

STATES PARTIES

ALBANIA

Key developments since May 2001: On 4 April 2002, Albania completed the destruction of its stockpile of 1,683,860 antipersonnel mines. No mines are being retained for training or development purposes. Albania has identified a total of 85 contaminated areas, totaling 14 million square meters of land. Lack of funding has hampered clearance efforts. During 2001, a total of 302,000 square meters of land was cleared, including 744 antipersonnel mines. There were nine new mine and UXO casualties in 2001, a significant reduction from the previous year. Albania submitted its initial Article 7 Report in April 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Albania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 8 September 1998 and ratified it on 29 February 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 August 2000. Law 8547 of 11 November 1999 gave legal force in Albania to its general obligations under the treaty, but does not include the penal sanctions required by Mine Ban Treaty Article 9. Additional legislation said to be in preparation in early 2000 remains uncompleted.¹ Albania attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. It also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.² In January, a progress report on the stockpile destruction project was given and in May, the delegation reported on the successful completion on 4 April 2002 of stockpile destruction and also presented details of the mine clearance program (see later sections).

The initial transparency report required by Mine Ban Treaty Article 7, due on 28 January 2001, was submitted to the United Nations on 3 April 2002 (though dated 10 January 2002). It covers calendar year 2001. It contains detailed information on the stockpile of antipersonnel mines and the destruction program.³

On 29 November 2001, Albania voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Albania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) or its Amended Protocol II. It was expected that Albania would accede to the CCW by early 2002;⁴ the relevant ministries had forwarded the necessary documents to the Council of Ministers for signature and ratification by Parliament, but the Prime Minister's resignation on 29 January 2002 halted the process.⁵ Albania participated as an observer in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

¹ Interview with Ledia Hysi, Head of Legal and Consular Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 25 October 2001.

² Ambassador Ksenofon Krisafi, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, headed the delegation in Nicaragua. In January, the delegation included Amb. Krisafi, Pavli Zëri, the Deputy Minister of Defense and Head of the Albanian Mine Action Committee, and Major Frederik Beltoja, Chief of Integration Division, Ministry of Defense. In May, it included Pavli Zëri, Arben Braha, Amb. Vladimir Thanati, and Mira Schneider from the UN Mission in Geneva.

³ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted on 3 April 2002, dated 10 January 2002, covering calendar year 2001.

⁴ Interview with Ledia Hysi, Head of Legal and Consular office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 25 October 2001.

⁵ Interview with Armand Skapi, Acting Head, United Nations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 7 March 2002.

Use, Production and Transfer⁶

In 2001 and the first half of 2002 there were no reports of new use of mines within Albania.⁷

Antipersonnel mine production officially ceased in 1991. Albania possessed two antipersonnel mine manufacturing facilities – ULP Mjekës in central Albania and KM Poliçan in the south. Neither facility still possesses equipment unique to antipersonnel mine manufacture, and both have converted their activities to ammunition demilitarization under the auspices of government and NATO projects.⁸

The Albanian government has not expressed a position on the legality of transit of antipersonnel mines through its territory by a non-State Party, nor on the legality of other States engaging in activities involving antipersonnel mines on Albanian territory. In 1999, US Army engineer units reportedly deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems as part of Task Force Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. According to the source of the information, most of the US Army units deployed from bases in Germany. At the time of this deployment, Albania was a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty and Germany was a State Party.⁹

Stockpiling and Destruction

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, Albania announced, “The project of destroying the Albanian stockpile of antipersonnel mines has already begun on 29 June 2001, and will progress to completion by April 2002.”¹⁰ Stockpile destruction was completed on 4 April 2002.¹¹

The stockpile destruction program, carried out in converted former antipersonnel mine production facilities at ULP Mjekës, was completed ahead of schedule, under the management of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).¹² Albania’s Article 7 Report indicated that Albania possessed four types of antipersonnel mines, totaling 1,607,420 and “held at 57 different secure military storage depots locations throughout Albania.”¹³ In the last stages of stockpile destruction, an additional 76,440 antipersonnel mines were discovered, so that a total of 1,683,860 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.¹⁴

The Albanian Armed Forces transported the mines from their stockpile locations to the destruction facility, covering 410,000 kilometers in the process. The NAMSA team also traveled to Sazan Island in the Adriatic Sea to locate and destroy 8,100 antipersonnel mines by open detonation in a three-day operation assisted by the US Navy 8th Mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team from European Command (EUCOM) Sigonella. The program included a two-day operation led by General Karoli, Commander of the Albanian Land Forces, to recover

⁶ For details of past production and transfer see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 699 and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 560.

⁷ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 17 May 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Section 5, 3 April 2002.

⁹ Major Scott C. Johnson, “Strategic Mobility, the Force Projection Army, and the Ottawa Landmine Treaty: Can the Army Get There?” A student monograph submitted to fulfill the requirements of the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 15 February 2001. The author identifies his source in footnote 94 (p. 48): “Matt Pasvogel, interview by author, 9 January 2001. Captain Pasvogel was an engineer company commander who deployed with Task Force Hawk. His unit deployed with both MOPMS and Volcano mine dispensing equipment and mixed self-destructing AP/AT mines. Munitions that were not employed during the mission, but were available in Albania for use if the need did arise.”

¹⁰ Statement of Ksenofon Krisafi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

¹¹ Email from William D. G. Hunt, NAMSA Project Supervisor, 4 April 2002.

¹² Interview with William D. G. Hunt, NAMSA Project Supervisor, Tirana, 4 April 2002, and email, 4 April 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Section 2, 3 April 2002; see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 597, where it was noted that the PMD-6 wood and bakelite variants were counted as one “type.”

¹⁴ Email from William D. G. Hunt, NAMSA Project Supervisor, 4 April 2002.

mines from the former rebel stronghold of Lazarat in the south of Albania, as well as 5,350 antipersonnel mines sealed in tunnels since 1997.¹⁵

The army transportation agency and ULP Mjekës declared that there were no accidents during the stockpile destruction program.¹⁶

The stockpile destruction program was the first NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund project, and was co-sponsored by Albania and Canada, and financed by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Albania's contribution was to provide office facilities in Tirana for the NAMSAs project supervision team and military transportation of the mines. The project costs were offset by recycling of ferrous metals (1,100 tons, from which KM Poliçan is making manhole covers and Kurum International is making steel reinforcing rods) and of TNT explosives (192 tons, converted into about 2,000 tons of ammonite explosive for construction use). The program is reported to have been completed at below the projected cost of US\$790,000 (approximately 45 US cents per mine).¹⁷

Albania has chosen not to utilize the Article 3 exception. It has concluded "there are no justifiable reasons for the retention" of antipersonnel mines "for training or any other purpose," and has therefore destroyed its entire antipersonnel mine stockpile.¹⁸

At the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002 there was discussion of the possibility of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) transferring its stockpile of antipersonnel mines to Albania for destruction. The Head of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) said that Albania had offered assistance and premises for transferring the stockpile for destruction, but as of mid-May 2002 the FYROM had not responded.¹⁹

Landmine Problem

The existing mine problem derives from two sources: looting in 1997 when mines and other weaponry were stolen from military storage sites, and the 1998/1999 conflict in Kosovo which led to the Albanian border area being contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) of Serbian, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and NATO origin.²⁰

During the civil unrest and looting in early 1997, explosions in 15 ammunition depots killed civilians²¹ and contaminated surrounding areas with UXO; these areas were termed "hotspots." Ismet Miiftari, the chief of Albanian EOD, estimated in April and May 2000 that 600,000 antipersonnel mines were looted during the civil disorder.²² An extensive national and international process of collecting and destroying looted weaponry has been conducted in Albania since 1999. On 15 April 2002, Ana Stjarnerklint, the UN Development Program (UNDP) Resident Representative in Tirana, was reported as saying that "150,000 weapons have been collected, 116,000 have been destroyed, and 100,000 to 150,000 have been taken (smuggled) out of the country.... This leaves about 250,000 still in circulation, and this is a dangerously high level." The same report referred to "500,000 light weapons" being looted in 1997.²³ The reports of these activities make no specific references to mines, but the UNDP technical representative confirmed that the collections do include mines.²⁴

¹⁵ Interview with William D. G. Hunt, NAMSAs Project Supervisor, Tirana, 4 April 2002, and email, 4 April 2002.

¹⁶ Information confirmed in email from William D. G. Hunt, NAMSAs Project Supervisor, 4 April 2002.

¹⁷ Interview with William D. G. Hunt, NAMSAs Project Supervisor, Tirana, 4 April 2002, and email, 4 April 2002.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Section 4.1, 3 April 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 17 May 2002.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Executive Summary, 3 April 2002.

²¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 701-702.

²² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 597. It is not clear if this estimate has been confirmed by subsequent events.

²³ Alban Bala, "Balkan Weapons Round-up," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15 April 2002, www.reliefweb.int, accessed on 22 April 2002.

²⁴ Interview with Shkëlqim Sina, National Technical Representative, UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control, Tirana, 17 May 2002.

No information has been reported on how the collection and selection processes are supervised. Albania's Article 7 Report does not state whether and how the Mine Ban Treaty prohibitions have been made known to the population in general, or to the police and other officials involved in the collection process.

In 1998 and 1999, areas close to the border with Kosovo were said to be contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines as well as UXO of Serbian, KLA and NATO origin.²⁵ Albania's Article 7 report states that mine contamination "is limited to the Albania-Kosovo border.... During the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999, Serb military and paramilitary forces laid large numbers of mines along the Kosovo border with northern Albania. In addition to defensive minefields within Kosovo it was discovered that mines were also laid within Albanian territory as a defensive measure, where topographical and tactical conditions made this necessary, and also as an interdiction measure against assembly points and infiltration routes being used by the [KLA]."²⁶ The mines are a combination of antipersonnel mines (PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3 blast mines, PROM and PMR-2A fragmentation mines) and antivehicle mines (TMM-1, TMA-4 and TMA-5), almost all of Yugoslav manufacture.²⁷

A total of 85 contaminated areas have been identified, in the districts of Tropojë, Has, and Kukës, totaling 1,400 hectares (14 million square meters) of land. Contamination is reported of some 120 kilometers of border up to 400 meters into Albania, as well as some isolated munition impact areas up to 20 kilometers beyond the border.²⁸ The Article 7 report provides details of each mine-contaminated area.²⁹ These areas are mainly forest, agricultural and grazing areas, with villages and frequently used routes for travel over the border into Kosovo. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the Albanian delegation described the mines and UXO as posing not only a physical threat, but also having "a major impact on the already harsh lives of those who live in the affected areas.... Nearly 120,000 people, mostly living in abject poverty, whose livelihood depends on farming, herding, gathering firewood and other subsistence activities and also obtaining essential supplies across the border, are profoundly affected by the presence of mines and UXO."³⁰

Marking and fencing of known mine- and UXO-contaminated areas has been problematic due to inclement weather during winter months preventing access, a lack of resources, and the theft of marking posts for use as fuel or fencing.³¹ In 2002, the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) plans to provide 3,000-5,000 signs for the re-marking of mine- and UXO-contaminated areas.³²

The Article 7 Report adds that there are no other known mined areas in Albania. Ministry of Defense areas that had been "defensively mined" were cleared by the Albanian armed forces before Mine Ban Treaty ratification in February 2000.³³

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

The Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC) was formed in October 1999 as the policy-making body for mine action, with responsibility for obtaining funding and assistance, and

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Executive Summary, 3 April 2002.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, Executive Summary and Section 3, 3 April 2002.

²⁷ Article 7 Report, 3 April 2002, Section 3, and "Operation Summary," Swiss Federation for Mine Action, December 2001.

²⁸ AMAE, "Albania Mine Action Program," report circulated at Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, p. 1.

²⁹ Article 7 Report, Sections 3 and 9.2, 3 April 2002.; for a description of the nature of the mine/UXO-contaminated areas and the effects on the local population, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 598.

³⁰ "Albania Mine Action Programme," presented at Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

³¹ Article 7 Report, Sections 3 and 9.2, 3 April 2002.

³² "Mine Awareness Education in Albania," UNICEF, (undated).

³³ Article 7 Report, Section 3, 3 April 2002.

prioritizing mine action. The Albanian Mine Action Executive was established at the same time to carry out mine action under AMAC direction, including producing a mine action program, accreditation and quality assurance of all mine action (to UN standards), survey and marking, investigation of all mine-related accidents/incidents, and data-gathering.³⁴

In mid-2000 the UNDP formulated a proposal for addressing weaknesses in the AMAE and AMAC, which it has supported since their establishment in 1999. The proposal was revised in June 2001 and in September a UNDP-funded mission assessed the capacities and needs for mine action in Albania. The AMAC was described as having “virtually faded out over time” while the AMAE had “neither the capacity nor capability of addressing any of the mine action processes expected of a ‘Mine Action Center’.... Dedicated and assured funding is non-existent. In effect the major result of the AMAE since its inception has been to fund its own continued existence. No funds have been available for the technical and operational control of mine action activities, particularly mine clearance.”³⁵

In March 2002, Pavli Zëri, the Deputy Defense Minister and Head of AMAC, told Landmine Monitor, “We know that we have made slow progress so far in designing projects thanks to lack of experience, but professional assistance is welcomed.” He said:

The legal department of the Ministry of Defense is preparing the draft for institutionalization of AMAC/AMAE which will regulate the relations of the institution including the management of funds. The draft is not yet approved by the government.... The lack of the law created the lack of coordination with other institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense, local authorities etc.... When everything will be regulated by the law the authority of the mine action body will be raised and the Mine Action Plan will be better implemented.... The law will force other institutions to be involved and give whatever contribution might be needed, even if it is a modest one.³⁶

The UNDP-Albania program aims to support the development of a national mine action program, increase AMAE’s capacity, with particular reference to the International Mine Action Standards and standing operating procedures for humanitarian demining, evaluate capacities for victim assistance and rehabilitation, and establish a mine casualty data-collection system.³⁷ With UNDP support a Chief Technical Advisor was appointed in April 2002, with an Information Officer to be appointed in June 2002. The intention was to complete the national mine action plan by July 2002 and “have the AMAE fully operational by December 2002, including operational Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), external quality management and administrative cells. In addition to this, a regional office will be established in Kukës to coordinate mine action at field level.”³⁸

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

On a number of occasions, Albanian authorities have criticized the lack of funding for mine action in Albania. In January 2002, Pavli Zeri claimed that there had been “little progress on the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance.... Support from the international community for humanitarian demining has been very limited and there currently appears to be little prospect of progress in 2002.”³⁹ In June 2002, the Albanian Minister of Defense was quoted as saying: “On 29 February 2000, Albania signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel mines and demilitarized its landmine industry. And from April 2001 to the present, we have fully destroyed the entire stock of antipersonnel mines, two years before the deadline. But regardless of the efforts

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Section 1.2.2.

³⁵ “Mine Action in Albania,” Government of Albania and UNDP, reference ALB/02/001 (undated), pp. 8-9.

³⁶ Interview with Pavli Zëri, Head of AMAC and Deputy Minister of Defense, Tirana, 23 March 2002.

³⁷ “Assistance to the National Mine Action Programme in Albania,” UNDP, undated.

³⁸ “Mine Action in Albania,” Government of Albania and UNDP, reference ALB/02/001 (undated), p. 9.

³⁹ Article 7 Report, Executive Summary, 3 April 2002.

made by committed antipersonnel mine professionals and the support of several loyal donors, financing and assistance for this antiminng activity has been sporadic, resulting in low demining figures.”⁴⁰ Similarly, a September 2001 report from the Ammunition Management Ordnance Disposal Advisory Training Team (AMODATT) declared: “Whilst Albania has made a visible effort to tackle all aspects of mine action, international support to demining efforts has been inadequate. The AMAE is effectively non-functional and is critically under resources.”⁴¹

About US\$2.2 million was donated for mine action in Albania in 2001. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mine action investments database records donations in 2001 from Austria (US\$100,000), Canada (US\$98,442), Germany (US\$325,000), Norway (US\$100,024), and Switzerland (US\$853,000).⁴² In addition, in its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided US\$684,401, through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF) based in Slovenia, to support demining operations in Albania.⁴³

The majority of international funding in 2001 and 2002 was provided directly to mine action organizations working in Albania, rather than to the AMAC or AMAE for allocation. Some of the donations have been identified as contributions to the NAMSA stockpile destruction project (Austria, Canada, and Norway). Switzerland reports funding of US\$605,000 for mine clearance in northern Albania, and US\$125,000 of in-kind support for mine clearance, US\$18,000 in support for the AMAE, and US\$105,000 for the stockpile destruction project. Germany donated US\$325,000 for mine clearance in Tropojë district, which was conducted by the German NGO, HELP International.⁴⁴

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance started channeling funds for mine action in Albania in 2001, after concluding an agreement with the government on 28 November 2000.⁴⁵ The ITF has also provided in-kind computer equipment, software, and financial support to AMAE.⁴⁶

In March 2001, Germany donated 17 metal detectors to the ITF for demining operations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Before the detectors were distributed to the mine action centers, training was provided by the ITF. On 27-29 May 2000, five Albanian demining experts were trained in Tirana by members of the Civil Protection Department of the Slovenian Ministry of Defense.⁴⁷ Also within the ITF framework, in February 2002 funding was provided for two years for two Geographical Information System specialists to implement the IMSMA (Information Management System for Mine Action).⁴⁸ The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining reinstalled the IMSMA software at the mine action center in Albania in 2001.⁴⁹

As the AMAE had no funds for July and August 2001, the UNDP provided temporary funding. At the end of August a chief technical advisor was employed, with funding from UNDP between September and December 2002 (US\$24,000). One of the adviser’s first duties was to raise funds to enable AMAE to operate normally.⁵⁰ From June 2001 through March 2002 Switzerland

⁴⁰ “Albania: Kosovo land-mine legacy still scars territory,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 19 June 2002, www.reliefweb.int, accessed on 19 June 2002.

⁴¹ “Post Operational Report,” AMODATT, Phase 5, 2 October 2000 - 24 September 2001.

⁴² “Multi-year Recipient Report: Albania,” UNMAS Mine Investments database, accessed on 12 May 2002.

⁴³ US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” November 2001, p. 23.

⁴⁴ “Annual Donor Report for Germany: 2001,” UNMAS Mine Investments database, accessed on 8 May 2001.

⁴⁵ “ITF Signed Administrative Agreement with Albania,” Press Release, International Trust Fund, 28 November 2000, www.sigov.si/itffund/news, accessed on 12 June 2001.

⁴⁶ “Annual Report 2001, International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance,” p. 16.

⁴⁷ “Germany Donates Mine Detectors,” Newsletter No. 6, International Trust Fund, July 2001, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 5 April 2002.

⁴⁹ “Update on Activities between January and December 2001,” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 31 December 2001, p. 4.

⁵⁰ “AMAE report,” September 2001.

donated US\$18,000 for AMAE office maintenance. UNICEF funded a mine awareness adviser from July 2001 to April 2002 (US\$27,383).⁵¹

For 2002, mine action funding includes the following: Switzerland has provided US\$300,000 via the ITF, which has attracted a similar amount from the US in matching funds; the US\$600,000 donation has been channeled to the Swiss Federation for Mine Action to resume battle area clearance, including cluster bomb strike zones, in Kukës and Has districts. This operation started on 2 April. DanChurchAid, a Danish NGO, has funding of US\$550,000 (received from ACT-Holland and ACT-Geneva, from private donations, and taken from its own sources) for general and technical surveys, clearance of minefields, and data gathering on socio-economic priorities in Tropojë district. This operation started on 8 April 2002. Germany has allocated US\$270,000 for "integrated mine action" in Albania in 2002.⁵² The UNDP will provide assistance budgeted at US\$669,060; this capacity building by UNDP has a shortfall of US\$150,000 for 2002. For the demining program there is a shortfall of US\$64,000, as of May 2002.⁵³

To increase mine clearance capacity in Albania, UNMAS has transferred substantial equipment from Kosovo. Some of the equipment will be handed over to the AMAE, and some used to establish a humanitarian demining capability in the Albanian Armed Forces.⁵⁴

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 the Albanian delegation said that "until now very little of the mines and UXO threat on the Albania-Kosovo border has been cleared.... A realistic estimate indicates that Albania can be rid of the effects of mines within 3 years for a modest budget of US\$5-7 million. This needs, however, to be confirmed by impact and technical surveys."⁵⁵

Survey and Prioritization

Albania's Article 7 Report provides the following new information: the "General Mine Action Assessment (formerly incorporating Level 1 Surveys) is ongoing. This is the responsibility of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) with assistance by CARE funded consultants in 1999."⁵⁶ The assessment identified the extent of contaminated areas, but how the survey process was carried out is not known. The AMAE states that: "The initial General Surveys undertaken by AAF assets and by the CARE funded contractor has proven to be of variable quality and accuracy and have to be confirmed by socio-economic impact surveys.... The shortcomings in the General Surveys have been compounded by the lack of resources to undertake further detailed technical surveys. It is considered that enhanced technical survey effort is necessary to assist the prioritisation process and to better target limited clearance resources."⁵⁷

According to the government, technical survey began on an ad hoc basis in 2000 and on a more organized basis in 2001.⁵⁸ As of early 2002, approximately 15 percent of the contaminated area identified had been subjected to technical survey and the government said, "This process has produced encouraging results both in identifying mine and UXO affected areas more accurately and also in the area reduction process. It is hoped to continue the process in 2002."⁵⁹

However, in January 2002, Arben Braha, the AMAE Director, said that due to lack of funding and support the AMAE was not able to organize a technical survey.⁶⁰ In March 2002, a

⁵¹ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 5 April 2002.

⁵² "Current and Planned Donor Activity for Germany," UNMAS Mine Action Investments database, accessed on 8 May 2001; ACT stands for Action for Churches Together.

⁵³ "Albania Mine Action Program," AMAE, document distributed at Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, May 2002, p. 7.

⁵⁴ "Mine Action in Albania," Government of Albania and UNDP, reference ALB/02/001 (undated), p. 8.

⁵⁵ "Albania Mine Action Programme," presented at Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002, original emphasis.

⁵⁶ Article 7 report, submitted on 10 January 2002, Section 1.2.3.

⁵⁷ "Albania Mine Action Program," AMAE, document distributed at Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, May 2002, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸ Article 7 Report, Section 1.2.3., 3 April 2002.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 10 January 2002.

local representative of the Swiss Federation for Mine Action claimed, "A technical survey is very much needed due to the fact that the last one was carried out in 1999. No funds are provided since it takes a lot of time and money. If a general survey is conducted I believe that the mined area can be reduced."⁶¹

The AMAE has been provided with the IMSMA database system, but existing maps do not meet IMSMA requirements and computer equipment is inadequate due to lack of funding. At the request of AMAE, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) gave technical assistance by setting up hardware and installing software.⁶² On 23 March-5 April 2002 members of the AMAE attended a training course on the IMSMA system in Tirana, with participants from other countries. In previous years, Albanian staff have attended other courses on IMSMA.

Mine/UXO Clearance

During 2001, three mine clearance organizations operated in Albania: HELP International, the Swiss Federation for Mine Action, and RONCO. They cleared a total of 30.2 hectares (302,000 square meters) of land, destroying in the process 744 antipersonnel mines, 25 antivehicle mines, and 115 items of UXO. The Article 7 Report describes the rates of clearance as "disappointing...small-scale and [reliant] on basic manual clearance methods which, though offering high levels of clearance confidence, are slow and not particularly cost-effective.... These operations have cleared a total of less than 50 hectares in the past two years, which has made little impact on the global problem within Albania representing less than 3 percent of the total contaminated area."⁶³

In 2001, the HELP operation had two eight-man demining teams operating beside a road at Qaf-Morine in Tropojë District. These teams are made up of experienced Bosnian team leaders and locally recruited and trained deminers. The Article 7 Report described this operation as "methodical and...of acceptable quality, however it has been extremely slow. The HELP Project Manager has been investigating the provision of both mechanical and Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) support for the future, subject to sufficient funding in an attempt to accelerate clearance rates." HELP had cleared 1.84 hectares (18,400 square meters) by 31 October 2001, destroying in the process 146 antipersonnel mines and three items of UXO.⁶⁴

The Swiss Federation for Mine Action (SFMA) started training local staff in April 2001, with mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) starting on 21 May 2001 in five areas in the Kukës and Has districts. Four manual teams were constituted of locally recruited and trained deminers, each under the supervision of an expatriate. The main emphasis was on clearance of KB-1 submunition strike areas using search instruments. These areas had been surface-cleared by Army teams in 1999. Two large areas affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also cleared. SFMA introduced explosive detection dogs in October 2001 to accelerate clearance rates. Although this was achieved, the benefit was compromised at the end of October when it was found that the dogs were failing to detect the TMM-1 antivehicle mine. By 31 October, the SFMA had cleared 17.63 hectares (176,300 square meters), destroying in the process 269 antipersonnel mines, 25 antivehicle mines and 112 items of UXO, of which 102 were KB-1 submunitions.⁶⁵ By the end of the year the SFMA had cleared 190,854 square meters destroying in the process 308 antipersonnel mines, 26 antivehicle mines and 137 items of UXO.⁶⁶

The RONCO operation started on 22 May 2001 in the area of Has Qafe Prushit, close to the border crossing, where operations have been going on for two years. It used limited mechanical support to manual teams made up of experienced deminers from Bosnia. In spite of the integrated

⁶¹ Interview with Alex Van Roy, Project Manager, Swiss Federation for Mine Action, Kukes, 26 March 2002.

⁶² ICRC Fact sheet, Mine Action 2001, ICRC Tirana.

⁶³ Article 7 report for calendar year 2001, submitted on 3 April 2002, Section 1.2.4.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Annual Report 2001, International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance, p. 16, and "Operation Summary," Swiss Federation for Mine Action, December 2001.

nature of the operation, progress was limited. The Article 7 Report suggests this may have been because of the inappropriateness of the mechanical equipment selected.⁶⁷ The RONCO operation ended on 20 October 2001, with 10.73 hectares (107,300 square meters) cleared and 329 antipersonnel mines found, according to the Article 7 Report.⁶⁸

By the end of 2001, the Armed Forces had cleared ten of the fifteen "hotspots" resulting from the munitions explosions during civil unrest in 1997. A local NATO officer described this as an outstanding achievement in view of the Army's limited resources. Of the five remaining hotspots, it was planned to clear one near Burrel by the end of May 2002. The other hotspots are in the areas of Selic, Klos, Pilur and Picar (Gjirokastrë). They are not fenced or guarded and the civilian population still has access to them, resulting in casualties in 2001.⁶⁹

Mine Awareness/Mine Risk Education

UNICEF is the lead UN agency for mine risk education in Albania. Its objectives include reducing the risk of mine/UXO accidents, developing mine risk education training programs for school teachers, and enhancing community projects through local organizations. In 2001, UNICEF supported the mine risk education activities carried out by CARE in northern districts, including a two-day seminar for 84 teachers in the Tropojë district. Training of teachers will be continued by a cascade system, with UNICEF training Ministry of Education staff to act as trainers in the 11 highest risk areas. A needs assessment survey started in 2001 is continuing in 2002, to feed into a national mine risk education strategy planned for 2002. The UNICEF program also includes support for the Mine Victims Association and social reintegration of survivors, and provision of signs for re-marking dangerous areas.⁷⁰

The AMAE appointed a mine risk education officer in mid-2001. Organizations that have carried out mine risk education in Albania in 2001 include CARE, the ICRC, and the Albanian Red Cross. These activities included poster campaigns, visits to school and community facilities, and television, press and radio campaigns.⁷¹

The ICRC and Albanian Red Cross launched a joint mine risk education program in October 1999. This program has developed to work now with local branches focusing on high-risk group in mined areas, notably children and farmers. Owing to economic pressures, the local population knowingly enters dangerous areas in search of firewood and grass for use in winter months, travels over the border into Kosovo where prices are lower, and sometimes attempts to clear mines and UXO themselves. One aim of the Red Cross campaign is to change behavior by offering other solutions to meet these needs.⁷²

At local level, villages in the affected areas are visited by mine risk education instructors. In 2001, 29,020 people were contacted in the affected districts of Tropojë, Has, Kukës and also Shkodra. Activities included an interactive play, "Bear Trap," performed by local professionals in 33 villages to 2,614 children and 460 adults in 2001. Promotional material, posters and games have been distributed. The instructors also have the role of collecting information on mine/UXO casualties for the AMAE.⁷³

⁶⁷ Article 7 Report, Section 1.2.4., 3 April 2002.

⁶⁸ The ITF reported this as 108,773 square meters cleared and 267 mines and 19 UXO found. Annual Report 2001, International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance, p. 16.

⁶⁹ Interview with Captain Emanuele Andreottola, Team Leader - Task Area 1, AMODATT (NATO) Office, Tirana, 22 March 2002, and "Post Operational Report," AMODATT, Phase 5, 2 October 2000 - 24 September 2001. In October 2000, the AMODATT mission replaced the NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Ammunition Storage Training Team (EODAST) dispatched to Albania to assist the Albanian armed forces with Albania's significant EOD problem.

⁷⁰ "Mine Awareness Education in Albania," UNICEF, (undated).

⁷¹ Article 7 Report, Section 9.1, 3 April 2002.

⁷² ICRC Fact Sheet, "Mine/UXO Awareness Program—Albania—Year 2001," March 2002; ICRC, "Albania: Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness," 11 April 2002.

⁷³ ICRC Fact Sheet, "Mine/UXO Awareness Program—Albania—Year 2001," March 2002; and ICRC, "Albania: Demining and Mine Awareness Program," 13 July 2001.

In February 2001, the ICRC made a film on mine survivors in Tropojë and Has districts. The film, "Women and Mines in Albania," was broadcast on 8 March by international TV channels. In April, a 30-minute program on the Red Cross activities was broadcast nationally. In June, a compilation of reports called "Mines in Albania" was produced and broadcast by CNN International, EBU and 8 Mont Blanc TV stations. In November 2001, a report on UXO casualties was broadcast by three main Albanian TV channels.⁷⁴

According to a local ICRC fact sheet of March 2002, it has helped secure funding from Switzerland for the Swiss Federation for Mine Action and from private donors for Dan Church Aid in 2001-2002. In the process, the ICRC is attempting to establish an integrated approach linking mine risk education with clearance and humanitarian work in general.⁷⁵

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, nine new mine/UXO casualties were reported by the ICRC. One adult male was killed and three others were injured, and five boys were injured.⁷⁶ Most were the result of UXO explosions.⁷⁷ This number is a significant reduction from the 35 new casualties reported by ICRC in 2000.⁷⁸

A record of landmine and UXO incidents is maintained by the AMAE in Tirana. However, due to the remoteness of some mine-affected areas, and the fact that some incidents go unreported, the actual number of casualties is expected to be higher.⁷⁹ The number of ICRC mine/UXO data collectors also reduced considerably in 2001.⁸⁰

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the Albanian delegation reported that "since 1999 there were 197 mine accidents in which 211 persons were injured and 25 killed."⁸¹ UNDP reports that mine casualties since 1999 "number almost 200 separate incidents with over 230 casualties representing some 20 percent of all civilian casualties arising from mines and UXO contamination engendered by the Kosovo crisis."⁸²

In September 2001, the Team Leader of the German demining group HELP, a Bosnian national, was injured by a PMA-2 mine while monitoring work in the demining area.⁸³ An AMODATT team leader reported that due to non-marking or removal of markings around sites contaminated by mines/UXO in the 1997 civil disorder, people have access to the sites and tampering with the explosives. As a result, one civilian perished at Ura e Gjadrit in July 2001 and two young boys were seriously injured at Suç, Burrel, in November 2001.⁸⁴

Survivor Assistance

State facilities provide immediate medical aid and treatment to mine casualties. After the first intervention mine survivors are sent to specialized facilities if needed, such as eye or burns clinics. As in previous years, the Albanian Prosthesis Center in Tirana received no financial

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ ICRC Fact Sheet, "Mine/UXO Awareness Program—Albania—Year 2001," March 2002; and ICRC News, "Albania: Dealing with the Legacy of Mines," 5 July 2001.

⁷⁶ Statistics compiled by ICRC in collaboration with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, in January 2002.

⁷⁷ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 10 January 2002.

⁷⁸ ICRC Fact Sheet, "Detailed Statistics on Mine/UXO Incidents in Albania," 7 February 2001. The US State Department reported 31 mine casualties in 2000. US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 23.

⁷⁹ "Albania: Dealing with the legacy of mines," *ICRC News*, 01/26, 5 July 2001.

⁸⁰ Interview with Paul-Henri Morard, Head of Delegation, ICRC Albania, Slovenia, 2 July 2002.

⁸¹ "Albania Mine Action Program," presented at Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

⁸² "Mine Action in Albania," Government of Albania and UNDP, reference ALB/02/001 (undated), p. 4.

⁸³ "AMAE report," September 2001.

⁸⁴ Interview with Capt. Emanuele Andreottola, Team Leader - Task Area 1, AMODATT (NATO) Office, Tirana, 22 March 2002, and "Post Operational Report," Ammunition Management Ordnance Disposal Advisory Training Team (AMODATT), Phase 5, 2 October 2000-24 September 2001.

support from the State, due to continuing bureaucratic difficulties in the handover of financial responsibility from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the administration of the Center. At the Center, ten staff cover the whole country's needs for prostheses. The Center works closely with the ICRC and there is an agreement to prioritize mine survivors for treatment.⁸⁵

In January 2002, the government submitted the voluntary Form J in its Article 7 report, giving information on victim assistance. The report stated, "There has been some limited success in the area of Victim Assistance although this has largely centered on the provision of prosthesis to mines victims... There is currently very limited capability for support to families of victims, counselling or retraining of victims."⁸⁶

During 2001, the Albanian Prosthesis Center fitted 59 mine survivors (45 men, five women, and nine children) with artificial limbs. The ICRC is the only international organization providing raw materials for the production of artificial limbs at the Center. In April 2001, the ICRC funded the training in Italy of seven Albanian Prosthesis Center staff as prosthesis technicians. The ICRC also provided leather for the production of orthopedic shoes for mine survivors.⁸⁷

On 28 November 2000, a two-year agreement was signed between the Albanian Mine Action Center and the ITF to collaborate on demining and mine victim assistance. In 2001, the ITF allocated approximately US\$100,000 for victim assistance programs in Albania, which included support for the rehabilitation for 39 Albanian mine survivors at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute and the training of seven Albanian Prosthesis Center staff in June-July 2001 in Slovenia.⁸⁸ In 2002, 25 mine survivors will receive assistance.⁸⁹

To assist with the economic reintegration of mine survivors, the ICRC supported the "Shoemaker" project initiated by the Albanian Red Cross. In the project, 12 survivors from the northern districts of Has and Kukes were taught how to make shoes over a period of eight months. The training started on 2 April and lasted until November 2001.⁹⁰

Included in the UNDP program of mine action assistance for 2002 is the evaluation of national capacities for victim assistance and rehabilitation, and the establishment of a mine casualty data-collection system. The UNDP has budgeted US\$50,000 as a contribution to the World Health Organization for victim assistance in Albania in 2002.⁹¹

Disability Policy and Practice

There is no disability provision specific to mine survivors, but they are entitled to the same rights as all persons with disabilities in Albania, which includes a monthly payment of approximately US\$80 (equivalent to a monthly salary in the public sector). In addition, a one-year pension is available to people injured in the performance of their duties, such as border policeman or soldiers marking minefields. There is no statutory obligation to provide prostheses to amputees.⁹²

ALGERIA

Key developments since May 2001: Algeria ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 October 2001, and the treaty entered into force for Algeria on 1 April 2002. An interministerial commission responsible for the landmine issue is being established.

⁸⁵ Interview with Harun Iljazi, Head of Orthopedics Center, Tirana, 12 February 2002.

⁸⁶ Article 7 Report, Form J, 3 April 2002.

⁸⁷ "Mine Action Year 2001," ICRC Albania Fact Sheet.

⁸⁸ Annual Report 2001, International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, p. 18.

⁸⁹ Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, Tirana, 10 March 2002.

⁹⁰ "Mine Action Year 2001," ICRC Albania Fact Sheet.

⁹¹ "Assistance to the National Mine Action Programme in Albania," UNDP, undated.

⁹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 602.

Mine Ban Policy

Algeria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 9 October 2001.¹ It entered into force for Algeria on 1 April 2002. A national interministerial commission responsible for the landmine issue, first proposed in the year 2000, is being established; a number of focal points within different ministries have been appointed to prepare the creation of the commission.² A Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor in January 2002 that national implementation legislation would be adopted as soon as the ban treaty entered into force, but as of June no formal steps had been taken. Progress on legislation may be dependent on the establishment of the commission and subsequent landmine policy decisions.³

In September 2001, Algeria attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua as an observer.⁴ In November 2001, Algeria cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Algeria participated in the "Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa," held in Tunis, Tunisia, from 15-16 January 2002. In a statement to the conference, Algeria said that it had proved its commitment to the fight against landmines by ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, and indicated that the process of implementing the treaty domestically was already underway.⁵ Algeria also participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002.⁶

Algeria's initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report is due by 27 September 2002.

Algeria is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and did not attend any CCW meetings in 2001 or 2002.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Algeria is not believed to have either produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is thought to have imported mines from five different countries, but thus far Algeria has not provided information about the types or number of mines in its stockpile.⁷

According to Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, the Algerian Army does not use antipersonnel mines in its current internal conflict. The government maintains that insurgents continue to use homemade mines (improvised explosive devices), either to protect their retreat, or as traps for government troops.⁸ The Ministry of Interior gathers information on mines laid by insurgents, but has not made this available to Landmine Monitor.⁹

¹ Domestic ratification took place on 17 December 2000, by virtue of Presidential Decree 2000-432, but formal deposit of the instrument of ratification with the United Nations did not occur until 9 October 2001.

² Letter to Landmine Monitor from Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 May 2002. *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 915, erroneously reported that the commission had already been created. It will be composed of members of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior, and probably of the Ministries of Health, War Veterans, Solidarity and Social Affairs. Statement by Mr. Abdelaziz Lahiouel, Director of International Policies Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa, Tunis, Tunisia, 15 January 2002.

³ Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002; interview with Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 30 May 2002.

⁴ Represented by Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi from the Ministry of Defense.

⁵ Statement by Abdelaziz Lahiouel, Director, International Policies Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa, Tunis, Tunisia, 15 January 2002.

⁶ In January, Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, and Nassima Baghli, Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, represented Algeria. Baghli attended in May.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 871. Stockpile details will be provided officially in the Article 7 transparency report, due September 2002. Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002; Letter to Landmine Monitor from Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 May 2002.

⁹ Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

Landmine Problem

Algeria has a landmine problem dating back to World War II, when Germany and Italy laid mines in the northern coastal region. Many mines are also left from the Liberation War. Most of the landmines are in the remote, mountainous areas of the northern portion of its borders with Morocco and Tunisia. According to a recent US State Department report, "Landmines block traditional areas of transit or habitation, particularly in the east."¹⁰ The full extent of Algeria's landmine problem has never been assessed, but the government reports an estimated 1.3 million mines, of which 913,000 are in the east, and 420,100 are in the west.¹¹ According to *El Watan*, an Algerian daily newspaper, Sid Ali Bounab in Kabylie, Addgagh Aouragh region (some 120 kilometers east from Algiers), is mine-affected.¹²

Mine Action

Little information on mine action activities in Algeria is available, but the government reports conducting both mine clearance and mine risk education programs.¹³ The Army is carrying out mine clearance operations on the borders.¹⁴ The National Security Police has a team of explosive ordnance disposal experts to handle landmines and UXO in urban areas.¹⁵

In April 2002 the Algerian Army conducted mine clearance in Sid Ali Bounab to facilitate entry into a forest to fight the Salafist Preaching and Combat Group (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) of Hassan Hattab.¹⁶

Landmine Casualties

During the Army's mine clearance operation in Sid Ali Bounab in April 2002, a mine explosion killed five Islamists and wounded five military personnel. The Salafist group is reported to have laid the mine, as its base is located there.¹⁷

The lack of information on landmine casualties in 2001 and 2002 is due in large part to the absence of an overall database in Algeria. The need to establish such a database is one of the priorities for forthcoming interministerial commission.¹⁸ The Ministry of War Veterans has a database on military mine casualties, but this information was not made available to Landmine Monitor.¹⁹

Survivor Assistance

The Ministry of War Veterans and the Ministry of Defense are responsible for providing assistance to military mine survivors, while the Ministry of National Solidarity has responsibility

¹⁰ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. A-55.

¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 997; "Algeria," *Journal of Mine Action*, 7 May 2002. <http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.3/profiles/algeria.htm>.

¹² "Cinq islamistes tués dans une opération militaire en Kabylie" (Five Islamists killed in a military operation in Kabylie), *El Watan* (Algerian daily newspaper), 16 April 2002.

¹³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 997; "Algeria," *Journal of Mine Action*, 7 May 2002; Letter to Landmine Monitor from Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 May 2002.

¹⁴ Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002. For more detail on the clearance operations see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 916.

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 916; "Algeria," *Journal of Mine Action*, 7 May 2002.

¹⁶ "Cinq islamistes tués dans une opération militaire en Kabylie" (Five Muslims killed in a military operation in Kabylie), *El Watan* (Algerian daily newspaper), 16 April 2002.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Statement by Abdelaziz Lahiouel, Director of International Policies Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Seminar on Ottawa Convention in North Africa, Tunis, 15 January 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Lt. Col. Hacene Gherabi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

for civilian survivors. Mine survivors have free access to local and national structures of the Ministry of Health.²⁰

Since the end of 2000, Handicap International has established a rehabilitation center in Algiers and conducted a program for persons with disabilities but none of the patients are believed to be mine survivors.²¹ Social and economic measures for persons with disabilities are part of the global framework of governmental social action.²²

In June 2001, the ICRC signed an agreement with the Algerian Ministry of Health to create a production unit at the Ben Aknoun prosthetic/orthotic center in northern Algiers.²³ The unit has the capacity to produce 150 prostheses per year with the intended beneficiaries being Sahrawi ex-combatants and victims of violence. Two technicians undertook a training course at the ICRC center in Ethiopia.

ANDORRA

Andorra signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 29 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. It did not introduce new legislation to implement the treaty, but has regulations governing the use and traffic in arms.¹

Andorra did not attend either the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua, nor the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002. On 29 November 2001, Andorra cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Andorra is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Andorra submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 12 July 2000. By the end of June 2002, it had not submitted the annual reports due by 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002. Andorra has never produced or possessed antipersonnel mines. The initial Article 7 Report noted no necessity to decommission or convert production facilities, no mines stockpiled, retained or transferred under Article 3 of the treaty, no need for a stockpile destruction program, and no mined areas.²

Andorra contributed US\$11,100 in 2000 and \$11,750 in 2001 to mine clearance programs.³

ANGOLA

Key developments since May 2001: Angola ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 July 2002. There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines since the April 2002 peace agreement. The government created a new Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance to be responsible for policy-making, coordination of mine action and victim assistance, and the design of a new National Mine Action Plan. According to the mine action NGOs operating in Angola, 6.8 million square meters of land were cleared during 2001. A total of 339 mine and UXO accidents, resulting in 660 casualties, were reported in 2001, a significant decline from the year 2000.

²⁰ Interview with Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 30 May 2002.

²¹ Phone interview with Nicolas Brun, Program Director, Handicap International, 14 May 2002.

²² Letter to Landmine Monitor from Nassima Baghli, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 May 2002.

²³ ICRC (Geneva), *Special Report, Mine Action 2001*, July 2002, p. 37.

¹ Article 7 Report, Introduction and Form A, submitted on 12 July 2000, covering 1 January 1996-31 December 1999. It contains the relevant text from a 3 July 1989 Decree, including penal sanctions applicable.

² Article 7 Report, Forms B-H, 12 July 2000.

³ Letter from Jaime Gaytán Sansa, Ambassador of Andorra to Spain, 13 February 2002.

Background

On 22 February 2002, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed by government forces in Moxico Province. A cease-fire took affect almost immediately, followed by the signing, on 4 April 2002, of a Memorandum of Understanding effectively reactivating the Lusaka Protocol.¹ Regarding mine action, that agreement states that “the Government and UNITA agree to provide all available information relating to mines and other explosives, to help implement mine survey programs, mine awareness and demining programs for the benefit of all Angolans.”²

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Luanda reported that over 98,000 persons were displaced between 1 January 2002 and 28 February 2002.³ According to the government, 4.28 million people are now displaced inside Angola.⁴ These figures are significant since up to 75 percent of all mine accidents in Angola involve internally displaced persons (IDPs) stepping on mines as they traverse unfamiliar areas.⁵ If the peace agreement holds, a definitive peace after some 27 years of civil war would likely result in many tens of thousands of IDPs returning to their homes, and Angolan officials acknowledge the risk of mine accidents will be great.⁶

Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. On 25 July 2000, the Angolan Parliament approved ratification of the treaty, with 147 votes in favor, one against, and one abstention. According to the Angolan Constitution, the next step will be the ratification act of the President of the Republic followed by the depositing of the instrument of ratification with the United Nations in New York.⁷ With the collapse of the Lusaka Peace Process at the end of 1998, however, government and UNITA forces both resorted to planting landmines in the renewed conflict. Government representatives have openly admitted to the use of mines by their forces during this period.⁸

With the end of hostilities in April 2002, the Angolan Armed Forces Chief of Staff officially informed the new National Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH)⁹ that the army had stopped laying mines.¹⁰ A chain of events leading toward ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was set in motion. According to Balbina Silva, a government advisor working with CNIDAH, in April 2002 the Angolan Parliament formed a special commission to address the issue of treaty ratification and CNIDAH began working with this commission to advance the ratification process.¹¹ Soon thereafter, President dos Santos apparently asked the commission to provide him with the original document that had been approved by

¹ The new agreement consists of a Memorandum of Understanding between the military leadership of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and of UNITA's Armed Forces regarding the establishment of a general cease-fire and the implementation of the remaining military tasks under the Lusaka Protocol. See “Statement of the Government of Angola on the ceasefire settlement of the Government and UNITA general military staff,” UN Security Council Document, S/2002/346, 3 April 2002.

² The Lusaka Protocol, paragraph II.1) 1.34 of Annex 8, in relation to Military Issues (Agenda Item II.1).

³ “Humanitarian Situation in Angola, Monthly Analysis February 2002,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, available on www.reliefweb.int.

⁴ Out of the total number stated by the government, 1.4 million IDPs have been confirmed by humanitarian organizations and registered for assistance. See OCHA's “Humanitarian Fact Sheet, April 2002.”

⁵ UN Development Program Project Document, “Status and Prospects for Expanded National Mine Action Capacity in Angola,” 2 May 2002, p. 10. Hereinafter referred to as “UNDP Project Document.”

⁶ Interview with General Santana Andre Pitra (aka, General Petroff), Luanda, 30 April 2002.

⁷ Letter from the Angolan Ambassador to the UN, New York, to the ICBL, as cited in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.183.

⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 184.

⁹ In Portuguese: Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária às Vítimas das Minas (CNIDAH).

¹⁰ Email from Stephen Kinloch, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Angola, 17 June 2002.

¹¹ Interview with Dra. Balbina Silva, Luanda, Angola, 30 April 2002.

Parliament in July 2000. During the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Conference of Demining and Mine Action Operators held in Luanda on 26-28 June 2002, a copy of the instrument of ratification was symbolically handed over to the senior landmine official of the SADC Secretariat, João Ndlovu.¹²

According to an Angolan government statement, the ratification document was handed over to the UN on 28 June 2002.¹³ On 5 July 2002, the UN officially registered Angola's deposit of its instrument of ratification, making it the 125th State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty will formally enter into force for Angola on 1 January 2003.

The Angolan government announcement of the ratification concludes that, "The decision to ratify the Ottawa Treaty demonstrates to the international community that the Angolan Government is firmly committed to eliminate antipersonnel mines and other explosive devices," and that "the ratification of the Treaty is a further step in the process of consolidating peace and national reconciliation."¹⁴

Angola's initial transparency report required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty is due on 29 June 2003.

Angola attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001. Angola cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It sent representatives to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. The seventh meeting of the SADC's Acting Committee on Landmines was held on 27-28 June 2002 in Luanda, Angola. The meeting was held simultaneously with the first SADC Conference of Demining Operators.¹⁵

Angola is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which took place in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Seventy-six different types of antipersonnel mines from 22 countries have been found or reported in Angola. Little is known about the size or composition of Angola's current landmine stockpile, or that held by UNITA military forces.¹⁶ During the SADC conference in Luanda in June 2002, 100 antipersonnel mines and ten antivehicle mines were destroyed in a ceremony.¹⁷ The treaty-mandated deadline for destruction of all Angola's stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 January 2007.

