New use of antipersonnel mines continues to decline. There was compelling evidence of new use by just three governments in this Landmine Monitor reporting period (since May 2005), as well as use by non-state armed groups in 10 countries. There were no confirmed instances of antipersonnel mine transfers. However, in May 2006, the UN arms embargo monitoring group on Somalia reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia; Eritrea strongly denied the charge. Four more States Parties completed destruction of their stockpiled antipersonnel mines, bringing the total to 74; only 13 States Parties still have stocks to destroy.

Over 740 square kilometers of land was demined by mine action programs in 2005—more than in any other year since the start of modern demining in the late 1980s. This was due largely to efforts in some major mine-affected countries to better identify which mine-suspected land is not in fact mined, and to improve targeting of resources and increase efficiency of clearance operations. Over 470,000 landmines (450,000 were antipersonnel mines) and 3.75 million explosive devices were removed and destroyed. Two more mine-affected countries, Guatemala and Suriname, declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations by completing



© Cameron Maccauley / Landmine Survivors Network, April 2006

clearance of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas. Some 15 other States Parties reported good progress towards achieving clearance before their Article 5 deadlines; however, there were indications that some dozen others are not on track to do so. Several major mine action programs were threatened by lack of funding in 2005. Mine risk education took place in 60 countries, reaching some 6.4 million people directly, in addition to mass media. MRE became increasingly integrated with other mine action activities, and there were more community-based programs.

Landmine Monitor identified at least 7,328 new casualties in 2005, an increase of 11 percent from 2004. Mine casualties occurred in every region of the world—there were new casualties in 58 countries and seven non-state territories in 2005. Efforts to improve the assistance given to mine survivors made progress in six of the 24 States Parties identified as having the most survivors and the greatest need to improve survivor assistance. However, in 2005 existing

*The Salvadoran Association of Football Amputees is comprised of 37 players, 34 of whom are landmine survivors.*

*Over 740 square kilometers of land was demined by mine action programs in 2005 — more than in any other year since the start of modern demining in the late 1980s.*



Participants at an event held in conjunction with the release of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, in Zagreb, Croatia.

© Stuart Maslen, 22 November 2005



programs were far from meeting the needs of mine survivors and faced the same problems as in previous years.

The trend for year-on-year increases in mine action funding halted in 2005; this was the first significant decrease since 1992, due mainly to cuts by the two biggest donors.

Progress has been made, therefore, yet daunting challenges remain to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty and strengthen the norm of banning antipersonnel mines, to fully implement the treaty, to clear mines from the ground, to destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and to assist mine survivors. The ICBL believes that the only real measure of the Mine Ban Treaty's success will be the concrete impact that it has on the global antipersonnel mine problem. As with the seven previous annual reports, *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* provides a means of measuring that impact.

This introductory chapter provides a global overview of the current *Landmine Monitor* reporting period since May 2005. It contains sections on banning antipersonnel mines (universalization, treaty implementation, use, production, trade and stockpiling), on mine action (including mine risk education), and on landmine casualties and survivor assistance.



# Banning Antipersonnel Mines

**T**he Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later. For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to submit its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (with annual updates each year thereafter), destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and destroy antipersonnel mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.



## Universalization

Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 151 States Parties, a total of 84 states ratified or acceded to the treaty after its entry into force on 1 March 1999.<sup>3</sup> The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55; 1999—32 (23 after 1 March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8; 2003—11; 2004—3; 2005—4; and 2006 (as of July)—3.

Four signatory states have ratified the treaty since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*: Ukraine (December 2005), Haiti (February 2006), the Cook Islands (March 2006) and Brunei (April 2006). Ukraine possesses a very large stockpile of 6.6 million antipersonnel mines, including 5.9 million difficult-to-destroy PFM-type mines. With Haiti's ratification, only two countries in the Americas, Cuba and the United States, remain outside of the treaty.



The Cook Islands and Brunei provide positive examples for the Asia-Pacific states that are not yet party to the treaty.

There are three states remaining that have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty: Indonesia, Marshall Islands, and Poland. There are positive indications from Indonesia and Poland that they will ratify the treaty in the near-term. The President of Indonesia issued his consent to start the process for ratification of the treaty in October 2005, and in March 2006 a draft law was submitted to the Ministry of Legal and Human Rights Affairs for final revision.

Poland continues to work on the national ratification process following elections and a change in government. In addition, in December 2005, the Marshall Islands voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, after it abstained on similar resolutions in past years.

There have also been encouraging developments in many of the non-signatory nations around the world.

**In sub-Saharan Africa:** Somalia is the only country in the region that is not party to the treaty. In June 2005,

*A young girl throws a pair of shoes on top of a shoe pyramid, part of an awareness-raising campaign in Lyon, France.*

*Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining.*





the Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) reaffirmed the TFG's resolve to accede to the treaty and called for assistance, including for stockpile destruction.

**In the Asia-Pacific region:** At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Palau expressed its hope to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006. The Federated States of Micronesia attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November-December 2005—its first participation in a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting—and told the ICBL that accession legislation was being drafted. In May 2006, Mongolia indicated it has initiated a step-by-step approach to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008; a first step in the plan is to reveal information on its landmine stockpiles. In October 2005, at the UN, Mongolia's representative declared, "Mongolia denounces the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of all types of anti-personnel landmines and supports the efforts undertaken by the international community to ban this dangerous and indiscriminate weapon."

In July 2005, Laos confirmed its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the future. In December 2005, China voted for the first time in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution; it continued to make statements supporting the Mine Ban Treaty's purposes and objectives. India has shown an increasing openness toward the Mine Ban Treaty, and has regularly attended meetings related to the treaty since December 2004; at the Sixth Meeting of State Parties the Indian delegate stated that its participation in these meetings "is a reflection of our commitment to the common vision of a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance."

During the visit of a Canadian government delegation in November 2005 to promote the Mine Ban Treaty, Vietnamese officials indicated that Vietnam will join the treaty at some point and stressed that it already respects the spirit of the treaty by not producing, selling or using antipersonnel mines. On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. In June 2006, Taiwan enacted legislation that bans production and trade of antiper-

sonnel mines, but not stockpiling and use, and requires clearance of mined areas within seven years.

**In the Commonwealth of Independent States:** For the first time, Azerbaijan in December 2005 voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution. Armenia has reportedly decided to submit to the UN Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, the annual transparency reports required by the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II. Georgia attended the intersessional meetings in May 2006, where it said that its position on non-accession to the Mine Ban Treaty was being re-considered, and it re-stated its commitment not to use, produce, import or export antipersonnel mines.

**In the European Union:** Finland is the only EU country that has not signed, ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Finland reiterated its commitment to accede by 2012 and destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2016.

**In the Middle East-North Africa region:** In Kuwait, a draft accession law was submitted to the National Assembly; Kuwait voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution for the first time since 1998. Senior Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials said in March 2006 that Iraq would join the treaty and that preparations were underway. In Lebanon, an internal review process that could lead to accession began. In June 2006, Lebanon's Prime Minister and the Army Chief told the ICBL that they were not averse to accession, and the Foreign Minister said that Lebanon was giving serious consideration to accession. For the first time, Lebanon voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution in the First Committee; it was absent from the final vote. Morocco continued to express strong support for the Mine Ban Treaty and stressed its *de facto* compliance; it voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the second consecutive year, and announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties its intention to submit a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

#### **UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80**

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 60/80 was adopted on 8 December 2005 by a vote of 158 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.<sup>4</sup> This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution, and the lowest number of abstentions, since 1997 when it was first introduced.<sup>5</sup> Twenty-four states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included three countries that subsequently became States Parties (Ukraine, Haiti and Brunei), three signatory countries (Indonesia, Poland

*Stockpile of antipersonnel mines prepared for a destruction event conducted by the Polisario Front in Tifariti, Western Sahara.*

*The government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines.*



*Landmine Monitor researchers for India and Pakistan discuss research findings at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.*

© Mary Wareham/Next Step Productions, November-December 2005



and Marshall Islands), and 18 non-signatories (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Iraq, Kuwait, Micronesia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the United Arab Emirates). Most notable among this latter group are Azerbaijan and China, who voted in favor of the annual resolution for the first time, as well as Kuwait (first time since 1998) and the Marshall Islands (first time since 2002). Lebanon voted in favor for the first time in the First Committee, but was absent for the final vote. It is noteworthy that of the 40 existing non-States Parties, more voted for the resolution (18) than abstained (17); five non-States Parties were absent from the vote.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were also discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to the treaty. Government forces in Burma (Myanmar), Nepal and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. The United States has been developing new landmine systems that may be incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. Some states that were reported to be making progress toward the treaty in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* did not report any further progress, such as Bahrain, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

### **Non-State Armed Groups**

There is ever-increasing awareness of the need to involve non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. NSAGs were a prominent topic at the June 2005 and May 2006 Standing Committee meetings, as well as the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.

A significant number of non-state armed groups have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. They have done this through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, and by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment<sup>7</sup> NSAGs in three States Parties (Philippines, Senegal and Sudan) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments. In addition, in August 2005, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)

signed a cease-fire with the government that included an agreement to clear mines.

Geneva Call has received signatures from 29 NSAGs, many of them in Somalia, since 2001. The signatories are in Burma, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Western Sahara. The Polisario Front in Western Sahara signed the Deed of Commitment in November 2005 and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), also known as the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra-Gel), signed in July 2006.

## **Sixth Meeting of States Parties**

States Parties, observer states and other participants met for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005. It differed from previous annual meetings in that it was conducted in the framework of formally assessing progress in fulfilling the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 that had been adopted at a high political level at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November-December 2004. Thus, the meeting produced the Zagreb Progress Report, which in addition to reviewing progress made in the past year, highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. The Zagreb Progress Report took the place of the President's Action Programme that emerged from previous annual meetings.

Notable announcements at the meeting included: Guatemala and Suriname completing their mine clearance obligations; Algeria and Guinea-Bissau completing their stockpile destruction obligations; Nigeria destroying mines previously retained for training; and, Australia pledging 75 million Australian dollars for mine action over five years. In the only substantive agreement of the meeting, States Parties agreed to a proposal from Argentina and Chile for a new format for expanded reporting on antipersonnel mines retained for training or development purposes under the Article 3 exception. The ICBL was pleased with the focus of States Parties on Article 5 mine clearance deadlines, and especially Norway's offer to initiate a process to facilitate fulfillment of these obligations.

Participation in the meeting was high—over 600 people—with a total of 115 country delegations attending, including 94 States Parties. More than 180 representatives of NGOs from 63 countries attended. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners, people from the field, and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

A total of 21 non-States Parties participated, indicating the continuing spread of the international norm rejecting antipersonnel mines. Some of the more notable holdouts attended, including Azerbaijan, China, Egypt and India. India made its first formal statement at a Mine Ban Treaty meeting. Notably, seven non-States Parties from the Middle East/North

Africa region took part, an encouraging development in a region with low adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty. These included Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

States Parties made a number of practical decisions at the Sixth Meeting. They decided to hold the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva from 18 to 22 September 2006, with Australia as the President-designate. Jordan offered to host the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in 2007. In addition, new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs were selected for the Standing Committees.

The ICBL identified several disappointing aspects of the meeting, including that Australia was the only State Party to announce a specific new financial commitment for mine action, responses to the victim assistance questionnaire were of varying quality with objectives too vague in many cases, and there was little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty's prohibition on "assistance," and mines with sensitive anti-handling devices or sensitive fuzes.

## Implementation and Intersessional Work Program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty's provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee, contact groups on universalization, resource mobilization and Articles 7 and 9, the sponsorship program, and an implementation support unit.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in June 2005 and another week in May 2006. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, the new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs were selected for the period until the next annual meeting, as follows: General Status and Operation: Belgium and Guatemala as co-chairs and Argentina and Italy as co-rapporteurs; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Jordan and Slovenia as co-chairs and Chile and Norway as co-rapporteurs; Stockpile Destruction: Japan and Tanzania as co-

chairs and Algeria and Estonia as co-rapporteurs; and Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Afghanistan and Switzerland as co-chairs and Austria and Sudan as co-rapporteurs.

Details of Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found in the thematic sections which follow.

## Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

A total of 86 states were party to Amended Protocol II of CCW, as of 1 July 2006.<sup>8</sup> Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. It entered into force on 3 December 1998. Since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, only Tunisia joined Amended Protocol II. Just 10 of the 86 States Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and the United States.

China, Latvia, Pakistan and Russia deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex.<sup>9</sup>

China and Pakistan are obligated to be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia's deferral is now presumably irrelevant due to its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibits the use of such mines and requires their destruction.

Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex.<sup>10</sup> Their respective nine-year deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, and 2014 for Russia. Ukraine is obliged by the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.

In November 2003, 91 CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive remnants of war (ERW). On 12 May 2006, the 20th State Party ratified the protocol, triggering an entry-into-force date of 12 November 2006. As of 1 July 2006, 23 states had ratified Protocol V.<sup>11</sup>

In the CCW, work on mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) and on measures to prevent specific weapons, including cluster munitions, from becoming explosive remnants of war continued in 2005 and 2006.

*States Parties agreed to a proposal from Argentina and Chile for a new format for expanded reporting on antipersonnel mines retained for training or development purposes.*

*Treaty Implementation Officer Tamar Gabelnick at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Switzerland.*



© Mary Wareham/Next Step Productions, May 2006

A Norwegian People's Aid EOD team prepares the demolition of hand grenades and mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

© Damir Alkovic / Norwegian People's Aid, 26 April 2006



## Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2005, three governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia. These same governments, as well as Georgia, were identified as using antipersonnel mines in the previous Landmine Monitor reporting period.

Myanmar's military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was most widespread in Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah) and Shan states. In May 2006, Human Rights Watch reported that civilians seeking refuge in Thailand have been placed at grave risk by landmines planted by the Myanmar Army along the border in Karen state. It said antipersonnel mines were being planted in civilian areas to terrorize the local popula-

tion, and cited a figure of 2,000 mines laid in one area to block escape routes and deny the civilian population access to food supplies, commodities and other humanitarian assistance. The Myanmar Army has reportedly obtained and is using an increasing number of antipersonnel mines of the US M-14 design; manufacture and source of these non-detectable mines—whether foreign or domestic—is unknown.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields, noting, "Antipersonnel mines are used to protect facilities of high importance." They indicated mines are used by forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards. While Russia has regularly acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in the past, in August 2005 Russian military officials claimed to Landmine Monitor that Russian Ministry of Defense forces had not used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2004 or 2005.

On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes no use of landmines. Prior to the cease-fire, both sides had continued to use landmines and/or improvised explosive devices. Government forces (the Royal Nepalese Army and other security services) used both factory-made antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

There is no evidence—or even serious allegation—of use of antipersonnel mines by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories in the reporting period. This is notable in that many current States Parties have either admitted using, or there are credible allegations of their using, antipersonnel mines in the recent past, before joining the treaty, some even as signatories.<sup>12</sup>

### Use by Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups are using antipersonnel mines in more countries than government forces, but antipersonnel mine use by non-state armed groups is also on the decline. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least 10 countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like IEDs was reported in three States Parties (Burundi, Colombia and Guinea-Bissau) and in seven non-States Parties (Burma, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia/Chechnya and Somalia). *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 13 countries. Guinea-Bissau, where Senegalese rebels used mines against the Guinea-Bissau Army, was added to the list, while Georgia, the Philippines, Turkey and Uganda were removed this year.

For the first time in several years, there were no confirmed reports, or even serious allegations, of use of antipersonnel mines by non-state actors in Georgia. There were many instances in 2005 and 2006 where the Ugandan military seized caches of antipersonnel mines belonging to the Lord's Resistance Army, but Landmine Monitor did not find any reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LRA. The LRA is known to have used mines in the past.


Many media and other reports in the Philippines referred to use of "landmines" by several NSAGs, including the New People's Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group, but Landmine Monitor could only identify use of antivehicle mines and command-detonated mines and IEDs. The NPA stepped up its use of command-detonated improvised antivehicle mines, resulting in more casualties than ever before. NPA and MNLF both have stated that they do not use victim-activated antipersonnel mines.

Similarly, media and official reports in Turkey frequently referred to use of "landmines" by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/Kongra-Gel) but, again, Landmine Monitor could only clearly identify use of antivehicle mines and command-detonated mines and IEDs. Some incidents during the reporting period appear to have been the result of victim-acti-

*Three governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia.*



# Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines since May 2005



*Unearthed landmines, found during the construction of a dam, are stockpiled in a temporary storage facility on Kinmen Island, Taiwan.*

© Jason Chang, 25 April 2005



vated antipersonnel mines or IEDs, but the date of their placement was not evident. The Turkish government has reported that in 2005, 39 military personnel were killed and 155 injured by mines laid by the PKK. In December 2005, the Gendarme General Command reportedly recovered 40 DM-11 antipersonnel mines and other weapons that belonged to the PKK. According to Geneva Call, the PKK has admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of explosive devices which can be activated by a victim or a vehicle. In commenting on a draft Landmine Monitor report, the government stated that the PKK's claim not to use victim-activated mines "does not square with reality." As noted above, in July 2006, the PKK signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines.

In Burma, the Karen National Liberation Army, Karenni Army, Shan State Army (South), Chin National Army, United Wa State Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and several other non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel mines; it is likely that the Karen National Liberation Army was the NSAG using mines most extensively in this reporting period.

In Burundi, the government continued to accuse the Front National de Libération (FNL) rebels of using antipersonnel mines; the increased number of mine casualties, particularly in Bujumbura Rural province where fighting has been taking place, indicates ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.

Chechen rebels continued to use improvised explosive devices extensively. It was difficult to ascertain the degree to which victim-activated antipersonnel mines or IEDs were being used, but it appears that in most instances, the rebels were using command-detonated IEDs targeting vehicles.

In Colombia, the FARC continued to be the biggest user of landmines in the country, and among the biggest in the world. Landmine Monitor registered new use of antipersonnel mines by FARC forces in several municipalities that had not reported mine incidents previously. Other groups, notably the ELN, also used mines. There were no specific reports of use of antipersonnel mines by AUC in this reporting period, though mines were seized from and turned in by AUC members.<sup>13</sup>

In March and April 2006, a faction of the Senegal-based Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance led by Salif Sadio fled into northern Guinea-Bissau and laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during fighting with Guinea-Bissau armed forces, causing civilian casualties and significant socioeconomic disruption.

In India, a variety of NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and, most commonly, improvised explosive devices. Communist insurgents in central India used command-detonated IEDs, victim-activated explosive devices, and booby-traps. A number of groups in northeastern India used victim-activated devices. Insurgents in Kashmir used command-detonated IEDs, and the Indian Army recovered antipersonnel landmines from the insurgents.

In Iraq, opposition forces continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as antivehicle mines. The IEDs appeared to be almost exclusively command-detonated, though Coalition forces discovered many caches of antipersonnel mines. In June 2006, insurgent forces reportedly placed numerous victim-activated IEDs in the area surrounding the bodies of two American soldiers who had been kidnapped and killed.

In Nepal, Maoists used large numbers of command-activated explosive devices, as well as victim-activated and time-activated devices, leading to casualties in almost every district of the country.

In Pakistan, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and IEDs extensively in Baluchistan, and to a lesser extent in Waziristan and elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

In Somalia, there is little specific information available, but it appears there has been ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by various factions in different parts of the country.


In Sri Lanka, since December 2005, suspected use by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) of command-detonated Claymore mines has escalated greatly, and the Army has in a few instances alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the rebels.

Militants in Egypt may have used antipersonnel mine-like devices during an August-October 2005 operation against them by Egyptian security forces.



## Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.<sup>14</sup> Thirty-eight states have ceased the production of antipersonnel mines.<sup>15</sup> This includes five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Israel and Poland. In addition, Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006. A total of 24 treaty members have reported on the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of antipersonnel mine production facilities.<sup>16</sup>





Landmine Monitor identifies 13 countries as producers of antipersonnel mines. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period. Last year, Egypt and Iraq were removed.<sup>17</sup>

### Antipersonnel Landmine Producers

Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, Vietnam

Vietnamese officials from both the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry told a visiting Canadian delegation in November 2005 that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has sought confirmation and clarification from the government, including whether there is an official policy, law or regulation prohibiting production.

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. However, it has been conducting research and development on new landmines. The Pentagon is requesting \$1.3 billion for research on and production of two new landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between 2005 and 2011; these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. The US Congress ordered a Pentagon study of the possible indiscriminate effects of Spider, thereby deferring the Pentagon's expected decision in December 2005 whether to produce Spider.

Burma's Military Heavy Industries reportedly began recruiting technicians for the production of the next generation of mines and other munitions. A former Nepalese government official told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that landmines are produced at the weapons factory at Sunchari south of Kathmandu, but the government has not provided any information on the types of mines produced.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW. In August 2005, India told Landmine Monitor that it is not producing remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines; it had stated in October 2000 that it had designed a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, for trial evaluation and prototype production.

The director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of Defense in 2002 that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have found since 2002 many hundreds of Iranian antiper-

sonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.

The South Korean company Hanwha produced about 3,300 Claymore mines (KM18A1) in 2005. Previously, South Korea reported that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2004.

NSAGs in Burma, Colombia, India, Iraq and Nepal are known to produce victim-activated mines or IEDs. Command- or remotely-detonated IEDs were produced by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In Burma, the United Wa State Army is allegedly producing PMN-type antipersonnel mines at an arms factory formerly belonging to the Burma Communist Party.

## Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines. However, a UN panel leveled the most serious and specific allegation ever of a transfer of antipersonnel mines by a Mine Ban Treaty State Party. In May 2006, a UN arms embargo monitoring group reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia in March 2006. Eritrea denied the claims as "baseless and unfounded" and labeled the report as "outrageous and regrettable." An earlier October 2005 report from the UN monitoring group stated that between 25 March and 10 April 2005, Eritrea twice shipped arms including mines to an opponent of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG); it did not specify antipersonnel or antivehicle mines.

The October 2005 and May 2006 UN reports also said that the government of Ethiopia had provided unspecified types of landmines to factions in Somalia. Ethiopia strongly denied the allegations. The October report also said the government of Yemen provided unspecified types of mines to the TFG, apparently in July 2005.

There continued to be reports and allegations that armed groups in Pakistan were smuggling mines into the country from Afghanistan. The May 2006 UN monitoring group report said that in August 2005 traders at the Bakaraaha arms market in Somalia reportedly purchased mines and other arms from a Yemeni arms trading network.

In July 2005, Israel extended for another three years its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines which was first declared in 1994. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended export moratoria in recent years including China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and the United States. South Korea exported 1,050 command-

*A UN panel leveled the most serious and specific allegation ever of a transfer of antipersonnel mines by a Mine Ban Treaty State Party.*

detonated-only Claymore mines to New Zealand in December 2005.

In July 2006, the United States repeated its desire (first announced in July 2004) to pursue negotiations on an international ban on the sale or export of non self-destructing landmines in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Several States Parties have objected to the proposal, noting that banning only one category of antipersonnel mines implies the acceptability of trade in other categories. The CD has not been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.



## Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and their Destruction

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, 131 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 50 countries stockpile about 178 million antipersonnel mines. One notable development in this reporting period is that South Korea for the first time disclosed its stockpile total of 407,800 antipersonnel mines; various officials had previously indicated a stockpile of about 2 million antipersonnel mines.

### States Parties

It appears that, as of July 2006, 138 of the 151 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. A total 74 States Parties have completed destruction of their stockpiles.<sup>18</sup> Another 64 have either formally declared never possessing stocks, or are not believed to possess stocks.

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 39.5 million antipersonnel mines, destroying nearly 700,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Guinea-Bissau (October 2005), Nigeria (November 2005), Algeria (November 2005) and DR Congo (announced in May 2006). Although it had not previously reported any progress in its stockpile destruction program, DR Congo told States Parties in May 2006 that it had completed the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines under its control that it had been able to identify, and thus fulfilled its treaty obligation. It also said it expected to find additional stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the future, which it would then destroy.

Landmine Monitor estimates that upwards of 16 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by 13 States Parties that still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs. A total of 11 States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus (3.7 million), Burundi, Cyprus, Greece (1.6 million), Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Turkey (3 million) and Ukraine (6.7 million).<sup>19</sup> While they have not officially declared their stockpiles in Article 7 reports, Ethiopia and Guyana are also thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines.



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Algeria's stockpile destruction is completed in Hassi Bahbah, Algeria.


Latvia, which became a State Party on 1 January 2006, has reported that it will destroy its stockpile of 2,410 mines in 2006. Serbia and Montenegro began destroying its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in August 2005 and by March 2006 had destroyed 649,217 mines, almost half of its stockpile. Cyprus destroyed 11,000 antipersonnel mines in 2005 and another 18,000 are slated for destruction in 2006. In May 2006, Afghanistan assured States Parties that all known stockpiles would be destroyed by its March 2007 deadline, and stated that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed.

After signing a contract with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in February 2006, Belarus began destroying its remaining stockpile of 294,755 antipersonnel mines, other than PFM mines. The Belarus Ministry of Defense signed a "statement of endorsement" to accept technical assistance from the European Commission (EC) for the destruction of 3.37 million PFM mines on 6 May 2006, with the goal of starting the project in January 2007. In February 2006, the EC awarded a €3 million (some \$3.7 million) contract for destruction of Ukraine's 5.95 million PFM-type mines. An EC €1 million (\$1.2 million) tender for destruction of an additional, recently identified 716,745 non-PFM-type antipersonnel mines was cancelled. Turkey reported that in December 2005 NAMSA and a company signed an agreement to establish a new facility to destroy stockpiled mines.

In May 2006, Angola for the second time indicated the country may require an extension of its 1 January 2007 deadline for completion of antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction; however, the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow extensions for stockpile destruction. Burundi and Sudan are still determining the number and location of all their stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Guyana, which has not submitted its initial Article 7 report due July 2004, has never provided any information on its stockpile or its destruction plans and progress. Landmine Monitor has estimated Guyana's stockpile at 20,000 antipersonnel mines.

*States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 39.5 million antipersonnel mines, destroying nearly 700,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in this reporting period.*

# Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines



138 States Parties have either completed stockpile destruction or never possessed antipersonnel mines.

- Large stockpile of Antipersonnel Mines.
- Stockpile of Antipersonnel Mines.
- Stockpile of Antipersonnel Mines in Process of Destruction.

STATES PARTIES (Signed and Ratified or Acceded).  
 Signatories (Signed but not Ratified).  
 States not Party (Not yet Acceded).



### Pending Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

Angola	1 Jan 2007
Afghanistan	1 Mar 2007
Cyprus	1 July 2007
Guyana	1 Feb 2008
Belarus	1 Mar 2008
Greece	1 Mar 2008
Serbia & Montenegro	1 Mar 2008
Turkey	1 Mar 2008
Burundi	1 Apr 2008
Sudan	1 Apr 2008
Ethiopia	1 Jun 2009
Latvia	1 Jan 2010
Ukraine	1 June 2010

A total of 55 States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.<sup>20</sup> In addition, there are nine states that have not yet submitted Article 7 reports formally declaring the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Vanuatu.

### Signatories

The three remaining signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile approximately one million antipersonnel mines. Poland declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005; it dismantled 12,990 expired stockpiled mines in 2005. Indonesia has estimated its stockpile at 16,000 antipersonnel mines. The Marshall Islands is not thought to stockpile any antipersonnel mines.

### Non-Signatories

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (26.5 million) and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million), India (estimated 4-5 million) and South Korea (407,800). Other states not party to the treaty believed to have

large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam.

Non-signatories have destroyed significant numbers of antipersonnel mines, more than 25 million, primarily because they had expired or to be compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. Israel for the first time reported that it destroyed 15,510 outdated stockpiled mines in 2005. In November 2005, a Chinese official stated that over the past three years China had destroyed nearly 500,000 landmines that did not comply with Amended Protocol II. It appears that from the late 1990s through 2005, China destroyed some 2.2 million antipersonnel mines that were either obsolete or not compliant with Amended Protocol II. Russia has reported destroying more than 19.5 million antipersonnel mines since 2000.

### Non-State Armed Groups

During this reporting period, NSAGs were reported to possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Uganda. Most often, these stockpiles were reported as part of seizures by government forces. Landmines were seized from or turned in

by NSAGs, or unidentified sources, in eight States Parties: Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, the Philippines, Turkey and Uganda. Only DR Congo reported such seizures in its Article 7 report; none of the other states have reported on the acquisition or destruction of seized antipersonnel mines.

*Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Brazil, Turkey, Algeria, Bangladesh and Sweden.*

### Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 151 States Parties, 69 retain over 227,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least 71 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the recent additions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Moldova.<sup>21</sup> In July 2006, FYR Macedonia destroyed its entire stockpile of 4,000 mines retained for training. During the May 2006 intersessional meetings, Moldova stated that it will destroy all 249 of its retained mines between 17 May and 31 July 2006. Hungary destroyed all of its 1,500 retained mines in October 2005.

Eleven States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.<sup>22</sup>

Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Brazil (16,125), Turkey (15,150), Algeria (15,030), Bangladesh (14,999) and Sweden (14,402).

A total of eight States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sudan (10,000), Australia (7,266),

*HALO Trust destroys a stockpile of antipersonnel mines at a disposal center in Dehsabz district, Kabul province, Afghanistan.*



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Landmine Monitor  
researcher Boybat  
Cheikh Abdelhay at a  
Polisario Front stockpile  
destruction event in  
Tifariti, Western Sahara.

© Mahfoud Brahim Omar/Sahawari Campaign to Ban  
Landmines, 27 February 2006



Greece (7,224), Croatia (6,236), Belarus (6,030), Japan (5,350), Serbia and Montenegro (5,000) and Tunisia (5,000). Sudan reported in February 2006 that in addition to the 5,000 mines it had previously indicated would be retained by its armed forces, another 5,000 mines will be kept by the Government of Southern Sudan People's Army.

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.<sup>23</sup> During the May 2006 Standing Committee meetings, Chile, which previously retained 5,866 mines, announced that it had undertaken a review of its training program and the number of mines required, and had decided, in addition to the 300 mines to be consumed during training in 2006, to destroy another 1,292 antipersonnel mines that are no longer needed for training.

Another 17 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.<sup>24</sup> Botswana has not reported the number of mines it retains.

A total of 14 States Parties reported consuming 3,702 mines for training and research purposes in 2005.<sup>25</sup> In 2004, 24 States Parties reported consuming 6,761 mines. In 2003, 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines.

At least 51 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2005: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Namibia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone,

Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Five of the 51 countries did not specifically report consuming any mines retained for training, but reported lower numbers than previous years' Article 7 reports: Australia, France, Namibia, Netherlands and Uganda.

A total of 36 States Parties did not report consuming any mines in 2004; 26 did not consume any in 2003; 29 did not consume any in 2002.

At least 15 States Parties that retain over 1,000 mines have not reported consuming any mines for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years, including Algeria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Mozambique, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia. Some states have indicated that the purposes for which they utilize the mines do not require the consumption (destruction) of the mines.

The ICBL believes that states that retain antipersonnel mines and apparently do not use any of these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception permitted by Article 3.

The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties agreed to adopt a new voluntary expanded reporting format for Form D on retained mines at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005. Initially proposed jointly by Argentina and Chile, this modified format allows States Parties to report on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines retained under Article 3. Eleven States Parties made use of the new format for calendar year 2005.<sup>26</sup>

Seventeen States Parties made statements on their retained mines during the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, with Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Germany, the Netherlands, Tanzania, Tajikistan and Yemen in particular providing details on their national practices.

## Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the Convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 96 percent. This compares to 96 percent in 2005, 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.

Two State Parties have submitted initial reports since *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, Cameroon and Latvia. For Cameroon, the deadline for submission was August 2003.

Six States Parties have a pending deadline: Bhutan (31 July 2006), Vanuatu (28 August 2006), Ukraine (28 November 2006), Haiti (28 January 2007), Cook Islands (28 February 2007) and Brunei (30 March 2007).

A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Gambia (28 August 2003), São Tomé e Príncipe (28 February 2004), Guyana (31 July 2004) and Ethiopia (28 November 2005).

*At least 15 States Parties that retain over 1,000 mines have not reported consuming any mines for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years.*

For the second year, there was a decrease in the rate of annual updates submitted for the previous calendar year, which were due by 30 April 2006. As of 1 July 2006, a total of 90 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2005; 55 States Parties had not submitted updates.<sup>27</sup> This equates to a compliance rate of 62 percent. The rate of compliance for annual reports for calendar year 2004 was 65 percent, for calendar year 2003 was 78 percent, and for calendar year 2002 was 62 percent.

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001, Gambia in 2002 and Lithuania in 2002, when they were signatories. Then non-State Party Latvia submitted voluntary reports in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports each year since 2003. In June 2005, non-State Party Sri Lanka submitted its first voluntary Article 7 report. It is quite detailed in many areas, but does not report on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Several other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, most recently Armenia and Morocco, joining Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.

## National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 49 of 151 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.<sup>28</sup> This is an increase of five State Parties since publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*: Albania, Djibouti, Niger, Serbia and Montenegro, and Lithuania. A total of 23 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.<sup>29</sup> Bolivia and Tanzania initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland and Uganda.

A total of 40 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.<sup>30</sup> Argentina, Cyprus and Greece joined this category in the past year. Argentina and Guinea-Bissau said they are exploring the possibility of adopting new legislation even though they have deemed existing legislation sufficient. Although Qatar has not considered new legislation necessary because it has never produced, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines and is not mine affected, it has established a national committee to provide advice on the need for national legislation. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future

violations of the treaty and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 41 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>31</sup>

The ICRC has produced an Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. This kit is available from the ICRC in English, French, Russian and Spanish and is also available on the internet.<sup>32</sup>

## Special Issues of Concern

### Assisting in Any Activity Prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1)

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances ... assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance. Many States Parties have recognized the need to address this issue and to share views on policy and practice.

The Final Report and President’s Action Program agreed at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003 states that “the meeting called upon States parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference.” The co-chairs of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention (Mexico and the Netherlands) at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings undertook significant consultations on reaching understandings or conclusions on issues related to Article 1, but a number of States Parties remained opposed.

The Nairobi Action Plan for 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”

*Only 49 of 151 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty —an increase of five.*



*ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams and Stephen Goose of HRW sit with the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, at a stockpile destruction event in Hassi Bahbah, Algeria.*



Munitions, including IEDs, remain on the ground six weeks after a Maoist attack in Palpa district, Nepal.

### Joint Military Operations

An understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 42 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty which may use antipersonnel mines.<sup>33</sup> Several States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor since May 2005:

- Albania stated that “during joint military operations with State and Non-State Parties, Albania does not use and is not engaged in the use or transport of the antipersonnel mines.”
- Chad stated that “we will reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines and will refuse to order them as well. We will also reject participation in any joint operation if our military forces derive any military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines and we will not provide security or transportation of antipersonnel mines.”
- Cyprus stated that Article 1 “prohibits common military exercises of states parties to the Convention with the armed forces of states that have not ratified the Convention.”
- Estonia stated, “Almost two years ago the Netherlands circulated a non-paper, which lists the activities that could be regarded as assistance. The suggestions listed in the non-paper were acceptable for Estonia. On 21 June 2004 the chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and

Operation of the Convention also introduced a non-paper on this particular topic on the basis of the Netherlands non-paper, which was acceptable for Estonia as well.”

- FYR Macedonia stated that it “reserves the right to reject any rules of engagement permitting use of APM and refuse orders to use them.”
- Moldova said, “It is our firm belief that States Parties engaging in military operations with other states or groups of states should not: participate in planning for use of anti-personnel mines; train others to use anti-personnel mines; participate in operations wherein direct military benefit is known by the State Party to be derived from the use of antipersonnel mines; agree to rules of engagement permitting the use of anti-personnel mines; or request others to use anti-personnel mines.”
- Slovenia stated that its “Armed Forces will under no circumstances take any action that would lead to the use of antipersonnel mines or contribute to such use in joint operations with other States.”

- Yemen stated that “one cannot participate in any activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines and should reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines and refuse orders to use them, and reject participation in any joint operation if their military forces derive any military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines, and should not provide security or transportation for AP mines.”

Some States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited; each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies.<sup>34</sup> Australia has formally declared that it is permissible to provide “indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” presumably including the laying of antipersonnel mines.

### Transit and Foreign Stockpiling

A total of 31 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing of foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.<sup>35</sup> Several States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor since May 2005:

- Albania stated that it “prohibits transfer of antipersonnel mines in its territory and foreign stockpiling in Albania of the antipersonnel mines.”
- Cyprus stated, “The meaning of the term ‘assist’, which is included in Article 1 of the Convention, should be interpreted thus: (a) It prohibits the storage of anti-personnel mines in the territory of another state, in which that state exercises its jurisdiction; (b) It prohibits the transshipment of antipersonnel mines by states not parties to the Convention, through the territory of states that have ratified the Convention....”
- Estonia stated, “On 21 June 2004 the chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention also introduced a non-paper on this particular topic on the basis of the Netherlands non-paper, which was acceptable for Estonia as well.”
- FYR Macedonia stated that the treaty “prohibits the transit of foreign APM on, across, or through territory under the jurisdiction or control of a state party; and prohibits foreign stockpiling of APM on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”
- Moldova stated, “We are strongly behind the view that Article 1 prohibits the transit of antipersonnel mines across, or the foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on, territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”
- Yemen said it supports the view that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the transit “of antipersonnel mines across, or the foreign stockpiling of anti-personnel mines on, territory under jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”

*A total of 31 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing of foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.*



Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in an Article 7 transparency measures report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan. Germany, Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom have stated that US antipersonnel mine stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control.

### Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL and ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty's definitions, any mine—even if it is labeled as an anti-vehicle mine—equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. However, for a small number of States Parties this remains a contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what mines are banned may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

The following 26 States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Yemen and Zambia. Four States Parties (Denmark, France, Japan and United Kingdom) have said that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to anti-vehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

A growing number of States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor in communications since May 2005:

- Albania stated that it “possesses stockpiles of anti-vehicle mines with sensitive fuses (break wires) and there are actually plans for their destruction and these mines are also currently used during the disposal of the old ammunition.”
- Croatia informed States Parties that it has removed the tilt rods from its TMRP-6 anti-vehicle mines. It said that it “fully subscribes” to the statement in a Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet that “a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine.”
- Estonia stated that “mines equipped with a tripwire, breakwire, or tilt rod fuse should not be used.”
- Germany stated that “anti-vehicle mines which can be actuated accidentally by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, have to be treated as antipersonnel mines, regardless of the question whether



*A sample of mines that were destroyed at the stockpile destruction event at the Defense Ministry range near the town of Borisov, Belarus.*

the detonation is caused by a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device. From our point of view, such mines are thus prohibited.”

- A Guatemalan official told Landmine Monitor that Guatemala supports the interpretations of the ICBL and many States Parties regarding Article 2.
- Kenya stated that “any mine that functions or has the capacity to function as an antipersonnel mine, or can be modified to function as such, should be considered as an antipersonnel mine and is therefore banned within the meaning of a mine and within the letter and spirit of the Convention. We therefore consider mines with sensitive fuzes and all anti-vehicle mines with antihandling devices to be covered under Article 2 and therefore prohibited under the Convention. We lend our support to the interpretation provided by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Committee of the Red Cross in this regard.”
- FYR Macedonia stated that “anti-vehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuses are effectively APM banned under the Ottawa Convention.”
- Moldova stated, “It is our firm belief that all mines, including anti-vehicle ones, designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons, do fall within the scope of the Ottawa Convention and are thus prohibited by the Convention. We fully share the view that a mine equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device, capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, should be considered an anti-personnel mine and banned under the Convention, regardless of an attached label possibly calling it an anti-vehicle mine, and of the respective amount of explosives going with it.”
- Slovenia stated that “anti-vehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices, which activate when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb anti-vehicle mines, and anti-vehicle mines with fusing devices, which cause mines to

*Twenty-six States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited.*



HALO Trust destroys a stockpile of antipersonnel mines at a disposal center in Dehsabz district, Kabul province, Afghanistan.



© Sediq Rashid Sr./UNIMACA, March 2006

function as anti-personnel mines, fall under Article 2 of the Ottawa Convention and are thus prohibited by the Convention.”

- Yemen stated that it supports the view that “any mine even if it is called an antivehicle mine equipped with a sensitive fuse or sensitive antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited.”

There appears to be agreement, with some notable exceptions, that a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or a tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However, the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and a Czech company has offered for sale mines with a tripwire fuze. The Czech Republic has also acknowledged possessing tilt

rod fuzes, but has stated that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired within 15 years. Slovenia has TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes, and is considering how to deal with them. Sweden has antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. France has destroyed a number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. Germany and Slovakia have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines. Slovakia has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling device. Belarus has committed to destroying MUV-type fuzes used as antihandling devices and booby-traps.

#### **Claymore and OZM-72 Command-Detonated Mines**

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed

to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In the past, options for both means of utilization have often been packaged with the mine.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation are permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions. The M18A1 (produced originally by the United States but also widely copied or license-produced by other countries), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries) and the MRUD (produced in the former Yugoslavia) are the most well known and widely held examples of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.

Several States Parties have extended this command and target activation distinction to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities. Lithuania and Moldova have reported modifying small numbers of OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them antipersonnel mines, and do not count them as mines to be destroyed or mines retained for training. Belarus decided to convert over 200,000 OZM-72 mines into command-detonated munitions.

A total of 30 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.<sup>36</sup> A number of States Parties have clarified their positions since May 2005:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina included 15,343 MRUD directional fragmentation mines held by the armed forces in its total of mines retained for training.
- Denmark stated in March 2006, “Tripwires and tripwire devices have been removed from Danish Claymore Mines and have been replaced by electric detonators. Hereby the mines can only be activated on command.”
- Latvia disclosed possessing command-detonated MON series mines in its initial transparency report as a State Party, and committed itself “to not use them as antipersonnel mines.”
- Nicaragua reported in 2005 that a total of 121 MON series mines previously reported as mines retained for training have been excluded from the list as these mines are “not included in the restrictions established by the Ottawa Convention.”
- The head of Thailand’s mine action center reiterated in 2005 that all units have been briefed that Claymore mines are to be used only in command-detonated mode. However, no physical modifications have been undertaken to ensure use in command-detonated mode.

- Turkey stated in May 2006 that “the victim activation components of M18 Claymore mines have recently been added to the list of mines to be destroyed and the necessary steps have been taken to stock only command detonated M18 Claymore mines.” It initially declared possessing 18,236 M18 Claymore mines.

Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap. Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand and Sweden have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their Article 7 reports. With regard to the victim-activated components of the OZM-72, Belarus states, “This type of munition is currently revised: all subparts designed for uncontrolled detonation are to be extracted and destroyed.”

Thirty States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have destroyed Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.<sup>37</sup> Albania, Chad, Cyprus, FYR Macedonia and Moldova are the most recent additions to the list of States Parties declaring that they do not possess Claymore-type mines. In May 2006, Moldova stated that it would destroy the 249 OZM-72 and MON series mines it previously retained for training purposes. It noted that “in the immediate future non-conventional training (like antipersonnel mine simulators and other relevant computer programmes) will be used instead...”

The vast majority of States Parties, a total of 91, have not declared whether their forces possess these types of mines. While the majority of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it

cannot be presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.

#### **Reporting on and Destroying Captured or Newly Discovered Stockpiles (Article 4)**

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. Burundi, DR Congo, Cambodia, Sudan and Turkey have provided some official information on such discoveries. Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Kenya, the Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Uganda and Yemen have not so far reported. Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.”

States Parties are largely failing to report these finds or any resulting actions. When States Parties fail to report captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel mines, there is no information on whether or not the mines were placed into a stockpile, retained for training purposes, or destroyed. It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines after the completion of its stockpile destruction program. To guarantee complete information, States Parties should reveal in Article 7 reports the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines.<sup>38</sup>

*It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines after the completion of its stockpile destruction program.*



© Tamar Gabelinick, May 2006

*The stockpile destruction of non-PFM mines is completed at the Defense Ministry range near the town of Borisov, Belarus.*



# Mine Action

© Sediq Rashid Sr./UNMIACA, March 2006



**T**his section reviews the major successes and challenges in the planning, implementation and management of programs around the world that are seeking to address contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war.<sup>39</sup> It is based primarily on an analysis of data amassed by Landmine Monitor in the course of research on 101 mine/ERW-affected countries and areas in 2005 and the first half of 2006. Reports on each of these countries describe, as relevant, the mine and ERW problem, the coordination and management of the mine action program, and progress in demining during the reporting period.<sup>40</sup>

Particular attention is paid to monitoring the progress of States Parties towards meeting their (time-limited) obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Full and timely compliance with this obligation represents the greatest challenge to the integrity of the treaty over the coming five years. The first Article 5 deadlines for States Parties to complete the clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control are less than three years away—yet financial resources are becoming scarcer. Maximizing effectiveness and efficiency, making the best use of available resources, should be the aim of every mine action program.

## Major Achievements of Mine Action Programs

A total of more than 740 square kilometers—an area larger than the entire territory of some countries—was

demined by mine action programs in 2005.<sup>41</sup> This means that more hazardous and suspected hazardous land was freed from contamination in a single year than at any time since the start of modern demining in the late 1980s.<sup>42</sup> This was spearheaded by increased efforts by several mine action programs to achieve more “area reduction” (the identification of land suspected to be contaminated that does not in fact contain either mines or ERW, without resorting to time-consuming and expensive clearance operations). In 2005, just three major mine action programs—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Yemen—reduced the extent of suspected contamination by almost 340 square kilometers. Area reduction in all programs for which figures were available accounted for 55 percent of the total area demined worldwide in 2005.<sup>43</sup>

In terms of actual mine clearance, a total of almost 145 square kilometers of mined areas and 190 square kilometers of battlefields were cleared in 2005; however, these figures are likely to include an element

of area reduction as some do not appear to disaggregate between the different demining techniques. Over 470,000 landmines—of which the overwhelming majority, around 450,000, were antipersonnel mines—and more than 3.75 million explosive devices were removed and destroyed.<sup>44</sup> The table below sets out the achievements of major mine action programs in 2005.

These figures reflect particular successes in a number of programs. Four programs, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yemen, each released more than 100 square kilometers of land during the year.


In **Cambodia**, the area cleared by humanitarian demining agencies in 2005 increased by more than 63 percent from the previous year, mainly as a result of the efforts of the Cambodian Mine Action Center, which doubled the area it cleared. Other operators in Cambodia developed a new strategy to accelerate area reduction, recognizing land previously designated as mine-suspected, but which had been put under cultivation by villagers, as low-risk if no mine

*An Afghan Technical Consultants clearance team performs manual mine clearance in Kunduz, Aliabad, Laqai village, Afghanistan.*

*A total of more than 740 square kilometers—an area larger than the entire territory of some countries—was demined by mine action programs in 2005.*



# Destruction of Antipersonnel Mines in Mined Areas



## Progress in Demining (square kilometers) in 2005 in Major Mine Action Programs<sup>45</sup>

Country or territory	Total area demined	Area reduction	Mine clearance	Battle area clearance
Afghanistan	139.3	1.4	39.7	99.5
Angola	12.44	0.2	12.2	0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina	158	154	4	0
Cambodia	125.6	85	40.6	0
Croatia	27.5	17.5	10	0
Ethiopia	11.3	7	4.3	0
Lao People's Democratic Republic	17	0	0	17
Somaliland	18.6	0	0.3	18.3
Sri Lanka	19.5	9	1.5	9
Yemen	103.3	101.7	1.6	0

incidents/casualties had occurred. The government endorsed this strategy in May 2006 and said it wanted operators to focus efforts on clearing the most densely contaminated land. By the end of 2005, HALO Trust had mapped more than 50 square kilometers of land in productive use that the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) agreed to remove from the database of suspect land. Reform and restructuring in the CMAA in 2005 were also seen by donors as supporting the trend to higher productivity.

Progress by local communities in returning land formerly considered suspect to productive use and the narrow geographic distribution of mine incidents has sharpened debate about how long it will take Cambodia to be free from the impact of mines. HALO Trust believes that priority areas identified by affected communities may be cleared within five years—but only if clearance resources are concentrated in those areas. Furthermore, a study undertaken for the CMAA on explosive remnants of war, which was completed in 2006, projected a sharp decline in mine casualties in future years and emphasized the need to tackle the residual long-term threat from ERW as well as mines.

In **Afghanistan**, the pace of demining also accelerated during 2005: the total area demined increased by more than one-third (compared with 2004) to almost 140 square kilometers, according to the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). Notably, this increase was achieved despite the greater constraints imposed by deteriorating security.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, systematic survey released an impressive 147 square kilometers of suspected hazardous land in 2005, albeit less than the annual target set by the strategic plan (170 square kilometers). Systematic survey is a non-technical general assessment involving comparative analysis of data collected by the mine action center over more than 10 years, the design of polygons (the more precise mapping of the perimeters of mined areas) and the production of precise geographical data on contaminated areas, thereby reducing suspected land.

In **Yemen**, by April 2006, survey and clearance operations had eliminated mines and ERW from 12

out of 14 high-impact communities, 62 out of 86 medium-impact communities and 107 low-impact communities, out of the total 594 identified by the landmine impact survey in 2000 and subsequent surveys. Demining in 2005 released more than 100 square kilometers of land—a record for the country.

**Guatemala** and **Suriname** also reported important achievements in 2005—the completion of clearance of all mined areas containing antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (*see below*). They join the only two States Parties to have previously and unequivocally declared to have met their Article 5 obligations: **Costa Rica** and **Honduras**.<sup>46</sup>

Other notable achievements during 2005 and early 2006 were reported in:

**Abkhazia:** The amount of land cleared and reduced by HALO Trust, more than 2.5 square kilometers, was a record for its program there; during 2005, HALO declared the Gali region and the Gumista river valley near Sokhumi mine impact-free.

**China:** A project to clear landmines from its border with Vietnam was launched in 2005.

**Jordan:** To accelerate mine clearance, the national mine action authority brought in an international demining NGO, Norwegian People's Aid, in October 2005.

**Laos:** The national operator UXO Lao reported a sharp increase in productivity in 2005, demining 15.7 square kilometers of land, 25 percent more than the previous year.

**Libya:** A national program for demining and land reclamation was started in April 2005.

**Peru and Ecuador:** Initiated clearance operations in the Chira river area in April 2006.

**Rwanda:** After several years of inactivity, the demining program was given a kick-start by the training and equipping of 140 deminers in early 2006, and deployment of three technical advisors from an international NGO, Mines Awareness Trust.

*Guatemala and Suriname reported the completion of clearance in all mined areas containing antipersonnel mines.*

Minefield markings are severely damaged after a long winter in Brcko, northern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

© Damir Atikovic/Norwegian People's Aid, 30 March 2006



**South Korea:** Troops started clearance of three minefields in the Civilian Control Zone and seven military bases.

**Sri Lanka:** Operators demined 19.5 square kilometers, more than five times as much as in 2004, as a result of increased area reduction efforts and increased manual and mechanical clearance capacity.

**Taiwan:** A law was enacted in June 2006 with a seven-year deadline for completing clearance of all landmines from Kinmen and Matsu islands.

**Thailand:** The mine action center initiated area reduction in 2005 in a bid to accelerate demining, and the area released (5.9 square kilometers) nearly tripled compared to 2004. Rapid acceleration in clearance of land was also reported in the first quarter of 2006,

mostly through area reduction—4.3 square kilometers was area-reduced in the first three months, almost as much as in the whole of 2005.

**Ukraine:** An interagency working group to prepare a national mine action program was formed in January 2006.

## Major Challenges for Mine Action Programs

Despite the achievements of many mine action programs, major challenges confront all programs. Three of these challenges are: responding effectively to the needs of affected communities; fulfilling the requirements of Article 5; and ensuring national ownership and good governance of the mine action program. These challenges are outlined below.

## Responding Effectively to Community Needs

### Assessing the Mine Problem

Identifying the nature and extent of mine and ERW contamination and its impact on the civilian population is a pre-requisite for an effective national mine action response. If the relevant actors do not agree on this, they are unlikely to adopt coordinated and effective responses. Some states have been more

## The Global Landmine Problem in 2005-2006

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	Asia/Pacific	Europe/Central Asia	Middle East/North Africa
<b>Angola</b>	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>Colombia</b>	<b>Bangladesh</b>	Armenia	Egypt
<b>Chad</b>	Cuba	<b>Cambodia</b>	Azerbaijan	Iran
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>Ecuador</b>	China	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Iraq
<b>Rep. of Congo</b>	<b>Nicaragua</b>	India	<b>Croatia</b>	Israel
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	<b>Peru</b>	Korea, North	<b>Cyprus</b>	<b>Jordan</b>
<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>	Korea, South	<b>Denmark</b>	Kuwait
<b>Ethiopia</b>		Laos	<b>France (Djibouti)</b>	Lebanon
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>		Nepal	<b>FYR Macedonia</b>	Libya
<b>Malawi</b>		Pakistan	Georgia	Morocco
<b>Mauritania</b>		<b>Philippines</b>	<b>Greece</b>	Oman
<b>Mozambique</b>		Sri Lanka	Kyrgyzstan	Syria
<b>Namibia</b>		<b>Thailand</b>	<b>Moldova</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>
<b>Niger</b>		Vietnam	Russia	<b>Yemen</b>
<b>Rwanda</b>		<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	<b>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</b>	<i>Palestine</i>
<b>Senegal</b>		<i>Taiwan</i>	<b>Tajikistan</b>	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Somalia			<b>Turkey</b>	
<b>Sudan</b>			<b>Ukraine</b>	
<b>Swaziland</b>			<b>UK (Falklands)</b>	
<b>Uganda</b>			Uzbekistan	
<b>Zambia</b>			<i>Abkhazia</i>	
<b>Zimbabwe</b>			<i>Chechnya</i>	
<i>Somaliland</i>			<i>Kosovo</i>	

**Bold:** States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.  
*Italics:* Areas not recognized as states by the UN.

adept than others at accurately determining the problem to be addressed.

Landmine Monitor research indicates that 78 states and eight other areas are affected by mined areas. There are an additional 14 states and areas primarily affected by explosive remnants of war; some may also have a residual level of mine contamination.<sup>47</sup>

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to make “every effort” to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines, prior to and in preparation for clearance.<sup>48</sup> This implies that a State Party should carry out an appropriate survey of suspected mined areas. Until recently, the most widely used form of “needs assessment” was the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), as promoted by the Survey Working Group. It appears that the LIS is falling out of favor with some mine action programs.<sup>49</sup> This is due to a number of factors, including accuracy, cost, time and resources used. Many Landmine Impact Surveys have led to excessive estimates of the extent of contaminated land.

In **Mozambique**, for example, the accuracy of the 2001 LIS was questioned from the outset. It produced an estimate of the area affected, 562 square kilometers, that several key operators considered exaggerated. A new estimate of 149 square kilometers was produced by the National Demining Institute, based on the LIS results and taking into account subsequent re-surveys and mine clearance, at the end of 2005. Mine clearance since the LIS accounted for only a small portion of this decrease. The new estimate may still significantly overstate the extent of contamination. Extrapolation from re-surveys by three clearance operators indicated that the actual extent of affected areas is far lower. According to a UN Development Programme (UNDP) official in Mozambique, “given that since 2001, of the 423 square kilometers visited by operators in the 1,047 LIS-identified areas, only 17.5 square kilometers of land needed clearance, it can be assumed, with caution, that the remaining 149 square kilometers which need clearance may turn out to be only six square kilometers.”

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, similarly, official claims based on the 2003 LIS are that the total area potentially contaminated by mines and UXO is about 2,100 square kilometers. However, in November 2005, the deputy director of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center referred to the need to clear only some 400 square kilometers. Confirmation that the contaminated area had been significantly overestimated also came from a study of survey and a UNDP mid-term review, which noted that systematic survey has reduced the size and number of suspected hazardous areas by 50 percent in the Federation entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>50</sup>

In **Angola**, also, a LIS ongoing since 2004 and uncompleted has estimated that there are approximately 2,900 suspected hazardous areas covering some 1,300 to 1,400 square kilometers. However,

according to UNDP, this estimated can be significantly reduced by technical survey and area reduction.

The effectiveness of a LIS may be greatly increased by combining it with existing survey data. In **Afghanistan**, the LIS incorporated survey data that operators had amassed over the years, thereby confirming or discrediting data from the LIS

preliminary opinion collection. This resulted in a significant reduction, from 1,350 to 715 square kilometers, in the estimate of contaminated land. The more focused impact survey also found that Afghanistan’s mine and ERW

contamination is more geographically concentrated than previously thought. All but one of the 32 provinces are mine-affected, but three-quarters of suspected hazardous areas and of recent casualties are in only 12 provinces; half the suspected hazardous areas are in six provinces and nearly half the recent casualties are in three provinces. Survey information such as this has obvious and significant implications for the targeting of demining resources.

However, not every excessive estimate of contamination can be ascribed to an impact survey. **Mauritania**, for example, has previously claimed that one quarter of its territory is mine-suspected, although none of the areas have been mapped. Mauritania expects a forthcoming impact survey, focusing only on communities in the north suspected to be mine-affected, to provide a more realistic estimate of the extent of the problem and specifics of the locations and nature of the mine contamination.

**Kosovo** is an example of initial overestimation of the mine problem and, possibly, later underestimation. Estimates in 2000 of contamination covering 360 square kilometers were reduced greatly, although demining operations accounted for only 41 square kilometers of the reduction from 1999 to the end of 2005. As to the extent of the remaining mine problem, the UN and a major mine action operator continue to disagree forcefully: the UN describes this as “residual” on the level of western European countries, while HALO Trust is convinced that there are many more than the 15 known dangerous areas and 51 suspect areas at the end of 2005.

*Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to make “every effort” to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines, prior to and in preparation for clearance.*



*Landmine Monitor researcher Hafiz Safikhanov conducts a meeting with municipal authorities and community members to update and clarify the AzCBL Mine Survivor Database, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan.*

© Kendrah Jespersen, October 2005





A deminer performs manual mine clearance in Mozambique.

### Village Demining

A second component in efforts to respond effectively to the needs of affected communities is resource allocation, including the targeting of demining resources. So-called “village,” or “spontaneous” demining continues to receive a great deal of attention, especially in southeast Asia. Previously, mine action programs have tended to eschew formal recognition of such initiatives. That is beginning to change. There may be formal recognition of voluntary efforts by villagers to clear mines from land needed for local sustainability, with the provision of some training, equipment and oversight. At a minimum, there is a growing appreciation that such intentional risk-taking is a reasoned and economically-driven response by communities who do not expect that professional deminers will assist them in the near future. This re-emphasizes the need to target resources effectively.

In **Cambodia** in 2005, HALO Trust deployed three survey teams for two months to investigate local land reclamation initiatives in three districts of two provinces. They found that farmers had reclaimed 34.53 square kilometers of land, cleared 3,371 mines and 2,222 pieces of UXO, sustaining only one injury. HALO concluded, “This initiative was equivalent to tens of millions of dollars worth of clearance work by demining operators, and therefore deserves serious attention.”

### Marking and Fencing

One frequently overlooked requirement of Article 5 is that, prior to clearance operations, each affected State Party should ensure, as soon as possible, that mined areas are “perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained there-in have been destroyed.”

Few if any mine-affected States Parties are known to have fulfilled this obligation comprehensively, and few have reported adequately in Article 7 reports on their efforts to meet this treaty obligation. Denmark, France (in respect of its base on Djibouti), and the United Kingdom (Falklands) appear to have taken adequate measures to ensure the exclusion of civilians from mined areas under their jurisdiction or control.

## Fulfilling the Requirements of Article 5

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas within the jurisdiction or control of a State Party as soon as possible, and no later than 10 years from entry of force of the treaty for each State Party.

Landmine Monitor research indicates that at least 29 States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 (24 States Parties) or 2010 (five States Parties) have mined areas containing antipersonnel mines under their jurisdiction or control: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France (a French military base in Djibouti), Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Kingdom (Falkland Islands),<sup>51</sup> Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

States Parties likely to be able to meet their Article 5 deadlines include: Albania, Djibouti, France, Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda and Venezuela. Also, Ecuador and Peru have publicly affirmed their determination to meet their respective deadlines.

## Article 5 Status of Mine-Affected States Parties with 2009-2010 Deadlines<sup>52</sup>

Declared compliance/ completion of clearance	Compliance/completion of clearance uncertain	Indications currently on-track to meet deadline (or clear statements of intent to do so)	Indications not on-track to meet deadline (or no clear statement of intent to do so)
Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras Suriname	Djibouti Namibia Philippines	Albania Ecuador France (Djibouti) Jordan FYR Macedonia Malawi Nicaragua Peru Rwanda Swaziland Tunisia Uganda Venezuela	Bosnia and Herzegovina Cambodia Chad Croatia Denmark Mozambique Niger Senegal Tajikistan Thailand UK(Falkland Islands) Yemen Zimbabwe

However, at least 13 of the 29 States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in 2009/2010 are not currently on course to meet their treaty obligation. Collectively, greater efforts are required to fulfill the commitment made by States Parties at the First Review Conference to “strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3-6 of the Convention.”<sup>53</sup>

### Initiating and Completing Demining Operations As Soon As Possible

Article 5 requires each State to make “every effort” to identify areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and to destroy all the antipersonnel mines in any such areas *as soon as possible*. Thus, immediately upon entry into force of the treaty, Article 5 obligations are formally engaged for any State Party for which it is known, or suspected, that areas under its jurisdiction or control may contain antipersonnel mines.

It appears that not all States Parties have accepted that they have mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines, despite *prima facie* evidence. For example:

**The Philippines** has denied that there are mined areas on its territory, but occasional reports suggest otherwise.

**Bangladesh** has claimed in its Article 7 reports that there are no known or suspected mined areas on its territory. However, there are believed to be mines on its 208-kilometer border with Burma (Myanmar) and in the Chittagong Hill tracts. The Bangladeshi Army, commenting in 2005 on earlier Landmine Monitor findings, said it had also “learned that mines were laid by the Na Sa Ka [Burmese border security forces] but they [the Na Sa Ka] denied the existence of any landmines along the border.” Bangladesh has an Article 5 deadline of March 2011.

**Moldova** reported that it had completed the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas by August 2000. However, people in some communities remain skeptical about the results of past demining operations and still avoid entering certain suspected areas. For example, there are claims by the head of Dubasari district that mines remain in a number of wooded areas that Moldovan deminers did not find. There are also suspicions that other areas, not subject to earlier clearance, are also contaminated. Moldova also has an Article 5 deadline of March 2011.

**Republic of Congo** has not stated unequivocally that it has mined areas. Its Article 7 reports stated that “no mined area has yet been identified” but then indicated the location of a possible mined area, which UN information confirms. Republic of Congo has an Article 5 deadline of November 2011.

There are, in the view of Landmine Monitor, some notable cases where States Parties have accepted that they have obligations under Article 5, but have



Thirty-one-year-old Kam Pring is part of a locality demining team in Cambodia. “I was scared when I first started doing this job but now I am confident...when we have finished here there will be more land available, which means more food for the community.”

not acted “as soon as possible” to plan and conduct a demining program. These States Parties include Denmark, France, Niger, Swaziland, Venezuela and the United Kingdom.

**Denmark’s** deadline for clearance of its mined areas is 1 March 2009. Although its first Article 7 report in August 1999 stated that the mined area on Skallingen peninsula was being mapped and a plan for clearance would be developed, no action was reported until 2005. Significant progress was made in late 2005. Denmark announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties that it had allocated more than \$14.5 million for clearance activities in 2006-2008. However, in a statement on compliance with Article 5 to the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Denmark did not indicate its intention or ability to meet the 2009 deadline.

*There are, in the view of Landmine Monitor, some notable cases where States Parties have accepted that they have obligations under Article 5, but have not acted “as soon as possible” to plan and conduct a demining program.*

**France** has an Article 5 responsibility with respect to antipersonnel mines remaining around its ammunition depot close to the town of La Doudah in Djibouti; its deadline for completion of clearance operations is 1 March 2009. Despite two assessment missions, France had not begun to clear antipersonnel mines as of May 2006, more than seven years after becoming a State Party. France announced that it planned to initiate demining in October 2006, but warned that “administrative constraints” could further delay the process.

**United Kingdom** has an Article 5 responsibility with respect to antipersonnel mines in extensive mined areas on the Falkland Islands; its deadline is 1 March 2009. Since becoming a State Party in 1999, the UK’s progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations is confined to an agreement in October 2001 with Argentina to carry out a feasibility study, and a joint working group which had met eight times as of May 2006. The feasibility study has not been initiated; a plan and timetable for clearance operations have not been formulated. No mine clearance has been initiated. In its statements to Standing Committee meetings and in its Article 7 reports, the

Ibrahim Sultan, a 33-year-old deminer, clears mines near the village of Kafar Tebnit, Lebanon.

Sean Sutton/MAC/September 2005/magclearmines.org



UK has not indicated its intention or capacity to meet the Article 5 deadline.

**Niger** had not initiated clearance operations as of mid-2006. Since presenting a draft mine action plan to Standing Committee meetings in February 2004, Niger has not reported any preparations for clearance operations nor its intention or ability to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 September 2009.

**Swaziland**, similarly, had not initiated clearance operations as of mid-2006. However, in May 2006 it did report to the Standing Committee meetings preparations for clearance operations intended to meet its Article 5 obligation (deadline 1 June 2009).

**Venezuela** has also not yet begun clearing its mined areas. In July 2005, it provided for the first time a timetable for clearance; in May 2006, Venezuela declared that it

would not initiate operations before 2007 due to lack of equipment and training. Its Article 5 deadline is 1 October 2009.

In other cases, States Parties have initiated demining operations but made slow progress, to the extent that completion of operations before the Article 5 deadline appears to be in doubt, or in some cases is questioned by officials.

**Thailand's** Foreign Minister warned the Prime Minister in March 2006 that the progress of demining was slow and as a result, Thailand would not meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2009. Reasons given for the slow progress included that mine action had not been a government priority, inadequate financial support, and the military structure of mine action in Thailand.

#### **Successful Completion of Clearance Operations:**

The goal set by Article 5 for treaty-compliance is the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas. The Mine Ban Treaty does not make provisions for any lesser degree of clearance, such as "mine-safe" or "impact-free" (where, for example, a mined area which is judged to pose no danger and to have no socioeconomic effect may be fenced and marked but not cleared).

**Namibia** is not yet in a position to declare fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations. In December 2005, the Chief

of Mine Action of the Ministry of Defense stated that he will make sure that all suspected areas are visited before declaring the country mine-free. In March 2006, he added that "Namibia does not want to rush to the declaration. It will do so when the time is ripe to do so," meaning after the completion of an ongoing survey.

Similarly, some other States Parties which have completed clearance operations may not yet be in a position to declare with confidence that they have complied with Article 5.

**Djibouti** made several statements about completion of mine clearance and fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations, including declaring itself "mine-safe" (but not "mine-free"). Details of mined areas, survey and clearance operations have not been reported fully in Djibouti's Article 7 reports. There is some evidence that mines may remain in the north and possibly also the south of the country.

The treaty does not specify how a State Party should make known its completion of clearance operations and Article 5 compliance (other than through transparency reporting under Article 7), nor what information States Parties collectively should require in this respect. The ICBL recommends that all States Parties make a formal declaration of full compliance to an annual Meeting of States Parties or to a review conference, so that its compliance can be assessed.

**Suriname's** clearance operation was reported to the Standing Committee meetings in June 2005 by the Organization of American States (OAS). It reported that on 4 April 2005, clearance operations and quality control of the remaining mined area in Suriname were completed: "It is our view that the mine clearance was conducted using appropriate technologies and methodologies and in accordance with accepted International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) such that the results conform to the requirements of Article 5 of the Convention."

The OAS recommended that the government of Suriname "use a declaration format similar to those employed by Costa Rica and Honduras (and under consideration by Guatemala) to communicate compliance with the Convention. That format would declare that all known or suspected mine areas and minefields had been cleared; that the National Plan/Program had been successfully concluded; that a residual national capacity was in place to respond to any unforeseen circumstances related to mine clearance."<sup>54</sup> In November 2005, in a document sent to the Implementation Support Unit for the Mine Ban Treaty, Suriname claimed that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5.

**Guatemala's** Article 7 report for 2005 declared that clearance of all known antipersonnel mines and ERW had been completed, and that no mined areas remained on its territory.<sup>55</sup> Guatemala also made a statement of full compliance to the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006. **Costa Rica** had announced the completion of the mine clearance

program at intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February 2003.

The final report of the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty noted simply that **Honduras** had reported completion of clearance operations, but does not refer to a formal statement of compliance. According to the OAS, clearance operations were completed in October 2004.

Article 5 requires the identification of “known or suspected” mined areas and destruction of all antipersonnel mines within those areas. However, it may be that identification and clearance operations are carried out effectively, but further mined areas or scattered antipersonnel mines are discovered at some future date. In that eventuality, it is consistent with the treaty that those mines are destroyed promptly and details reported fully in the State Party’s next Article 7 annual update report.

In case there are new discoveries of emplaced antipersonnel mines, several States Parties have taken steps to maintain a “residual” clearance capacity. This prudent measure can be recommended to all affected States Parties. In Guatemala, a mobile demining unit was created in December 2005 to respond to reports of residual mines and explosive remnants of war. Similarly, the OAS recommended to Suriname that a residual national capacity be in place to respond to any unforeseen circumstances related to mine clearance.

### Granting Extensions to the Article 5 Deadline

The treaty contains a specific set of conditions and a procedure for the *possible* granting of an extension to the Article 5 deadline for States Parties that are unable to complete clearance within 10 years.

The ICBL supports the appropriate granting of an extension period for a heavily mine-affected State Party following careful consideration of the particular circumstances that have prevented it from completing the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as well as a detailed plan on how it will ensure completion of destruction of antipersonnel mines within a new timeframe.

However, the ICBL calls on States Parties not to accord a blanket extension to any State Party. It is consistent with Article 5 that each extension granted by States Parties should be for the shortest possible time period and should be subject to the requirements for regular reporting by the requesting State Party and the achievement of reasonable milestones within that time period. Moreover, the obligation to complete clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas “as soon as possible” demands that demining planning and operations have been initiated in a timely fashion and carried out expeditiously. A situation in which a State Party has delayed the start of clearance operations until close to the Article 5 deadline, or otherwise has made little progress within the initial 10-year period, does not accord with the provisions of Article 5, which states, “If a State Party believes that it will be *unable*

to...” (emphasis added). The wording of Article 5 does not provide the option of applying for an extension to States Parties that have simply not addressed the clearance obligation in a timely manner.

## National Ownership and Good Governance of Mine Action

The primary responsibility for implementing Article 5 rests with the affected State Party, according to Article 5. In seeking to address mine contamination and comply with the treaty, each affected State Party should assume effective responsibility for the mine action program.

As regards good governance, every mine action program is only as good as its management.

### Funding

Central to national ownership and good governance of mine action is ensuring that adequate resources, national and international, are mobilized by the affected State Party to sustain the mine action program at a reasonable level. Article 6 of the treaty, however, requires other States Parties in a position to do so to support the efforts of each affected State Party. It therefore calls on donors to continue providing sufficient support for the implementation of effective mine action programs.

Several programs were threatened by lack of funding during the reporting period:

- In **Afghanistan**, mine clearance operations ran into severe funding shortfalls in mid-2006, causing UNMACA to announce the lay-off of 1,130 demining personnel in July and to plan to cut 2,800 more jobs in August and September.
- **Croatia** declared in May 2006 that its “likelihood of meeting the 2009 Convention deadline for demining is, indeed, very, very slim.” Parliamentarians called on the government to earmark more funds to the mine action program. Croatia already self-funds some 57 percent of its mine action program.

*The obligation to complete clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas “as soon as possible” demands that demining planning and operations have been initiated in a timely fashion and carried out expeditiously.*



*Mine clearance using dogs in Boeng Sangker village, Cambodia.*

Sean Sutton/MAC/April 2006/magclearmines.org



Chilean, Argentinian and Bolivian defense officials and Landmine Monitor researcher Fabiola Fariña Mellafe near mined areas at the Lullailaco Volcano, Chile, at the commencement of mine clearance operations.

© Fabiola Fariña, 28 February 2006



- In **Guinea-Bissau**, a funding crisis in the mine action program in April 2006 forced one of the two national demining NGOs to cease operations for two months. A shortage of long-term resources threatens the chances of Guinea-Bissau completing its Article 5 requirements within the treaty deadline.
- In **Iraq**, 15 explosive ordnance disposal teams operated by MineTech International under contract to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) were disbanded in mid-2005 when the contract was terminated because of lack of funds.<sup>56</sup>
- In **Mauritania**, mine clearance was suspended for the whole of 2005 due to lack of funds, resuming in 2006.
- In **Tajikistan**, shortfalls in donor support and the non-arrival of pledged funds jeopardized plans to achieve higher productivity in 2006. Tajikistan warned that international assistance “is needed now if we are to meet our obligations to the treaty.”

Greater efforts are needed from many States Parties, both affected and non mine-affected, in order to comply with their obligations under Articles 5 and 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL urges all States Parties with Article 5 obligations to do everything possible to ensure that they meet the treaty deadlines, and urges other States Parties to provide assistance to the best of their abilities.

#### Civilian Control of Mine Action

In seeking to ensure good governance of mine action, some programs believe they will be more productive, transparent and attract more international funding if they are under civilian rather than military management.

- **Lebanon's** National Demining Office initiated a medium-term project in 2005 to formalize the involvement of a broader representation of national and local institutions into planning and coordination of mine action, thereby allowing greater oversight from civilian institutions. This aimed to give “mine action in Lebanon the robust structure and documentation set necessary to fulfill mine action requirements in a transparent and cost-effective manner.”

- In **Mauritania** in 2006, discussions were initiated within the ministries of national defense and economic affairs and development to transfer the National Humanitarian Demining Office to the control of a civilian ministry.
- **Rwanda's** National Demining Office remains under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, despite a 2003 assessment which recommended that it should be headed by a civilian, to attract international donors.
- **Thailand** Mine Action Center proposed to the cabinet in 2005 that it should convert from a military organization to become a civilian organization. A high-level review in January 2006 endorsed this suggestion and requested a formal proposal for a transfer to the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office.

#### Integration into Development

A number of donors believe that integration of mine action into development will help to mobilize resources and maximize the effectiveness of the sector. Examples of efforts, some more and some less successful, to undertake such integration include:

- **Angola** claims to have integrated mine action into its development plan. Mine action is identified as a specific goal in its Strategy to Combat Poverty 2004-2006. One of the Strategy's goals is to “guarantee basic physical security through demining, disarmament and the upholding of law and order throughout the country.”
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina's** Mid-Term Development Strategy 2004-2007 included mine action as a priority sector; however, only a few development sectors included mine action as a priority. Revision in mid-2006 was said to embrace mine action as a priority for more strategic development sectors, and increase access for mine action to financial resources allocated to development programs.
- **Guinea-Bissau's** Public Sector Reform Program was revised in September 2005 and factored into mine action planning; these documents were due to be presented to a donor roundtable at the end of 2006.
- **Iraqi** Kurdistan Mine Action Center reported that as casualties in northern Iraq fall its clearance priorities were changing from purely humanitarian tasks towards projects that support economic growth.
- **Jordan's** National Mine Action Plan 2005-2009, drafted over a 10-month period of consultation with government, civil society, mine-affected communities and the private sector, was said to conform to the goals of the government's Social Economic Transformation Plan and Millennium Development Goals.
- **Mozambique's** second Poverty Reduction Strategy, approved in May 2006 by the Council of Ministers, included mine action both as a crosscutting issue and as a sectoral issue. It was claimed that the incorporation of mine action into the Strategy will

encourage all development projects to include a demining component.