Use

In October 2000, the Ministry of Defense circulated to all its commanders a decree stating that following the ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty by Parliament in July 2000, the military should refrain from using antipersonnel mines during their operations.¹⁸ This was apparently done in response to international criticism of the incongruous policy of moving towards ratification while at the same time continuing to plant antipersonnel mines. Nonetheless, the use of mines by both sides continued until April 2002, when the war came to an end as a result of the death of Jonas

¹² Landmine Monitor (South Africa) interview with Neuma Grobbelaar, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1 July 2002; "Angola formally adheres to Ottawa Convention on landmines," *Xinhua* (Luanda), 9 July 2002.

¹³ "Angola: Ratificada Convenção de Ottawa sobre minas anti-pessoal," *LUSA* press agency, 8 July 2002.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* (unofficial translation)

¹⁵ "SADC experts defend enlargement of campaign against landmines," *ANGOP* (Luanda), 29 June 2002.

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 184-185.

¹⁷ Landmine Monitor (South Africa) interview with Neuma Grobbelaar, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1 July 2002; "Angola formally adheres to Ottawa Convention on landmines," *Xinhua* (Luanda), 9 July 2002.

¹⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 183.

Savimbi.¹⁹ According to General Petroff, former Minister of Interior and now Director of CNIDAH, “In this regard we have been pragmatic. While the war with UNITA continued, it was not possible for us to say that we would not use mines. Where we did not have the physical capacity to defend our strategic objectives without using defensive mines, we were forced to use them. So there was no use in sending to parliament a treaty to ratify when we were at the same time planting mines.”²⁰

Prior to April 2002, Angolan government officials had admitted to the continued planting of mines by their military forces on many occasions, and previous field research by the Landmine Monitor has documented specific instances of this.²¹ Throughout 2001 and early 2002, the new use of antipersonnel mines appears to have declined as the zones of military operations became smaller and more focused on specific areas. It is worthwhile noting that, during this period, there were no reports of planting mines in areas that had been previously cleared.²²

Since the April 2002 peace agreement, there have not been any reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government or UNITA forces.

Landmine Problem, Survey and Assessment

Angola is regarded as one of the countries most affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Through the end of 2001, a total of 2,232 minefields and UXO locations had been registered in the database of the national mine action office, INAROE (Instituto Nacional de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenheiros Explosivos). In addition, some 660 minefields and UXO locations have been cleared since 1995; 73 of these were cleared in 2001.²³

Since late 1998, the deteriorating security situation and, in some cases, declining donor resources forced demining operators to restrict their areas of operations and, in many cases, pull back to provincial capitals where they worked in support of IDP camps. With the end of the conflict, most of these organizations are once again beginning to conduct survey activities and to assess the possibility of moving out into rural areas.

Recent assessments have been undertaken by Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) along the Benguela railway near Ca’ala, Huambo Province, and by Santa Barbara, another German NGO, along the Matala–Menongue railway in southern Angola. The HALO Trust reassessed 505 sites in Benguela, Huambo, and Bie Provinces during the first half of 2002.²⁴ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine survey teams are engaged full-time in an inter-agency “Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs” (RACN) process, coordinated by OCHA. This process links recently passed Angolan legislation regarding standards for IDP resettlement with humanitarian operations in the field.²⁵ As part of the RACN, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has contributed surveys in previously

¹⁹ In a notorious incident, on 10 August 2001, a train carrying approximately 500 passengers from Luanda inland to Dondo triggered a landmine and caught fire. UNITA rebels claimed responsibility for staging the attack, insisting the train was loaded with military supplies. The death toll ultimately reached 250, including those gunned down by UNITA forces as they fled the burning wreckage. See “Angola’s UNITA Rebels Claim Responsibility for Attack on Train,” *Xinhua*, 13 August 2001; “Death Toll in Angola Train Attack Reaches 250,” *Reuters*, 15 August 2001.

²⁰ Interview with General Petroff, Luanda, Angola, 30 April 2002.

²¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 184-186.

²² Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “The Mine Action Sector in Angola: Mission Report,” February 2002, p. 43. Hereinafter referred to as “GICHD Mission Report.”

²³ INAROE Annual Report, “Mine Accident and Survey Report – 2001.” Hereinafter referred to as “INAROE 2001 Annual Report.” Available on www.inaroe@ebonet.net. This figure includes high-risk and low-risk locations, marked areas, and areas currently being demined.

²⁴ “The HALO Trust Angola – Briefing Notes as at 23 May 2002.”

²⁵ Promulgated on 5 January 2001, Article 4 of Decree Number 1/01 states, “a) All resettlement and return sites must be verified free of mines. b) For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, INAROE and its partners will create mine awareness brigades and, when necessary, conduct demining.” This piece of legislation is based on the UN document entitled “Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.”

inaccessible areas of Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces. As security has improved, MAG has also conducted further survey and assessment work in Cunene and Moxico.²⁶

According to the Survey Action Center (SAC), the donor community has shown interest in funding a Landmine Impact Survey for Angola. An impact survey is community-focused rather than minefield-focused, and in this case would include a retrofit of the current INAROE database into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) system. An advance survey mission is scheduled to visit Angola in September 2002.²⁷

Mine Action Funding

The annual budgets for 2001 for the principle mine action NGOs came to a total of more than US\$13.5 million. In addition, UNICEF spent about \$1.5 million on its mine risk education programs and the ICRC spent an unknown amount on mine risk education and victim assistance programs.

Nine donors reported contributions to mine action in Angola in 2001 totaling about \$9.6 million. The United States reported \$3,188,000 in funding, including \$2 million to NPA and \$800,000 to HALO Trust.²⁸ Norway reported \$2,259,999 for NPA (\$2.1 million) and the Trauma Care Foundation. The Netherlands reported \$1,143,170 for NPA and HALO Trust. Germany reported \$1,022,052 to MAG, St. Barbara, MgM, and GTZ (victim assistance). Sweden reported \$1 million for NPA. Finland reported \$422,000 for the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for victim assistance and mine risk education. Ireland reported \$276,219 for HALO Trust and UNICEF. Japan reported \$130,000 for UNICEF for mine risk education. Canada reported \$129,164 for the UNDP database.²⁹ As can be seen from the information provided below by the mine action operators, there have been other donors as well.

HALO Trust receives funding from the United States, Netherlands, Ireland, and the European Community (EC). In 2001, it received roughly \$2.6 million in funding, and as of 1 July 2002 had received \$3.7 million for 2002, with prospects to receive an additional \$1.6 million before the end of the year.³⁰

Intersos was funded by the EC and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the amount of €1.7 million (\$1.53 million) from 1999 through end September 2001, as well as by UN OCHA with \$208,000. In 2002, Intersos submitted a \$500,000 proposal to clear an agricultural area in Matala Municipality in support of the resettlement of 24,000 IDPs from the eastern and northern parts of Huíla Province.³¹

The *Mines Advisory Group's* total budget for July 2001-June 2002 was \$2.5 million. MAG plans to at least double its capacity in 2002-2003. MAG receives funding from the German Foreign Ministry (through Medico International), UNOCHA (Consolidated Appeal), US Department of State, Finnish Foreign Ministry, Bread for the World, Misereor and LWF/FinnChurchAid.³²

MgM received \$100,000 in 2001 from the German government and €600,000 (\$538,800) from the EC, leaving it with an estimated annual budget shortfall of \$1.7 million. MgM expects to

²⁶ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 July 2002.

²⁷ SAC News Update, June 2002.

²⁸ US Department of State, "To Walk The Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 2.

²⁹ See individual country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor, and also the UN Mine Action Investments Database at: <http://webapps.dfaict-maeci.gc.ca>.

³⁰ Email from Guy Willoughby, Director of HALO Trust, 1 July 2002.

³¹ OCHA's 2002 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal.

³² Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 July 2002.

receive \$560,000 in May 2002 from the US Department of Defense, and has requested roughly \$1.5 million in funds for 2002 through the UN Consolidated Appeal Process.³³

Santa Barbara operations in 2001 were funded by \$111,000 from the German Business Donor Circle. In addition, the German government provided \$25,000 in basic support to maintain the Santa Barbara camp and to perform equipment maintenance.³⁴

Norwegian People's Aid received about \$5.14 million for its work in Angola in 2001 from the following sources: Netherlands, \$615,000; Norway (NORAD), \$2,083,750; Sweden, \$952,500; and the US, \$1,489,600.³⁵ As of June 2002, the following \$5 million in funding had been committed for NPA's 2002 budget of approximately \$8.3 million:

Norway (NORAD)	\$1,667,000 (a reduction of 25 percent from last year)
Royal Norwegian MFA	\$1,111,000 (new)
Sweden (SIDA)	\$750,000 (a reduction of 27 percent)
Royal Dutch MFA	\$500,000 (a reduction of 23 percent, when confirmed)
US State Dept.	\$980,000 (for May 02-May 03, a 52 percent reduction)
Total funds committed:	\$5,008,000 (total 15 percent reduction from last year)

NPA reports that the shortfall in funding will force it to close down several of its operational groups during the second half of 2002, if additional resources are not received.³⁶

Handicap International's budget for its mine risk education activities in 2001 was about \$400,000. Donors included ECHO (\$101,430), UNDP (\$69,940), and UNESCO (\$9,188). The remaining funds came from HI.³⁷

Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA) carries out survivor assistance activities, and is funded by USAID, with an annual budget of almost US\$1 million.³⁸

UNICEF's mine awareness project received roughly \$1.5 million in 2001, and estimates its 2002 budget at \$2 million. Key donors include Canada, Ireland, Germany, Israel, Italy, UK, US, Japan, and Australia.³⁹

Mine Action Coordination

In 2001, the Angolan government began restructuring the national mine action sector. On 28 July 2001, the National Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance for Mine Victims (CNIDAH) was established in response to the lack of overall coordination in the mine action sector and the lack of donor confidence in national mine action institutions. According to one assessment, collaboration between the international community and the Angolan national demining institute, INAROE, "showed clear signs of a lack of proper mandates, poor overall planning, lack of co-operation between key organizations, contradictory messages to donors, and a gradually increasing international distrust in the work of INAROE."⁴⁰ With CNIDAH, Angola hopes to restore donor confidence by creating a clear separation between policy, coordination, and fundraising on the one hand, and the implementation of mine action activities on the other.

In 2002, INAROE remains in crisis and has reduced its activities to a minimum. A severe lack of confidence in the institution on the part of donors, mine action NGOs, and others⁴¹ led the

³³ Statistical breakdowns were provided by Ken O'Connell, of MgM Angola, via email on 6, 7, and 26 May 2002. UN Consolidated Appeal figures taken from the 2002 CAP document on www.reliefweb.int.

³⁴ Email from Christfried Schoenherr, Santa Barbara representative in Luanda, 19 May 2002.

³⁵ Email from Janecke Wille, NPA, Oslo, 10 July 2002.

³⁶ Data supplied by Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Program Manager for Mine Action in Angola, NPA, May 2002.

³⁷ Emails from Corinne Henon, Program Director, Handicap International, Luanda, 15 July 2002, and Cathy Badonnel, MRE coordination, HI, Lyon, 3 July 2002.

³⁸ Mike Kendellen, VVAFA, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire; and email from Tom Petocz, VVAFA Country Representative in Angola, 4 May 2002. See Survivor Assistance section below for details on VVAFA's activities.

³⁹ Interview with Emanuel dos Santos Pinheiro, UNICEF Project Assistant for Mine Risk Education, Luanda, 29 April 2002.

⁴⁰ GICHD Mission Report, p. 4.

⁴¹ See UNDP Project Document, which contains a lengthy analysis of the structural weaknesses of INAROE.

UN to suspend its technical assistance in August 2000.⁴² Its minimal government funding covers salaries, but very little in the way of mine action operations. With the creation of CNIDAH, a major restructuring of INAROOE will take place, but its future role has yet to be defined.

INAROOE maintains the mine action database, however the NPA database advisor left Angola in June 2002 and it appears unlikely that NPA will continue to support the database in its current form.⁴³ A change in the management structure of the database, and its possible transfer from INAROOE to CNIDAH, could be part of the restructuring process.

One of the first tasks of CNIDAH is to establish basic coordination and reporting processes to demonstrate an ability to coordinate the mine action sector. CNIDAH is responsible for policy-making, coordination of demining activities and mine victim assistance, and the design of a National Mine Action Plan. It reports to the Council of Ministers and includes representatives from the Ministries of Social Welfare, Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Territorial Administration, External Relations, Defense, Interior, and the Angolan Armed Forces. Representatives from national and international NGOs will also participate in the Commission.⁴⁴

CNIDAH has already identified three broad priority areas for mine action in Angola: increased mine risk education given the number of IDPs in the country; demining in all areas of IDP resettlement; and demining of the Benguela railway corridor for future reconstruction of the line.⁴⁵

As of July 2002, CNIDAH had not produced an approved work plan and had received no funding from the government. While General Santana Andre Pitra (General "Petroff") has been appointed to head CNIDAH, there are no permanent staff members, no office space, and CNIDAH has not yet issued formal policy statements.⁴⁶ CNIDAH was attempting to address these basic, yet urgent, issues during the mid-year review of the national budget.

According to a June 2002 UN document, a new provincial plan of action has been agreed upon due to the critical IDP situation in the country. It includes the deployment of 12-13 qualified personnel to the provinces to assist in provincial level mine action coordination. Their first priority will be based on the Provincial Emergency Plans of Action for Resettlement and Return (PEPARR). These staff members will work closely with INAROOE, mine action NGOs, UN agencies, and local administrations to implement mine action priorities. Specific attention will be given to: 1) alerting returning populations to mine infested areas; 2) conducting mine clearance activities in priority locations; 3) strengthening coordination at the provincial level, and 4) information sharing between key partners. The new personnel will also concentrate on preparing the groundwork for the Landmine Impact Survey.⁴⁷

Mine Clearance

Great disparities in the information provided to Landmine Monitor by INAROOE underscore its weakness in coordinating mine action. It could not provide clear statistics for mine clearance in 2001, nor could it provide data for the first quarter of 2002. The following table illustrates disparities in data provided regarding the number of square meters of land cleared during the 2001. The first three columns show data from three different INAROOE documents.⁴⁸ The final column is from individual NGO mine action organizations directly.

⁴² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 187.

⁴³ Interview with Sara Sekkenes, NPA Mine Policy Advisor, Oslo, Norway, 2 July 2002.

⁴⁴ UNDP Project Document, p. 12.

⁴⁵ Interview with General Petroff, Luanda, 30 April 2002.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ UN OCHA Luanda, "Mine Action," a short briefing document, June 2002.

⁴⁸ During the last week of April 2002, the Landmine Monitor Angola Researcher met repeatedly with INAROOE technical director, Leonardo Sapalo, and with the staff of the database, though General Helder Cruz, INAROOE director, did not appear at a scheduled meeting. Over a period of four days, INAROOE database personnel printed out documents one and two, recorded in the chart above. During a meeting with the

Square Meters of Land Cleared in 2001

	INAROE Doc. 1	INAROE Doc. 2	INAROE 2001 Annual Report	NGO Reports
HALO Trust	193,442	273,165	246,714	1,359,877 ⁴⁹
INAROE	629,223	646,123	12,825 ⁵⁰	12,825
Intersos	424,883	1,209,982	785,099	525,417 ⁵¹
MAG	114,191	114,191	16,913	170,225 ⁵²
MgM	25,374	25,374	120,106	1,036,533 ⁵³
NPA	1,053,033	748,744	1,109,099	3,640,470 ⁵⁴
Santa Barbara	40,863	40,863	4,226,022	55,841 ⁵⁵
Total	2,481,009	3,058,442	6,516,778	6,801,118

While, at first glance, the INAROE Annual Report and the total figure from the NGO reports appear relatively close (6.5 million versus 6.8 million), in fact the INAROE table has mistakenly added 4.2 million square meters to the NGO Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara itself is very clear that it demined a total of 55,841 square meters during the year.⁵⁶ Similar discrepancies exist in regard to the number of mines and UXO cleared during the year.⁵⁷

HALO Trust. The British NGO HALO Trust maintains 26 manual demining teams, four combined EOD/survey/mine awareness teams, two armored loaders, one tracked dozer, two Wer'Wolf mine-protected area reduction vehicles, and one armored vegetation cutter. There is also a seasonal attachment of mine detection dog teams. HALO has a staff of 385 (339 in operations and 46 support staff) managed by one expatriate program manager.

As of 23 May 2002, its operations included 19 mine clearance tasks across Bie, Huambo, and Benguela Provinces. Throughout 2001 and into early 2002, as a result of the continued poor security situation and the increased numbers of IDPs in the provincial capitals, HALO teams focused on clearance tasks adjacent to the growing IDP camps. With the ceasefire and improvement of security in spring 2002, HALO survey teams were able to begin a comprehensive re-survey of the three provinces and have identified the following priority sites: 223 sites in Bie, 205 sites in Huambo, and 77 sites in Benguela. In the near future HALO plans to expand to 800+ national staff, import additional mechanical resources (with US State Department funding) and to spread its deployment into newly accessible areas in outlying municipalities.⁵⁸

In 2001, HALO cleared 1,359,877 square meters of land (78 percent of this area was battle area clearance), destroying 1,084 mines, 1,070 UXO, and 7,048 items of stray ammunition. In 2002, HALO has cleared 145,763 square meters of land, destroying 735 mines, 189 UXO, and

Technical Director of INAROE, a copy of the *Mine Action and Survey Report – 2001* was provided, from which the data in the third column is taken.

⁴⁹ Email from Tim Porter, HALO Trust Africa Desk Officer, 24 June 2002.

⁵⁰ INAROE statistic includes INAROE plus BTS Bie (Brigadas Técnicas de Sapadores).

⁵¹ Email from Osvaldo Amato, Intersos Mine Action Operations Officer, 21 June 2002. This figure represents clearance during a 23-month time period, ending September 2001.

⁵² Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 July 2002.

⁵³ *MgM Annual Report 2001*, provided via email by Ken O'Connell, MgM Angola, 7 May 2002.

⁵⁴ Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Mine Action Program Manager, NPA, 7 May 2002.

⁵⁵ Email from Christfried Schoenherr, Santa Barbara representative in Luanda, 19 May 2002.

⁵⁶ Email communications between Landmine Monitor and Christfried Schoenherr, 16, 19, and 27 June 2002.

⁵⁷ To give just one example, MgM reports destroying 1,293 UXO in 2001, while INAROE reported that MgM destroyed 63,973 UXO during the same period.

⁵⁸ "The Halo Trust Angola-Briefing Notes as at 23 May 2002." Additional statistical breakdowns were provided by Tim Porter, HALO Trust Africa Desk Officer, via email on 24 June 2002.

11,451 items of stray ammunition. During this 18-month period, 107,657 people in mine-affected communities received mine risk education briefings from HALO.⁵⁹

Intersos. In 2001, Intersos continued its activities in the provinces of Huíla and Kuando Kubango. In accordance with agreements reached at the local and provincial level, and with OCHA (acting as donor), Intersos carried out mine surveys, and EOD and battle area clearance. Clearance statistics over the 23-month period ending September 2001 include 525,417 square meters of land cleared, with 77 mines and 47,019 UXO destroyed. Intersos collected and destroyed 262,225 pieces of ammunition in their battle area clearance project, and they estimate the immediate beneficiaries of their mine action activities at 16,000.⁶⁰

*Mines Advisory Group (MAG).*⁶¹ As of July 2002, MAG maintained five Mine Action Teams (MAT) in Angola, from operations bases in Moxico and Cunene provinces. In Cunene, in February 2002, MAG began surveying the previously inaccessible eastern areas of the province. During 2001, in Cunene, MAG destroyed 131 mines and 9,106 items of UXO, and cleared 139,477 square meters of land. The MATs also responded to 258 community reports of mines and UXO.

In Kuvelai in Cunene, MAG is working around an IDP camp and has cleared areas around a WFP food distribution point. In Cakulavale in Cunene, MAG has destroyed several thousand items of ordnance from an old ammunition dump. MAG's Community Liaison Officers (CLO) visited 119 communities in Cunene in 2001 to conduct mine risk education, information gathering, and impact surveys. Following clearance, the CLOs carried out post-clearance assessments. MAG bases its "National Training Team" in Cunene province.

In Moxico province in 2001, MAG cleared and destroyed 146 mines and 3,201 items of UXO, clearing 30,748 square meters of land. MAG was limited to the area within and immediately surrounding Luena by the ongoing conflict during 2001, and focused on responding to emergency requests from communities and local government. In late 2001, MAG cleared land and roads to help establish the new Muachimbo IDP camp. In December 2001, MAG cleared areas around Luena's water pumping and filtration station, enabling repairs to be carried out by local government, and running water to flow for the city's 250,000 inhabitants for the first time since 1993. During this project, 7,000 square meters was cleared and 17 antipersonnel mines were removed and destroyed.

In Moxico, MAG's participatory mine risk education is targeted at non-school attending children and newly arrived IDPs. A total of 17,175 people attended sessions in 2001. MATs also responded to reports from the local population about UXO and mines. With improved security in early 2002, MAG conducted technical appraisals and opened safe access along the main roads from Luena to Lucusse, Luau and Congombe, to make possible the road-delivery of food and medical aid by local agencies and by WFP and MSF.

*Menschen gegen Minen (MgM).*⁶² During the first half of 2001, MgM continued its operations in Ambriz, Bengo Province, an area that has been MgM's main base of operations for over five years. On 5 June 2001, Ambriz was attacked by UNITA forces and MgM halted operations and relocated the bulk of its human and technical resources to its southern base in Ondjiva, Cunene Province, where a test bed facility was constructed for analyzing the capabilities of new demining technologies.⁶³

⁵⁹ "The HALO Trust Angola—Briefing Notes as at 23 May 2002."

⁶⁰ Email from Osvaldo Amato, Intersos Mine Action Operations Officer, 21 June 2002.

⁶¹ This section is drawn from: Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 July 2002.

⁶² People Against Landmines.

⁶³ The test beds were designed by Andy Smith of AVS Consulting, for technologies developed in the EU's Esprit Program. Ground penetrating radar and nuclear magnetic resonance are two of the newest technologies tested in Ondjiva. See *MgM 2001 Annual Report*, and the website www.mgm.org.

A small portion of MgM's staff and equipment remained in Luanda, and throughout the year carried out a number of small tasks in Luanda and Bengo Provinces. Eighteen power pylons were demined inside an IDP camp near Caxito (roughly 35 kilometers from Luanda), an old ordnance dump at the airport in Luanda was surveyed, and an MgM EOD team partially cleared and marked another mined area near Caxito. MgM also operates a vehicle maintenance facility in Luanda that services NGO, UN, and embassy vehicles; any profits generated by the workshop are used to support MgM demining activities.

MgM received a request for assistance from the provincial government of Cunene after the governor, Sr. Mutinde, was seriously injured in a mine accident when he drove over an antivehicle mine on his family's private property. MgM and MAG collaborated on a thorough reassessment of the area, which had reportedly been cleared by Angolan Army engineers in 1982. MgM also carried out a reassessment of all areas adjacent to the Ondjiva airport, to facilitate runway extension and repair work. Utilizing armored graders, vapor detection dogs teams, and one section of deminers, MgM verified over 1 million square meters on this one task.⁶⁴

Throughout 2001, MgM opened 13.4 kilometers of roadway and cleared/verified 1,036,533 square meters of land. MgM destroyed 160 antipersonnel mines, 16 antivehicle mines, and destroyed 1,293 UXO. MgM maintains an operational capacity of two armored graders and one armored Caterpillar 916 with ROTAR attachment, plus two dog teams and 40 manual deminers.⁶⁵

Norwegian People's Aid. NPA remains the NGO with the most extensive mine clearance operations in Angola, operating in the provinces of Malange, Kwanza Norte, Huíla, Cunene, and Moxico with a staff of roughly 500 Angolans and seven expatriates. Throughout 2001, NPA cleared 3,640,470 square meters of land and opened 3,392 kilometers of road. In 2001, 748 antipersonnel mines, 78 antivehicle mines, and 1,071 UXO were removed. Between 1 January and 31 March 2002, NPA cleared a total of 651,472 square meters of land, removing 438 antipersonnel and 17 antivehicle mines and 473 UXO.⁶⁶

NPA has now fully developed a "Task Impact Assessment" (TIA) procedure. TIA is an analytical and planning process to assesses the needs and capacities of local communities, as well as the current operational and managerial capacities of the demining teams themselves, in an effort to more closely link mine action with post-demining development work. TIA is, in essence, a task prioritization process that links mine action directly to the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the target population.⁶⁷

Throughout 2001 and the first quarter of 2002, NPA's operational capacity remained virtually unchanged from that reported last year.⁶⁸ There are four manual demining groups consisting of roughly 350 deminers. The mechanical group operates three Aardvark and two Hydrema flail machines, while the mine dog teams consist of 14 free-running dogs and 11 REST dogs (Remote Explosive Scent Tracing). The REST dogs work from a stationary location with air samples that are collected in the field by manual teams traveling in three armored Casspir vehicles. NPA also maintains a fully nationalized mine survey group; in 2001 its teams surveyed and documented 129 mine sites. The information collected by these teams is consolidated in the INAROOE national landmine database with the technical assistance of one NPA expatriate.⁶⁹ In addition, there are two mobile EOD teams that focus on finding and destroying UXO.

⁶⁴ *MgM Annual Report 2001*, provided via email by Ken O'Connell, MgM Angola, 7 May 2002.

⁶⁵ Email from Ken O'Connell, MgM Angola, 26 May 2002.

⁶⁶ Data supplied by Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Program Manager for Mine Action in Angola, Norwegian People's Aid, May 2002.

⁶⁷ Email from Sara Sekkenes, Mine Policy Advisor, NPA Oslo, 23 May 2002.

⁶⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 191.

⁶⁹ The NPA database advisor left Angola in June 2002 and it appears unlikely that NPA will continue to support the database in its current form. Interview with Sara Sekkenes, NPA Mine Policy Advisor, Oslo, Norway, 2 July 2002.

Santa Barbara. This German NGO has been in Angola since 1997. In 2001, its operations continued around Xangongo, Cunene Province, though at a greatly reduced level due to a shortage of funding. In total, 55,841 square meters of land were cleared, with 15 antivehicle mines, nine UXO, and 92 items of stray ammunition destroyed. During this “quiet period,” demining staff members performed *ad hoc* mine awareness and spot clearance activities in the greater Xangongo area. In May 2002, Santa Barbara participated in an assessment mission along the Matala–Menongue railway in southern Angola.⁷⁰

Angolan Armed Forces. In January 2002, Spain announced it would hold a basic training course in demining for 12 members of the Angolan Armed Forces. The class would be held near Madrid between 11 February to 22 March and would train participants in the areas of recognition, identification and registration of mines, and would train them to become mine clearance instructors.⁷¹

Mine Risk Education

UNICEF continues to be the lead agency in mine risk education (MRE). UNICEF works with state agencies and departments to develop a long-term capacity-building strategy within the government. Together with INAROOE, UNICEF has produced television and radio spots, and instituted a train-the-trainer program in primary schools throughout the country. Over 980 teachers have been trained to train other teachers in the school system in MRE. This year, MRE was formally accepted into the national curriculum by the Ministry of Education. Between August 2001 and February 2002, 142,200 children benefited from mine awareness education in the formal sector.⁷²

UNICEF also funds local NGOs in seven of the most mine-affected provinces.⁷³ Their activities include theater skits, community awareness-raising events, and MRE classes in non-formal schools. Between August 2001 and February 2002, 262,726 people benefited from such activities. Additionally, these local NGOs and their community networks play an important role in advocating for the full ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty and other mine-related issues, such as survivor assistance and the rights of the disabled. Finally, UNICEF is the primary producer of mine awareness education materials such as posters, newsletters, caps, T-shirts, etc, which are used and distributed by all organizations in Angola, including government departments, national, and international NGOs.⁷⁴

Handicap International also plays a significant role in mine risk education in Angola. Their educational activities are focused on the provinces of Bie, Huambo, Benguela, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Cunene, Bengo, and Kuando Kubango. From mid-2000 to mid-2001, HI’s activities reached 80,000 beneficiaries in the provinces of Bengo and Kuando Kubango; the project emphasizes direct support in those two provinces, while it focuses on institutional support to INAROOE and provincial coordination mechanisms in the other six provinces. HI cooperates with many organizations in the field, including UNICEF, Intersos, MAG, NPA, and MgM, as well as a large number of national NGOs operating in the area of mine risk education.⁷⁵ In addition to HI, the HALO Trust, Care, NPA, and World Vision are all active in the mine risk education sector.

⁷⁰ Emails from Christfried Schoenherr, Santa Barbara representative in Luanda, 18, 20, and 24 May 2002.

⁷¹ “Spain to Hold Demining Course for Angolan Army Officials 11 Feb-22 Mar,” *ANGOP*, 20 January 2002.

⁷² UNICEF Progress Report, April 2002.

⁷³ UNICEF funds the following local mine awareness NGOs: Palancas Negras (Malange), Grupo de Apoio à Criança (Huambo and Bie), Trindade (Bengo), Club de Jovens (Hufla), Xname de Abeila (Moxico), CDR and Tumbuanza (Uíge). Interview with UNICEF Luanda, 29 April 2002.

⁷⁴ UNICEF Progress Report, April 2002.

⁷⁵ Handicap International, “HI in Angola (mid 2000 – mid 2001),” provided via email from Cathy Badonnel, MRE Coordination, HI, Lyon, 3 June 2002.

MAG carries out mine risk education alongside its mine clearance and survey activities in Moxico and Cunene provinces. (See section above for details).⁷⁶

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, 660 new casualties were reported, from a total of 339 mine and UXO incidents.⁷⁷ Of the total casualties, 170 people were killed and 362 injured; the status of 128 casualties is unknown. This represents a decline in new casualties of 21 percent from the 840 casualties reported in 2000, of which 388 people were killed and 452 injured.⁷⁸ In 2001, 20 percent of casualties were female. Forty-nine percent of total casualties were traveling⁷⁹ at the time of the incident. In one incident, on 3 September 2001, 24 individuals were killed by an antivehicle mine near the village of Luarica, roughly 15 kilometers from Lucapa, Lunda Norte Province.⁸⁰ Civilians accounted for 56 percent of total casualties recorded in 2001, with 42 percent military personnel, and two percent unknown. The age group most affected by mines, is 19- to 35-year-olds with 53 percent of recorded casualties, followed by those over the age of 35 with 21 percent. Sixteen percent were under the age of 18. Of all casualties reported during the year 2001, 41 percent were the result of antivehicle mines, 40 percent resulted from antipersonnel mines, and almost 10 percent were the result of an exploding UXO. The provinces recording the highest number of incidents were Malange with 23 percent of reported incidents, Uíge 15 percent, Moxico 14 percent, Kuando Kubango 10 percent, and Huambo Province with 9 percent.

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002, although the numbers recorded do not appear to be comprehensive yet. On 2 February 2002, three civilians were killed by one antipersonnel mine in Cachimbago, 12 kilometers north of Ganda, Benguela Province.⁸¹ INAROE reports that between 1 January and 30 April 2002, a total of 27 mine/UXO incidents resulted in 44 people being killed or injured.⁸² However, according to UNICEF there had been at least 200 incidents since the beginning of the year.⁸³

In the period from 1998 to 2001, a total of 2,055 mine and UXO casualties, including 487 children, were recorded.⁸⁴

Survivor Assistance

Few facilities are available for the physically disabled. The provision of any type of assistance, particularly outside major cities, has been significantly affected by the conflict.⁸⁵ One in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury.⁸⁶ The challenges facing both local and international organizations working with Angolan mine survivors in 2001 and 2002 included ongoing military clashes, population displacements, as well as a decrease in resources from donors.

In general, 30-50 percent of mine casualties die before or after surgery for reasons including: distance to the nearest medical facility, lack of transport, and wrongly applied first aid.⁸⁷ The

⁷⁶ See MAG's activities in the mine clearance section of this country report.

⁷⁷ All casualty data is taken from the INAROE "Mine Accident and Survey Report – 2001."

⁷⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 193.

⁷⁹ "Traveling" as a category refers to those individuals who were involved in a mine incident while moving from one place to another rather than while living in one location. In reality, the vast majority of casualties are internally displaced and step on mines while fleeing zones of conflict or returning to their place of origin.

⁸⁰ OCHA Luanda security incident database. Information provided by OCHA Field Advisors.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Printout provided to Landmine Monitor by INAROE, 29 April 2002.

⁸³ Interview with UNICEF, Luanda, 29 April 2002.

⁸⁴ These figures are cited by UNICEF in a map printed 19 January 2002, based on data provided by INAROE. Published in: "Mine Awareness Education: Progress Report for the Canadian International Development Agency and the UNICEF National Committee of Canada," April 2002.

⁸⁵ See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 194.

⁸⁶ GICHD Mission Report, February 2002, p. 43.

⁸⁷ Sebastian Kasack, Medico International, "The Luena/Angola experience," presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 28 January 2002.

World Health Organization (WHO), together with the Norwegian NGO, Trauma Care Foundation (TCF), and Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) provide emergency care training to medical personnel in Luena Province. In 2001/2002, a total of twenty-eight people were trained. Ten of the participants have qualified as instructors for training villagers as first responders to provide first aid to mine casualties.⁸⁸ The ICRC works in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health, providing assistance in government hospitals, including the surgical ward at the Central Hospital in Huambo. In the provinces of Huambo, Bié and Uíge, the ICRC also supports 12 Primary Health Care centers, in collaboration with the national Red Cross Society and the Ministry of Health.⁸⁹

The Ministry of Health operates ten centers providing rehabilitation services for the disabled, including landmine survivors. Three of these centers are supported by the ICRC, three by Handicap International Belgium, two by German Technical Cooperation, one by Intersos, and one by Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation/Veterans International.⁹⁰

The ICRC provides physical rehabilitation services in Luanda, Huambo and Kuito. In 2001, the centers provided 1,953 prostheses, of which 1,578 were for mine survivors. In addition 6,232 patients received crutches and 64 received wheelchairs.⁹¹ Partial transport reimbursements were given to 756 patients while another 117 patients were transported to the centers in the ICRC plane. In addition, prosthetic components and crutch handles were provided free of charge until April 2002⁹² to six other rehabilitation centers for the production of 1,500 prostheses. Two crutch-making units in Huambo and in Luanda are assisted by the ICRC, using recycled polypropylene from used prostheses, which aim to cover the national needs. Due to security problems, poverty, and a lack of information, one of the key issues addressed in 2001 was the dissemination of information regarding assistance available at the centers. The government input into the centers increased during the year; salaries of national staff were raised and also paid regularly.⁹³ In the first six months of 2002, support for nearly 3,000 disabled persons from seven different provinces continued in the three orthopedic centers directly supported by ICRC. All services were provided to patients free of charge until April 2002.⁹⁴

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) continued to support the physical rehabilitation workshops in Benguela, Lubango, and Negage as well as the prosthetic foot factory in Viana. In 2001, 856 patients were fitted with prostheses, 739 prostheses were repaired, and 1,858 pairs of crutches were distributed. The foot factory in Viana is capable of producing and distributing 700 prosthetic feet per month. In 2001, a total of 5,593 prosthetic feet were produced and 5,247 feet were distributed to all ten orthopedic centers in the country; these vulcanized rubber feet have been accepted as the national standard by the Angolan government. Training was provided to 14 local orthopedic technicians and seven physiotherapy assistants. A drastic shortage of funding forced HIB to suspend its support to the Negage center in April 2002 and to significantly decrease support to the Viana foot factory in June 2002. This situation is due to a two-year delay in launching the European Development Fund (EDF) project for physical rehabilitation. The estimated budget for 2002 is \$1.3 million, and HIB's main donors include the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, DGCI, Stichting Vluchteling, AUSTCARE, and the EU through the European Development Fund.⁹⁵

The Italian NGO, Intersos, in cooperation with the local NGO Mbembwa, began construction of the Landmine Victims Orthopedic Center in Menongue, Kuando Kubango Province in October 1999. At the same time, training began for orthopedic technicians and physiotherapy staff.

⁸⁸ "Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs 2002," accessed at www.landminevap.org.

⁸⁹ "ICRC Activities in Angola—January to June 2002," accessed at www.icrc.org.

⁹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 194.

⁹¹ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 16.

⁹² Email from Robert Burny, Angola Desk Officer, HIB, 18 July 2002.

⁹³ "ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, Annual Report 2001," accessed at www.icrc.org.

⁹⁴ "ICRC Activities in Angola—January to June 2002," accessed at www.icrc.org.

⁹⁵ "Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001;" and Handicap International Belgium briefing document available at the Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, May 2002.

Currently, all rehabilitation activities and prostheses production are functioning fully. Fifteen qualified nurses have been trained, seven as orthopedic technicians and eight as physiotherapists. The center produces 20 below-knee prostheses, and 100 pairs of crutches per month. The center has 23 local staff and two expatriates (a physiotherapist and orthopedic technician specialist), and has facilities to temporarily house 50 patients and family members. The local NGO, Mbembwa, in cooperation with other organizations, organizes professional vocational training to reintegrate disabled individuals into productive activities. From July 2001 to May 2002, the center operated on €295,000 (\$265,000) from the EU, and in June 2002 received bridging funds from OCHA's Emergency Response Fund. Since the center is included in the Angolan Ministry of Health's Five Year Rehabilitation Plan, which is supported by the EC, Intersos expects to receive further funding soon.⁹⁶ The center also received €300,000 (\$269,000) from the Italian Cooperation.⁹⁷

Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation/Veterans International (VVAFF/VI) continues its support of the orthopedic center in Luena, Moxico Province, by providing physical rehabilitation, physical therapy, and psycho-social and socio-economic reintegration assistance to war-affected Angolans. The prosthetics and orthotics workshop provides artificial limbs, crutches, and wheelchairs to mine survivors as well as polio victims. In 2001, the center provided assistance to 485 people, of whom 271 received an orthopedic device produced by the workshop; 112 of these patients were landmine survivors. VVAFF/VI also assists patients from Saurimo, Lunda Sul Province, and will soon begin a program with the Irish Government to fly mine survivors to the center from Dundo, Lunda Norte Province. Funding is provided by USAID and VVAFF, with an annual budget of almost US\$1 million.⁹⁸

The Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) socio-economic program for landmine survivors in Luena assisted 100 people in 2001 including: 15 carpenters received skills training; 12 women benefited from micro-credits; literacy classes were held; 95 survivors and their families received non-food items; hospital visits to survivors; twice weekly visits to new survivors; and pastoral care and counseling.⁹⁹

Medico International (MI) shares the premises at the Regional Community Rehabilitation Center in Luena with VVAFF/VI and JRS and continues its program of community development with the aim of full reintegration of mine survivors into the community.¹⁰⁰ MI works with a local NGO, Support Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (CAPDC), to provide psychosocial support to landmine survivors, their families and other persons with disabilities. In 2001, activities included the development of sports and cultural activities, working with amputees in their homes, accompanying amputees to the prosthetic workshop for fittings and follow up rehabilitation, and organizing referrals for vocational or literacy training. The program also supports the ophthalmology ward at the Central Hospital, community theater and a mobile clinic. About 300 landmine survivors benefited from the program in 2001, as well as many more members of the community. Funders of the program in 2001 include the German government, the U.S. War Victims Fund through VVAFF, and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

In September 2001, the Jaipur Limb Campaign UK began a program in Viana and Luanda with the Angolan NGO, League for the Reintegration of Disabled People (LARDEF), to promote the economic reintegration of disabled persons. The program has set up small cooperatives of appropriate low cost transport for goods and people, which are run by amputees – the majority of whom are landmine survivors. The cooperatives also provide transport to orthopedic centers in

⁹⁶ "Intersos: Orthopedic Center for Amputated Landmine Victims, Menongue-Kuando Kubango Province–2002 Briefing Document," via email from Stefano Calabretta, Mine Action Coordinator, Intersos Rome, 28 and 29 June 2002.

⁹⁷ Stefano Calabretta, Mine Action Coordinator, Intersos Rome, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 26 April 2002.

⁹⁸ Mike Kendellen, VVAFF, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire; and email from Tom Petocz, VVAFF Country Representative in Angola, 4 May 2002.

⁹⁹ Jesuit Refugee Service, "Annual Report 2001," p. 23; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 196.

¹⁰⁰ Sebastian Kasack, Project Coordinator, Mine Action Focal Point, Medico International, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 11 July 2002.

order to improve access to rehabilitation services. In 2001, the program was supported by the UK-based Heather Mills Health Trust and in 2002 by Comic Relief.¹⁰¹

The ICRC and other rehabilitation NGOs continue to work with the Orthopedic Coordination Group, established in 1995 by the Ministry of Health, and the new Victim Assistance Subcommission of the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, established in July 2001.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Antigua and Barbuda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 3 May 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 November 1999. Antigua and Barbuda states that existing legislation makes any treaty it joins part of domestic law. According to the representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), "In essence, we have adopted it as a national law."¹

Antigua and Barbuda provided its initial Article 7 transparency report on 29 March 2000, but has not submitted any subsequent annual report. It was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly resolution 56/24M, but has supported similar pro-ban resolutions in recent years. Antigua and Barbuda has never used, produced, imported, or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines, including for training purposes, and is not mine-affected.² In March 2001, Ambassador Lionel Hurst announced that Antigua and Barbuda pledged a "small sum" of fund toward the OAS Mine Action Program activities in Central America.³

ARGENTINA

Key developments since May 2001: Argentina told Landmine Monitor that of the 13,025 mines it had officially declared as retained for training purposes, 12,025 will be emptied of their explosive content to make inert "exercise mines." Argentina also reported for the first time that the Army will keep 1,160 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines to use as fuzes for antivehicle mines, apparently for training purposes. The total number of reported stockpiled mines has increased by 7,343. Stockpile destruction plans have been developed. A documentary film appears to have established that mines are present on both the Argentine and Chilean side of the border.

Mine Ban Policy

Argentina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified it on 14 September 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2000. Argentina has not enacted national implementation legislation to implement the treaty, but is investigating how to incorporate penal sanctions into existing Argentine legislation.¹ An order prohibiting the use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces was published in Public Journal of the Army Number 4745/01.²

Since the political and economic crises began in Argentina in December 2001, there have been several changes of government. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine

¹⁰¹ Isabel Silva, Projects Officer, Jaipur Foot Campaign, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 11 July 2002.

¹ Ambassador Lionel Hurst, Permanent Representative to the OAS. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW) during Hemispheric Security Committee session on landmines, OAS, Washington DC, 14 March 2002.

² Article 7 Report submitted 29 March 2000.

³ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW) during Hemispheric Security Committee session on landmines, OAS, Washington DC, 14 March 2002.

¹ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002; also noted in Article 7 Report, Form A, 23 July 2002.

² Article 7 Report, Form A, 23 July 2002.

Monitor that the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Carlos Ruckauf, is committed to full compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.³

Argentina attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001 and participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. Argentina cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Argentina submitted transparency measures reports as required by Article 7 on 31 August 2000, 28 May 2001, and 23 July 2002.⁴

Argentina is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001, but did not submit its Article 13 annual report. Argentina also participated in the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Production and Transfer

Argentina is a former producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.⁵ Production took place at the General Directorate of Military Industries (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares) of the Ministry of Defense. The only model Argentina claims to have produced at the “Fray Luis Beltrán” factory is the low metal content FMK-1 antipersonnel mine. A total of 18,970 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines were produced between 1976 and 1990. The production equipment for the mines is apparently now used to make reinforced fuzes, detonators for grenades, and “*estopines*” (initiators).⁶

Stockpiling and Destruction

Argentina initially declared a stockpile of 89,170 antipersonnel landmines, but has increased this number by 7,343 mines in its Article 7 Report submitted in July 2002.⁷

30 August 2000 and 28 May 2001 Article 7 Reports		23 July 2002 Article 7 Report	
FMK-1 (Argentina)	5,361	FMK-1 (Argentina)	7,272
EXPAL P-4-B (Spain)	72,924	EXPAL P-4-B (Spain)	75,019
SB-33 (Italy)	10,885	SB-33 (Italy)	9,935
		Mina AP MAP (Libya)	1,699
		Mina AP TRA (Libya)	2,588
Total	89,170		96,513

It has not provided information about No. 4 mines imported from Israel.⁸

In its July 2002 Article 7 Report, Argentina reported on two previously undisclosed stockpile destruction events. In November 1998, the Air Force destroyed 1,160 FMK-1 mines, which constituted all of the antipersonnel mines in the Air Force stockpile. Between November 1999 and March 2000, the military factory “Fray Luis Beltrán” destroyed 1,000 FMK-1 mines and their fuzes

³ Interview with Minister Juan José Arcuri, International, Nuclear and Space Affairs division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, January 2002.

⁴ The initial report submitted on 31 August 2002 covers the period from 14 March 2000 to 21 August 2000; the report submitted 28 May 2001 covers the period from 22 August 2000 to 11 May 2001; the report submitted on 23 July 2002 covers the period from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.

⁵ According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Argentina is reported to have manufactured three types of antipersonnel mines: the FMK-1 plastic blast mine, the MAPG pressure or tripwire mine, and the MAPPG bounding mine.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form E, 23 July 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Reports, Form B, 30 August 2000, 28 May 2001, 23 July 2002.

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 272-273, for details on these mines.

stored at this facility. Argentina also reported on the destruction of 200 P-4-B antipersonnel mines in November 2000 during the regional seminar on stockpile destruction in Buenos Aires.⁹

The treaty-mandated deadline for completion of stockpile destruction in Argentina is 1 March 2004. Argentina told Landmine Monitor that it has developed a stockpile destruction plan, which is being executed; the first stage involves collection and transfer of landmines from different combat units to the logistics units responsible for stockpile destruction.¹⁰ The Army intends to destroy stockpiled mines by open-air detonation at nine different locations, in order to minimize environmental harm. Argentina has indicated that external financial support for stockpile destruction is not needed.¹¹

The Navy plans to destroy its mines at a weapons stockpile station in the "Puerto Belgrano" Naval Base. The detonators will be destroyed by open-air detonation, while the casings will be destroyed by mechanical means and the remaining explosive material will be stored in the stocks of the Navy.¹²

Argentina originally declared that it would retain 13,025 mines for training purposes.¹³ In April 2002, Argentina told Landmine Monitor that of these, 12,025 (92%) are considered "exercise mines," as Argentina plans to empty them of their explosive content to make them inert.¹⁴ The government now believes that these mines should be considered as "destroyed."¹⁵ This information was subsequently reflected in Argentina's July 2002 Article 7 Report. The remaining 1,000 mines (860 SB-33 and 140 FMK-1) will be retained by the Navy and will be used for training until 1 April 2010.¹⁶

In addition to the 140 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines noted above Argentina has declared it is retaining for training purposes, it has declared that the Army will keep 1,160 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines as fuzes (initiators) for antivehicle mines, with a "*cápsula adaptadora*."¹⁷ These antivehicle mines with FMK-1 antipersonnel mines as fuzes will apparently be used for training purposes. Argentina states that "the FMK-1 mines will be destroyed (consumed) as the antitank mines are destroyed (consumed)."¹⁸ Argentina should clarify that these antivehicle mines with FMK-1 mines as fuzes are only being used for training purposes, and not for operational purposes.

Landmine Problem

Argentina has repeatedly stated that the only mine-affected part of its territory is the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (see separate Landmine Monitor report). According to Argentina's May 2001 Article 7 report, 20,000 EXPAL P-4-B, and FMK-1 antipersonnel mines were laid during the 1982 conflict. The Article 7 Report of 23 July 2002 added SB-33 antipersonnel mine to this list.¹⁹ As it has done in the past, Argentina included in its Article 7 report an interpretative statement on

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form G, 23 July 2002.

¹⁰ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002.

¹¹ *Ibid.* The response stated that as soon as the dates of stockpile destruction events are officially known, the Joint Chief of Staff intends to invite foreign military attaches and propose to the Ministry of Defense that it extends invitations to the representatives of the Argentine Red Cross, UNPD and the ICBL as civilian observers.

¹² Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 May 2001.

¹⁴ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002; Response by Captain Carlos Nielsen, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMCFFAA), 2 April 2002.

¹⁵ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 23 July 2002.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* This modification will presumably insure that the antivehicle mine does not function at the 50 kilogram threshold necessary to initiate the FMK-1 antipersonnel mine.

¹⁸ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002; Response by Captain Carlos Nielsen, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMCFFAA), 2 April 2002.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 23 July 2002.

its claims of sovereignty over the Islands. Argentina and the United Kingdom are still engaged in negotiations over mine clearance of the islands.

Argentina has stated that areas mined by Chile in the 1970s are on the Chilean side of the border, and not the Argentine side.²⁰ However, on 31 October 2001, Channel 13 (Buenos Aires) screened a *Telenoche Investiga* documentary on the landmine threat in San Antonio de los Cobres in Salta province on the border with Chile.²¹ The film crew was warned by their guide and Chilean Carabineros (Chilean police) that there were mines on the Socompa path on the Argentine side of the border. In the documentary, the director of International Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Juan José Arcuri, said, "There are no landmines planted by Argentina in the continental territory of the country." But, the president of the Defense Committee of the National Congress, Waldo Mora, told *Telenoche Investiga* that there were mines on the Argentine side of the border, and that Chile had maps of the minefields.