- **Zambia** announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties that it had incorporated mine clearance strategies into its new five-year national development plan 2006-2010. The objective is for development needs to drive humanitarian demining.

### Improving Program Performance

A number of evaluations of mine action projects and programs have been conducted during the reporting period, with the intention of improving the performance of mine action programs.

In **Abkhazia**, the mine action center and the HALO program were evaluated twice in 2005 by representatives from the US Department of State. The evaluations found that, "The program was considered to be efficient, well-run and on course to declare Abkhazia mine-safe during 2007."

In **Azerbaijan**, an evaluation in late 2005 of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was prepared by the World Bank at the request of the Cabinet of Ministers. According to ANAMA, the evaluation found that the organization was "an efficiently structured and well-functioning organization operating in accordance with international standards for demining activities... ANAMA can reasonably be expected to achieve the objectives of the current Mine Action Plan, namely certifying by the end of 2008 that all land in the 'liberated territories' is mine-free, provided the necessary funding is provided during the next three years."

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a mid-term evaluation in June 2006 of the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Program and concluded that, overall, the program has been successful in supporting the emergence of national capacities for planning and coordinating the mine action program.

In **Chad**, a joint UNDP/UNOPS mine action assessment was conducted in June 2005 in order to review UN efforts to develop mine action managerial and technical capacities, to determine the need for

more donor support and how this could be achieved, and to advise how the UN program could be improved. The mission recommended a review of the National Demining Office's human resources to ensure that staff are properly qualified for their positions, and a comprehensive training plan for national staff. The mission stated, "further reorganization, reduction and simplification of structures are required to improve efficiency and rationalize costs."

In **Laos**, two one-year pilot projects undertaken by Norwegian People's Aid were due for completion in June 2006. They attracted attention as providing a basis for improving deminer efficiency and productivity. UXO Lao said the reviews could lead it "to completely modify its approach to its humanitarian mandate." NPA's studies included an "enhanced" technical survey study, intended to improve task assessment and planning, and to set guidelines for area reduction, enabling UXO Lao to achieve greater efficiency and productivity.

In **Mozambique**, the GICHD undertook a comprehensive review of the mine action program. Its main recommendations included the need to better quantify the remaining humanitarian and development challenges (through re-survey and improvements in IMSMA updates and accuracy) and to make stronger links between mine action on the one hand, and development and reconstruction on the other. As of the end of April 2006, IND still had to discuss the review's recommendations made in October 2005 and to plan for their implementation.

In **Sri Lanka**, UNDP commissioned an independent evaluation of its role and operations in 2006.

In **Yemen**, an evaluation of UNDP support to the mine action program in April 2005 was conducted by the GICHD. The report concluded, "significant progress had been achieved in mine action and that the YEMAC [the Yemen Mine Action Center] has an organizational structure capable of addressing all components of a mine action program." It also highlighted several gaps such as the lack of training, lack of munitions destruction facilities and the need to enhance post-clearance community rehabilitation. In March 2006, YEMAC and the GICHD started a socioeconomic and livelihood study to assess the overall socioeconomic returns from mine clearance investment.

*Landmine Monitor has recorded more than 100 casualties among deminers in accidents during clearance operations in 2005.*

*OMAR manual team performs UXO clearance in Herat province, Afghanistan.*

### Ensuring Safety of Deminers

Landmine Monitor has recorded more than 100 casualties among deminers in accidents during clearance operations in 2005. Afghanistan and Cambodia together account for more than half of the total recorded casualties. (Details of deminer casualties are given in the section on *Landmine Casualties*).

Some mine action programs have responded to concerns about HIV/AIDS among deminers. In **Mozambique**, a 10-year review by the GICHD



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reported that high rates of long-term illnesses among demining teams give cause for concern. It found that a significant percentage of the staff of some operators were unable to work because of illnesses often associated with AIDS, citing two operators as having lost eight percent of operational capacity to what were believed to be AIDS-related diseases in 2003. The review concluded that, "there is every reason to fear that deminers serve as a vector of transmission, both to communities in mine-affected areas and to their wives or sexual partners at home."<sup>57</sup> More research needs to be conducted in this area.

## Mine Risk Education

The UN's Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy 2006-2010 declares, "More effective tools to reduce risk have contributed to steadily declining casualty levels." Mine risk education (MRE) is one of the tools to mitigate risk from landmines and explosive remnants of war. MRE is defined as activities that seek to "reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioral change; including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison."

MRE is an integrated component of mine action, needed to provide warnings and advice on safe behavior, but also to mobilize the community to report on dangerous areas and unexploded or abandoned ordnance. MRE can promote the sharing of information between mine action operators and local people. MRE teams are often involved in data collection for mine action, and can help to identify mine survivors and their needs, as well as provide relevant information to survivors. MRE is also a good tool to advocate for a ban on landmines.

A particularly encouraging development in 2005-2006 has been the increased promotion of community-based MRE. As noted by one expert, "Community-based approaches involve local people in the provision of MRE messages to their own communities, an approach that can be cost effective, ensure good coverage, build competencies and create some expectation of sustainability."<sup>58</sup>

In another welcome development, an increasing number of MRE programs have established links with survey, marking and clearance efforts, and worked within the framework of official school curricula. Stand-alone MRE projects are decreasing.

The biggest challenge to MRE providers is intentional risk-taking behavior. The most frequently noted example is collection of mines and explosive remnants of war as lucrative scrap metal, but intentional risk-taking also entails daily livelihood activities such as knowingly entering dangerous areas to collect firewood, to farm, to graze animals or for other economic activities.<sup>59</sup> To address this, MRE operators have developed comprehensive risk reduction approaches involving local stakeholders to identify concrete alternatives to risk-taking behavior. These include incorporating geographically-specific messages into MRE sessions to explain where safe areas are located, constructing safe play-areas for children, and specific projects targeting scrap metal collectors and dealers.

## MRE Programs

Landmine Monitor recorded MRE programs or activities in 60 countries in 2005 and the first half of 2006, one less country than recorded in last year's report.<sup>60</sup> Thirty-nine of the countries are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>61</sup> Twenty-one are not party to the treaty.<sup>62</sup> There were also MRE programs or activities in eight of the nine non-state areas covered by Landmine Monitor.<sup>63</sup>

The total number of direct MRE recipients increased to 6.4 million people in 2005, from 6.25 million in 2004.<sup>64</sup> As in past years, the global total is only an estimate based on many sources providing information to Landmine Monitor. The total of 6.4 million does not include recipients of MRE delivered by mass media, but many could be individuals receiving MRE from multiple sources. Five countries accounted for over four million of the recipients: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Thailand.<sup>65</sup> However, MRE operators stress that the number of people reached with MRE is less important than the quality and impact of MRE.

The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States Parties report on measures taken "to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population" of mined areas. As of June 2006, 23 States Parties had reported on MRE in their 2005 Article 7 reports, considerably less than the 33 noted last year.<sup>66</sup> A number of States Parties that either do have or should have MRE activities did not make use of Form I of the Article 7 reporting format to identify MRE activities (Belarus, Cambodia, Honduras, Latvia, Namibia, Ukraine and Zambia). Some other States Parties that either do or should have MRE activities stated in Form I that the topic is not applicable to them (Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Moldova).

In the view of Landmine Monitor, new or additional MRE programs and activities are most needed

*An increasing number of MRE programs have established links with survey, marking and clearance efforts, and worked within the framework of official school curricula.*

*Local villagers in Nhamatanda, Mozambique receive information booklets and posters as part of a mine risk education session.*



© Handicap International



in Algeria, Burma/Myanmar, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Laos, Mozambique, Pakistan, Turkey and Ukraine.

### New MRE Activities

In 2005 and 2006, new mine risk education projects and activities were recorded in 28 countries, a notable development that builds on the new MRE recorded in 15 countries last year. For the first time, MRE activities were recorded in China; in other countries, there were new MRE providers, significantly expanded activities, and/or new geographic areas covered.

Of the 28 countries, 18 are States Parties (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Liberia, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Zimbabwe) and 10 non-States Parties (Armenia, China, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Vietnam). There were also new MRE activities in Palestine and Western Sahara.

### Adequate MRE Programs

Twenty-three countries and five areas had adequate MRE programs in place in 2005 and the first half of 2006. "Adequate" means that an MRE program or a sizeable project was in place that was capable of providing MRE in terms of need and quality in relation to the actual mine/ERW threat. In countries or areas with a limited mine/ERW problem, a limited MRE program may be adequate as long as the number of casualties remains very low or zero. However, in most of these countries additional MRE capacity would be justified to achieve a more comprehensive provision of services.

Fifteen countries with adequate MRE programs are States Parties, including Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen.

Eight non-States Parties have adequate MRE programs, including Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, South Korea and Sri Lanka. The five areas with adequate MRE programs are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Falkland Islands, Kosovo and Somaliland.

### Inadequate MRE Activities

Landmine Monitor recorded inadequate MRE activities in 37 countries in 2005-2006. "Inadequate" means that the MRE approach taken was too basic, or that MRE was on a too limited scale or did not reach some geographical areas in need.<sup>67</sup> This included 24 States Parties (Albania, Belarus, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and 13 non-States Parties (Armenia, Burma/Myanmar, China, Georgia, India, Israel, Laos, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Somalia, Syria and



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*Students study mine risk education posters outlining the types and appearances of mines in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.*

Vietnam). Inadequate MRE activities were also recorded in Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine and Western Sahara.

### No MRE Activities

In 2005 and 2006, no mine risk education was recorded in 30 countries affected by mines or explosive remnants of war. In some of these countries, an initial mine/ERW assessment has not been undertaken to allow for a proper judgment of whether risk education is needed; in some, formal risk education may not be necessary. Of the 30 countries, 20 are States Parties:

Algeria, Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Greece, Honduras, Kenya, Latvia, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Niger, Panama, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Venezuela. Ten are not States Parties: Cuba, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, North Korea, Oman and Uzbekistan. In addition, no MRE activities were recorded in Taiwan.<sup>68</sup>

### Key Actors

Thousands of community volunteers—including those from Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, children from Child Clubs, and "student-teachers" (child-to-child and child-to-parents approach)—and tens of thousands of teachers in primary and secondary schools are the key actors undertaking MRE within their own communities, including in camps for refugees and internally displaced people.


The staff of national mine action centers and security forces (including army personnel, border guards, police and firefighters) provide warnings to the population; in some countries they have been trained to provide quality MRE as an integral component of the national mine action program.

A total of 121 national NGOs conducted MRE in 30 countries and three areas during the reporting period.<sup>69</sup> National NGOs often work with mobile teams of MRE educators to reach mine-affected communities and to train and monitor community-based volunteers and teachers.

Internationally, the principal MRE operators are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, Handicap International, Mines Advisory

*New mine risk education projects and activities were recorded in 28 countries.*





Mine risk education materials and mine warning signs and markings are prepared in Portuguese for posting in Guinea-Bissau.

*People most at risk from landmines and unexploded ordnance vary by country and region, but in general the majority are male, either adolescents or of working age, and very often rural inhabitants.*

Group, DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, INTERSOS, HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid. Other international NGOs involved in substantial MRE activities include the International Save the Children Alliance (Save the Children Sweden, UK and US), World Vision, AVSI (Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale), World Education, World Rehabilitation Fund, Islamic Relief and Mines Awareness Trust.

International NGOs—predominantly the mine action NGOs listed above—carried out MRE in 25 countries and four areas in 2005-2006.<sup>70</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies conducted MRE programs in about 27 countries.<sup>71</sup> In 2005, ICRC developed a framework for its future preventive mine action operations, seeking to integrate mine action, including MRE, across all appropriate ICRC departments.

Within the UN, UNICEF retains a primary role in the areas of MRE, survivor assistance and advocacy. In 2005 and 2006, UNICEF provided financial and technical support for mine action in 30 countries and two areas. This support was directed predominantly to MRE and advocacy, but also to data collection and survivor assistance.<sup>72</sup> As noted in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, the UN launched a revised inter-agency policy on mine action in 2005, and decisions related to the activities of UNICEF and other UN agencies have been decentralized to UN in-country teams.<sup>73</sup>

The UNDP, UNMAS and OAS help integrate risk education into mine action, and provide regular landmine and ERW safety briefings.<sup>74</sup> Commercial demining companies normally do not engage in MRE or in community liaison, except for RONCO which has taken on MRE in Sudan.

## At-Risk Groups

People most at risk from landmines, unexploded and abandoned ordnance vary by country and region, but in general the majority are male, either adolescents or of working age, and very often rural inhabitants. Returnees, both refugees and internally displaced people, are also at great risk, especially those who are unfamiliar with the local threat (as seen in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere). Casualty data show that children are more at risk from UXO than adults, while adults are more likely to fall victim to landmines. Nomads and semi-nomads are a specific at-risk group in various countries.

In Afghanistan, males are particularly at risk. In Albania, mine incidents are decreasing but casualties due to explosive remnants of war are on the rise. In Croatia, hunters continue to be particularly at risk; they were targeted with specific MRE activities in a joint effort by the Croatian Red Cross and the Croatian Hunting Association.

In Lebanon, the major at-risk groups are males and those older than 20 years (72 percent of casualties were aged 21 to 50 years). In Nepal, unexploded IEDs are the most common cause of incidents; children represented 56 percent of total civilian casualties in 2005. In Sri Lanka, risk is affected by seasonality. Risk is greatest in September when the cycle of planting and harvesting begins, and a mine action week is organized prior to the harvest season. In Yemen, women and children are most vulnerable while doing their daily chores (herding, collecting wood and fetching water), even if they are aware of the risks.

## MRE in Areas of Conflict

In a number of places where humanitarian clearance cannot be undertaken, due to ongoing conflict or other reasons, MRE is still carried out and is often instrumental in reducing casualties. In 2005 and 2006, emergency MRE was undertaken in Chad, Sri Lanka and Guinea-Bissau/Senegal after renewed fighting that at times involved the use of landmines.

In Iraq, including the central area, local staff continued to provide MRE, reaching at least 85,000 people in 2005. There were ongoing MRE activities in Burma, Chechnya, Colombia and Nepal despite continued conflict, albeit with great limitations in each case. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, MRE was integrated with HIV/AIDS awareness in conflict zones in Northern Katanga and South Kivu. In Tajikistan, MRE remains the only viable option to mitigate risk from landmines in the contaminated areas bordering Uzbek enclaves, pending negotiations with Uzbekistan that may permit clearance.

## Integration of MRE with Other Mine Action Activities

Continuing a positive trend of recent years, MRE was increasingly integrated into other forms of mine action and broader disciplines in 2005-2006, in many countries. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on MRE state that “projects and programmes should be integrated... with other mine action, relief and development activities.” Community liaison teams are a key instrument to promote improved integration. However,

Abdulla Ali holds up an MRE poster during a mine risk education presentation in Hamack Village, in the mine-affected governorate of al-Dale, Yemen.



one expert has pointed out that they have seldom been used to liaise with development activities.<sup>75</sup>

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, MRE is an integral component of the Community Impact Mine Action Plans guiding the country's overall mine action strategy. Some MRE operators assist in erecting mine warning signs. In South Lebanon, community liaison has helped ensure that clearance proceeds smoothly and given landowners confidence to use cleared land; more generally it has helped build trust among communities. In Somaliland, demining operators provide MRE, and community liaison personnel have convinced locals to hand in mines stored at home.

In Sri Lanka, clearance teams reported that the community liaison role of the MRE teams has helped them to function more effectively. MRE organizations are the main source of information on new dangerous areas and isolated UXO. For instance, in the LTTE-controlled areas of Vanni and Jaffna, local MRE NGOs provided 86 percent of the 158 dangerous areas reports sent to the district mine action office in Jaffna in 2005.

## Community-based MRE

Community-based approaches involve local people in the provision of MRE messages to their own communities. Most often, professional MRE operators identify and train local volunteers, and at times provide incentives or compensation for expenditures. Twenty-two countries and four areas implemented some type of community-based MRE during the reporting period.<sup>76</sup> School-based MRE is not included in this number as teachers usually receive a salary, but it can be considered a subset of community-based MRE as most teachers are members of the community. There are two serious challenges to the community-based approach: keeping volunteers motivated over a long period of time, particularly if the mine risk is fairly low, and ensuring the quality and consistency of messages.

In Afghanistan, ICRC and the Afghan Red Cross Society have identified and trained more than 100 community volunteers from villages in 10 provinces to conduct MRE. In Angola, 318 MRE community committees or community networks (typically 12 community leaders and volunteers each) have been formed. They provide MRE to newcomers and returnees, share information about dangerous areas and incidents, link with mine action operators and local governmental and NGO bodies, and support mine survivors. In Azerbaijan, 59 MRE committees with 512 members have been established. The committees are tasked with determining at-risk groups in their localities and providing MRE.

In Cambodia, volunteers in 422 community-based mine risk reduction networks use participatory techniques to identify how mines and UXO affect villages, and then use this information as a basis for prioritizing clearance plans and requests for development resources. In Kosovo, the local Red Cross Society held regular meetings with MRE volunteers to gather



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*Mine risk education session for bus drivers in Kabul, Afghanistan.*

information about areas affected by mines and UXO. It had seven field offices covering 26 of the 30 municipalities, and 60 to 65 volunteers who served as a link between communities and the field offices.

In Kyrgyzstan, local NGOs, community leaders, civil society actors and teachers were targeted for training of trainers workshops. The trainings included 39 staff members from 26 NGOs and 13 community/village leaders from affected villages. In Sri Lanka, to reach out-of-school children, UNICEF established some 130 children's clubs with an average of 60 members in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts in 2004 and 2005. In 2005, 2,605 community liaison MRE activities were conducted in support of mine action.

*Community-based approaches involve local people in the provision of MRE messages to their own communities.*

## Evaluations and Learning

In 2005-2006, evaluations, Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) surveys and learning opportunities on aspects of the mine or UXO problem were recorded in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Laos, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan and Uganda.

The IMAS MRE Best Practice Guidebooks, prepared by the UN and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, were released in November 2005. These draw on best practices from MRE programs globally to identify a series of possible indicators of impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The 10 guidebooks cover the following topics: an introduction to MRE; data collection and needs assessment; planning; public information dissemination; education and training; community mine action liaison; monitoring; evaluation; emergency mine risk education; and coordination.

In March 2006, the Mine Action Program Afghanistan published a comprehensive MRE impact monitoring study, presenting and analyzing two surveys undertaken in 2004-2005. The surveys showed that the MRE knowledge level among boys and young men was higher than among women and girls, yet the large majority of mine/UXO incidents involve boys and young men, demonstrating that MRE as a stand-alone activity is not sufficient to

After an accident involving an antitank mine in Kejo Keji, Sudan, MAG staff provided mine risk education to the local population.



Sean Sutton/MAC/June 2005/magclearmines.org

change dangerous behavior: “Economic necessity leads to this *subconscious* ignoring of danger.”

In Albania, a study showed that the country faces a serious problem from explosive remnants of war that has not been addressed by its mine action program, which is focused on the mine-affected

Kukës region while ignoring other areas suffering from ERW. Countries that recently started developing a new MRE strategy like Jordan are

taking this ERW factor into account.

In Angola, Handicap International undertook an external evaluation of its MRE project in Huambo in 2005. Some of the main findings were that volunteers need close monitoring, supervision and refresher training to stay motivated, and that unless MRE was seen as a long-term requirement, other approaches may be more suitable and less time-consuming than

a community-based approach. Training for agents in participatory methods was recommended.<sup>77</sup>

In Laos, UNICEF and GICHD published a study on the impact of the scrap metal economy on children, in response to an increase in the number of reported casualties. They concluded that lucrative prices on the scrap metal market make it difficult to identify alternative income sources; safety messages could be improved; and, greater emphasis should be placed on supporting communities to manage these risks for themselves.<sup>78</sup> UNICEF and GICHD also released an evaluation of UNICEF’s UXO risk education projects in Laos.<sup>79</sup>

In Cambodia, a study published in December 2005 summarized the strengths and weaknesses of community-based approaches. It concluded that “mine action and development agencies have their own mandate and agenda and are not always responsive to community generated requests for assistance.” It said that the Mines Advisory Group’s approach improved understanding between mine action teams and local populations, but noted that community liaison could be “a relatively transitory approach which does not last beyond the demining operations; can be time consuming... [and] is a consultation process rather than a process to build local competencies.” The Cambodian Mine Action Center’s approach was low cost, allowed large areas to be covered, developed local competencies and promoted local decision making; however, it constituted little more than basic information gathering and basic community liaison, and required intensive training of district focal points.<sup>80</sup>

*Lucrative prices on the scrap metal market make it difficult to identify alternative income sources.*

# Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

*“Mine survivors are not a problem to be solved. They are individuals with hopes and dreams like all of us. They are assets with the capacity to be productive contributors to the social and economic development of their communities. The challenge is to provide the environment and opportunities that will enable mine survivors and other people with disabilities to reach their full potential to contribute to their communities and realize their dreams.”<sup>81</sup>*

## New Casualties in 2005-2006

In 2005, Landmine Monitor identified new casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war in 58 countries, the same number as in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*.<sup>82</sup> Landmine Monitor also registered mine/ERW casualties in seven of the nine non-state areas it covers, one less than reported last year.<sup>83</sup> Between January and June 2006, casualties were recorded in 48 countries and six areas.

Compared to last year’s *Landmine Monitor Report*, there are seven new countries with reported casualties: Chile, Honduras, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia and Peru. There are also seven countries dropped from last year’s list because there have been no reported mine/ERW casualties since the end of 2004 in Belarus, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Zambia.

Landmine Monitor has identified another 16 countries and one area with no new landmine casualties in 2005-2006, but with casualties (130 total) caused exclusively by unexploded ordnance: Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Republic of Congo, Tunisia, Ukraine and Zambia, as well as Kosovo. In 11 of these, Landmine Monitor did not record casualties in 2004.

In 2005-2006, mine/ERW casualties were still occurring in every region of the world: in 17 countries and one area in sub-Saharan Africa, in 13 countries and one area in the Asia-Pacific region, in 12 countries and three areas in Europe and Central Asia, in 10 countries and two areas in the Middle East and North Africa, and in six countries in the Americas. Landmine Monitor found that 36 of the 65 countries and areas that suffered new mine casualties in 2005-2006



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had not experienced any armed conflict during the research period. For all of the seven countries added to the casualty list in 2005-2006, the reason for inclusion was new casualties from previous conflicts, rather than the onset of a new conflict. However, expanded conflict in a number of countries accounted for most of the global increase in casualties in 2005, as explained below.

## Increased Casualties in 2005

Landmines continue to pose a significant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat. Landmine Monitor identified at least 7,328 new landmine/ERW casualties in calendar year 2005—721 (11 percent) more than in 2004 (6,607).<sup>84</sup> It is important to remember, however, that the 7,328 figure represents only the *reported* casualties and does not take into account the many casualties that are believed to go unreported.<sup>85</sup> In many countries, civilians are killed or injured in remote areas away from any form of assistance or means of communication; in some countries, casualties are not reported for military or political reasons. While acknowledging that it is not possible to know with absolute certainty,

*UXO survivor Adel Farag from Marsa Matrouh town lost his right arm and badly damaged his eyesight when he found a piece of ordnance near his home. Injured at 12-years-old, Adel did not complete school and is illiterate.*

*Landmine Monitor continues to estimate that there are between 15,000–20,000 new landmine/ERW casualties each year.*



## New Landmine and [ERW] Casualties January 2005–June 2006

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	Asia/Pacific	Europe/Central Asia	Middle East/North Africa
<b>Angola</b>	<b>Colombia</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>CHILE</b>	Burma (Myanmar)	Armenia	Egypt
<b>Chad</b>	<b>El Salvador</b>	<b>Cambodia</b>	Azerbaijan	Iran
<b>DR Congo</b>	<b>HONDURAS</b>	China	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Iraq
<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Nicaragua</b>	India	<b>Croatia</b>	Jordan
<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>PERU</b>	Korea, South	Georgia	Kuwait
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	<b>[Bolivia]</b>	Laos	<b>Greece</b>	Lebanon
<b>KENYA</b>	<b>[Guatemala]</b>	Nepal	<b>MOLDOVA</b>	MOROCCO
<b>Mauritania</b>		Pakistan	Russian Federation	Syria
<b>Mozambique</b>		<b>Philippines</b>	<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
<b>Rwanda</b>		Sri Lanka	<b>Tajikistan</b>	<i>Palestine</i>
<b>Senegal</b>		<b>Thailand</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Somalia		Vietnam	<i>Abkhazia</i>	<b>[Tunisia]</b>
<b>Sudan</b>		<i>Taiwan</i>	<i>Chechnya</i>	
<b>Uganda</b>		<b>[Bangladesh]</b>	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	
<b>Zimbabwe</b>		<b>[Mongolia]</b>	<b>[Belarus]</b>	
<i>Somaliland</i>			<b>[Hungary]</b>	
<b>[Côte d'Ivoire]</b>			<b>[Kyrgyzstan]</b>	
<b>[Congo, Rep.]</b>			<b>[Latvia]</b>	
<b>[Liberia]</b>			<b>[FYR Macedonia]</b>	
<b>[Zambia]</b>			<b>[Poland]</b>	
			<b>[Ukraine]</b>	
			<b>[Kosovo]</b>	

**Bold:** States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty

*Italic:* Areas not internationally recognized as independent states

CAPITALS: new in 2005

Landmine Monitor continues to estimate that there are between 15,000 and 20,000 new landmine/ERW casualties each year.<sup>86</sup>

The vast majority (81 percent) of new landmine casualties in 2005 were civilians, as in past years. The 2005 total included at least 1,518 children (21 percent) and 347 women (5 percent).<sup>87</sup> Nineteen percent of the reported casualties were identified as military personnel (1,404), a decrease from 25 percent (1,650) in 2004.<sup>88</sup>

The number of reported new mine/ERW casualties has dropped significantly in some heavily affected countries (notably Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina), but continued to rise in some others (notably Colombia, Mozambique and Pakistan). The number of casualties remained fairly steady in most countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia and Laos.

The global increase in casualties in 2005 was largely due to expanded conflict in a number of countries. In eight countries and one area experiencing conflict (Burma/Myanmar, Colombia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey; and Palestine) there was a combined increase in casualties totaling more than 950. Economic pressures and population movements contributed to increased casualties in coun-

tries like Lebanon, Mozambique, Syria and Uganda. In some cases, the higher number of reported casualties at least partly reflects better sources of information or improved media analysis (for example, in Algeria, Morocco, Nepal, Philippines and Russia). In a few cases, a single incident created a large increase in casualties, as in Eritrea and Yemen.

Of the total recorded casualties, 39 percent (2,833) occurred in just three countries: Afghanistan, Cambodia and Colombia. Most (58 percent) of the recorded casualties occurred in 37 States Parties, and 42 percent occurred in 28 non-States Parties or areas not recognized by the UN. Of the casualties in States Parties, 87 percent were recorded in the 24 countries identified as having significant numbers of mine survivors (the "VA 24"). Analysis of the data shows that far less is known about casualties in non-States Parties.

In 2005, the most reported casualties occurred in Colombia - 1,110 (up from 882 in 2004), Cambodia - 875 (down from 898 in 2004), Afghanistan - 848 (down from 857 in 2004), Iraq - 363 (up from 261 in 2004) and Palestine - 363 (up from 187 in 2004).

In 2005, notable increases in casualties occurred in Colombia - up 228 to 1,110, Palestine - up 176 to 363, Somalia - up 174 to 276, Iraq - up 102 to 363, and Burma - up 99 to 231.<sup>89</sup>

In 2005, notable decreases in casualties were reported in Vietnam - down 126 to 112, Chechnya -

*Of the total recorded casualties, 39 percent occurred in just three countries:*

*Afghanistan, Cambodia and Colombia.*

## Global Human Impact of Mines/ERW in 2005

	Casualty Total	Killed	Injured	Unknown Status	Male	Female	Child	Deminer	Military	Unknown Casualty
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,328</b>	1,743	5,348	237	1,494	347	1,518	115	1,404	2,450
% of Total		24%	73%	3%	20%	5%	21%	2%	19%	33%
<b>States Parties</b>	<b>4,238</b>	991	3,220	27	995	254	1,073	90	1,077	749
% of Total	<b>58%</b>	57%	60%	11%	66%	73%	71%	78%	77%	31%
<b>VA 24</b>	<b>3,664</b>	782	2,869	13	951	241	1,012	83	802	575
% of Total	<b>50%</b>	45%	54%	5%	64%	69%	66%	72%	57%	23%
<b>Non-States Parties</b>	<b>3,090</b>	752	2,128	210	499	93	445	25	327	1,701
% of Total	<b>42%</b>	43%	40%	89%	34%	27%	29%	22%	23%	69%

down 70 to 24 (as recorded by UNICEF), Bosnia and Herzegovina - down 24 to 19, Albania - down 23 to 23 and Sri Lanka - down 18 to 38.<sup>90</sup> It also appears there was a significant reduction in casualties in Angola, but full-year data for 2005 was not available by mid-2006.

In 2005-2006, an increasing number of countries have seen intensified conflict resulting in both more civilian and more military (national and foreign) mine and ERW casualties. In Chad, there were 54 casualties from January to May 2006, compared to 35 in 2005 and 32 in 2004. In Colombia, there has been a constant increase in casualties, with 526 in the first five months of 2006, 1,110 in 2005, 882 in 2004, 734 in 2003 and 627 in 2002. In Pakistan, in the first five months of 2006 at least 344 mine/ERW casualties were reported in the media, compared to 214 in all of 2005.

Not only mine-affected countries have a problem with landmines. In 2005-2006, mine/ERW casualties also included nationals from 31 countries and one area (including nine mine-free countries) who were killed or injured while abroad engaged in military conflict, demining operations, peacekeeping or other activities. The mine-free countries were France, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. The others were Armenia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, as well as Palestine.

In 2005 and January-June 2006, mine accidents during clearance operations or in training exercises caused casualties in at least 29 countries and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Vietnam and Yemen.

Improvised explosive devices are an increasing problem in many countries. Most IED incidents Landmine Monitor identified in 2005 and 2006 involved command-detonated or vehicle-borne devices, and were therefore not included in Landmine

Monitor's casualty totals. Command-detonated devices were used extensively in Afghanistan, Iraq and India. But in some cases, IEDs exploded upon direct contact with a person, acting as *de facto* antipersonnel mines, and those casualties were included. However, identification of the type of IED (command-detonated or victim-activated) is often difficult, particularly when using media reports, which usually do not give enough detail on the circumstances of the explosion or accurate terminology for types of devices. In Algeria, victim-activated IEDs caused 46 of 51 casualties in 2005, the others being caused by antipersonnel mines and ERW. In Nepal, UNICEF found that from January-May 2006, 90 percent of civilian casualties were caused by IEDs, the majority of which were victim-activated.

An increasing number of casualties were attributed to people (mainly men and boys) engaging in the increasing scrap metal trade in many countries. In Vietnam, an impact survey in three provinces indicated that scrap metal collection, "bomb hunting," and tampering accounted for at least 62 percent of casualties from 2001 to 2005. In Jordan, eight of nine casualties recorded through 18 April 2006 were from trading scrap metal. In Azerbaijan, an explosion in a metal workshop processing ordnance from former Soviet munition stores in Aghstafa killed three people and injured 23. On a positive note, in Cambodia stricter policing decreased the number of dealers selling hazardous material, resulting in fewer casualties in the first five months of 2006.

### An Increasing Number of Survivors Globally

The number of new casualties each year is only a small indicator of the landmine problem, as the total number of landmine survivors having a right to assistance continues to increase. The exact number of mine survivors globally is unknown. Landmine Monitor has identified more than 264,000 mine survivors, the vast majority injured from the mid-

*In 2005-2006, an increasing number of countries have seen intensified conflict resulting in both more civilian and more military (national and foreign) mine and ERW casualties.*



Marcelina, a young mine survivor living in Angola.

1970s onwards. However, this figure of recorded survivors is only a starting point. It is reasonable to assume that, despite the increasing retroactive recording of survivors, a significant number of survivors have never been reported. Also, the number of recorded survivors does not include the many estimates of survivors in various countries. It does not include the new and more accurate estimate for the number of survivors in Afghanistan, of between 52,000 and 60,000, or the preliminary results of the disability database in Eritrea indicating that there are 84,000 known landmine survivors. Nor does it include longstanding estimates of 70,000 mine survivors in Angola, 30,000 in Mozambique, and 80,000 in Ukraine. While acknowledging that some country estimates may not be reliable, and that it is impossible to ascertain how many survivors are still living, a conservative estimate of survivors in the world today would be approximately 350,000 to 400,000, but could be well over 500,000.

*A conservative estimate of survivors in the world today would be approximately 350,000 to 400,000, but could be well over 500,000.*

Many countries with no new reported landmine casualties nevertheless have landmine survivors who continue to require assistance. Landmine Monitor has identified 122 countries with mine/ERW survivors, including 19 non-affected countries with nationals injured abroad in mine incidents and demining accidents. This means that almost two-thirds of the countries in the world are directly affected to some extent by the landmine/ERW problem and the issue of survivors.

## Capacities and Challenges in Collecting Data

At the First Review Conference in November-December 2004, States Parties acknowledged “the value and necessity of accurate and up-to-date data on the number of new landmine casualties, the total number of survivors and their specific needs, and the extent/lack of and quality of services that exist to address their needs...”<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, comprehensive data on landmine/UXO casualties continues to be difficult to obtain, particularly in countries experiencing ongoing conflict, with minefields in remote areas, or with limited resources to monitor public health services. The sources used to identify new casualties include databases, government records, hospital records, media reports, surveys, assessments and interviews. The principal collectors of mine casualty data are mine action centers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Crescent and Red Cross societies, UNICEF, and some NGOs.

A number of mine-affected countries collect and store mine incident and casualty data using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or other databases. Often a lack of human and financial resources prevents prospective, proactive data collection and full operational use of data-

bases.<sup>92</sup> IMSMA was primarily set up for humanitarian mine action purposes, making it less suitable for casualty data and survivor assistance planning. Additionally, many actors have indicated that other systems are more easily adaptable to local contexts, more user-friendly and can contain more relevant survivor assistance information for planning purposes.<sup>93</sup> Landmine impact surveys also give an indication of casualties in communities identified as mine-affected, but this does not indicate the number of mine survivors living outside these surveyed places, or nomadic or displaced populations. Even so, survivor assistance planners have told Landmine Monitor that LIS results have not been used to their full extent for planning purposes.

Of the 58 countries and seven areas reporting new mine casualties in 2005-2006, 40 countries and five areas reported using IMSMA or other comparable databases to record casualty data.<sup>94</sup> Of those, only nine countries and one area were able to provide Landmine Monitor with complete full year data, collected in all mine-affected regions. Even in countries with a functioning data collection system, it is likely that not all mine casualties are reported.

In some countries, significant decreases in reported new casualties would appear to be the result of a decrease in capacity to undertake comprehensive data collection, such as in Angola, Burundi and Rwanda. In other cases, conflicts (as in Burma and Iraq), instability and insecurity (as in Sudan), or political reasons (as in Colombia) impede data collection and information sharing.

In other mine-affected countries, there is no formal data collection mechanism. Only limited data on landmine/UXO casualties is collected from government ministries and agencies, international agencies, NGOs, hospitals, media reports, surveys, and country campaigns of the ICBL. In many countries, there is a strong likelihood not only of significant underreporting, but also of inaccurate or duplicated data.

In 2005-2006, many countries made progress in the area of retrospective data collection by consolidating data sets, unifying separate data collection systems, reviewing existing records and revisiting survivors. In other countries, data collection was expanded to cover areas previously not monitored, or to include better statistics on less recent casualties. Additionally, many governments, NGOs, and other experts have identified better distribution of information and better integration into larger injury surveillance mechanisms as a priority area to improve; some countries tried to include more relevant survivor assistance information to enhance data for survivor assistance program planning purposes.

**Albania:** In 2005, incident and needs assessment reports were compiled for previously unknown casualties in the “hotspots” from the 1997 uprising in order to improve planning. Survivor assistance planning and identification of beneficiaries are based on

analysis of continuous data collection, including detailed information on the needs and status of beneficiaries. Socioeconomic reintegration projects are registered in IMSMA to measure progress and make comparisons with original impact surveys possible.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** In 2006, full control of an integrated mine/UXO casualty database was passed to the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMACH) in an effort to avoid overlap. All survivors in the database will be visited and BHMACH will provide periodic updates to partners for better planning and coordination of survivor assistance and other mine action programs.

**Cambodia:** In the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, a subgroup of data collection and victim assistance actors was formed in December 2005 to address the lack of information on survivors' progress through rehabilitation and other services.

**Eritrea:** The National Survey of People with Disabilities was completed in 2005, establishing the first national database for people with disabilities, including mine survivors; the database has detailed psychological and social indicators.

**Ethiopia:** In 2005-2006, casualty data was not collected because of a lack of political will, coordination, a clearly defined mandate and division of tasks between the federal and local level; implementing partners do not have free access to information in IMSMA.

**Pakistan:** A mine/UXO database with results from a household survey in Kurram Agency has been set up to facilitate interventions in the future.

### Collecting Information on Beneficiaries

Collecting and sharing accurate information on the number of people assisted, and the people on waiting lists in relation to the total number of mine survivors and other people with disabilities, is crucial for planning purposes. Many facilities have been asked to report on how many people were assisted in the previous year, and how many were landmine survivors. Landmine Monitor was not always able to get this information and some facilities do not keep records on the cause of injury, as all people with disabilities are treated equally. Some facilities reported not having the capacity to record any form of data. In many cases, data is not collected in a systematic or centralized way so that it can be verified, aggregated and effectively analyzed for planning purposes. Some organizations do not count the number of beneficiaries, but count the number of sessions provided; others do not record the number of new patients, or do not include sufficient patient information to give an indication of the reach of the program, changes in patient profile, or changes in the scope of the problem. Improved information sharing would also reduce duplication of services and gaps in existing services, and improve referral systems. Nevertheless, while acknowledging that the data is



US Army Sgt. Joey Bozick stretches out in the physical therapy room with the help of his wife at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC. Bozick lost two legs and one arm in a landmine incident in Iraq.

far from complete, it does give an indication of where additional attention may be needed.

## Addressing the Needs of Survivors

While there has been progress, existing programs are far from meeting the needs of landmine survivors. Survivors continue to face many of the same problems as in previous years. Survivors and other people with disabilities are still among the most impoverished groups in every society and often do not have access to some of the most basic needs: food security, clean water, adequate housing, a means to earn an income, affordable healthcare, rehabilitation, education or transportation services, let alone counseling services and equal rights. Additionally, many local and international NGOs report that a lack of funding, especially long-term funding, is limiting their operations and the sustainability of their programs.

The Mine Ban Treaty requires, in Article 6, Paragraph 3, that "Each State in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reinte-

gration, of mine victims...." Many mine survivors are benefiting from the increased attention given to the issue of victim assistance by States Parties and others. States Parties have agreed to promote a comprehensive integrated approach to victim assistance that rests on a three-tiered definition of a landmine victim. This means that a "mine victim" includes directly affected individuals, their families, and mine-affected communities. Consequently, victim assistance is viewed as a wide range of activities that benefit individuals, families and communities.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, States Parties have recognized that mine survivors are part of a larger community of people with injuries and disabilities, and that victim assistance efforts should not exclude this larger group because "the impetus provided by the Convention enhanced the well-being of not only landmine victims but also all other people with war-related

*Survivors and other people with disabilities are still among the most impoverished groups in every society and often do not have access to have some of the most basic needs.*



## Progress in Casualty and Survivor Assistance in 2005<sup>95</sup>

	2005	2004	Variance	Complete Data Collection	Data Management System	Adequate Assistance	Disability Law	Form J
<b>Total</b>	<b>7328</b>	<b>6305</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Total ERW</b>	<b>119</b>							
<b>VA-24</b>	<b>3,664</b>	<b>3,645</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>
Afghanistan	848	857	- 9	.	.	.	.	.
Albania	23	46	- 23	.	.	.	.	.
Angola	96	191	- 95	.	.	.	.	.
Bosnia & Herzegovina	19	43	- 24	.	.	.	.	.
Burundi	162	320	- 158	.	.	.	.	.
Cambodia	875	898	- 23	.	.	.	.	.
Chad	35	32	+ 3	.	.	.	.	.
Colombia	1,110	882	+228	.	.	.	.	.
Croatia	20	16	+ 4	.	.	.	.	.
DR Congo	45	56	- 11	.	.	.	.	.
El Salvador	4	0	+ 4	.	.	.	.	.
Eritrea	68	30	+ 38	.	.	.	.	.
Ethiopia	33	27	+ 6	.	.	.	.	.
Guinea-Bissau	16	30	- 14	.	.	.	.	.
Mozambique	57	30	+ 27	.	.	.	.	.
Nicaragua	15	7	+ 8	.	.	.	.	.
Peru	9	0	+9	.	.	.	.	.
Senegal	10	17	- 7	.	.	.	.	.
Serbia & Montenegro	2	2	0	.	.	.	.	.
Sudan	79	71	+ 8	.	.	.	.	.
Tajikistan	20	14	+ 6	.	.	.	.	.
Thailand	43	28	+ 15	.	.	.	.	.
Uganda	40	31	+ 9	.	.	.	.	.
Yemen	35	17	+ 18	.	.	.	.	.
<b>Other States Parties</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>303</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>
Algeria	51	9	+ 42	.	.	.	.	.
Chile	8	4	+ 4	.	.	.	.	.
Greece	8	24	- 16	.	.	.	.	.
Honduras	1	0	+ 1	.	.	.	.	.
Jordan	5	27	- 22	.	.	.	.	.
Kenya	16	0	+ 16	.	.	.	.	.
Mauritania	5	5	0	.	.	.	.	.
Moldova	14	0	+ 14	.	.	.	.	.
Namibia	12	3	+ 9	.	.	.	.	.
Philippines	145	47	+ 98	.	.	.	.	.
Rwanda	14	12	+ 2	.	.	.	.	.
Turkey	220	168	+ 52	.	.	.	.	.
Zimbabwe	14	4	+ 10	.	.	.	.	.
<b>Non-States Parties</b>	<b>2,514</b>	<b>1,875</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Armenia	5	15	- 10	.	.	.	.	.
Azerbaijan	59	32	+ 27	.	.	.	.	.
Burma	231	132	+ 99	.	.	.	.	.
China	1	4	- 3	.	.	.	.	.
Egypt	16	10	+ 6	.	.	.	.	.
Georgia	16	53	- 37	.	.	.	.	.
India	336	295	+ 41	.	.	.	.	.
Iran	109	109	0	.	.	.	.	.
Iraq	363	261	+ 102	.	.	.	.	.
Korea, South	10	3	+ 7	.	.	.	.	.
Kuwait	8	20	- 12	.	.	.	.	.
Laos	174	194	- 20	.	.	.	.	.
Lebanon	22	14	+ 8	.	.	.	.	.
Morocco	9	1	+ 8	.	.	.	.	.
Nepal	199	132	+ 67	.	.	.	.	.
Pakistan	214	195	+ 19	.	.	.	.	.
Russia	305	6	+ 299	.	.	.	.	.
Somalia	276	102	+ 174	.	.	.	.	.
Sri Lanka	38	56	- 18	.	.	.	.	.
Syria	11	3	+ 8	.	.	.	.	.
Vietnam	112	238	- 126	.	.	.	.	.
<b>Areas</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>384</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Abkhazia	15	6	+ 9	.	.	.	.	.
Chechnya	24	94	-70	.	.	.	.	.
Nagorno-Karabakh	18	34	- 16	.	.	.	.	.
Palestine	363	187	+ 176	.	.	.	.	.
Somaliland	93	63	+ 30	.	.	.	.	.
Taiwan	3	0	+ 3	.	.	.	.	.
Western Sahara	2	0	+ 2	.	.	.	.	.

injuries and people with disabilities.”<sup>97</sup> States Parties have also recognized that assistance to mine survivors must be considered in the broader context of development and underdevelopment. They have agreed that mine victim assistance should be integrated into poverty reduction strategies and long-term development plans to ensure sustainability and to avoid unnecessary segregation of survivors.

## Capacities and Challenges in Providing Assistance

Landmine Monitor has found that in at least 49 of the 58 countries with new mine casualties in 2005-2006, and in six areas, one or more aspects of survivor assistance are reportedly inadequate to meet the needs of mine survivors and other people with disabilities. Landmine Monitor research indicated five main clusters of challenges impeding effective assistance in 2005-2006: accessibility, variety and efficiency of services provided, capacity, rights implementation, and financial resources.

### Access to care

Most healthcare, rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration services are located in urban centers, and are often long distances away from the mine-affected rural areas where the majority of mine survivors live. Community-based rehabilitation programs remain limited. Access to services is further hampered by the lack of transportation, including emergency transport, insufficient awareness of available services, the non-existence or deficiency of referral systems and bureaucratic obstacles for certain groups of people to obtain certain services. Whereas emergency care is mostly free of charge, continuing medical care, rehabilitation, counseling and socioeconomic services are not always free, especially not for the uninsured. Even if the services are free, transport, accommodation and food usually are not. Economic constraints often prevent people from leaving their homes for needed care.

### Variety and effectiveness of assistance

The majority of resources continue to be directed toward medical care and the provision of orthopedic appliances. Although there are vocational training programs, this training does not necessarily lead to employment or a sustainable income. These programs do not always meet market demand, and there may not be job placement services or sufficient follow-up for income generation projects. Additionally, people with disabilities are often not eligible for regular vocational training or micro-credit schemes. Special or inclusive education remains limited, as does the capacity of teachers to deal with children with special needs. In 2005-2006, psychosocial support remained limited due to social stigma and lack of knowledge of the beneficial effects. Few formal counseling services exist, making peer support groups and family networks the main support

systems. Despite calls for integrated rehabilitation, many actors focus on just one part of survivor assistance and referral systems remain weak.

### Capacity

Infrastructure and human resources capacity remain key problematic issues. Many health, rehabilitation and reintegration facilities need upgrades and new equipment, and many have difficulties maintaining sufficient supplies. The greater part of the physical rehabilitation sector remains dependent on international support due to the high cost of materials. Specialized staff need ongoing technical and management training for sustainability of projects, as do local associations of people with disabilities. Building capacity at government level and coordination between stakeholders, including local, national and international agencies, remain priority challenges.

### Rights implementation

Many countries have general or specific legislation addressing discrimination against people with disabilities, but implementation remains weak. Several countries have introduced employment quotas for people with disabilities and fines for non-compliance, but these have rarely been enforced. Unemployment among people with disabilities remains high. Compensation for mine survivors, people with disabilities and disabled ex-combatants continues to be inadequate in many cases; in this reporting period, some countries have reduced benefits. Military personnel continue to receive higher compensation than civilians. Indigenous groups, nomadic people, refugees or internally displaced people still have less access to their rights, often because they cannot produce the necessary supporting documents.

*Most healthcare, rehabilitation and socioeconomic services are located in urban centers, and are often long distances away from the mine-affected rural areas where the majority of mine survivors live.*

*Viana Orthopedic Center in Luanda, Angola, offers physical rehabilitation services, vocational training programs, and prosthesis and orthotic devices for disabled people.*



© Patricia Campbell/Handicap International, March 2006

### Financial resources

In 2005, donor financial support for victim assistance programs increased, but victim assistance remains the smallest component of mine action funding. Long-term funding to ensure sustainability of programs is difficult to obtain. National entities (both governmental and non-governmental) are only slowly increasing their contributions to internationally supported projects, and national entities often lack the financial resources to continue programs after international organizations have withdrawn.

### Other factors

Ongoing conflict, and consequent security concerns, severely limit the ability to provide assistance to landmine survivors in some countries. Entire groups of a population are excluded from assistance in some cases. Other emerging priorities for governments and non-governmental assistance providers, such as HIV/AIDS, also have an impact.

*Twenty-four States Parties were identified as having significant numbers of mine survivors, and the “greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.*

## Victim Assistance and Mine Ban Treaty Implementation

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first multilateral disarmament treaty to call upon states to take responsibility in assisting victims of a particular type of weapon. In meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration (SC-VA), governments, survivors, ICRC, ICBL and other NGOs work closely to advance victim assistance

understanding and implementation. Since December 2005, Afghanistan and Switzerland have served as co-chairs of the SC-VA and Sudan and Austria have served as co-rapporteurs (they are expected to become co-chairs in September 2006).

At the First Review Conference in November-December 2004, States Parties agreed on 11 concrete actions to encourage allocation of sufficient efforts and resources to facilitate the full rehabilitation, reintegration and participation of mine/UXO survivors and other people with disabilities. Within this framework, 24 States Parties were identified as having significant numbers of mine survivors, and the “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.<sup>98</sup> Without neglecting other States Parties or states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, these countries, the VA 24, are receiving more focused support for the period 2005-2009.

In early 2005, a questionnaire was developed to assist the VA 24 in developing a victim assistance action plan by answering four key questions: what is the situation in 2005 in each of the six main thematic areas of victim assistance;<sup>99</sup> what are the SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) objectives to be attained in each of these areas by 2009;<sup>100</sup> what are the plans to achieve these objectives by 2009; and what means are available or required to implement these plans. In 2006, the SC-VA co-chairs acknowledged that “the questionnaire was not an end-product but rather an initial step in a long-term planning and implementation process.” Two regional workshops were organized in the Americas and in Africa to allow the relevant states to share experiences and develop their answers to the questionnaire.

At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb in November-December 2005, the VA 24 were to present information on the current status of survivor assistance and their objectives for the period to 2009, as a first step to turn objectives into concrete action plans. This information was included in a detailed annex to the Zagreb Progress Report that emerged from the Sixth Meeting of States Parties. However, the varying quality of responses and capacities to respond to the first two questions of the questionnaire made clear that the process could not proceed at the same pace for all 24 States Parties. Two countries did not submit a description of their current status nor objectives (Burundi and Chad). Several countries did not provide a complete overview of their status (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Serbia and Montenegro). Several countries did not provide complete objectives (Colombia, Croatia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Serbia and Montenegro). Most countries did not provide SMART objectives (Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,

*A young Cambodian mine survivor.*



© T. Divert/Handicap International

Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan and Thailand).

Nevertheless, the questionnaire was useful as a starting point to create some sense of national ownership, as a benchmark for progress and as an indication of priorities to be achieved. The ICBL has identified non-signatories to the treaty that could especially benefit from using the questionnaire, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

With funding provided by Switzerland, the treaty's Implementation Support Unit employed a Victim Assistance Specialist to provide support to the VA 24 in developing SMART objectives and action plans. This included country visits; one-on-one meetings with officials from relevant ministries to raise awareness and to stimulate interministerial coordination; communication with relevant international and other organizations regarding victim assistance efforts; and interministerial workshops to bring together relevant actors to discuss and consolidate objectives and plans.<sup>101</sup>

At the May 2006 SC-VA meeting, Chad presented some of its 2005-2009 objectives; Afghanistan, DR Congo, and Serbia and Montenegro presented refined objectives; Tajikistan presented revised objectives and a plan of action agreed by relevant ministries; Albania presented an improved plan of action and progress achieved as of May 2006. Nine other VA 24 countries made general progress statements. Only 10 delegations included a victim assistance specialist (Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Colombia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan and Uganda)<sup>102</sup> and only three delegations included a survivor or person with a disability (Afghanistan, Croatia and Uganda). Eight countries did not engage in the process: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Senegal.

The ICBL's Working Group on Victim Assistance (including mine survivors from various countries, national campaigns, Handicap International, Landmine Survivors Network and the Landmine Monitor thematic research coordinator on victim assistance) participated actively in the May 2006 SC-VA meeting. It presented a document aimed at increasing the level of knowledge on survivor assistance, *Landmine Victim Assistance in 2005: Overview of the Situation in 24 States Parties*, which was produced by Standing Tall Australia and Handicap International with funding from Australia. Survivors from El Salvador and Afghanistan made a statement urging States Parties to implement their victim assistance obligations and accurately represent the extent of the problem and the challenges faced rather than presenting a picture of a "survivor paradise." The ICBL reaffirmed its commitment to provide a reality-check, to avoid the risk of the victim assistance efforts creating a "paper paradise."



*Landmine survivor Sivakumar Ranjini competes in the women's bicycle race for the disabled in Jaffna, Sri Lanka.*

© Cemunu Amarasinghe/AP, 21 August 2005

As of 12 July 2006, a total of 38 States Parties had submitted a voluntary Form J with their 2006 Article 7 reports to report on victim assistance activities or mine action funding. This included 22 mine-affected States Parties and 16 non-affected States Parties.<sup>103</sup>

Based on a variety of factors, Landmine Monitor perceives that in 2005-2006, the most progress has been made on victim assistance in Afghanistan, Albania, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan and Uganda. The least progress has been made in Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Thailand.<sup>104</sup>

*Based on a variety of factors, Landmine Monitor perceives that in 2005-2006, the most progress has been made on victim assistance in Afghanistan, Albania, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan and Uganda.*

## **Coordination and Integration for Sustainable Victim Assistance**

### **Coordination and National Ownership**

Each state with landmine survivors and other mine victims has the responsibility to ensure the well-being of this group as part of the larger population. In many mine/UXO affected countries this is done with the support of the international community, in implementing, advisory and funding roles. However, the ICBL urges states to see these services for what they are, temporary provisions until the national infrastructure can meet these needs. Therefore, close cooperation and coordination between national authorities, national and international partners, is necessary to ensure a better use of limited resources, prevent duplication of services, and decrease the gaps in services. States Parties and experts also prioritized this process as an area of work in 2006. This coordination responsibility ideally lies with the relevant line ministries in



*Phoung Dinh Duong of Vietnam could not find work in the years after he lost his leg to a landmine. He received a grant to build and stock his own pond.*

© Tom Giosi / Landmine Survivors Network, April 2006



the form of interministerial committees or inter-sectoral task forces, which assess the needs and relevant existing activities, develop objectives and national plans and identify resources. The recent VA 24 process concerning the questionnaire has shown that dialogue within and between national and international stakeholders and government and non-governmental partners is flawed: objectives were sometimes written by one key player, an expatriate working in a mine action center, external consultants, or within one ministry,

*Only two mine survivors were part of government delegations at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006.*

without consulting relevant colleagues, national and international NGOs, national campaigns or experts in the disability sector. In some countries, relevant actors were interviewed but were not able to provide input to the final result. In other countries, key assistance providers are not aware of the Nairobi Action Plan, other survivor assistance strategies or disability initiatives.

To be sustainable, survivor assistance programs must be integrated into the general national health and social network, whereby a feeling of national ownership, responsibility, accountability and gradual nationalization of programs both financially and in terms of implementation is stimulated. International organizations and NGOs can play an important role in the capacity-building of government officers and staff in several countries.

**Afghanistan:** in 2005-2006, a disability task force, an NGO coordination unit and a national capacity-building program were established to integrate and coordinate disability services, create national ownership and include relevant actors in decision-making processes so that relevant ministries can gradually take over responsibilities.

**Angola:** nationalization of the physical rehabilitation sector is hampered by a lack of government technical, managerial and financial capacity.

**Iraq:** in mid-2005, several NGO-run rehabilitation and medical programs were handed over to the Ministry of Health in northern Iraq, which also developed cost and responsibility sharing strategies with the Ministry of Social Affairs to ensure future sustainability.

**Somalia:** to reduce dependency on external funding and to create local ownership, a cost-sharing model has been introduced in several rehabilitation centers and referral hospitals, which is used to buy equipment and to facilitate travel and accommodations for patients.

**Survivor Inclusion and Consultation**

Action #38 of the Nairobi Action Plan that emerged from the First Review Conference states that States Parties need to “ensure the effective integration of mine victims in the work of the Convention.” At the national level, assessing the needs of survivors by consulting them directly is an important planning tool to increase efficiency of services. In 2005-2006, many survivors and their organizations continued to indicate that they were not included in planning and policy-making processes, and that they were not consulted on what they perceive as gaps. Only two mine survivors were part of government delegations at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006. The ICBL delegation at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties included 23 survivors and at least 10 survivors were present at the Standing Committee meetings.

**Azerbaijan:** in 2005, monthly information sharing meetings with relevant ministries, NGOs, ICRC and UN were started to increase the effectiveness of victim assistance. The first project completely managed by the national victim assistance program was funded.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** in 2005, a user satisfaction survey was conducted to provide feedback to prosthetic centers and relevant governmental bodies, and to highlight the issue of the quality of prosthetic services and devices.

**Croatia:** several survivors worked in the mine action center and with mine action operators as data entry, MRE or monitoring staff.

**El Salvador:** survivor organizations, assistance providers and mine survivors were not included in discussions on the national victim assistance plan.

**Guinea-Bissau:** survivors were revisited with the support of local NGOs and the World Health Organization to complete information in the mine/UXO casualty database; as a result, several medical and rehabilitation treatments were conducted in 2006.

**Integration with Other Mine Action, Development and Disability Programs**

Victim assistance cannot be separated from a country's health, social, economic, education and cultural policies and existing infrastructure and services. Assistance also needs to be seen within the larger context of a country's development, reconstruction and mine action. In 2005-2006, a number of countries linked victim assistance programs to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, reconstruction efforts, development of the health sector, mine action coordination, millennium

goals, and disability legislation. In 2006, the VA 24 were asked to provide information on how victim assistance plans were integrated into broader care, legislative, and policy frameworks.

**Albania:** victim assistance connects to other pillars of mine action, and to national disability and regional community development strategies, all driven by the needs of survivors and mine-affected communities, and with active survivor participation; the victim assistance program is also linked to national and local government activities to ensure sustainability.

**Cambodia:** several NGOs have taken a “development approach” to survivor assistance, whereby (after mine clearance) they assist mine survivors and other members of the community by providing land, roads, wells, schools, healthcare facilities and income-generating assistance.

**Mozambique:** disabled people’s organizations advocated for the inclusion of specific actions in favor of people with disabilities in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program 2006-2009; as a result the program set specific targets in terms of people assisted, capacity to provide services, and awareness-raising.

**Serbia and Montenegro:** ICRC completed the transfer of its basic health services pilot project to the Ministry of Health; the project inspired national primary healthcare reform and replication elsewhere in Serbia.

**Uganda:** victim assistance is linked to the issue of internally displaced people; disability is included in Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Programme; the casualty database will include indicators to monitor the situation of mine/UXO survivors in relation to the Millennium Development Goals; the Office of the Prime Minister prepared a draft bill to legislate mine action, including a victim assistance component.

## Progress in Survivor Assistance

As in past editions, *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* provides information on the facilities that have been identified as assisting landmine survivors and other people with disabilities in mine-affected countries. It is not exhaustive, as information on the activities of some local and international NGOs and governmental agencies is sometimes difficult to obtain. *Landmine Monitor* would welcome more input from governmental agencies and NGOs on their survivor assistance activities for future editions of this report. Nevertheless, *Landmine Monitor* identified certain indications of the progress and problems faced in addressing the needs of mine survivors.

### Emergency and Continuing Medical Care

Emergency and continuing medical care includes first aid and management of injuries in the immediate aftermath of a landmine explosion, surgery, pain management, acute hospital care, and the ongoing medical care needed for the physical recovery of the mine survivor.

In this reporting period, as in the past, emergency assistance was delayed in many instances because so many mine incidents occurred in remote, rural areas without adequate emergency transport and with facilities that could only provide first aid. The main obstacle impeding access to continuing medical care for many survivors is the lack of financial resources to afford services, exacerbated by lack of awareness, long distances, transport and accommodation costs, and documentation issues. Several mine-affected countries also have difficulties providing adequate assistance due to the lack of trained specialized staff, equipment and supplies.

*Victim assistance cannot be separated from a country’s health, social, economic, education and cultural policies and existing infrastructure and services.*

**International Committee of the Red Cross** assisted more than 6,300 weapon-injured patients in hospitals in 18 countries in 2005. Approximately 5 percent were identified as mine casualties. In Afghanistan alone, ICRC-supported hospitals surgically treated 2,241 war-injured, including 250 mine casualties.

**Emergency**, the Italian NGO, operates hospitals and health centers in three countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq until May 2005) which performed at least 2,567 operations on war-injured in 2005 and provided medical treatment for 3,711 more; at least 1,154 new mine/UXO survivors were treated and an additional 491 mine survivors received follow-up treatment.

**Burundi:** cost recovery schemes limited access to services for poor people; it is estimated that a majority of people go into debt or sell assets to pay for medical services.

**Chechnya:** ICRC facilitated specialized war surgery training for 23 surgeons and facilitated specialized courses for 46 other doctors from the northern Caucasus.

**DR Congo:** it generally takes more than 12 hours to reach a health center, up to 24 hours before being seen by a professional, and at least 48 hours before emergency surgery and amputations are performed.

**Ethiopia:** only an estimated 10 percent of mine casualties have access to basic healthcare and rehabilitation;



*A landmine survivor recovers at the Baku Center for the Rehabilitation of Invalids in Azerbaijan.*

© Arne Hodalić, September 2005

Participants at a seminar on small businesses and socioeconomic reintegration in Tovuz district, Azerbaijan.

© Hafiz Saflihanov/AzCBL, 27 May 2006



access to complex post-trauma care is even lower as the country only has two orthopedic surgeons.

**Iran:** the Iranian Mine Victim Resource Center, the only NGO with the capacity and technology to provide pre-medical care and first aid training in the mine-affected Ilam province, lost international funding and ceased operations as of March 2006.

**Mozambique:** hospitals treated 1,038 people registered as disabled in 2005; 397 disabled people were newly registered, 106 had been registered before and 535 were outpatients.

**Sudan/Kenya:** on 31 May 2006, ICRC closed its Lopiding war hospital in Lokichokio, Kenya, which assisted mainly southern Sudanese people, who will now be treated in Juba (Sudan).

### Physical Rehabilitation

Physical rehabilitation includes the provision of services for rehabilitation, physiotherapy and the supply of prosthetics/orthotics and assistive devices. Rehabilitation centers for the most part are located in urban areas far from patients who need them. For many people services are not affordable.

In Ethiopia, there are approximately 360,000 people in need of physical rehabilitation, yet in 2005 Landmine Monitor recorded only some 23,000 people receiving services, including 1,321 mine survivors. In Afghanistan, there are between 747,500 and 867,100 people with disabilities, including 52,000-60,000 mine survivors, while in 2005 Landmine Monitor recorded 113,340 people receiving physical rehabilitation, including at least 3,946 mine survivors. In North Korea, there are an estimated 64,000 amputees, yet in 2005 only 1,219 people were recorded as receiving rehabilitation services, including 10 mine survivors.

In 2005, ICRC supported prosthetics and orthotics training for 36 technicians from 10 countries and trained at least 51 more technicians in its national operations in three countries.

**Chad:** a three-year national physiotherapy training program in Moundou is in the final development stages.

**Ethiopia:** in August 2005, the Dessie Regional Rehabilitation Center moved to a location more accessible to people with disabilities and improved its infrastructure, leading to an increase in people assisted.

**North Korea:** In May 2006, ICRC finished installing the newly constructed Rakrang center in Pyongyang, operated in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense to treat disabled military personnel.

**Rwanda:** the Ministry of Health received support from a coordinator for physical disability to improve existing rehabilitation services; a survey on physical disability was conducted to facilitate the planning of services according to needs.

**Tajikistan:** the government increased its budget for the operating costs of the National Ortho Center and coordinated an outreach program providing transportation and accommodation during treatment, and follow-up for amputees from remote areas.

**Lebanon:** after the first prosthesis, provided free of charge, patients cannot get free repairs or replacements for two years, which is especially problematic for children.

**Yemen:** nationalization of the Aden rehabilitation center on 31 December 2005 resulted in decreased staff salaries and shortages in raw materials by June 2006.

### Supply of Prosthetics/Orthotics/Assistive Devices

In 2005, ICRC assisted approximately 140,000 people in 72 projects in 18 countries, producing 20,543 prostheses and 25,914 orthoses, and providing 1,979 wheelchairs and 19,446 pairs of crutches. Fifty-two percent of prostheses produced were for mine survivors. ICRC-supported centers produced 5,097 prostheses (2,218 for mine survivors), 4,282 orthoses, 7,349 pairs of crutches and 190 wheelchairs in Africa; 10,388 prostheses (6,862 for survivors), 11,553 orthoses, 9,064 pairs of crutches and 1,567 wheelchairs in Asia; and 3,199 prostheses (1,066 for survivors), 6,974 orthoses and 541 pairs of crutches in the Middle East and North Africa in 2005.

In 2005, Handicap International-supported projects in 12 countries produced 3,300 prostheses, 5,150 orthoses, 6,885 pairs of crutches, 876 wheelchairs and 2,785 other mobility devices.

### Psychosocial Support and Social Reintegration

Psychological support and social reintegration includes activities that assist mine survivors and the families of those killed or injured to overcome the psychological trauma of a landmine explosion and promote their social well-being. These activities include community-based peer support groups, associations for the disabled, sporting and related activities, and professional counseling. This component of victim assistance remains the smallest and least appreciated, although several VA 24 countries indicated they will start assessing the needs in this field and develop support

*In Afghanistan, there are between 747,500 and 867,100 people with disabilities, including 52,000-60,000 mine survivors.*

programs. In many countries, counseling is left to the family support network and there is a stigma attached to seeking professional psychological help. In some countries counseling is available through general war victim support, often targeting children. Social reintegration is hindered by the lack of understanding among the general population of the rights, needs and capacities of people with disabilities.

In 2005-2006, more organizations included sports activities in their programs, increasingly recognizing the value of sports both for health reasons and psychosocial reasons.

Inclusive education is becoming better known as a concept, but few countries have teachers trained in dealing with children with special needs.

**Angola:** in 2005, the Rehabilitation through Sport Program provided training to physiotherapists, sports trainers and people with disabilities on the use of sports activities as a tool for rehabilitation.

**Kosovo:** 24 young landmine survivors participated in a summer camp, where they were encouraged to talk about their incidents and how they cope.

**Nicaragua:** psychological support and social reintegration are available in Managua, but the economic situation does not allow for services in the rest of the country.

**Peru:** psychosocial support is available, but not free of charge, and financial support to assist civilian mine survivors facing post-traumatic stress issues is not available.

**Senegal:** children disabled by mines can receive financial support to go to school, like other disabled children; Handicap International facilitates the integration of disabled children in classes as teachers are not trained in inclusive education.

**Sri Lanka:** UNICEF supported psychosocial rehabilitation and trained counselors about the needs of people with disabilities.

**Sudan:** in 2005, a psychological support curriculum and manual for use by social workers, rehabilitation staff and in hospitals was developed.

### Economic Reintegration

Economic reintegration programs improve the economic status of mine survivors and other people with disabilities and raise awareness so that people with disabilities get equal chances at jobs and services. Economic reintegration includes education, vocational training, creation of employment opportunities, micro-credit schemes, and development of community infrastructure to reflect the local economic reality. For many mine survivors, taking up their roles as productive community members and working for their families' well-being is the most important part of integral rehabilitation. However, they face challenges accessing employment opportunities and experience difficulties in maintaining a reasonable standard of living. The chances of socio-

economic reintegration are often further diminished by negative social perceptions, discrimination and stereotyping.

Where vocational training programs are available, they are not always geared towards people with disabilities, or free of charge. Training does not necessarily lead to employment and sustainable income: there is discrimination when accessing credit schemes or regular employment; training does not always meet market demand; and there is often insufficient follow-up for self-employed people. Moreover, it is important to open up economic reintegration programs to family members, and in particular to wives, widows and women alone. Women are often the primary caregiver, or become the principal income-earner, when their partner is killed or injured.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** in 2005, the national Red Cross Society started a project creating employment and income-generating opportunities for survivors and their families, by providing training, micro-credits and job placements.

**Cambodia:** the National Center for Disabled People has a disabled workers database, primarily for urban disabled seeking work; however, out of 1,500 people registered, only 125 are placed each year.

**Lebanon:** at least 432 of the 2,239 recorded mine/UXO survivors received direct socioeconomic assistance in 2005, not including at least 350 mine survivors receiving socioeconomic follow-up. An

*Social reintegration is hindered by the lack of understanding among the general population of the rights, needs and capacities of people with disabilities.*



*A landmine survivor receives vocational training in woodworking at Banteay Prieb, a center providing survivors with training and activities run by Jesuit Service Cambodia, located near Phnom Penh.*

© Tamar Gabelnick, April 2006



assessment of income-generating projects for survivors was undertaken; 25 percent needed further financial assistance or better training.

**Morocco:** results of a disability census released in December 2005 concluded that only 12 percent of disabled people, aged 15 to 60 years and capable of working, were employed.

**Senegal:** vocational training is available in mine-affected areas, but not accessible for mine survivors because it is not free of charge. Mine survivors rarely resume their former employment and are often refused access to credit by the banks.

**Tajikistan:** two national income generation projects for people with disabilities were discontinued at the end of 2005 due to a lack of funding.

**Thailand:** in October 2005, the government started a pilot project, through which Social Development and Human Security Offices in provinces employed people with disabilities on a one-year contract basis.

#### Community-Based Rehabilitation Programs

Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) and outreach programs are designed to supplement facility-based rehabilitation in order to improve service delivery, provide equal opportunities and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to services due to high costs, uneven distribution of services and small numbers of rehabilitation staff. CBR integrates actions for all domains of survivor assistance with survivors' and disabled people's participation using realistic and sustainable resources. CBR programs and outreach workers aim at empowering people with disabilities and integrating them into society, via development of disabled people's organizations, increased community decision-making and accountability; skills training in self-care principles; needs-based programming; and identifying local skills and technologies. CBR also plays a role in improving

coordination with and referral to other services, which are unavailable in the community and of which the community might be unaware.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** many mine survivors start rehabilitation in the hospital and continue their rehabilitation in one of the community-based rehabilitation centers, which also provide psychosocial support.

**Cambodia:** in June 2006, the government and Disability Action Council proposed a nationwide project to establish sustainable national community-based physical rehabilitation, standardize disability awareness-raising materials and activities, and develop mechanisms for monitoring, coordinating and exchanging information.

**Eritrea:** the CBR program has trained community members in basic counseling, peer-to-peer support, mobility, physiotherapy, referrals and reporting and administering various aspects of disability support; and includes income generation, sustainable livelihood and attitude changing programs. Affirmative action in the CBR areas results in people with disabilities sometimes getting preference in employment over a person without disability.

#### Disability Policy and Practice

States Parties have recognized the need for legislation and actions "that promote effective treatment, care and protection of all disabled citizens."<sup>105</sup> Landmine survivor assistance, as with assistance for all people with disabilities, is more than just a medical and rehabilitation issue; it is also a human rights issue. Landmine Monitor has identified over 50 mine-affected countries or areas with legislation or measures explicitly protecting the rights of people with disabilities; in other countries people with disabilities are protected by common law. However, in many instances these laws are not fully implemented or enforced.

**Algeria:** as of May 2006, draft decrees assess financial penalties on businesses and organizations failing to provide employment for people with disabilities and stipulate criteria for free public transport, reduced costs for property rental and social housing.

**Croatia:** in December 2005, the Law on Humanitarian Demining was passed which lists and defines the rights of deminers, their relatives and other participants in demining who are injured or unable to work after their injuries.

**India:** in 2006, a review of the People with Disabilities bill was started; the National Policy for People with Disabilities was presented, recognizing that people with disabilities are a valuable human resource deserving full participation in society.

**Sri Lanka:** in February 2006, the Human Rights Commission conducted a National Conference on Disability Rights establishing specific commitments

*Landmine survivor assistance, as with assistance for all people with disabilities, is more than just a medical and rehabilitation issue; it is also a human rights issue.*

*Mosha, a 7-month-old calf, receives medical care for her mine injury at the Friends of the Asian Elephant hospital in Lampang, Thailand.*



© Friends of the Asian Elephant, Thailand, June 2006

and activities toward the implementation of the National Policy on Disability.

**Tajikistan:** in 2005, the government allocated more than \$30,000 for pensions for mine survivors or the families of those killed in a mine explosion, and the minimum pension was raised.

**Uganda:** in February 2006, two members of parliament who had been elected as part of the special interest group of representatives of people with disabilities stood on the ordinary ballot and were elected on their own political party merits.

© J.P. Porcher/ Handicap International, November 2005



*A landmine survivor undergoes rehabilitation therapy at an orthopedic center in Herat, Afghanistan.*

## Other International Developments

Negotiations on the draft text of the Comprehensive and Integral Convention on Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Dignity of People with Disabilities were scheduled to be completed in August 2006. In December 2005, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution calling upon states to participate constructively to have the text ready for submission at the 61st session of the UN General Assembly starting in September 2006. The adoption and implementation of the Convention would require inclusion of disability issues into mainstream policy agendas, commitment of resources, awareness-raising, capacity-building, comprehensive data collection, implementation of services and programs, and establishment of an independent monitoring body.

From 28 August to 3 September 2005, Raising the Voices East Africa, in Kampala, Uganda provided advocacy training to 10 participants from Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. In May 2006 in Geneva, Landmine Survivors Network initiated its Widening the Voices training program for graduates of its Raising the Voices program aimed at improving their advocacy skills so they can engage at local, regional and international levels, and helping them implement sustainable initiatives for survivors and other people with disabilities.

*Negotiations on the draft text of the Comprehensive and Integral Convention on Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Dignity of People with Disabilities were scheduled to be completed in August 2006.*



# Mine Action Funding

Gathering accurate and complete information on global mine action funding remains an elusive task. There is a lack of transparency on the part of many countries, and among those who do report, there is a great deal of variation in what is reported, the level of detail reported, and for what time period.<sup>106</sup> However, it is possible to provide an informative picture of the global funding situation.

For 2005, Landmine Monitor has identified US\$376 million in mine action funding by more than 27 donors.<sup>107</sup> This is a decrease of \$23 million, or 5.8 percent, from 2004.<sup>108</sup> The decrease in total global funding largely reflects big reductions in funding from the two most significant donors, the European Commission (\$14.9 million decrease) and the United States (\$14.6 million decrease). Of the 20 most significant donors, 10 provided less funding in 2005 than 2004. (See below).

This is the first time that global mine action funding has decreased meaningfully since 1992, when states first began to devote significant resources to mine action.<sup>109</sup> It is a matter of serious concern that global mine action funding fell markedly instead of increasing in 2005, the year after many Mine Ban Treaty States Parties made renewed commitments to mine action at the First Review Conference and in their collective endorsement of the Nairobi Action Plan. It is disconcerting that funding fell as many States Parties approach their 10-year treaty mandated deadlines for completion of mine clearance.

However, it should also be noted that the 2005 total of \$376 million is the second highest annual total ever recorded, and is \$37 million (10.9 percent) more than two years ago (2003). The decrease in 2005 comes on the heels of increases of 37 percent in 2002, 5 percent in 2003 and 18 percent in 2004.

## Donor Contributions in 2005

The biggest contributors to global mine action in 2005 were the United States (\$81.9 million), the European Commission (\$51.5 million), Japan (\$39.3 million), Norway (\$36.5 million), the United Kingdom (\$21.4 million), Germany (\$21.1 million), Canada (\$20.5 million) and the Netherlands (\$19.3 million).

Of the 20 most significant donors, half increased their mine action contributions in 2005 in terms of national currency, and half provided less. Those with increases were: Slovakia (114 percent); France (103 percent); Australia (50 percent); Italy (44 percent); Germany (13 percent); United Kingdom (6.3 percent); Sweden (4.9 percent); Switzerland (2 percent); Norway (1.2 percent); and the Netherlands (0.2 percent).

Those with the decreases in terms of national currency were: New Zealand (65 percent); Ireland (32 percent); Belgium (30 percent); Austria (25 percent); European Commission (22 percent); Denmark (18 percent); US (15 percent); Canada (9 percent); Japan (7 percent); and Finland (2 percent).