The crew filmed two unmarked minefields in Paso del Riel, Punta Negra and Alto del Inca, in Chile, where the remnants of a small truck destroyed by a landmine could be clearly seen. The crew interviewed an Argentine mine survivor and learned of a second injured peasant.

As a result of the documentary, the Office for Humanitarian Demining of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they might travel to the concerned area to carry out a field study to accurately assess the risks posed by mines on the Argentine side of the border.²²

While mine clearance has been a topic in official discussions between Argentina and Chile, no progress has been made during the reporting period. In September 2001 Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soledad Alvear, stated that Chile sought agreements, including on mine clearance, with Argentina and Perú as part of a process to strengthen trust in defense affairs.²³

Mine Action

Argentina did not provide any financial assistance to mine action in 2001 or 2002, but an Argentine Army company of engineers continued to carry out demining operations and explosive ordnance disposal in Kuwait as part of the UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait) peacekeeping mission.²⁴

The Army Center for Training in Humanitarian Demining (CED) continued to train Argentine Army personnel in humanitarian mine clearance personnel in 2001 and 2002. Argentine Navy personnel received training in humanitarian demining through an annual course for engineers at the Naval base in Puerto Belgrano.²⁵

From late August until 11 September 2001, military personnel from the US and eight other countries of the region participated in "Cabañas 2001" military exercises in Salta, Argentina.²⁶ According to media reports, the exercises included recovery of a soldier who had strayed into a minefield, and procedures to identify and mark mined areas.

No landmine casualties were recorded during 2001 or the first quarter of 2002.

²⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 222.

²¹ "Frontera explosiva: las secuelas de una guerra que no fue," *Telenoche Investiga*, Channel 13 (Buenos Aires), 31 October 2001. See www.telenocheinvestiga.com (programa 04, ciclo 2001). Landmine Monitor has a copy of the documentary.

²² These remarks were made to a member of *Telenoche Investiga* when he met with the Office for Humanitarian Demining and the Argentine Gendarmería (Frontier Corps) to clarify doubts on the location of the minefields. Notes taken by "Telenoche Investiga" crew member, Buenos Aires, 5 April 2002.

²³ Statement by Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Soledad Alvear, "Destrucción de Minas Antipersonal: Un Acto a Favor de la Paz", Quebrada de Santa Cruz, Chile, 13 September 2001. See <http://www.defensa.cl/paginas/public/noticias/2001/13.09.2001destrucc-minas-antipers.htm>.

²⁴ For more details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 274.

²⁵ Response from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 4 April 2002.

²⁶ Graciela Eslanoa, "Civiles recorrieron las sendas del operativo militar Cabañas 2001," *El Tribuno* (Salta), 30 August 2001; "El Ejército por dentro," *El Tribuno* (Salta), 12 September 2001.

AUSTRALIA

Key developments since May 2001: Since September 2001, Australia has co-chaired the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction. It has helped other States Parties destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The Australian government and the Australian Network of the ICBL continued to work collaboratively to promote universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Australia provided A\$12 million (US\$6.4 million) in mine action funding for financial year 2001-2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Australia signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 14 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for Australia on 1 July 1999. National implementation legislation, the Anti-personnel Mines Convention Act 1998, was enacted on 10 December 1998.

Australia participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001.¹ In its statement to the plenary, Australia encouraged countries identified by *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* with respect to allegations of mine use to “clarify their government’s position in relation to the concerns which have been raised, in keeping with the letter and spirit of Article 8.”² Australia also contributed A\$75,000 (US\$39,750) to the Managua Challenge Fund.³

Australia continued to take a leading role at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. Following the Third Meeting of States Parties, Australia became co-chair, together with Croatia, of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction.⁴ The ICBL and other States Parties have praised the co-chairs for their very pro-active approach in identifying potential problems and solutions regarding stockpile destruction, with a focus on the looming four-year deadlines for many countries. Australia is also an active member of the informal “Universalization Contact Group.”

Australia cosponsored and voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. During the First Committee debate on the resolution, Australia again reiterated its support for efforts to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵ To this aim, Australia funded and participated in a regional governmental seminar on landmines held in Bangkok from 13-15 May 2002. It also made a series of demarches jointly with Japan and countries of the Asia-Pacific region urging holdout states in the region to join the treaty without delay.⁶ Australia also participated in the regional seminar on stockpile destruction held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in August 2001.

¹ The delegation was led by Bernard Lynch, Director Conventional & Nuclear Disarmament Section, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. A representative of the Australian Network of the ICBL invited to participate on the Australian government delegation was unable to attend the meeting due to travel difficulties following 11 September.

² Bernard Lynch, Director Conventional & Nuclear Disarmament Section, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001, p. 4. Australia also provided funding assistance to the governments of Laos and Vietnam to participate in the 3MSP, but travel difficulties prevented Vietnam from attending.

³ The Managua Challenge Fund was established to assist governments to meet the goals of completing destruction of stockpiles and ratification during the lead-up to the 3MSP. Interview with Todd Mercer, Executive Officer, Conventional & Nuclear Disarmament Section, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Canberra, 5 November 2001.

⁴ The role of co-chair was filled by Peter Truswell, Third Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva, in the January and May 2002 meetings.

⁵ H.E. John Dauth LVO, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, Statement to the General Debate, First Committee 56th Session, 11 October 2001.

⁶ Letter to Liz Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, from Peter Tesch, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 1 May 2002. Australia reported on these demarches at the May meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, noting that Bhutan and Indonesia had been particularly receptive.

Australia submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report covering the calendar year 2001 on 30 April 2002. The report includes information on mines retained for training and utilizes "Form J" for the second time, to report on contributions to mine action.

The Australian government supported the ICBL's Landmine Monitor initiative for the third year in a row, with a contribution of A\$210,000 for *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*.

In January 2002, the Hon. Christine Gallus MP, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replaced Senator Kay Patterson as Australia's Special Representative on Mine Action.

CCW and CD

Australia's Ambassador for Disarmament, Les Luck, was elected President of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), held in Geneva from 11-21 December 2001. In its address to the plenary, Australia supported measures to amend the scope of the Convention to allow all protocols to apply to internal conflicts, to strengthen provisions on antivehicle mines, and to strengthen compliance provisions. Australia also called on states that have not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, to do so.⁷

After the Review Conference, Alexander Downer, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs said Australia strongly supported the establishment of a group of governmental experts to examine humanitarian problems caused by explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as antivehicle mines.⁸ Prior to the meeting, Downer wrote to 104 Foreign Ministers of non-CCW States Parties urging them to join the CCW.⁹

During the first 2002 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Australia expressed its disappointment that participating countries had been unable to agree on a program of work for several years and urged all countries that had not yet done so to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible and "in the interim to refrain from the laying of anti-personnel landmines, given the risks to civilian populations."¹⁰

NGO Activity

In October 2001, the Australian Network of the ICBL made a display on landmines for the Commonwealth People's Festival in Brisbane, which was held despite postponement of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) due to security concerns. In February 2002, prior to the CHOGM held in Coolum, the Australian Network sent a "Report Card" to governments, outlining the position of Commonwealth members with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Australian Network has been particularly active in promoting awareness of the landmine situation in Sri Lanka and the need for a landmine ban there.¹¹

World Vision Australia continues to manage the government-NGO initiative, "Destroy-a-Minefield - Rebuild Lives," in which the government provides one dollar for every two dollars raised by the public. The program will continue under World Vision management until December 2002. World Vision educated young Australians on landmines during its major annual fundraising initiative, the 40 Hour Famine.

⁷ Peter Tesch, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, "Australia's National Statement to the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons," Geneva, 12 December 2001, pp. 2-3.

⁸ Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Release, 24 December 2001. http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/fa189_01.html.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ambassador Les Luck, "Statement to the first session of the Conference on Disarmament," January 2002; email from Todd Mercer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 March 2002.

¹¹ Much of the work has been done under the auspices of the Sri Lanka Peace Project of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA). On 1 March 2002, Australian NGOs lobbied for accession to the treaty when they met with Sri Lanka's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tyrone Fernando, just prior to CHOGM.

Three Vietnam veterans who cleared landmines during that conflict established the MIVAC Trust (Mines, Victims, and Clearance) Veterans and Services Humanitarian Aid Foundation. The organization aims to provide funding for mine action projects.¹²

Production

The Department of Defence clarified to Landmine Monitor that live and practice antipersonnel landmines previously reported as “manufactured” at St. Mary's Ammunition factory were not manufactured, but assembled at the factory.¹³ Information is still pending as to whether the components for these mines were manufactured in Australia or imported from overseas. According to Australia's Department of Defence, the antipersonnel mines assembled were M-14s, a US mine.¹⁴ This assembling at St. Mary's ceased in the early 1980s.¹⁵

Stockpiling and Destruction

Australia destroyed its entire known stockpile of 128,161 antipersonnel mines in five days in September and October 1999.¹⁶ Australia's May 2001 Article 7 Report revealed that 6,460 mines were inadvertently omitted from the initial transparency report and subsequently destroyed in October and November 2000.¹⁷ Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel have shared their destruction technology with other countries and have trained stockpile destruction Project Managers in Peru in 2000 and Switzerland and Malaysia in 2001.¹⁸

In its Article 7 Report submitted in May 2001, Australia reported a reduction in the number of antipersonnel mines retained for training purposes as permitted under Article 3 of the treaty, from a total of 10,000 to 7,845.¹⁹ In the subsequent May 2002 Article 7 Report, Australia reported retaining 7,726 antipersonnel mines for training (3,952 M14 and 3,774 M16), a depletion of 119 mines since the previous Article 7 Report.²⁰ According to the 2002 report, the training stockpile is centralized, but small numbers of mines are located in ammunition depots throughout the country for regional training. The School of Military Engineering in Sydney conducts training using these live mines. Stockpile levels will be regularly reviewed and assessed with a “realistic” training quantity held which will be depleted over time.²¹

As noted above, in September 2001 Australia became co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, which met twice in 2002; on 31 January and 30 May. Its term will end at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.

Australia retains a stockpile of command-detonated Claymore mines for operational use. ADF indicated to Landmine Monitor that it views Claymore mines in tripwire mode as prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty so it has “no equipment or training to operate these devices in other than

¹² Email from Merle Woolley, MIVAC Tasmania, 28 March 2002. The three founders are Rob Woolley, Sandy MacGregor and Jack Miller.

¹³ Email from Strategic International Policy Division, United Nations Peace Keeping & Arms Control, Department of Defence, 14 March 2002; see also, letter from Richard Maude, A/g Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (Landmine Monitor Coordinator), 7 September 2000.

¹⁴ Email from Strategic International Policy Division, United Nations Peace Keeping & Arms Control, Department of Defence, 14 March 2002.

¹⁵ Letter from Richard Maude, A/g Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (Landmine Monitor Coordinator), 7 September 2000.

¹⁶ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 375.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Form G, 21 May 2001.

¹⁸ Interview with two officers, Australian Defence Force, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 5 November 2001.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 21 May 2001.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, 30 April 2002.

²¹ *Ibid.*

command-detonated mode.” It also said a permanent ban on their use in tripwire mode has been incorporated into Australian Army doctrine.²²

Mine Action Funding

The Australian government, through its international development agency AusAID, has committed or spent approximately A\$73 million (US\$43 million) on humanitarian mine action programs from January 1996 to the end of the fiscal year 2001-02.²³ This includes A\$12 million (US\$6.4 million) in FY2001-02. The FY2001-02 total has A\$1.5 million (US\$795,000) committed for mine action in Afghanistan.²⁴

Cambodia and Laos have been the main recipients of Australian mine action funding, but in 2001/2002 others include Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka.²⁵

Australia is a member of the Mine Action Support Group, which helps to coordinate international responses to mine action issues.

As seen in the chart below, the Australian government is well advanced to meet its commitment to spend A\$100 million on mine action activities in the decade ending December 2005.²⁶

AusAID Assistance for Mine Action Programs (in A\$ and US\$) ²⁷		
Financial Years 1995/96 – 2001/02		
(Australia's financial year = 1 July to 30 June)		
1995-1996	US\$4.5 million	A\$7.5 million
1996-1997	US\$4.5 million	A\$7.5 million
1997-1998	US\$5.9 million	A\$9.9 million
1998-1999	US\$7 million	A\$11.1 million
1999-2000	US\$8 million	A\$12.4 million
2000-2001	US\$6.7 million	A\$12.6 million
2001-2002	US\$6.4 million	A\$12 million
Total	US\$43 million	A\$73 million

²² ADF refers to Claymore mines as “anti-personnel weapons system Claymores,” email from Department of Defence, 18 February 2002. Response by Department of Defence to Questions from Landmine Monitor Australia, received by email 6 February 2002.

²³ See *Mine Action Expenditure - Notional cash flow and commitments. January 1996 to December 2005*, AusAID reports 5 November 2001, 27 March 2002 and 3 April 2002; Article 7 Report, Form J (Mine Action Programs Summary of Expenditure and Commitments for 2002/2002), 30 April 2002; email from Derek Taylor, Humanitarian & Emergencies Section, AUSAID, 22 July 2002. Exchange rate of A\$ = US\$ 0.53 used throughout.

²⁴ Kevin Rudd, MP, the opposition party's shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs has called on the Howard Government to increase its mine action funding for Afghanistan by an additional US\$2 million. “Rudd meeting with UN High Commissioner for refugees,” Australian Labour Party News Statement, 15 January 2002. <http://www.alp.org.au/print.html?link+media/0102/krmsun150102.html>. Accessed 29 March 2002.

²⁵ Bernard Lynch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; email from Derek Taylor, Humanitarian & Emergencies Section, AUSAID, 22 July 2002.

²⁶ Email from Derek Taylor, Humanitarian & Emergencies Section, AusAID, 22 July 2002.

²⁷ Australian dollar amounts from “Mine Action Expenditure - Notional Cash Flow and Commitments, AusAID Assistance for Mine Action Programs, January 1996 to December 2005,” 5 November 2001 and 27 March 2002; email from Derek Taylor, Humanitarian & Emergencies Section, AUSAID, 22 July 2002. US\$ amounts are from *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, Executive Summary, p. 45, except year 2001/2002, which is calculated at A\$=US\$0.53.

Summary of Expenditure and Commitments for FY 2001/2002 (A\$)²⁸

(1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002)

Country	Mine Action & Coordination	Mine Clearance & Awareness	Victim Assistance	Integrated Programs	Advocacy	Landmine Monitor	Workshops, Seminars & Conferences	Other	Total A\$ (US\$)
Afghanistan	1,500,000								1,500,000 (US\$795,000)
Angola		96,200							96,200 (US\$50,986)
Burma							25,000		25,000 (US\$13,250)
Cambodia	4,440,200	680,800	827,800	494,600					6,443,400 (US\$3,415,002)
Global	1,250,000				75,000	210,000	48,800	30,000	1,613,800 (US\$855,314)
Laos	27,500		64,800						92,300 (US\$48,919)
Lebanon	86,000								86,000 (US\$45,580)
Mozambique		1,443,600							1,443,600 (US\$765,108)
S.E. Asia					66,800				66,800 (US\$35,409)
Sri Lanka		650,000							650,000 (US\$344,500)
Total	7,303,700	2,870,600	892,600	494,600	141,800	210,000	73,800	30,000	12,017,100 (US\$6,369,063)

²⁸ Australian dollar amount from "Mine Action Expenditure - Notional Cash Flow and Commitments, AusAID Assistance for Mine Action Programs, January 1996 to December 2005," 5 November 2001 and 27 March 2002; email from Derek Taylor, Humanitarian & Emergencies Section, AUSAID, 22 July 2002. US\$ amounts calculated by Landmine Monitor at A\$=US\$0.53.

Australian NGOs and agencies that operate or actively promote and raise funds for mine action activities include AUSTCARE, World Vision Australia, CARE Australia, and UNICEF.

AUSTCARE is supporting the following programs in the 2001/2002.²⁹

- Angola: US\$272,402.5 [A\$513,967] funded by AusAID for Handicap International Belgium's prosthetics production work for the period from July 2000-March 2002.
- Bosnia: US\$21,200 [A\$40,000] funded by AUSTCARE's Bosnia Appeal for Norwegian People's Aid's mine detection dog training project for the period from October 2000-September 2001.
- Bosnia: US\$9105 [A\$17,179] funded by AUSTCARE's "Landmine Dog-a-thon" for Norwegian People's Aid's mine detection dog training project for the period from October 2001-June 2002.
- Cambodia: US\$559,426 [A\$1,055,521] funded by AusAID for mine clearance by the HALO Trust in O'Preal village, Samrong district for the period from June 2000-May 2002.
- Cambodia: US\$343,778 [A\$648,638] funded by AusAID for mine clearance by the HALO Trust in Ta Peng village, Kulen mountains for the period from July 2000-June 2001, now extended to December 2001.
- Mozambique: US\$443,227 [A\$836,277] funded by AusAID for mine clearance by Handicap International in Inhambane for the period from May 2001-March 2003.
- Mozambique: US\$277,227 [A\$523,070] for mine clearance by the HALO Trust in northern Mozambique for the period from February 2001-January 2002.

World Vision Australia is supporting the following programs in Cambodia in 2001/2002.³⁰

- US\$239,429.6 [A\$451,754] funded by AusAID for a rehabilitation and reintegration project in Rattanak Mondol and Samlot.
- US\$264,871.7 [A\$499,758] funded by AusAID for a mine awareness and team training project.
- US\$222,218.9 [A\$419,281] funded by AusAID for a mine action project in Banan.
- US\$188,036 [A\$354,785] funded by child sponsorship for a development program in Banan.³¹

The joint "Destroy-a-Minefield" initiative has raised US\$265,000 to date for 2001/2002 toward a goal of US\$424,000 (A\$800,000) by the end of 2002. For every A\$400,000 that is raised by World Vision, A\$200,000 is contributed by the government.³² Six sites in Cambodia have received the mine clearance funds since the program's inception in November 1999. Chirgwin Services Group, an Australian mine clearance company, cleared 49,200 square meters at the Sunrise Orphanage site, 17 kilometers southeast of Phnom Penh. The UK NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) cleared 38,763 square meters of land at five sites in Samlot district, Battambang province, to make way for a fruit orchard, a district health center, housing, subsistence crops, and safe access to the community pagoda. As of March 2002, another twelve sites in Battambang were being demined.³³

Elsewhere, in Laos, through AusAID and supplemental private donations, World Vision Australia has provided US\$600,000 [A\$1.1 million] for the National Rehabilitation Centre and the Integrated UXO Clearance Project for the period from March 2001-February 2002.³⁴ AusAID

²⁹ Email from Corinne Stroppolo, Mine Action Officer, AUSTCARE, 12 February 2002.

³⁰ Email from Kerrie-Anne McKenzie, World Vision Australia, 13 February 2002.

³¹ Email from Heather Elliott, World Vision Australia, 11 February 2002.

³² Email from Diane Shelton, World Vision Australia, 25 March 2002.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Email from Heather Elliott, World Vision Australia, 11 February 2002.

funding for World Vision's landmine awareness program in Angola was not renewed after mid-2001 due to shifting AusAID priorities.³⁵

CARE Australia obtained partial funding from AusAID for CARE International to work in conjunction with the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) on a segment of the Integrated Demining and Development Program. CARE Australia was responsible for development-related activities while CMAC carried out demining work. The project was divided into two phases (Phase I = US\$430,223 [A\$811,741] and phase II = US\$496,440 [A\$936,679]) for the period from 1 September 2000-30 June 2002.³⁶

Research and Development

Minelab Electronics Pty. Ltd., a South Australian Company, is developing a "Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System," in conjunction with US contractor CyTerra, for the US Department of Defense.³⁷ The system combines a ground penetration radar system with Minelab's metal detection technology into a hand-held mine detector. Another Minelab initiative under development is the "Rapid Route and Area Mine Neutralisation System," combining ground penetration radar, metal detection and thermal imagery onto a vehicle platform.³⁸ This project is being supported by the ADF. The F3 hand-held mine detector is also under development by Minelab.³⁹

The primary research and development section of the Australian Department of Defence, the Defence Science & Technology Organisation (DSTO), is evaluating the performance of an Area Denial Weapon System (ADWS) produced by Queensland ballistics company, Metal Storm Pty. Ltd. The grenade-pod based technology is touted by Metal Storm as a viable alternative to antipersonnel landmines without the threat of unexploded ordnance.⁴⁰ In response to ICBL Australian Network inquiries on the potential for the weapon to result in UXO, the Department of Defence stated, "Projectiles employed in the ADWS incorporate a high reliability dual self-destruct and make-safe/deactivation capability that is designed to minimise the potential for projectiles employed in the ADWS to become UXO."⁴¹ An estimated US\$50 million in funding for continued research and development of Metal Storm is provided by DSTO and the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).⁴²

In late 2001, the Australian Army conducted field trials of the South African Chubby Mine Clearing System in the heat of the Northern Territory.⁴³ Redpath Technical Services in South Australia has developed an infrared imager, the "LCII," to detect landmines (plastic or ceramic, with or without metal components). The LCII is made under license to the ADF.⁴⁴ A private organization named Australian Detection Dog Services, in Townsville, northern Queensland, has commenced training dogs for use in mine detection work.⁴⁵

³⁵ Reported by representative of ICBL Australian Network following AusAID Mine Action Consultation, Melbourne, March 2002.

³⁶ Email from Grace Nicholas, Program Officer, CARE Australia, 30 January 2002.

³⁷ Product Development, Countermining Division, Minelab Electronics Pty. Ltd., <http://www.countermining.minelab.com/> accessed 10 February 2002.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Metal Storm website, <http://www.metalstorm.com>, accessed 11 November 2001. See also "Metal Storm secures Australian Army support," 7 July 2000.

⁴¹ Response by Department of Defence to Questions from Landmine Monitor Australia, received by email 6 February 2002.

⁴² Hiroko Kawasaki, "Weapon Breakthrough," *Herald Sun* (Melbourne), 19 March 2002, p. 27.

⁴³ ICBL-Australian Network Weekly Bulletin # 4c, "Australian army evaluates Chubby Mine Clearing System in the heat," 3 December 2001. <http://defence-data.com/current/page12919.htm>.

⁴⁴ Email from Lynda Walsh, Redpath Technical Services, 2 April 2002.

⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Mike Storey, Director, Australian Detection Dog Services, 18 March 2002.

Landmine Casualties

On 18 January 2002, an Australian SAS soldier lost two toes after stepping on a landmine in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ On 16 February 2002, an Australian soldier was killed when the vehicle he was traveling in hit a landmine in Afghanistan. He was the first Australian to die in combat since the Vietnam War.⁴⁷

According to a 1988 report recently uncovered by Landmine Monitor, of the 500 Australian military personnel killed during the Vietnam conflict, at least 110 died from landmine injuries, and another eight were killed by booby-traps.⁴⁸ Several more died from fragmentation wounds, which, according to one Vietnam veteran, may also have involved landmines.⁴⁹ The Australian War Memorial (AWM) and National Archives have indicated that further information on landmine deaths amongst ADF personnel is difficult to determine as the records kept do not reveal a breakdown of injury types or causes of death in this manner.⁵⁰

AUSTRIA

Key developments since May 2001: Austria continued to play an important role in promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In September 2001, Austria was named as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention. While mine action funding had doubled in 2000, it returned in 2001 to its previous level of ATS 13.7 million (about \$888,000). Considerable funding has been pledged in 2002 for mine action in Afghanistan.

Mine Ban Policy

Austria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 29 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation containing penal sanctions for activities prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty pre-date the treaty.¹

Austria participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.² The Austrian delegation acted as "friend of the chair" for the President's action program annexed to the final report of the Meeting. Austria was named to act as co-rapporteur of the intersessional Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in the 2001-2002 session.³

⁴⁶ Mark Forbes, "SAS destroys weapons stashes," *The Age* (Melbourne), 23 January 2002; "Aussie soldier's toes blown off. Inside Camp Cuba," *Herald Sun*, 19 January 2002, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Christine Jackman, "Digger Dies. Afghan mine kills new dad," *Herald Sun* (Melbourne), 18 February 2002; "First Australian troops who served in Afghanistan return home," *Associated Press* (Perth), 3 April 2002.

⁴⁸ Some of the types of mines that killed or wounded Australian military personnel included US M16 antipersonnel mines, Claymore mines, and antitank mines. These mines were specifically mentioned in individual stories of the deaths of each soldier who died as a result of landmine injuries. "500-The Australians who died in Vietnam," *The Australian* (Special Edition), 18 August 1988, pp. 1-19.

⁴⁹ Emails from Sandy MacGregor, C.A.L.M. Pty. Ltd., 29 January 2002 and 5 February 2002.

⁵⁰ The Military History section of the AWM indicated that difficulties existed in determining the definition of 'landmine' in the context of the recordkeeping of past conflicts. Email from David Jolliffe, Information Services, Research Centre, Australian War Memorial, 8 March 2002.

¹ For details of Austria's leading role in the Ottawa Process and national legislation preceding the Mine Ban Treaty, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 524-528, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 567-569, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 603.

² The delegation included Alexander Kmentt (acting head of delegation), Counselor at the Austrian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Hans Georg Danninger and other members of the Austrian Development Cooperation section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ Alexander Kmentt, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, served in this role in the January and May 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee.

Austria actively participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁴ At the meetings, Austria has contributed to the discussions on Mine Ban Treaty Article 2, and the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices. Austria has called on a number of occasions for States Parties to adopt best practices with respect to these mines (see below).⁵ On 31 May 2002, at the meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Austria declared that:

In our view, the definition of APMs is straightforward. It is a mine which is designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person... In this respect, we completely agree with the argument put forward by the ICRC in its Working Paper of January 2002, that any mine – regardless of how it is labeled – is banned by the Convention “if the design is such that it would detonate by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.”⁶

Austria submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report, for calendar year 2001, on 30 April 2002. As Austria has completed destruction of its antipersonnel mines and has retained no antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes, the report adds new information only in the voluntary Form J, noting Austrian donations to mine action in 2001. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 29 July 1999, 28 April 2000 and 30 April 2001.⁷

On 29 November 2001, Austria cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Austria has participated in the Universalization Contact Group formed by States Parties to encourage non-States Parties to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, and the Article 7 working group formed to assist States Parties in transparency reporting. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 Austria encouraged signatory States to voluntarily submit Article 7 reports in advance of ratification.⁸

The focus of Austrian activities in support of universalization in 2001 and 2002 has been on Central Asia and the Caucasus.⁹ A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman stated, “Austria supports the aim of the universalization of the Ottawa Convention and its obligations. In 2001, it actively continued its efforts to strengthen the goal of universality of the Convention. In this context Austria has supported the endeavors of other States Parties to coordinate efforts with a view to promoting universalization in the framework of the competent committees of the Ottawa Convention wherever feasible. Austria has continued its endeavors to promote the universalization of the treaty in the southern Caucasus and in Central Asia. In particular, Austria fostered relations with representatives from Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in order to disseminate knowledge

⁴ The delegations included Alexander Kmentt and Stefan Scholz from the Permanent Mission; Brigadier-General Peter Grabner, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations in Geneva; Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Monsberger, Head of Arms Control Section, Ministry of Defense; and Dr. Wernfried Koeffler, Head of Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee on the General Operation and Status of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002, and telephone interview with Alexander Kmentt, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, 11 February 2002.

⁶ Statement of Austria to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002, accessed at: www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/speeches_gs/Statement_Austria_Article_2.pdf on 29 June 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 29 July 1999 for the period 1 March-30 April 1999; submitted on 28 April 2000 for the period 30 April-31 December 1999; submitted on 30 April 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 3 May 2002 for calendar year 2001.

⁸ Statement of Austria to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

⁹ Telephone interview with Alexander Kmentt, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, 25 March 2002.

about the aims of the Ottawa Convention. In addition, bilateral contacts with representatives of Bhutan were used for an exchange in order to discuss the universal validity of the Convention.”¹⁰

Austria is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and submitted its annual report under Article 13 of the protocol on 30 October 2001. This differs from the previous Article 13 report only in respect of Form E reporting international cooperation on mine clearance in 2001.¹¹

Austria attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Belgium delivered a statement on behalf of European Union countries, expressing views on proposals to be considered by the Review Conference.¹²

In its annual report to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), Austria stated that it supports “all efforts that might contribute to the total elimination of anti-personnel mines worldwide, in all appropriate fora, including the Conference on Disarmament, provided these efforts are in support of and consistent with the Ottawa Convention.”¹³

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines ceased before entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁴ Austria stated that its antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction was completed in 1996,¹⁵ and no antipersonnel mines were retained for training and development purposes, as permitted by Mine Ban Treaty Article 3.¹⁶

In 2001, the NGO Austrian Aid for Mine Victims (AAMV) and Landmine Monitor expressed concerns about the Dynamit Nobel spring percussion igniter, and the type HG 84 fragmentation grenade made by the Austrian company Armaturen GesmbH (Arges), because these devices may be used in, or adapted as, antipersonnel mines. It was believed that Arges had licensed Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) to produce the grenade (which Arges denied) and that POF had adapted it for use in a bounding antipersonnel mine. AAMV and Landmine Monitor have been disappointed by the minimal and ineffective response of the Austrian government on these matters.¹⁷

On 13 December 2001, an armed attack took place on the parliament building in New Delhi, India. It was reported that the grenades used bore the markings of Arges.¹⁸ While this attack did not involve landmines, it generated interest in Arges and its ties to Pakistan and landmines. The Green Party sent letters of inquiry to the foreign affairs and interior ministries.¹⁹ The letters were

¹⁰ Interview with Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 3 April 2002, and email on 8 April 2002.

¹¹ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, submitted on 30 October 2001.

¹² See report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

¹³ Report of the Austrian Permanent Mission to the OSCE, submitted on 1 December 2001.

¹⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 528-529.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, submitted on 29 July 1999 for the period 1 March-30 April 1999; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 571.

¹⁶ Article 7 Reports, Form D, submitted on 30 April 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 3 May 2002 for calendar year 2001.

¹⁷ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 605-606. The Foreign Ministry states it made no inquiries with Arges about the matter because the company denied the allegation. Email from Romana Koenigsbrun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 August 2002.

¹⁸ “Militants Used Grenades of Austrian Origin?,” *Hindu* (Indian daily newspaper in English), 17 December 2001; “Granaten aus OÖ bei Anschlag” (“Grenades from Upper Austria in Terror Attack”), *Kurier* (Austrian daily newspaper), 13 January 2002; “Attentat in Indien mit Waffen aus Österreich?” (“Terror Attack in India with Weapons from Austria”), *Die Kronen Zeitung* (Austrian daily newspaper), 13 January 2002; “Osi-Granaten aus Pakistan” (“Austrian Grenades from Pakistan”), *Salzburger Nachrichten* (Austrian daily newspaper), 21 January 2002; “Durchschlagender Export” (“Penetrating Export”), *Format* (Austrian weekly magazine), 21 January 2002.

¹⁹ The letters of inquiry, dated 30 January 2002, were signed by Members of Parliament Dr. Peter Pilz and Ulrike Lunacek, to the Ministry of the Interior (3327/J) and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3326/J-NR/2002).

answered by each Ministry on 27 March.²⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that matters related to export licenses were not its responsibility.²¹ It did not know of the Arges grenade and had not instituted any investigations.²² Asked if Arges (or related companies) had ever applied for permission to license production abroad, the Ministry of the Interior replied that license agreements for armaments do not need a permit under national legislation (the War Materials Act).²³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it had found no information on such applications, but made reference to an article in an Indian newspaper which stated Arges' predecessor-company sold production machinery for grenades to a Pakistani firm in 1969-1971, and granted a licence for production of the grenades.²⁴

Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes or Antihandling Devices

The Austrian delegations to the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 and at the meeting of the Standing Committee on General Operation and Status of the Convention on 1 February 2002 supported the establishment of best practices regarding the design and use of certain fuzing mechanisms on antivehicle mines. Austria also supported the recommendation that States Parties review their inventories of antivehicle mines to ensure that the risk to civilians is minimized.

In March 2002, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that the armed forces did not possess antivehicle mines which were not compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁵ Austria also stated in its most recent Amended Protocol II Article 13 report that its "Armed Forces do not possess mines, booby-traps or other devices which are not in compliance with the technical provisions of this Protocol or which would be in contradiction with the obligations from other international treaties."²⁶

In April 2002, a member of the Disarmament Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that progress on this issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices should be expected within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, not the Mine Ban Treaty, and that the two instruments should complement each other.²⁷ At the May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Austria declared, "We think that the development of best practices would be a suitable way to address the humanitarian problems of such mines. In this respect, we would again like to invite States Parties to consider adopting the best practices for AV mines with sensitive fuses like these that were identified in the report of the Expert Meeting hosted by the ICRC in March 2001."²⁸

At the May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Austria also gave its legal analysis of the treaty definitions of antipersonnel mine and antihandling device. The ICBL and many States Parties have expressed the view that an antivehicle mine with an antihandling device that explodes from the unintentional act of a person is defined as an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. Austria, while re-stating its view that any mine, regardless of how it is labeled, is banned by the treaty if its design is such that it will detonate as a result of the presence, proximity or contact of a

²⁰ Letter from the Ministry of the Interior, 27 March 2002 (3330/AB XXI.GP) to Deputies Dr. Peter Pilz and colleagues, and letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002 (3339/AB XXI.GP) to Deputies Dr. Peter Pilz and colleagues.

²¹ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002.

²² Ibid.

²³ Letter from the Ministry of the Interior, 27 March 2002.

²⁴ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, citing *The Hindu*, 16/17 February 2002.

²⁵ Interview with Lt.-Col. Monsberger, Arms Control Section, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 27 March 2002.

²⁶ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, submitted on 30 October 2001.

²⁷ Interview with Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 3 April 2002.

²⁸ Statement of Austria to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

person, also offered these comments with respect to antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices:

The words *to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine* mean in our opinion that the conduct of a person must be aimed at disturbing the mine. Such acts include, inter alia, removing, destroying or disrupting the mechanism of the mine. Conduct or acts that are not aimed at disturbing the mine are not covered by the word *tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine*. If a device were designed to activate through conduct not aimed at disturbing the mine, we would not consider it to be a legitimate AHD [antihandling device]. The action of the person must be directed at the *tampering with or otherwise intentionally disturbing the mine*. However, in our view, it is not necessary that the person is aware of the fact that it is a mine with which it is tempering with or disturbing. Hence, we consider an AHD that activates when a person that does not know that it is dealing with a mine is removing, destroying or disrupting the mine to be a legitimate device.²⁹

Mine Action Funding

The Austrian policy for funding of mine action was described in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs added in January 2002, with respect to victim assistance, that "in general terms, Austria advocates an integrated approach towards the recipient countries, and due to the form and comprehensive character of our projects a clear distinction [between victim assistance and other projects]...is not always feasible or even desirable."³⁰

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that mine action funding totaled ATS 13,683,385 (US\$888,511) in 2001.³¹ The ATS 13.7 million represents funds actually dispersed out of the budgeted ATS 15 million.³²

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that mine action funding totaled about ATS15 million (US\$950,000) in 1999 and ATS30 (US\$1.9 million) in 2000, with a total of US\$7.1 million

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Email from Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 25 January 2002. For details of funding policy, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 607.

³¹ Email from Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 25 January 2002. Exchange rate on 22 May 2002: US\$1 = ATS 0.0655.

³² Ibid. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) database records that Austria contributed \$1,330,850 to mine action in 2001. UNMAS Mine Action Investments database, accessed at: www.mineaction.org, on 22 May 2002. The Foreign Ministry has informed UNMAS of several mistakes in its database entry for Austria. Email from Romana Königsbrun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 10 July 2002.

from 1994-2000.³³ At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Austria reported that over the last three years it had allocated approximately US\$4 million to mine action programs.³⁴

In 2001, in addition to the financial contributions, Austria continued to provide in-kind assistance in the form of six personnel undertaking clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) with UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan. Training programs were also offered by Austrian military personnel in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and in other contexts.³⁵

³³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 608-609 and *Executive Summary 2001*, p. 45.

³⁴ "Austrian Interventions Intersessional 27-31 May 2002," Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 30 May 2002, accessed at: www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/speeches_mc/Statement_Austria_Assistance_Cooperation.pdf on 1 July 2002.

³⁵ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, submitted on 30 October 2001.

Governmental Mine Action Funding in 2001 in Austrian Schillings (ATS), Euros and US\$³⁶

Implementing Organization	Project	Country	Total Project Value	Disbursed in 2001 ATS (Euro)	Disbursed in 2001 US\$
AAMV and Development Technology Workshop	Victim Assistance	Cambodia	ATS1, 081,000	ATS1, 077,890 (€78,333)	71,283
NATO Partnership for Peace	Stockpile Destruction	Albania	\$100,000	ATS1, 633,722 (€118,727)	100,000
International Trust Fund ³⁷	Victim Assistance	South Eastern Europe (allocated by ITF to BiH)	ATS600,000	ATS600, 504 (€43.640)	39,712
United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Mine Survey and planning	Afghanistan	\$200,000	ATS3, 093,040 (€224,780)	200,000
International Committee of the Red Cross	Victim Assistance	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CHF210,000	ATS1, 954,230 (€142,019)	130,657
		Uganda	CHF125,000	ATS1, 164,195 (€84,605)	74,452
UN Development Program and Croatian Mine Action Center	Training of Mine Detection Dogs	Croatia	\$80,000	ATS1, 250,935	80,000
International Campaign to Ban Landmines	<i>Landmine Monitor Report 2001</i>		\$80,000	ATS1, 202,470 (€87,386)	80,000
Government of Nicaragua	Third Meeting of States Parties	Nicaragua	ATS160,000	ATS156, 367 (€11,363)	10,000
Horizont 3000 – Río Coco	Victim Assistance	Nicaragua	ATS3, 030,000	ATS1, 000,030 (€72,675)	66,134
Austrian Research Centre at Seibersdorf	R & D – environmental effects of PFM mine destruction	Austria	ATS550, 000	ATS550, 000 (€39,970)	36,252
Total				ATS 13,683,383	\$888,490

³⁶ Email from Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 25 January-February 2002. Article 7 Report, Form J, for calendar year 2001, submitted on 3 May 2002; UNMAS Mine Action Investments database. The US\$ and € amounts in the table are as calculated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2002, and as appearing in the UNMAS database and the Article 7 Report Form J.

³⁷ The ITF reported this donation as \$39,971 in its Annual Report 2001.

Funds designated for Mozambique in 2001 (ATS 5,711,360 or US\$363,548) were not used due to the slow progress of the projects, according to the responsible section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁸

A mine survivors project in Cambodia was completed in September 2001. This was a joint project of Austrian Aid For Mine Victims and the Development Technology Workshop in Phnom Penh, providing skills training for Cambodian mine survivors in the manufacturing of demining machinery. The project was considered a success; all trainees found employment and are in the position to support their families. Disability Action Council officials evaluated the training conditions and were satisfied.³⁹

For 2002, funding of ATS 15 million (US\$982,500) is budgeted. Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner also pledged a further €1.9 million (US\$1.7 million) for Afghanistan at a donor conference in Japan in 2001. The period of time over which this will be spent, and the proportion to be devoted to mine action projects, was not decided.⁴⁰ However, in May 2002 at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, it was suggested that the full amount would be for mine action over the coming three to four years.⁴¹ The UNMAS database shows a total of US\$2.8 million budgeted by Austria for 2002, including US\$2,135,000 for mine action projects in Afghanistan.⁴²

Although Austria contributed to the funding of the NATO Partnership for Peace project in Albania in 2001, which destroyed Albania's stockpile of antipersonnel mines, no funding is planned in 2002 for the Partnership for Peace project in Moldova, as this project is considered to have only a small relevance to antipersonnel mines.⁴³

Non-Governmental Funding of Mine Action

Austrian NGOs contributed at least US\$97,549 to mine action in 2001. In addition, the Austrian National Committee for UNICEF contributed ATS 1.5 million (US\$98,250) via UNICEF headquarters for mine awareness and victim assistance projects in a number of countries.⁴⁴

Caritas donated ATS704,632 (US\$46,153) via its project partner, Mutter Teresa Vereinigung, in Pristina, Kosovo for economic support to mine victims and their families (50 families each received a dairy cow with veterinary certificates).⁴⁵

The Entwicklungshilfe-Klub donated €42,952 (US\$38,571) to the Jesuit Service Cambodia, via Misereor, for victim assistance in 2001.⁴⁶

The Rotary Club-Salzburg West donated US\$3,000 via Austrian Aid for Mine Victims for wheelchairs to the Jesuit Service Cambodia. It also donated €7,000 from the proceeds of a golf tournament fundraiser to AAMV for its mine action work.⁴⁷

Some NGOs which had previously funded mine action projects provided no funding in 2001, including CARE Austria, Médecins sans Frontières-Austria, and the Austrian Red Cross. A number of these organizations plan to provide mine action funding in 2002.

³⁸ Telephone interview with Günter Stachel, Austrian Development Cooperation, 9 April 2002. Austria provided ATS 5.6 million for mine action in Mozambique in 2000. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 608.

³⁹ Email from Judith Majlath, AAMV, 10 March 2002.

⁴⁰ Telephone interview with Dr. Andreas Liebmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2002, and interview with Gerhard Doujak, Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 25 May 2002.

⁴¹ "Austrian Interventions Intersessional 27-31 May 2002," Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

⁴² "Current and Planned Donor Activity for Austria," UNMAS Mine Investment database, accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 22 May 2002.

⁴³ Telephone interview with Karl Brummer, Mission to NATO, Austrian Embassy, Brussels, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁴ Email from Sylvia Tresek, Austrian National Committee for UNICEF, 12 March 2002.

⁴⁵ Email from Marion Feik, Emergency Aid Manager, Caritas, 20 March 2002.

⁴⁶ Fax from Franz Christian Fuchs, Entwicklungshilfe-Klub, 13 February 2002.

⁴⁷ Email from Judith Majlath, AAVM, 19 July 2002.

Research and Development (R&D)

The Schiebel company is involved in two international R&D projects into mine survey and clearance technology: the Demand and ARC projects. These are partially funded by the European Union. Schiebel is coordinating the ARC project, which aims to develop a new airborne system for technical survey and post-clearance quality control. The project has a 30-month duration, until September 2003, and uses an enhanced Schiebel unmanned aerial vehicle ("camcopter"). In 2001-2002, the project was developing multi-spectral data analysis and fusion techniques, combined with the Geographic Information System. A field evaluation carried out in Croatia in 2001 led to refinements of the entire system. A prototype is being prepared for further minefield trials in 2002, which will focus on screening image data for minefield indicators so as to distinguish between suspected mined areas that contain mines and those that do not.⁴⁸

The Hadi-Maschinenbau company developed and produced the FMR 2000 mine clearing device, a thirty-six-ton vehicle which is remotely-operated and mills the soil to a depth of 40 centimeters. According to the manufacturers, this avoids endangering personnel and allows more efficient clearance of terrain where other machines do not operate efficiently, such as dense vegetation and rocky ground. From 4-29 September 2001, with the assistance of the Austrian Ministry of Defense and the German NGO HELP, Hadi reportedly successfully cleared a suspected mined area near Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁹

BAHAMAS

The Bahamas signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 31 July 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. It has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation.¹ The Bahamas submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 12 March 2002, reporting for the period from 1999 to 2001. It is essentially a "nil" report. The Bahamas cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. It has never produced, transferred, or used antipersonnel landmines.² In its Article 7 Report, the Bahamas declared no stockpile of mines, including for training, and affirmed that it is not mine-affected.³

BANGLADESH

Key developments since May 2001: Bangladesh established a National Committee on implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2001. As of February 2002, a Bangladesh Army battalion was engaged in demining in Ethiopia as part of the UN peacekeeping mission. In May 2002, Bangladesh attended the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings for the first time. It has not submitted its initial Article 7 Report, due 28 August 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Bangladesh signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 March 1998 and ratified it on 6 September 2000. On the same day, it ratified Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Bangladesh on 1 March 2001.

⁴⁸ Email from Schiebel GmbH, 17 June 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 610.

⁴⁹ "FMR 2000 in Humanitarian Use in Bosnia," Media Information, Hadi-Maschinenbau, emailed on 21 June 2002.

¹ It did not complete Form A (National implementation measures) of its Article 7 Report submitted 12 March 2002.

² Landmine Monitor questionnaire completed by the High Commission for the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Ottawa, 2 February 1999.

³ Article 7 Report submitted 12 March 2002.

Although Article 145-A of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, “All treaties with foreign countries shall be submitted to the President who shall cause them to be laid before the Parliament,” the President has not yet done so with the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Bangladesh has not yet taken any steps to enact implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty.² However, in August 2001 Bangladesh established a National Committee for the Implementation of the Obligations of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The National Committee is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and includes representatives from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Welfare.³ The Committee has met twice, in September 2001 and May 2002. Landmine Monitor was told, “During the meetings, all concerned Ministries and other authorities discussed Bangladesh’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention and reviewed the progress of implementation of these obligations. The Committee is currently in the process of preparing Bangladesh’s initial report under Article 7 of the Convention.”⁴

Bangladesh did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Managua in September 2001. An official of the Foreign Ministry said, “The time of Managua meeting was difficult one, particularly following the September 11 incident and at that time there was even apprehension that the meeting might be called off.”⁵ Bangladesh cosponsored and voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001 as it had in previous years.

In May 2002 Bangladesh participated for the first time in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva. At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention on 27 May 2002, Counselor Rabab Fatima expressed concerns about being “the only country in South Asia that is State Party to the Ottawa Convention.” She noted that non-state actors (armed opposition groups) and others had used mines on the border and even inside Bangladesh. She spoke of the need to bring others, including non-state actors, into the fold of the convention, and advocated a mechanism to monitor the possible use of mines by non-State Parties against State Parties in the region.⁶

Bangladesh has yet to submit its initial Article 7 transparency report, due on 28 August 2001. A Foreign Ministry official said, “We have received a printed form related to the Article 7 report to fill in and to submit. The government is in the process of preparing the report. It will be a fairly comprehensive report involving extensive consultation with all concerned government agencies.”⁷ No time line for completion was provided.

At the Third Annual Meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II in December 2001, Ambassador Dr. Toufiq Ali stated, “As a party of the Ottawa Convention, we see both these

¹ The Constitution of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, *International Treaties, Article-145A*. Article 145-A does not prescribe a timeframe for placement of a treaty before Parliament and, according to one legal expert, the Executive can defer submission for an indefinite period of time. Interviews with A.K.M. Shamsul Huda, Lawyer, Constitution expert and former Parliament member, Chittagong, 13 and 28 April 2002.

² One legal expert has pointed out that upon ratification, it becomes incumbent upon the government to comply with treaty obligations, and noted that national legislation might not be required because customary international law and the Mine Ban Treaty obligations, which do not call for alteration of domestic law or the constitution, are directly applicable in Bangladesh. Interview with Ridwanul Hoque, Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Chittagong, September 2001 at Chittagong and phone interview and e-mails, 29 and 30 March, 1 and 2 April 2002.

³ Interview with Rabab Fatima, Counsellor, Bangladesh Mission to the UN, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴ Email from Rabab Fatima, Counsellor, Bangladesh Mission to the UN, 4 July 2002.

⁵ Interview with Salahuddin Noman Chawdhury, Assistant Secretary, UN wing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 23 March 2002.

⁶ Oral remarks by Rabab Fatima, Counselor of Bangladesh Mission, Geneva, to the Standing Committee, 27 May 2002, notes taken by Human Rights Watch.

⁷ Interview with Dr. Mohammed Ali Sarkar, UN desk chief-ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 27 January 2002.

as major instruments towards ensuring a mine free world. Though the production, stockpiles and global trade of antipersonnel mines have been reduced significantly, further transparency on usage, production, stockpiles and other mine related matters are essential.”⁸ Bangladesh has not yet completed the annual Amended Protocol II Article 13 reporting requirement.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

According to officials, Bangladesh has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The government acknowledges that it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but has not yet provided information on the quantity, types or suppliers of the mines. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said, “Soon we will provide all details to the appropriate authorities.”⁹ It appears that Bangladesh possesses antipersonnel mines made in Pakistan, the former Soviet Union, China, and the United States.¹⁰ The planning process for destruction of stockpiles has apparently not yet begun; the deadline for completion of destruction is 1 March 2005.