Donors that increased their contributions by at least \$1 million included: Slovakia (\$3.7 million); Australia (\$3.2 million); Germany (\$2.4 million); Norway (\$2 million); France (\$1.9 million); Italy (\$1.3 million); Switzerland (\$1.2 million); and United Kingdom (\$1 million).

Donors that decreased their contributions by at least \$1 million included: European Commission (\$14.9 million); US (\$14.6 million); Japan (\$3.5 million); Denmark (\$2.4 million); Canada (\$2.1 million); Belgium (\$1.7 million); and New Zealand (\$1.6 million). In terms of mine action funding on a per capita basis, the largest country donors were: Norway (\$7.90 per capita); Iceland (\$5.08 per capita); Luxembourg (\$2.84 per capita); and Denmark (\$2.09 per capita). Switzerland, Slovakia, Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland also had mine action contributions in excess of \$1 per capita.

In terms of mine action funding as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), the largest country donors were: Slovakia (0.017 percent); Norway (0.013 percent); and Iceland (0.011 percent). These were the only three countries to contribute over one one-hundredth of their gross national income to mine action in 2005. The next largest donors on a GNI basis were Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland.

*This is the first time that global mine action funding has decreased meaningfully since 1992, when states first began to devote significant resources to mine action.*



### Additional Mine Action-Related Funding in 2005

The \$376 million total for donor countries does not capture all global spending related to mine action in 2005. Other types of spending on and contributions to mine action that are not part of that total include research and development (R&D), some victim assistance funding and in-kind contributions, funding by NGOs and the private sector, UN peacekeeping funds, and funding by mine-affected countries of their own mine action programs.

As in past years, Landmine Monitor has not included funds for research and development into demining technologies and equipment in this total, and has instead listed available R&D funding separately; in 2005, R&D funding totaled at least \$30 million (See R&D section below).

Funding for mine victim assistance programs is included where possible, but for some major donors, victim assistance funding cannot be separated out from other non-landmine-specific programs.

In some cases, donors do not report the monetary value of in-kind (as opposed to cash) contributions.

Mine action funding provided by NGOs and the private sector is not explicitly included, in part in order to avoid double counting when an NGO receives funds from a government donor. Landmine Monitor has not been able to gather extensive information on NGO and private sector funding, but some examples in 2005

include: Adopt-a-Minefield (USA) contributed \$3.7 million for mine action in nine countries; the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund (UK) contributed over \$3 million to mine action for three countries and two NGOs; Land-

mine Survivors Network (US) reported receiving private contributions totaling \$800,000; the Humpty Dumpty Institute (US) raised \$770,000 for mine clearance in Angola through the sale of surplus milk in a public-private partnership with the US Department of Agriculture's Food Aid Program; and NGO members of ActionLandmine.de (Germany) contributed more than \$300,000 to mine action.

Contributions from UN peacekeeping assessed budgets for mine action are not included in the global total. UNMAS reported securing over \$24.3 million for mine action through UN peacekeeping funding in calendar year 2005; these funds primarily covered the costs of mine action conducted in conjunction with peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Lebanon and Sudan.<sup>110</sup>

Finally, and most importantly, the contributions to mine action by the mine-affected countries themselves are not part of the \$376 million donor total. Many mine-affected countries do not make information available on their mine action expenditures, so that Landmine Monitor has not been able to develop an accurate global accounting. The total funding by

mine-affected states amounts to tens of millions of dollars each year. Following are some examples of contributions by mine-affected countries in 2005, drawn from this year's Landmine Monitor country reports; these eight mine-affected countries provided nearly \$50 million in 2005.

- Croatia provided KN192,769,625 (\$32.4 million), or 57 percent of its total mine action expenditures. Croatia's 2005 contribution comes to more than 0.09 percent of its gross national income, or more than five times the highest international donor contribution measured as a percentage of GNI.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, national sources (including the Council of Ministers, entity governments and cantons) provided KM17,753,131 (\$11.3 million), about 44 percent of its total mine action expenditures, an increase from 30 percent in 2004; this continued the trend of increasing national contributions since 2002.
- Mozambique provided 52.9 billion Meticaís (\$2.3 million), compared to 178 billion Meticaís (\$7.9 million) in 2004; contributions were partly in-kind and tax-exemptions.
- Azerbaijan contributed AZM3,498,623,400 (\$740,120), an increase from \$255,000 in 2004.
- Chile provided \$680,217 for the National Demining Commission budget, compared to \$154,086 in 2004.
- Thailand contributed Baht 18.21 million (\$452,400) to the national mine action center, less than half the Baht 38.21 million (about \$950,000) provided the previous fiscal year.<sup>111</sup>
- Chad provided \$367,790 for national mine action in 2005.<sup>112</sup>
- The Colombian government approved COP571 million (about \$213,400) for the national mine action program for the period July 2005 to June 2006, compared to COP2.5 billion (about \$934,100) for the period July 2004 to June 2005.

In addition, in 2006, Jordan reported that it contributes \$3.5 million annually to its national demining program. In 2005, Lebanon reported that it makes an annual contribution of in-kind and other support to mine action valued at approximately \$4 million. In 2005, Cyprus estimated that it provides €170,000 (\$211,000) annually for mine clearance and stockpile destruction. In 2004, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense reported that Nicaragua provides 16 million Córdoba (about \$1 million) each year to the member institutions of the National Demining Committee.

Mine-affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty previously reported national mine action contributions totaling \$190 million from 1997-2003, and for 2004 Landmine Monitor identified about \$57.5 million in contributions from the seven states with available information, including \$4 million by Ethiopia and \$3.5 million by Yemen.

*In terms of mine action funding as a percentage of GNI, the largest country donors were: Slovakia, Norway and Iceland.*

## Funding, Cooperation and the Mine Ban Treaty

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty contains mine action cooperation obligations for States Parties. Furthermore, under the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009, States Parties agreed they will ensure the sustainability of their commitments, including providing where possible multi-year funding to facilitate long-term planning of mine action and victim assistance programs (Action #45); they agreed, where relevant, to urge the UN, regional organizations, and the World Bank, regional development banks and financial institutions to support States Parties requiring assistance in fulfilling their treaty obligations (Action #48); and they agreed to pursue efforts to identify new and non-traditional sources of support, technical, material or financial (Action #50).<sup>113</sup>

## Donor Funding Policy and the Mine Ban Treaty

Some donor states stipulate specifically that their mine action funding should be directed with strong preference to States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Donor states which have expressed this as a policy position include Canada, Germany and the Netherlands. The EC lists “proven commitment of non-States Parties to mine action and the principles of the Mine Ban Treaty” as funding criteria, rather than State Party status, but the EC has also indicated that adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty influences its decision on mine action funding.

### Donor Coordination

Several donor bodies exist which facilitate the coordination of mine action resources. The Mine Action Support Group (MASG), chaired by Switzerland in 2005 and by the US in 2006, consists of 27 donors. MASG usually meets three times a year and produces a regular newsletter which has contained some information regarding mine action funding. The Steering Committee on Mine Action, chaired by UNMAS's director, includes representation by 24 donor states, and meets bi-annually. The Mine Ban Treaty's Resource Mobilization Contact Group (RMCG), led by Norway, was established with the intention of securing sustainable funding and promoting cost-efficient and effective mine action. A prominent issue for the RMCG during the reporting period was identifying the specific needs of States Parties which require assistance to meet Article 5 mine clearance deadlines.

### Integrating Mine Action Funding into Development Programming

In 2006, the Contact Group on Mine Action and Development was initiated by Canada to address issues regarding the mainstreaming of mine action into the development sector, complementary to the work of the RMCG. In 2005, two meetings were held on the topic of integrating mine action into development program-

ming; these meetings were attended by the ICBL and other NGOs, as well as by States Parties. The First Informal Dialogue Meeting on Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development was co-sponsored by Canada and the GICHD in June 2005. Fourteen donor states, the European Commission and various international agencies attended. The Second Informal Dialogue Meeting on Linking Mine Action to Development was held 5-6 December 2005, after the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb. The dialogues were linked to Actions #40 to #50 of the Nairobi Action Plan, addressing mine action in the context of development processes, “rather than to be solely labelled as an element of humanitarian assistance.”<sup>114</sup>

Proponents see the integration of mine action into development funding as a means of providing long-term stability for mine action funding, and of preventing any future decline in mine action contributions due to “donor fatigue,” by expanding the channels for funding within donor states own official development assistance agencies and by better utilizing other existing funding mechanisms such as the World Bank, regional development banks and trust fund facilities. Canada, the leading proponent among States Parties, has stated that integration of mine action into development programming need not be a single track solution, and that mine action can be integrated into development programs in addition to donors providing dedicated mine action funding.<sup>115</sup>

Some have expressed concerns about mainstreaming (or integrating). Ambassador Martin Dahinden, speaking as the outgoing director of the GICHD in 2004, warned that Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty, compelling States Parties to offer cooperation assistance, “would have a less prominent role” should mine action funding be integrated into broader development spending.<sup>116</sup> Others have noted the approach may inadvertently jeopardize the security of mine action resources, make mine action operators compete for limited international aid resources distributed according to often-changing geopolitical interests, and diminish the significant influence that civil society has had in promoting substantial mine action funding. A report for UNDP by the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Norway concluded “that there is little mine action expertise in development departments and vice versa a lack of development expertise within mine action management.”<sup>117</sup>

Although many States Parties mention development in statements regarding their funding policies, there has not been substantial movement toward implementation of the development integration approach. Following are some of the views expressed and actions taken by States Parties.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is putting in place an approach that will

*Although many States Parties mention development in statements regarding their funding policies, there has not been substantial movement toward implementation of the development integration approach.*

*In 2005, trust funds reported receiving at least \$113.4 million in mine action funding, representing the equivalent of 30 percent of the total donor reported contributions.*

promote integration of mine action in its regular programs. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is working to include mine action into its peace and security programming. Within the department, the Mine Action Unit is pursuing the integration of mine action into humanitarian, development and civil society programming frameworks in affected countries.

CIDA has promoted development mainstreaming at meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>118</sup>

The UK's Department for International Development (DfID) planned a review in mid-2006 of its mine action funding policy; this was expected to recommend continued integration of mine action into broader development programs and the security sector, in line with DfID's policy change in 2004.<sup>119</sup>

The Netherlands expects to mainstream mine action into peace-building and security/stability sectors, rather than development.<sup>120</sup>

## Funding Channels

A considerable portion of mine action funding reported by donors is channeled through third-party funding mechanisms. In 2005, trust funds reported receiving at least \$113.4 million in mine action funding, representing the equivalent of 30 percent of the total donor reported contributions. Trust funds can provide coordination between donors and implementing agencies and can use multiple funding sources to sustain ongoing programs.

- The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), operated by UNMAS, received total donor contributions of about \$50 million including core and multi-year funding in 2005. Funding was received for mine action in six countries in 2005: Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Lebanon and Sudan. UNMAS was also active in securing peacekeeping funding for mine action from the UN.
- The UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery reported receiving contributions totaling about \$33.7 million for mine action in 14 countries in 2005. UNDP also funds its mine action programs through locally administered cost-sharing agreements and trust funds with UNDP country offices.
- The UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund is part of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. In 2005, the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund received \$1 million in mine action funding from the Republic of Korea. In February 2006, Greece contributed €1.9 million (\$2.4 million) to mine action in Iraq through the fund.
- In 2006, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) began to direct funding to mine action for

the first time since its inception in 1999, channeling more than \$1.7 million to mine action in Sudan. UNTFHS is currently a single donor trust fund that receives contributions exclusively from Japan.<sup>121</sup>

- The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) based in Slovenia received \$27.8 million from 13 governments, the EC, UNDP, local authorities, government agencies, and private donors in 2005. Funding was directed to mine action in southeastern Europe and the Caucasus, principally Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and its province of Kosovo, as well as Azerbaijan. The ITF has an arrangement whereby the US provides matching funds for donations to mine action in southeastern Europe.
- The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund assists NATO partner countries to fulfill their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2005, the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund reported receiving a total of € 854,000 (over \$1 million) from five countries for antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction in Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>122</sup>

Funding as reported by donors often differs from that reported by trust funds due to a number of factors, including varying fiscal years. In 2005, trust funds reported contributions by at least three donors which were not identified from direct donor reporting: Andorra, \$25,522 to the UN VTF for core funding; Portugal, \$16,000 to the UN VTF for Sudan; and Hungary, € 40,000 (\$49,796) to NATO PfP for Serbia and Montenegro.

## Mine Action Donors

Unless otherwise noted, figures are in US dollars.<sup>123</sup> Totals include victim assistance funding where this is known, and do not include funds for research and development, which is identified separately where known.

### Donor Mine Action Funding by Year

1992-2005	\$2.9 billion
2005	\$376 million
2004	\$399 million
2003	\$339 million
2002	\$324 million
2001	\$237 million
2000	\$243 million
1999	\$219 million
1998	\$187 million (incl. an estimated \$9 m.)
1997	\$139 million (incl. an estimated \$35 m.)
1996	\$132 million (incl. an estimated \$34 m.)
1992-95	\$258 million (incl. an estimated \$41 m.)

The 1992-2005 total includes \$50 million contributed by United Arab Emirates to Lebanon 2002-2004, but individual year totals are not known.

### Donor Mine Action Funding 1992-2005: \$2.9 billion

United States	\$708.3 million
European Commission	\$422.6 million
Norway	\$255.6 million
Japan	\$217.3 million
United Kingdom	\$175.3 million
Canada	\$148.1 million
Germany	\$144 million
Netherlands	\$133.9 million
Sweden	\$126.6 million
Denmark	\$109.8 million
Switzerland	\$79.9 million
Australia	\$75.1 million
Italy	\$56.5 million
Finland	\$52 million
United Arab Emirates	\$50 million
Belgium	\$31.5 million
France	\$28.6 million
Ireland	\$16.3 million
Austria	\$16.2 million
New Zealand	\$12.4 million
Slovakia	\$10.9 million
Spain	\$10.1 million
Greece	\$9.6 million
Other countries	\$32.5 million

- The total of \$32.5 million for other countries includes China (\$6.2 million), Luxembourg (\$5.9 million), South Korea (\$5.2 million), Slovenia (\$3.8 million), Saudi Arabia (\$3 million), Iceland (\$2.8 million), Czech Republic (\$2.1 million), Poland (\$2 million), and \$1.5 million for other donors including Brazil, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Portugal, South Africa, and others for lesser amounts.

### Donor Mine Action Funding for 2005: \$376 million<sup>124</sup>

United States	\$81.9 million
European Commission	\$51.5 million
Japan	\$39.3 million
Norway	\$36.5 million
United Kingdom	\$21.4 million
Germany	\$21.1 million
Canada	\$20.5 million
Netherlands	\$19.3 million
Switzerland	\$12.1 million
Sweden	\$11.7 million
Denmark	\$11.3 million
Australia	\$8.9 million
Slovakia	\$7.2 million

Finland	\$5.9 million
Italy	\$4.5 million
Belgium	\$4 million
France	\$3.8 million
Austria	\$2.2 million
Ireland	\$2.2 million
Poland	\$2 million
Spain	\$1.9 million
Iceland	\$1.5 million
Czech Republic	\$1.4 million
Luxembourg	\$1.3 million
South Korea	\$1.1 million
New Zealand	\$0.9 million
Slovenia	\$0.4 million

- Mine action funding was reported by the European Commission and 18 of the 25 European Union member states, which taken together totaled \$187 million of funding identified by Landmine Monitor.<sup>125</sup>

### Mine Action Funding per capita in 2005<sup>126</sup>

Norway	\$7.90
Iceland	\$5.08
Luxembourg	\$2.84
Denmark	\$2.09
Switzerland	\$1.63
Slovakia	\$1.34
Sweden	\$1.30
Netherlands	\$1.18
Finland	\$1.12
Canada	\$0.64
Ireland	\$0.53
Australia	\$0.44
Belgium	\$0.38
United Kingdom	\$0.36
Japan	\$0.31
United States	\$0.28
Austria	\$0.27
Germany	\$0.26
New Zealand	\$0.22
Slovenia	\$0.19
Czech Republic	\$0.14
Italy	\$0.08
France	\$0.06
Poland	\$0.05
Spain	\$0.04
South Korea	\$0.02



### Mine Action Funding in 2005 as a percentage of Gross National Income<sup>127</sup>

Slovakia	0.0168%
Norway	0.0133%
Iceland	0.0110%
Denmark	0.0044%
Luxembourg	0.0043%
Netherlands	0.0032%
Sweden	0.0032%
Finland	0.0030%
Switzerland	0.0030%
Canada	0.0019%
Australia	0.0014%
Ireland	0.0013%
Czech Republic	0.0013%
Slovenia	0.0011%
Belgium	0.0011%
United Kingdom	0.0009%
New Zealand	0.0008%
Japan	0.0008%
Germany	0.0007%
Poland	0.0007%
Austria	0.0007%
United States	0.0006%
Italy	0.0003%
France	0.0002%
Spain	0.0002%
South Korea	0.0001%

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA — \$708.3 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$81.9 million</b>
2004	\$96.5 million
2003	\$80.6 million
2002	\$73.8 million
2001	\$69.2 million
2000	\$82.4 million
1999	\$63.1 million
1998	\$44.9 million
1997	\$30.8 million
1996	\$29.8 million
1995	\$29.2 million
1994	\$15.9 million
1993	\$10.2 million

- Figures do not include mine victim assistance funding; funding for war victims programs totaled an additional \$14.4 million in fiscal year 2005.
- R&D totaled an additional \$13.15 million in fiscal year 2005, \$12.8 million in fiscal year 2004, and \$146 million for fiscal years 1995-2005.
- See United States country report for more details of US mine action funding.

### EUROPEAN COMMISSION — \$422.6 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$51.5 million (€41.3 million)<sup>128</sup></b>
2004	\$66.4 million (€53.4 million) <sup>129</sup>
2003	\$64.5 million (€57 million)
2002	\$38.7 million (€40.7 million)
2001	\$23.5 million (€26.1 million)
2000	\$14.3 million (€15.9 million)
1999	\$15.5 million (€17.3 million)
1998	\$21.4 million (€23.8 million)
1992-1997	\$126.8 million (€141.2 million)

- Figures do not include additional mine action funding by individual European Union Member States.
- EC R&D funding totaled an additional €1,090,000 (\$1,356,941) in 2005, €460,000 (\$572,148) in 2004, and €51 million from 1992-2005.

The European Commission allocated some €41,337,001 (\$51,460,332) to mine action in 2005. This was a significant decrease from €53.4 million (\$66.4 million) in 2004. In 2005, the EC provided mine action funding to 17 countries, compared to 21 countries in 2004. The total for 2005 includes allocations of multi-year funding, some of which was to be dispersed in 2006. The total also includes an allocation of €3 million (\$3.7 million) for a tender for stockpile destruction in Belarus which had not been dispersed as of June 2006. Countries receiving EC funding in 2005 but not 2004 included Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Those receiving EC funding in 2004 but not 2005 included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Somalia/Somaliland and Tajikistan.

### NORWAY — \$255.6 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$36.5 million (NOK235 million)<sup>130</sup></b>
2004	\$34.3 million (NOK231.2 million)
2003	\$28.6 million (NOK202.4 million)
2002	\$25.4 million (NOK202.9 million)
2001	\$20 million (NOK176.9 million)
2000	\$19.5 million (NOK178.6 million)
1999	\$21.5 million (NOK185 million)
1998	\$24 million
1997	\$16.7 million (NOK125 million)
1996	\$13.5 million (NOK101 million)
1995	\$11.6 million (NOK87 million)
1994	\$4.0 million (NOK30 million)

- Additionally, R&D totaled NOK3,983,375 (\$618,421) in 2005, and NOK2,250,000 (\$333,833) in 2004; previous Norwegian expenditures on R&D are not known.

Norway provided NOK235,020,163 (\$36,487,015) in 2005, its highest funding contribution to date. Norway contributed mine action funding to 18 countries in 2005, compared to 16 countries in 2004. Victim assistance support totaled at least NOK40,227,963 (\$6,245,414) in 2005, slightly less than in 2004.

## JAPAN — \$217.3 million

2005	\$39.3 million (¥4,323 million) <sup>131</sup>
2004	\$42.8 million (¥4,630 million)
2003	\$13 million (¥1,590 million)
2002	\$49.7 million (¥5,537 million)
2001	\$7.5 million (¥802 million)
2000	\$12.7 million (¥1,480 million)
1999	\$16 million (¥1,904 million)
1998	\$6.3 million (¥722 million)
Pre-1998	approx. \$30 million

• R&D totaled ¥811 million (\$7.4 million) in 2005,<sup>132</sup> ¥795 million (\$7.35 million) in 2004, and ¥2,366 million (\$21 million) from 1999 to 2005.

In 2005, Japan contributed ¥4,323 million (\$39.26 million), less than the ¥4,630 million (\$42.8 million) contributed in 2004.<sup>133</sup> Almost half of Japan's 2005 mine action funding, ¥2,100 million (\$19 million), was allocated to Sudan. In 2005, Japan provided victim assistance funding of ¥112,825,790 (\$1,024,664) or 2.6 percent of total spending, an increase from ¥53.3 million in 2004.

## UNITED KINGDOM — \$175.3 million

2005-2006	\$21.4 million (£11.8 million) <sup>134</sup>
2004-2005	\$20.4 million (£11.1 million)
2003-2004	\$20 million (£12.3 million)
2002-2003	\$18.5 million (£12.5 million)
2001-2002	\$15.4 million (£10.7 million)
2000-2001	\$21.5 million (£15 million)
1999-2000	\$20.4 million (£13.6 million)
1998-1999	\$6.5 million (£4.6 million)
1997-1998	\$6.6 million (£4.6 million)
1996	\$6.3 million
1995	\$6.9 million
1994	\$6.3 million
1993	\$5.1 million

• Figures do not include victim assistance funding.

• Additionally, R&D totaled £1,777,563 (\$3,235,165) in 2005-2006, £1.2 million (\$2.2 million) in 2004-2005, and £8.9 million (\$14.6 million) from 1999-2000 to 2005-2006.

UK funding of £11,758,747 (\$21,400,920) in fiscal year 2005-2006 represented an increase from an upwardly adjusted 2004-2005 total of £11,137,178 (\$20,414,447). In 2005-2006, the DfID reported mine action funding for 10 states, Somaliland and seven organizations totaling £9,225,924 (16,791,182). The UK Ministry of Defence provided £2,379,823 (\$4,331,278) to the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Kenya, and the Handicap International Phoenix project in Kosovo received £153,000 (\$278,460) through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. The UK continued its funding support for UNMAS and UNICEF, but did not report core funding to UNDP in 2005-2006.

## CANADA — \$148.1 million<sup>135</sup>

2005	\$20.5 million (C\$24.8 million) <sup>136</sup>
2004	\$22.6 million (C\$29.5 million)
2003	\$22.5 million (C\$30.8 million)
2002	\$15.1 million (C\$22.3 million)
2001	\$15.5 million (C\$24 million)
2000	\$11.9 million (C\$17.7 million)
1999	\$15.2 million (C\$23.5 million)
1998	\$9.5 million
1997	\$3.0 million (C\$4.6 million)
1996	\$4.0 million (C\$6 million)
1995	\$1.5 million (C\$2.2 million)
1994	\$2.9 million (C\$4.4 million)
1993	\$2.2 million (C\$3.4 million)
1989	\$1.7 million (C\$2.5 million)

• Additionally, R&D totaled C\$3.4 million (\$2.8 million) in 2005, C\$3.1 million (\$2.4 million) in 2004, and US\$16.3 million from 1998-2005.

Canada provided C\$24,799,163 (\$20,469,800) in fiscal year 2005-2006, a decrease from C\$29.5 million (\$22.6 million) the previous year. Canada provided funding to 31 countries and areas (five less than the previous year), as well as regional bodies, UN agencies, NGOs, ICRC and GICHD. Canada increased support to mine clearance from \$3.5 million to \$6.4 million, but decreased funding for victim assistance from \$2 million to \$1.6 million and for mine risk education from \$1.1 million to about \$562,000.

## GERMANY — \$144 million

2005	\$21.1 million (€17 million) <sup>137</sup>
2004	\$18.7 million (€15 million)
2003	\$22.1 million (€19.5 million)
2002	\$19.4 million (€20.4 million)
2001	\$12.3 million (DM26.8 million, €13.7 million)
2000	\$14.5 million (DM27.6 million)
1999	\$11.4 million (DM21.7 million)
1998	\$10.1 million
1997	\$4.9 million
1996	\$7.9 million
1995	\$0.8 million
1994	\$0.5 million
1993	\$0.3 million

• R&D: no funding was identified in 2005; 2004: €102,989 (\$128,098); figures not available for 2000-2003; 1993-1999: \$5.1 million.

Germany's funding for mine action totaled €16,972,295 (\$21,128,810) in 2005, an increase from €15 million (\$18.7 million) in 2004. In 2005, Germany provided funding to 20 countries and regions, two more than in 2004. Those receiving funding in 2005 but not in 2004 included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Jordan,

Somalia/Somaliland, and Uganda. Countries receiving funding in 2004 but not in 2005 included Burundi and Egypt. Germany funded UNICEF activities in the Caucasus in both years. The vast majority of German mine action funding was directed to mine clearance. In May 2006, Germany stated that it no longer funds research and development activities and, in preference, focuses funding on mine clearance.<sup>138</sup>

#### THE NETHERLANDS — \$133.9 million<sup>139</sup>

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$19.3 million (€15.5 million)<sup>140</sup></b>
2004	\$19.3 million (€15.5 million)
2003	\$12.1 million
2002	\$16 million
2001	\$13.9 million (Dfl 32 million, €15.5 million)
2000	\$14.2 million (Dfl 35.4 million)
1999	\$8.9 million (Dfl 23 million)
1998	\$9.3 million
1997	\$10.2 million
1996	\$10.7 million

The Netherlands contributed €15,521,772 (\$19,323,054) to mine action in 2005, a comparable amount to €15,494,919 (\$19.3 million) in 2004. In 2005, the Netherlands provided funding to 10 countries, as well as Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland. Activities labeled as mine clearance/mine risk education received €11,812,619 or 76 percent of total funding; capacity-building €2,758,002 or 18 percent; advocacy €277,203 or about 2 percent; and victim assistance received €542,893 or about 3 percent, with the remaining €131,555 going to activities including MRE. The annual mine action budget of €12.6 million (\$15.7 million) for 2005 was overspent. The Netherlands expects funding to be at the level of €12.6 million for the coming few years.

#### SWEDEN — \$126.6 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$11.7 million (SEK87.6 million)<sup>141</sup> disbursed</b>
2004	\$11.4 million (SEK83.5 million) disbursed
2003	\$12.7 million (SEK102.9 million) disbursed
2002	\$7.3 million (SEK71 million) disbursed
2001	\$9.8 million (SEK100.9 million) disbursed
2000	\$11.8 million (SEK107.9 million) disbursed
1999	\$9.8 million (SEK83.3 million) disbursed
1998	\$16.6 million (SEK129.5 million) allocated
1997	\$11.9 million allocated
1996	\$10.4 million allocated
1995	\$5.1 million allocated
1994	\$2.6 million allocated
1990-93	\$5.5 million allocated

- Figures do not include victim assistance funding.
- Sweden has in the past funded a number of R&D programs (approximately \$24 million in 1994-1999 and \$1.7 million in 2003), but the total value for 2005 is not known.

In 2005, Sweden's mine action contribution totaled SEK87,554,890 (\$11,719,300), an increase from SEK83.5 million (\$11.4 million) in 2004. Sweden provided mine action funding to three countries in 2005 that had not received funding in 2004: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Philippines. Sweden did not fund mine action in Mozambique in 2005, and decreased funding for Cambodia (from SEK12 million to SEK3.8 million) and Nicaragua (from SEK6.6 million to SEK3.2 million). Sweden continued its support to UNMAS in 2005.

#### DENMARK — \$109.8 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$11.3 million (DKK67.7 million)<sup>142</sup></b>
2004	\$13.7 million (DKK82.3 million)
2003	\$11.9 million (DKK78.6 million)
2002	\$10.6 million (DKK83.5 million)
2001	\$14.4 million (DKK119.4 million)
2000	\$13.4 million (DKK106.7 million)
1999	\$7 million (DKK49.9 million)
1998	\$6.2 million (DKK44.3 million)
1997	\$5.4 million (DKK38.6 million)
1996	\$8 million (DKK57 million)
1995	\$2.3 million
1994	\$2.0 million
1993	\$1.7 million
1992	\$1.9 million

- Figures for 1992-1995 do not include bilateral contributions.
- Denmark reported providing funding of DKK250,000 (\$41,699) to the Nordic Demining Research Forum for research and development in 2005.<sup>143</sup> It has funded other R&D programs in the past, but the value is not known.
- See Denmark country report for more details on mine action funding.

#### SWITZERLAND — \$79.9 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$12.1 million (CHF15.1 million)<sup>144</sup></b>
2004	\$10.9 million (CHF14.8 million)
2003	\$8.8 million
2002	\$8.3 million
2001	\$9.8 million
2000	\$7.4 million
1999	\$5.7 million
1998	unknown
1997	\$4.0 million
1996	\$2.6 million
1995	\$4.1 million
1994	\$3.5 million
1993	\$2.7 million

- The totals since 2000 include significant funds for the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), most of which could be counted as R&D funding, but Landmine Monitor has not identified specific R&D amounts. Swiss funding for the GICHD totaled \$6.4 million

in 2005, \$6.1 million in 2004, \$5.23 million in 2003, \$4.35 million in 2002, \$3.3 million in 2001, and \$2.3 million in 2000, totaling some \$27.7 million from 2000-2005.

Switzerland provided CHF15,094,000 (\$12,114,937) in 2005, an increase from CHF14.8 million (\$10.9 million) in 2004. The 2005 total included CHF8 million (\$6.4 million) for the GICHD and CHF7,094,000 (\$5.7 million) for other mine action activities; non-GICHD spending totaled CHF6.7 million (\$4.8 million) in 2004. In 2005, Switzerland contributed mine action funding to 13 countries, two less than in 2004. Countries receiving funding in 2005 which did not receive contributions in 2004 were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and Vietnam. Those receiving funds in 2004 but not 2005 included Albania, Chad, Georgia, Somalia and Yemen. The 2005 total includes an estimate of CHF2 million (\$1,605,265) for in-kind contributions of nine Ministry of Defense staff for mine action activities in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Eritrea, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, as well as staff and equipment in Sudan. Switzerland reported victim assistance funding of CHF1,125,000 (\$902,962), including CHF300,000 (\$240,790) as “victim assistance—support to MBT.”

#### AUSTRALIA — \$75.1 million

<b>2005-2006</b>	<b>\$8.9 million (A\$11.7 million)<sup>145</sup></b>
2004-2005	\$5.7 million (A\$7.8 million) <sup>146</sup>
2003-2004	\$5.5 million (A\$8.2 million)
2002-2003	\$7.8 million (A\$14.5 million)
2001-2002	\$6.6 million (A\$12.9 million)
2000-2001	\$7.3 million (A\$12.6 million)
1999-2000	\$7.9 million (A\$12.4 million)
1998-1999	\$6.8 million (A\$11.1 million)
1997-1998	\$7.3 million (A\$9.9 million)
1996-1997	\$5.8 million (A\$7.5 million)
1995-1996	\$5.5 million (A\$7.5 million)

• Australia has funded a number of R&D programs in the past, but the total value is not known.

Australia contributed A\$11,666,422 (\$8,897,980) to mine action for its fiscal year July 2005-June 2006, an increase of some 50 percent from the A\$7,756,101 (\$5.7 million) provided in 2004-2005, and the largest amount in three years. Australia has pledged mine action funding of A\$75 million for the period 2005-2009, with priority for heavily mine-affected countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In FY 2005-2006, Australian contributions were directed to seven countries, compared to three the previous year, with Afghanistan, Burma, Laos and Sudan receiving support, in addition to Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Victim assistance activities received A\$3,244,192 (\$2,474,345) in 2005-2006, including significant contributions to ICRC for the Special Appeal for Mine Action 2006 and the Special Fund for the Disabled 2006.

#### ITALY — \$56.5 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$4.5 million (€3.6 million)<sup>147</sup></b>
2004	\$3.2 million (€2.5 million)
2003	\$5.8 million (€5.1 million)
2002	\$8.7 million (€9.9 million)
2001	\$5.1 million (L11.2 billion, €5.6 million)
2000	\$1.6 million (L4.3 billion, €1.7 million)
1999	\$5.1 million (L13.9 billion, €4.8 million)
1998	\$12 million (L20 billion)
1995-97	\$10.5 million (L18 billion)

• Italy has also funded a number of R&D programs, but the total value is not known.

Italy contributed €3,583,600 (\$4,461,224) to mine action activities in 2005, a greater amount than €2,539,500 (\$3,158,630) in 2004. Italy provided funding to fewer countries, six in 2005 compared to nine in 2004. Iraq and Mozambique received funding from Italy in 2005, but not in 2004. Countries which did not receive contributions in 2005 but had the previous year were Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Eritrea and Tajikistan. Italy also continued to contribute to mine action in the Americas with funding to the OAS in 2005. Funding for Sudan increased to €1,522,500 (\$1,895,360) in 2005 from €200,000 (\$248,760) in 2004.<sup>148</sup>

#### FINLAND — \$52 million

<b>2005</b>	<b>\$5.9 million (€4.7 million)<sup>149</sup></b>
2004	\$6 million (€4.8 million)
2003	\$6.3 million (€5.6 million)
2002	\$4.5 million (€4.8 million)
2001	\$4.5 million (€5 million)
2000	\$4.8 million
1999	\$5.7 million
1998	\$6.6 million
1997	\$4.5 million
1996	\$1.3 million
1995	\$0.7 million
1991-94	\$1.3 million

• See Finland country report for more details of Finland's mine action funding.

#### UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — \$50 million

The United Arab Emirates has reported that it provided \$50 million to mine action in Lebanon from 2002-2004 under Operation Emirates Solidarity.<sup>150</sup> The precise year-by-year breakdown of expenditures is not available. The UAE dispersed \$3,332,751 for Lebanon through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund in 2002-2005, including \$310,000 for follow-up activities to the Operation Emirates Solidarity in 2005; presumably this is also part of the multi-year allocation of \$50 million.<sup>151</sup>



### BELGIUM — \$31.5 million

2005	\$4 million (€3.2 million) <sup>152</sup>
2004	\$5.7 million (€4.6 million)
2003	\$6.2 million (€5.5 million)
2002	\$3.6 million (€3.8 million)
2001	\$2.1 million (€2.2 million)
2000	\$2.5 million (BEF111 million)
1999	\$2.3 million (BEF93 million)
1994-1998	\$5.1 million

• R&D totaled €456,314 (\$568,065) in 2005, €1,090,215 (\$1.36 million) in 2004, and \$9.8 million from 1994-2005. In addition, multi-year R&D funding of €905,960 (\$1,127,830) was contributed by the regional Flanders Government in 2005 for the APOPO project.

Belgium contributed €3,201,918 (\$3,986,068), to mine action activities in 2005, including significant in-kind contributions. Belgium contributed €4,547,878 (\$5,656,651) in 2004. In 2005, Belgium provided mine action funding and assistance to 10 countries and Kosovo, twice as many countries as the previous year. Countries receiving funding and assistance in 2005 but not in 2004 included Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Indonesia, Iraq and Liberia. Funding for ICRC was not reported for 2005, but totaled €2 million (\$2.5 million) or 35 percent of total funding in 2004, which more than accounts for the 30 percent decrease in total funding for 2005.

### FRANCE — \$28.6 million

2005	\$3.8 million (€3.1 million) <sup>153</sup>
2004	\$1.9 million (€1.5 million)
2003	\$2.5 million (€2.2 million)
2002	\$3.6 million (€3.8 million)
2001	\$2.7 million (€3 million)
2000	\$1.2 million
1999	\$0.9 million
1995-98	\$12 million

• R&D spending was not reported for 2005. In 2004, R&D contributions totaled €1.4 million (\$2.2 million).

France reported mine action funding of €3,055,000 (\$3,803,170) in 2005.<sup>154</sup> This was more than double the 2004 total of €1,523,845 (about \$1.9 million). Funding was provided to six countries in 2005 (compared to 15 countries in 2004): Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Yemen. Funding to victim assistance totaled €820,000 (\$1,020,818) in 2005, or some 27 percent of total funding. France has reported that it contributes between 17 and 25 percent of EC funding to mine action projects through various channels.<sup>155</sup>

### IRELAND — \$16.3 million

2005	\$2.2 million (€1.7 million) <sup>156</sup>
2004	\$3 million (€2.4 million)
2003	\$2.3 million (€2 million)
2002	\$1.6 million (€1.7 million)
2001	\$2 million (€2.2 million)
2000	\$1.1 million
1999	\$1.5 million
1994-1998	\$2.6 million

Ireland contributed €1,740,000 (\$2,166,126) for mine action in 2005, compared to €2,427,000 (\$3,018,703) in 2004. In 2005, Ireland provided funding to four countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea and Somalia. Victim assistance funding of €200,000 (\$248,980) was provided to Angola in 2005; no victim assistance funding was given in 2004.

### AUSTRIA — \$16.2 million

2005	\$2.2 million (€1.8 million) <sup>157</sup>
2004	\$3 million (€2.4 million)
2003	\$0.9 million (€0.8 million)
2002	\$2 million (€2.1 million)
2001	\$0.9 million (ATS13.7 million)
2000	\$2 million (ATS30 million)
1999	\$1 million (ATS15 million)
1994-1998	\$4.2 million

Austria provided €1,766,752 (\$2,199,430) in 2005. This was a decrease from €2.4 million (\$3 million) in 2004, which marked the highest level for Austrian mine action funding. Austrian contributions benefited seven countries in 2005, as in 2004. The only countries to receive funding from Austria in both 2005 and 2004 were Croatia and Mozambique. Countries to receive funding in 2005 but not in 2004 included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nicaragua, Serbia and Montenegro and Sri Lanka. Victim assistance contributions included funding to ICRC and to a regional program for East Africa. Austria has reported that in addition to bilateral mine action funding, it provides approximately 2.2 percent of overall EC development aid expenditures, which include mine action contributions.<sup>158</sup>

### NEW ZEALAND — \$12.4 million

2005/06	\$0.9 million (NZ\$1.3 million) <sup>159</sup>
2004/05	\$2.5 million (NZ\$3.7 million)
2003/04	\$1.1 million (NZ\$1.6 million)
2002/03	\$0.8 million (NZ\$1.4 million)
2001/02	\$0.7 million (NZ\$1.7 million)
2000/01	\$1.1 million (NZ\$2.3 million)
1999/00	\$0.8 million (NZ\$1.6 million)

1998/99	\$0.5 million (NZ\$0.9 million)
1992-1998	\$4 million (NZ\$6.9 million)

• New Zealand has funded R&D programs, but annual totals are not available.

New Zealand reported contributions totaling NZ\$1,290,723 (\$909,831) for mine action activities during its fiscal year July 2005-June 2006, a decrease from NZ\$3,736,922 (\$2.48 million) in 2004-2006, which was New Zealand's largest contribution ever. In addition to countries funded in 2004, funding was provided to Nepal and Sudan in 2005.

#### SLOVAKIA— 10.9 million

2005	\$7.2 million (SKK218.5 million)
2004	\$3.5 million (SKK101.9 million)
1996-2002	\$230,000

Slovakia reported contributing SKK218.5 million (\$7.2 million) as the value of in-kind contributions of the Slovak Armed Forces in demining operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2005; in 2004, it reported SKK101.9 million (\$3.5 million) in in-kind contributions to those two countries.<sup>160</sup>

#### Other Mine Action Donors

**Spain** provided €1,533,648 (\$1,909,238) in 2005, including in-kind clearance contributions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, and training at its International Demining Training Center. Funding also included contributions from Spanish regional administrations to mine action in Colombia. Spain contributed €978,494 (\$1.2 million) in 2004.<sup>161</sup> Estimated total mine action funding is \$10.1 million.<sup>162</sup>

**Greece** did not report mine action funding in 2005. Previous mine action funding totaled \$9.6 million 2001-2004. In February 2006, Greece contributed €1.9 million (\$2.4 million) for mine action in Iraq to the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) for demining operations; the funds had been pledged in July 2005.<sup>163</sup>

**Luxembourg** provided €1,081,931 (\$1,346,896) for mine action in 2005. Funding benefited six countries. In 2004, \$773,186 in funding was reported. R&D was not reported for 2005, but totaled €2,500 (\$3,110) in 2004.<sup>164</sup> Total mine action funding is \$5.9 million.

**The Republic of Korea** contributed \$1,050,000 to mine action in 2005, including \$1 million for Iraq. \$3.1 million was contributed in 2004. Total mine action funding is \$5.2 million.<sup>165</sup>

**Slovenia** reported contributing \$384,498 in 2005, including \$374,153 through the ITF and contributions to the GICHD. Slovenia provided \$433,861 through ITF in 2004.<sup>166</sup> Total mine action funding is \$3.8 million.

**Iceland** allocated \$1,500,000 in 2005 for prosthetics, specialists, treatment, and training to the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dohuk, Iraq.<sup>167</sup> Total mine action funding is \$2.8 million 1997-2005.

**The Czech Republic** contributed CZK32,886,000 (\$1,370,794) for mine action activities in 2005, a significant increase from \$189,234 in 2004. The bulk of the funds were reported as an in-kind contribution of military mine clearance in Afghanistan. Funding was also provided to four other countries. Estimated total mine funding is \$2.1 million.

**Poland** estimated its in-kind assistance to mine action in 2005 as totaling €1.6 million (\$1.99 million). Polish deminers (137 in total) were engaged in peacekeeping and stabilization missions abroad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syria, and Kosovo.<sup>168</sup>

#### Research and Development Projects Reported by Donors

In 2005, nine countries reported spending about \$30 million on R&D related to mine action, including \$2.1 million for the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The biggest expenditures were by the United States (\$13.2 million), Japan (\$7.4 million), United Kingdom (\$3.2 million) and Canada (\$2.8 million). Other countries are also believed to have devoted funds to mine action R&D, but did not make information available.

Belgium allocated €456,314 (\$568,065) to R&D for six projects, including multi-sensor mine signature detection, the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP), demining software development, and in-kind assistance for demining technology evaluations in Angola.<sup>169</sup>

The Belgian regional government of Flanders provided funding to APOPO of €905,960 (\$1,127,830) for R&D and deployment of rats as biosensors, for the period 2005-2007. The total Flanders contribution to APOPO from 2003-2007 was €1,296,432 (\$1,613,928), including €150,000 (\$186,735) for 2004 not previously reported by Landmine Monitor.<sup>170</sup>

Canada allocated C\$3,153,849 (\$2,603,260) to the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technology (CCMAT) for unspecified research and development projects.<sup>171</sup>

Denmark reported funding of DKK250,000 (\$41,699) to the Nordic Demining Research Forum.<sup>172</sup>

The EC reported €350,000 (\$435,715) in funding to the European Committee for Standardisation for R&D standardization activities in the field of humanitarian mine action.<sup>173</sup>

Japan reported R&D funding totaling ¥811,000,000 (\$7,365,362), including ¥716,000,000 (\$6,502,588) though the Japan Science and Technology Agency for research programs in explosives sensor technology,

*In 2005, nine countries reported spending about \$30 million on R&D related to mine action.*

and an additional ¥95,000,000 (\$862,774) to the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization for research including the improvement of detectors and machinery for use in shrubby areas, and portable demining machines.<sup>174</sup>

Norway provided NOK150,000 (\$23,288) to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) for activities of the Nordic Demining Research Forum, and NOK33,375 (\$5,181) to UNI Consult AS for consultancy on Nodeco/Minecat 230.<sup>175</sup>

The UK DfID provided R&D funding of £1,477,563 (\$2,689,165) in fiscal year 2005-2006. DISARMCO was provided with £206,335 (\$375,530) for its mine incinerator project, Dragon, which has been entirely funded by DfID.<sup>176</sup> ERA was funded with £867,615 (\$1,579,059) to develop and test Minehound, a dual sensor mine detector.<sup>177</sup> Funding of £301,807 (\$549,289) was provided to ITEP/QinetiQ for knowledge, research and advice, and BARIC received £101,806 (\$185,287) for demining advice.<sup>178</sup>

The US Department of Defense spent \$13.15 million on humanitarian demining R&D projects in fiscal year 2005, including the evaluation of prototype demining systems. The US also participates in ITEP to improve existing technologies.<sup>179</sup>

Donors also provided contributions to the GICHD identified as R&D funding. R&D type activities undertaken by GICHD may include research activities into mechanical clearance and biosensor technologies, and the development and distribution of software and information management/data products such as the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

The following donors reported funding totaling \$2,116,202 to GICHD for R&D in 2005:

- Canada: C\$230,440 (\$190,211), consisting of C\$11,342 (\$9,362) as a general R&D contribution, and C\$219,098 (\$180,849) for a GICHD technology officer;<sup>180</sup>
- Denmark: DKK300,000 (\$50,039) as a general contribution of R&D funding;<sup>181</sup>
- EC: €740,000 (\$921,226) for R&D, information and coordination;<sup>182</sup>
- Norway: NOK3,800,000 (\$589,952) for R&D including mechanical mine action systems;<sup>183</sup>
- UK: £300,000 (\$546,000) for GICHD core support for research and knowledge.<sup>184</sup>

In addition, Switzerland provided the GICHD with CHF8 million (\$6.4 million) in 2005, and a total of some \$27.7 million from 2000-2005. Landmine Monitor has included these amounts as part of Switzerland's general mine action funding, rather than R&D, because it has not been possible to consistently distinguish the R&D components.

## States and Victim Assistance

Precise, comprehensive and comparable figures on resources available for mine victim assistance in many countries are difficult to obtain. Some governments do not provide specific funding for victim assistance, but rather consider victim assistance as an integrated part of humanitarian mine action. Even among those governments which do provide some specific victim assistance funding allocations, often a number of victim assistance activities are reported together with other mine action activities and it is not possible to separate all amounts expended.

Despite the complications of identifying specific funding allocations, it is apparent that in many mine-affected countries the assistance available to address the needs of survivors is inadequate and additional outside assistance is needed to provide for the care and rehabilitation of mine survivors.

In the Zagreb Declaration from the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, governments affirmed a commitment that those in a position to do so should respond to the victim assistance priorities of the "24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors." States Parties also declared, "We recognize the urgency of fulfilling all our obligations under the Convention as well as our responsibilities... to landmine survivors."<sup>185</sup> The wording might be interpreted to imply, incorrectly, that States Parties' responsibilities to mine survivors are somehow separate from treaty obligations, however, the expression of urgency in the statement is pertinent.

Sustained support to victim assistance activities by all States Parties is needed, including both donor and mine-affected countries. States Parties at the First Review Conference reiterated the obligations in Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, that "Each State in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims," stating that this "constitutes a vital promise for hundreds of thousands" of mine survivors. In the Nairobi Action Plan, States Parties reasserted their collective commitment to providing external support for victim assistance. Action #36 calls on States Parties to "act upon their obligation under Article 6.3."<sup>186</sup> While support for victim assistance has been increasing, more substantive action is required on the part of States Parties to fulfill these commitments.

In addition to resources provided by states, the European Commission reported funding for mine victim assistance in 2005. The total of funding attributable specifically to victim assistance is not known, however, the EC reported providing €799,684 (\$995,527) to Handicap International for victim assistance in Angola. The EC also contributes funding to programs which include victim assistance components.

The identifiable victim assistance funding for 2005 was some \$37.2 million, a significant increase of about 29 percent from \$28.8 million in 2004. Donor states reported victim assistance funding to at

*In many mine-affected countries the assistance available to address the needs of survivors is inadequate and additional outside assistance is needed to provide for the care and rehabilitation of mine survivors.*

## Donor Mine Victim Assistance Funding 2005<sup>187</sup>

	2005	2004	Total Since 1999
Australia	\$2,474,346	\$1,943,452	\$7,771,029
Austria	\$310,525	\$280,628	\$1,865,172
Belgium	\$1,349,243	\$2,099,552	\$6,842,645
Canada	\$1,927,938	\$1,804,429	\$15,471,278
Czech Republic	\$0	\$15,944	\$182,154
Denmark	\$0	\$0	\$604,414
Finland	\$659,797	\$624,664	\$3,889,925
France	\$1,020,818	\$318,042	\$2,471,667
Germany	\$16,669	\$1,075,887	\$11,123,752
Hungary	\$0	\$0	\$33,910
Iceland	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$1,500,000
Ireland	\$248,980	\$0	\$2,699,936
Italy	\$0	\$0	\$5,946,804
Japan	\$1,024,665	\$186,616	\$7,342,748
Luxembourg	\$62,245	\$6,219	\$2,876,487
Netherlands	\$675,847	\$435,330	\$5,971,220
New Zealand	\$240,109	\$174,530	\$927,225
Norway	\$6,138,818	\$4,737,173	\$35,115,236
Poland	\$0	\$0	\$25,364
Portugal	\$0	\$0	\$285,946
Slovakia	\$0	\$0	\$35,477
Slovenia	\$66,856	\$49,698	\$751,414
South Africa	\$0	\$95,200	\$247,987
Spain	\$267,653	\$0	\$591,316
Sweden	\$0	\$0	\$226,677
Switzerland	\$662,173	\$112,000	\$2,309,083
United States of America	\$18,530,130	\$15,577,227	\$91,308,892
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$37,176,812</b>	<b>\$29,536,591</b>	<b>\$208,417,758</b>

least 22 countries, a decrease from at least 33 countries in 2004.

Several states contributed funding which had not done so in 2004. Many states increased their reported funding of victim assistance by more than 25 percent, including Australia, France, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The greatest increase in dollar terms was made by the United States (an increase of \$2.95 million from 2004). It should be noted that while the US contribution appears to be the largest, this includes the total contribution of the Leahy War Victims Fund (some \$14.4 million, an increase of \$2.47 million from 2004 funding), which supports programs for all victims of war; the percentage of funding that goes to support programs assisting landmine survivors is not available. Others with large dollar increases included Australia, France, Japan, Norway and Switzerland.

It is worth noting that the larger sums identified for victim assistance are influenced by improved methods of tracking financial support and may not represent significantly higher levels of funding in real terms. For example, in 2005 Iceland allocated \$1,500,000 as in-kind assistance to the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in northern Iraq, a specialist

rehabilitation center that treats landmine survivors. Although the amount was identified as a contribution assisting mine survivors in *Landmine Monitor Report 2006* reporting, it was not labeled as survivor assistance funding. Furthermore, due to States Parties' greater awareness of victim assistance (highlighted though the VA 24 process), some of the reported increases are assumed to be the result of clearer reporting of existing victim assistance funding. Some similar contributions were likely to have been made in the past, but not earmarked as victim assistance spending.

Despite the reported increases, current levels of resources available for victim assistance continue to be inadequate for the needs of landmine survivors. Funding shortages were identified during the reporting period which impeded survivor assistance programs in several countries, including among the 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors. Countries with activities which assist survivors that experienced funding shortages included Cambodia, Croatia, Sudan, Tajikistan and Yemen.

The overall level of funding contributed for survivor assistance has been failing to keep up with needs of the existing projects available to the growing



number of landmine survivors requiring assistance. For example, when measured proportionately as a collective UN mine action pillar, only 27 percent of the total sum for all the victim assistance project appeals through the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects was received in 2005 (\$4.7 million received of \$17.5 million requested). In comparison, mine clearance projects received 75 percent of the total of their collective appeals in 2005 (\$115 million received of \$153 million requested). In 2005, victim assistance programs received only 2 percent of the total of funds received through Portfolio appeals (\$4.7 million of a total \$241 million). The UN Portfolio End-Year Review reports that these percentages are consistent with past trends.<sup>188</sup>

The continued lack of substantial long-term funding commitments to victim assistance is a matter of serious concern. Fluctuations in spending on victim assistance programs have impeded the work of implementing organizations, and resulted in reduced levels of services for mine survivors in some

cases. Landmine Monitor reporting has shown that victim assistance programs are highly vulnerable to shifting funding allocations. Existing services have been terminated, and in some cases whole programs have been forced to close,

suddenly leaving mine survivors without services when short-term funding has finished. Increased long-term funding is needed to enable organizations and survivor assistance programs time to build capacity and secure alternative funding sources. Furthermore, with long-term funding organizations can be held more accountable, which is beneficial for both program recipients and donors.

As in the past, some states (including Denmark, Sweden and the UK) did not provide any specific funding for victim assistance. Sweden and the UK take the view that landmine survivors are reached through bilateral development cooperation and other contributions. In 2006, Germany stated that it will fund victim assistance only in exceptional cases, and will concentrate funding on mine clearance.<sup>189</sup>

Experience has shown that unless funding is specifically targeted at facilities and programs that assist people with disabilities, including landmine survivors, it is likely that resources will be directed to other areas of public health or development concern, leaving the disabled population further disadvantaged. With respect to integration of victim assistance into broader development programming, the ICBL favors a twin-track approach that allocates funding to specific victim assistance programs, as well as incorporating victim assistance activities into existing and emerging development programs and the health sector.

Some States Parties have acknowledged the need for sustained commitments specific to assisting

mine survivors and people with disabilities. Having committed to strengthening its support for survivor assistance over the next five years, Australia recognized that “survivor assistance has been one of the lesser funded areas in this convention and that a long term commitment to assisting landmine survivors is needed by both mine-affected countries and donors.”<sup>190</sup>

Equally, if not more important, than international donor funding are the contributions made by mine-affected states to victim assistance. However, information on their contributions is rarely available. The Yemeni government was reported to have contributed \$108,000 to the Yemen Landmine Victim Assistance Program. In Croatia, the state was reported to have allocated KN155,000 (\$26,059) for victim assistance in 2005. Landmine Monitor has recorded victim assistance contributions by Croatia totaling \$76,356 since 2001.

Funding by mine-affected states to areas of the public health system which assist landmine survivors is also rarely reported. However, state facilities and services which address the needs of landmine victims are an essential part of ongoing survivor assistance. States Parties which provide resources to assist mine survivors through the health system, or have enacted legislation which commits funding for survivor assistance through state services, should report on those contributions. For example, Tajikistan has laws entitling mine survivors and other people with disabilities to assistance, including medical care and physical rehabilitation; in its most recent Article 7 report, Tajikistan recorded an allocation of \$235,000 in 2005 for an orthopedic clinic which treats people with disabilities, 10-12 percent of whom were landmine survivors. Mine-affected States Parties should be encouraged to report with as much detail and clarity as possible on how funding through the state system is allocated to assist mine survivors. Such reporting would not only indicate the commitment of States Parties to fulfill Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, it would also support the data collection processes necessary for providing appropriate assistance.

The \$37.2 million in donor country contributions for victim assistance in 2005 is not fully representative of the total resources available to provide assistance to mine survivors. In addition to the contributions of mine-affected states noted above, other sources include numerous private donors and charitable foundations. Some examples in 2005 were: the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund (a UK-based charity) provided \$1.7 million; Adopt-a-Mine-field raised about \$1.3 million; Landmine Survivors Network received \$3.2 million (40 percent of its annual income) in contributions from private grants and individual donations (including funding from the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund).<sup>191</sup> Other examples of funding provided through various means, including individual donations, in-kind

*The overall level of funding contributed for survivor assistance has been failing to keep up with needs of the existing projects available to the growing number of landmine survivors requiring assistance.*

contributions and legacies, are found in various country reports.

Included in the information provided by states are contributions to the ICRC Special Appeal for Mine Action and the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled.<sup>192</sup> In 2005, the ICRC Special Appeal for Mine Action received contributions for its physical rehabilitation programs totaling CHF17,800,000 (\$14,286,861), compared to CHF15.8 million (\$12.7 million) in 2004. The 2005 total included CHF5,224,000 (\$4,192,953) from four countries (Belgium, Canada, Finland and Norway); CHF405,000 (\$325,066) from national societies (Australia, Norway and United Arab Emirates); CHF955,000 (\$766,514) from organizations including Rotary, Soroptimist International and others; and CHF11,216,000 (\$9,002,328) from contributions to the annual emergency appeals.<sup>193</sup>

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled expended CHF4,308,000 (\$3,457,741) on physical rehabilitation programs for people with disabilities, including landmine survivors in 2005, an increase from the CHF4,074,085 (\$3,278,150) reported for 2004. In 2005, five countries (Canada, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States via the Leahy War Victims Fund) contributed CHF3,037,000 (\$2,437,595); seven national societies (Germany, Ireland, Japan, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) provided CHF745,000 (\$597,961); and private donors provided CHF255,000 (\$204,671).

States also report contributions to victim assistance through the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. In 2005, the ITF expended \$1,169,529 on victim assistance, or 4.2 percent of overall spending.<sup>194</sup> This represents an increase from \$717,358 in 2004 (2.9 percent of overall spending), but is significantly less than the \$2,684,100 (10.8 percent) expended in 2003. Expenditure for victim assistance remains far below the ITF target of 15 percent. In 2005, Norway, Slovenia and the United States contributed to victim assistance through the ITF, compared with four countries in 2004 and seven countries in 2003.<sup>195</sup>

## Major Mine Action Recipients

Reliable information regarding major mine action recipients is even more difficult to obtain than for mine action donors. According to available information, the largest recipients of mine action funding over time have been Afghanistan (\$515 million since 1991), Cambodia (\$256 million since 1994), Iraq (\$253 million since 1993), Mozambique (\$214 million since 1993), Angola (\$177 million since 1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$163 million since 1995), Kosovo (\$93 million since 1999), Lebanon (estimated at greater than \$86 million since 2000), Sudan (\$80 million since 2001), and Laos (\$69 million since 1994). Sudan was added to the list of largest recipients for the first time in this edition of Landmine

Monitor. Funding for Sudan more than tripled in 2005 compared to 2004.

The top recipients of mine action funding in 2005 were Afghanistan (\$66.8 million), Sudan (\$48.4 million), Angola (\$35.8), Iraq (\$27.8), Cambodia (\$23.9 million) and Sri Lanka (\$19.1 million).

Only in Sudan did mine action funding increase greatly in 2005 (up \$33.4 million). Other notable increases in 2005 were seen in Guinea-Bissau (\$2.5 million), Albania (\$2.3 million), Uganda (\$1.5 million), Abkhazia (\$1.3 million), Lebanon (\$1.3 million) and Burundi (\$1 million).

Drastic reductions in mine action funding occurred in Iraq (down \$30.9 million, or 53 percent), Afghanistan (\$25 million, or 27 percent), and Cambodia (\$17.7 million, or 43 percent). Other countries with substantial decreases in 2005 included Sri Lanka (\$4.6 million), Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$2.7 million), Mozambique (\$2 million), Jordan (\$1.7 million), Tajikistan (\$1.6 million) and Colombia (\$1.2 million).

### Top Mine Action Recipients in 2005

Afghanistan	\$66.8 million
Sudan	\$48.4 million
Angola	\$35.8 million
Iraq	\$27.8 million
Cambodia	\$23.9 million
Sri Lanka	\$19.1 million
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$15.0 million
Croatia	\$9.1 million
Mozambique	\$7.9 million
Laos	\$7.0 million
Lebanon	\$6.5 million
Vietnam	\$5.8 million
Democratic Republic of Congo	\$4.9 million
Eritrea	\$4.9 million
Albania	\$4.8 million
Azerbaijan	\$4.1 million
Somaliland	\$3.7 million
Nicaragua	\$3.5 million
Guinea-Bissau	\$3.5 million
Abkhazia	\$3.3 million
Ethiopia	\$2.6 million
Yemen	\$2.5 million
Colombia	\$2.3 million
Burundi	\$2.1 million
Cyprus	\$1.9 million
Kosovo	\$1.9 million
Uganda	\$1.7 million
Serbia and Montenegro	\$1.7 million
Nagorno-Karabakh	\$1.3 million
Chad	\$1.2 million
Chechnya	\$1.0 million

## Summary of Major Mine Action

### Recipient Funding

**Abkhazia:** HALO's operations in Abkhazia received about \$3.25 million in 2005. In 2004, HALO received less, about \$2 million.

**Afghanistan:** Reports by donors indicate that 16 countries and the European Commission contributed \$66.8 million for mine action in Afghanistan in 2005. This represents a decrease of some 27 percent from the \$91.8 million provided by 16 countries and the EC in 2004.

**Albania:** Donors reported contributions totaling \$5.32 million in 2005. In 2004, contributions totaling \$3 million were reported.

**Angola:** In 2005, 17 countries and the EC reported contributing \$35.8 million to mine action in Angola, a significant increase from the \$28 million contributed in 2004.

**Azerbaijan:** From donor reports, Landmine Monitor estimated that Azerbaijan received international donations totaling \$4.1 million for mine action in 2005, compared to \$3.21 million in 2004.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** Fifteen countries reported contributing \$15 million for mine action in BiH in 2005, much less than the \$17.7 million in 2004.<sup>196</sup> Landmine Monitor estimated that some \$26.8 million was contributed to mine action in BiH in 2005 from both national and international sources.

**Burundi:** Landmine Monitor estimated that a total of \$2.12 million was contributed by three countries and the EC for mine action in Burundi in 2005, a large increase from 2004 (\$1.1 million).

**Cambodia:** Fourteen countries reported contributing \$23.9 million in 2005. This is a significant decrease from donor funding for 2004 (\$41.7 million by 13 countries and the EC). The decrease primarily reflected Japan's annual contribution falling from \$18.7 million in 2004 to \$4.5 million in 2005; the 2004 contribution had been a six-fold increase from 2003.

**Chad:** The only country to report funding for mine action in Chad in 2005 was the United States, which contributed \$1.17 million. In 2004, four donor countries provided a total of \$1.9 million.

**Chechnya:** In 2005, three countries reported providing \$982,124 for mine action in Chechnya and surrounding regions, an increase from 2004 (\$804,066 from three countries and the EC).

**Colombia:** Seven countries and the EC reported contributing \$2.33 million to mine action in Colombia in 2005. This was a decrease of some 34 percent from the \$3.53 million for 2004.

**Croatia:** Eight countries and the EC reported contributing \$9.08 million, a reduction from \$9.82 million in 2004.

**Cyprus:** The EC provided €1.5 million (\$1.87 million) for demining in the buffer zone in 2005, as part of €4 million (\$5 million) in mine action funding since 2004.

**Democratic Republic of Congo:** Eight countries and the EC reported contributing \$4.86 million to mine action in the DRC in 2005. Five countries and the EC donated \$4.46 million in 2004.

**Eritrea:** In 2005, six donor countries reported contributing \$4.85 million to mine action in Eritrea. Eight donor countries and the EC reported contributing a total of \$4.95 million in 2004. Mine action funding to Eritrea has been decreasing since 2002.

**Ethiopia:** Six countries provided mine action funding totaling \$2.6 million to Ethiopia in 2005. In 2004, funding totaled approximately \$2.3 million.

**Guinea-Bissau:** Two countries reported providing \$349,187 for mine action in Guinea-Bissau in 2005. In 2004, \$998,771 was contributed by three donors.

**Iraq:** Fourteen donors reported providing a total of \$27.8 million for mine action in Iraq in 2005, a decrease of more than half from the \$58.7 million from 13 donors in 2004. US funding alone decreased \$24 million.

**Jordan:** Three countries reported contributing \$468,906 for mine action in Jordan in 2005, a sharp decrease from 2004 when international donors provided some \$2.2 million.

**Kosovo:** Landmine Monitor identified six donors which contributed a total of at least \$1.89 million for mine action in Kosovo in 2005, an increase from approximately \$1.58 million by three countries in 2004.

**Laos:** Ten donor countries reported contributing a total of \$7.2 million to mine action in Laos in 2005, a decrease from \$8.13 million in 2004.

**Mozambique:** Twelve donor countries reported contributing a total of \$10 million to mine action in Mozambique in 2005, a decrease from some \$12 million donated by 14 countries and the EC in 2004.

**Nagorno-Karabakh:** The Netherlands reported providing €667,638 (\$831,143) to HALO for mine clearance and MRE in Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO's budget for 2005 was approximately \$1.33 million.

**Nicaragua:** Landmine Monitor identified at least \$3.5 million donated in 2005 for mine action in Nicaragua by six countries. In 2004, five donor countries reported donating about \$4 million. It is difficult to clearly identify mine action funding for Nicaragua on an annual basis, because many donors designate funds for the Organization of American States' Central America program and not Nicaragua specifically, and some provide multi-year funding.

**Serbia and Montenegro:** In 2005, two international donors provided approximately \$1.7 million to mine action in Serbia and Montenegro (excluding stockpile destruction funding), the same amount as in 2004.

**Somaliland:** Six donor countries reported providing \$3.73 million in mine action funding for activities in Somaliland (as distinct from Somalia) in 2005, compared to \$4.11 million in 2004.

**Sri Lanka:** In 2005, 10 countries and the EC reported \$19.05 million in funding for mine action in Sri Lanka, a decrease from \$23.6 million contributed in 2004 by 12 countries and the EC.

**Sudan:** Landmine Monitor identified contributions in 2005 totaling \$48.4 million for mine action in Sudan, from 14 governments and the EC. This was an increase of \$33.4 million, more than three times the \$14.97 million provided by twelve governments and the EC in 2004. Most notably, Japan contributed more than \$19 million, compared to \$1.2 million in 2004. Since 2001, mine action funding to Sudan has risen sharply each year: \$2.2 million in 2001; \$5.1 million in 2002; \$9.5 million in 2003; \$15 million in 2004; and \$48.4 million in 2005.

**Tajikistan:** Landmine Monitor identified \$924,168 in mine action funding by three donors in 2005, a significant decrease from the \$2.5 million contributed by six donor countries and the EC in 2004.

**Uganda:** In 2005, five donors reported contributing a total \$1.76 million for mine action in Uganda, a large increase compared with \$228,539 reported by two donors in 2004.

**Vietnam:** In 2005, six countries reported providing \$5.74 million for mine action in Vietnam, an increase from the \$4.92 million provided by four countries in 2004.

**Yemen:** Six governments reported contributing approximately \$2.46 million to mine action in Yemen in 2005, a decrease from \$2.64 million in 2004.





# Status of the Convention

## 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a).

As of 1 July 2006, 154 signatories/accessions and 151 ratifications/accessions (a)

### States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)  
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00  
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01  
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02  
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99  
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99  
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99  
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98  
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00  
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99  
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)  
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98  
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98  
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)  
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98  
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00  
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99  
Brunei Darussaleem 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06  
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98  
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03  
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99  
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02  
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01  
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)  
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99  
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01  
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00  
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)  
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 01 (a)  
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)  
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 06  
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99  
Cote d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98  
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03  
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99  
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98  
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98  
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99  
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)  
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)  
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)  
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04  
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98  
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02  
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03  
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98  
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98  
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01  
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03  
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06  
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98  
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98  
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98

Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99  
 Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99  
 Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98  
 Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98  
 Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98  
 Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01  
 Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)  
 Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)  
 Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98  
 Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)  
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99  
 Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03  
 Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99  
 Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)  
 Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99  
 Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98  
 Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99  
 Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00  
 Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98  
 Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01  
 Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00  
 Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98  
 Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
 Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98  
 Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98  
 Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98  
 Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)  
 Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99  
 New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
 Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98  
 Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99  
 Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)  
 Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98  
 Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98  
 Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98  
 Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)  
 Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98  
 Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98  
 Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00  
 Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99  
 Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98  
 Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00  
 Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00  
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98  
 Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99  
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01  
 Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
 San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98  
 Sao Tome e Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03  
 Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98  
 Serbia and Montenegro 18 Sep 03 (a)  
 Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00  
 Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01

Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99  
 Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98  
 Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99  
 South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98  
 Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99  
 Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03  
 Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02  
 Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98  
 Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98  
 Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98  
 Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)  
 Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00  
 Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98  
 Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)  
 Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00  
 Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98  
 Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99  
 Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)  
 Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98  
 Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99  
 Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05  
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98  
 Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01  
 Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05  
 Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99  
 Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98  
 Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01  
 Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

#### **Signatories**

Indonesia 4 Dec 97  
 Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97  
 Poland 4 Dec 97

#### **Non-Signatories**

Armenia	Libya
Azerbaijan	Micronesia
Bahrain	Mongolia
Burma (Myanmar)	Morocco
China	Nepal
Cuba	Oman
Egypt	Pakistan
Finland	Palau
Georgia	Russian Federation
India	Saudi Arabia
Iran	Singapore
Iraq	Somalia
Israel	Sri Lanka
Kazakhstan	Syria
Korea, North	Tonga
Korea, South	Tuvalu
Kuwait	United Arab Emirates
Kyrgyzstan	United States
Lao PDR	Uzbekistan
Lebanon	Vietnam

# Key Developments

## States Parties

### Afghanistan

In May 2006, Afghanistan reported that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed, including 44,819 since the beginning of 2005. Afghanistan served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration from December 2005 to September 2006. The pace of demining accelerated in 2005; the amount of land demined increased by over one-third to almost 140 square kilometers, despite deteriorating security. Mine clearance operations ran into severe funding shortfalls in mid-2006; the laying-off of demining personnel was announced in July, with further cuts expected. Mine risk education reached over 1.8 million Afghans and 2,365 communities in 2005. There were 848 new casualties recorded in 2005, maintaining the relatively constant casualty rate of recent years; however, child casualties continued to increase.

### Albania

In April 2006 the parliament adopted national implementation legislation. Albania revealed that it possesses antivehicle mines with breakwires and that it plans to destroy them. DanChurchAid demined and released 1.38 square kilometers of mine-affected land in northeast Albania in 2005, where mine risk education continued. Most casualties occurred in a different part of the country, caused by explosive remnants of war. In 2005, 23 new casualties were recorded; only two casualties were in the northeast.

### Algeria

Algeria completed its stockpile destruction on 21 November 2005. A total of 150,050 antipersonnel mines of 10 different types were destroyed in 12 destruction events over the course of a year. Algeria served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from December 2004 until December 2005. From November 2004 to 31 March 2006, the army discovered and destroyed 190,858

emplaced antipersonnel mines (six percent of the three million-plus mines on Algeria's eastern and western borders). Algeria also destroyed 10,996 antipersonnel mines laid by its army during the struggle with insurgent groups in the 1990s. In May 2006, the government and UN Development Programme negotiated a cooperation agreement on mine action. There was a significant increase in casualties from mines, unexploded ordnance and victim-activated improvised explosive devices in 2005, with at least 15 people killed and 36 injured.

### Angola

In May 2006, Angola again indicated it may require an extension of its 1 January 2007 deadline for completion of antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction, but the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow extensions. National implementation legislation has been sent to the parliament. In 2005, 14.2 square kilometers of land and 668 kilometers of roads were demined, according to Angola; demining operators reported less clearance. In December 2005, the Executive Commission for Demining was created, to increase the efficiency and capacity of Angola's national demining institutions. The Landmine Impact Survey continued and by May 2006 had been completed in 15 of 18 provinces. In 2006, Angola drafted its first mine action strategic plan, for 2006-2011. It aims to change mine action in Angola to a dual focus on humanitarian requirements and national reconstruction and development requirements. Mine risk education extended to 17 provinces reaching 440,334 people in 2005; the focus changed from an emergency approach to a more development-oriented approach. In 2005, there were at least 96 new casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance, a significant decrease from 2004; most incidents involved antipersonnel mines.

### Bangladesh

Bangladesh served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from December 2004 to December 2005. No mine casualties were reported in Bangladesh in 2005 and January-May 2006; there were eight UXO-related casualties in



2005. Between 1999 and 2005, 163 people were killed and 1,281 were injured by improvised explosive devices, according to initial survey results.

#### **Belarus**

After signing a contract with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency in February 2006, Belarus began destroying its remaining stockpile of 294,755 antipersonnel mines, other than PFM mines. It reported destroying 3,600 antipersonnel mines in 2005. Belarus will also destroy the victim-activated components of its MON-type and OZM-72 mines. The Ministry of Defense signed a "statement of endorsement" to accept technical assistance from the European Commission for the destruction of 3.37 million PFM mines on 6 May 2006, with the goal of starting the project in January 2007. More than 31,000 explosive remnants of war were destroyed in clearance operations in 2005, including almost 3,000 landmines of which 58 were antipersonnel mines. In May 2006, a senior Ministry of Defense official declared that 353 square kilometers of land required clearance. There was one incident with four casualties due to unexploded ordnance in 2005, a decrease from the five incidents and 16 casualties in 2004.

#### **Bhutan**

Bhutan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 18 August 2005 and the treaty entered into force on 1 February 2006.

#### **Bolivia**

Bolivia reported that the process for enacting domestic implementation legislation was underway. On 7 April 2006, the President of Bolivia promulgated the National Plan for Equality and Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.

#### **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Mine clearance and technical survey in 2005 released 10.6 square kilometers of land, more than in 2004 but much less than required by the 2005-2009 strategic plan. Over 100,000 people received mine risk education in 2005. The downward trend in new casualties continued in 2005; 19 casualties were reported. In January 2006, EUFOR found the largest weapons cache since the beginning of its operation in BiH, including more than 500 antipersonnel mines. Hundreds of antipersonnel mines were collected from the population under Operation Harvest in 2005. BiH reported that at the end of 2005, it retained 1,305 active antipersonnel mines, 822 fuzeless mines and 15,343 MRUD (Claymore-type) directional fragmentation mines.

#### **Brunei**

Brunei ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 April 2006. The ICBL undertook an advocacy mission to Brunei in March 2006, and the treaty's Implementation Support Unit visited in early April. Officials confirmed

that Brunei stockpiles only command-detonated Claymore mines, numbering between 500 and 1,000.

#### **Burundi**

Burundi stated that rebels continue to use antipersonnel mines. A general survey was initiated in mid-2005 to determine the extent of contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war. DanChurchAid cleared 1,998 square meters of land, reducing the contaminated area by a further 15.5 square kilometers in 2005. Handicap International trained 255 mine risk education volunteers, who reached nearly 37,000 beneficiaries.

#### **Cambodia**

Cambodia declared that from 2000 to 2005 a total of 71,136 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were newly discovered and destroyed, including 16,878 in 2005, the largest number for a single year. Mine clearance increased by more than 63 percent in 2005, due to increased clearance by the Cambodian Mine Action Center and due to other operators recognizing land under cultivation and free of accidents as low-risk. This area reduction strategy was endorsed by the government in May 2006. In 2005, there were 875 new landmine/UXO casualties, maintaining the daily average of two new casualties since 2000. To address this, the mine risk education strategy was revised in 2006. Twenty-two deminer casualties were recorded in 2005, but only 14 were accounted for by known operators. For the first time, the Cambodian armed forces sent deminers to join a UN peacekeeping mission.

#### **Chad**

The National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO was revised in 2005 to take account of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for clearance of all mined areas; however, it aims only for "zero victims" and "no impact" by the 2009 deadline. The Council of Ministers approved national implementation legislation in October 2005 and submitted it to parliament. A UN assessment in July 2005 concluded that management and financial problems jeopardized Chad's mine action program; in December, UN financial support was suspended after Chad failed to provide its pledged funding for mine action; UNDP reinstated some funding in mid-2006. In 2005, 285,172 square meters were cleared of mines, with an additional two square kilometers of battle area clearance. Two mine risk education campaigns reached around 110,000 Sudanese refugees and local people in 2005. Some emergency MRE was undertaken after renewed conflict in April 2006. The number of recorded casualties continued to increase, despite limited data collection; in 2005, there were at least 35 casualties, and from January to June 2006, there were at least 54 new casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance.