Use

A military official has reiterated to Landmine Monitor that Bangladesh has never used antipersonnel mines, not even during its fight against an insurgency movement in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) from January 1973 to December 1997.¹¹ But, as noted by Ambassador Ali, “we have not been spared the casualties of mines laid by others. Scattered, unmarked minefields have hurt our nationals as well.”¹² According to Bangladesh authorities, the Burmese army and Na Sa Ka (border security forces in Arakan state) have planted mines in no-man’s land, and even inside Bangladesh territory, mainly to stop cross-border guerrilla activities, but also to extort bribes from smugglers.¹³

However, this practice may have abated or even ended in the past year. A Bangladesh border security force (BDR) official told the Landmine Monitor researcher, “There is no news of casualties after the monsoon of this year [August 2001]. Usually Na Sa Ka plants new mines every year after the rainy season. This year, so far, they did not plant any new mines and did not replace old ones.” When asked about the apparent change in practice, the official said that the situation had improved thanks to several meetings between the officials of the border security forces of the two countries.¹⁴

A leader of an armed opposition group in Arakan, Burma, said, “The cause behind Burma’s not planting new mines this year is the fact that Burma has been facing international criticism for its mines activities. The Burmese authority has also understood that we remove mines planted by them. It does not mean that the whole border area is mine-free. We only demine our passage with the help of our own experts with some mine-sweeping equipment. Another cause of it may be that we had minimal activities within Burma this year.”¹⁵

Despite the above information, in March 2002 there were several newspaper reports of mine use by Na Sa Ka forces, and an armed opposition group leader told Landmine Monitor that on 17

⁸ Statement by Ambassador Dr. Toufiq Ali, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, to the Third Annual Meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 10 December 2001.

⁹ Interview with Salahuddin Noman Chawdhury, Assistant Secretary, UN wing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 23 March 2002.

¹⁰ For further detail see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 432-433.

¹¹ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Commanding Officer, Naikongchari BDR (Bangladesh border security forces), Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

¹² Statement by Ambassador Dr. Toufiq Ali, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, at the Third Annual Meeting of the States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 10 December 2001.

¹³ For further details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 433.

¹⁴ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Commanding Officer Naikongchari BDR, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

¹⁵ Interview with a leader of an NSA of Arakan, Bangladesh-Burma border, 18 January 2002.

March 2002, Na Sa Ka men were seen carrying basketfuls of mines to the no-man's land and emplacing them.¹⁶

Non-State Actors

The Chittagong Hill Tracts is a hilly area with thick jungles, and is a homeland to approximately twelve ethnic tribes.¹⁷ It borders on the Burmese states of Arakan and Chin, as well as India's Mizoram and Tripura states. Armed opposition groups, also known as Non-State Actors (NSAs), from Bangladesh are based there. According to newspaper reports, the rebels of neighboring countries also take refuge within CHT after incursion in their respective countries. However, Bangladesh's border security forces claim that all foreign rebel forces are immediately driven across the borders when their presence is known.¹⁸

Two armed Bangladeshi groups, the Prity group and the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), use booby-traps and improvised explosive devices that function like an antipersonnel mine.¹⁹ Both armed groups were formed after the 1997 peace agreement between Shanti Bahini and the Bangladesh government.

Two of the Burmese Arakan groups possess some 200-350 Chinese Type 58 antipersonnel blast mines and Type 59 antipersonnel stake mines, which they claim were originally laid by Burmese forces.²⁰ One Arakan group claims to have a sizeable stockpile of battery-powered mines and command-detonated mines, which it uses to protect temporary camps in no-man's land.²¹ Some of the rebel groups in CHT have the capacity to make mine-like devices, and they share this expertise with friendly groups.²²

The Bangladesh branch of Nonviolence International (under Nonviolence International Southeast Asia) is carrying out an awareness program among the NSAs and educating them about global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Problem

Landmines are found along the border with Burma in Chittagong Hill Tracts, a hilly area 208 kilometers long.²³ The mines remain a menace to the people living near the border. According to a BDR Naikongchari officer, the most mine-affected area is between pillars No. 38 and 47; this area is also the most densely populated.²⁴ The villages close to mine-affected areas are located in Ukhia and Ramu sub-districts of Cox's Bazar and Naikongchari, Alikadam, and Thansi sub-districts of Bandarban. Most people depend on forest resources for their living; they collect bamboo and cut wood to sell in local markets.

¹⁶ Interview with leaders of the NSAs of Arakan and cross-border traders, Bangladesh-Burma border, 26 and 27 March 2002; Abdul Kuddus Rana, "Na Sa Ka has planted mines along Myanmar border anew," *Prothom Aloo (The First Light)*, 25 March 2002, p. 5; Bandarban reporter, "Na Sa Ka again planted landmines along Bandarban border," *Ittefaq (Way of Events)*, 24 March 2002, p.1.

¹⁷ Interview with Dr. Jafar Ahmad Hanafi, Project Director, Cox's Bazar Cultural Center, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, 29 March 2002.

¹⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Commanding Officer Naikongchari BDR, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with NGO workers, Rangamati, Bangladesh, 1 and 2 January 2002; interview with political leaders and journalists, 11-13 March 2002.

²⁰ Interview with NSAs of Arakan, Bangladesh-Burma border, December 2001, January and March 2002; and "Burma continues to plant mines along Burma-Bangladesh border," *Kaladan Press Network*, 26 October 2001.

²¹ Interview with the militant leader of alleged NSA group, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, January and March 2002.

²² Interview with leaders of NSAs, Bangladesh-Burma border, December 2001, January and March 2002.

²³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 434 and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 446.

²⁴ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002 and 18 March 2002.

Mine Clearance

The Bangladesh army has several battalions with mine clearing capabilities. They have cleared mines in Kuwait, Cambodia, in UN peacekeeping operations, and inside Bangladesh. One Bangladeshi battalion is engaged in a mine clearing operation in Kuwait under the Kuwaiti Engineering Corps.²⁵ As of February 2002, a battalion was engaged in a demining operation in Ethiopia as part of the UN peacekeeping mission.²⁶

Since February 2001, border security officials of Bangladesh and Burma have met several times to discuss measures to solve the landmine problem, including on 25 April 2002. Bangladesh has repeatedly asked Burma to clear mines from the border area, but Burma has denied any responsibility and blamed the rebel groups for laying the mines.²⁷ BDR officials also told Landmine Monitor, "During bilateral talks the poor English of the border security officials of Burma poses a problem to some extent. Most of the time we have to depend on an interpreter, which makes the things more muddled. So, neither side can communicate clearly."²⁸

Bangladesh has neither received nor provided any mine action funding.

Mine Risk Education

The government has provided no formal mine risk education. A variety of initiatives have been taken at the local level to warn the population about the dangers of mines.²⁹ Local and national newspapers report mine incidents along the border, but people in the affected areas have a high rate of illiteracy. In March 2001, the Landmine Monitor researcher supplied a number of videos on landmines to the BDR Naikongchari to show to the public and to provide to community leaders.

During visits in mine-affected villages in December 2001 and January and March 2002, Landmine Monitor found that a good number of people in those villages are aware of the presence of mines. However, villagers still go into the forest for their livelihood, driven by poverty and hunger.³⁰ In some cases they try to avoid the paths, which they fear to be mined.

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, three people were killed and six injured in reported antipersonnel mine incidents.³¹ In June 2001, two people belonging to the Chak tribe died in a landmine blast, which occurred while they were collecting bamboo.³² From January through April 2002, there were no reports of human casualties. Wild animals may have caused the many mine blasts occurring between January and April 2002.³³ According to newspaper reports, a number of elephants have been killed or injured.

From various sources, there are reports of mine incidents causing 61 deaths and 125 injuries from 1993 to 2000. Of the deaths, ten occurred from 1993 to 1996, seventeen in 1997, thirteen in 1998, one in 1999, and eight in 2000. For twelve deaths, the year of the incident could not be

²⁵ Email from Landmine Monitor researcher for Kuwait, 7 July 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 434.

²⁶ Interview with Salauddin Noman, Assistant Secretary, UN wing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 23 March 2002.

²⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 435.

²⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor and Capt. Yosuf Hassan, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

²⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 435.

³⁰ Landmine Monitor researchers interviewed families of mine victims and survivors in mine-affected villages from 25 to 30 December 2001 and 10 to 17 January 2002. The survey covered about 100 persons in 11 villages.

³¹ Sources include local newspapers, interviews with mine-affected villagers from 10 to 17 January 2002, and with leaders of NSAs, 27 March 2002.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Interviews with mine-affected villagers from 10 to 17 January 2002, and with leaders of NSAs, 27 March 2002.

ascertained. Of the injuries, up to 1998, 124 people were injured, and in 2000, one person was injured. Most of the mine casualties are wood and bamboo cutters.³⁴

Survivor Assistance

The government seems to attach little importance to landmine survivor assistance, perhaps reflecting the relatively small number of victims and the remoteness of mine-affected areas. BDR officials stationed near the border area stated, "It is not only because of Bangladesh's obligation as a ratifying country to the Mine Ban Treaty that we want to help mine victims. On humanitarian grounds also we are ready to do so if anyone asks for it. We have doctors with our battalion."³⁵

In September 2001, Hope Foundation, a sister organization of Memorial Christian Hospital, provided one free artificial leg to a mine survivor. Jaipur Foot, another sister organization of the same hospital, provided two artificial legs to mine survivors in 1998. In 1999, three mine survivors received free artificial legs, and one survivor received treatment from a local NGO, Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims. One BDR personnel who stepped on a landmine in 1997 received free treatment in an Army hospital. Apparently, no other survivors, or families of victims, have received any form of help.

In Cox's Bazar, a philanthropic organization called Baitush Sharaf is setting up an orthopedic unit at their hospital, in collaboration with Aide Medicale et Developpment, a French humanitarian organization. The director of the Baitush Sharaf hospital stated that although the main goal of the unit was to treat rickets patients, "We will be happy to provide emergency medical support to the landmine victims."³⁶ The orthopedic unit was scheduled to open by April 2002. Initially it will have 30 beds along with necessary equipment and surgeons, with a target of 50 beds in the future.³⁷

There is an orthopedic hospital in Dhaka, and a hospital for disabled children. All government medical college hospitals have orthopedic units, but they are far away from the mine-affected areas. In 2001, the only hospital with a good orthopedic department close to mine-affected areas was the Memorial Christian Hospital; however, in 2002, the new orthopedic unit at the Baitush Sharaf Hospital will also be within easy reach.

A field survey by Landmine Monitor in late 2001 and early 2002 revealed that out of ten mine casualties, nine died on the way to a hospital. The reasons for this high rate of death included: excessive bleeding, delays in reaching the hospital, lack of transportation to get to the hospital, lack of money to pay for transportation or medical assistance.³⁸

Handicap International, working in partnership with the Center for Disability in Development, has a center at Alikadam, in the mine-affected area, with a program called "Community Approaches to Handicap and Disability."³⁹ However, it does not appear that any landmine survivors have benefited from the program, probably due to lack of knowledge about the services offered.

Disability Policy and Practice

On 4 April 2001, the Parliament adopted Bangladesh's first comprehensive disability legislation, the "Bangladesh Persons with Disability Welfare Act-2001".⁴⁰ The legislation includes,

³⁴ Sources include BDR official papers, newspaper reports, NSA interviews, the NGO Bangladesh Rehabilitation for Trauma Victims, and Landmine Monitor interviews in affected communities.

³⁵ Interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor and Capt. Yusuf Hassan, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

³⁶ Interview with Sirajul Islam, Director of the Baitush Sharaf Hospital, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, 6 February 2002.

³⁷ Interview with Carine Moussay, Medical Coordinator, Baitush Sharaf Hospital, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, 10 March 2002.

³⁸ Interviews with families of mine victims and survivors from 25 to 30 December 2001 and 10 to 17 January 2002.

³⁹ Interview with Rifat S. Khan, Program Coordinator, Handicap International, Dhaka, 24 March 2002.

⁴⁰ "Bangladesh Persons with Disability Welfare Act-2001," accessed on-line at

among other things, measures to improve access to health care, rehabilitation, education and vocational training, and to raise awareness on disability issues. The Act also establishes a National Coordination Committee for Welfare of the Persons with Disabilities. Although landmine survivors are not specifically mentioned in the Act, they are included in the general definitions in the legislation.

In 2000, the Bangladesh government declared that about 10 percent of the total population of the country is disabled, and formed a trust fund with one hundred million Bangladeshi taka (about US\$1.8 million).⁴¹ None of the landmine survivors interviewed have benefited from the trust fund.

BARBADOS

Barbados signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 26 January 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 July 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. On 12 July 2001, Barbados informed Landmine Monitor that it had submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report to the United Nations, but the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs has not received the report.¹ Barbados cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Barbados has never produced, stockpiled, transferred, or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.²

BELGIUM

Key developments since May 2001: Belgium continued to play a leading role in promoting the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Belgium was approved by States Parties to preside over the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2002. Belgium's funding for mine action decreased in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Belgium signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 4 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation banning antipersonnel mines has been in force for several years.¹

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, Belgium's delegation was headed by Jean Lint, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, and Marc Baptist, Deputy Director-General of Political Multilateral Relations and Thematic Questions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A representative from the Belgian NGO, Handicap International Belgium, was also part of the delegation.

Ambassador Lint delivered a statement on behalf of the European Union and other countries. He summarized the success of the Mine Ban Treaty in gaining the adherence of many states but said:

We must do even better and reach out to the whole international community. The European Union will continue to press for swift worldwide application of the Convention. It has accordingly made more than 60 démarches to that effect.... We have no time to lose. The Convention lays down strict time limits for the destruction of stockpiles and clearance of mined areas.... The countries affected should not be left on their own in this fight. The whole international community should contribute to attaining the objectives of the Convention.... The European Union, as it has constantly

www.disabilityworld.org/05-06_01/gov/bangladesh.shtml, (15 July 2002).

⁴¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 448.

¹ Telephone interview with Donna Ford, First Secretary, Barbados Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 12 July 2001.

² Government of Barbados response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 29 January 1999.

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 577.

stated, will direct its aid as a matter of priority to those States Parties and States Signatories which put into practice the principles and objectives of the Convention.²

Subsequently, Ambassador Lint declared, on behalf of Belgium, that the States negotiating the Mine Ban Treaty had intended that the number of mines retained under Article 3 should be the “minimum absolutely necessary.” He supported the suggestion of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that States Parties should specify the intended purposes for which mines are retained.³

As co-chair of the intersessional Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Belgium participated actively in preparations for the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001. At the meeting itself, Belgium was elected to be co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies. Belgium was also approved by States Parties to preside over the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, in September 2002, in Geneva.

Belgium participated extensively in the Standing Committee meetings in both January and May 2002.⁴ At the Standing Committee meetings Belgium chaired the Article 7 contact group, and Ambassador Lint presented overviews of the status of reporting by States Parties. In the May meeting, the contact group was expanded to include efforts regarding Article 9 on national implementation measures. Also in May, Ambassador Lint presented a paper with suggestions for improving Article 7 reporting that was well received by other States Parties and the ICBL. In 2001, Belgium contributed financially to the *Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention* prepared by the NGO, VERTIC.

Belgium is an active member of the Universalization Contact Group, set up by States Parties to promote the Mine Ban Treaty. The focus of Belgian universalization efforts has been in Africa. On 2-3 May 2002, Ambassador Lint spoke at a workshop on landmines held in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Lint also spoke in a regional seminar on landmines, held in Bangkok, Thailand later that month.

Belgium has taken part in discussions among States Parties regarding possible violations of the treaty and the operationalization of Mine Ban Treaty Article 8 on compliance.⁵ On 31 May 2002, at the meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Belgium stated its preference to deal with compliance concerns in the Mine Ban Treaty’s spirit of cooperation, trust and transparency, rather than establishing a new compliance mechanism. It argued that the Standing Committees should be given the opportunity to deal with compliance issues, at least on the level of information exchange. Belgium supported Canadian proposals on compliance, and the suggestion of developing regional fora to deal with compliance.⁶

Belgium submitted its annual updated Article 7 Report on 30 April 2002, covering calendar year 2001. Previous Article 7 reports were submitted in May 1999, 15 August 1999, 27 April 2000

² Statement made by Belgium on behalf of the European Union (EU) to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey associated themselves with the EU statement.

³ Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁴ Belgium was represented by Ambassador Lint, Stéphane de Loecker, Belgium’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, Damien Angelet and Filip Van der Linden from the Belgian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and various officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and International Cooperation.

⁵ Email from Damien Angelet, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, 24 April 2002.

⁶ Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee meeting on the General Operation and Status of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

and 30 April 2001.⁷ The reports in 2001 and 2002 include use of voluntary Form J, in which Belgium provides information on mine action funding and victim assistance measures.

On 29 November 2001, Belgium voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. In its capacity as future President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Belgium joined Nicaragua and Norway, the current and past presidents of meetings of States Parties, in introducing the annual resolution.

In 2001 and 2002, Belgium continued to play a key role in universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. While serving as EU President in the second half of 2001, Belgium executed more than 50 démarches promoting the treaty.⁸ Louis Michel, Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed some 30 letters to his counterparts in States that have not yet signed or acceded to the treaty. On 1 March 2002, the third anniversary of entry into force of the treaty, Louis Michel stated that he was pleased with the increasing number of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and encouraged non-signatory States to take the opportunity presented by the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002 to accede to it. He also encouraged all States Parties to respect the treaty deadlines for the destruction of mine stockpiles and clearance of mined areas.⁹

In January 2002, Mirella Minne, a Belgian Member of Parliament, introduced a draft resolution requesting the government to continue putting the treaty on both the national and international agenda, to ban all arms exports to countries which are not States Parties, to request the EU to urge states applying for membership to the union to accede to the treaty, and to increase collaboration with the United Nations and particularly the Conference on Disarmament. This proposal was discussed in Parliament on 15 May and adopted unanimously after amendment (including the removal of the proposed ban on exports to non-States Parties).¹⁰

Belgium, represented by Stéphane De Loecker, assumed the annual presidency of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in November 2001, with Belgium having identified the following priorities for the year: greater interaction between donors and agencies working in the field; a higher profile for mine action, and increased financial resources for mine action to ensure that it meets the needs better at the same time as maximizing the effectiveness of the funds.¹¹ These priorities for the MASG relate to Mine Ban Treaty Article 5, and to Belgium's role as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies. Ambassador Lint elaborated on the priorities in a speech given at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels on 18 February 2002 in the presence of the Belgian Minister of Defense and Philippe Busquin, European Commissioner for Research.¹²

On 23-28 September 2001, Belgium supported a mission on behalf of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Joe De Vroe of the Belgian armed forces to evaluate the capacity of a number of Balkan States to destroy their antipersonnel mine stockpiles in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty, and to identify what additional assistance might be needed.¹³

Belgium is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Its annual report, submitted in accordance with Article 13 of the protocol on 19 November

⁷ Article 7 reports submitted on 2 May 1999 for the period 3 December 1997-30 April 1999, submitted on 15 August 1999 for the period 1 May-15 August 1999, submitted on 27 April 2000 for calendar year 1999, submitted on 30 April 2001 for calendar year 2000, and submitted on 30 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

⁸ Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, p. 2.

⁹ Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2002.

¹⁰ "Proposition of Resolution in Relation to the Universalization and Intersessional Work of the Ottawa Convention of 1997, Concerning the Prohibition of the Use and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," Brussels, 31 January 2002, index no. 1748/1, and as amended 15 May 2002, index no. 1748/2.

¹¹ Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2002, p.3.

¹² Ambassador Jean Lint, "Mine Action Technologies and the Ottawa Convention," Royal Military Academy, Brussels, 18 February 2002.

¹³ Response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, p. 6; "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001.

2001, gives detailed information on international assistance and cooperation and research projects.¹⁴

Belgium attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001.¹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed that a limited number of States have given their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II, but have not yet become States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and asked what was preventing these States from adhering to both the protocol and the treaty.¹⁶

The same delegation represented Belgium at the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Ambassador Lint presented a statement on behalf of the EU and other countries. The statement described the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II as complementary (“la grande complémentarité”) and he reminded delegates that the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings were open to all States. The statement called for universalization of both the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II, and set out the EU position in favor of several proposals before the CCW conference: extension of the Convention to non-international conflicts, a strongly mandated expert working group on “explosive remnants of war,” and a more stringent regulation of “mines other than antipersonnel mines.”¹⁷

On 11 September 2001, at the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Lint congratulated Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Kenya, and Romania on ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. Six other CD members had signed, but not yet ratified the treaty, and 25 were non-signatories. He summarized the progress made by many States Parties toward meeting the treaty commitments, and concluded that “an international standard had been created for the total prohibition of the production, stockpiling, use and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and that this standard could not be circumvented even by non-signatory States.” He called on all States to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible.¹⁸

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated in March 2002 the previous policy that Belgian forces are prohibited from any use of antipersonnel mines in joint military operations with a State not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, and that efforts were made to encourage other NATO partners to become States Parties. In Parliament, Defense Minister Andre Flahaut confirmed that he has informed partners and allies on the restrictions which national legislation imposes during joint military operations, and that Belgian military forces in joint military operations fall under national legislation.¹⁹

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling²⁰

Belgium completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in September 1997. An initial quantity of 6,240 antipersonnel mines (Type M 35 Bg) was retained in 1999 for purposes permitted by Mine Ban Treaty Article 3. This quantity has since been reduced each year (5,816 at

¹⁴ CCW, Amended Protocol II, Article 13 Report, submitted on 19 November 2001.

¹⁵ The delegation was led by Ambassador Lint and included Danielle Haven, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Damien Angelet, from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Lieutenant-Colonel Baudoin Briot and Major Dominique Jones, both from the Ministry of Defense.

¹⁶ Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, p. 5.

¹⁷ Statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the EU to the Second Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001. (The statement was delivered on 11 December 2001, although the document is dated 10 December 2001). Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland also associated themselves with the EU statement.

¹⁸ United Nations, “Conference on Disarmament Hears Statements on Convention for the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines,” Press Release, Geneva, 11 September 2001.

¹⁹ Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, pp. 3-4; oral joint questions from Mirella Minne and Ferdy Willems, Commission of National Defense, Chamber of Representatives, Integral Bulletin Ref. CRIV 50 COM 672, 26 February 2002, pp. 3-4.

²⁰ For details of past production and transfer, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 540-543, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 613.

the end of 1999, 5,433 at the end of 2000, and 5,099 at the end of 2001). Belgium supplies full details in Form G.1 of the Article 7 reports about the exact purposes for which each quantity of retained mines has been used/destroyed. Since 1999, Belgium has used 1,141 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes, especially the training of military engineers.²¹

On 1 February 2002, at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Belgium declared that it needed live mines for permitted training purposes, and that it was using between 350 and 400 antipersonnel mines per year.²²

Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices

At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2002, the Belgian delegation stated that the army had reviewed its antivehicle mines and concluded that all types in the inventory are “in compliance with both the spirit and letter” of the treaty.²³

Several parliamentary initiatives concerning antivehicle mines with antihandling devices have been introduced since the developments reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. In the Senate two proposals were discussed: Senator E. Thijs (Christian Democratic Party) and Senator P. Mahoux (Socialist Party) each introduced a proposal prohibiting antihandling devices. The Minister of Defense, Andre Flahaut, initially saw no objections to a prohibition. The President of the Commission decided to organize a hearing on the issue together with the Commission of the Chamber of Representatives, where a similar proposal had been introduced. The Defense Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reportedly announced that in view of its international commitments, the Belgian government cannot engage in a unilateral prohibition.²⁴

On 4 March 2002, Handicap International Belgium wrote to the Defense Minister again expressing its concerns about the HPD mine in Belgian stockpiles, and giving technical information about this French-made antivehicle mine equipped with an antihandling device. The letter pointed out that important questions about these mines were raised by CNEMA (Commission Nationale française d'Élimination des Mines Antipersonnel).²⁵ On 9 April 2002, Defense Minister Andre Flahaut replied, stating that the HPD is considered to be an antivehicle mine and that, “My department has considered the questions advanced by the CNEMA in its 2000 annual report. I can tell you that the technical requirements, as set out in the specifications, were met as soon as the devices were received. To my knowledge, no new element has invalidated these declarations of conformity.”²⁶

In addition to the technical information on the HPD mine noted in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, military sources have indicated that the antihandling device may be detonated by a person walking nearby carrying metal (such as a metal belt, military equipment, or a metal detector) and that the self-neutralization feature is easily re-set.²⁷

²¹ Article 7 reports submitted on 2 May 1999, 15 August 1999, 27 April 2000, 30 April 2001, 30 April 2002, Forms B, D, G.

²² Article 7 reports submitted on 2 May 1999, 15 August 1999, 27 April 2000, 30 April 2001, Form D, and Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee meeting on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

²³ Landmine Monitor notes of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

²⁴ Email from Karl Verdickt, CD&V (Christian Democratic Party), 26 April 2002; see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 613-616 for previous developments.

²⁵ Letter from Handicap International Belgium to Andre Flahaut, 4 March 2002.

²⁶ Letter from Andre Flahaut to Handicap International Belgium, 9 April 2002. Landmine Monitor researcher's translation.

²⁷ Interviews with a former officer in SEDEE-DOVO, 2 December 2001, and with a retired military engineer, 30 May 2001; see also reports on France and Switzerland in this edition of the Landmine Monitor, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 613-616, and 691-692.

Landmine/UXO Problem, Casualties, Survivor Assistance

In 2001, and through 14 May 2002 the SEDEE-DOVO (Belgium's explosive ordnance disposal unit) were not aware of any mine-related incidents in Belgium.²⁸ On 9 March 2002, a mine was discovered in the town of Thumaide by a man digging in his garden.²⁹

Mine Action Funding³⁰

In 2001, Belgium contributed about €3,651,506 (US\$3,279,052) to mine action, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Form J of the Article 7 Report for 2001. This represents a decrease from governmental funding in 2000 (\$3,749,594), and contrasts with policy statements stressing the need to maintain high levels of mine action funding. The Belgian entries on the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Mine Action Investments database show a total of \$3,157,138 donated in 2001 and \$3,722,250 donated in 2000.³¹

In 2001, funding was allocated to the following projects according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amounts in Euro) and the UNMAS database (amounts in US\$); major variances between these two sources are noted.

Support to advocacy work and public awareness: BEF3,112,021 (€77,145; \$69,276)

- Contribution to support the coordination of the Belgian network of the ICBL campaign, carried out in cooperation with HI Belgium; this is an increase on funding in 2000 of BEF2,922,044 (\$64,862).

Support for the promotion and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: €324,187 (\$291,120)

- To VERTIC: €38,187 for production of the Guide for Article 7 reporting.³²
- To Nicaragua: €13,000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to assist with the organization of the Third Meeting of State Parties.³³
- To regional UN centers in Africa (Lomé) and Latin America (Lima): €25,000 (\$22,450) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for organization of the Third Meeting of States Parties and promotion of the treaty in Africa.
- To assist with the production of Article 7 Reports by African countries: €124,000 (\$111,352) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- To the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Demining: €124,000 (\$111,352) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Support for monitoring the Mine Ban Treaty:

- To the Landmine Monitor: €50,000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁴

²⁸ Telephone interview with Colonel Briot, SEDEE-DOVO, 14 May 2002.

²⁹ "Thumaide: une Mine dans le Jardin" (Thumaide: a Mine in the Garden), *Nord Eclair*, (éd. Mons, Borinage) (French language newspaper), 10 March 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 616-617, for details of notifications to SEDEE-DOVO and past incidents.

³⁰ For mine action funding policy, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 617. Unless otherwise specified below, information in this section comes from: Response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, which contains the same funding data as the Article 7 Report, Form J, submitted 30 April 2002 for the calendar year 2001. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.898; €1 = BEF40.3399, used throughout this report. However, this differs in some respects from the mine action investments database of the United Nations Mine Action Service.

³¹ "Annual Donor Report for Belgium: 2001," Mine Action Investments database, UNMAS, at www.mineaction.org, accessed on 10 April 2002; the UNMAS records funding in US dollars only; these dollar amounts are used in this report.

³² Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, p. 2; email from Angela Woodward, VERTIC, 8 March 2002; this item of expenditure is not recorded in the Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002, nor on the UNMAS Mine Action Investments database.

³³ The contribution to the government of Nicaragua of €13,000 is shown on the UNMAS database as \$13,000.

Support to mine clearance operations (humanitarian or military): €1,204,588 (\$1,081,720)

- *Cambodia*: €388,426 (\$348,806). Financial and in-kind support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. Since 1994, three mine clearance experts have served as technical advisers to Cambodian Mine Action Center on a development project intended to enable Cambodian staff ultimately to operate independently.
- *Kosovo*: €150,000 (\$134,700). Estimated value of in-kind support, from the Ministry of Defense, for three mine clearance experts operating with KFOR and assisting local demining organizations. The Amended Protocol II Article 13 report states that in 2001 12 additional bomb disposal experts have been operating in Kosovo, with costs borne by the Belgian Armed Forces.³⁵
- *Croatia*: €90,000 (\$80,820). Estimated value of in-kind support, from the Ministry of Defense, for a training adviser for the Western European Union Demining Mission project.
- *Laos*: €570,000 (\$511,860). Financial aid plus in-kind support (no estimate of value available) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including three demining experts to provide technical assistance for the staff of UXO LAO in clearing the province of Champassak. The Amended Protocol II Article 13 report indicates four experts, and states that the project will continue until 2003.³⁶
- *Democratic Republic of Congo*: €369,825 or \$639,200. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a Handicap International Belgium project assisting demining in Kisangani.³⁷
- *UN Coordination Center for Demining*: €25,000 (\$22,450). From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the management of UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Demining.

Support to mine awareness and victim assistance:

- € 247,894 (\$222,609) for the special appeal launched by the ICRC in late 1999 for the period 2000-2005 for victim assistance, advocacy and prevention.

Support to victim assistance: €501,238 (\$450,112)

- Burundi: Assistance to Disabled Persons in Burundi via HIB (physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration): €152,054 (\$136,545).
- Cambodia: Physical Rehabilitation: €82,532 (\$74,114) and Socio-Economic Reintegration: €184,235 (\$165,443). Both via HIB.
- Colombia: Structural Support to the Rei Foundation (rehabilitation of disabled persons, Cartagena) via HIB: €82,417 (\$74,010).³⁸

Support to R&D of new mine detection and clearance technologies: €1,536,061 (\$1,379,382)

- *HUDEM (HUMANitarian DEMining)*: €744,000 (\$668,112) from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, plus in-kind assistance.³⁹
- *PARADIS* project: €73,000 (\$65,554).
- *APOPO* project: €506,891 (\$455,188) increased funding from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs.
- *HOPE*: € 93,000 (\$83,514) of in-kind resources from the Ministry of Defense.

³⁴ The contribution to the Landmine Monitor of €50,000 is shown on the UNMAS database as \$50,000.

³⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 19 November 2001, Form E.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Two clearly different amounts for funding of this project in 2001 are given, respectively, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (€369,825) and UNMAS (\$639,200).

³⁸ Interview with Jerome Ruelle, Financial Director, HIB, 2 August 2002. "Plan d'Action 2001. Lutte contre le handicap dans les pays en développement", HIB, September 2000.

³⁹ Two clearly different amounts for funding of this project in 2001 are given, respectively, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (€744,000) and UNMAS (\$310,025).

- *Multi Sensor Mine Signature*: approx. €57,260 (\$51,419) from the Ministry of Defense.
- *ITEP*: €74,000 (\$66,452) from the Ministry of Defense.

Research and Development (R&D)⁴⁰

As noted above, Belgium contributed €1.5 million to R&D on mine detection and clearance technologies in 2001. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* provided a description for most of the R&D programs, but some updated information follows.⁴¹

HUDEM (National Project on Humanitarian Demining): Its first phase will be terminated at the end of 2002. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described HUDEM as a great success, and expects that the request for a further phase of the program, over four years, will be accepted.

PARADIS (Projet d'Aide a la Planification Rationnelle des Opérations de Déminage Fondée sur l'Imagerie Satellitaire): This multi-agency project to develop an electronic planning and follow-up tool for demining operations, based on satellite images, included evaluation missions in Mozambique in April 2001 and Laos in June 2001. The project finished in October 2001.

APOPO (AntiPersoonsmijn-Ontmijnings Productontwikkeling): This project researching the use of "bio-sensors" (African rats) in humanitarian mine clearance operations reached the stage of field-testing in 2001. These tests, in minefields in Tanzania, produced encouraging results, with the rats proving more successful in detecting mines than dogs trained for the purpose. A validation phase in 2002 was foreseen.

HOPE (Hand-held Operational Demining System): In this multi-agency project Belgium is in charge of the program that seeks to develop a more effective mine detector. Testing was carried out in 2001 at the European Commission (EC) research center at Ispra and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A demonstration system was tested in early 2002 to see whether the project was feasible, but the army expected that two to three years and additional funding would be required to make it operational.⁴²

Multi-Sensor Mine Signature: This project, which is to construct a database of mine-signatures to support researchers testing or developing new mine detectors, is half financed by the EC research center and half by EU countries. The Belgian Royal Military Academy contributes personnel to the project.

ARIS and EUDEM 2: These networks aim to accelerate European research in humanitarian demining by giving information on progress and difficulties in ongoing research, new technologies, procedures and normalization standards. The Belgian Royal Military Academy participates in ARIS and the Free University of Brussels leads EUDEM 2.

DEMINE: This project, financed by the EC, researches a cost-efficient surface-penetrating radar detector for humanitarian demining. The Free University of Brussels participated in this project until September 2001, which will end in 2002.

SMART (Spaceborne and Airborne Mined Area Reduction Tools): This project started in May 2001 under the technical direction of the Royal Military Academy and the management of the Belgian company Trasys Space. The goal is to improve general surveys of minefields in South East Europe, by providing image analysts with tools to interpret images correctly. The project will continue through May 2004.

CLEARFAST: This new project, which started in January 2001, researches low-risk area reduction based on the fusion of advanced sensor technologies. It is funded by the EC, and the Free University of Brussels participates. It will continue through May 2003.

⁴⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2001, pp. 10-13, Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 19 November 2001, Form E, and Article 7 report submitted on 30 April 2002 for calendar year 2001, Form J.

⁴¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 619-620, for descriptions of ITEP, HUDEM, PARADIS, APOPO, HOPE, Multi-Sensor Mine Signature, and ARIS.

⁴² Information provided by the Belgian army in June 2002 and contained in email from Koen Baetens, HI Belgium, Brussels, 19 June 2002.

ARC: This new project, which started in January 2001, involves the Free University of Brussels. It aims to develop, demonstrate and promote a new system for performing technical surveys, and use a remotely-controlled helicopter (camcopter) to reduce contaminated zones. The project is EC-funded project will continue until December 2003.

NGO Activity

Handicap International Belgium organized an event in the Senate on 12 September 2001 to mark the launch of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. This was attended by the media and by many political figures including Armand De Decker, President of the Senate, Olivier Deleuze, Secretary of State for Energy and Sustainable Development, and Ambassador Lint.

In 2001, Handicap International Belgium⁴³ continued to raise public awareness of the mine issue, using its symbol of blue laces to express solidarity with mine survivors. On 5 September 2001, in an international football match between Belgium and Scotland, Belgian players wore the HI logo on their shirts and his Royal Highness King Albert II also wore the logo. Child landmine survivors from Cambodia and Senegal entered the field together with the players. A local team, KFC Wintam, also wore blue laces at matches on 6-7 October and 13-14 October. On 27 October 2001, the Belgian rugby federation played a match against Switzerland also wearing the blue laces.

On 22 February 2002, HI Belgium organized National Blue Laces Day, its annual public awareness day on the mine issue. The Belgian Scout and Guide Movement gave its support to the campaign on "Thinking Day," the day its founder, Lord Baden-Powell, was born. Several actions took place throughout Belgium, including mine awareness games provided by HI Belgium.

HI also set up a photo exhibition in the Peace House in Ghent, on 22 February-25 March 2002. The exhibition combined materials from the field (mines, prostheses, etc) with audiovisual stories of landmine victims. About 260 visitors came to see it, and workshops were organized for eight groups.

On 1 March 2002, to mark the third anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, HI sent letters to the Embassies of all States Parties in Brussels, urging Ambassadors to increase the pressure on non-signatory states, especially India and Pakistan, to join the treaty, and issued a press release.

BELIZE

Belize signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 February 1998, ratified on 23 April 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. It has not yet enacted domestic implementation legislation.¹ Belize attended the Third Meeting of States Parties, but did not participate in any intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the treaty. It submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 4 November 1999, but has not submitted any subsequent annual reports. Belize was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, but voted for similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. Belize has never used, produced, imported, or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines, including for training purposes, and is not mine-affected.²

⁴³ www.handicapinternational.be.

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted 4 November 1999, Form A (National implementation measures) response was "none."

² Article 7 Report, 4 November 1999.

BENIN

Key developments since May 2001: In March 2002, Benin established an interministerial commission to draft Mine Ban Treaty implementing legislation. France provided financial support for the establishment of a regional mine clearance training center in Benin.

Mine Ban Policy

Benin signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 25 September 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. Although the Article 7 transparency report submitted on 18 October 2000 mentioned that a commission was established in 2000 to consider national implementation measures,¹ the draft decree effectively establishing this interministerial commission was only adopted in March 2002. The commission will reportedly present draft legislation to implement the ban treaty to the National Assembly before the end of 2002.²

Benin participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001.³ Benin also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January 2002 and in May 2002.⁴ The government also attended the regional “Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention” in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001. On 29 November 2001, Benin cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, which calls for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Benin submitted its third Article 7 Report covering calendar year 2001 on 21 January 2002; it was a “nil” report. Benin has never produced, transferred, nor used antipersonnel mines. Benin does not have any stocks of antipersonnel mines, not even for training purposes.

Benin is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not adhered to the 1980 or 1996 Amended Protocol II. It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties of the Amended Protocol, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Mine Action

Benin does not have a mine problem on its territory.⁵ However, in 2000, about thirty bomb disposal experts were trained with the help of France and Belgium.⁶ From 19 October–11 December 2001, military engineers were trained in Benin by the French National Center for Humanitarian Demining.⁷ France provided further support for the establishment of a regional mine clearance training center in Ouidah for ECOWAS member states in August 2001, with a donation of €259,164 (US\$232,729).⁸

¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 56.

² Interview with Pamphile Goutondji, Deputy Director, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

³ Benin was represented by Pamphile Goutondji, Deputy Director, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

⁴ In January 2002 Benin was represented by Pamphile Goutondji, Col. Maurice Mathias Adjou-Moumouni, Judicial Technical Counselor, Ministry of Defense, and Capt. Remy Soka, Head of Investigation and Engineers Office and in May 2002 by Pamphile Goutondji.

⁵ Article 7 Report, 21 January 2002; interview with Pamphile Goutondji, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 57.

⁷ Answer to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Samuel De Beauvais, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, 27 March 2002.

⁸ Interview with Pamphile Goutondji, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Cotonou, 14 February 2002. For more information about the regional center, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 57.

BOLIVIA

Mine Ban Policy

Bolivia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, deposited its instrument of ratification on 9 June 1998, and it entered into force on 1 March 1999. Bolivia has not yet enacted any national implementation legislation.¹

Bolivia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001. The Bolivian delegation reiterated Bolivia's "commitment to the principles of the Ottawa Convention," commented on the need for international cooperation in dealing with the issue of landmines and urged States that have not yet ratified the ban treaty to do so.²

Bolivia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 8 November 1999 for the period from 1 January 1999 to 8 November 1999.³ On 28 May 2002, it submitted an Article 7 Report for calendar year 2001.⁴ Bolivia reports that it has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines and it has no stockpiles, including any mines retained for training.⁵

Bolivia cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001.

On 21 September 2001, Bolivia joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It subsequently participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

Landmine Problem

Bolivian territory is not mine-affected, but the border with Chile was mined by Chile in the 1970s, particularly in 1978 during a territorial dispute. In 2001, Bolivia provided Landmine Monitor with detailed information on the Chilean minefields near the border.⁶ Chile ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 and is currently taking steps to clear the border areas of landmines.

In September 2001, Bolivia welcomed Chile's ratification of the treaty and the measures it has taken to deal with the landmine problem, but emphasized there is still "a long road ahead before freeing this zone of anti-personnel mines that put at risk the lives of indigenous people from both countries who do not recognize borders in the mutual pursuit of food, grazing land and economic activities."⁷ It also commented on the need for "serious safety measures such as clearly marking mined areas with signs warning of the existing danger."⁸

Bolivia's Ministry of Defense has indicated that the country lacks detailed maps of mined areas on the border with Chile as these areas are in Chilean territory.⁹ In the past Bolivia has stated that the local population knows the existence of mined areas and avoids entering them.¹⁰

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Landmine Monitor, faxed by Ambassador Fernando Rojas Alaiza, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2002.

² Statement by Bolivia to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.

³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has told Landmine Monitor that Bolivia also submitted an Article 7 Report for the period from 8 November 1999 to 30 April 2001. It has not been posted on the website of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Landmine Monitor, 10 May 2002.

⁴ The report was still pending input from the United Nations as *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* went to print, so Landmine Monitor did not have access to the report.

⁵ Article 7 Report, 8 November 1999; Ministry of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, faxed by Ambassador Jorge Soruco Villanueva, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2001.

⁶ For further details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 277; Article 7 Report, 8 November 1999; Ministry of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, 22 March 2001.

⁷ Statement by Bolivia to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ministry of Defense response to Landmine Monitor, 10 May 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, 8 November 1999; Ministry of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, 22 March 2001.

Mine Action and Landmine Survivors

Bolivia told Landmine Monitor that it has not offered help to Chile in the demining of the border, and there are no contacts on this issue between the Bolivian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces and their Chilean counterparts.¹¹ In 2001, it was reported that deputies from Bolivia and Chile met for two days in Cochabamba, Bolivia to discuss demining of the border areas, and issued a joint declaration on the matter.¹² A second meeting on the demining of the border was planned in Valparaíso, but as of June 2002 had still not taken place.

In 2002, Bolivia provided three military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA mine clearance efforts by the OAS in Central America.¹³ It provided two supervisors in the year 2000.

While it is difficult to obtain information on landmine incidents, authorities told Landmine Monitor that there were no landmine casualties along the border in 2001 or first quarter of 2002. On 26 May 2000, the first recorded Bolivian landmine casualty since 1997 occurred.¹⁴

Basic health services exist in the border area, while more specialized health services, including surgery, are found in the capitals of departments such as La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí.¹⁵ Bolivia has policies in place for people with disabilities, including Law 1678 of 15 December 1995, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that no official records are kept to confirm whether landmine survivors receive the benefits stipulated by this law.¹⁶

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Key developments since May 2001: A new demining law was approved in February 2002. Donors provided \$16.6 million in mine action funding in 2001. Demining operations cleared 5.5 to 6 million square meters of land in 2001, and 73.5 million square meters of land were surveyed. A national Landmine Impact Survey is expected to start in November 2002. There were 87 mine and UXO casualties in 2001, a reduction from 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)¹ signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. BiH reported on 20 May 2002 that a “special law” prohibiting use and production of antipersonnel mines was in the process of creation and “should be completed by autumn 2002.”² The Demining Commission stated that it was working on a first draft and would do its utmost to have the new law adopted by the end of 2002.³ Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information of the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC), told Landmine Monitor that the possession, production, storage, and use of antipersonnel mines was already criminalized as “any other explosive device” by existing law in BiH.⁴

¹¹ Ministry of Defense response to Landmine Monitor, 10 May 2002.

¹² “Chile y Bolivia levantarán de su frontera minas antipersonales”, *El Tribuno* (Salta, Argentina), 28 January 2001.

¹³ “Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America,” Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

¹⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 280.

¹⁵ Ministry of Defense Response to Landmine Monitor, 22 March 2001.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Response to Landmine Monitor, 10 May 2002.

¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) consists of two “Entities,” the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS).

² Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 May 2002.

³ Interview with Dragisa Stankovic and Franjo Markota, members of the Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 31 January 2002. In its April 2002 report to the OSCE, BiH said, “It is expected that the Ministry for Civil Affairs and Communications will finalize a draft Law in a near future.”

⁴ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 December 2001.

After long delays, BiH adopted a Demining Law on 12 February 2002.⁵ The UN High Representative described the importance of the new legislation: “This legislation will strengthen the Demining Commission, creating a single focal point that will represent BiH demining operations in its relations with the international community. The law will authorize BHMACE to implement the same standards for demining across BiH, and for the first time offer protection to deminers by defining their responsibilities and rights in line with international standards.”⁶ The law entered into force in March 2002.

BiH attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Nicaragua. On 29 November 2001, BiH cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. BiH participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

BiH submitted its third Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report on 20 May 2002.⁷ It submitted its annual report on landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 26 April 2002.⁸

BiH is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but did not submit a national annual report in December 2001. BiH did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001, but did attend the subsequent CCW Second Review Conference.

Production and Transfer

BiH has not reported the date on which it ceased production of antipersonnel mines. There is no evidence of production or transfer of antipersonnel mines since entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March 1999. About half of the former Yugoslavia’s defense production was located in BiH, with substantial mine production at factories in Gorazde, Vogosca, and Bugojno.

BiH’s first Article 7 Report on 1 February 2000 stated that BiH “has not completed the planning process appertaining to the conversion or decommissioning of APM production facilities. The work is intended to be undertaken this year (2000) and will be reported on as and when the plans are completed.”⁹ BiH’s two subsequent Article 7 Reports state that “the Bugojno factory has destroyed all the equipment used in mine production,” but do not refer to the other former production facilities.¹⁰

Requested to supply the missing information, two members of the Demining Commission stated in January 2002 that all production facilities had been decommissioned.¹¹ The same month, the director of the Gorazde factory confirmed that it did previously produce antipersonnel mines (contradicting an earlier denial by the Federation Defense Minister)¹² and added that its production facilities remain in place.¹³

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 May 2002.

⁶ “The High Representative Appeals for Urgent Passage of State/Level Demining Legislation,” Press Release, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, 5 February 2002.

⁷ This Article 7 Report covers the period from January 1996 to 30 April 2002. BiH’s initial Article 7 Report was submitted on 1 February 2000, for the period 8 March 1999 to 1 February 2000, and its second Article 7 Report was submitted on 1 September 2001, for the period January 1996 to 1 September 2001.

⁸ Telephone interview with Amira Aripovic, Department for Peace and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sarajevo, 30 April 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form E, 1 February 2000. For details of past production, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 553-554.

¹⁰ Article 7 Reports, Form E, 1 September 2001 and 20 May 2002.

¹¹ Interview with Dragisa Stankovic and Franjo Markota, members of the Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 31 January 2002.

¹² Letter from Brig. Haso Ribo, Federation Ministry of Defense, 21 April 2000.

¹³ Interview with Jusuf Hubjer, Director, Unis-Ginex, Gorazde, 25 January 2002.

Stockpile Destruction

Destruction of antipersonnel mine stockpiles was completed by November 1999, with a total of 460,727 mines destroyed.¹⁴ In addition to those mines, BiH reports the ongoing destruction of mines acquired in mine clearance operations and collected by the Entity Armies, civil protection teams, and the international Stabilization Forces' (SFOR) Operation Harvest. By 1 September 2001, a total of 71,829 antipersonnel mines acquired or collected in these ways were destroyed, and by 30 April 2002 the total had increased to 73,703.¹⁵

BiH's initial Article 7 Report of February 2000 noted a total of 2,165 antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3 for training and development purposes.¹⁶ The two later Article 7 Reports of September 2001 and May 2002 note a total of 2,405 mines retained. The bigger total includes fuzeless mines and fuzes not reported initially, as well as an additional 20 PMR-21 antipersonnel mines.¹⁷

A BHMAC official told Landmine Monitor that some of the discrepancies in the Article 7 Reports were due to the lack of continuity between the previous and current Demining Commission. He added that with the new Demining Law, the current Demining Commission will be able to demand more complete information.¹⁸

According to the Article 7 Reports, neither the Republika Srpska nor the Federation entity has expended any of the retained mines since entry into force; no details of the planned purposes for which they are being retained have been reported.

Use

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 included a number of reports of possible use of antipersonnel mines in BiH, particularly in relation to suspected attempts by Bosnian Serbs in southern Bosnia to prevent the return of Bosnian Muslim refugees. In December 2001 and January 2002, BiH officials stated that there was no evidence of new emplacement of antipersonnel landmines.¹⁹ In February 2002, a Croat in the town of Travnik, who had returned there a few days before, was seriously injured by a mine. The Office of the High Representative stated that "if this was a return-related incident, we strongly condemn it, and that is why we are for a fast and efficient investigation."²⁰ On 20 February 2002, unknown people mined the house of the former police crime department head in Bileca, in the southeast of Republika Srpska.²¹

Caches of munitions including mines have been discovered. In October 2001, the international Stabilization Force found two illegal weapons caches, including antitank mines, in underground bunkers near the east Bosnian town of Han Pijesak.²² Other caches of mines and munitions were found in southeastern Bosnia, near Kopaci, in March 2002 and near Dobož in April

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form G.1, 1 February 2000. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 590-591.