## Chile

A proposal by Chile and Argentina for expanded reporting on mines retained for training and development purposes was agreed by States Parties in December 2005. Chile announced that in 2006 it would destroy 1,292 antipersonnel mines no longer needed for training, in addition to 300 mines expected to be consumed during training. Chile is still preparing legislation to more fully and specifically implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Between April 2005 and April 2006, Chile cleared 2,239 antipersonnel mines and 843 antivehicle mines. Two new demining fronts were opened, in Tambo Quemado in July 2005 and in Lullaillaco National Park in February 2006. Chile fenced 14 newly mine-suspected areas between August and December 2005. An agreement was signed for \$1 million in European Commission funding for mine action in Chile. There were two landmine casualties and six UXO casualties in 2005, an increase from 2004 (no mine casualties).

## Colombia

Non-state armed groups, most notably FARC, continued to use antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices extensively. Colombia initiated mine clearance of the military bases. Clearance of one base was completed, was ongoing in a second, and impact surveys had been carried out on 17 bases. Despite inadequate data collection, Colombia recorded a significant increase in casualties in 2005: 1,110, approximately three casualties per day, compared with 882 in 2004, 734 in 2003 and 627 in 2002.

## Democratic Republic of Congo

In May 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo told States Parties that it had completed the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines under its control that it had been able to identify, and thus fulfilled its treaty obligation. It also said it expected to find additional stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the future, which it would destroy. There have been a few reports of rebel use of antipersonnel mines during conflict related to the demobilization process. In 2005, mine action in DRC received only three percent of funding requested through the consolidated appeals process and 22 percent of funding requested through the UN portfolio process. One mine action operator closed operations in DRC due to lack of funding. A total of 446,498 square meters of land and 60.6 kilometers of roads in inhabited areas of Equateur, Katanga and Orientale provinces were cleared during 2005; 1,172 mines, 28,337 items of unexploded ordnance and 49,288 other explosive remnants of war were destroyed. Mine risk education continued to be limited, but UNICEF for the first time received funding for activities in four provinces. In 2005, there were at least 45 casualties, including 14 people killed and 31 injured; less than in 2004 and much less than in 2003.

## Cook Islands

Cook Islands ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 March 2006, and the treaty entered into force for the country on 1 September 2006.

## Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire indicated that it is not mine-affected, despite recent armed conflict. The United Nations peacekeeping mission and French forces carried out 18 operations to dispose of unexploded ordnance. Two children were killed by unexploded ordnance in 2005.

## Croatia

Croatia hosted the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005. It served as President of the Meeting, a position with responsibilities until the next Meeting of States Parties in September 2006. In May 2006, Croatia stated that it had removed the tilt rods from its TMRP-6 mines. The Croatian company, Agencija Alan, removed TMRP-6 mines from its website and sales catalogues. On 15 December 2005, parliament passed the Law on Humanitarian Demining and the Law on Special Rights for Social Security and Pension Insurance for the Humanitarian Demining program. Of the total of 32 square kilometers planned for demining, Croatia released only 27.2 square kilometers. Parliamentarians criticized the slow pace of demining and limited implementation of victim assistance. There were 20 recorded landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, more than in 2004.

## Cyprus

A national plan for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including stockpile destruction and mine clearance, was finalized in August 2005. Cyprus destroyed 11,000 antipersonnel mines in 2005 and another 18,000 were slated for destruction in 2006. In May 2006, Cyprus made known its positions on certain matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Clearance of National Guard minefields in the buffer zone was completed in July 2005. In August 2005, an agreement was reached to clear Turkish forces' minefields inside the buffer zone. As of April 2006, 20 of the 48 minefields in the buffer zone had been cleared, with the release of more than 900,000 square meters of land. Cyprus reported the destruction of 237 antipersonnel mines in two Republic-controlled mined areas outside the buffer zone in 2005.

## Denmark

In November 2005, Denmark announced that it would allocate DKK86 million (nearly US\$15 million) to clear landmines from the Skallingen peninsula, which it first reported as a mined area in its Article 7 report in 1999. In May 2006, a British commercial company was selected from among the five companies that pre-qualified. Denmark ratified CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 28 June

2005. Denmark destroyed 1,929 of its retained antipersonnel mines in training activities in 2005, leaving 60 mines.

#### **Djibouti**

Djibouti enacted national implementation legislation in March 2006.

#### **El Salvador**

El Salvador joined CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 23 March 2006. In March 2006, El Salvador reiterated that it does not have a mine problem. Nine mines and 370 items of unexploded ordnance and other explosive devices were discovered and destroyed by the National Civilian Police in 2005. A total of 4,823 people received risk education. In 2005, there were at least four mine/ERW casualties. As of 11 May 2006, El Salvador—one of the 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors—had not submitted Form J of its annual Article 7 report nor otherwise provided updates on its victim assistance plans.

#### **Eritrea**

In May 2006, the UN arms embargo monitoring group reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia. Eritrea denied the claims as “baseless and unfounded” and labeled the report as “outrageous and regrettable.” In October 2005, Eritrea reported that it no longer retains any live mines for training purposes. Eritrea has not reported any national measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, as required by Article 9. Eritrea ended the UN mine action capacity-building program that was suspended in mid-2005 following government seizure of demining vehicles. In October 2005, the UN suspended mine clearance adjacent to the Temporary Security Zone when Eritrea banned UN helicopter flights (needed for medical evacuation during demining). Eritrean demining teams cleared almost 2.2 square kilometers of land in 2005. Over 129,000 people received mine risk education, including safety briefings for 3,433 UN peacekeepers, staff and NGO workers. There were 68 recorded new casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance, a significant increase from 2004.

#### **Estonia**

During 2005, planned clearance operations destroyed 2,066 items of unexploded ordnance, including more than 890 items in the south, more than 400 on Saaremaa Island and more than 400 in the northeast of the country; only four of these items were mines. From 1 January to 7 May, 559 explosive items were found, two of which were mines.

#### **Ethiopia**

Ethiopia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 June 2005. Ethiopia has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 28 November 2005. In October 2005 and May 2006, the UN arms embargo monitoring group for Somalia reported that the government of Ethiopia had provided unspecified types of landmines to factions in Somalia; Ethiopia strongly denied the allegations. In 2005, Ethiopia reported that more than 11 square kilometers of land was demined (area reduction of seven square kilometers of land and clearance of 4.3 square kilometers), destroying 184 antipersonnel mines, 98 antivehicle mines and 6,607 items of unexploded ordnance; according to the UN Development Programme, some six square kilometers was returned to civilian use in 2005. Norwegian People's Aid began operating in Ethiopia in November 2005; it developed a mine detection dog and area reduction/technical survey capacity in Ethiopia. In April 2006, the European Commission pledged at least €8 million (US\$10 million) to mine action in Ethiopia over three years. There were at least 31 new casualties in 2005, more than in 2004, but data collection remained inadequate.

#### **France**

Although there are no recorded mined areas in mainland France, it has treaty obligations in respect of any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere. France announced that it planned to initiate clearance of antipersonnel mines around its ammunition depot in Djibouti in October 2006, more than seven years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

#### **Greece**

In 2005, the Greek Army battalion, TENX, surveyed almost 2.25 square kilometers in various locations across the country, mainly in the Grammos and Vitsi mountains in the northwest. As of 10 April 2006, 10,002 of the 24,751 antipersonnel mines had been cleared from the minefields on the Evros River bordering Turkey. In 2005, at least seven people were killed and one other was injured in the Evros minefields. Landmine Monitor identified one instance of rehabilitation and other assistance provided to a civilian mine survivor in Greece.

#### **Guatemala**

On 15 December 2005, Guatemala completed its National Demining Program and declared that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. A mobile demining unit was created to respond to reports of residual mines and explosive remnants of war. In 2005, 23 mines were discovered in clearance operations, 114,479 people in 495 mine-affected communities received mine risk education, and there were at least two people killed and seven injured by unexploded ordnance. In December 2005, Guatemala became co-chair of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

### **Guinea-Bissau**

On 17 October 2005, Guinea-Bissau completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,654 antipersonnel mines, just ahead of its 1 November 2005 treaty deadline. In March and April 2006, a faction of the Senegal-based Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance laid antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau, causing civilian casualties and significant socioeconomic disruption. Casualties in 2005 fell by almost half from 2004, but by June 2006 had risen again to double the 2005 level. As of June, there were 37 new casualties, mostly the result of one incident causing 28 casualties. The capital, Bissau, became free of mined areas by the end of June 2006.

### **Guyana**

As of June 2006, Guyana had not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 July 2004.

### **Haiti**

Haiti ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 February 2006 and it entered into force on 1 August 2006.

### **Honduras**

In 2005, Landmine Monitor recorded the first new mine casualty in Honduras since reporting began in 1999.

### **Jordan**

Jordan offered to host the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2007. Jordan became co-chair of the Standing Committee for Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in December 2005. Jordan published its first five-year mine action plan in June 2005. To accelerate mine clearance in efforts to meet its Article 5 deadline, Jordan decided that Norwegian People's Aid should start clearance operations in 2006; clearance was previously carried out only by army engineers. The army reported clearing a total of 2,943,380 square meters of land in 2005. A strategy and annual plan for mine risk education was agreed. There were at least seven new casualties in 2005.

### **Kenya**

In 2005, the newly established International Mine Action Training Centre, a joint British-Kenyan project, trained and equipped deminers from Kenya, Nigeria, Somaliland and Uganda. In 2006, it provided training to deminers from Rwanda and Sudan. Handicap International started a two-year project to provide mine risk education to Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp in Kenya. During 2005, 16 casualties were recorded in one landmine incident.

### **Latvia**

Latvia became a State Party on 1 January 2006. It submitted its initial Article 7 report, which indicates a stockpile of 2,410 mines will be destroyed in 2006, while 1,301 mines will be retained for training. During 2005, more than 8,000 explosive remnants of war including 200 antitank and antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed. In August 2005, Latvia's explosive ordnance disposal school was formally accorded the status of a national educational institution with the right to issue state diplomas. In early 2006, a private store of explosive ordnance was found in a farm in eastern Latvia; one civilian was injured trying to neutralize one of the devices.

### **Liberia**

On 16 September 2005, Liberia joined Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Liberia has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report since October 2004. It has not enacted any national implementation measures. Liberia has declared no mined areas containing antipersonnel mines. The little information available indicates a small residual risk from landmines and a greater risk from unexploded ordnance. Landmine Action UK conducted a pilot project in early 2006, which revealed at least 14 previously unreported casualties since November 2004, and a need for risk education and improved reporting of explosive ordnance.

### **Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)**

In July 2006, FYR Macedonia destroyed all 4,000 mines previously retained for research and training purposes. For the first time it expressed its view on issues related to Articles 1 and 2, agreeing with the positions of the ICBL and many States Parties. In May 2006, FYR Macedonia declared that clearance of the remaining minefields would start in June 2006. The Protection and Rescue Directorate became operational in June 2005 for clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance; in December it presented a plan to clear all mines by September 2006 and all unexploded ordnance by 2009. There was one casualty, from unexploded ordnance, during 2005.

### **Mauritania**

New national implementation legislation has been drafted. Mine clearance resumed in early 2006 after being suspended for the whole of 2005 due to lack of funds. In 2005, the National Humanitarian Demining Office continued with marking, surveying and small-scale explosive ordnance disposal; it released 960,000 square meters of suspected hazardous areas and cleared 43 items of unexploded ordnance. Mauritania and the UN mission in Western Sahara held a meeting to discuss further regional cooperation in mine action.



### **Moldova**

In May 2006, Moldova for the first time expressed its views on issues related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, agreeing with the positions of the ICBL and many States Parties. Moldova announced its intention to destroy in 2006 all 249 mines previously retained for training. Moldova does not consider that territory under its control is mine-affected, but unconfirmed reports indicate that antipersonnel mines may remain in some areas. In 2005, there were 14 civilian casualties caused by unexploded ordnance, including four children killed.

### **Mozambique**

The National Demining Institute's problems with the recording and reporting of mine action data persisted in 2005 and early 2006. It claimed that humanitarian demining operators cleared 11.3 square kilometers of mined land in 2005; however, the operators reported clearance of only 3.9 square kilometers. Some humanitarian operators continued to re-survey suspected mined areas identified by the Landmine Impact Survey and further confirmed its deficiencies. Two deminers were killed and three others injured during demining in 2005. The Accelerated Demining Program closed for lack of funding. Two of the other three largest operators, Norwegian People's Aid and HALO Trust, planned to close field operations in 2006 and 2007. A total of 57 new mine/UXO casualties in 23 incidents were reported in 2005, almost twice the casualties in 2004 and four times as many as in 2003. The approved Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper includes actions in favor of people with disabilities, including mine survivors.

### **Namibia**

The Namibian Defence Force continued to conduct limited survey operations in Kavango and Western Caprivi regions in 2005 but did not find any mines. The Namibian Police destroyed five mines and 3,300 unexploded ordnance across the country during 2005. In March 2006, Namibia stated that it was "mine-safe," but that it was not ready to declare itself mine-free until the completion of ongoing surveys. In 2005, 12 people were injured by mines and unexploded ordnance.

### **Nicaragua**

Nicaragua served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration until December 2005. Nicaragua ratified CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 15 September 2005. A total of 353,562 square meters of land were cleared in 2005, less than in 2004, and 86 percent of the clearance plan for the year. Nicaragua postponed completion of its National Humanitarian Demining Program to 2007, due to clearance delays and continuing discovery of mines not included in military records.

In 2005, 92,257 people in 303 high-risk communities received mine risk education; programs were revised in early 2006 in view of continuing mine/UXO casualties. In 2005, casualties doubled with 15 new mine/UXO casualties recorded; another six casualties had occurred by May 2006.

### **Niger**

National implementation legislation, Law 2004-044, was adopted on 8 June 2004.

### **Panama**

Panama's National Environmental Authority declared in September 2005 that it would clear former US military ranges contaminated by unexploded ordnance.

### **Peru**

Clearance was conducted of mines and explosive fragments around 375 electricity towers. In April 2006, Peru and Ecuador initiated clearance operations around the Chira river area, postponed from 2005. Limited mine risk education was provided by a Peruvian NGO. Reported casualties increased in 2005.

### **Philippines**

The rebel New People's Army stepped up its use of command-detonated improvised antivehicle mines, resulting in many more casualties. Landmine Monitor media analysis found 145 mine/IED casualties reported in 2005, a nearly 300 percent increase on the 47 casualties reported in 2004. The Armed Forces of the Philippines reported seizures of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from the NPA. The Moro National Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group continued to plant antivehicle mines in their ongoing battles with the army.

### **Rwanda**

A draft national implementation law has been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. The demining program was activated by the training and equipping of deminers in early 2006. By May 2006, Rwanda's demining workforce had increased by 150 personnel. Mines Awareness Trust deployed three technical advisors in May 2006 to support the newly trained deminers. In 2005 and 2006, landmine casualties continued to increase despite incomplete data collection, reportedly due to economic necessity and a lack of mine risk education.

### **Senegal**

Rebels from an MFDC faction used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in Guinea-Bissau in March 2006. In August 2005, Senegal adopted national implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty. This included authorization for a national mine action authority and a mine action center. In October 2005, the UN Development Programme and Handicap International initiated an emergency landmine

impact survey in Casamance; preliminary results indicated that 93 villages are affected by landmines. In 2005, 10 new casualties were recorded, a decrease from 17 casualties in 2004.

### **Serbia and Montenegro**

Serbia and Montenegro began destroying its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in August 2005 and by March 2006 had destroyed 649,217 mines, almost half of its stockpile. A new Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia entered into force on 1 January 2006, which criminalizes antipersonnel mines. In 2005, 963,775 square meters of mined areas and battle areas were cleared in Serbia. In Montenegro, the Regional Center for Underwater Demining initiated a general survey of contamination in Plav and Rozaje municipalities in May 2006. No civilian casualties were reported during 2005. No funding was provided nationally or internationally for mine survivor assistance plans proposed annually since 2004.

### **Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since February 2004. It has not enacted any national implementation measures.

### **Sudan**

Sudan cited a stockpile of 14,485 antipersonnel mines, adding 5,000 SPLA mines to the previous total; it intends to retain 10,000 of these mines for training purposes. It is continuing to do an inventory of stockpiled mines. On 24 December 2005, a national mine action authority and mine action center were created, and a South Sudan mine action center. Demining organizations cleared almost three times as much land in 2005 as in 2004, with similar survey and clearance capacity. Over 1.3 square kilometers of mined area were cleared. In 2005, some US\$61.5 million was estimated spent on mine action (including mine action support to peacekeeping). MRE activities increased significantly and expanded to new areas of Sudan; 316,188 people were reached in 2005 with special emphasis on returnees. There were at least 79 casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance in 2005, more than in 2004; in 2006 there were at least 29 casualties by 21 May.

### **Suriname**

With the support of the Organization of American States, Suriname cleared the last 13 antipersonnel mines from its territory between February and April 2005.

### **Swaziland**

The Swaziland Defence Forces informed Landmine Monitor in 2006 that Swaziland cannot declare with certainty whether the country remains mine-affected. In March 2006, the Ministry of Defence accepted the offer of international assistance to assess the mine

situation and develop a clearance plan in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty deadline.

### **Tajikistan**

State authorities report destroying 80 antipersonnel mines in December 2005 seized during law enforcement operations. Tajikistan consumed 30 mines for training of deminers in 2005; this was reported using the new expanded Article 7 report format for retained mines. Swiss Foundation for Mine Action demining teams cleared 129,156 square meters in 2005, a big increase made possible by an expansion in demining capacity. A mine detection dog center opened in April 2006. Shortfalls in donor support jeopardized plans to achieve higher productivity in 2006. In May 2006, Tajikistan completed a victim assistance plan for 2005-2009. Casualties increased for the third consecutive year to 20. From 18 to 30 July 2005, the first camp for 32 child mine survivors was held, providing mine risk education and survivor assistance.

### **Tanzania**

In May 2006, Tanzania stated it was in the process of adopting national implementation legislation. It intends to acquire 1,000 additional mines for use in its project to train mine detection rats.

### **Thailand**

The Thailand Mine Action Center initiated area reduction in 2005 in a bid to accelerate demining; the area released (5.9 square kilometers) was three times greater than in 2004. The center proposed to the cabinet that it should convert from a military organization under the armed forces to become a civilian organization. In January 2006, this was endorsed at a high-level review of Thailand's mine action program; a proposal was submitted to the government in May. Funding cuts led to the units responsible for most of the demining in Thailand to lose more than half their workforce in 2006. Mine risk education increased, with over 333,000 people reached. There were an estimated 43 new mine casualties in 2005; plans were discussed for nationwide collection of mine casualty data. A plan for survivor assistance was drafted in December 2005.

### **Tunisia**

Tunisia joined CCW Amended Protocol II on 23 March 2006. As of 15 April 2006, the army had cleared 90 percent of the Ras Jedir minefield, destroying 3,503 antipersonnel mines and 785 anti-vehicle mines.

### **Turkey**

Turkey declared a stockpile of 2,979,165 antipersonnel mines, a larger figure than reported before; for the first time it included 22,788 artillery-delivered ADAM mines in the total. Turkey reported that in December 2005, the NATO Maintenance and Supply

Agency and a company signed an agreement to establish a new facility to destroy stockpiled mines. In May 2006, Turkey said that the victim-activation components of M18 Claymore mines will be destroyed. On 18 July 2006, the Kurdistan Workers' Party committed to a ban on antipersonnel mines by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. There were at least 220 new landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, a significant increase from 168 in 2004 and 67 in 2003. A total of 2,171 mines were cleared from 300,000 square meters of land in 2005. The process of inviting national and international companies to tender for clearance of mined areas, in return for their free use of the land, was contested in parliament.

#### **Uganda**

Ugandan forces have continued to seize landmines from the Lord's Resistance Army. There have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines in 2005 or early 2006. Uganda submitted two Article 7 transparency reports in 2005. The National Steering Committee for Mine Action met for the first time in January 2006; in February it began drafting legislation in support of mine action. In April 2006, the Uganda Mine Action Centre opened; almost 60 personnel from the army and police were seconded to it. By May 2006, mine action needs assessments were ongoing in two districts and technical survey continued in three other districts. In 2005, 40 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded. Casualties continued to be reported in 2006, with at least 22 by May.

#### **Ukraine**

Ukraine deposited its ratification on 27 December 2005 and the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 June 2006. In February 2006, the European Commission awarded a €5.9 million contract for the destruction of Ukraine's 5.95 million PFM-type mines. An EC €1 million tender for the destruction of an additional recently identified 716,746 non-PFM antipersonnel mines was cancelled. The UN conducted an inter-agency assessment in December 2005; the report had not been completed as of 1 June 2006. Ukraine approved a three-year program to dispose of ammunition at the Novobohdanovka military base. Mine risk education was initiated in 2005 on a regional basis. There were 16 new casualties from unexploded ordnance in 2005, a decrease from 2004.

#### **United Kingdom**

Although there are no recorded mined areas in mainland UK, it has treaty obligations in respect of any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere. More than seven years since becoming a State Party, the UK has not initiated clearance of mined areas on the Falkland Islands. The UK and Argentina met five times in the reporting period to discuss implementation of a feasibility study, which was expected to take place between November 2006 and March 2007.

#### **Vanuatu**

Vanuatu ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 September 2005 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2006.

#### **Venezuela**

In July 2005, Venezuela provided for the first time a timetable for clearance of the antipersonnel mines laid around its six naval posts. In May 2006, Venezuela declared that it would not initiate clearance operations before 2007 because Navy combat engineers needed demining equipment and additional training.

#### **Yemen**

Yemen elaborated its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, taking strong positions mirroring those of the ICBL and many other States Parties. A UN monitoring group reported the transfer of unspecified types of mines by Yemen to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia in July 2005. Area reduction through technical survey released more than 100 square kilometers of mine-affected and suspected land in 2005. Clearance operations released another 1.8 square kilometers. One deminer was killed during clearance operations. In March 2006, a socioeconomic and livelihood study was started to assess the socioeconomic returns from mine clearance. Mine risk education reached 191,262 people in 92 communities during 2005. Casualties doubled in 2005, compared to 2004. Several survivor assistance and disability organizations withdrew from Yemen in 2005-2006, and national organizations faced funding difficulties.

#### **Zambia**

In 2005, the Zambia Mine Action Centre was restructured, which limited its operations. A three-year strategy was developed with the goal of clearing mines and unexploded ordnance from 41 dangerous areas by 2007. Lack of progress led to revision of the program targets and, in May 2006, Zambia drafted the Mine Action Completion Plan, which aimed to meet its 2011 Article 5 deadline. In March 2006, Zambia announced free healthcare for people living in rural areas, including mine survivors, abolishing fees introduced in the early 1990s.

#### **Zimbabwe**

There were two isolated instances of farmers using antipersonnel mines to protect crops. Clearance of the Victoria Falls-Mlibizi minefield was completed in October 2005. A total of 25,959 mines were destroyed in the minefield, including 6,959 in 2005. In May 2006, Zimbabwe reported that only half of its minefields had been cleared, leaving a significant challenge in meeting the 1 March 2009 treaty deadline. Mine risk education in mine-affected areas resumed

in 2006. In 2005, 14 new casualties including seven children were recorded. Seven Zimbabweans were also involved in landmine accidents in Afghanistan and Taiwan in 2005.

## Signatories

### Indonesia

In October 2005, the President of Indonesia formally gave his approval to start the ratification process for the Mine Ban Treaty. A draft ratification law is under review.

### Marshall Islands

The Marshall Islands voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution promoting the Mine Ban Treaty, after abstaining in earlier years.

### Poland

Documents for Poland's ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty have been undergoing interministerial consultations. Poland declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005; it dismantled 12,990 expired stockpiled mines in 2005. In 2005, Polish military teams carried out 7,698 responses to mines and explosive remnants of war, clearing 6,138 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 39,160 explosive remnants. In addition, the police disposed of 281 grenades, 828 fuzes and detonators, 1,642 items of unexploded ordnance and 26,029 pieces of ammunition.

## Non-Signatories

### Armenia

The UN reported in 2005 that Armenian authorities have decided to submit to the UN Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, the annual transparency reports required by the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II. Armenia completed a landmine impact survey, and teams from the Ministry of Defense demined 125,000 square meters of land. UNICEF conducted trainings in mine risk education in April 2006, and started to develop a mine risk education strategy. In 2005, five people were injured by mines and unexploded ordnance, a decrease from the 15 casualties reported in 2004.

### Azerbaijan

For the first time, Azerbaijan voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Azerbaijan said it may provide a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report. In 2005, Azerbaijan demined almost seven square kilometers of land, similar to productivity in 2004. During the first quarter of 2006, almost 2.3 square kilometers were demined. Reported casualties increased in 2005 from 32 to 59 owing to a

single UXO incident that killed three people and injured 23 others. Two survivor assistance projects began in April-June 2006. Pensions for war-disabled people were increased in April 2006.

### Burma (Myanmar)

Both the military junta and non-state armed groups have continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively. The Myanmar Army has obtained, and is using an increasing number of antipersonnel mines of the United States M-14 design; manufacture and source of these non-detectable mines—whether foreign or domestic—is unknown. In November 2005, Military Heavy Industries reportedly began recruiting technicians for the production of the next generation of mines and other munitions. The non-state armed group, United Wa State Army, is allegedly producing PMN-type antipersonnel mines at an arms factory formerly belonging to the Burma Communist Party. In October 2005, the military junta made its first public statement on a landmine ban since 1999. There were at least 231 new mine casualties in 2005. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-France closed its medical assistance program and withdrew from Burma, due to restrictions imposed by the authorities.

### China

In December 2005, China voted for the first time in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. From the late 1990s to 2005, China destroyed nearly 2.2 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines that had either expired or did not comply with CCW Amended Protocol II. China launched a new project to clear landmines from its border with Vietnam, and conducted mine risk education in nearby villages. It provided a three-month training course in Thailand, and sent a demining battalion to Lebanon in April 2006 to support the UN. One mine casualty was reported.

### Egypt

The National Council for Human Rights organized a landmine conference in December 2005—the first major landmine event to be held in Cairo since April 2000. The conference recommended that Egypt reconsider its stance on the Mine Ban Treaty and former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called on Egypt to accede. The ICBL's Diplomatic Advisor met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior defense officials; the Foreign Minister said that Egypt was no longer insistent on the legal question of user responsibility for mine clearance. There were reports of use of landmines by militants in 2005. Media reported that in April 2006, the Ministry of International Cooperation and the UN Development Programme would initiate a demining project; this has not been confirmed. In 2005, there were at least 16 new casualties, and by the end of June 2006, a further 15 casualties were recorded.



### **Finland**

At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Finland reiterated its commitment to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by 2012 and destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2016.

### **Georgia**

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Georgia said that its position on non-accession to the Mine Ban Treaty was being reconsidered. It re-stated its commitment not to use, produce, import or export antipersonnel mines. Georgia hosted a workshop on confidence-building and regional cooperation through mine action in Tbilisi in October 2005, the first government-sponsored international landmine event in Georgia. There were reports that Georgian combat engineers cleared mines in South Ossetia in 2005. At least 31 new casualties were reported in 2005, a decrease from 2004.

### **India**

Non-state armed groups have continued to use mines and improvised explosive devices in many parts of India. India participated as an observer in all three major Mine Ban Treaty meetings in the reporting period. The government of Canada undertook the first high-level advocacy mission to India in March 2006. India undertook demining to allow delivery of relief across the Line of Control to Pakistani earthquake victims. There were at least 336 casualties from mines and improvised explosive devices in 2005, and 271 from January to May 2006.

### **Iran**

In 2005, UNDP revised its proposal for assistance to mine action, and awaited response from Iran's mine action center as of May 2006. In January 2006, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining signed an agreement to provide mine action training. Iran and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding in December 2005 to clear landmines from their border. A mine risk education committee was formed in December 2005, which developed a strategy and action plan. At least 109 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in 2005.

### **Iraq**

Iraqi officials have continued to express strong interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Opposition forces have continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as antivehicle mines. Coalition forces have discovered many caches of antipersonnel mines. Reduced international funding for Iraq (down by half from 2004) plus deteriorating security significantly hindered mine action in all but the northern regions; some contracts and operations ended early. The National Mine Action Authority reported a sharp drop in mine clearance in 2005. The authority's second

director general in two years was replaced in October 2005. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey completed surveying 13 of Iraq's 18 governorates in April 2006, but suspended survey in Tikrit and Diyala due to lack of security. As of May 2006, the survey had recorded 565 casualties in two years (over 20 percent were children) and 7,631 less recent casualties. In 2005, there were at least 358 casualties, an increase from 2004, and likely an underestimate as there is no effective casualty surveillance in Iraq.

### **Israel**

The Israel Defense Force destroyed 15,510 outdated stockpiled mines in 2005. Israel extended its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines for three years in July 2005. Clearance operations were conducted in the northern part of the Jordan Valley in 2005, following the displacement of mines as a result of flooding.

### **Kazakhstan**

An official told Landmine Monitor that Kazakhstan is preparing to destroy its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, most of which are expired.

### **Republic of Korea**

South Korea reported a stockpile of 407,800 antipersonnel mines, instead of the two million it indicated previously. South Korea produced Claymore-type mines for the first time since 2000. It exported Claymore mines to New Zealand in December 2005. South Korean troops started clearance of three minefields in the Civilian Control Zone and seven military bases in the south. In 2005, there were at least 10 new landmine casualties.

### **Kuwait**

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, and a draft accession law was submitted to the National Assembly. Kuwait voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution for the first time since 1998. In 2005, eight new casualties caused by mines and unexploded ordnance were reported, a significant decrease from the 20 casualties reported in 2004. From January to May 2006, there were seven new casualties; all were foreign nationals.

### **Kyrgyzstan**

A project for survey and marking of mined areas and for mine risk education was started by Danish Demining Group in partnership with Border Guards and local NGOs.

### **Lao People's Democratic Republic**

In July 2005, Laos confirmed its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the future. Donor concerns over the institutional structure led to a drop in finan-

cial support in 2005; the government appointed the National Regulatory Authority's first director in December. UXO Lao reported a sharp increase in productivity in 2005, demining 15.7 square kilometers of land. Two demining organizations received authorization for clearance operations in 2005 and one more in early 2006. There were 164 new casualties in 91 incidents (54 percent were children), fewer than reported than in 2004. Two studies were conducted, on the impact of the scrap metal trade on casualties from unexploded ordnance, and on victim assistance.

### **Lebanon**

For the first time, Lebanon voted in favor of the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution in the First Committee; it was absent from the final vote. An internal review process that could lead to accession was underway. Lebanon was considering submission of a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report. The ICBL undertook a special advocacy mission to Lebanon in June 2006. Two square kilometers of mine-affected land was cleared in 2005, and a further 3.9 square kilometers of mined and mine-suspected land was released through survey. The National Demining Office drafted a mine action policy giving itself responsibility for management of the mine action program and involving civilian institutions in priority-setting. A nationwide technical survey started in 2005; 9.8 square kilometers of suspected area had been surveyed by May 2006, resulting in the cancellation of 7.2 square kilometers as not contaminated. Mine risk education was delayed by the security situation, but resumed in late 2005. There were 22 new casualties in 2005, a significant increase from 2004.

### **Mongolia**

Mongolia has initiated its step-by-step approach to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008. Amendments to the Law on State Secrets are being prepared in order to exclude landmines from the secrecy list and place details regarding the number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the public domain. Army engineers disposed of more than 1,000 items of explosive ordnance in 2005. One civilian was reported injured by unexploded ordnance in 2005.

### **Morocco**

Morocco voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty for the second consecutive year. It announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties its intent to submit a voluntary Article 7 transparency report. Between April 2005 and April 2006, 289 mines and items of unexploded ordnance were marked and 7,074 items of explosive ordnance, mostly Polisario's stockpiled antipersonnel mines, were destroyed. In 2005, there were at least nine new casualties.

### **Nepal**

On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. Prior to the cease-fire, both sides continued to use landmines and/or improvised explosive devices. The UK suspended training for the army's explosive ordnance disposal unit in February 2005, but resumed in August 2005 and delivered new equipment. Casualties from all kinds of explosive devices appeared to be lower in 2005 than 2004; efforts were made by NGOs to create a nationwide casualty data collection system. The majority of casualties were children. Mine/explosives risk education gathered pace, involving many local and international organizations.

### **Pacific Islands (Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu)**

In May 2006, Palau expressed its hope to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006.

Micronesia completed a review of the Mine Ban Treaty and was drafting accession legislation to submit to congress. In December 2005, Micronesia for the first time voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

### **Pakistan**

Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices extensively in Baluchistan province, and to a lesser extent in Waziristan and other areas of Pakistan. Mine risk education was carried out by NGOs and to some extent by Pakistani authorities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in Pakistani Kashmir; the British NGOs Islamic Relief and Response International started new mine risk education projects in 2005-2006 in Pakistani Kashmir. In 2005, there were at least 214 casualties from mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices, an increase from 195 in 2004. In 2006, casualty rates continued to increase, with at least 263 casualties as of 14 May.

### **Russian Federation**

Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor in June 2006 that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. CCW Amended Protocol II entered into force for Russia on 2 September 2005. Clearance teams undertook over 300 tasks in 2005 to deal with explosive remnants from World War II, destroying 40,000 explosive items, including 10,500 mines. Landmine Monitor identified 305 new casualties in at least 82 incidents in 2005.

### **Somalia**

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) reiterated its intention to join the Mine Ban Treaty. There apparently has been ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by various factions in different parts of the country. In May 2006, the UN arms embargo monitoring group reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia. In October 2005, the monitoring group reported that members of the TFG, including its president, and an opponent of the TFG had been involved in weapons transfers that included unspecified types of landmines. The monitoring group also stated that the governments of Ethiopia and Yemen had provided unspecified types of mines to factions in Somalia. The Somali region of Puntland completed a Landmine Impact Survey of three regions in 2005. The survey found 35 mine-impacted communities, equivalent to an estimated 6 percent of the communities of the three regions. At least 276 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in 2005, a significant increase over the previous year. Police explosive ordnance disposal teams in Puntland reported the destruction of more than 3,000 items of unexploded ordnance between July 2004 and the end of 2005. Puntland Mine Action Center staff, jointly with EOD personnel, started providing mine risk education.

### **Sri Lanka**

Since December 2005, suspected LTTE use of command-detonated Claymore mines has escalated greatly, and the Army has in a few instances alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the rebels. Eleven operators demined 19.5 million square meters of land in 2005, more than five times as much as in 2004, as a result of increased manual and mechanical clearance capacity and increased area reduction. However, renewed hostilities in early 2006 severely constrained demining operations in contested areas, resulting in much reduced clearance. Mine risk education expanded, reaching more than 630,000 people in 2005; 80 percent of schoolteachers in the mine-affected provinces have been trained in mine risk education. There were 38 new landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, significantly fewer than the 56 casualties in 2004.

### **Syria**

In April 2006 the Syrian Army completed clearance operations in Hanoot Saida village in southern Golan, and in Hameedia village north of Quneitra city; 1,564 antivehicle mines were cleared and destroyed. UN forces cleared and destroyed six antipersonnel mines, 177 antivehicle mines and 34 items of unexploded ordnance in 2005. In 2005, there was a significant increase in reported casualties from mines and UXO over 2004 and 2003; there were at least 11 new casualties in 2005 and nine from 1 January to 22 May 2006. Following a mine incident on the Golan Heights in January 2006 in which five children were injured, the governmental committee,

formed in 2004 to promote mine risk education in the affected border areas, was re-energized and activities were undertaken in schools.

### **United States of America**

The US government spent over \$95 million in fiscal year 2005 on humanitarian mine action programs, compared to over \$109 million in fiscal year 2004, the biggest change being a significant decrease in special funding being allocated to mine action in Iraq. The Pentagon requested \$1.3 billion for research on and production of two new landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between fiscal years 2005 and 2011; these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. Congress ordered a Pentagon study of the possible indiscriminate effects of Spider, thereby deferring the Pentagon's decision expected in December 2005 on whether to produce Spider.

### **Uzbekistan**

In October 2005 Uzbekistan reported it had cleared one fifth of its border with Tajikistan and several areas around Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan

### **Vietnam**

During the visit of a Canadian government delegation in November 2005 to promote the Mine Ban Treaty, officials from both the defense and foreign ministries insisted that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines. Several officials indicated that Vietnam will join the treaty at some point and stressed that it already respects the spirit of the treaty by not producing, selling or using antipersonnel mines. The pilot phase of the UXO and Landmine Impact Assessment and Technical Survey concluded in May 2005. Two NGOs ceased working in Vietnam at the end of 2005. UNICEF received five-year funding for mine action focusing on mine risk education and advocacy. There were at least 112 new casualties in 2005.

## **Other**

### **Abkhazia**

The amount of land cleared and reduced by HALO Trust in 2005—more than 2.5 square kilometers—was a record for the organization's program in Abkhazia. During 2005, HALO declared the Gali region and the Gumista river valley near Sukhum mine impact-free. In 2005, 15 new mine/UXO casualties were reported, a significant increase from 2004 (six casualties).

### **Chechnya**

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. Chechen forces have continued to use improvised explosive devices extensively. Clearance teams cleared 5,000 items of explosive ordnance in Chechnya and Ingushetia, including 32 landmines

cleared from railway lines. National NGOs supported by UNICEF, ICRC and Danish Demining Group/ Danish Refugee Council provided mine risk education in Chechnya and to displaced people in the northern Caucasus. UNICEF recorded 24 new landmine/UXO casualties, continuing the reduction in casualties in recent years. To make casualty data more accurate, changes were made to the data collection and recording system. UNICEF conducted the first training on trauma counselling for 22 child psychologists from Chechnya. ICRC secured treatment for Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan.

### **Kosovo**

In 2005, demining operations cleared more than 4.3 square kilometers of land, a 10 percent increase on productivity in 2004, destroying 719 antipersonnel mines, 30 antivehicle mines, 977 cluster bomblets and 1,378 other items of UXO. In December 2005, Handicap International ended its demining activities in Kosovo after six years of operations. By the end of 2005, 15 dangerous areas still required clearance; of these, three contained a mine threat and the remaining 12 were contaminated with cluster bomblets. There were also 53 areas requiring a technical survey and possibly also clearance. At least one of the demining operators is convinced that this understates the residual contamination, and planned an assessment mission for mid-July 2006 to define the remaining threat from cluster munitions and landmines. In 2005, 11 new casualties were recorded, a decrease from 2004; all were caused by cluster bomblets or other unexploded ordnance, and most were the result of tampering.