¹⁵ Article 7 Reports, Forms F, 1 September 2001 and 20 May 2002.

¹⁶ However, the subtotals reported for each type of mine add up to 2,145. Article 7 Report, Form D, February 2000.

¹⁷ Article 7 Reports, Forms D, February 2000, 1 September 2001 and 20 May 2002.

¹⁸ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 December 2001. He explained the first Article 7 Report was written by a technical advisor to the previous Demining Commission. When a BHMAC official prepared the later Article 7 Reports, the records of the previous Commission were not made available.

¹⁹ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Information Director, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 December 2001; email from Bojan Vukovic, Mine Risk Education Officer, RSMAC, 29 January 2002.

²⁰ "Daily Media Monitoring Summary, Wednesday, 20 February 2002," UN Mission in BiH.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² "More Illegal Weapons Found," *Kathimerini* (Greek newspaper, English-language internet edition), 31 October 2001; "Bosnia: Monthly Report to the United Nations on the Operations of the Stabilization Force," UN Security Council, 4 January 2002, www.reliefweb.int, accessed on 18 February 2002.

2002.²³ In July 2002, it was reported in the press that “significantly more weapons and ammunition” were collected by SFOR “this year as compared to last year.... This year, Bosnians have turned in 18,666 hand grenades, 2,826 mines, 4,893 small arms....”²⁴

Landmine Problem

The BHMAL has described BiH as probably the most heavily mined country in Europe following extensive use of landmines, especially antipersonnel mines, during the 1991-1995 war. A considerable quantity of unexploded ordnance (UXO) also affects the country.²⁵ The BHMAL described the situation as “a threat which is generally low density and random in nature. The total area potentially affected is in the order of 4,000 square kilometers and the bulk of it still requires survey in order to determine the finite extent of the problem.”²⁶

By 30 April 2002, BHMAL had recorded 18,228 minefields. However, it estimates the probable total number to be 30,000, containing approximately one million mines.²⁷ BHMAL also estimates that two million items of UXO are still unlocated.²⁸

Number of Recorded Minefields²⁹

Administrative Area	at 30 April 2002
Federation	13,538
- Central Bosnia	2,209
- Neretva	1,402
- Posavina	436
- Sarajevo	1,772
- Tomislavgrad	767
- Tuzla	2,903
- Una Sana	1,651
- Zenica Doboј	255
- Gorazde	2,143
Republika Srpska	4,690
Total BiH	18,228

BHMAL explains that there has been no complete national survey, and these records refer only to known minefields. More minefields are being discovered from better reporting and from clearance activity. In the middle and southern part of BiH, most mines were randomly laid by soldiers not trained for orderly laying of mines and accurate record-keeping; many of the minefield records are therefore nonexistent or useless. BHMAL has received no minefield reports from the Serb army for the areas around Sarajevo and Gorazde.³⁰

²³ “NATO Finds Illegal Munitions in Southeastern Bosnia,” *Kathimerini* (Greek newspaper, English-language internet edition), 14 March 2002; “Crates of Mines, Other Explosives Found in Bosnia,” *European Stars and Stripes*, 20 April 2002.

²⁴ “Bosnians Hand in More Weapons to Collection Program,” *Kathimerini* (English-language Greek newspaper, internet edition), 17 July 2002.

²⁵ For a full description of the landmine problem, see “Mine Situation in BiH,” www.bhmac.org, and “The Mine Problem,” www.bhmac.org/fed/opis.htm.

²⁶ BHMAL, “BHMAL Mine Action 2002,” January 2002, p. 2.

²⁷ Article 7 Report, Form C, 20 April 2002; BHMAL database www.bhmac.org/bhmac/info/statistics/statistics_e.htm, accessed on 4 January 2002. The estimate of one million mines is based upon 307,000 records in the BHMAL database of mines planted by the Entity Armies. It is estimated the Armies laid 700,000 mines and an estimated 300,000 mines were laid by civilians without any reporting. “BHMAL Mine Action 2002,” January 2002.

²⁸ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 21 February 2002.

²⁹ Article 7 Reports, Forms C, 1 February 2000, 1 September 2001, and 20 May 2002; interview with Filip Filipovic, Director, BHMAL, 8 March 2001.

³⁰ Interview with Ahdin Orahovic, Director, Federation MAC, Sarajevo, 12 March 2002.

Survey and Assessment

The amount of land surveyed increased in 2001, although it was previously reported that survey teams were reduced due to lack of funding. In 2001, 73,475,085 square meters of land were covered by survey, bringing the total area surveyed since 1998 to 212,000,000 square meters.³¹ In 2000, 70,697,945 square meters were surveyed. In 1999, only 573,299 square meters were surveyed due to concentration on testing and demining.³² BHMAC has confirmed that these data refer to both general survey and technical survey; BHMAC has not recorded separate statistics for each.³³

The Mine Action Center in the Federation entity reported that during 2001 a significant innovation was introduced, the systematic survey, to determine the position, size and borders of mine suspected locations, and their level of risk and impact on the population. This was implemented because existing data is not precise enough to plan mine action of good quality and secure funding for it.³⁴

The Survey Action Center (SAC) mission to BiH in 2000 was reviewed in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. SAC recommended major revisions to information management systems, a Landmine Impact Survey, and conversion to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system. Mine Action Center staff were unwilling to change information management practices substantially or conduct a Landmine Impact Survey. Instead, a consultant reviewed existing systems and made recommendations in a report, *A Study of the Information Management Needs of the BiH Mine Action Centre*, dated 21 May 2001.³⁵ BHMAC stated in April 2002 that it will retain its existing information management system but make it XML- and IMSMA-compatible. It will be linked with, though not made part of, the Geographic Information System.³⁶

However, international donors directed that the recommended Landmine Impact Survey should go ahead. At the Board of Donors meeting on 20 March 2002, the US representative said, "With funds channeled through the ITF, the United States and the European Union have agreed to fund a Landmine Impact Survey, using the Survey Action Center as the implementing partner."³⁷ SAC carried out an advance survey mission in early 2002. The SAC will contract with Handicap International, Cranfield University and Geo-Spatial to conduct the survey and follow-on planning. The survey will begin in November 2002 and should take approximately 8-10 months, with a report issued within a year from the start of the survey itself.³⁸

Coordination and Planning of Mine Action

At the national level, the new demining law establishes the BiH Demining Commission as the central body for demining activities, with responsibility for implementing the long-term task of mine clearance in BiH. The Commission is located within the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication, and is responsible to this ministry for its work. The BiH Mine Action Center is the technical service of the Demining Commission, established by the BiH Council of Ministers. BHMAC will have offices in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. At the international level, the Board of

³¹ "BiH Clearance-Survey Data: Surveyed Area 2001 Correct at 01 January 2002," www.bhmac.org/bhmac/info/statistics/ accessed 19 February 2002; interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC 15 February 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 634.

³² "BiH Clearance-Survey Data: Surveyed Area 2000;" interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC, 13 December 2001.

³³ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 4 June 2002.

³⁴ "Report for the Year 2001. FMAC, Sarajevo, January 2002," pp. 3, 13-14, provided by Ahdin Orahovac, Director, Federation Mine Action Center, 12 March 2002.

³⁵ Interview with David Rowe, Program Manager and Strategic Advisor, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 February 2002. The report is available at www.gichd.ch. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 636.

³⁶ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 12 April 2002.

³⁷ "United States Statement on Demining Funding," Board of Donors, Sarajevo, 20 March 2002, document provided by Alan Carlson, Second Secretary, US Embassy, Sarajevo.

³⁸ Email from Survey Action Center to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 30 July 2002.

Donors has the function of supporting the work of the Demining Commission and BHMAL. The new law states that the Board of Donors will consist of the UN Development Program (UNDP), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and other donor representatives.³⁹

The Demining Law also regulates the implementation of demining operations in accordance with the mine action plan approved by the Commission in cooperation with the Board of Donors. BHMAL is responsible for formulating and proposing the mine action plan, which must be approved by the Council of Ministers. A Tender Commission will be appointed by the Demining Commission to regulate the tender process and ensure that it is transparent. The new law regulates working conditions for deminers, including working hours per day and rest between shifts. BHMAL will accredit deminers, who must be trained in accordance with BiH standards.⁴⁰

A draft "Demining Strategy Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Year of 2010" was presented to the Board of Donors on 20 March 2002. The strategy aims to complete demining of first priority land by 2010. The draft Strategy states that to realize these aims by 2010, the cost will be KM657,500,000 (US\$313 million) or €333 million.⁴¹ In 2002, 5.5 percent of demining expenditure will be provided from the State and Entity budgets. In 2003, it is planned that this will increase to 10 percent, and every following year increase by 5 percent so that by 2009 BiH will be funding 40 percent of the cost of demining in total. After 2010, this will increase to 70 percent.⁴²

The draft plan remains under discussion. Final approval is dependent on the Landmine Impact Survey.⁴³

In addition to the BHMAL, there are Entity Mine Action Centers (EMALs) – the Federation MAC (FMAL) and the Republika Srpska MAC (RSMAL).⁴⁴ The BHMAL workplan for 2002 includes prioritization of 1,055 tasks for general survey (FMAL 700, RSMAL 355), general surveying of 1,500 locations (FMAL 1,000, RSMAL 500) and 900 demining projects (FMAL 600, RSMAL 300). A general survey will also be performed on 34 million square meters of risk area (FMAL 26 million square meters, RSMAL 8 million) and on 51 million square meters without obvious risk (FMAL 34 million square meters, RSMAL 17 million) making a total of 85 million square meters of general surveyed area.⁴⁵

Mine Action Funding

Funding of mine action in BiH has been primarily channeled through the UNDP or the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). Some of contributions are directed to mine action operations (predominantly demining), while some were channeled via UNDP for support to the three Mine Action Centers. The government has made an in-kind contribution to mine clearance by payment of salaries of Entity Army demining teams and tax exemption for demining organizations.

³⁹ Demining Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the Official Gazette, number 5, year vi, on 12 March 2002.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Exchange rates at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$ 0.898, and at 1 April 2002: US\$1 = KM2.1, used throughout.

⁴² "Demining Strategy Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Year of 2010, Draft," document provided by Ahdin Orahovac, Director, Federation MAC, Sarajevo, 22 March 2002.

⁴³ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Assistant Director of Information, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 4 June 2002.

⁴⁴ For details of the structure in 2001 of BiH and Entity Mine Action Centers, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 626-628.

⁴⁵ "BHMAL Mine Action 2002," January 2002.

Mine Action Funding 1995-2001 (US\$)⁴⁶

Donor	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Year Total:	3,159,427	17,914,434	5,781,387	20,803,120	23,018,780	16,175,841	16,567,864

There was a severe funding crisis in 2001, particularly for the MACs, at least in part due to lingering lack of donor confidence.⁴⁷ Funding in 2001 totaled \$16.6 million, while the UNDP estimated that approximately \$23 million per year was needed for demining activities in BiH and an additional \$3 million to maintain the Mine Action Centers.⁴⁸ The funding crisis for the MACs has apparently stabilized. The UNDP project in BiH ends in mid-2003, by which time it is expected that the government will cover all staff costs for the MACs, with international donors funding only the operational costs of demining.⁴⁹

In February 2002, the UNDP confirmed that the total amount of planned funding for the Mine Action Centers via the UNDP for the two-year period July 2001 - June 2003 is \$3,058,503, with contributions by Canada, Slovenia, Sweden, UK, and the US (all via the ITF) and directly to UNDP from Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea.⁵⁰

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, set up by Slovenia, is a favored funding vehicle for international donors, as donations received by the ITF are doubled by US matching funds before being distributed to countries in South Eastern Europe.

Funding of mine action in BiH by the ITF declined in 2001. The ITF allocated \$8,305,216 to mine action in BiH in 2001 (representing 32.5 percent of its funding of mine action in South East Europe).⁵¹ This is a decrease from the previous year (\$11,115,576 or 52 percent of ITF spending). In 2002, it is planned to allocate 28.6 percent of ITF funds to BiH.⁵²

In 2001, 17 percent of the ITF allocation to BiH was directed to UNDP for support of the MACs (stated by the ITF to be \$1,382,041). Demining received 76 percent (87 percent in 2000), rehabilitation received 5 percent and other mine victim assistance programs 2 percent (compared to 13 percent on all victim assistance in 2000).⁵³

The United States in fiscal year 2001 contributed \$5,160,600 to mine action in BiH, all via the ITF.⁵⁴ For calendar year 2002, planned US contributions total \$5,245,000. Of this, \$3.2 million is designated for commercial and NGO mine clearance, and nearly \$1.2 million for victim assistance. The US also plans to support a regional dog training and operations center in BiH in 2002.⁵⁵

Canada contributed Can\$1,708,643 (\$1,106,159) for various programs and periods in BiH in 2001, including Can\$522,000 (\$337,938) for mine clearance (by the entity armies, and the Akcija

⁴⁶ "Multi-year Recipient Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina," UN Mine Action Service Mine Investments database, www.mineaction.org, accessed on 26 July 2002. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reports Canadian funding to total Can\$1,708,643 (\$1,106,159) in 2001 (email from Lisanne Garceau-Bedner, CIDA, to Landmine Monitor, 20 June 2002).

⁴⁷ The High Representative in October 2000 dismissed three members of the Demining Commission on charges of corruption and abuse of authority, dissolved the Commission and reconstituted it with new members.

⁴⁸ Statement by Henrik Kolstrup, UNDP Resident Representative, at the Mine Action Program of BiH Board of Donors meeting, Sarajevo, 12 March 2001, and on 29 March 2001 at a briefing session in New York: see UN press release, 30 March 2001, www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page2.html.

⁴⁹ Interview with Jusuf Tanovic, Program Officer, Mine Action Program, UNDP, Sarajevo, 16 January 2002. For details of the UNDP Trust Fund for Mine Clearance in BiH, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 631-632.

⁵⁰ Email from Jusuf Tanovic, Program Officer, Mine Action Program, UNDP, 15 February 2002.

⁵¹ Email from Eva Veble, ITF, 12 March 2002.

⁵² "Plan of ITF Activities for the Year 2002," *Newsletter* No. 8, ITF, April 2002, p. 5.

⁵³ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 19; email from Eva Veble, ITF, to Landmine Monitor, 5 June 2002.

⁵⁴ Email from Alan Carlson, Second Secretary, US Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2002.

⁵⁵ "United States Statement on Demining Funding," Board of Donors meeting, Sarajevo, 20 March 2002.

Protiv Mine and Norwegian People's Aid), Can\$119,175 (\$77,153) for mine detection dog training, Can\$472,708 (\$306,026) for two victim assistance programs, and Can\$570,100 (\$369,077) via the UNDP to support the Mine Action Centers. For 2002, Canada budgeted Can\$914,607 (\$592,107), including Can\$172,502 (\$111,675) for mine clearance, Can\$253,637 (\$164,202) for mine detection dog training, Can\$177,000 (\$114,588) for two victim assistance programs, and Can\$290,000 (\$187,743) via UNDP to support the Mine Action Centers. All Canadian funding is channeled through the ITF, which deducts an administration fee from the annual totals.⁵⁶

Italy provided €224,142 (\$201,279) for UN International Children's Fund (UNICEF) mine awareness programs and €245,160 (\$220,154) for mine clearance carried out by the Italian NGO Intersos.⁵⁷

Norway provided NOK14,469,179 (\$1,721,325) to Norwegian People's Aid for manual mine clearance and NOK4,746,525 (\$564,670) for mechanical clearance, both through the ITF. Additionally NOK500,000 (\$59,482) was donated to the MAC structure through UNDP.⁵⁸

Austria funded the International Committee of the Red Cross in BiH with ATS1,888,696 (\$123,710).⁵⁹

Mine Clearance

According to the BHMAL database, in 2001 a total of 5,545,005 square meters of land were cleared, and 3,113 mines and 2,675 items of UXO were found and destroyed.⁶⁰ BHMAL reports that in 2000, a total of 7,111,000 square meters of land was cleared, with 5,797 mines and 3,408 UXO found and destroyed.⁶¹

According to a member of the Demining Commission, "At present BiH is using only 30 percent of its demining capacity. The country has a capacity of 2,000 deminers, but only 600 of them are presently engaged, and they are not even 100 percent engaged."⁶²

Analysis of the clearance organizations responsible reveals that 49 percent was cleared by commercial companies, 26 percent by NGOs, 16 percent by Entity Armies and 9 percent by civil protection forces. Compared with 2000, commercial companies cleared less in 2001, and all others cleared larger proportions. There were 44 mine clearance organizations accredited to work in BiH in 2001 (32 in 2000).⁶³

Housing accounted for the greatest proportion of land cleared in 2001 (51 percent compared with 47 percent in 2000), agriculture for a smaller proportion (15 percent compared with 20 percent in 2000), and electric power for a lower proportion (7 percent compared with 17 percent in 2000).⁶⁴

The aggregate amount of land reported cleared in 2001 by the two Entities is 5,964,385 square meters, or 419,380 square meters more than the figure provided by BHMAL.

⁵⁶ Email from Lisanne Garceau-Bedner, Canadian International Development Agency, to Landmine Monitor, 20 June 2002 (US\$ equivalents as supplied by CIDA); CIDA website: www.acdi-cida.gc.ca, accessed on 27 March 2002; email from Emil Baran, Canadian Embassy, Sarajevo, 21 March 2002.

⁵⁷ "Italy 2001 Mine Clearance, Rehabilitation and Victim Assistance Programs," document distributed at the intersectoral Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, February 2002; email from Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, 13 June 2002.

⁵⁸ Email from Marie Louise Teige, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 23 January 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: NOK 1 = US\$ 0.119, used throughout.

⁵⁹ Email from Judith Majlath, Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, 8 March 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: ATS 1 = US\$ 0.0655, used throughout.

⁶⁰ BHMAL, "BiH Clearance-Survey Data 2001 Correct at 01 January 2002," www.bhmal.org, accessed on 20 February 2002.

⁶¹ Interview with Filip Filipovic, Director of BHMAL, Sarajevo, 8 March 2001.

⁶² Interview with Dragisa Stankovic, member of the Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 8 February 2002.

⁶³ BHMAL, "Clearance-Survey Data 2001 Correct at 01 January 2002;" list of accredited organizations available on www.bhmal.org/bhmal/coordination/documents, accessed on 4 January 2002.

⁶⁴ BHMAL, "Clearance-Survey Data 2001." For comparison, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 637; some categories of land-use have changed.

Federation of BiH

In this entity, the target for mine clearance in 2001 was 10 million square meters; the actual achievement was 4,425,189 square meters. On 246 demining sites (including 418 houses), a total of 2,529 antipersonnel mines, 73 antitank mines, and 2,246 items of UXO were found and destroyed. Clearance achievements were similar in 2000.⁶⁵

The Federation Mine Action Center reported that its army demining unit, with 19 teams at 16 demining sites, cleared 765,270 square meters in 2001, exceeding its target of 670,000 square meters.⁶⁶ In 2001, civil protection forces in the Federation cleared 358,147 square meters.⁶⁷

Republika Srpska

The RSMAC reported that in 2001 a total of 1,539,196 square meters of land was demined in 112 tasks, with 147 houses cleared, and 528 antipersonnel mines, 106 antitank mines and 397 UXO found.⁶⁸ The RSMAC reported that the RS army demined 188,759 square meters in 19 demining tasks in 2001, with five houses cleared, 183 antipersonnel mines, no antitank mines and 88 UXO found.⁶⁹ In 2001, civil protection forces in Republika Srpska cleared 121,079 square meters.⁷⁰

NGOs and Commercial Demining Companies

The total area reported cleared by ITF-funded NGOs and commercial companies in BiH in 2001 was 3,001,837 square meters, during which 1,875 mines and 896 UXO were destroyed. This compares to 3.9 million square meters cleared in 2000.⁷¹ NGO demining operations accounted for 1,197,404 square meters of the 2001 total.⁷² In 2001, there were 26 commercial demining companies accredited to work in BiH.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has carried out mine/UXO clearance and other mine action projects in BiH since 1996. In 1997, NPA teams moved to Sarajevo canton. In 2001-2002, NPA teams re-focused on more rural areas, with some work continuing in suburban parts of Sarajevo. Although most minefields in BiH are low-density, there is a high-density minefield on the outskirts of Sarajevo on which NPA has been working. This has an area of 3,113 square meters and contains 889 antipersonnel mines; in one particularly intensive day, NPA located 194 mines here. NPA has introduced new task impact assessment procedures, which include socio-economic evaluation of mine clearance carried out (described as Level 4 survey). NPA employs 167 people in its mine action programs in BiH, including six platoons of manual deminers, a mine detection dog project, a small mechanical demining team, and EOD, technical survey and medical teams. It also carries out mine risk education and is involved in research programs into mine clearance.⁷³

The Italian NGO, Intersos, has undertaken to clear 40,000 square meters of the Famos industrial complex in Hrasnica, Sarajevo canton, from January to December 2002. This land is highly contaminated with low metal content PMA-3 mines and the ground contains ferrous

⁶⁵ "Federal Report for the year 2001," Federal Mine Action Centre, Sarajevo, January 2002, and "Federal Report for 2000," Federal Mine Action Centre, January 2001.

⁶⁶ Federal Mine Action Centre Bulletin, January – September 2001, p.3, and "Demining Operations Review for the Area of the Federation and D.C. Brcko of BiH in 2001," available at www.bhmac.org/fed/s12.htm, accessed on 4 March 2002.

⁶⁷ "Demining Operations Review for the Area of the Federation and D.C. Brcko of BiH in 2001," available at www.bhmac.org/fed/s12.htm, accessed on 4 March 2002; "Report for 2000 FMAC, Sarajevo January 2001," document provided by Ahdin Orahovac, Director, Federation Mine Action Center, Sarajevo, 12 March 2002.

⁶⁸ Email from Bobella Stevkovic, Information Officer, RSMAC, Banja Luka, 3 June 2002.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ "Demining Operations Review for the Area of the Federation and D.C. Brcko of BiH in 2001;" "Report for 2000 FMAC, Sarajevo January 2001."

⁷¹ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 24.

⁷² Email from Eva Veble, Head of International Relations, ITF, 12 March 2002.

⁷³ NPA, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," Humanitarian Mine Action 2002 (undated).

material, making location of mines with metal detectors very difficult. Clearance is almost wholly manual, and local deminers are involved.⁷⁴

The Canadian International Demining Corps has since 1999 trained and supplied 40 mine detection dogs and their Bosnian handlers for deployment in mine clearance operations throughout Bosnia. Thirty-four dogs are accredited and operational as of mid-2002.⁷⁵

Mine Risk Education

There was no national policy on mine risk education in BiH through 2001, but it is included in the 10-year national plan of mine action.⁷⁶ Mine risk education in BiH has been carried out by international organizations, mainly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNDP, UNICEF, foreign and national NGOs and aid organizations, entity/cantonal ministries of education, entity Red Cross organizations, SFOR, BHMAL, and the Entity Mine Action Centers.

BHMAL has a coordinating role, responsible for training and standards, while the EMALs are responsible for mine risk education in their areas, including training. A meeting and training course organized by BHMAL in 2001 identified the lack of uniform approach as a problem for mine risk education in BiH.⁷⁷ The BHMAL course identified the future challenge as improving and strengthening the present structure, coordinating more efficiently and integrating into a uniform system, while taking into account the funding available.⁷⁸

All primary schools in BiH are supposed to conduct six mine risk education lessons each school year, but this depends on the location of each school and other factors such as recognition of the need and an overloaded school curriculum.⁷⁹

RSMAL. In 2001, the mine awareness section in RSMAL did 45 presentations in schools and small communities, attended by 1,770 people, including returnees. The RSMAL mine risk education working group met eight times in 2001. A four-day training course for instructors was held in Jahorina in May 2001; 25 people attended, mainly scouts and mountaineers. UNDP, Handicap International, and the ICRC supported the training financially. A four-day course for the police took place in December 2001 in Banja Luka, with 31 policeman from both Entities attending. They were trained to conduct mine risk education programs in elementary and high schools. In 2001, 147 newspaper articles on mine awareness were published in the daily and weekly newspapers in Republika Srpska.⁸⁰

FMAL. In 2001, there were eight meetings of the mine risk education coordination group in the Federation. Activities included the mine risk education of 2,695 people from high risk areas, distribution of material through the UNDP mine risk education campaign (18,469 posters, 200 leaflets, 160,390 schedules for children, 46,033 badges, 1,656 T-shirts, 18,106 notebooks), a 5-day course for instructors from mountain associations, and 338 lectures by 10 FMAL instructors.⁸¹

UNICEF. The mine risk education activities described in the previous Landmine Monitor continued in 2001. UNICEF's general objectives for 2002-2004 are capacity-building within the BiH government and communities to prevent children becoming casualties of mine incidents and strengthen coordination of mine action programs. As part of this, major activities will be support of local initiatives and innovative approaches on how to live with mines, and developing a community action kit with tools for community prevention of mine injuries with training of selected

⁷⁴ Email from Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, 13 June 2002.

⁷⁵ Email from CIDC to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 30 July 2002.

⁷⁶ Interview with Nermin Hadzimujagic, Assistant Director of Coordination, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 5 March 2002.

⁷⁷ "The Mine Awareness Structure in BiH – Status And Problems," BHMAL, FMAL and RSMAL Report on Mine Awareness Course, pp. 4-5, July 2001, provided by Nermin Hadzimujagic, Assistant Director of Coordination, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 5 March 2002.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Interviews with Vanja Bojinovic, Mine Awareness Coordinator, ICRC, Sarajevo, 2 April 2001 and 26 February 2002.

⁸⁰ Email from Bojan Vukovic, Mine Risk Education Officer, RSMAL, 29 January 2002.

⁸¹ Interview with Ahdin Orahovac, Director of FMAL, Sarajevo, 25 February 2002.

communities on how to use the kits.⁸² The overall budget for this three-year project was \$445,000.⁸³

ICRC.⁸⁴ The ICRC, in close cooperation with Red Cross organizations in both entities, continues to carry out mine- and UXO- risk education activities countrywide. Community-based activities are implemented through a countrywide network of trained Red Cross mine risk education instructors targeting high-risk groups of local residents (farmers, hunters, fishermen, woodcutters and others), returnees, internally displaced people, and children. The ICRC has also focused on building up the capacity of Republika Srpska to respond adequately to the needs of affected communities. In 2001, over 4,000 presentations and about 5,600 group discussions, involving 96 instructors, were organized for some 107,000 participants.

The ICRC also has a data-gathering function in BiH. By working at community level it continues to collect data on mine/UXO casualties, and the statistics are help to shape the ICRC's mine action policies. The statistics are published and shared with other organizations working on mine awareness, victim assistance, demining, and the return process.

The Local Initiative program is designed to support initiatives originating at the grassroots level and encourage community members to help find answers to the mine/UXO problem. Some projects are entirely conceived and implemented by local Red Cross branches, such as the simulated minefield organized in Tuzla. Other local initiatives involved simple leaflets with messages specific to mines/UXO in the area and safe behavior, in Kupres, Modrica and Vukosavlje municipalities.

Mine risk education work with returnees has increased as the return process has gathered pace, including cross-entity sharing of information and cooperation, joint presentations and discussions on mine-related issues in the Gorazde, Tuzla, Doboj, Zenica and Birac area. Presentations were organized for returnees in all 29 tent settlements in the Gorazde area.

Red Cross Youth associations organized training for their members in Trebinje region, Una-Sana and Sarajevo cantons. Youth activists performed the mine awareness play "Little Red Riding Hood" throughout Una-Sana canton. For children with special needs, video tapes of the play, comic books on mine awareness and audio tapes were delivered to 23 schools for children with special needs.

In secondary schools the ICRC has introduced a mine risk education program as an out-of-school activity, with much support from the entity-level ministries of education. In the Federation, four training seminars were organized in September and October 2001 targeting secondary school teachers from the cantons of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Herceg-Bosna, Zenica-Doboj, and Tuzla. In Republika Srpska, at the ICRC's initiative, teachers in five secondary schools introduced questionnaires on mine danger into the classroom.

UNDP.⁸⁵ Evaluation of mine risk education effectiveness from 27 April to mid-September 2001 found a "measured increase in the level of awareness of the dangers posed by mines and UXO in the target population in both BiH entities as a direct result of the media campaign." Additionally, the independent assessment detected "a clear increase in the level of knowledge of the prescribed mine safe behaviors in the target population" and concluded, "the UNDP mine and UXO awareness campaign was effective and successful."

For 2002, the UNDP considered two mine risk education initiatives: a two-month extension of the 2001 media campaign, re-broadcasting animated short films and printing a limited number of

⁸² "Mine Injuries in Children. Plan of Action 2002-2004," UNICEF, provided by Berina Arslanagic and Helena Eversole, assistant representatives, UNICEF, Sarajevo, March 2002.

⁸³ "Mine Injury Prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina," UNICEF, (undated), available at www.mineaction.org, accessed on 1 July 2002.

⁸⁴ Email from Pascal Cuttat, Head of ICRC in BiH, 7 February 2002 and meetings with Vanja Bojinovic, Mine Risk Education Coordinator, ICRC, Sarajevo, 26 February 2002.

⁸⁵ Emails from Jusuf Tanovic, Program Officer, Mine Action Program, UNDP, Sarajevo, 15 and 20 February 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 645.

support materials for schoolchildren, and co-sponsoring the mine awareness seminar for journalists in March.

*Other.*⁸⁶ In 2001-2002, several other organizations were involved in mine risk education activities, including:

- *APM- Bihac and Handicap International* trained primary school teachers to be mine risk education instructors. In 2001 they completed this work in all Federation cantons, educating 26,742 people (1,525 teachers and 25,217 children) and distributed 350 sets of mine risk education materials.
- *PRONI* works on education of young people in Brcko district area and northern Federation. In 2001 six mine risk education instructors gave 186 presentations to 6,990 people, and distributed 906 posters, 600 leaflets, 7,200 brochures, 1,700 badges, and 50 t-shirts.
- *Mountain Roof Association BiH* has been educated by the Federation MAC to conduct mine awareness instruction, with eight instructors who gave 13 lectures to 330 people in 2001. They also distributed 1,800 posters, 6,000 brochures, 3,000 badges, 120 t-shirts and 300 notebooks.
- *Mountain Roof Association HB* was also trained by the Federation MAC to conduct mine risk education instruction, with six instructors who gave five lectures to 50 people in 2001. They also distributed 900 posters, 3,000 brochures, 150 badges, 60 t-shirts, and 200 notebooks.
- *Mountain Association Medex Novi Travnik* carry out educational work in children's camps throughout BiH. In cooperation with the GVC organization, their seven mine risk education instructors gave 44 lectures to 1,450 people in 2001, and distributed 300 posters, 1,000 leaflets, 2,000 brochures, 1,000 badges, and 200 notebooks.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, reported landmine/UXO explosions killed 32 people and injured 55 others, including 12 children, representing a decrease from the 100 new casualties reported in 2000. Of the new casualties, 84 were civilians. On 2 April 2001, a landmine explosion near the southwestern town of Prozor killed a French soldier serving with SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during a reconnaissance operation.⁸⁷

Landmines and UXO continued to claim casualties in 2002, with 15 civilians killed and 19 injured up to 10 May 2002.⁸⁸

The ICRC, working at the community level throughout the country, continues to collect data and provide up-to-date information on landmine and UXO incidents. As of 10 May 2002, the ICRC database contained information on 4,733 individuals killed or injured by landmines or UXO.⁸⁹ The database is continuously updated from field reports, and in some instances information is collected on casualties that occurred in prior years that were not previously recorded.⁹⁰ Based on the ICRC statistics, between 1996 and 2002 the mine incident rate fell from an average of 52 casualties per month to just over seven casualties per month.

The statistics indicate that local residents of mine-affected areas, rather than internally displaced persons or returning refugees, continue to record the highest number of incidents, and

⁸⁶ Interview with Ahdin Orahovac, Director, Federation Mine Action Centre, Sarajevo, 25 February 2002.

⁸⁷ 2001 casualty figures from: email to Landmine Monitor from Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 14 May 2002; April 2001 incident from: "Mine Blast Kills French Soldier," *The Independent* (British daily newspaper), 5 April 2001.

⁸⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor from Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 14 May 2002.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ For example, in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reported casualties in 2000 were 32 killed and 60 injured. The ICRC database now registers 35 killed and 65 injured in 2000. Interview with Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 26 February 2002.

rural males aged 20-40 years are most likely to fall victim to mines, as they practice high-risk behavior. The population is, in many cases, aware of the existence of mines and the danger they pose, but all do not practice safe behavior mainly due to the economic necessity of cultivating the land, although other factors also come into play. Of the casualties reported in 2001, 35.6 percent had knowledge of the danger of mines.⁹¹

Seasonal variations indicate that the highest risk for the population is March to May, July and August, which are the months of peak agricultural activity. The majority of casualties were injured while farming (rural males), incurring the risk pursuing activities out of economic need.⁹²

The ICRC's ongoing data collection also indicates that children, despite preventive measures, continue to fall victim to landmines and UXO in BiH. Children under the age of 18 accounted for 13.8 percent of new casualties reported in 2001.

Landmine/UXO Casualties in the ICRC Database (1992-10 May 2002)⁹³

Year	No. of casualties
1992 – 1995	3,346
1996	632
1997	290
1998	149
1999	95
2000	100
2001	87
2002 (to 10 May)	34
Post-war total	1,387
TOTAL	4,733

Survivor Assistance

The government of BiH, and the international community, continue to work towards alleviating the medical and socio-economic obstacles faced by landmine survivors, nevertheless, no overall coordination exists. In general, mine survivors continue to be neglected and their needs and problems are not tackled in a systematic way. The existing assistance programs are conducted in isolation, and coordination occurs only on a bilateral basis, which does not always avoid duplication of efforts.⁹⁴

As reported last year, the Strategic Framework for survivor assistance was intended to have political and technical/operational levels.⁹⁵ However, by February 2002 no progress had been made on implementing the plan and no reasons have been given for this lack of progress.⁹⁶ The ICRC and NGOs are not involved in the process of implementing the Strategic Framework.⁹⁷

There are more than 20 general hospitals in BiH, and every municipality has a public health center. CBR centers provide some physical and psychological rehabilitation. A few hospitals and public health centers also provide some physical therapy and rehabilitation. In addition, six

⁹¹ Email to Landmine Monitor from Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 14 May 2002.

⁹² "Statistics on Mine/UXO Victims," in: Bosnia and Herzegovina: ICRC Community-based Mine/Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Programme, International Committee of the Red Cross, 22 May 2002.

⁹³ Email to Landmine Monitor from Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 14 May 2002. Data is updated to 10 May 2002.

⁹⁴ Information provided in confidence by several sources.

⁹⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 649.

⁹⁶ Telephone interview with Dr Goran Cerkez, Federation Ministry of Health, 4 February 2002.

⁹⁷ Telephone interview with Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, Sarajevo, 6 March 2002.

rehabilitation centers in BiH, offer special hydrotherapy treatment for persons with disabilities.⁹⁸ State-run social welfare centers are located in each municipality and can assist landmine survivors at the local level. However, their capacities to assist are limited.⁹⁹

Under the War Victims Rehabilitation Project, the World Bank supported the opening of the community based rehabilitation centers (CBR) in BiH. The project, completed in December 1999 at a cost of \$30 million, included the rehabilitation of facilities and provision of equipment, essential drugs and supplies, training and technical assistance for physiotherapy, occupational therapy, and psycho-social rehabilitation.¹⁰⁰ There are 38 CBR centers in FBiH, and six centers in RS. Queen's University provided training for staff in the centers. The Japanese Government donated US\$8 million worth of equipment to the RS Ministry of Health to facilitate the opening of 17 more CBRs in the RS in the near future.¹⁰¹ The preconditions set are that the centers must have "a minimum of 200m² space, one doctor-specialist in physiotherapy, two nurses, two physiotherapists/technicians, a sufficient number of potential patients, and a financial calculation for self-sustainability."¹⁰²

In BiH, there are 15 prosthetic centers, distributed across the Federation and Republika Srpska, where landmine amputees can receive assistance. The average distance between amputees and a limb-fitting center is 100-150 kilometers.¹⁰³ Since 2001, all the centers use imported prostheses components of very good quality from Otto Bock, one of the leading producers of orthopedic material in the world. The company has an office in Sarajevo, and according to LSN, about 60 percent of amputees are satisfied with the quality of their prosthesis. Only one workshop in Ilidza is producing wheelchairs. Crutches and special pressure-support pillows have to be imported from abroad.¹⁰⁴

The War Victims Rehabilitation Project also included a component for the supply, production and maintenance of quality prostheses and orthoses. However, one of the centers supported by the project, the Tuzla Prosthetics Centre, has now stopped production.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, a study conducted in July and August 2001 suggested that with adequate resources, good quality prostheses can be fitted by competent prosthetists in a reasonable period of time.¹⁰⁶

The ITF provided US\$656,850 for mine victim assistance in BiH in 2001.¹⁰⁷ This represents about 2.3 percent of the total ITF funding for 2001. Donors included Austria, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and the US. During the year, 44 mine survivors from BiH were treated at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute. The ITF also organized rehabilitation holidays, in June 2001, for 15 child mine survivors from BiH, at the Youth Health Resort at Debelirtic on the Slovenian coast.¹⁰⁸

Five international organizations continue to provide specific assistance to mine survivors in BiH: the ICRC, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) and Queen's University.

⁹⁸ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002. For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 603-604.

⁹⁹ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

¹⁰⁰ "War Victims Rehabilitation Project," World Bank Reconstruction and Development Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Progress Update, May 2001, p. 41.

¹⁰¹ Telephone interview with Dr Goran Cerkez, Federation Ministry of Health, 4 February 2002.

¹⁰² Letter from RS Ministry of Health to Health Centre Trebinje, Document number 01-05-565/2001, 3 April 2001.

¹⁰³ Final Report on the MOPS Research Phase, EdaS (Elegant Design and Solutions), 9 October 2001, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Final Report on the MOPS Research Phase, EdaS (Elegant Design and Solutions), 9 October 2001, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 17 May 2002.

¹⁰⁸ ITF, Annual Report 2001, p. 19.

The ICRC provides assistance through the Red Cross network in BiH. Information collected on mine/UXO casualties is often used by potential donors and project implementers to make direct connections with qualified mine survivors to run their projects in a region.¹⁰⁹

In mid-2001, a donation from the Japanese Red Cross enabled assistance to be given to mine survivors with the greatest need in RS. The precise needs of the mine survivors were identified by mine awareness instructors and assistance provided through the Red Cross network. Twenty-eight people benefited from this ad hoc assistance that helped them to be more self-sufficient; for example, assistance included house repairs, provision of farm animals, five amputees received prostheses, and 1,400 socks for stump protection were distributed.¹¹⁰

In another project, through contact between the ICRC and representatives from Whittier College, California, and an American Red Cross branch around 1,000 "friendship boxes" were distributed to child mine survivors in BiH.¹¹¹

The JRS in BiH is running two programs: a mine survivors assistance program for children, and another program for elderly mine survivors. The program for children provides medical assistance, rehabilitation, material, psychosocial and legal support. Based in Sarajevo, the program assists child mine survivors all over BiH. In 2001, 173 children benefited from the program which included 916 home visits, 34 prostheses, and a summer camp for 27 children. The program for elderly mine survivors, covers the Sarajevo canton, Middle Bosnia, Una Sana and Banja Luka Region, assisted 32 people in 2001 by providing medicines, prostheses and rehabilitation assistance. The programs are funded by RENOVABIS (Germany), CORDAID and JRS.¹¹²

There are no State-run programs for vocational rehabilitation; such programs are implemented through NGOs working with persons with disabilities. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) runs a vocational training program in Banja Luka, and organizes seminars for mine survivors. In Mostar, the IRC is assisting mine survivors with prostheses, supporting sporting programs for persons with disabilities, and the running of small businesses.¹¹³

In 2001, LSN continued its work with community-based outreach workers, who are also amputees, to assist individual survivors. The program, which works in 11 different mine-affected regions in BiH, is expanding to new areas next year. The program assesses survivors' needs, offers psychological and social support, and educates families about the effects of limb loss. LSN links individual survivors and their families to existing services and tracks progress toward recovery and reintegration. LSN also provides direct material support to survivors through covering the cost of prostheses, vocational training, house repairs or emergency food aid, if necessary. LSN publishes a national directory of organizations used in linking survivors to rehabilitative services in BiH. The directory is also available on the Internet.¹¹⁴ LSN works closely with survivors, and local and international organizations to protect the human rights of all persons with disabilities, and to promote equal access to community activities, education, employment and physical recreation, such as hosting annual sitting volleyball and sitting basketball tournaments. In 2001, 1000 people received assistance, of which about 90 percent were mine survivors.¹¹⁵

Through the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, military mine survivors have the right of a free prosthesis every third year, free health care and insurance, free treatment in special rehabilitation centers, and receive compensation for their disability.¹¹⁶ However, civilian mine survivors must pay

¹⁰⁹ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Vanja Bojinovic, ICRC Mine Awareness Coordinator for BiH, 26 February 2002.

¹¹¹ Email from Pascal Cuttat, Head of ICRC in BiH, 7 February 2002 and meetings with Vanja Bojinovic, Mine Awareness Coordinator, ICRC, Sarajevo, 26 February 2002.

¹¹² Interview with Przemek Miozga, Program Director, Jesuit Refugee Service, Sarajevo, 8 March 2002; and responses to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaires, 22 February 2002.

¹¹³ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

¹¹⁴ www.lsnatabase.org.

¹¹⁵ Information from Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, completed by Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 11 March 2002.

¹¹⁶ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

for their own health care or insurance, and receive much lower, and more irregular, compensation for their injuries. Civilians must pay a part of the total cost of their prosthesis which can cost between 3,000 and 5,000 KM (\$2,381). In FBiH, civilians pay 15 percent of the total cost, whereas in RS, it is 10 percent. In Una-Sana canton, prostheses are free for civilians, and in Central Bosnia canton the price is fixed at 1,000 KM (\$47). In Tuzla canton, civilian mine survivors must pay 100 percent of the total cost.¹¹⁷ The costs are prohibitive for many in a country where the average wage is \$880 per year.¹¹⁸

Although detailed statistics are not available, it would appear that a significant number of survivors have been blinded by landmines. For example, 57 survivors are registered with the Banja Luka Association for the Blind. However, little is being done to address the needs of blind survivors. It has been reported that there are only two guide dogs in BiH.¹¹⁹

Sixty-one NGOs, including local associations, assist persons with disabilities in BiH.¹²⁰ For example, in the FBiH, there are 18 sitting volley-ball clubs in two divisions (I – 10 clubs and II – eight clubs). In RS, there are six sitting volley-ball clubs competing in tournaments. In August 2001, BiH were European Champions in sitting volley-ball for men, for the second time. FBiH has seven men's wheelchair basketball clubs and one women's club and in RS, there are two men's clubs. FBiH also has three athletic clubs for persons with disabilities and several small football clubs.¹²¹

According to the LSN database, around 200 mine/UXO survivors, out of 897, do not need any support (i.e., 22 percent are psychologically and physically well, and self sustainable). The other 78 percent of survivors registered in the database need continuous follow-up and support.¹²²

Disability Policy and Practice

Three State laws regulate the rights of persons with disabilities.¹²³ In the FBiH, once a law has been adopted at entity level the cantons must then adopt their own laws; therefore the situation varies from canton to canton. Only Tuzla canton, Bihac canton, and Central Bosnia canton have developed such laws. The reason for the delay is that State law considers that centers for social welfare should take care of persons with disabilities, including payment for having a disability. But the status and funding of these centers has not been clearly defined, with the result that disability pensions have not been paid for one or more years. In RS, which does not have the cantonal system, there is a delay of four months in paying disability pensions.¹²⁴ LSN, and some mine survivors, are urging the centers for social welfare to do more with regard to supporting civilian mine survivors. However, the Centers claim that they have many categories of clients to take care of and too few resources to deal with them all.¹²⁵

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Final Report on the MOPS Research Phase, EdaS (Elegant Design and Solutions), 9 October 2001, p. 8.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹²⁰ Interview with Dr Goran Cerkez, Federation Ministry of Health, 20 March 2001.

¹²¹ Email from Plamenko Priganica, Director of Landmine Survivors Network in BiH, 25 January 2002.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 604.

¹²⁴ Interview with Plamenko Priganica, LSN BiH Director, Tuzla, 24 March 2001.

¹²⁵ Meeting with Sacira Hidanovic, Social Worker with LSN, Trebinje, 17 January 2002.

BOTSWANA

Key developments since August 2001: Botswana submitted its first Article 7 transparency report, officially declaring that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, except for training purposes.

Botswana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 March 2000. The treaty entered into force for Botswana on 1 September 2000.

In its report last year, Landmine Monitor noted that instructions had been given to the Attorney General's Chambers to prepare domestic implementation legislation and assistance in incorporating the provisions of the treaty into domestic law had been sought from the Zimbabwe office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).¹ No progress has been made as of July 2002. The ICRC "continues to assist the Government in the march towards paving a smooth implementation of International Humanitarian Law into our domestic legislation."²

Botswana submitted its first Article 7 Report on 28 September 2001. It had been due on 28 February 2001. In this four-paragraph report, the government stated, "Botswana joins the International Community in deploring the irreparable harm that landmines inflict on populations. Botswana is therefore committed to the Convention ... and to the full implementation of its provisions. It will in this regard continue to actively participate in international efforts aimed at the complete eradication of these weapons."³

Botswana did not attend the First, Second, or Third Meetings of States Parties. It participated in its first intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, though it did not attend in May 2002.⁴ An official has indicated that the reason for Botswana's non-attendance at international landmine meetings has simply been because it is not mine-affected.⁵ Botswana cosponsored and voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Botswana is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Botswana has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines.⁶ Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officials state that the military has never laid any landmines in Botswana or in any other country.⁷

According to its Article 7 Report, "The Country does not have a stockpile of mines but maintains a small quantity for training purposes." Details on numbers and types are not provided, though are required by Article 7. The Botswana Defense Force has said it has a small number of inert mines for training purposes, including seven inert antipersonnel directional mines and three antivehicle mines.⁸ Botswana states that it needs the training mines "because in the past the Botswana Defense Force soldiers have been deployed to mine-infested countries on peace keeping assignments. Therefore there is need for the soldiers to be trained in handling landmines."⁹

¹ Interview with Ms. Tshenolo Modise, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Botswana, 2 March 2001; interview with Ms. Daphne Matlaka, Deputy Attorney General, Gaborone, 26 February 2001.

² Presentation to the Southern African Regional Seminar on International Humanitarian Law, Pretoria, South Africa, 21-23 May 2002.

³ Article 7 Report, submitted on 28 September 2001. There are no dates noted for the reporting period.

⁴ It was represented by the Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Botswana to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁵ Interview with Mr. Sanoto, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, Botswana, 6 February 2001.

⁶ Article 7 Report, 28 September 2001.

⁷ Ibid.; interview with Colonel Tjatanga Moloi, Botswana Defense Force, Gaborone, 2 March 2001.

⁸ Interview with Colonel Tjatanga Moloi, Botswana Defense Force, Gaborone, 2 March 2001.

⁹ Article 7 Report, 28 September 2001.

BRAZIL

Key developments since May 2001: On 31 October 2001, Brazil enacted national implementation legislation, Law 10.300. After September 2001, Brazil began its stockpile destruction program and destroyed 13,194 mines by the end of the year. The target for completion is July 2002. Brazil is retaining 16,545 antipersonnel mines for training, the highest number of any State Party. Brazil has made important interpretive statements on antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, on joint military operations with non-State Parties, and on foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Brazil signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 30 April 1999. The treaty was promulgated by the President on 5 August 1999 (Decree 3.128) and it entered into force on 1 October 1999.

On 31 October 2001, Brazil enacted national implementation legislation, Law 10.300, which took effect on 1 November 2001. The law "prohibits and establishes as criminal offences all activities on national territory involving antipersonnel landmines, including use, development, production, transfer, stockpiling and any commercial activities," with the exception of those carried out by the Armed Forces according to Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It includes four to six years imprisonment or a fine with the possibility that the penal sanction will increase by a third if a public servant is responsible (civilian or military), and will increase by half in the case of repeat offenders.¹

Brazil attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001. In a statement to the plenary, Brazil announced that the Ministry of Defense had formulated a national stockpile destruction plan and destruction would soon commence.²

Brazil actively participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January/February 2002 and May 2002. At the 1 February 2002 meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Brazil made a number of statements pertaining to interpretation of the treaty. On Article 1(c), which states that a State Party may "never under any circumstances ... assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party," Brazil said that the article:

...clearly bans joint operations with non-States Parties that may involve the use of anti-personnel mines. Even if the States Parties involved in such operations do not participate directly and actively in the laying of anti-personnel mines, the operations should be considered illegal if the use of landmines by a non-State Party is of direct military benefit to those States Parties. In the absence of such a broad interpretation of the term "assist," Article 1 would contain a serious and unfortunate loophole. All States Parties should commit strictly to observe the provisions of Article 1, which would include giving the term "assist" as broad an interpretation as possible.³

With respect to the stockpiling and transit of foreign-owned mines, Brazil stated that:

[I]ndefinite retention by a State Party of foreign-owned anti-personnel mines on territory under its national control and jurisdiction is incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Convention. Under a literal interpretation of Article 4, States Parties

¹ Lei nº 10.300, de 31 de Outubro de 2001 "Proíbe o emprego, o desenvolvimento, a fabricação, a comercialização, a importação, a exportação, a aquisição, a estocagem, a retenção ou a transferência, direta ou indiretamente, de minas terrestres antipessoal." See Brazil, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 30 April 2002. See <http://www.presidencia.gov.br/civil-03/LEIS-2001/L10300.htm>.

² Brazilian Intervention, Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001, Managua. See http://www.gichd.ch/mbc/all_meetings/3msp/agenda_and_speeches.htm.

³ Brazilian Intervention, January 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings. See http://www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_jan02/speeches_gs/Brazil_article%201.pdf.

would not be obligated to destroy foreign-owned mines held on their national territory, given that Article 4 states that States Parties are obliged only to destroy mines they "own or possess," or that are under their "jurisdiction and control." Article 1, however, does set forth a broad obligation to never "stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines." Brazil is of the view that the latter obligation applies to foreign-owned landmines. Brazil has no foreign anti-personnel mines on its territory and will never, under any circumstances, allow any transiting of anti-personnel mines on its national territory for purposes that are banned by the Convention. We call upon other States Parties to undertake a similar pledge.⁴

Brazil submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2002, covering the period from January to December 2001 and including voluntary form J.

Brazil cosponsored and voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Brazil participated in a conference on "Mine Action in Latin America" in Miami from 3-5 December 2001.⁵ Captain Carlos Machado Gouvêa of the Brazilian Army and an Operations Officer with MARMINCA in Central America made a presentation on MARMINCA's activities.

Brazil is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and also participated in the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001. Brazil submitted its Article 13 annual report for Amended Protocol II (dated 3 October 2001) on 10 December 2001, which covers the period August 2000 to October 2001.

The ICBL and Landmine Monitor researchers from the Americas region met in Brasília from 9-11 December 2001 for their annual regional meeting, which was hosted by the Associação do Jovem Aprendiz (AJA). On 11 December, the campaigners and researchers participated in a roundtable on landmines in the region, hosted by the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress. Officials from the Brazilian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the Brazilian Army, deputies from the National Congress, and diplomatic representatives from countries including Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Norway, Peru, and the U.S. also participated.

Federal Deputy Marco Rolim, a member of the Human Rights Commission, participated in the roundtable and on the same day made a statement in the Chamber of Deputies in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in which he called for the government to exercise complete transparency in implementation of the treaty.⁶ On 12 December 2001, Deputy Rolim wrote to the Minister of Defense requesting information on implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including stockpiles, mine destruction plan, number of mines produced in the last ten years, list of Brazilian producers, and number of Brazilian landmines exported in the past. As of June 2002, the Minister of Defense had not responded to the request.⁷

The Brazilian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campanha Brasileira Contra Minas Terrestres, CBCM) continues to advocate for full and transparent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and assistance for mine-affected countries that received Brazilian-manufactured antipersonnel mines. CBCM members represented the ICBL at the Second World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre from 23-28 January 2002. They held a photo exhibition, staffed an information table and collected signatures for the Youth Against War Treaty, as well as delivering a presentation during a Forum seminar, "For a Society without Arms."

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Conference was sponsored by: the U.S. Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States (OAS); the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

⁶ Landmine Monitor has a copy of Federal Deputy Rolim's Statement to the Chamber of Deputies.

⁷ Landmine Monitor has a copy of Federal Deputy Rolim's Request for Information to the Minister of Defense.

Production, Transfer, and Use

Brazil is a former producer, exporter, and importer of antipersonnel landmines. The April 2002 Article 7 Report states that Brazil has not produced or exported landmines since 1989. It identifies Química Tupan S.A. and IBQ Industrias Químicas (formerly Britanite Indústria Química Ltda) as companies formerly engaged in landmine production.⁸ It also states, “There are no APM production facilities to be converted or decommissioned in Brazil,” but does not provide information on previous conversion efforts.⁹

According to previous Landmine Monitor reports and information from Article 7 Reports submitted by other countries, Brazilian antipersonnel mines have been planted in the ground or held in stockpiles in Ecuador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua¹⁰

Landmine Monitor has found no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in Brazil, including areas near the Colombian border. Brazil states that there are no mined areas in its national territory.¹¹

Stockpiling and Destruction

Brazil reports that as of 31 December 2001, it had a stockpile of 30,748 antipersonnel mines, including 26,616 Belgian-manufactured MAP NM M409 mines and 4,132 Brazilian-manufactured MAP NM T-AB-1 mines.¹² Of that stockpile, 16,545 are being retained for training purposes, leaving a total of 14,203 mines to be destroyed.

In its “National Plan for the Destruction of AP Landmines,” Brazil named eight locations throughout the country where stockpile destruction will take place, with a completion date scheduled for the end of July 2002.¹³ No further information on the destruction schedule was provided. Landmine Monitor Brazil and CBCM have requested to participate as observers in the stockpile destruction events, but have not yet received a response.

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Brazil said that stockpile destruction would commence soon, and that by July 2002, all stockpiled mines would be destroyed, “except those retained strictly for training purposes.”¹⁴

According to the 2002 Article 7 Report, 13,194 MAP NM M409 mines were destroyed between September and December 2001, in accordance with the national plan, including 9,385 mines not previously reported under Article 7 “because they already were operationally disabled.”¹⁵

Brazil originally retained 17,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes -- the highest number of mines retained for training by any State Party. Brazil has said that these mines “will be destroyed in training activities during a period of ten years after entry into force of the Convention for Brazil, that is by October 2009.”¹⁶

While Brazil is retaining enough mines to consume 1,700 per year in training activities, in the year 2000 it destroyed 450 MAP NM M409 mines, and in 2001 it destroyed five MAP NM T-AB-1 mines for training purposes.¹⁷

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, Brazil stated that it has no antivehicle mines “with sensitive anti-handling devices that may be unintentionally detonated by individuals” and said it repudiates their use on “humanitarian grounds.”¹⁸

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form E, submitted 30 April 2002.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 110 (Mozambique) and p. 328 (Ecuador) and *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 266 (Nicaragua).

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Forms C, F and I, 30 April 2002.

¹² Ibid., Form B.

¹³ Ibid., Form F.

¹⁴ Brazilian Intervention, Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001, Managua. See http://www.gichd.ch/mbc/all_meetings/3msp/agenda_and_speeches.htm.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Form G, 30 April 2002.

¹⁶ Ibid., Form D.

¹⁷ Ibid., Form G.

Mine Action

Brazil is not mine-affected. It continues to participate in international humanitarian mine action efforts on a bilateral and multilateral basis. In 2001, Brazil reported that eleven Brazilian military officers were on duty in the OAS Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (MARMINCA).¹⁹ Brazil states that its officers have constituted nearly half of MARMINCA's foreign experts.²⁰ Brazil has also participated in mine clearance activities with UNAVEM in Angola. In April 2002, Brazil said that it is "currently exploring new options for cooperation in international humanitarian demining activities."²¹

On 2 January 2002, Brazil's Ambassador to the OAS presented a voluntary contribution of \$305,392 to the OAS Assistant Secretary General.²² According to the OAS press release, the funds will be used for a variety of OAS-related activities, including the demining program in Central America.

The Engineering Section of the Army School of Specialized Instruction (Escola de Instrução Especializada) has offered a four-week training course on landmine detection and mine clearance to Brazilian Army and Navy personnel since 1996. During the course, a simulated minefield called PED (Pista Escola de Desminagem) is utilized. The Engineering Section also uses "modern mine detectors such as AN 19/2 recently received."²³

BULGARIA

Key developments since May 2001: An agreement with Turkey on the non-use of antipersonnel mines and their removal from their common border areas entered into force on 1 May 2002. Bulgaria reported the completion of decommissioning of antipersonnel mine production facilities. Bulgaria has provided detailed information to Landmine Monitor on its antivehicle mine stockpile and states that none of the mines it possesses are inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

Bulgaria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 4 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reported that implementation legislation has been enacted, and that sanctions for violations of the Mine Ban Treaty are included in the penal code.¹

Bulgaria submitted Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports on 27 August 1999, 5 April 2000, 1 March 2001, and 22 April 2002. The Article 7 Report submitted on 22 April 2002, for the period 1 March 2001 to 31 March 2002, provided details on national legislation and the completion of decommissioning former production facilities, and included additional information in the voluntary Form J on victim assistance.²

¹⁸ Brazilian Intervention, Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001, Managua. http://www.gichd.ch/mbc/all_meetings/3msp/agenda_and_speeches.htm.

¹⁹ CCW, Article 13 Report, Form B, 3 October 2001.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2002.

²¹ Ibid.

²² OEA Comunicado de Prensa C-001, "Brasil entrega contribución a fondos voluntarios de la OEA," 2 January 2002; see <http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/sp/Año2002/enero2002/C002.htm>.

²³ Cap. Eng. André Luiz Vieira Cassiano, "Especialização em Desminagem no Exército Brasileiro," *Revista Realengo* (magazine of the Escola), N°11, ABR/MAI/JUN 2001.

¹ Letter from Ivan Piperkov, Head of Global Security and Disarmament Department, International Security Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 2001; Article 7 Report, Form A, 22 April 2002.

² Article 7 reports, submitted on 27 August 1999 for the period 1 March-27 August 1999, submitted on 5 April 2000 for the period 27 July 1999-5 April 2000, submitted on 1 March 2001 for the period 5 April 2000-1 March 2001, and submitted 22 April 2002 for the period 1 March 2001-31 March 2002.

Bulgaria participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.³ In its statement to the meeting, Bulgaria described the process of antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction in Bulgaria, which was completed in December 2000, well in advance of the treaty deadline. Bulgaria also expressed continued support for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a forum for establishing an antipersonnel mine-free region.⁴ Bulgaria also associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.

On 29 November 2001, Bulgaria cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Bulgaria attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva.

Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey in March 1999 on the non-use of antipersonnel mines and their removal from their common border areas.⁵ The agreement with Turkey was ratified and the documents of ratification exchanged during a visit by the Turkish Prime Minister to Bulgaria on 30-31 January 2002.⁶ It “provides that the destruction of the mines in the areas adjacent to their common borders will take place over a period of six years. 90 days after the agreement has come into effect, initial information on the location of APMs and their numbers will be exchanged. This information as well as the process of removal and destruction of the APMs will be monitored through annual surveillance visits.”⁷ The agreement took effect on 1 May 2002.

Bulgaria is a party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its annual report as required by Article 13 of the Protocol II on 31 October 2001.⁸ It attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, and the Second CCW Review Conference, both in Geneva in December 2001. At the Review Conference, the delegation associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union. Peter Kolarov of the Bulgarian Mission in Geneva is serving as the coordinator of the CCW group of government experts examining mines other than antipersonnel mines, which was formed in December 2001 and has met in May and July 2002.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Bulgaria has stated that production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1998, and export stopped in 1996.⁹ The decommissioning of production facilities previously reported as being “in process” was reported in April 2002 as having been “completed – all lines of APMs production in Dunarit EAD – Russe are permanently decommissioned.”¹⁰

Destruction of the original stockpile of 885,872 antipersonnel mines was completed on 20 December 2000.¹¹ As of 31 March 2002, Bulgaria retained 3,693 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes under Mine Ban Treaty Article 3. Bulgaria expended 327 mines to train army

³ The delegation included Ivan Piperkov, Head of Global Security and Disarmament Department, International Security Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Angel Topalov from the Ministry of the Economy.

⁴ Statement by Ivan Piperkov, Head of Global Security and Disarmament Department, International Security Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Report from Bulgarian Council of Ministers website, www.government.bg, accessed on 23 April 2002, and Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 April 2002.

⁷ Email from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2002.

⁸ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, submitted on 31 October 2001.

⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 570–571, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 651–652 for information on past production and transfer.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form E, 22 April 2002.

¹¹ The initial Article 7 Report, on 27 August 1999, listed the stockpile as comprising mine-types PMN, OZM, PM-79, SHR-II, PFM-1C, and MON-50. Not listed were three further types (PSM-1, MON-100, MON-200) noted in a 1999 Bulgarian government publication—these were included in the retained stock referred to in later Article 7 reports.

engineers between 1 March 2001 and 31 March 2002; this apparently included all training stocks of the PFM-1S. Previously Bulgaria reported that a total of 4,000 antipersonnel mines were being retained; the discrepancy of 20 mines is explained as a “technical error” and the corrected (increased) totals of three types are given in the Article 7 Report of 22 April 2002.¹²

Antivehicle Mines

Landmine Monitor invited the Foreign Ministry to make known its position on the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of antivehicle mines equipped with sensitive fuzes or with antihandling devices capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person.¹³ It responded as follows:

Currently the Ministry of the Interior has a stockpile of 2,894 anti-tank mines (ATM) of the following types: TM-46; TM-62M; TM-62PZ and B-3. According to the Engineering Arms Material Manual their fuzes are activated between 180 and 500 kilograms of pressure. Therefore, they are impossible to activate unintentionally by a person.

The ATMs...cannot be activated unintentionally by a person even in a combat situation due to the great pressure needed for the activation of their fuzes. The pressure needed to activate a TM-46 mine is between 50 kg and 150 kg and it is further ensured against activation (the pressure cover should be deformed in advance to activate the fuze). Analysis on mine production and testing has been made by the manufacturers, and analysis on their use has been performed by the customers. Deviations from the indicated characteristics and safety in the mine handling have not been reported.¹⁴

The TM-46 is the only ATM reported to be capable of having an antihandling device and Bulgaria indicates that, “almost all TM-46 mines will be deactivated by the end of 2002.”

The Bulgarian response included a chart with technical characteristics of the mines. Bulgaria also reports it possesses types of remotely delivered AVM (anti-invasion mine 1-B and anti-invasion mine 2-B) that are pressure activated and have self-destruct and self-neutralizing mechanisms. A new non-contact, presumably magnetic influence, fuze has been designed for these mines that will also contain a self-destruct mechanism.¹⁵

Mine Action Assistance

Bulgarian officers participated in the OSCE mine monitoring groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria reiterated its willingness to “take part in the exchange of equipment and antipersonnel mines discharge technology.”¹⁶

In the period 2000-2001, Bulgaria received financial assistance from Canada totaling Can\$65,000 (US\$43,765) to buy 15 protective mine clearance suits and receive training on their use from Med-Eng Systems Inc. in Ottawa.¹⁷ This helped Bulgaria to send more experienced and trained deminers to work in Southeastern Europe.¹⁸

¹² Article 7 Reports, Forms D, 22 April 2002 and 1 March 2001. Bulgaria initially declared it would retain 10,446 mines, but decided to reduce this to 4,000, as noted in the Article 7 Report submitted on 5 April 2000.

¹³ Landmine Monitor researcher’s questionnaire submitted on 19 February 2002.

¹⁴ Email from Ivan Piperkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2002.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 10 December 2001.

¹⁷ “Reaffirming the Commitment: 2000 - 2001 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund,” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, p. 22. The US\$ equivalent is that recorded in the United Nations Mine Action Investments database.

¹⁸ Email from Ivan Piperkov, Head of Global Security and Disarmament Department, International Security Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2002.

BURKINA FASO

Key developments since May 2001: Burkina Faso adopted a decree to incorporate the Mine Ban Treaty into domestic law on 2 May 2001. Although Burkina Faso possesses no stockpiles, it reserves the right to retain a maximum number of 500 antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Burkina Faso signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 16 September 1998, becoming the 40th country to do so, and therefore triggering the treaty's entry into force on 1 March 1999. On 2 May 2001, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campaore, signed a decree on the ban of antipersonnel mines, incorporating the treaty into domestic law. Violations of the decree are sanctioned with a one- to five-year term of imprisonment and/or a fine of CFAF 300,000 to 1,500,000 (US\$410 to \$2,050). The State is authorized to retain a maximum of 500 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. The decree specifies the conditions for inspection as per Article 8 of the Treaty. The same penal sanctions are applicable in the case of preventing inspection operations. The Ministers of Security, of Defense, and of Justice and Promotion of Human Rights, are responsible for the implementation of the decree.¹

Burkina Faso was scheduled to attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, but due to flight difficulties was unable to do so. It attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. Burkina Faso also participated in the regional "Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention" in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001.

In November 2001, Burkina Faso cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, which calls for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Burkina Faso submitted its third Article 7 transparency report on 14 March 2002, for calendar year 2001.² As a follow-up to its commitment at the regional landmine conference held in Bamako, Mali in February 2001, Burkina Faso co-chaired with Belgium a meeting of the Article 7 Contact Group in Geneva on 30 January 2002. Burkina Faso has since directly contacted a number of States Parties to encourage them to submit their transparency reports.³

Burkina Faso is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use and Mine Action

Burkina Faso has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁴ The military and governmental authorities have reaffirmed that the country has never used antipersonnel mines.⁵

Burkina Faso possesses no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. However, national legislation permits the authorities to "retain and transfer antipersonnel mines for training in detection, demining and destruction," with the number being limited to no more than 500 mines.⁶

¹ Decree N°2001-180/PRES/PM/SECU on the ban of antipersonnel mines in Burkina Faso, 2 May 2001, published in the monthly Official Journal in June 2001.

² The UN lists the date of submission as 14 March 2002, although Burkina Faso has it dated 23 January 2002.

³ Interview with Blaise Kiema, Officer of the Military Engineers, Ministry of Defense, and with Piabé Firmin N'Do, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 30 May 2002. Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices are explicitly excluded from the application of the decree.

⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 61; confirmed by Capt. Blaise Kiema, Ministry of Defense, and Piabé Firmin N'Do, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

⁵ Interview with Capt. Blaise Kiema, Ministry of Defense, and Piabé Firmin N'Do, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

⁶ Decree N°2001-180/PRES/PM/SECU, 2 May 2001.

Burkina Faso's last two Article 7 Reports state that the Army has not retained antipersonnel mines for training purposes "yet."⁷ When asked about this, a Ministry of Defense official underlined the need for training for militaries involved in international operations. He added, however, that the purchase of antipersonnel mines is forbidden.⁸

One battalion (approximately 200 persons) of the Military Engineering Department have been trained in demining techniques in France since independence in 1969. Since 1997, every year, six soldiers attend demining training sessions at the "Ecole de la Paix" in Zambakro, Côte d'Ivoire.⁹

Burkina Faso is not mine-affected. There are no mine victims. It is not involved in conducting mine clearance or mine risk education programs and has not made any financial contribution to mine action programs during the reporting period.

CAMBODIA

Key developments since May 2001: The Cambodia Landmine Impact Survey was completed in April 2002 and revealed that nearly half of all villages are either known or suspected to be contaminated by mines or UXO. In 2001, a total of 21.8 million square meters of land was cleared, including 29,358 antipersonnel mines. In 2001, there were 813 mine and UXO casualties. Thousands of stockpiled mines continue to be discovered and destroyed.

Mine Ban Policy

Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 28 July 1999. The treaty entered into force in Cambodia on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation, The Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines, entered into force when King Norodom Sihanouk signed it on 28 May 1999.¹ To date, there are no known instances of trial or punishment for breaking the mine ban law.

Cambodia participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001. The Cambodian representative said, "My delegation welcomes the new States Parties who have just signed and ratified the Convention. However, we should continue to intensify our efforts to convince many non-signatories countries to join us so that the Ottawa Convention will attain its ultimate goal."² It also urged donor countries to support Cambodian capacity building on mine action.

The government actively participated in all of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Cambodia submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 19 April 2002. Cambodia cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2001.

At the Fifth International Meeting of Mine Action Programme Directors and Advisors in Geneva on 25 February 2002, Sam Sotha, Secretary-General of the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), said, "The reduction of poverty is the overarching development objective of the Royal Government of Cambodia. With an estimated 36% of the

⁷ Article 7 Reports, Form D, 14 March 2002 and 6 August 2001.

⁸ Interview with Blaise Kiema, Ministry of Defense, and Piabé Firmin N'Do, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

⁹ Interview with Capt. Blaise Kiema, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 29 January 2002; email from Capt. Blaise Kiema, 17 June 2002.

¹ The law bans the production, use, possession, transfer, trade, sale, import and export of antipersonnel mines. It provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offenses committed by civilians, or members of the police and the armed forces. It also provides for the destruction of existing mine stockpiles and the creation of the National Demining Regulatory Authority to coordinate activities related to the mine problem.

² Statement by Ieng Mouly, Head of Delegation, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18 September 2001.

overall population and 40% of the rural population living below the poverty line and with a per-capita gross domestic product of about US\$280, addressing poverty constitutes a critical challenge in Cambodia.... Obviously, the large number of mines and UXO in Cambodia directly contributes to the problem, and is a major hurdle to food security and the economic reintegration of returning and landless populations.”³

On 24 February 2002, Cambodia celebrated the tenth anniversary of mine action in Cambodia with a ceremony in Rattanak Mondol, one of the most heavily mined parts of the country. On the occasion, Prime Minister Hun Sen strongly called for no new landmine victims and no need for mine clearance in Cambodia by the time of the twentieth anniversary. He also said, “I wish to make an appeal that we have to focus our demining efforts in areas where land availability is crucial for our farmers so that they could be converted from land of mines into agricultural lands. Every demining program has to focus on demining to free the land for the landless farmers and refrain from freeing land from mines for those who wish to grab more land. This should be seen as a land issue policy of the Royal Government because we have to provide land to our people to toil for life.”⁴

Cambodia is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW and the CCW Second Review Conference in December 2001. Its report required by Article 13 was completed on 10 March 2002.

The Cambodia country report for *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* was publicly released in Cambodia on 4 September 2001 in Battambang, the most mine-affected province of Cambodia. The event was attended by representatives of the government, the landmine planning unit, demining agencies, development agencies, rehabilitation agencies, churches, and villagers. The report was released in English and Khmer and circulated to government ministries, to embassies and to the press.

The Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL) has been very active in regional and international promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2001. Sponsored by World Vision, a youth landmine survivor, Man Sokheurm, visited Australia to support the Australian Network of the ICBL in its fundraising for mine clearance. ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth went to Taiwan and Australia for a fundraising campaign for mine clearance and victim assistance. CCBL members Sok Eng and Denise Coghlan facilitated a meeting in Laos on the effects of landmines and Agent Orange. ICBL Youth Ambassador Song Kosal participated in the initiatives organized by the government of Canada for the 1 March anniversary of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty. In March 2002, in Germany, Tun Channareth led a march of 10,000 Munich youth in support of the mine ban and of the campaign against the use of child soldiers. Misereor organized the event.

Production, Transfer, and Use

There are no reports of use of antipersonnel or antivehicle mines by government forces or any opposition forces. No known production has taken place in 2001. There are no specific allegations of transfer of antipersonnel mines, though there are persistent rumors about the illegal transfer of arms by individuals at borders.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Cambodia declared again in 2001, as it has since 1999, that there is no longer an antipersonnel mine stockpile. However, police and military units continue to find and collect weapons and ammunition, including mines, from various sources, locations and caches.⁵ The mines are handed over to Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction. According to the

³ Statement by Sam Sotha, Secretary-General of Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, to the Fifth International Meeting of Mine Action Programme Directors and Advisors, Geneva, 25 February 2002.

⁴ Address of Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, Rottank Mundul, 24 February 2002.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form F, 19 April 2002, covering calendar year 2001.

latest Article 7 Report the CMAC Explosive Ordnance Disposal Branch destroyed 533 of those mines in 2001. Another 3,165 mines found in 2001 were destroyed in January 2002. It appears that far fewer mines were found in 2001 than the previous year when a total of more than 11,000 mines were found and destroyed.⁶

On 14 January 2002, the Deputy Prime Minister, the governor of Kompong Chhnang Province and the Director General of CMAC, presided over the first public ceremony for mine destruction since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty. On this occasion 3,165 antipersonnel mines (PMN2) were destroyed. Khem Sophoan, Director General of CMAC, declared, "This is the first time that the Kingdom of Cambodia is destroying so many mines at one time. This clearly manifests that the Kingdom of Cambodia has been implementing strictly the Ottawa Convention on the destruction of all antipersonnel mines...."⁷

Prime Minister Hun Sen, speaking at the mine action tenth anniversary ceremony in Rattanak Mondul, said, "Mines are hidden killers left over by a long and protracted war from many generations. We have to take those mines, not only the ones that are uncovered in the field but that are stored in warehouses of both the military and the police to be destroyed by CMAC."⁸

The Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority is responsible for the monitoring of stockpile destruction. It is not clear to Landmine Monitor what processes are in place for this work. However, the government has declared its intention to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty, and military and police have been very clearly instructed that all antipersonnel landmines must be turned in for destruction.

In its three Article 7 Reports, Cambodia has indicated that it has no antipersonnel mines retained for training or development purposes, as permitted under Article 3.⁹ However it has also reported transfer of mines for training and development purposes to the CMAC Training Center in 1993 (348 mines), 1998 (236 mines), 1999 (818 mines), 2000 (52 mines), and 2001 (423 mines).¹⁰ Thus, it appears that each year, as CMAC discovers new mines in stockpiles or removes them from the ground, it transfers a certain quantity to its Training Center, which it consumes shortly thereafter. In 2001, the 423 mines were transferred from CMAC DU 6 (Siem Reap) to the CMAC Training Center and "used for the training of Mine Detection Dog teams."¹¹

Landmine Problem

As a result of various conflicts over the last thirty years or so, Cambodia is one of the most heavily landmine and UXO contaminated countries in the world. The Landmine Impact Survey completed in April 2002 revealed that the number of areas contaminated by mines and UXO is about 30% higher than estimated in the United Nations Transitional Authority period. All 24 provinces have areas contaminated by mines and UXO, and 13 areas are also affected by cluster munitions.¹² A total of 6,422 villages, or 46% of Cambodian villages, have mine/UXO-affected areas. The total suspected contaminated area is 4,466 million square meters, or 2.5% of the total surface of the country.¹³

⁶ Article 7 Report, Forms B and F, 30 June 2001, covering calendar year 2000. The report indicated that 8,739 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed by CMAC, another 1,078 by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and about 1,600 by the National Police in 2000.

⁷ Address by Khem Sophoan, Director General of CMAC, Kompong Chhnang province, 14 January 2002.

⁸ Address of Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, Rottank Mondul, 24 February 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Reports, Form D1., 26 June 2000, 30 June 2001, and 19 April 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D 2., 19 April 2002.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Cambodian National Level One Survey Statistical Profile, GeoSpatial, Phnom Penh, 2 May 2002.

¹³ *Ibid.* Cambodian government reports have different statistics. The April 2002 Article 7 Report indicates: 3,075 areas suspected to be contaminated; 4,437 square kilometers suspected (2.4%); 6,367 villages suspected (45.8%); 1,393 villages confirmed contaminated (10%); an estimated 5.16 million people at risk. The CCW Article 13 Report, 10 March 2002, indicates: a total of 6,397 villages, or 46% of Cambodian villages,

The threat of UXO and mines impedes mobility, security, economic activity, and development in several provinces, particularly in the north and northwest of the country. In the forests of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, and Pailin, the most affected provinces, people still have their limbs blown off as they search for a way to feed their families. Mine and UXO contamination restricts access to home, agricultural land, pasture land, water sources, forests, schools, dams, canals markets, business activities, health centers, pagodas, bridges, and neighboring villages. UXO incidents account for about 50% of total casualties.¹⁴

By the end of 2001, close to 170 million square meters had been cleared, and around 1 million people of the rural population benefited from gaining access to safe land and essential infrastructure. Since 1993, over 1.7 million people participated in mine awareness programs in Cambodia. With over 80% of the country's population residing in rural areas, and 40% of these estimated to be living below the poverty line, mine action programs continue to be of the highest priority in the achievement of Cambodia's overriding policy of poverty reduction.¹⁵

Marking of mined areas is in progress, but it will take a long time to fence all areas. On 31 December 2001, the Cambodian Mine Action Center was reported to have marked a total of 619 mined locations, representing 126.26 million square meters.¹⁶ In March 2002, 92% of the 98 casualties reported had the incident in non-marked places.¹⁷

Survey and Assessment

The first comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey was completed in April 2002. It was a joint project of CMAC and the government of Canada's aid agency, CIDA. The effort is part of the Global Landmine Survey initiative of the Survey Action Center. The Canadian firm, Geospatial International Inc. (GeoSpatial/GST), conducted the survey. The Canadian government provided funding of US\$1.7 million. All 13,900 villages were surveyed, representing an estimated population of 11.5 million people.¹⁸ While a Landmine Impact Survey is not designed to measure the precise size of the affected areas, it provides valuable information on the socio-economic impact of the mine/UXO contamination on the local population; this information is extremely useful in the planning and prioritization process.¹⁹ The key findings of the survey are detailed above, in the "Landmine Problem" section.

Mine Clearance

Cambodia reports that 166 million square meters of land were cleared from 1992 through 2001, and a total of 313,586 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed.²⁰ Mine clearance in Cambodia is carried out by the Cambodian Mine Action Center, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), and by village "deminers." A known total of 21.8 million square meters of land was cleared in 2001.²¹ This compares to a known total of 32.2 million square meters in 2000. CMAC, HALO and MAG all cleared more land, but the RCAF total decreased from 20 million to 6.5 million square meters.

have mine/UXO-affected areas; the total suspected contaminated area is 4,426.7 million square meters or 2.4% of the total surface of the country.

¹⁴ CMAC, "CMAC Integrated Work Plan, Executive Summary 2002," p. 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Article 13 Report, CCW Amended Protocol II, 10 March 2002, p. 9.

¹⁷ Cambodian Mine/UXO Victim Information System, March 2002, p. 2.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form C, 19 April 2002.

¹⁹ Article 13 Report, CCW Amended Protocol II, 10 March 2002, p. 9.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form F, 19 April 2002.

²¹ This is based on information provided by CMAC, HALO, MAG, and the April 2002 Article 7 Report. See the following section for each operator.

Total Mine Clearance in 2001²²

Agency	Area cleared (m ²)	AP Mine	AT Mine	UXO
CMAC	9,637,455	17,112	460	76,368
HALO Trust	4,336,014	4,699	422	7,319
MAG	1,418,813	4,966	44	10,876
RCAF	6,482,357	2,581	15	4,060
Total	21,874,639	29,358	941	98,623

Cambodian Mine Action Center

The CMAC program began in November 1993. CMAC engages in mine and UXO clearance, survey and marking, mine risk education, and training in mine clearance. After a severe funding crisis led to major cut-backs in personnel and operations in October 2000, by the middle of 2001 CMAC's situation stabilized with a reduced, but consistent capacity. In August 2001, the new Royal Decree and sub-decree on CMAC and CMAA established the functions and links of the two institutions. The CMAA is the national mine action coordination body while CMAC focuses on mine clearance and related services.

In 2001, CMAC cleared 9,637,455 square meters of land, found and destroyed 17,112 antipersonnel mines, 460 antitank mines, and 76,368 UXO.²³ Kheam Sophoan, Director General of CMAC said, "CMAC achieved 137% of the total target for year 2001 and we should be proud of that." This success is due in part to the deployment of several Mine Dog Detection teams and four brush cutters, but also to a general improvement of staff morale after the crisis period of 1999-2000.²⁴

CMAC cleared land in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, Pailin, and Kompong Thom. Land cleared in 2001 included agricultural land and land for physical and social infrastructure in both rural and urban areas.²⁵ CMAC has been using statistics of mine incidents as a base for prioritizing areas to clear and has been deploying its resources according to the casualty rate in the various affected provinces. In Battambang and Banteay Meanchey, CMAC chooses areas to be cleared in collaboration with the Land Use Planning Unit (LUPU) and with village authorities and development organizations. LUPU, under the Provincial Rural Development Committee, establishes priorities based on a participatory process involving all the stakeholders and committee members.

The total demining forces of CMAC consist of:²⁶

- 48 demining platoons (30 deminers per platoon)
- 12 community Mine Marking Teams (teams of 5)
- 19 Mine Marking Teams (teams of 3)
- 16 Exploded Ordnance Disposal teams (teams of 3)
- 2 Brush Cutter Teams (12 members in total)
- 4 Mine Detection Dog teams (6 dogs per team)
- 1 Mine Awareness Team with the support of six teams of community-based Mine Risk Reduction.

HALO Trust

HALO Trust came to Cambodia in 1991 and took part in the initial national survey carried out by UNTAC. It then began mine clearance operations in March 1992. As of December 2001, HALO Trust Cambodia had a total manpower of 901 Cambodians and two expatriates.²⁷ HALO

²² Based on information provided by CMAC, HALO, MAG, and the April 2002 Article 7 Report.

²³ Provided by Tong Try, Director of Operations, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 8 February 2002.

²⁴ UNDP, "Mine Action Update # 1/ 2002," Phnom Penh, 4 February 2002, p. 6.

²⁵ Address by Khem Sophoan, Director General of CMAC, Kompong Chhnang, 14 January 2002.

²⁶ Address by Khem Sophoan, Director General of CMAC, Rattanak Mondul, 24 February 2002.

²⁷ Provided by David Mahon, Deputy Director, HALO Trust Cambodia, 27 February 2002.

Trust believes that the indigenous demining capacity is the most efficient and cost-effective method of removing the mine and UXO problem from the country.

In 2001, HALO Trust Cambodia cleared and handed over to the local community 4,336,014 square meters of demined land in 107 separate mine sites. It found and destroyed 4,699 antipersonnel mines, 422 antitank mines and 7,319 UXO.²⁸

In 2001, HALO Trust Cambodia successfully deployed Ground Compensation Detectors that speed up detection on laterite and carbonized soils. In Anlong Veng district the Khmer Rouge often buried double-staked antitank mines in pits over one meter deep, and at this depth it is impossible to detect the mines using conventional detectors. HALO Trust deployed deep search bomb locators to find deep buried mines. It also developed armored Volvo excavators for areas with high levels of metal contamination. The Volvos sift the soil and deminers then manually inspect the sifted soil looking for fuses or any other small items.²⁹

As of February 2002, HALO Trust Cambodia was engaged in clearing 42 minefields in Oddar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey, Preah Vihear, and Siem Reap provinces. The program deployed 602 lanes manned by 602 deminers with 13 mechanical units that support manual mine clearance through vegetation cutting and excavation of mined areas.³⁰

The HALO Trust has two four-person survey teams. These teams are usually deployed by motorcycle and each team is backed up by an ambulance. During 2001, the teams surveyed 47,931,796 square meters of minefields in Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, and Pursat provinces.³¹

Mines Advisory Group

Mines Advisory Group began operations in Cambodia in 1992. From the mid-1990s, MAG decided to focus its assistance away from large “demining platoons” and concentrate on tasks that would have direct and immediate impact on the community needs. MAG Community Liaison strategies aim to ensure that mine and UXO clearance is prioritized based on the needs of the villagers who would directly benefit. MAG Community Liaison Teams conduct pre-clearance village assessments where the views of the community are sought on development priorities, and monitor post-clearance activities.³²

MAG works in partnership with development NGOs including World Vision Cambodia, Church World Service, Lutheran World Service, Health Unlimited, Wathnakpheap, and the Japanese Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS). It coordinates its work plans with these NGOs to implement community development activities in cleared areas, including building schools, health centers, houses for resettlement and pagodas; together with ensuring access to wells, roads and small plots of land for agriculture. MAG coordinates work plans with CMAC in areas where both organizations work.³³

In 2001, MAG cleared 1,418,813 square meters and destroyed 4,966 antipersonnel mines, 44 antitank mines and 10,876 UXO. MAG operated 22 Mine Action Teams, 10 Community Liaison Teams, and two Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams in Battambang, Pursat, Kompong Thom, and Preah Vihear provinces. MAG also used mechanical support to increase clearance productivity.³⁴

During 2001, MAG conducted Technical Surveys of 67 minefields. The Community Liaison Department conducted the Pre-Clearance Assessment in 78 suspected minefields. Some of the 67 minefields surveyed were completely cleared and some are in process.³⁵

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 1 August 2002.

³³ Provided by Stephen Bradley, Senior Technical Advisor of MAG Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 31 January 2002; email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 1 August 2002.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

The military engineers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces have been involved in demining and bomb disposal since 1994. In 2001, the RCAF carried out clearance in Kampot, Pursat and along Route 1 from Kandal to Prey Veng. It cleared roads and areas for the placement of cables. RCAF also checks for and removes mines before visits of Cambodian leaders to provincial sites.

In 2001, the RCAF Engineer Corps reported that it cleared 6,482,357 square meters of land and 2,581 antipersonnel mines. The most commonly found antipersonnel mines in Cambodia are PMN, PMN2, POMZ2, POMZ-2M, MN79, Type 69, Type 72A, and Type 72B.³⁶

On 24 February 2002, Prime Minister Hun Sen said, “We have to pay heed to fortify the capacity of the engineering forces so that they can fulfill tasks that the foreign funding agencies could not implement. Chief of General Staff Ke Kim Yan reported to me that from 1993 to 2002, the engineering forces have liberated 4,288,913 ha from mines. Among those uncovered, 128,868 were mines against human beings, 7,373 were the ones against tanks, and 22,079 were UXO. So I would like that the engineering team extend its capacity to include this task in addition to their current engagements. Take building rural roads and infrastructure for instance, where the Ministry of Public Works could not access, the engineering forces have to go right in.”³⁷

Village Demining

What has become known as “village” or “spontaneous” demining is generally taken to mean the situation whereby people remove mines and UXO from areas they use so that they can build houses, plant crops, gain access to water, or engage in similar activities.

In January 2001, Handicap International Belgium released a study on spontaneous demining, which uncovered the main reasons why villagers engage in demining activities.³⁸ In September 2001, an evaluation commissioned by CARE concluded, “Investigations into spontaneous demining reveal that it exists in Cambodia and that it is a natural response by people wishing or forced to establish a livelihood in an area contaminated by mines or UXO. They also agree that it will continue to exist while ‘official’ demining resources are insufficient, either in terms of output or speed, to meet the needs of those people requiring their land to be cleared of mines and UXO. Unfortunately there is a dearth of practical solutions as to how to effectively deal with the situation.”³⁹ The same report looks at the pros and cons that have been advanced for supporting spontaneous demining in Cambodia.⁴⁰

Private Demining Companies

In 2001, officially registered and approved private demining companies were allowed to work in Cambodia. Chirgwin Services Group, in an AusAID-funded project called “Destroy-a-Minefield,” cleared the Toul Kra Sang village orphanage land of UXO and ammunition from 4-31 January 2001.⁴¹ CMAA has no information on any other private demining activities since that time.

Use of Cleared Land

Land use planning, management and development in mined areas is part of the Royal Government of Cambodia’s national development strategy to improve the standard of living, security and national unity.⁴² The first Land Use Planning Unit was established in 1999. In 2002,

³⁶ Article 7 Report, Form F, 19 April 2002.

³⁷ Address of Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister, Rottank Mundul, 24 February 2002.

³⁸ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 446.

³⁹ Carl G. Chirgwin, *Evaluation of the Demining Component*, Phnom Penh, September 2001, p. 51.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁴¹ Interview with Sam Sotha, Director-General of CMAA, Phnom Penh, 25 March 2002.

⁴² Summary of Land Use Planning Unit Project, Battambang province, 18 February 2002.

Land Use Planning Units are operating in Battambang,⁴³ Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear.⁴⁴

LUPU's objective is to ensure that the demining process is clearly planned, is fair and transparent, and engages the full participation of local authorities; it is also aimed at preventing and solving land disputes. LUPU in Battambang functions under the direct supervision of the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD) and reports to the Provincial Sub-Committee (PSC). LUPUs in the other three provinces are under the supervision of CMAA and the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction.⁴⁵

In Battambang, LUPU experience proved to be a viable approach to decentralized land use planning and integrated development; coordinated with developmental needs in the province; it also achieved a reduction in the disputes relating to demined land; and ensured the security of tenure.⁴⁶

Landmine Monitor researchers conducted studies on the use of land cleared by CMAC in disputed areas in 2000, 2001 and 2002.⁴⁷ They found that most of the land cleared was originally used for the intended purpose, but that some land subsequently changed hands for other purposes. HALO Trust, with support from Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), also conducted a post-clearance evaluation on the use of land cleared by HALO. HALO Trust concluded there was a very high degree of success in terms of land used for the intended purpose. MAG and World Vision conducted a joint assessment in Banaon District of Battambang Province and came to the same conclusion.⁴⁸

Coordination and Planning of Mine Action

In September 2000, a Royal Decree established the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority. CMAA is the regulatory authority acting on behalf of the Royal Government, and has the responsibility of coordination of mine action in Cambodia. In 2002, CMAA is in the process of taking on its responsibilities. According to its 2002 work plan, CMAA will undertake activities in four fields:⁴⁹

1. Policy Development and Strategic Planning. Objectives include the establishment of a National Strategic Plan for mine action, the definition of National Mine Action Standards, mine action coordination and resource mobilization, land prioritization at the national, provincial and local levels, and compliance with the reporting obligation of international treaties.
2. Quality Management and Technology. This includes the establishment of procedures for accreditation and licensing of mine action organizations; procedures for monitoring, post-clearance inspection and handover of cleared land, and guidelines for implementation of new technologies.
3. Information Management. This includes the establishment of a National Mine Action Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); it is also planned to set up a Cambodian Mine Action Website and to issue a Public Information Plan.

⁴³ LUPU Battambang works in 9 districts: Bavel, Banan, Kamrieng, Kaus Krolor, Moug Ruessei, Phnum Proek, Rottanak Mondul, Sam Lout, and Sampov Lun.

⁴⁴ Funded by ECHO and France, Handicap International Belgium supported the establishment of LUPU in the latter three provinces. Interview with Reuben Noguera McCarthy, Disability Prevention Coordinator, Handicap International Belgium in Cambodia, Brussels, 26 June 2002.

⁴⁵ Interview with Reuben Noguera McCarthy, Disability Prevention Coordinator, Handicap International Belgium in Cambodia, Brussels, 26 June 2002.

⁴⁶ Summary of Land Use Planning Unit Project, Battambang province, 18 February 2002.

⁴⁷ Emma Leslie and Soth Ngarm, "Mine Clearance and Land Distribution: A Study of Three Heavily Mine affected Provinces in Cambodia," Phnom Penh, February 2001, p. 3. The study was commissioned by Landmine Monitor and carried out between November 2000 and February 2001.

⁴⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 1 August 2002.

⁴⁹ CMAA, *2002 Work Plan*, Phnom Penh, December 2001.

4. Mine Awareness Education and Victim Support. This includes the coordination of mine risk education activities and the development of standards; promotion of the inclusion of mine survivors in development projects; promotion of rehabilitation programs and development of information networking on victim assistance through the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation, and the Disability Action Council (DAC).

The Federal Republic of Germany through the direct management of the German Coordination Project Ltd (GPC) has supported this project. GPC has also provided office equipment and technology to the CMAA.

Mine Action Funding

In 2001, seventeen donors reported contributions to mine action in Cambodia totaling more than \$21 million. This included contributions to the UNDP Trust Fund for Cambodia, which mostly funds CMAC, to CMAC directly, to other mine action organizations in Cambodia, especially the Mines Advisory Group and HALO Trust, to the global UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance for projects in Cambodia, and in-kind contributions.

Donors in 2001 included the United States (\$4.6 million), Japan (\$3.1 million), Sweden (\$2.6 million), Australia (\$2.4 million), United Kingdom (\$1.4 million), Canada (\$1.4 million), Germany (\$1.3 million), Finland (\$1.3 million), and France (\$1.1 million), as well as Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, and Spain.⁵⁰

Cambodia Mine Action Center. In 2001, CMAC received about \$7.46 million. This included \$4,746,878 from the UNDP Trust Fund for demining and \$2,602,852 bilaterally from Germany (\$742,000), Japan (\$569,549), Norwegian People's Aid (\$648,651), UNICEF (\$311,039), CARE (\$163,652), and others.⁵¹

In 2001 and 2002 a number of donors resumed funding of CMAC. These include Australia, Sweden, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. At a ceremony for the new financial agreement between Sweden and CMAC, Daniel Asplund, representing Sweden, congratulated CMAC for re-establishing credibility. He said, "This additional contribution also reflects our satisfaction with the impressive institutional changes and reforms that have taken place during the last year in the sector, the good progress made by CMAC in improving management and efficiency, and not in the least, the strong evidence of national ownership and responsibility for humanitarian demining that followed the National Symposium last year."⁵²

HALO Trust Cambodia is supported by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Finland, the Netherlands, Australia, Japan, Ireland and the International Rotary Club. Total funding for 2001 was US\$4.5 million.⁵³

Mines Advisory Group received approximately US\$3.5 million in 2001 for its operations in Cambodia. Donors included the governments of the UK, US, Japan and Australia, as well as ECHO, World Vision, CWS, JAHDS, LWS, and the Anti-landmijn Stichting.⁵⁴

Mine Risk Education

In 2001, CMAC suspended its mine risk education (MRE) activities in order to develop a new approach involving the participation of communities in mine action and using existing human resources to provide mine/UXO risk education. Supported by UNICEF and Handicap International Belgium, CMAC established a community-based mine/UXO risk reduction project. The project consists of two phases: an initial pilot phase of eight months covering six districts in the provinces

⁵⁰ See individual country studies in this edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*.

⁵¹ CMAC, "Annual Report 2001 Final Draft 2001," pp. 80 – 83.

⁵² Speech of Daniel Asplund, Ceremony for the agreement between CMAA and Sweden, Phnom Penh, 13 December 2001.

⁵³ Provided by David Mahon, Deputy Director, HALO Trust Cambodia, 27 February 2002.

⁵⁴ Stephen Bradley, Senior Technical Advisor of MAG Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 31 January 2002.

of Pailin and Battambang from October 2001 to May 2002, followed by an extension to Pursat and Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihea and Siem Reap provinces, according to the evaluation and recommendations made by the pilot project.⁵⁵

In 2001, MAG conducted mine risk education as part of its mine action activities. Within each of MAG's Mine Action Teams, two deminers are trained to give mine risk education presentations to the villagers where MAG works. MAG Community Liaison Teams also provide mine risk education when appropriate during pre-clearance village assessments.⁵⁶

World Education developed teacher training materials on mine risk education in a national curriculum, using previous mine awareness experiences of MAG, Ministry of Education and UNICEF. From July 2000 to June 2001, the project reached 14 remote and affected districts in the North Western provinces of Cambodia (Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Siem Reap, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey). More than 2,000 teachers have been trained to use the curriculum and they have reached more than 90,000 primary school children and more than 20,000 out-of-school children.⁵⁷ In the targeted villages in the most mine-affected areas of the country approximately half the children do not attend school, so new "out-of-school" strategies had to be employed. The program was mainly funded by UNICEF.

In 2001, World Vision Cambodia provided mine risk education to 6,367 people; including children and ex-combatants in 25 villages of Rattanak Mondul and Samlot districts in Battambang province.⁵⁸

A working group on mine risk education, chaired by UNICEF and involving all concerned agencies, was formed to develop future strategies. The group found that there was still a need for MRE in Cambodia due to the high number of incidents, the continued community requests for MRE, and the slow rate of mine clearance. The group also identified issues of concern, including the lack of participation of village deminers in the planning of mine action responses, insufficient coverage of adult males, and insufficient consideration of groups at risk of mine/UXO incidents by community development projects. The group suggested that traditional mine awareness needed to broaden its approach to develop the capacity of communities to fully participate in mine action and to use the community's human resources to provide mine/UXO risk education.⁵⁹

Landmine Casualties

The Cambodia Mine UXO Victim Information System implemented by the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and Handicap International Belgium provides statistics on landmine incidents. Mine casualties in Cambodia decreased slightly in 2001, but people are still injured or killed at a rate of more than two each day.⁶⁰

In 2001, 813 people were injured or killed in mine/UXO incidents, a decrease of 34 (4%) from the previous year. Ninety-five percent of the casualties were civilians. Two hundred and thirty-two were children (28%), 516 were men (64%), and 65 were women (8%). Of the total, 173 people were killed and 640 were injured during 2001.⁶¹ Casualties continue to occur in 2002, with 343 killed or injured between January and April 2002.⁶²

⁵⁵ Interview with Reuben Noguera McCarthy, Disability Prevention Coordinator, Handicap International Belgium in Cambodia, Brussels, 26 June 2002. See also, Article 13 Report, Amended Protocol II, CCW, 10 March 2002, p.4.

⁵⁶ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 1 August 2002.

⁵⁷ Article 13 Report, Amended Protocol II, CCW, 10 March 2002, p.4.