### **Nagorno-Karabakh**

In 2005, HALO demined more than 7.9 square kilometers of mined area by clearance and survey, and a further 13 square kilometers of land by battle area clearance. HALO also provided mine risk education to about 7,700 people. There were significantly fewer casualties reported than in 2004 when casualty rates peaked.

### **Palestine**

There were reports of Palestinian use of antivehicle mines in June and July 2006 during Israeli military action in Gaza. A UN mine action assessment in September 2005 criticized the Palestinian Authority for its lack of an effective response to the threat from landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices, which increased when Israeli settlers and military withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005. There were 46 people killed and 317 people injured in 187 incidents in 2005, an increase from 2004. In early 2006, efforts were made to

revitalize the National Mine Action Committee. Palestinian police explosive ordnance disposal teams conducted 1,162 explosive ordnance disposal tasks in 2005, compared to 939 in 2004.

### **Somaliland**

In 2005, the two international demining NGOs Danish Demining Group and HALO Trust demined more than 18 square kilometers of land, the great majority of which was battle area clearance by HALO; 602 antipersonnel mines, 99 antivehicle mines, over 20,000 explosive remnants of war and large quantities of ammunition were destroyed. In March 2006, Danish Demining Group ceased all mine clearance in Somaliland. In 2005, 93 new landmine/UXO casualties were recorded; two-thirds were children and almost one-third were female; casualties occurred in all six regions. Mine risk education increased, reaching at least 30,000 beneficiaries from January 2005 to June 2006.

### **Taiwan**

In June 2006, Taiwan enacted legislation that bans production and trade of antipersonnel mines, but not stockpiling and use, and requires clearance of mined areas within seven years. In September 2005, the President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vice President of the Legislative Yuan all signed statements committing to a ban on antipersonnel mines and demining. A contract awarded to MineTech International to clear mines on Kinmen Island was suspended after an explosion in April 2005 in which two deminers were killed and a third injured. A legislator said the Ministry of National Defense cancelled funding for demining in 2006 after the government proposed a major purchase of arms. Officials said demining would resume in 2007 and that the Ministry had proposed a NTD4.2 billion (US\$131 million) budget to clear all remaining minefields after 2009.

### **Western Sahara**

In November 2005, the Polisario Front signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment renouncing antipersonnel mines. Polisario destroyed over 3,000 of its stockpiled mines in February 2006. Between April 2005 and April 2006, the UN mission in Western Sahara discovered and marked 289 mines and unexploded ordnance, and monitored the destruction of 7,074 items of explosive ordnance, mostly stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Landmine Action UK started an explosive ordnance disposal and technical survey project in mid-2006. Antipersonnel mines caused at least two casualties in 2005, and there were at least eight mine casualties from January to May 2006.





18 September 1997

# Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

## Preamble

### The States Parties

*Determined* to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

*Believing* it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

*Wishing* to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

*Recognizing* that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

*Welcoming* the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

*Welcoming* also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

*Welcoming* furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Stressing* the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by

the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

*Recalling* the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

*Basing* themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

## Article 1

### General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:

- a) To use anti-personnel mines;

b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

## Article 2

### Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

## Article 3

### Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

## Article 4

### Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

## Article 5

### Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

a) The duration of the proposed extension;

b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

(ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and

(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with para-

graphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

## Article 6

### International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

## Article 7

### Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all



destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

## Article 8

### Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secre-

tary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compli-

ance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

## Article 9

### National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

## Article 10

### Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

## Article 11

### Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
  - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
  - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
  - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## Article 12

### Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years

after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  - a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  - b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
  - c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  - d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## Article 13

### Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depository of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

## Article 14

### Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

## Article 15

### Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

## Article 16

### Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depository.

## Article 17

### Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratifica-

tion, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## Article 18

### Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

## Article 19

### Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

## Article 20

### Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depository and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depository. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

## Article 21

### Depository

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depository of this Convention.

## Article 22

### Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.





# Notes

- <sup>1</sup> As of 1 July 2006.
- <sup>2</sup> The ICBL generally uses the short title, Mine Ban Treaty; other short titles in use include: Ottawa Treaty, Ottawa Convention, Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, and Mine Ban Convention.
- <sup>3</sup> Of the 84, 65 were signatories who ratified and 19 were non-signatories who acceded.
- <sup>4</sup> Seventeen states abstained from voting for UNGA Resolution 60/80 in December 2005: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
- <sup>5</sup> Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)—142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)—147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)—139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V)—143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)—138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)—143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)—153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; and 2005 (Resolution 59/84)—157 in favor, none against, 22 abstentions.
- <sup>6</sup> The five states not party who were absent were Lebanon (which voted in favor in the First Committee), Mongolia (which voted in favor of every previous annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution since 1998), and Laos, North Korea and Saudi Arabia (all absent from every previous vote).
- <sup>7</sup> Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment, a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action.
- <sup>8</sup> The full name is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.
- <sup>9</sup> In a June 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, India confirmed that it “has not sought any deferral for any provision” of Amended Protocol II. There has been confusion on this point because India has on occasion referred to modifying its non-detectable mines “well before the stipulated period” of Amended Protocol II.
- <sup>10</sup> Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by CCW Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. India has explored development of such systems. The Mine Ban Treaty requires Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, and Ukraine by 1 June 2010. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan and the United Kingdom have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.
- <sup>11</sup> Since publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, 10 states ratified Protocol V in this order: Bulgaria, Norway, Holy See, El Salvador, Slovakia, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Albania, Tajikistan, and most recently on 6 June 2006, the Czech Republic. Sweden was the first to ratify Protocol V, in June 2004, followed by Lithuania, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Nicaragua and Liberia.
- <sup>12</sup> See past editions of *Landmine Monitor Report* for details. Angola, Ecuador and Ethiopia have admitted using antipersonnel mines as signatories. Landmine Monitor has cited credible allegations of use while a signatory by Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. Other current States Parties who used antipersonnel mines since the early 1990s as non-signatories include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Eritrea, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>13</sup> FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional; AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. See report on Colombia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
- <sup>14</sup> There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.
- <sup>15</sup> Thirty-three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>16</sup> Nine States Parties have not officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in Article 7 reports: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. For many of these states the production of antipersonnel mines ceased prior to entry into force of the treaty.

- <sup>17</sup> Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor also removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (which became Serbia and Montenegro) from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.
- <sup>18</sup> As of 1 July 2006, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Rep. of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>19</sup> In the cases of Burundi, Greece and Sudan, the actual physical destruction of mines had not begun as of mid-2006. Landmine Monitor considers states to be "in progress" if they have reported they are formulating destruction plans, seeking international financial assistance, conducting national inventories, or constructing destruction facilities.
- <sup>20</sup> The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Togo, and Trinidad & Tobago. A number of these apparently had stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including Eritrea, Rwanda and Senegal.
- <sup>21</sup> Of the 71 choosing not to retain antipersonnel mines, 20 once possessed stockpiles.
- <sup>22</sup> Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, São Tomé e Príncipe, Ukraine and Vanuatu have not indicated whether they intend to retain antipersonnel mines; most have not yet submitted an Article 7 report. Of these eleven, only Ethiopia, Guyana and Ukraine are thought to possess mines.
- <sup>23</sup> Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.
- <sup>24</sup> Seventeen States Parties retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Colombia, Republic of Congo, Denmark, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>25</sup> The following 14 States Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2005: Belgium (356), Canada (50), Chile (29), Croatia (164), Germany (41), Honduras (11), Ireland (8), Japan (1,596), Mozambique (151), Nicaragua (19), Slovenia (1), Sweden (396), Tajikistan (30) and Turkey (850).
- <sup>26</sup> The 11 States Parties which made use of the expanded Form D are: Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, Moldova, Nicaragua, Romania, Tunisia and Turkey.
- <sup>27</sup> The 55 States Parties not submitting updates were: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay. This number does not include the six States Parties with pending deadlines: Bhutan, Brunei, Cook Islands, Haiti, Ukraine and Vanuatu.
- <sup>28</sup> A total of 49 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>29</sup> A total of 23 States Parties are in the process of enacting legislation: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda.
- <sup>30</sup> A total of 40 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new legislation is necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Central African Rep., Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Estonia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Jordan, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela.
- <sup>31</sup> Those without progress toward national implementation measures include: Angola, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Latvia, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
- <sup>32</sup> [www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JR2C?OpenDocument](http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JR2C?OpenDocument).

- <sup>33</sup> Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>34</sup> Australia, Czech Rep., New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>35</sup> Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yemen and Zambia.
- <sup>36</sup> States Parties that acknowledge possessing Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines include: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brunei, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Honduras, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>37</sup> States Parties that declare not possessing or having destroyed Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines included as part of their stockpile destruction programs include: Albania, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, Czech Rep., El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Yemen.
- <sup>38</sup> Article 7.1 of the Mine Ban Treaty states, "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General...on: g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4."
- <sup>39</sup> Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
- <sup>40</sup> This overview summarizes detailed information in country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor. Unless otherwise indicated, see the relevant country report for sources of information.
- <sup>41</sup> In accordance with the definition laid down by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the area demined includes that released by survey as well as through mine and battle area clearance.
- <sup>42</sup> Moreover, the figure of 740 square kilometers does not fully reflect the extent of demining as Iran, one of the world's largest demining programs, declined to provide statistics for 2005, as did some others.
- <sup>43</sup> "Demining" refers collectively to the activities of survey, assessment, area reduction, marking and fencing and all other activities preparatory to "clearance," as well as post-clearance survey. Mine "clearance" refers to the destruction of mines *in situ*, or their removal from the ground and subsequent destruction elsewhere.
- <sup>44</sup> This total combines UXO and AXO but does not include, where known, pieces of small arms ammunition, which would increase the total significantly.
- <sup>45</sup> The figures given in the table have been disaggregated based on the available evidence and input from operators. The figures presented are those given by the operators where they differ from the mine action center. In the case of Ethiopia, the figures are those provided by the Ethiopian Mine Action Centre.
- <sup>46</sup> In Honduras in November 2005, however, a mine was reported to have killed a farmer in the municipality of El Paraíso, in an area on the Honduran side of the border with Nicaragua that had previously been demined. It is not known what action has been taken by the Honduran authorities to verify the area is safe, nor whether this was a newly laid mine or one that had been missed by earlier demining operations. El Salvador claims to have freed its territory from mine contamination to international standards in 1994, before becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- <sup>47</sup> Belarus, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Estonia, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone and the US. A number of other countries also have explosive remnants of war from World Wars I and II.
- <sup>48</sup> Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty applies to States Parties regardless of when antipersonnel mines were emplaced, or by whom, and will similarly apply to any antipersonnel mines that may be laid in the future.
- <sup>49</sup> For example, Guinea-Bissau and Jordan appear to have eschewed the full LIS in favor of a cheaper and more lightweight impact survey.
- <sup>50</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina is made of two entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation (the larger of the two), and Brcko District.
- <sup>51</sup> Argentina also asserts its jurisdiction over the Falklands (Malvinas) and therefore accepts obligations under Article 5.
- <sup>52</sup> This summary of the status of mine-affected States Parties, as of May 2006, is based on results of research conducted for *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, including but not restricted to official statements. Clarifications in response to this table are welcomed.
- <sup>53</sup> Nairobi Action Plan, Action #27, "Final Report of the First Review Conference," APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.
- <sup>54</sup> Statement by the OAS on Suriname, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005.
- <sup>55</sup> Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2006. The report actually claims that Guatemala is "free of antipersonnel mines." It does not refer to antivehicle mines, although it has reported finding and destroying antivehicle mines in the past.
- <sup>56</sup> Iraq is not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but since 2004 government officials have said that they are favorably inclined to joining the treaty.
- <sup>57</sup> GICHD, "A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique," Final Report, October 2005, p. 25.
- <sup>58</sup> Ruth Bottomley, Norwegian People's Aid, "Community Participation in Mine Action, A Review and Conceptual Framework," December 2005, p. 4.
- <sup>59</sup> A Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) study undertaken in Afghanistan asked locals: "Some people take risks and go to dangerous areas. Why do they do so?" The generic reply, "because of economic and financial problems," received 45 percent, and the three main specific activities mentioned were grazing cattle, collecting firewood and collecting scrap metal. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA), "KAP Analysis 2004/2005, Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan," Kabul, 2006, p. 25.



- <sup>60</sup> Six countries were dropped from last year's list because no MRE activities were reported (Bangladesh, Estonia, Latvia, Malawi, Moldova, and Serbia and Montenegro) and five were added due to new activities (China, Côte d'Ivoire, Peru, Tunisia and Ukraine).
- <sup>61</sup> States Parties with MRE programs include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>62</sup> Non-States Parties with MRE programs include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma/Myanmar, China, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Vietnam.
- <sup>63</sup> The areas are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland and Western Sahara.
- <sup>64</sup> Landmine Monitor recorded 8.4 million people in 2003, 4.8 million in 2002, and smaller numbers in previous years.
- <sup>65</sup> Sri Lanka and Thailand are new additions to the top five; last year Ethiopia and Laos held those spots.
- <sup>66</sup> States Parties reporting on MRE in 2005 included Afghanistan, Albania, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>67</sup> MRE that is too basic does not go beyond lecture-style approaches and in many countries does not include school-based MRE.
- <sup>68</sup> Honduras, although self-declared mine-free, had one mine victim in 2005. For this reason it reappears on the list. Suriname, after a mine clearance operation including community liaison, is considered mine-free and was removed from the list.
- <sup>69</sup> National NGOs operated in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen, as well as in Chechnya, Somaliland and Western Sahara.
- <sup>70</sup> International NGOs operated in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DR Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam, as well as in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland.
- <sup>71</sup> The ICRC stated that it supported preventive mine action activities in 27 countries, but did not list them all. ICRC, "Special Report Mine Action 2006," Geneva, May 2006, p. 8. Landmine Monitor has information on MRE activities by national societies, usually with technical and financial support from ICRC, and at times by ICRC itself, in 24 countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel/OPT, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Russia (Northern Caucasus), Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo), Sudan, Syria and Tajikistan.
- <sup>72</sup> UNICEF supported mine action activities in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Indonesia (advocacy), Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Russia (Northern Caucasus), Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as Palestine and Somaliland.
- <sup>76</sup> See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 40.
- <sup>74</sup> Many entities providing security training incorporate landmine and ERW safety into their briefing packages, including military training centers for peacekeeping troops, UN Department of Safety and Security, World Food Program, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the NGO training organization RedR-IHE.
- <sup>75</sup> Joanne Durham, "From Interventions to Integration: Mine Risk Education and Community Liaison," *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
- <sup>76</sup> States Parties with community-based MRE programs include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda. Non-States Parties with community-based MRE include Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. There were community-based MRE activities in Chechnya, Kosovo, Palestine and Somaliland.
- <sup>77</sup> Ruth Bottomley, "Evaluation Report for Handicap International France, Strengthening and Promoting Associations and Community Networks for Sustainable Mine Risk Education [in Angola]," Lyon, May 2005, p. 6.
- <sup>78</sup> UNICEF/GICHD, "A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR," Geneva, September 2005, pp. 5-6.
- <sup>79</sup> UNICEF/GICHD, "An Evaluation of UNICEF-supported UXO Risk Education Projects in Lao PDR," Geneva, October 2005, p. 5. The four key recommendations were: initiate a multi-province UXO risk education needs assessment; engage in a strategic planning process for the overall program with all relevant stakeholders based on that assessment; establish a national victim surveillance system that fully covers risk education needs; and continue to support development of an MRE coordination mechanism.
- <sup>80</sup> Ruth Bottomley, "Community Participation in Mine Action, A Review and Conceptual Framework," Norwegian People's Aid, December 2005, pp. 30-35.
- <sup>81</sup> Sheree Bailey, Victim Assistance Specialist, GICHD, "Developing SMART objectives and a national plan of action – the role of inter-ministerial coordination," Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
- <sup>82</sup> For the purposes of Landmine Monitor research, casualties include the individuals killed or injured as a result of an incident involving antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). When it was clear that a device was command-detonated, these incidents were excluded. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, all casualties identified as IED casualties were excluded from the totals as they appeared to be command-detonated incidents. From the information available in many countries, it is not always possible to determine with certainty the type of weapon that caused the incident. Where this level of detail is available, information is included in the country report.
- <sup>83</sup> These include Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan and Western Sahara.

- <sup>84</sup> *Landmine Monitor* reported 6,521 casualties for the year 2004 in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, but due to the ongoing nature of data collection, additional casualties occurring in 2004 have been registered in several countries, including Colombia, DR Congo and Sudan.
- <sup>85</sup> Moreover, even the number of *reported* new casualties should be viewed as a minimum, as many heavily mine-affected countries were not able to provide statistics for the full year or for the whole country. Some reports refer to several people killed or injured without giving a specific figure; these reports and any with “estimates” are not included in the total.
- <sup>86</sup> There are some indications that this estimate should be revised and reduced, but at this point there is insufficient country data on which to base a new estimate.
- <sup>87</sup> The figures for mine casualties involving women and children should also be viewed as a minimum; the gender and age of casualties is often not identified; the gender and age of 2,450 casualties unknown.
- <sup>88</sup> In mine-affected countries where the media is the main source of information, reported casualties are predominantly military. In Colombia, for example, where a data collection mechanism has been established and the country is experiencing armed conflict, 69 percent of 1,110 recorded casualties in 2005 were military personnel. Reported mine/UXO casualties in Colombia account for 15 percent of casualties recorded by *Landmine Monitor* in 2005. Therefore, the high percentage of military casualties in Colombia impacts on the overall global percentage of military to civilian casualties. In contrast, in Cambodia, a country at peace, only one percent of 898 casualties were military.
- <sup>89</sup> *Landmine Monitor* recorded 305 casualties in Russia in 2005 compared to just six in 2004, but this increase is primarily due to more extensive research in Russian-language sources.
- <sup>90</sup> *Landmine Monitor* also recorded far fewer casualties in Burundi and Georgia in 2005 than 2004, but further review indicates the 2004 data was not accurate.
- <sup>91</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 29.
- <sup>92</sup> Most database management systems only have the capacity to record casualties reported to them, but not to actively identify casualties in mine-affected areas.
- <sup>93</sup> Survivor assistance planners and providers in Afghanistan, Laos, and elsewhere have also noted this to *Landmine Monitor*, and have cited other systems such as CMVIS in Cambodia, INSEC in Nepal, IHSCO in Iraq, and Epi.info systems.
- <sup>94</sup> This compares with 33 countries and six areas reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*.
- <sup>95</sup> “Incomplete Data Collection” means the system does not cover all mine-affected areas or does not allow analysis, or relevant actors have stated data is incomplete for other reasons. “Data Management System” includes IMSMA and all other types of formal data collection, but not media analysis. “Adequate Assistance” does not mean everyone is served or the system is perfect; assistance is considered inadequate if relevant actors state it is, or if it is clear that the services do not meet the needs of people with disabilities in general. “Disability Law” indicates whether there are specific laws, not whether they are enforced, which is mostly not the case. “Form J” indicates the presence of victim assistance information in Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 voluntary Form J; it does not reflect the quantity or quality of the information. There were 98 casualties in 2004 that do not appear on this chart because they occurred in the seven states that were dropped from *Landmine Monitor’s* list this year due to no casualties in 2005 or 2006, but they are included in the total casualty figure for 2004. For reasons of comparison, in the case of Chechnya, UNICEF data were used, whereas in the total casualties in 2004 the results of *Landmine Monitor* media analysis in Chechnya were also included.
- <sup>96</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 27.
- <sup>97</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 27. *Landmine Monitor* provides information on facilities available to people with disabilities regardless of the cause of disability and where possible identifies the number of mine survivors accessing these services.
- <sup>98</sup> The VA 24 are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen. Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33.
- <sup>99</sup> These thematic areas are: data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies.
- <sup>100</sup> Specific: quantifiable change compared to current situation; Measurable: system to measure progress in place; Achievable: can be met by 2009 with a reasonable amount of effort; Relevant: constitute important improvement of current situation; and Time-bound: no later than 2009.
- <sup>101</sup> GICHD, “Process Support provided by the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD to States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention that have reported the responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors,” 8 February 2006, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>102</sup> A victim assistance specialist for Burundi was included in the List of Participants of the Standing Committee Meetings, but *Landmine Monitor* could not verify this person’s presence.
- <sup>103</sup> Mine-affected: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen (used Form I) and Zimbabwe. Non-mine affected: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Sweden. At least 11 other countries used Form J to report on matters other than victim assistance and funding, including: Argentina, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Malawi, Nigeria, Poland, Rwanda and Slovakia.
- <sup>104</sup> This reflects an overview of total progress (or the lack thereof) in the field of victim assistance, not an evaluation of specific activities, based on the information *Landmine Monitor* has been able to obtain. *Landmine Monitor* considered the following indicators: number of mine/UXO casualties; improved existing projects or newly implemented projects in the areas of data collection, medical care coverage, rehabilitation, socioeconomic reintegration, and psychosocial services; improved implementation of disability rights; increased national coordination and capacity; and quality of progress reporting and participation in treaty forums (including survivor participation) between May 2005 and May 2006. Specific information can be found in the country reports in *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*.

- <sup>105</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, pp. 31-32.
- <sup>106</sup> As of July 2006, only eight donor countries had reported their funding contributions on the UN Mine Action Investments database for 2005. Donor reporting to the UN database (accessible at [www.mineactioninvestments.org](http://www.mineactioninvestments.org)) has declined over the last five years (18 in 2001, 11 in 2002, 10 in 2003, 12 in 2004, 8 in 2005). Fourteen States Parties reported mine action funding contributions for 2005 in Form J of their Article 7 transparency reports, but of these, only seven contained enough appropriate and detailed data to be useful for analysis. Some funding data was contained in CCW Amended Protocol II National Annual Reports. Other data was provided directly to Landmine Monitor by donors.
- <sup>107</sup> In some cases, donors are not reporting on calendar year 2005. Among the countries reporting for different fiscal years are the US (October 2004-September 2005), Canada (April 2005-March 2006), UK (April 2005-April 2006) and Australia and New Zealand (July 2005-June 2006). As in the past, donor funding information for Japan has been disaggregated on a calendar year basis.
- <sup>108</sup> Unlike the past three years when the increase in global mine action funding as expressed in US dollars was inflated by the declining value of the dollar, in 2005 the relative leveling of exchange rates against the US dollar means that the decrease this year was not much influenced by the dollar's value. For example, the Euro increased in value by less than a 0.09 percent versus the dollar in 2005, compared to an increase of about 10 percent in 2004. For the Euro, Landmine Monitor has used these average rates: in 2005: €1 = US\$1.2449; in 2004: €1=US\$1.2438; in 2003: €1=US\$1.13; in 2002: €1=US\$0.95; and in 2001: €1=US\$0.90. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2006.
- <sup>109</sup> Funding increased every year since 1992, except for 2001 when Landmine Monitor reported a reduction of \$4 million while noting, "Given uncertainties and anomalies in gathering mine action data, this reduction is not statistically significant. Indeed it is at least partially attributable to fluctuating exchange rates with the US dollar."
- <sup>110</sup> UNMAS, "Annual Report 2005," pp. 60, 64.
- <sup>111</sup> For fiscal year 1 October 2005-30 September 2006. Average exchange for 2005: Baht 40.252 = US\$1. US Federal Reserve, "Foreign Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2006; *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 570.
- <sup>112</sup> However, the Chad government was reported to have failed to or delayed in delivering its pledged share of mine action funding in 2005, adversely affecting operations during the year. See report on Chad in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
- <sup>113</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, pp. 94-105.
- <sup>114</sup> See [www.gichd.ch/1067.o.html](http://www.gichd.ch/1067.o.html).
- <sup>115</sup> Statement by Canada, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
- <sup>116</sup> Amb. Martin Dahinden, (former) Director, GICHD, "Humanitarian Demining at a Crossroads: a Farewell Lecture," 1 July 2004.
- <sup>117</sup> Kristian Berg Harpviken and Jan Isaksen, "Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development," PRIO- UNDP Report, 2004, p. 43.
- <sup>118</sup> Email from Carly Volkes, DfAIT, 7 June 2006.
- <sup>119</sup> Email from Andrew Willson, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DfID, 4 July 2006.
- <sup>120</sup> Email from Ellen Schut, Arms Control and Arms Export Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006.
- <sup>121</sup> Email from Mayumi Watabe, Human Security Unit, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 15 June 2006.
- <sup>122</sup> Email from Anne Suotula, Staff Officer for Trust Funds, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO HQ, 6 July 2006.
- <sup>123</sup> Figures for the years prior to 2005 are taken from Landmine Monitor Report 2005, with any corrections received for earlier years. For 2004, increased funding reported in corrected data by Australia and the UK offset decreased funding reported by the EC. In most but not all cases, the figures for earlier years are calculated at the exchange rates for those years.
- <sup>124</sup> Average exchange rates for 2005, used throughout this report; €1 = US\$1.2449, A\$1 = US\$0.7627, US\$1 = NOK6.4412, £1 = US\$1.820, US\$1 = C\$1.2115, US\$1 = SEK7.4710, US\$1 = DKK5.9953, NZ\$1 = US\$0.7049, US\$1= ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US\$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2006 used for CHF conversions other than FSD financial reporting. Currency conversions are rounded throughout, which may result in rounding-off addition differences.
- <sup>125</sup> The EC reported the total of EU member state contributions and EC contributions as more than €147 million (\$183 million). "EC contribution to Landmine Monitor 2006," 30 June 2006.
- <sup>126</sup> Per capita funding provides another perspective on mine action funding by donor countries. To calculate these figures, the 2005 country funding amounts were divided by that country's population. Population numbers are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, "Population 2005," 1 July 2006, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org), accessed 1 July 2006. Not included in the country funding amounts, and therefore not reflected in the per capita figures, are contributions to European Union bodies subsequently dispensed as European Commission funding of mine action.
- <sup>127</sup> Gross national income (GNI) was formerly known as gross national product (GNP). GNI figures are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, "Total GNI 2005, Atlas method," 1 July 2006, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org), accessed 1 July 2006.
- <sup>127</sup> Emails from Laura Liguori, Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, June-July 2006.
- <sup>129</sup> This figure has been adjusted down by €4.09 million (\$5.09 million) from the total in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* based on newly available information. EC, "Mine Actions in the World 2005," p. 55; European Community's Contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, by email from Nicola Marcel, RELEX Unit 3a Security Policy, EC, 19 July 2005; emails from Laura Liguori, EC, June-July 2006.
- <sup>130</sup> Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006.
- <sup>131</sup> Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March -May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005 and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006.
- <sup>132</sup> Email from Kitagawa Yasu, JCBL, with information from Nobuhisa Tsuchiya, Research Propelling Division, and Mr. Saito, Mechanical System Technology Development Division, NEDO JST, 11 July 2006.

- <sup>133</sup> Email from Kitagawa Yasu, JCBL, 10 August 2005, with translation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs information sent to JCBL on 11 May 2005.
- <sup>134</sup> Email from Andrew Willson, DfID, 20 March 2006; email from Debbie Clements, Directorate of Joint Commitments, Ministry of Defence, 10 August 2005; email from Lt. Col. Robin Swanson, Ministry of Defence, 22 May 2006. The 2004 figure is revised from the £8.3 million (\$15.3 million) reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*. The amount was increased £2,913,231 (\$5,339,952) to reflect funding for the International Mine Action Training Centre in Kenya, but reduced £155,133 (\$284,359) for programs subsequently identified as R&D. Average exchange rate for 2004: £1 = US\$1.833, US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2005.
- <sup>135</sup> Figures prior to 1998 only include CIDA funding.
- <sup>136</sup> Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006.
- <sup>137</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database.
- <sup>138</sup> Statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
- <sup>139</sup> Figures prior to 1996 are not available.
- <sup>140</sup> Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, DMV/HH Humanitarian Aid Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.
- <sup>141</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Desk Officer, Department for Global Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March-May 2006.
- <sup>142</sup> Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Humanitarian Assistance & NGO Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006.
- <sup>143</sup> Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Humanitarian Assistance & NGO Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006.
- <sup>144</sup> Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006.
- <sup>145</sup> Email from Katheryn Bennett, AusAID, 30 June 2006.
- <sup>146</sup> The amount for 2004 has been revised upward by A\$509,516 (\$375,259) from the A\$7,246,585 (\$5.3 million) cited in *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* to include previously unreported amounts of A\$500,000 (\$368,250) for victim assistance in Cambodia and A\$9,516 (\$7,009) for mine detectors for Azerbaijan. Emails from Katheryn Bennett, AusAID, July 2006. Average exchange rate for 2004: A\$1 = US\$0.7365, US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2005.
- <sup>147</sup> Emails from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2006. Not included in this amount is \$300,000 to UNICEF for MRE in Sudan as reported by UNMAO.
- <sup>148</sup> The 2005 figure includes an amount of €1,280,000 (\$1,593,472) to Sudan reported by the Italian Embassy in Khartoum, as well as €242,500 (\$301,888) reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Sudan.
- <sup>149</sup> Mine Action Investments database; email from Paula Sirkkiä, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2006.
- <sup>150</sup> The UAE reported in the UN Mine Action Investment database that it had spent the \$50 million from 2002-2004 as follows: \$1,631,715 for Phase 1 (minefield recon-
- naissance and elimination of booby-traps); \$24,766,000 for Phase 2 (clearance and elimination of mines and UXO); \$6,199,000 for Phase 3 (clearance and elimination of UXO); \$1,349,685 for purchasing demining machinery and other equipment; \$3,342,800 as a contribution to the UN office in South Lebanon; \$476,538 for film and media coverage of the project by Emirates Media Corp; and \$12,234,262 for expenses of the UAE Armed Forces and other administrative expenses. Mine Action Investment database, [www.mineaction.org](http://www.mineaction.org), accessed 4 August 2005.
- <sup>151</sup> UNMAS, "Annual Report 2005," p. 61; National Demining Office, Lebanon Mine Action Program, "Annual Report 2005," Annex A; MACC SL, "Annual Report 2005," 14 February 2006; email from Christopher Clark, UN Chief Technical Advisor/Programme Manager, MACC SL, 22 May 2006.
- <sup>152</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; email from Dominique Jones, Conseiller, Ministry of Defense, 17 May 2006; email from Stan Brabant, Head, Policy Unit, Handicap International, 26 May 2006.
- <sup>153</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 6 October 2005; information from Olivier Sigaud, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in email from Timon Van Lidth, Handicap International, 29 June 2006. France included funding to CNEMA (National Commission for the Elimination of Anti-Personnel Mines) of €135,000 (\$168,062) in its reporting for 2005; this funding has not been included in past reports.
- <sup>154</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 6 October 2005; information from Olivier Sigaud, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in email from Timon Van Lidth, Handicap International, 29 June 2006.
- <sup>155</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Support for mine action - role in mine clearance and aid to victims," available at [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr), accessed 4 July 2006. France has stated that it will present more detailed information regarding its financial contributions to mine action through the EC at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in 2006. Statement by Amb. François Rivasseau, Permanent Representative to the Disarmament Conference, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
- <sup>156</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 21 April 2006; emails from Therese Healy, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Political Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, May 2006.
- <sup>157</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Alexander Kmentt, Deputy Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2006.
- <sup>158</sup> Email from Alexander Kmentt, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2006.
- <sup>159</sup> Email from Helen Fawthorpe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006; email from Megan McCoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006.
- <sup>160</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, dated 4 May 2006; email from Henrik Markus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: SKKo.033 = US\$1. Landmine Monitor estimate based on information from [www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory](http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory).
- <sup>161</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Sub-department for International Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 25 April 2006.



- <sup>162</sup> This is an estimate, as Spanish funding of mine action has not been reported fully in all years. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 748.
- <sup>163</sup> IRFFI, "Pledges made to IRFFI and Iraqi reconstruction at the Expanded Donor Meeting of IRFFI," 18 July 2005; UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, "Newsletter," January 2006, p. 1.
- <sup>164</sup> Email from François Berg, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 30 March 2006.
- <sup>165</sup> Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006.
- <sup>166</sup> Emails from Irina Gorsic, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2006.
- <sup>167</sup> Embassy of Iceland in Washington DC, "Iceland Contributes 1,5 Million USD to a Prosthetics Project in Northern Iraq," Information Sheet 08/05, 28 April 2005. This amount was not reported specifically as a mine action contribution by Iceland.
- <sup>168</sup> Letters from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March and 8 May 2006.
- <sup>169</sup> Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006
- <sup>170</sup> "Cooperation between Flanders and Mozambique," (in Flemish), p. 2, Flanders Official website, www.flanders.be, accessed 3 June 2006; Geert Bourgeois, Flemish Minister of Administrative Affairs, Foreign Policy, Media and Tourism, "Answer to Question No. 42 from Sabine Poleyn from 13 January 2006," (in Flemish), Flanders Parliament Website, (no date), available at www.vlaamsparlement.be, accessed 3 June 2006.
- <sup>171</sup> Email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006.
- <sup>172</sup> Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006.
- <sup>173</sup> Emails from Laura Liguori, EC, June-July 2006.
- <sup>174</sup> Email from Kitagawa Yasu, JCBL, with information from Nobuhisa Tsuchiya, Research Propelling Division, and Mr. Saito, NEDO JST, 11 July 2006.
- <sup>175</sup> Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006.
- <sup>176</sup> DfID, "DFID funded project develops groundbreaking anti-landmine device," 5 April 2005, www.dfid.gov.uk, accessed 5 July 2006; Cranfield University, "Cranfield leads development of next generation anti-land mine device," 29 March 2005.
- <sup>177</sup> ERA, "Successful trials for ERA's revolutionary mine detector," (no date), www.era.co.uk, accessed December 2005.
- <sup>178</sup> Emails from Andrew Willson, DfID, 20 March and 4 July 2006.
- <sup>179</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Research and Development Descriptive Summary, Humanitarian Demining, PE: 0603920D8Z," February 2006, p. 291.
- <sup>180</sup> Email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006.
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- <sup>183</sup> Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006.
- <sup>184</sup> Email from Andrew Willson, DfID, 20 March 2006.
- <sup>185</sup> "The Zagreb Declaration," (Unofficial Version), Part III, 8, 2 December 2005.
- <sup>186</sup> Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 27.
- <sup>187</sup> All amounts are expressed in US dollars. This data was collated following an analysis by Landmine Monitor of Form J attachments to Article 7 reports, and other data provided to Landmine Monitor. Some of the figures for 2004 have changed since *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, as new information became available, and the 2004 total has been adjusted to include only international donor contributions. Full details are available on request.
- <sup>188</sup> UNMAS, "2005 Portfolio End-Year Review," p. 6, www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 May 2005.
- <sup>189</sup> Statement by Amb. Bernard Brassack, Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
- <sup>190</sup> Statement by Australia, "Survivor Assistance," Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 9 May 2006.
- <sup>191</sup> LSN, "Annual Report 2005," p. 25.
- <sup>192</sup> It should be noted that ICRC financial accounts are based on a calendar year whereas some donors have different fiscal years. For the purposes of funding analysis, the contributions are reflected in the year in which they were received by the ICRC.
- <sup>193</sup> ICRC Special Appeal Mine Action 2004. Landmine Monitor analysis of KPMG Fides Peat, "Assistance for Mine Victims, Geneva: Auditor's report on supplementary information on the Special Appeal, Statement of contributions and expenditure, Financial Statements 2004," Appendix II and III, Geneva, 14 July 2005. Average exchange rate for 2004: US\$1 = CHF1.2428, used for CHF amounts not contributed by the Swiss Government at a set rate. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2005.
- <sup>194</sup> Email from Luka Buhin, Project Manager, ITF, 30 May 2006; ITF "Annual Report 2005," p 18. In ITF's annual report for 2005, the total is slightly different (\$1,140,809.46, or 4.12 percent) as one victim assistance project was incorrectly counted as MRE.
- <sup>195</sup> Email from Luka Buhin, ITF, 30 May 2006; email from Iztok Hoävar, Head of International Relations Department, ITF, 18 July 2006.
- <sup>196</sup> Last year Landmine Monitor estimated \$18.8 million in mine action contributions for 2004, but that total included contributions by SFOR, UNDP and various international organizations in addition to donor governments and the EC.











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*Phoas Yek is a vivacious and studious sixteen year-old from Sung Il village, in Cambodia's remote and impoverished Samlot district. The third of eight children in a poor farming family, Phoas stepped on a mine while playing in the forest near her home, once a Khmer Rouge stronghold. Her parents worked hard to save the US\$4 needed to transport her to the Battambang rehabilitation center for medical assistance. Phoas has received seven prosthetic legs at the ICRC-supported center; she continues to grow so fast she frequently needs her prosthetic replaced. Unlike many disabled Cambodians, Phoas has been able to go to school, with support from Handicap International. Each day she cycles to school, and in her spare time she reads her schoolbooks repeatedly because other books are not available. She hopes to graduate from school and own a fancy dress rental shop.*

## Toward a Mine-Free World

The Landmine Monitor initiative is coordinated by an Editorial Board of four organizations: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People's Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency.



## Landmine Monitor Report 2006

*Landmine Monitor Report 2006* is the eighth annual report of the Landmine Monitor, an unprecedented civil society-based initiative by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 1997 Nobel Peace Co-Laureate. This report is the product of a global reporting network of 71 researchers from 62 countries.

Landmine Monitor collects information and assesses the response by the international community to the global landmines crisis, especially with regard to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On their Destruction. Since 1999, this highly-acclaimed initiative has successfully and consistently demonstrated for the first time that non-governmental organizations can work together in a sustained, coordinated and systematic way to monitor and report on the implementation of an international disarmament or humanitarian law treaty.

This edition of the Landmine Monitor Report presents new information collected in 2005 and 2006. It contains information on 126 countries and areas with respect to antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, trade, humanitarian mine clearance, mine risk education, mine action funding, landmine casualties and mine survivor assistance.

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