⁵⁸ World Vision Cambodia, Mines Programme, "The Summary of Year in Report 2001."

⁵⁹ Provided by Tong Try, Director Operation of CMAC, 8 February 2002.

⁶⁰ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS), December 2001.

⁶¹ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, March 2002.

⁶² HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, April 2002.

Activities at the time of civilian mine/UXO incidents in 2001 were: tampering 39%, farming 20%, traveling 18%, collecting wood 8%, collecting food 3%, fishing 3%, herding 2% and other 7%. However, 56% of incidents involving children were caused by tampering.⁶³

The location of the mines/UXO that caused injury in 2001 were in forests 26%, in fields 16%, on roads 7%, in villages 35%, on mountains 3%, near rivers 9%, and near military bases 4%.⁶⁴

Most new mine/UXO casualties occurred in the province of Battambang (24%) followed by Banteay Meanchey (17%), Oddar Meanchey (8%), Preah Vihear (6%), Krong Pailin (7%), Kompong Cham (6%) and Siem Reap (4%). A month-by-month, province-by-province breakdown of casualties is available.

Mine/UXO Casualties in Cambodia⁶⁵

Year	Recorded Mine/UXO Casualties	Monthly Average	Every Day
1996	4,151	346 people	11 people
1997	2,170	180 people	6 people
1998	2,096	174 people	5 people
1999	1,137	95 people	3 people
2000	847	70 people	2 people
2001	813	67 people	2 people
2002 (4 mths)	343	86 people	3 people

Civilian / Military Casualties

Year	Military	Civilian
1996	60%	40%
1997	45%	55%
1998	41%	59%
1999	14%	86%
2000	7%	93%
2001	5%	95%
2002 (4 mths)	2%	98%

It is difficult to estimate comprehensively the total number of mine survivors alive today in Cambodia. However, available information suggests that from 1979 to March 2002, mines and UXO had injured or killed a total of 52,967 people. Of these casualties, 16,855 were reported as having died between January 1979 and March 2002, thus there may be around 36,000 mine/UXO incident survivors in Cambodia today.⁶⁶

In 2000, 54% of the 847 casualties were recorded as having been caused by a mine, while 46% were recorded as an incident caused by unexploded ordnance. In 2001, 51% of the 813 casualties were recorded as having been caused by a mine while 49% were recorded as being injured or killed by UXO.⁶⁷ In 2001, eight deminers were injured during clearance operations.

These figures are higher than those shown in previous Landmine Monitor Reports as data collection teams now have access to new areas and to information from survivors from earlier years.

⁶³ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, Special report prepared for Landmine Monitor, 28 May 2002.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, March 2002. The reported casualties in earlier years were higher than previously reported by Landmine Monitor as survey teams now have access to new areas and new information, which has been recorded in the database.

⁶⁶ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, March 2002.

⁶⁷ HIB/CRC Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, December 2001.

Survivor Assistance

Most assistance to landmine survivors is provided by their families. International and local NGOs provide some specialized and community services, and for those injured as soldiers, the government provides a small monthly pension.

Health care services for landmine survivors are available, but are often economically inaccessible for the individual or his/her family.

First aid is available in health centers in the provinces, but many injuries require specialized treatment. These services are controlled by the Ministry of Health and are given in government hospitals. In 2001, most mine-injured people were transported to a provincial or city hospital or to the hospital run by the NGO Emergency in Battambang. However, many casualties cannot afford to pay for medical services in the government hospitals.

Emergency Hospital Battambang provides specialist surgery to mine victims. The hospital reports 115 patients with new mine injuries in 2001, and 112 people with old mine injuries needing new surgery. Between 1998 and 2001, 892 mine injury patients were assisted.⁶⁸

The Catholic Relief Service collaborates with Trauma Care Foundation to provide training, material support, and monitoring to village health volunteers in five districts, in order to provide emergency first aid to landmine casualties and to train villagers in first aid.⁶⁹

Medical rehabilitation is available in centers, including the Para-Tetra Rehabilitation Center in Battambang, supported by Handicap International Belgium, which provides rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord injuries including landmine victims, and Angkor Hospital for Children in Siem Reap providing surgical and medical treatment for children with disabilities.

There are 16 physical rehabilitation centers in 16 of the 24 mine-affected provinces where responsibilities are taken by International Organizations and NGOs in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSALVY), which has no operational budget of its own for physical rehabilitation. Veterans International (VVAF) supports three Physical Rehabilitation Centers; four receive the support of Cambodia Trust (CT); Handicap International Belgium has supported seven Centers; two others receive the support of the ICRC and American Red Cross.

Handicap International Belgium reports that about 130 physical therapists work in hospitals. Each year 15 students are selected for a three-year training program. The Physical Therapy section receives financial support and technical training. Current efforts rely on strengthening local management, and linking networks in Asia that work on Spinal Cord Injury management. The program includes the physiotherapy school, follow-up with physiotherapists, institutional support to the National Physiotherapy Center and the Cambodian Physiotherapists Association, and the integration of physiotherapy in provincial rehabilitation centers.⁷⁰

In 2001, Veterans International provided physical rehabilitation to over 6,000 patients, of which over 1,200 were landmine survivors.⁷¹ The Cambodia Trust assisted 5,043 people, including 1,182 landmine survivors, with physical rehabilitation, psycho-social support and vocational training.⁷²

Several international organizations have taken responsibility for the production and distribution of prosthetics and wheelchairs in Cambodia.⁷³ The total number of prostheses provided in 2001 include: the American Red Cross 573, Cambodia Trust 1,182, Handicap International Belgium 1,868, VVAF 1,212, and the ICRC 6,500.

⁶⁸ Mr Hyden Lars Ake, Medical coordinator of Emergency, Battambang, 17 January 2002.

⁶⁹ Response from Catholic Relief Service to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 7 February 2002.

⁷⁰ Pierre Hublet, Handicap International, 11 March 2002.

⁷¹ Larry Warren, Country Representative, VVAF, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, March 2002.

⁷² Philip Dixon, Chairman, Cambodia Trust, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 20 February 2002.

⁷³ For additional information see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 397-398.

In addition, Handicap International Belgium distributed 2,631 crutches and produced 335 orthopedic feet. The American Red Cross distributed 405 walking aids and 554 orthoses. The American Red Cross reports 40% of persons receiving physical rehabilitation services are mine survivors.⁷⁴ The ICRC produced 7,500 pairs of walking aids.

The total numbers of wheelchairs produced in 2001 include Association for Aid Relief (AAR) 330, Jesuit Service Cambodia 867, and VVAF 455. Of these Handicap International Belgium distributed 234 wheelchairs along with 105 tricycles, Cambodia Trust distributed 183 wheelchairs, American Red Cross distributed 274 wheelchairs, ICRC distributed 166, and Jesuit Service distributed 250.⁷⁵

American Friends Services Committee (AFSC) provides physical therapy and referral services to disabled people and their families. A small percentage of the clients are disabled due to landmine injuries.⁷⁶ In 2001, the NGO, Children Affected by Mines, assisted 184 children, all of whom are mine survivors, in accessing medical care, rehabilitation and psycho-social support.⁷⁷

Accelerated learning for disabled children is provided by Marist Mission Australia. Education for deaf and blind children is provided by Krousa Thmey. Arrupe Centre Battambang, AFSC and Jesuit Service sponsor accommodation and resources for a number of disabled children so they can attend schools. Vocational Training Centers providing services to survivors include AAR, World Vision International, Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS), Jesuit Service Cambodia, Maryknoll and United Cambodian Community Development Foundation (UCC). Most agencies offer follow-up services after vocational training.

World Vision operates a unit for pre-selection of students and follow up with graduates to enhance the student's possibilities for employment after graduation. This unit addresses a variety of issues including student loans, small business skills, and work sites. An Agriculture Unit (VRAU) operates community-based agriculture training in four locations for families with and without disabled persons.⁷⁸

Organizations that help market goods produced by landmine survivors included VVAF, Maryknoll, NCDP, and Jesuit Service.

Agencies addressing psycho-social, developmental and economic needs include Action on Disability and Development (ADD), American Friends Services Committee, Cambodian Disabled People's Organisation, CMI, Handicap International Belgium, Jesuit Service, Maryknoll, Social Service of Cambodia, and TPO. ADD focuses on self-help groups.

The Business Advisory Council project in Phnom Penh, supported by the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) and other NGOs, provided training and job placement for 132 persons with disabilities in 2001, of whom a high proportion are landmine survivors.⁷⁹

Agencies search for creative ways to address the real needs expressed by landmine survivors themselves. Generally, these assist reintegration and the development of the whole mine-affected community. MOSALVY has instituted district meeting points in some provinces where disabled people can be referred, but the most vulnerable complain they are unable to reach them.

Some landmine survivors express dissatisfaction that a lot of funding goes to referral groups, and there is not enough for groups that actually provide services that directly benefit the living conditions and other needs of victims.

Various agencies including CARE, NPA, ZOA, LWS, Jesuit Service, World Vision, and Handicap International Belgium address needs of mine-affected communities and are very important in partnering communities after mine clearance is done. In this way survivors benefit

⁷⁴ George Adams, Head of Delegation, American Red Cross, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Questionnaire, Phnom Penh, 14 February 2002.

⁷⁵ Information provided by named organizations to Landmine Monitor.

⁷⁶ Answer from Roath Leakhana, country representative of AFSC, 11 January 2002.

⁷⁷ Andrea Crossland, International Adviser, Children Affected by Mines, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 19 April 2002.

⁷⁸ Chhouk Chantha, Mine Programme Coordinator in Training World Vision, Cambodia, March 2002.

⁷⁹ Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

along with the whole community. The Capacity Building of Disabled People in the Community (CABDIC) carried out by HIB includes five main activities: capacity building of the parents in children rehabilitation, school integration, disability awareness, development of self-help groups and development of a volunteers network.⁸⁰ NPA has an extensive program in Banteay Meanchey. Jesuit Service through its Metta Karuna teams implements a 12-point plan, compiled by landmine survivors to address the needs of families of survivors. It encompasses housing, water access, emergency food, schooling assistance for children, and access to health services and markets through bridges and roads.

Disability Policy and Practice

CMAA is responsible for the coordination and monitoring of assistance to mine victims, however, the Authority has delegated responsibility for coordinating victim assistance activities to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation, and the Disability Action Council, through Prakas 308/MoSALVY. The Disability Action Council is located within the Ministry of Social Action.⁸¹

The DAC's role is to bring together government, national and international agencies, business, religious groups and local communities, and people with disabilities to initiate and secure the rights and services that ensure disabled persons have equal opportunity and full participation in society. Since its establishment in 1997, DAC has consolidated a national coordinating body and focal point on disability issues for the country and internationally. However, the DAC and the Secretariat in particular, has increasingly found its capacity being stretched to the limit as it tries to respond to all the demands made on it.⁸²

The DAC's new strategic goal will be to secure legislation in favor of people with disabilities by 2004 and to initiate, enable and coordinate affiliate members and partners so that they are capable of delivering integrated and sustainable services for people with disabilities.

In 2001 and 2002, the Disability Action Council developed a Strategic plan for its Secretariat.⁸³ The plan was developed in response to: findings of the DAC External Assessment Report conducted in July 2001; recommendations of the DAC Strategic Planning Workshop held in Phnom Penh during November 2001; discussions between the DAC Secretariat and USAID; and experiences and lessons learned during the past three years. The fact that DAC is still in a process of establishing guidelines in Disability programming were taken into consideration.⁸⁴

DAC names the passing of disability legislation as its priority for 2002. The draft law is unchanged.⁸⁵

CANADA

Key developments since May 2001: Canada continued to play a key leadership role in promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It co-organized regional conferences in Malaysia, Thailand, and Tunisia. It facilitated stockpile destruction in a number of countries. It has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and coordinated the Universalization Contact Group. Government contributions to mine action programs rose significantly to C\$27.7 million (US\$17.9 million) in its fiscal year 2001/2002.

⁸⁰ Handicap International Belgium, "Operational Strategy 2003 – 2005," Cambodia, March – April 2002.

⁸¹ CMAA, *2002 Work Plan*, Phnom Penh, December 2001, p. 8.

⁸² Draft *DAC Secretariat Strategic Plan 2002-2005 and beyond*, Phnom Penh, February 2002, p.4.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 399.

Mine Ban Policy

Canada signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. National implementation legislation was enacted in November 1997 and the treaty entered into force for Canada on 1 March 1999.¹

Canada provided logistical support and financial assistance for the organization of the Third Meeting of States Parties held in Managua, Nicaragua from 18-21 September 2001. Canada's Ambassador for Mine Action, Daniel Livermore, led the delegation to the meeting and Kerry Brinkert, a member of the delegation, was named Deputy Secretary-General of the meeting. Mines Action Canada (MAC), the national NGO coalition, participated in the official delegation.

In Canada's general statement, Ambassador Livermore reaffirmed Canada's commitment to universalization, implementation, and compliance efforts of the Mine Ban Treaty.² Canada was the only delegation at the meeting that explicitly expressed concern about mine use by certain governments, including non-States Parties Angola, Myanmar (Burma), the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan.³

Canada has taken the lead in addressing issues related to implementation of the treaty's Article 8 on compliance. Ambassador Livermore noted that while progress was made over the past year, "further work is required to better understand – through the 'spirit of cooperation' that is characteristic of the Ottawa Convention – how we can use a broader set of means to clarify concerns about compliance. Canada also encourages an open dialogue on concerns about compliance as they arise, and an acceptance that we as States Parties all have a role to play in facilitating these discussions."⁴ Canada undertook extensive consultations and tabled a non-paper on Article 8 at both the January and May 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings.

Canada continued its active role in the development and execution of the intersessional work program. It participated in all the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. It co-chaired the intersessional Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, together with Honduras. Canada also helped develop a proposal to establish an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and subsequently provided funds to the ISU's operations.⁵ It agreed to continue its facilitation of the informal Universalization Contact Group. Canada remained an active contributor to the Coordinating Committee of States Parties. It continued to provide financial support to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Sponsorship Fund, which enables mine-affected states and others to participate in the Mine Ban Treaty meetings. Canada has acted as the Chair of the Sponsorship Fund since its inception in the year 2000.

On 24 April 2002, Canada submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report, for the period 16 February 2001 to 1 March 2002. The report included the optional Form J, on activities undertaken by Canada to provide for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine victims for the reporting period.⁶

Canada cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

¹ Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction; Bill C-22, Assented to 27 November 1997. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 221-224.

² Notes for a statement by His Excellency Daniel Livermore, Ambassador for Mine Action, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵ A former staff member of the Mine Action Team of DFAIT joined the ISU as Manager in January 2002.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form J, 24 April 2002.

International Promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty

In 2001 and 2002 Canada cosponsored and/or funded a number of regional meetings to familiarize states with the Mine Ban Treaty's aims and obligations, while ensuring conference participants and government officials were aware of regional or international initiatives and programs to assist with treaty obligations such as clearance or stockpile destruction.

On 8-9 August 2001, Canada co-hosted a "Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of AP Mines and Other Munitions," hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. Canada and Tunisia organized a "Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention," in Tunis from 15-16 January 2002. A "Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action," held in Kinshasa on 23 May 2002, was the result of a joint initiative with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Canada co-sponsored a three-day seminar for ASEAN states on "Landmines in South East Asia," from 13-15 May in Bangkok, hosted by Thailand. Canada assisted in preparations to hold Afghanistan's first-ever major conference on landmines in late July 2002.

Canadian officials led by General (Ret'd) Maurice Baril, former Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, visited Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Poland to discuss ratification or accession to the Ottawa Convention with defense and foreign affairs officials.

From 3-5 December 2001, Canada participated in a regional conference in Miami on "Mine Action in Latin America." It spoke at an OAS Hemispheric Security Committee session on landmines in March 2002. Canada voted in support of three OAS resolutions pertaining to mines and mine action at the fourth plenary session of the OAS in Barbados in June 2002.⁷ Canada undertook a mission to Guyana and Suriname in early May 2002 to encourage these governments to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸ Suriname subsequently ratified on 23 May 2002.

In the lead-up to the annual G8 meeting held in Kananaskis, Canada from 26-27 June 2002, Canada chaired a meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers in which they agreed to support the Afghan authorities in their work to "eliminate the threat of landmines."⁹ Prior to the opening of the G8 meeting, Ministers Graham and Whelan met with civil society groups at the alternative G6B Forum in Calgary, where Graham replied to a question from the audience on landmines by saying, "We continue our pressure both on the United States and on Russia to sign the treaty and come on board.... I also raised this with Mr. Ivanov when I've met him in terms of where Russia should be. We'll continue to work in every possible way in all fora to make sure we can remove landmines around the world."¹⁰

Canada continued to work closely with and provide financial support to the ICBL, and its Landmine Monitor initiative.

Support for stockpile destruction remained a priority. In this reporting period, Canada contributed over C\$1 million to support other countries to destroy their stockpiles. In July 2001, it provided US\$200,000 to an eight-country project sponsored by Canada and managed by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to assist Albania to destroy 1.6 million mines. The project was completed in April 2002. In a second NATO Partnership for Peace program, Canada joined Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK in jointly allocating over US\$1 million to assist Moldova to eliminate antipersonnel mines and other items.¹¹ It provided explosives to the Mines Advisory Group in Cambodia for use in destruction of mines and unexploded ordnance.¹²

Canada has also sponsored a NAMSA-managed project supported by the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary to destroy 400,000 PMN mines in Ukraine. Canadian officials visited

⁷ AG/RES.1875 (XXXII-1/02) Support for action against mines in Peru and Ecuador; AG/RES.1878 (XXXII-0/02) Support for the Program of Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines in Central America; AG/RES.1889 (XXXII-0/02) The Western Hemisphere as an antipersonnel-land-mine-free zone.

⁸ "Canada works to rid hemisphere of landmines," *Inter Press Service* (Georgetown), 9 May 2002.

⁹ "G-8 Reaffirms Support for Establishing Stable Afghanistan," *Xinhua News*, 13 June 2002.

¹⁰ Excerpt of the draft transcript of the public forum provided to Mines Action Canada in an email from the DFAIT Mine Action Team, 3 July 2002.

¹¹ Alexander Mineyev, "NATO to help Moldova eliminate toxic liquid oxidant," *Itar-Tass* (Brussels), 20 June 2001.

¹² "Canada helps Cambodia destroy landmines," *Xinhua* (Phnom Penh), 7 August 2001.

Ukraine from 3-6 February 2002 and 4-6 June 2002 to attend coordination meetings as part of the destruction agreement with Ukraine. On 25 February 2002, NAMSA and the State Commission for Defence and Industrial Complex of Ukraine signed a contract with the Ukrainian firm "Spivdruzhnist" to conduct the destruction. The preparation phase of the project began immediately and the NATO Secretary-General formally opened the project in July 2002 at the destruction facility in Donetsk, Ukraine.¹³

Canada and Australia provided funds for the Managua Challenge Fund, administered by the Organization of American States, which facilitated completion of stockpile destruction by Ecuador, Peru and Honduras prior to the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001.¹⁴ Canada also provided financial support to Yemen to complete their stockpile destruction program ahead of the treaty deadline.

Domestic Promotion and Awareness of the Mine Ban Treaty

On 3 December 2001, activities marking the anniversary of Canada's signature and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty included a photo exhibit on landmines in Ottawa attended by Senator Finestone, the Special Advisor on Landmines. Finestone announced a further contribution of C\$125,000 to the Landmine Survivors Network for its "Raising the Voices" training program for mine survivor advocates.¹⁵ DFAIT sponsored another Raising The Voices graduate, Margaret Arach of Uganda, to speak at a number of public and media events in Calgary during the G8 Summit.

During March 2002, Canadian Landmine Awareness Week (CLAW) saw over 56 events in 12 cities organized by Mines Action Canada to commemorate the anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Premier of Manitoba province, Gary Doer, declared 1 March "Landmine Mine Awareness Day" and the mayors of Halifax, Montreal, and Ottawa made similar proclamations.¹⁶ MAC arranged a speaking tour by seven youth landmine survivors, practitioners and activists from Cambodia, Colombia, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Peru. At the end of the week, these guests joined with Canadian youth from Ottawa, Montreal, and Toronto to participate in a "Youth In Advocacy" forum in Ottawa.

In 2001 and 2002, MAC continued to collaborate with DFAIT and the Canadian Red Cross in the Youth Mine Action Ambassadors Program (YMAAP).¹⁷ MAC's Technology Competition is now in its fourth year.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Canada is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. In its annual Article 13 report submitted on 15 November 2001, Canada noted that obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty "encompass and go beyond Canada's obligations as a state party to Protocol II as Amended."¹⁸ Canada attended the annual meeting of Amended Protocol II of the CCW and the Second Review Conference of the CCW, both held in Geneva in December 2001.

¹³ Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from John MacBride, DFAIT-ILX, 23 July 2002.

¹⁴ Notes for a statement by His Excellency Daniel Livermore, Ambassador for Mine Action, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18 September 2001, p. 4.

¹⁵ "Fourth Anniversary of Ottawa Convention highlights Canada's commitment to landmine survivors," DFAIT press release, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 2001.

¹⁶ "Shoes mark landmines' many victims," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 2 March 2002.

¹⁷ The program is in its fourth year and aims to keep the landmines issue dominant in the public eye. The 2001/2002 program supported Youth Mine Action Ambassadors in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, St. John's and Halifax. For detailed information on these activities, see MAC's quarterly newsletter "Landmine BANner," Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2002.

¹⁸ Article 13 Report, reporting period: 25 November 2000 to 15 November 2001.

During the Second Review Conference, Canada made several interventions on the issue of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and supported the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts to discuss ways and means to address the issue.

Following the use of cluster munitions by the US in Afghanistan, Art Eggleton, then-Minister of Defence, said, "Cluster bombs are not the same thing at all [as antipersonnel landmines]. They are allowed by the legal conventions with respect to the use of weaponry, as long as they are targeted at military installations, and that is exactly what is happening."¹⁹

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines in Canada is prohibited under national legislation.²⁰ There were no changes in government policy on the issue of transfer versus transit of antipersonnel mines in Canadian territory.²¹ A 13 February 2002 statement by the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) reiterated, "The Convention does not prohibit the transit of anti-personnel mines, which is defined as the movement of anti-personnel mines within a state, or from a state, to its forces abroad. Canada, however, discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment or personnel for the purpose of transit of anti-personnel mines."²²

Canada destroyed its antipersonnel mine stockpile in 1997, with the exception of those mines retained under the provisions of Article 3 for training and testing.²³ As of 1 March 2002, Canada retained 1,947 anti-personnel mines.²⁴

During the reporting period the Department of National Defence received 290 antipersonnel mines from the United States (180 M-14) and the former Yugoslavia (102 PMA-2 and 8 PMR-2A) for permitted purposes.²⁵

Canada expended 59 of its retained antipersonnel mines during the reporting period, including 26 of the US M-14 mines, "for research and development in countermine and humanitarian demining procedures and equipment for the training of Canadian Forces personnel." Canada has reported that it "retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines," and has provided additional details about the use of its retained mines.²⁶

There was no change in government policy on antivehicle mines and antihandling devices during the reporting period and Canada did not make any statements on the matter during Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings.²⁷

Use

The Canadian Forces (CF) are prohibited from using antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty and Canada's national implementation legislation.

¹⁹ Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, House of Commons, *Hansard*, 7 November 2001.

²⁰ Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction entered into force on 1 March 1999.

²¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 241.

²² "The Canadian Forces and Anti-Personnel Landmine," DND document BG-02.007, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/feb02/13landmines_b_e.htm, 13 February 2002.

²³ Although not codified in Canada law, Canadian policy is to maintain no more than 2,000 mines for training purposes and the testing of clearance technologies. This policy has been stated several times by the Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and is noted in the government's Article 7 reports.

²⁴ Mines retained include four Italian-made SB-33; 962 Canadian-made C3A2; 478 M16A1/2 and 154 M-14 made in the US; 39 PMA-1, 119 PMA-2 and 24 PMA-3, all manufactured in the former Yugoslavia; 63 PP-M1-NA1 made in the former Czechoslovakia; 15 VS50, 10 VAL M69 and 6 VS MK2, all made in Italy; 61 PMN-2, made in Russia; two PROM-1, one MRUD and nine PMR-2A all produced in the former Yugoslavia. Article 7 Report, Form D, 24 April 2002.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 24 April 2002, for the period 16 February 2001 to 1 March 2002. In the report, Canada provides explicit details about the intended uses of these types of mines.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ For detailed information see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, page 293.

A Canadian soldier injured in Afghanistan was reported to possess a so-called "Claymore" mine at the time of the incident.²⁸ Claymore-type directional fragmentation devices are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty when used in a command-detonated mode. The government stated that Canadian Forces were deployed to Afghanistan with the "C19 Command Detonated Defensive Weapon" and explained that "the C19 inventory...is designed to be placed on the ground, aimed and controlled by a soldier who assesses the situation and makes a deliberate decision as to detonation. The Canadian Forces does not have, nor would be permitted to have, trip-wire or victim-activating accessories for the C19 Command Detonated Defensive Weapons. All Canadian Forces in Afghanistan are instructed to act in accordance with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention."²⁹

Joint Military Operations

Canada's position on joint military operations with a non-State Party who may use antipersonnel mines was presented in great detail in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.³⁰ The DND reiterated this position in February 2002 in response to various media reports and questions surrounding Canadian Forces operating in cooperation with the US in Afghanistan.³¹

In response to a media inquiry on the issue, a CF spokesperson confirmed DND regulations that even if Canadian Forces are being commanded by other nationalities, they will not be allowed to participate in the use of, or planning for the use of, antipersonnel landmines. The official stated, "Canadian soldiers will not be involved at all in using anti-personnel landmines in Afghanistan We can't be in any way, shape or form involved in their use."³²

In December 2001, then Defence Minister Eggleton told the ICBL that "when participating in combined operations with foreign states, Canada will not request, even indirectly, the use of anti-personnel mines and will not agree to rules of engagement that authorize their use by the combined force. This would not, however, prevent states that are not signatories to the Convention from using anti-personnel mines for their own national purposes, including in Afghanistan."³³

Mine Action Funding

Canada's activities in humanitarian mine action build on the Mine Ban Treaty as the framework for mine action and, almost without exception, are structured to facilitate its universalization and full implementation. Government activities in mine action go beyond provision of funds to include promotion of regional and international cooperation, provision of technical and administrative support for mine action centers, and donations of equipment for clearance activities and protection of deminers. Canada also supported the publication of a 188-page GICHD report entitled "Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action," released at the May 2001 intersessional meetings.

²⁸ CBC Radio broadcast interviews with a Canadian soldier who thought the Claymore strapped to his back was the cause of an explosion that killed four Canadian soldiers and wounded six others. The incident happened when a US pilot dropped a bomb on Canadian soldiers practicing military maneuvers in Afghanistan. See also Krista Foss, "Wounded troops eager to return to duty," *The Globe and Mail*, 30 April 2002.

²⁹ "ILX0149: Response to Query," email to MAC from Shannon Smith, DFAIT/ILX, 2 May 2002. See also "The Canadian Forces and Anti-Personnel Landmine," DND document BG-02.007, 13 February 2002. The Canadian Forces website states that they "currently have about 20,000 C19s in stock, with no plans to purchase any more."

³⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 294-295. See previous editions also for discussion of Canada's position on joint operations and its interpretation of "assist" in Article 1. *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 244; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 221-223.

³¹ "The Canadian Forces and Anti-Personnel Landmine," DND document BG-02.007, 13 February 2002.

³² David Pugliese, "Troops could be charged for landmines violations, Canada has banned devices, US has not," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 January 2002.

³³ Letter from Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, ICBL, 20 December 2001.

The Canadian Landmine Fund, established in 1997 with total funds of C\$100 million to be allocated over a period of five years, is entering its fifth and final year.³⁴ Almost all of Canada's mine action funding comes from this fund, with other support provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

In Canada's most recent fiscal year (1 April 2001 to 31 March 2002), Canadian government funding for mine action was C\$27,693,300 (US\$17.9 million).³⁵ This included C\$19.5 million (US\$12.6 million) for mine action and victim assistance activities in 31 countries, and another C\$8.2 million (US\$5.3 million) for multilateral, regional and domestic mine action programs. In addition, Canadian non-governmental organizations contributed more than C\$1.2 million (some US\$780,000) to mine action programs worldwide.

The C\$27.7 million in Canadian government mine action spending in fiscal year 2001/2002 represents a substantial increase over the C\$21.8 million of the previous fiscal year.

In January 2002, shortly after being appointed Minister for International Cooperation, Susan Whelan participated in the Tokyo conference on aid and reconstruction in Afghanistan, where she pledged C\$100 million in financial support for Afghanistan, including for mine action programs.³⁶ Later she reported that the first phase of this funding would include C\$4 million for the United Nations Mine Action Program for Afghanistan and C\$1 million for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for "rehabilitation services for victims of landmines and for other disabled or marginalized persons."³⁷

Canadian Mine Action Recipients (FY 2001/2002)

Country	USD	CAN	Country	USD	CAN
Afghanistan	\$3,811,910	\$5,902,400	Jordan	\$129,163	\$200,000
Albania	\$98,442	\$152,500	Laos	\$228,621	\$354,000
Angola	\$129,164	\$200,000	Lebanon	\$129,164	\$200,000
Belarus	\$49,383	\$76,500	Macedonia, FYR	\$57,461	\$89,000
Bosnia	\$1,168,059	\$1,808,700	Mauritania	\$18,922	\$29,300
Cambodia	\$1,409,164	\$2,182,000	Moldova	\$52,070	\$80,600
Chad	\$96,813	\$150,000	Mongolia	\$17,618	\$27,300
Chile	\$2,906	\$4,500	Mozambique	\$1,066,661	\$1,651,600
Colombia	\$48,437	\$75,000	Nicaragua	\$332,598	\$515,000
Croatia	\$210,886	\$326,500	Sudan	\$38,421	\$59,500
DR Congo	\$27,835	\$43,100	Thailand	\$295,972	\$458,300
Eritrea	\$1,072,063	\$1,660,000	Uganda	\$117,833	\$182,500
Ethiopia	\$135,381	\$209,700	Ukraine	\$236,500	\$366,197
Guatemala	\$51,666	\$80,000	Yemen	\$83,184	\$128,800
Honduras	\$208,609	\$323,000	Yugoslavia	\$1,239,975	\$1,920,000
India	\$16,145	\$25,000	Total	\$12,581,026	\$19,480,997

³⁴ For more details, see the 48-page annual report of the Canadian Landmine Fund, *Reaffirming the Commitment*, available online at www.mines.gc.ca.

³⁵ The official exchange rate used is 1 Canadian dollar (C\$) = 1.5484 US dollar. In making the conversion the C\$ amount is often rounded off to the nearest 100 dollars.

³⁶ "Canada to help Afghanistan sign anti-land mine pact," *Kyodo News* (Tokyo) 22 January 2002.

³⁷ CIDA, "Minister Susan Whelan announces details of assistance for Afghanistan," (2002-14) News Release, Ottawa, 21 March 2002.

Canadian Mine Action Funding (FY 2001/2002)

Country	Agency	Purpose	Canadian \$	US \$
<i>Mine Clearance</i>			\$9,888,500	\$6,386,108
<i>Demining</i>			\$1,637,600	\$1,057,537
Chad	UNDP	Demining by the Chad Mine Action Centre	\$150,000	\$96,813
Chile	MUACC	Policy awareness and advocacy	\$4500	\$2,906
DR Congo	HI	Demining in Kisangani	\$43,100	\$27,835
Eritrea	UNDP	Demining capacity building	\$410,000	\$264,787
Ethiopia	UNDP	Demining capacity building	\$140,000	\$90,415
Guatemala	OAS	Demining	\$80,000	\$51,666
Jordan	Royal Corps of Engineers	Ambulances for deminers	\$160,000	\$103,331
Lao Republic	UNDP	UXO Lao	\$150,000	\$96,873
Nicaragua	OAS	Demining	\$500,000	\$322,911
<i>Dogs</i>			\$119,200	\$76,966
Bosnia-H	CIDC	Dog program I	\$19,200	\$12,384
Bosnia-H	ITF	Dog program II	\$100,000	\$64,582
<i>Equipment</i>			\$1,005,100	\$649,070
Afghanistan	Med-Eng Inc	Helmets and visors	\$300,000	\$193,746
Belarus	CIDC	Metal detectors	\$76,500	\$49,383
Cambodia	MAG	Fixor explosives	\$70,700	\$45,645
Ethiopia	HALO	Purchase of explosive equipment for demining	\$69,600	\$44,966
Macedonia	CIDC	Med-Eng suits & training	\$89,000	\$57,461
Thailand		PROMAC	\$399,300	\$257,869
<i>General/Unspecified</i>			\$3,206,000	\$2,070,510
Bosnia-H	HI	Akcija Protic Mina Project	\$422,000	\$272,537
Bosnia-H	NPA	Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance Project	\$100,000	\$64,582
Croatia	UNDP	Mine action program	\$100,000	\$64,582
Eritrea	UNMAS	Temporary security zone demining	\$250,000	\$161,455
Honduras	OAS	Demining program	\$323,000	\$208,609
Yemen	UNDP	Capacity building and info system	\$91,000	\$58,770
Yugoslavia	Danube Commission	Clearance of three bridges in Novi Sad	\$120,000	\$77,499
Yugoslavia	UNMAS/ UNMACC	Mine action program in Kosovo	\$1,800,000	\$1,162,476
<i>Mapping</i>			\$496,600	\$320,717
Mozambique	National Resources Canada	Maps	\$496,600	\$320,717
<i>Surveys</i>			\$3,161,100	\$2,041,502
Cambodia	Geospatial	Level One Survey	\$1,765,700	\$1,140,324
Eritrea	UNDP	Landmine Impact Survey	\$750,000	\$484,366
Mauritania	MAG	Assessment mission	\$29,300	\$18,922
Mozambique	CIDC	Level One Survey	\$616,100	\$397,890
<i>Training</i>			\$262,900	\$169,806
Lebanon	CIDC	Supply and train 2 mine dog detection units	\$200,000	\$129,164
Mozambique		Technical expert	\$3,900	\$2,539

Country	Agency	Purpose	Canadian \$	US \$
Thailand	CIDC	Training on equipment	\$59,000	\$38,103
<i>Integrated mine action</i>			<i>\$861,000</i>	<i>\$556,014</i>
Cambodia	World Vision	Demining, MRE, victim assistance, advocacy	\$185,000	\$119,477
Mozambique	Canadian Autoworkers		\$310,000	\$200,205
Mozambique	Canadian Autoworkers	Demining, MRE, victim assistance, advocacy	\$100,000	\$64,582
Mozambique	Canadian Red Cross	Demining, MRE and victim assistance	\$86,000	\$55,502
Uganda	Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief	MRE and victim assistance	\$180,000	\$116,248
<i>Mine awareness</i>			<i>\$569,100</i>	<i>\$367,531</i>
Colombia	UNICEF	MRE	\$75,000	\$48,437
Eritrea	UNICEF Canada	MRE	\$250,000	\$161,455
India	IIPDEP	8 seminars in NE India & posters	\$25,000	\$16,145
Uganda	MAG	Mission	\$2,500	\$1,585
International	ICRC	MRE and victim assistance	\$216,600	\$139,909
<i>Coordination</i>			<i>\$694,800</i>	<i>\$448,690</i>
Bosnia	UNDP via ITF	BHMAC	\$170,100	\$109,854
	UNDP	BHMAC	\$400,000	\$258,328
	UNDP	BHMAC technical advisor	\$100,000	\$64,582
	ITF	Administration charges	\$24,700	\$15,926
<i>Information</i>			<i>\$543,100</i>	<i>\$350,759</i>
Angola	UNDP	Database	\$200,000	\$129,164
Croatia	CIDC	Support to the mine action program	\$226,500	\$146,304
Mozambique	Consultant	Capacity building	\$29,600	\$19,105
Domestic	York University	\$12,916 to support the Canadian Mine Action Student Essay Contest; 2 consultants (\$14,854 and \$16,791) mid-term evaluation of the PAHO project; consultant (\$11,625) to evaluate Ethiopia's mine action program	\$87,000	\$56,186
<i>Victim assistance</i>			<i>\$7,229,700</i>	<i>\$4,669,112</i>
Afghanistan	Guardians Institute (Kandahar)	Rehabilitation: physiotherapy and prostheses	\$202,400	\$130,730
Afghanistan	UNOCHA	Mine action program	\$4,400,000	\$2,841,613
Afghanistan	UNDP	Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Program	\$1,000,000	\$645,821
Bosnia	Queen's University (Canada)	Mine survivors peer counseling group	\$172,700	\$111,538
	Slovenian ITF	Child mine survivors	\$300,000	\$193,746
Cambodia	Oxfam Quebec	Vocational reintegration	\$160,600	\$103,718
Jordan	LSN	Capacity building	\$40,000	\$25,832
Laos	Garneau International	Socio-economic reintegration and physical rehabilitation programs	\$204,000	\$131,748

Country	Agency	Purpose	Canadian \$	US \$
Americas	PAHO	Central America victim assistance program	\$750,000	\$484,366
<i>Advocacy and prevention</i>			\$4,225,600	\$2,728,989
<i>Campaign Support</i>			\$681,700	\$440,215
Sudan	Sudan CBL	MRE strategy	\$59,500	\$38,421
International	ICBL	Core funding	\$274,800	\$177,435
Domestic	MAC	Core funding	\$347,400	\$224,359
<i>Conference Support</i>			\$412,300	\$266,267
Mongolia	LM	Conference (June 2001)	\$27,300	\$17,618
Malaysia	MKI-Malaysia	Seminar	\$58,600	\$37,826
Nicaragua	Government	3MSP host support	\$15,000	\$9,687
Poland	MKI Poland	Conference (June 2001)	\$15,200	\$9,802
International	LSN	"Raising the Voices" program	\$221,300	142,897
International	GICHD	Delegate sponsorship program	\$75,000	\$48,437
<i>Domestic Advocacy and Outreach</i>			\$1,735,900	\$1,121,133
CLF ³⁹	CIDA, DFAIT & Public Works	Operational costs	\$1,285,700	\$830,364
Canadian Red Cross	DFAIT	Interactive landmine exhibit	\$7,000	\$4,530
Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program	DFAIT via MAC	Core funding	\$443,200	\$286,239
<i>General/unspecified</i>			\$9,500	\$6,121
Mozambique	Government	English language training	\$6,800	\$4,408
Domestic	CIDA	Administration support to mine action	\$2,700	\$1,713
<i>Monitoring/Compliance</i>			\$223,000	\$144,018
Americas		Assessment of PAHO's workplan	\$13,000	\$8,396
International	ICBL	Landmine Monitor	\$210,000	\$135,622
<i>Stockpile Destruction</i>			\$1,163,200	\$751,235
Albania	NATO	Stockpile destruction	\$152,400	\$98,442
Moldova	NAMSA	PfP stockpile destruction	\$80,600	\$52,070
Ukraine	NAMSA	PMN stockpile destruction	\$366,200	\$236,500
Yemen		Including \$3,414 (C\$5,300) to GICHD assessment mission	\$37,800	\$24,414
Americas	OAS	Managua Challenge stockpile destruction	\$476,200	\$307,518
International	GICHD	ISU	\$50,000	\$32,291
<i>Research and Development</i>			\$3,681,300	\$2,377,453
Asia/Pacific	MKI	Demining Technology Information Forum (DTIF) in Vancouver, (June 2001) to sponsor 14 delegates	\$41,300	\$26,664
Domestic	CCMAT ⁴⁰	Operating, research and development costs	\$3,640,000	\$2,350,789
TOTAL			\$27,693,100	\$17,884,656

³⁹ For advocacy and fundraising for mine clearance, including matching grants, C\$696,500 was provided to the Canadian Landmine Foundation from CIDA.

⁴⁰ Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies.

Non-governmental funding

A number of Canadian NGOs implement humanitarian mine action or provide support to mine action efforts. Responses to Landmine Monitor surveys indicate Canadian organizations are involved in mine clearance, surveys, and capacity building for these activities, as well as mine risk education and victim assistance.⁴¹

The Canadian Landmine Foundation (CLF) in 2001 directly provided C\$485,225 in funding to mine action and victim assistance projects.⁴² CLF held its “Night of a Thousand Dinners” international fundraising event on 30 November 2001; it reports that globally tens of thousands of people in 33 countries participated, raising over \$1.4 million, including C\$273,950 raised in Canada.⁴³ CLF also launched its new Canine Demine program in partnership with the Canadian International Demining Corps. It continued to promote its “Adopt-A-Minefield (Canada)” program, with projects in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, and Mozambique. They also launched the “Peacekeepers Demining Fund.”

The Canadian Red Cross continued to operate its victim assistance program in Tajikistan. From January to December 2001 the Canadian Red Cross provided C\$609,251 in funding, which accounted for about 82 percent of the center's budget.⁴⁴ Approximately 12 percent of the beneficiaries are landmine survivors. The project was extended to 31 December 2002.⁴⁵ The Canadian Red Cross will have operated the program for four years at a total cost of approximately C\$2.3 million.⁴⁶

In 2001, the Canadian Association for Mine and Explosive Ordnance Security (CAMEO) completed its second year of providing assistance to their local partner Operation Save Innocent Lives Sudan (OSIL) in southern Sudan, centered in Yei and Nimule. Total CAMEO expenditures for the project in calendar year 2001 was C\$114,466.⁴⁷ The Hamilton Conference of the United Church of Canada and the Episcopal Relief and Development Agency of the Episcopal Church of the USA provided financial support to CAMEO for the project. In 2002, CAMEO is continuing its work, with a second grant provided by the Episcopal Relief and Development, and the Ottawa Diocese of the Anglican Church of Canada.

The Canadian International Demining Corps (CIDC) operates its mine detection dog program in Bosnia and Croatia. CIDC was part of a national survey of Mozambique, which was completed in 2001.⁴⁸

The Canadian Auto Workers union supports a demining, victim assistance, mine awareness, and community rehabilitation program in Mozambique.

World Vision Canada is involved in mine risk education, survey, clearance, and capacity building in Cambodia. World Vision Canada and World Vision Cambodia run a vocational rehabilitation workshop in Cambodia.

A Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief project in Uganda supports capacity building for mine awareness educators and provides support to landmine survivors in the form of vocational training, micro-finance, and psycho-social support. The project is supported by the CLF.

UNICEF Canada is active in Lebanon with a project that provides assistance to mine survivors and their families. A project of the Sierra Club of BC providing assistance to mine

⁴¹ The surveys were mailed or emailed to more than 300 Canadian agencies and NGOs by Mines Action Canada and circulated through several listservs. It was not possible to determine through the survey responses those organizations that are no longer in existence; this is particularly true with mine clearance organizations.

⁴² Information on CLF was obtained from emails from Scott Fairweather, Vice-President, CLF, Toronto, 21 June and 24 July, and telephone interview with Scott Fairweather on 24 July 2002.

⁴³ www.1000dinners.com.

⁴⁴ Canadian Red Cross, “Dushanbe Orthopaedic Centre, Annual Report 2001,” provided in email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Michael Rudiak, Canadian Red Cross, 23 July 2002.

⁴⁵ Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Michael Rudiak, Canadian Red Cross, 23 July 2002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Jim Megill, CAMEO, 23 July 2002.

⁴⁸ “Canadian Demining Institute reports landmines in 1,700 Mozambican villages,” *Lisbon RTP Internacional Television*, 15 June 2001.

survivors in Nicaragua ended in June 2002. The Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Service continues to work with landmine and other disabled through its vocational workshops. The Fallsbrook Center in Nicaragua works with landmine survivors in a project that aims to raise basic levels of health and nutrition through small scaled organic agricultural projects.

Transparency

Canada is thorough and transparent in reporting how mine action funds are allocated both domestically and internationally. Information is provided in annual reports to Parliament, through press releases, public events, regular progress reports and publications, on departmental websites, and through a detailed financial listing available on the UN Mine Action Investments Database.⁴⁹ On behalf of the four government departments involved in mine action in Canada, the Mine Action Team of DFAIT reports to Parliament annually on activities and projects supported by the Canadian Landmine Fund. This year's annual report, *Reaffirming the Commitment* was presented to Parliament on 1 March 2001.⁵⁰

Research and Development

The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) of National Defence and Industry Canada acts as Canada's focal point for demining technologies. CCMAT has supported research and development (R&D) of several new technologies currently used in mine clearance or undergoing testing and evaluation. The BDM48 brush cutter is now in use at the Thailand Mine Action Center following successful trials.⁵¹ The Niagara Foot, developed by Niagara Prosthetics and Orthotics Corporation, started formal clinical trials in Thailand in November 2001 and should continue until December 2002; it will be informally tested in Vietnam by the Prosthetics Outreach Center. Other CCMAT R&D projects include: the hyperspectral imaging for aerial surveys using infrared wavelengths; ground penetrating radar; sonar for detection in water or flooded areas;⁵² and mechanical systems.⁵³ CCMAT shares facilities with Defence Research and Development Canada – Suffield (DRDC-Suffield), formerly known as DRES.

In March 2001, Canada commissioned GPC International to conduct a study into the global market for humanitarian demining equipment and technologies, with a specific focus on technologies supported by CCMAT. The results of the study were presented to the intersessional Standing Committee meeting on Mine Clearance and Technologies by GPC in January 2002. The report concluded that companies engaged in mine action "are looking for governments to fund research and development, production, and purchase of the finished product. In short, companies indicate that they will not take the risk of investing in this market, without a realistic expectation of a reasonable return on their investment. It is clear that companies have little confidence the market for humanitarian demining equipment and technology will provide a return on investment without substantive government support."⁵⁴

A three-year "superboot" project is a public-private sector partnership involving the University of Waterloo, protective equipment maker Med-Eng Systems Inc. and the Defence Research establishment Valcartier to create a high-tech boot to protect deminers. It is budgeted at about C\$180,000 per year.

⁴⁹ <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai>.

⁵⁰ *Reaffirming the Commitment, 2000-2001 report on the Canadian Landmine Fund*, DFAIT publication, ISBN 0-662-66200-8.

⁵¹ Test results of the BDM48 are available online at www.ccmat.gc.ca/TechReports/index.htm "CCMAT newsletter No.2."

⁵² www.guigne.com/APL-DRUMS.htm.

⁵³ "CCMAT newsletter No.2," undated, www.ccmat.gc.ca See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 295-296 and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 239-241.

⁵⁴ "Assessment of the International Market for Humanitarian Demining Equipment and Technology," GPC International, prepared for the Government of Canada, p. 51.

Landmine Casualties

While Canada is mine-free, Canadian Forces personnel have been killed or injured by mines during their work overseas. In March 2001, Canadian Forces personnel serving with the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea were involved in two landmine incidents. The first occurred on 13 March when a vehicle drove over a landmine on a road that had just been cleared by a Canadian Forces mine clearance team.⁵⁵ There were no injuries. The next day, on the same road, another Canadian vehicle set off a landmine, slightly injuring a soldier.⁵⁶

On 28 April 2002, a Canadian soldier received minor injuries while riding in a US Humvee that hit a landmine. The vehicle struck what appeared to be an antipersonnel mine while on patrol near the Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan.⁵⁷ On 23 May, an eight-wheel Bison light armored vehicle drove over a landmine near the military base in Kandahar; the six Canadian soldiers in the vehicle were not injured.⁵⁸

CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 May 2001. The treaty entered into force for Cape Verde on 1 November 2001. Cape Verde's initial Article 7 transparency report was due by 30 April 2002, but as of July 2002 had not yet been submitted.

Cape Verde did not attend the Third Meeting of the States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. It was the only ECOWAS state that did not attend the conference on "Arms and International Human Rights: CCW and the Ottawa Convention," in October 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria. Although Cape Verde is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and its Amended Protocol II, it did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to the Amended Protocol, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Cape Verde cosponsored and voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.

While Cape Verde has not officially declared the presence or absence of a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it does not maintain a stockpile of landmines.¹ Cape Verde is not a mine-affected state.² Cape-Verdian communities reside in mine-affected countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

CHAD

Key developments since May 2001: The results of the Landmine Impact Survey completed in May 2001 were published, revealing that a greater proportion of communities are severely impacted than initially projected, and their geographic distribution is unexpectedly wide. The LIS identified 417 contaminated areas covering a total of 1,801 million square meters of land; mines and UXO affect 249 communities, and a total of 284,435 persons. Chad, for the first time, revealed that it has a stockpile of 2,803 mines. It reported having destroyed 1,210 mines in June 2001 and April 2002.

⁵⁵ Steven Edwards, "Landmine blasts hit Canadians, forces ordered off road after second explosion," *National Post*, 15 March 2001; See Department of National Defence Archives at www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2001/march01/14mine2_n_e.htm.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Mike Blanchfield, "Military mum on latest Afghan mission," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 24 May 2002; "Canadian soldiers strike landmine on Afghan road," *CBC News*, 23 May 2002.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹ Interview with Luís Dupret, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 May 2000.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 62.

Chad submitted its initial Article 7 Report, dated 12 December 2001, as well as a follow-up report, dated 29 April 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Chad signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 July 1998 and ratified it on 6 May 1999. The treaty entered into force for Chad on 1 November 1999. A draft decree to establish an Interministerial High Committee¹ in charge of the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO has been prepared for the signature of the President of Chad.²

Chad participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. In Chad's statement to the Meeting, Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, coordinator of the National High Commission for Demining (HCND),³ declared his country's "firm commitment to intensify the fight against mines...."⁴ Chad also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002.

Chad submitted to the United Nations its first Article 7 transparency report, dated 12 December 2001, and a second Article 7 report, dated 29 April 2002.⁵

Chad was absent during the vote of 29 November 2001 on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The country is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties of Amended Protocol II or the Second Review Conference of the CCW, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, and Use

Chad is not known to have produced or exported mines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* had noted allegations that Chad had re-laid a handful of mines that it had cleared in the north of the country and that it had signed contracts to buy new mines; Landmine Monitor indicated then it had no independent evidence of use by Chad.⁶ At the Third Meeting of States Parties, Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir "formally" stated Chad's denial of these allegations; Bechir had also denied the accusations at the time they appeared.⁷

¹ The Interministerial High Committee will be presided by the Prime Minister and will be composed by the Minister of Economic Promotion and Development, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense and Reinsertion, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Interior and Security, the Minister of Finance, the Resident Representative of the UNDP, and the President of the Donor's Office. Its Technical Committee will be presided by the General Director of the Ministry of Economic Promotion and Development; the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be Vice-President; the committee will further be composed by the General Directors of the Ministry of Health, of Finances and of Interior, the Chef d'état Major General des Armées, two donor representatives, the Coordinator of the HCND, the Program Officer of the UNDP, the Main Technical Advisor of the HCND. A copy of the decree was given to Landmine Monitor in May 2002.

² Interview with Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, National High Commission on Demining and Representative of the Ministry of Economic Promotion and Development, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³ In French: Haut Commissariat National au Déminage.

⁴ Statement of Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, National High Commission on Demining and Representative of the Ministry of Economic Promotion and Development, at the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁵ Chad made publicly available copies of its Article 7 Reports during the May 2002 Standing Committee Meetings in Geneva. The reports are "pending input" into the UN database. The first report had been due on 29 April 2000. The reporting period for the first report is given as "Renseignements pour la période du mois de décembre 2001," and the second is "Renseignements pour la période du mois d'avril 2002."

⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 63.

⁷ Statement of Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 63.

On 21 April 2002, during Chad's parliamentary elections, the car of a senior opposition figure, Gueti Mahamat, hit a landmine as he was traveling between two polling stations on the road to Faya-Largeau airport. He died the next day. A second mine was been found nearby and has been defused. Both the authorities and the opposition Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad accuse the other of having laid the mines.⁸

Stockpiling and Destruction

Chad's initial Article 7 Report indicated that during the Landmine Impact Survey conducted from December 1999 to May 2001, 23 stockpile sites had been recorded.⁹ These stockpiles were inventoried in April 2002, and only seven were found to contain antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ Chad's second Article 7 Report, dated 29 April 2002, gave details of the stockpile of 2,803 antipersonnel mines at the seven sites.¹¹

Type	Quantity	Origin
NR442	516	Belgium
PPM2	1,460	Former East Germany
NR109	386	Belgium
NR409	441	Belgium
Total	2,803	

Chad reported that, in June 2001, 180 NR409 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed by the Chadian army with the cooperation of the French military.¹² In April 2002, another 1,030 mines were destroyed, including: 184 NR409 mines in Mongo by the Chadian and French Armies; and 700 NR409, 23 NR109, and 123 NR442 mines in Ounianga by the German NGO, HELP.¹³ The quantity of mines to be kept for training purposes will be indicated in the next Article 7 Report.¹⁴

Chad's treaty mandated deadline for completion of stockpile destruction is 1 November 2003.

Landmine Problem, Survey, and Assessment

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in Chad between December 1999 and May 2001, after a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) request to the Survey Action Center (SAC). Handicap International (HI) was the executing agent. The data was entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which in turn is analyzed and used in strategic planning processes.

The LIS identified 249 mine-affected communities, with 417 different areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).¹⁵ Most of these communities are in the north of the country and the affected areas cover a total of 1.801 million square meters. The contamination directly interferes with the livelihood and safety of at least 284,435 persons.

Of the 28 departments surveyed in Chad, 23 are mine affected. The northern departments of Borkou and Ennedi contain more than one-third of all affected communities and more than one-

⁸ "Angry, supporters of the killed opposition leader accuse the authorities," *Agence France Presse*, 25 April 2002; "Chad opposition leader dies after hitting 'terrorist' mine," *Agence France Presse*, 22 April 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 12 December 2001.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2002.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2002. There is a discrepancy in the report in that a total figure of 2,965 is given, but quantities of individual mines add up to 2,803. Chad confirmed to Landmine Monitor that 2,803 is the correct number. Email from Mahamoud Adam Bechir, 15 July 2002.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form G, 12 December 2001.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form G, 1, 29 April 2002.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Form D.

¹⁵ Mines have been found from Belgium, former Czechoslovakia, former West Germany, Italy, former Soviet Union, the United States, and former Yugoslavia. For mine details see Article 7 Report, Form C and Annex II, 12 December 2001; Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2002.

quarter of the nation's population.¹⁶ Since the survey, new mined areas have been discovered, particularly in the Lake region and the regions of Borkou and Ennedi.¹⁷ It was not possible to survey the twenty-ninth department, Tibesti in the north, because security concerns prevented operations there. The LIS reports, however, that Tibesti is probably the region most heavily contaminated with both mines and UXO.¹⁸

A greater proportion of communities are severely impacted than initially projected, and their geographic distribution is more widespread than anticipated. The northern region of the country contains 91 mine-affected communities, 37 of which are highly impacted. The eastern region has 51 affected communities, 10 of which are rated as highly impacted.¹⁹

The most affected land is pasture and agricultural land, roads and trails, as well as water resources and housing. Pastureland is an important economic resource in Chad, a nation of many nomadic tribes where livestock outnumber people. Suitable land is limited, especially in the north.²⁰

Some mine-affected areas are fenced or marked, but in other areas, local authorities have been asked to inform the population of the dangers of unmarked minefields.²¹

The LIS discovered six active military firing ranges that constitute a threat to 12 communities with a total population of 11,045 inhabitants.²² The ranges are causing about 19 casualties per year. The survey also collected information on 25 abandoned ammunition depots that are no longer in use or under control of the authorities and that represent a constant danger for the surrounding communities.²³

Mine Action Funding

In 2001, approximately \$1.3 million was provided by five donors to support mine action in Chad. Canada provided a total of US\$96,813 for the HCND via UNDP for mine clearance.²⁴ Germany provided a total of \$395,896, including \$276,032 for demining to the German NGO HELP and \$119,864 to UNOPS.²⁵ Switzerland provided \$120,000 including \$60,000 to UNDP for mine clearance and \$60,000 as an in-kind contribution to HCND/UNOPS.²⁶ The United Kingdom provided \$388,800 during its fiscal year 2000/2001.²⁷ The United States, in its fiscal year 2001, contributed \$325,000 to Chad's humanitarian demining program to purchase demining equipment and to guarantee medical evacuation by air for landmine victims.²⁸

The final budget for the Landmine Impact Survey completed in 2001 was \$1,962,065, which included a large amount of non-expendable equipment (25%). Funding for the survey was provided by the US (\$688,900), the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (\$685,100), the UK (\$352,685), SAC (\$85,380) and HI (\$150,000).²⁹

¹⁶ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," pp. 14-19.

¹⁷ HCND, "National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO: 2003-2015." A copy was provided to Landmine Monitor in May 2002.

¹⁸ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," p. 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 13-19, 37-40.

²¹ Article 7 Report, Form I, 12 December 2001.

²² "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," p. 25.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁴ UNMAS, Mine Action Investments Database, at www.mineaction.org.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Hansard*, 29 March 2001, col. 723W, and 21 March 2002, col. 471W.

²⁸ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety, the United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 3.

²⁹ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," p. 73.

Chad's projected mine action budget for 2002 is \$3,821,500,³⁰ and the government of Chad has allocated \$915,714 for the HCND for its 2002 budget.³¹ For 2003, the projected mine action budget is \$5,070,000.³²

Chad's "National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO 2003-2015" has a total estimated budget of \$76 million. This figure anticipates all mine action related needs, including landmine survivor assistance.³³

At the intersessional Standing Committee meeting on Mine Clearance in May 2002, the head of the Chadian delegation questioned the way the European Commission was using its funds for research and development. He underlined the need for "more effective, affordable and simple technologies that would help countries to meet their targets."³⁴

Coordination and Planning

The Interministerial Committee, assisted by its Technical Committee, will oversee the National High Commission on Demining. The HCND, part of the Ministry of Economic Promotion and Development, has staff at headquarters, at its regional office in Faya Largeau, and at the national training school in N'djamena.³⁵ It consists of five operational units, including one for mine clearance, two for UXO clearance, and two for both mine and UXO clearance.³⁶ The Donor's Committee provides advice and guarantees transparency in management.³⁷

After the LIS survey, Chad developed a "National Strategic Plan To Fight Mines and UXO: 2003-2015," to be coordinated by HCND and implemented through Annual Action Plans. The goal is to free the country of the impact of mines and UXO before the end of 2015, defined as: "a country in which mines blocking the access to infrastructure (houses, routes and wells), to water, to pasture and agricultural land, will have been cleared or where these will be made accessible through marked corridors; where every mined area preventing the implementation of development programs or where the access to vital areas is denied to the communities, will have been treated; where all not-cleared areas will have been marked; where populations living in or close to those areas keep on benefiting from sensitization programs; where demining capacity is maintained to clear and mark where needed."³⁸

In 2001-2003, national mine action is focusing on mine risk education, surveying and marking of mine-affected areas, clearance of N'djamena and Faya Largeau and their surroundings, staff capacity building and quality control, and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by inventorying Chad's stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, planning their destruction and determining the number to retain for training purposes, and contributing to the national and international call for a mine-free world.³⁹

It is also targeting the re-opening of the most important axes in the Tibesti region, opening a regional center in Bardai and organizing medical air evacuation.⁴⁰ Since June 1998, UNDP has provided technical assistance and capacity building programs to government and HCND staff

³⁰ HCND, "Preparatory Document to the Third Meeting of State Parties of the Ottawa Convention," p. 23.

³¹ Interview with Moussa Ali Sountali, Program Administrator, HCND, N'djamena, 5 February 2002.

³² HCND, "National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO: 2002-2015."

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Statement of Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 65-66.

³⁶ HCND, "Annual Workplan: 2002-2003." A copy was provided to Landmine Monitor in May 2002.

³⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 65-66.

³⁸ HCND, "National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO: 2003-2015."

³⁹ HCND, "Preparatory Document to the Third Meeting of State Parties of the Ottawa Convention," pp. 19-20.

⁴⁰ HCND, "Annual Workplan: 2002-2003."

responsible for the implementation of the National Strategic Plans.⁴¹ Chad is seeking also technical assistance for the IMSMA database.⁴²

Mine Clearance

Chad's mine action program was developed in three phases. First the HCND was established, as well as mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. Then, the Landmine Impact Survey was carried out. The third phase has entailed deploying mine clearance assets to the areas identified as mine action priorities by the government. The first such clearance area was Faya Largeau, where the German NGO, HELP, is the primary implementing partner.⁴³

Based on the LIS, one-quarter of the estimated mine-contaminated area is flat land with little to no vegetation and presents the lowest degree of difficulty for clearance. Two-fifths of the contaminated land has rugged features with some vegetative cover or moving sand dunes and presents significant obstacles for mine clearance.⁴⁴

Initiatives taken by local people to clear mines and UXO themselves constituted the most important "mine action" activity in the two years prior the completion of the Landmine Impact Survey. Often, to prevent incidents or access by others, local communities have placed these devices in a "safe" place such as a river or stream, a hollow tree, or specially dug hole. More than one in ten communities have resorted to such informal "mine action" activities.⁴⁵

During 2001 and 2002 HELP has been the only NGO carrying out mine action programs in the Chad. HELP uses 70 local specialists, with one French supervisor.⁴⁶

According to Chad's Article 7 reports, a total of 5,241 antipersonnel mines were destroyed from June 2000 to April 2002. Between June 2000 and November 2001, a total of 4,189 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the departments of Ounianga Kébir (808), Faya (30), Iriba (1) and Waddi-doum (3,350).⁴⁷ Between February and April 2002, another 972 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in Ouanianga Kébir.⁴⁸

An HCND report on the results of mine clearance operations between 26 September 2000 and 1 June 2002 states that 645,663 square meters of land were demined, destroying 2,228 antipersonnel mines, 2,112 antivehicle mines and 28,781 UXO.⁴⁹

The HCND has developed a project to clear the Tibesti region, which will require the creation of a regional commission for demining in Bardai, with a clearance unit, survey teams, mine risk education projects, and medical evacuation capabilities.⁵⁰ Chad is seeking international assistance to be able to carry out the project.

⁴¹ Ministry of Economic Promotion and UNDP, "Support for the implementation of the National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO: 2002-2005, Project Document."

⁴² Interview with Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴³ UNDP, "Support to the Mine Action Programme in Chad," at http://www.mineaction.org/misc/dynamic_overview.cfm?did=50.

⁴⁴ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," p. 44.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴⁶ Email from Markus Haake, Germany, 24 June 2002, providing information from Birgitte Schulze, Project Coordinator, HELP, Germany.

⁴⁷ Article 7 Report, Form G, 12 December 2001. The Article 7 report totals the clearance as 4,269 antipersonnel mines however when Landmine Monitor calculated clearance by department the total came to 4,189.

⁴⁸ Article 7 Report, Form G, 29 April 2002.

⁴⁹ HCND, "Results of the Mine Clearance Operations in Chad between 26 September 2000 and 1 June 2002." In the report, another 765,284 square meters of land is listed as "Superficie depolluee," and an additional 988,066 square meters is listed as "Superficie controlee."

⁵⁰ HCND, "Project for clearance of the Tibesti region." A copy was provided to Landmine Monitor in May 2002.

Mine Risk Education

In the two years prior to the completion of the Landmine Impact Survey, only five out of the 249 contaminated communities reportedly benefited from any kind of mine risk education (MRE).⁵¹ At the intersessional Standing Committee meeting on Mine Clearance in Geneva on 29 May 2002, the head of the Chadian delegation stated that all clearance should be accompanied by MRE programs and that MRE experts should be integrated in all mine action teams.⁵²

The Landmine Impact Survey reported that many people sustain injuries as a result of tampering with weapons, and especially with UXO. The LIS concluded that there is a need for a focused mine risk education program to reduce tampering with munitions, and a targeted effort to destroy highly concentrated UXO "caches."⁵³

After the Landmine Impact Survey, HCND initiated mine risk education campaigns in the affected communities; these are carried out before demining or destruction of mines.⁵⁴ In June 2002, after meetings between UNICEF and the coordinator of Chad's mine action program, it was agreed to update the current mine risk education proposal for the country, "in light of the recently completed results of the mine/uxo economic impact survey...."⁵⁵

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, comprehensive data on new mine/UXO casualties is not available. Following the completion of the Landmine Impact Survey in May 2001, no on-going data collection system has been initiated. According to HCND, it occasionally receives reports of new casualties, but lacks resources to set up and maintain a database.⁵⁶ The Landmine Impact Survey recorded two incidents in 2001, one in January and one in May. In the incidents, five people were killed and five injured, including eight children.⁵⁷

Between January 1998 and May 2001, 339 casualties were reported: 122 were killed and 217 injured, of whom 87 percent were men. The fatality rate was 39% for males and 18% for females. Among both men and women, the age group most affected is 5-29 years old, with 260 of the recorded casualties. Of the total of 295 male casualties, 286 were civilians. Activities at the time of the mine/UXO incidents were: tampering 121, herding 73, traveling 48, farming 28, playing 15, military activities 9, housework 8, collecting food/water 5, and 32 casualties while engaging in other activities or unknown.⁵⁸ Of the 339 recent casualties, 39 were as a result of incidents involving abandoned munitions/UXO on military firing ranges.⁵⁹

Landmine/UXO Casualties 1 January 1998 to 1 May 2001⁶⁰

	Total	Killed	Injured	Male	Female	Child (M or F)	Civilian	Military
1998	104	29	75	95	9	28	98	6
1999	148	60	88	128	20	43	148	0
2000	76	27	49	61	15	31	75	1
2001 ⁶¹	10	5	5	10	0	8	10	0
Unknown	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
	339	122	217	295	44	110	330	9

⁵¹ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," p. 42.

⁵² Statement of Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁵³ "Landmine Impact Survey, Executive Summary," pp. 3-4, 7.

⁵⁴ Interview with Moussa Ali Sountali, Program Administrator, HCND, N'Djamena, 5 February 2002.

⁵⁵ Mine Action Support Group, "June Newsletter," New York, 14 June 2002, p. 22.

⁵⁶ Interview with Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁵⁷ Landmine Monitor analysis of Landmine Impact Survey "Recent Victims" data.

⁵⁸ "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad," pp. 31-34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶⁰ Landmine Monitor analysis of Landmine Impact Survey "Recent Victims" data. Due to discrepancies between various sources, the number of civilian casualties each year add to one more than the total of 330.

⁶¹ Only two incidents were recorded; one in January and one in May.

The number of “victims of less recent date” as recorded by the Landmine Impact Survey totaled 1,349 casualties, of which 703 were killed and 646 injured.⁶² Of 249 communities surveyed, 180 reported a history of mine incidents.⁶³ No data is available for the Tibesti region in the north.

In 2001, no casualties have been reported during demining operations.⁶⁴

On 21 April 2002, during the parliamentary elections, a senior opposition figure, Gueti Mahamat, was killed when the car in which he was traveling hit a landmine on the road to Faya-Largeau airport.⁶⁵

Survivor Assistance

In Chad, medical care and rehabilitation services for mine casualties remain rudimentary.⁶⁶ According to the Landmine Impact Survey, of recent casualties not killed immediately in the incident, 181 received some form of emergency care; however, no survivors reported receiving physical rehabilitation or vocational training. Eighteen survivors reported receiving no care. As a result of their wounds and type and level of care they received, 45 of the survivors had amputation of the upper limbs and 17 of the lower limbs. In addition to the victims with upper limb amputations, another 20 victims reported losing all or some of their fingers. Sixteen survivors are now blind and another ten lost partial sight. Another 119 sustained other types of injuries, mostly burns or fractures, with a few cases of paralysis reported. Only six survivors were permanently incapacitated by their injuries, however, a significant number reported being unable to earn an income due to their injuries.⁶⁷

The HCND has one old ambulance to evacuate mine victims to the hospital at Faya.⁶⁸ However, under an informal agreement, all Chadian and French airplanes are obliged to carry landmine casualties free of charge.⁶⁹ U.S. funding for Chad’s Mine Action Program includes funds to support medical evacuation by air.⁷⁰ The French army operates a surgical unit at the military hospital in N’Djamena with the capacity to assist mine victims.⁷¹ The military hospital also provides continuing medical care for mine survivors. Other hospitals or health centers reportedly do not have the capacity to do so.⁷²

In September 2001, first aid training was organized in Faya Largeau by the Chadian Army Medical Service and the ICRC to enhance participants’ knowledge in the areas of treating the war-wounded, emergency care, and preparing casualties for evacuation.⁷³ The ICRC supplied the army’s medical facilities in Faya Largeau with two dispensary tents, three hospital beds and 50 blankets and medical supplies. In October 2001, the Ministry of Defense and the ICRC organized a war-surgery seminar for 24 civilian and military surgeons from the main hospitals in N’Djamena, Faya Largeau, Abéché, and Sarh, to enable participants to improve their skills in war-surgery techniques.

SECADEV, a Catholic development organization, works with the ICRC, to provide physical rehabilitation services for amputees at their prosthetic/orthotic center in the capital, N’Djamena. In 2001, with financial support from the ICRC, the center was renovated and 94 landmine survivors

⁶² “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad,” p. 31.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁴ Interview with Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁶⁵ “Chad opposition leader dies after hitting ‘terrorist’ mine,” *Agence France Presse*, 22 April 2002.

⁶⁶ Interview with Moussa Ali Sountali, Program Administrator, HCND, N’Djamena, 5 February 2002.

⁶⁷ “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Chad,” p. 34.

⁶⁸ Information provided by Moussa Ali Sountali, Program Officer, and Tahir Togou Djmet, HCND, on the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration Questionnaire on Landmine Victim Assistance, 31 May 2002.

⁶⁹ Interview with Moussa Ali Sountali, Program Administrator, HCND, N’Djamena, 5 February 2002.

⁷⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 65.

⁷¹ Interview with Alasoum Bedoum, Program Officer, UNDP, N’Djamena, 8 February 2002.

⁷² Information provided by Moussa Ali Sountali, and Tahir Togou Djmet, 31 May 2002.

⁷³ ICRC (Geneva), *Special Report, Mine Action 2001*, July 2002, p. 17.

were fitted with artificial limbs. The ICRC also arranged for nine amputees from Faya Largeau to be airlifted to the center to be fitted with prostheses, with the costs of their 14-day stay fully covered by the ICRC. The ICRC works in partnership with the HCND to identify beneficiaries for its amputee assistance program.⁷⁴

Authorities report that, due to a lack of resources, insufficient effort has been made to address the needs of landmine survivors for physical and psycho-social rehabilitation and economic reintegration. International assistance and expertise is needed for infrastructure, capacity building and rehabilitation programs.⁷⁵ It is also acknowledged that mine survivors, and other persons with disabilities, are stigmatized both at the private and public level.⁷⁶

CHILE

Key developments since May 2001: Chile ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 10 September 2001. The Chilean Army destroyed 14,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 13 September 2001. Chile has announced that 50 percent of its stockpile will be destroyed by August 2002, and the rest by the end of 2003. A National Demining Commission has been established. Landmine Monitor field research has revealed problems with inadequate fencing and warning signs for minefields in some areas.

Mine Ban Policy

Chile signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 10 September 2001. The treaty entered into force for Chile on 1 March 2002. A promulgation of the Mine Ban Treaty was signed on 4 January 2002, and was published in the Official Gazette on 9 March 2002. This decree makes the Mine Ban Treaty binding domestically, but does not include penal sanctions or other measures specifically aimed at implementing the provisions of the treaty.¹

Chile's initial Article 7 transparency report is due by 28 August 2002.

Chile attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001 as an observer. During the general exchange of views, Chile stated its commitment to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty's requirements as soon as possible.²

On 9 September 2001, the Chile-Perú Permanent Committee on Consultations and Policy Coordination, which was established in July 2001, met for the first time, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of both countries participating.³ One of the first measures agreed on was to hold simultaneous stockpile destruction events on 13 September 2001 in Calama, Chile and Pucusana, Perú.⁴ The Ministers agreed on a ten-point declaration that included a commitment to eradicate landmines from their common border as soon as possible.⁵

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Interview with Lt. Col. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, Coordinator, HCND, Geneva, 29 May 2002; information provided by Moussa Ali Sountali and Tahir Togou Djmet, 31 May 2002.

⁷⁶ Information provided by Moussa Ali Sountali and Tahir Togou Djmet, 31 May 2002.

¹ Promulga la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Empleo, Almacenamiento, Producción y Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción Normas Generales, Diario Oficial Documento 4, 2002, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 9 March 2002.

² Luis Winter, head of Special Policy at the Ministry Foreign Affairs, "Intervención de jefe de la delegación de Chile a la III Reunión de Estados Partes de la Convención de Uso, Almacenamiento, Producción y Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción," Managua, 19 September 2001.

³ "Dan primer paso reducir gastos militares," *El Comercio* (Lima), 10 September 2001.

⁴ "Dan primer paso reducir gastos militares," *El Comercio* (Lima), 10 September 2001; Patricia Kadena, "Chile ratifica que comprará más aviones F16 y fragatas," *La República* (Lima), 10 September 2001; "Simbólica destrucción de minas," *El Mercurio de Calama*, Calama, Chile, 13 September 2001; "Ejército destruye 14,000 minas antipersonales en el norte de Chile," *Agence France Presse* (Calama), 13 September 2001.

⁵ "Cancilleres y ministros de Defensa de Perú y Chile acuerdan erradicar minas," *Agence France Presse* (Lima), 9 September 2001.

In November 2001, Chile voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had done on similar pro-ban resolutions in recent years. During the UNGA First Committee debate, Chile announced its ratification of the treaty, reiterated its commitment to converting the region to a mine-free zone and stressed the need for universalization of the treaty.⁶

In late November 2001, Soledad Alvear, Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed that "human security" be addressed regionally, and cited the campaign to eliminate landmines as an excellent example of how to tackle an issue that affects individual countries, but that also has regional and international transcendence.⁷

Chile attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, with representatives from its Geneva mission and the Ministry of Defense.

Some Chilean politicians have voiced concern that before initiating mine clearance efforts, Chile first needs to determine new ways to efficiently defend its borders. In November 2001, Senator Julio Canessa said landmines are necessary to protect Chile against possible aggression from neighboring countries, and also said that because mines are laid in unpopulated areas, the only civilians hurt by them are those trying to avoid border controls.⁸ During fieldwork in mine-affected regions, Landmine Monitor encountered similar attitudes. One border control police lieutenant said Chile would be defenseless once the mines are removed from the border.⁹

Chile is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but participated in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, as an observer, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, both in Geneva in December 2001.

The Institute for Political Ecology (IEP, Instituto de Ecología Política) joined the ICBL in December 2001. It has published a series of articles about Chile's landmine problem on its website.¹⁰ In December 2001, IEP offered to host the 2002 regional Landmine Monitor and ICBL meeting in Chile during the Fifth Meeting of Defense Ministers of the Americas (18-23 November 2002).

Production, Transfer, and Use

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines since 1985.¹¹ It had previously produced at least six different types of antipersonnel mines.¹² Both the Army's Fabricaciones Militares (FAMAE) and Industrias Cardoen, a private company, manufactured the mines.¹³ In 1975, Chile imported 300,000 M-14 antipersonnel mines from the United States.¹⁴ On 26 April 1999, Chile declared an official moratorium on the production, export, and use of new antipersonnel mines.¹⁵

⁶ Statement by Ambassador Juan Enrique Vega, Permanent Representative of Chile to the Conference on Disarmament, to the Fifty-Fifth Session of the UNGA First Committee-General Debate, New York, 10 October 2001, p. 3.

⁷ "Canciller inauguró seminario internacional de seguridad humana," press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 November 2001.

⁸ "Canessa: Cómo defenderse sin minas antipersonales," *El Mostrador* (Santiago), 14 November 2001.

⁹ Interview with Lieutenant Eric Huaita, Border Control Police, Colchane, 26 December 2001.

¹⁰ On 21 January 2002, for example, IEP publicly denounced broken and non-existent fencing at the Portezuelo Cerro Capitán minefield in northern Region I. See www.iepe.org/econoticias.

¹¹ Response by the Chilean Foreign Ministry to *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, provided by the Chilean Ambassador to Uruguay, Augusto Bermúdez Arancibia, 2 February 1999.

¹² For details and types see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 290.

¹³ Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 19 November 1999.

¹⁴ US Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.

¹⁵ Gobierno de Chile, Declaración Oficial, "Moratoria unilateral en la producción, exportación, importación, e instalación de nuevas minas terrestres antipersonal," Santiago, 26 April 1999; Letter from María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Jean-Benoît Burrión, Director General, Handicap International (Belgium), dated 31 August 2000.

Stockpiling and Destruction

The total number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Chile will be made known when it submits its Article 7 Report (due 28 August 2002). Estimates of 22,000 and 25,000 stockpiled mines have been given to Landmine Monitor in the past.¹⁶

At the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 30 May 2002, Chile stated that 50 percent of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines would be destroyed by August 2002 and the remaining half would be destroyed before the end of 2003, more than two years before the four-year treaty deadline of 1 March 2006.¹⁷ Chile also stated that it had already destroyed 16,000 antipersonnel mines. On 6 November 2000, the Chilean Navy destroyed 2,000 M-16 (US) antipersonnel mines in Puerto Aldea in Region IV, at a cost of US\$50,000.¹⁸ On 13 September 2001, the Chilean Army destroyed 14,000 M-14 (US) and M-35 (Belgium) antipersonnel mines in Calama.¹⁹

The Calama destruction took place at the same time as an event in Pucusana, Perú, which marked completion of Perú's stockpile destruction. The events were intended to symbolize the desire of both countries to reduce defense spending.²⁰ The Commander-in-Chief of Chile's Army Ricardo Izurieta, Minister of Defense Mario Fernández, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Soledad Alvear, presided over the event. Alvear described the destruction as showing Chile's commitment to peace, security, human rights, and its rejection of violence and terrorism.²¹

Landmine Problem

Chile has a significant landmine problem, but no systematic or comprehensive assessment or survey has taken place to determine the extent of the problem or the impact on civilians living in mine-affected areas. The Army has reported 293 minefields, located in Regions I and II in the north of the country, and in Region XII in the south, potentially affecting 17 municipalities, including three major urban centers (Arica, Calama, and Antofagasta).²²

The National Forestry Service (CONAF) again confirmed to Landmine Monitor that there are mined areas in six government-protected wilderness areas in Regions I, II, and XII.²³ In addition, an explosive object was found in Villarica National Park in Region IX, far from the park's publicly accessible areas; it is unknown if the object was an antipersonnel mine.²⁴ No park rangers or visitors have ever been injured or killed by landmines.²⁵

¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 393.

¹⁷ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW) of intervention by Chile to Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

¹⁸ Interview with Captain Cristián Rudloff Álvarez, Chilean Navy, Buenos Aires, 7 November 2000; Interview with Verónica Chain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December 2000.

¹⁹ "Ejército efectuará destrucción de minas antipersonales," Press release by Army of Chile, 11 September 2001, "Simbólica destrucción de minas" *El Mercurio de Calama* (Calama), 13 September 2001, "Ejército chileno destruyó 14 mil minas antipersonales" *El Mercurio* (Santiago) source credit: *Associated Press*, 13 September 2001, "Ejército destruye 14.000 minas antipersonal en el norte de Chile" *Agence France Presse* (Calama), 13 September 2001, "Detonaron 14 mil minas antipersonales" *El Mercurio de Antofagasta* (Antofagasta), 14 September 2001.

²⁰ "Chile ratifica que comprará más aviones F16 y fragatas" *La República* (Lima), 10 September 2001, "Dan primer paso para reducir gastos militares" *El Comercio* (Lima), 10 September 2001.

²¹ "Ejército elimina 14 mil minas de sus depósitos" *La Tercera* (Santiago), 14 September 2001, "El ejército destruye minas en el norte" *El Mercurio* (Santiago) 14 September 2001.

²² "Financiamiento detiene desminado," *La Estrella de Arica* (Arica), 10 April 2001; telephone interview with Elir Rojas, Andes Sur Action Team, 3 May 2001. For a detailed description of mined areas in Regions I and II, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 395-397.

²³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 398.

²⁴ Letter to Elir Rojas, Director, MUACC from Carlos Weber, Executive Director, CONAF, ref: 215, 1 August 2001.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Landmine Monitor visited a series of minefields in Region I in northern Chile. At the “Portezuelo Cerro Capitán” minefield, 83 kilometers from Colchane, many signs and fences identifying the land as a mine-affected had been destroyed or cut down, apparently quite recently, meaning that any person or animal could enter.²⁶ The minefield was laid right up to the edge of both sides of an interior road that connects two Aymara communities.

At the “Paso Huailla” minefield, 48 kilometers from Colchane, fencing and signs were in an acceptable state.²⁷ At the “Paso Apacheta de Tillujalla” minefield, 79 kilometers from Colchane, Landmine Monitor observed very old signs with fencing that looked new, but loose.²⁸ At the “Apacheta de Oje” minefield, 86 kilometers from Colchane, the signs and fencing were new and in good condition.²⁹

Landmine Monitor field researchers were told in northern Chile that animals grazing along the border are still stepping on landmines and being killed, thereby affecting the local economy.³⁰

Landmine Monitor field research in Region XII in southern Chile verified a number of minefields located in strategic areas throughout the region. However, local people do not consider these minefields to be a problem, and no mine incidents have been reported in this region. No one interviewed considered landmines as a hindrance to economic activity, since the minefields are generally located on private land used for sheep and cattle grazing, and the area of land is so enormous (92,000 hectares, for example), that if two hectares are mined, it makes almost no difference.³¹

Minefields are such a part of daily life in Region XII that everyone notices them, but almost nobody knows they could possibly be dangerous. Some fields are located adjacent to highways. The worst incidents involving landmines concern livestock that enter mined areas. All of the minefields viewed during the field research were double-fenced, although some were not very well marked. In general, the marking and fencing was in much better condition than that observed in the north of the country.³²

Mine Action Funding & Coordination

On 3 October 2001, the Chilean government announced the creation of a National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional del Desminado, CNAD), which has been allocated a budget of CLP\$90 million (US\$130,000) for the year 2002 to cover administrative and start-up fees.³³ The official decree creating CNAD is dated 2 May 2002, and CNAD was officially registered with the Comptroller General’s Office on 18 June 2002.³⁴

²⁶ Officer Castillo told Landmine Monitor said that he had done an inspection two months earlier, in November 2001, and the fencing was in good condition then. Landmine Monitor field visit to “Portezuelo Cerro Capitán” minefield, 15 January 2002.

²⁷ Landmine Monitor field visit to “Paso Huailla” minefield, 15 January 2002.

²⁸ Landmine Monitor field visit to “Paso Apacheta de Tillujalla” minefield, 26 January 2002.

²⁹ Landmine Monitor field visit to “Apacheta de Oje” minefield, 25 January 2002.

³⁰ Field visits by Landmine Monitor researcher Fabiola Fariña to Panavinto, Ancovinto, Cariquima, Huaitane, Chuyuncane, Parajalla, and Colchane. At the “Portezuelo Cerro Capitán” minefield, Landmine Monitor saw the carcass of a llama that died in the year 2000 after an antivehicle mine exploded.

³¹ Interview with Manuel Oyarzún, resident of San Gregorio and member of the 92,000-hectare San Gregorio sheep and cattle cooperative, 7 March 2002.

³² Landmine Monitor field visit to minefields in Region XII in San Gregorio, Puerto Natales, Río Verde and Punta Delgada, 5-10 March 2002.

³³ “Gobierno creará organismo técnico para desminar frontera,” *El Mercurio*, 3 October 2001; “Defensa crea organismo para eliminar minas antipersonales,” *El Metropolitano* (Santiago), 4 October 2001.

³⁴ “Decreto de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Desminado (CNAD),” 2 May 2002; “Decreto Supremo de la Subsecretaría de Guerra #79,” 18 June 2002; telephone interview with Coronel Patricio Rojas, Santiago, 24 July 2002.

The purpose of CNAD is to coordinate mine clearance and stockpile destruction, to establish strategies and priorities for a national mine action plan, and to receive and distribute any funding from external sources.³⁵

In late October 2001, Defense Minister Fernández told the Senate Defense Commission that the total cost for eliminating all mines in Chile is estimated at US\$324 million, including US\$120 million for demining, US\$123 million for defense items to substitute for mines, and US\$81 million for “symbolic” demining.³⁶ Earlier estimates recorded by Landmine Monitor ranged from US\$250million to US\$300 million.³⁷

Mine Clearance

When announcing establishment of the National Demining Commission, Defense Minister Fernández said he is aware that the ten-year period stipulated for mine removal can be renewed, but it is Chile’s goal is to complete mine clearance in the first ten years.³⁸

However, no mine clearance is planned for 2002.³⁹ The most recent mine clearance took place in April 2001, when Chilean Army engineers demined a small area of land near the border with Perú.⁴⁰ Landmine Monitor did not obtain any other reports of Chilean mine clearance operations in 2001 or 2002.

On 8-9 September 2001, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers of Perú and Chile agreed to clear all mines from the Chile-Perú border as a demonstration of confidence and transparency.⁴¹ The Chile-Perú joint Security and Defense Committee (COSEDE, Comité de Seguridad y Defensa) met on 26 March 2002 and reiterated the clearance goal, and Chile stated it was developing a comprehensive plan to remove its mines from the Peruvian border.⁴²

Mine Risk Education

No official government or NGO mine risk education programs are believed to be available in Chile. IEP has begun discussions with the mayors of Chile’s mine-affected towns to establish a network of municipalities to organize landmine awareness and prevention seminars and workshops.⁴³

In July 2001, the Army’s First Division published and started to distribute a full-color bilingual (English-Spanish) brochure called “Seguridad y Prevención” (Safety and Prevention) for tourists visiting Region II. It includes ten recommendations on how visitors can avoid mine accidents. The publication states that all minefields are well marked and fenced, but notes that

³⁵ Landmine Monitor meetings with Ramón Hormazábal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 November 2001, and Colonel Patricio Rojas, Ministry of Defense, 23 January 2002. Ramón Hormazábal is coordinating the commission’s creation for the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Colonel Rojas does the same at the Defense Ministry.

³⁶ “Gobierno gastará cerca de US\$320 millones en desactivar minas antipersonales,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 29 October 2001; “Gobierno anuncia fuerte inversión para destruir minas antipersonales,” *La Tercera* (Santiago), 29 October 2001; “Informe de la Comisión de Defensa Nacional, recaído en la solicitud de la Sala del Senado, en cuanto a estudiar los aspectos técnicos y de costo de la aplicación de la “Convención sobre la prohibición del empleo, almacenamiento, producción y transferencia de minas antipersonal y sobre su destrucción”, adoptada en Oslo, Noruega, el 18 de septiembre de 1997. Boletín No S 594-10, Senate Defense Commission report, 9 October 2001.

³⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 399.

³⁸ “Defensa crea organismo para eliminar minas antipersonales,” *El Metropolitano*, 4 October 2001.

³⁹ “Gobierno creará organismo técnico para desminar frontera,” *El Mercurio*, 3 October 2001; “Defensa crea organismo para eliminar minas antipersonales,” *El Metropolitano*, 4 October 2001.

⁴⁰ Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 400.

⁴¹ “Cancilleres y ministros de Defensa de Perú y Chile acuerdan erradicar minas,” *Agence France Presse* (Lima), 9 September 2001.

⁴² “Perú presenta plan para medir gastos en defensa con Chile,” *Agence France Presse* (Santiago), 27 March 2002; “II Reunión del Comité de Seguridad y Defensa del Perú y Chile (Cosede),” Press release from the Peruvian Defence Ministry, 26 March 2002, points #3 and #6.

⁴³ Interview with IEP Director Manuel Baquedano, 2 April 2002.

mines can shift due to heavy rains, and recommends that visitors stay on roads at all times. It also provides emergency phone numbers for military regiments and hospitals in the area.⁴⁴

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, three civilians were injured and one military officer was killed in landmine incidents. No mine casualties were reported in the first quarter of 2002.

On 7 April 2001, a 23-year-old Peruvian civilian lost his right leg to a landmine while attempting to enter Chile illegally near Quebrada de Escritos to look for work.⁴⁵

On 3 September 2001, a 31-year-old civilian received serious stomach and leg injuries after stepping on an “explosive artifact” inside the boundary of the Quilmo military training field in Chillán, Region VIII. According to a report by the Third Division of the Army, Ortíz had crossed into a training field despite the fact that it was well marked.⁴⁶

On 6 November 2001, a 34-year-old Peruvian civilian severely damaged both his legs after stepping on an antipersonnel landmine when trying to enter Chile illegally at Quebrada de Escritos.⁴⁷ Once released from the hospital, Chilean officials arrested him for illegally entering the country.

On 9 November 2001, a Chilean explosives expert from the Fifth Regiment of Army Engineers of Punta Arenas was killed outside Puerto Natales, in Region XII, while handling an antivehicle mine during military maneuvers.⁴⁸

Miguel Angel Pacheco, whose left foot and ankle were damaged by an antipersonnel landmine in November 1999, sued the government for CLP\$150 million (US\$220,000) in September 2001, on the grounds that he can no longer work or play sports. At the time of his injury Pacheco was an Army recruit and he said his superiors had sent him to change some barbed wire near a train track, without warning him about possible mines laid in the area.⁴⁹

Survivor Assistance

Chilean military personnel injured by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) receive care in military hospitals. There are no specific services available from the National Health Service, private health institutions or NGOs for civilian landmine victims in Chile.⁵⁰ The Fondo Nacional de Discapitados [National Fund for the Disabled] provides social assistance for the disabled.

On 27 February 2002, Chile ratified the OAS Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities.⁵¹ One key aim of this treaty is to provide legislative, social, educative, and labor means for re-integration into society.

⁴⁴ “Editan tríptico sobre minas personales,” *La Estrella del Norte* (Antofagasta), 19 July 2001; “Simbólica destrucción de minas,” *El Mercurio de Calama* (Calama); 13 September 2001.

⁴⁵ “Cuando intentaba entrar ilegalmente a Chile. Peruano resultó herido por mina antipersonal,” *La Tercera* (Santiago), Chile, 9 April 2001; “Pierde pie derecho por ingresar en forma ilegal a Chile,” *El Comercio*, 10 April 2001; Editorial, “Frontera con Chile,” *La Industria de Trujillo* (Trujillo), 11 April 2001.

⁴⁶ Landmine Monitor was not able to get official confirmation on the type of artifact, but was told unofficially that an investigation carried out determined that the artifact was not a mine, but rather some kind of UXO. Telephone interview with Regimiento Infantería Chillán official, 24 July 2002. “Internado grave herido por explosión en recinto militar,” *El Mercurio* source credit: ORBE, 3 September 2001.

⁴⁷ “Peruano herido por mina antipersonal al entrar a Chile,” *El Mostrador*, 7 November 2001.

⁴⁸ “Ejército reconoce 105 campos minados,” *La Tercera*, 12 November 2001.

⁴⁹ “Ex recluta pide \$150 millones,” *Las Últimas Noticias* (Santiago), 27 September 2001.

⁵⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 312.

⁵¹ “Chile ratifica convención Interamericana para eliminar discriminación contra discapacitados,” OAS Press Release, 27 February 2002.

COLOMBIA

Key developments since May 2001: On 25 July 2002, national implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, came into effect. On 8 October 2001, the government established a commission (CINAMA) to coordinate mine action and oversee implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The government's Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, within the Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance, became operational in 2001. On 15 March 2002, Colombia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report. Colombia reported a stockpile of 20,312 landmines. Colombia is developing a National Plan for stockpile destruction and mine clearance and expects clearance to take 20 years. Officials have stated that Army minefields around strategic sites will not be cleared while the war continues. At least 256 of Colombia's 1,097 municipalities in 28 of the 31 departments in the country are believed to be mine-affected. The government reports increased use of antipersonnel mines by non-State actors, including FARC, ELN, and AUC. Mine casualties rose as the conflict intensified. In the first ten months of 2001, 201 new landmine casualties were recorded; resulting in an average of approximately two casualties every three days. In September 2001, at the Third Meeting of States Parties, Colombia was named as the co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance.

Mine Ban Policy

Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 6 September 2000, and the treaty entered into force for Colombia on 1 March 2001.

Colombia's national implementation legislation, Law 759, was approved by the National Congress on 20 June 2002 and came into effect following Presidential approval on 25 July 2002.¹ Under the legislation, any use, production, transfer, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines is punishable by imprisonment of 10 to 15 years, a fine that is 500 to 1,000 times the official minimum monthly salary (in 2001, approximately \$53,000, COP 12,194,000), and prohibition from public office for a period of five to ten years. Anyone who encourages, assists, facilitates, stimulates, or induces other persons to participate in violations will be punished with imprisonment of six to ten years and a fine of 200 to 500 times the official minimum monthly salary.

Colombia is in the midst of an internal armed conflict that began over 40 years ago. Parties to the conflict include the government of Colombia, the FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), and the ELN (National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional). The AUC (United Self-defense Forces of Colombia, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) paramilitary forces are also involved in the conflict.

Hostilities in Colombia intensified in 2000 and 2001, despite peace negotiations. According to a March 2002 report by the National Planning Department (DNP, Departamento Nacional de Planeación), the government's obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty may be difficult to comply with, not only because of the costs involved, but also because of the ongoing conflict in the country: "Guerrillas will continue to lay, stockpile, and produce mines and will not provide information on the quantities and locations."²

In 2001, prior to the suspension of peace negotiations with the FARC in February 2002, the government and FARC agreed to create a "Commission of Personalities" (Comisión de

¹ Landmine Monitor received a copy of the law in draft form ("Project of Law [Bill] 098/01, Ponencia para segundo debate del proyecto de ley 098/01 senado - 214/02 Cámara") from Dr. Beatriz Elena Gutiérrez Rueda, General Coordinator, Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance, of the Presidential Program for the Promotion, Respect and Guarantee of Human Rights and Application of International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President, in an email to ICBL (Susan B. Walker), 25 June 2002.

² Yilberto Lahuerta Percipiano and Ivette María Altamar, Office of Economic Studies, "The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs," Economic Archives Document 178, Office of Justice and Security, National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002, p.10.

Personalidades) to produce recommendations for the peace negotiations.³ On 19 September 2001, the Commission of Personalities issued twenty-eight recommendations, including that both sides agree “to abstain from the use of unconventional weapons, such as antipersonnel mines...”⁴

In January 2002, prior to the May 2002 suspension of peace negotiations with the ELN, the government and ELN representatives issued a “Declaration of the Peace Summit of Havana,” (Declaración de la Cumbre por la Paz de la Habana), under which a joint commission with participation of a group of friendly nations (Cuba, France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland), and a representative from the UN Secretary-General, would meet to evaluate nine points, including “the localization and eradication of all types of antipersonnel mines.”⁵

Colombia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001.⁶ In its statement, Colombia proposed that the meeting call on non-State actors to renounce the use of antipersonnel mines. The proposal was integrated into the Final Declaration of the meeting.⁷ At the meeting, Colombia was named as the co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, along with France. Colombia served in this role at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva.

On 8 October 2001, the government established the first agency responsible for coordination of mine action in Colombia through Decree 2113.⁸ The National Inteministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (CINAMA, Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal) is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including the developing of a National Plan, making policy decisions and coordinating international cooperation.⁹ The Vice President’s Office chairs CINAMA.¹⁰

A number of NGOs, international organizations, and the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM, Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas) have worked to assist government agencies to implement the treaty, especially through mine risk education and victim assistance programs, and to establish CINAMA and the Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance (PAAV) of the Office of the Vice President.¹¹

In November 2001, Colombia cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Colombian government representatives

³ “Comunicado No. 29,” Mesa de Diálogo y Negociación, 11 May 2001. See <http://www.hechosdepaz.gov.co/es/load.php/uid=0/leng=es/4/comunicado29.htm>.

⁴ “Recomendaciones de la Comisión de Personalidades a la Mesa de Diálogo y Negociación,” Point D of First Recommendation, 19 September 2001. See www.farc-erp.org/dialogos/recomendaciones.html.

⁵ Declaración de la Cumbre por la Paz de la Habana, Point 7, 31 January 2002. See <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/noticias/2002/enero/31/2002013130.htm>.

⁶ The delegation was led by Dr. Julio Enrique Ortiz Cuenca, Colombia’s Ambassador to Nicaragua, and included: Dr. Reinaldo Botero, Director, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Vice President’s Office; Colonel José Octavio Duque López, Ministry of Defense; and Dr. Pedro Agustín Roa Arboleda, General Directorate of Special Affairs-Disarmament Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Statement by Ambassador Julio Enrique Ortiz Cuenca, Colombia, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 19 September 2001.

⁸ Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance (PAAV), Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President, “January Report 2002,” p.8.

⁹ Defensoría del Pueblo, Resolución Defensorial Humanitaria No.10, “Minas Antipersonal,” 1 March 2002, p.14; and PAAV, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President, “January Report 2002,” p.8.

¹⁰ CINAMA members include: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health, Interior, and Defense and the National Department of Planning. Other bodies invited to participate are the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Alto Comisionado para la Paz), the Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), and an NGO representing mine survivors. Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President, “January Report 2002,” p.8.

¹¹ Landmine Monitor will use the acronym PAAV in this report for convenience sake, though it is not an official acronym.

spoke at a “Mine Action in Latin America” conference in Miami from 3 to 5 December 2001.¹² On 17 April 2002, the Office of the Vice President of Colombia hosted a landmines forum in Bogotá, “Colombia camina sin tropiezos,” (Colombia Walks Without Stumbling).¹³

On 15 March 2002, Colombia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, covering the period from 1 March to 31 August 2001.¹⁴ The report included the voluntary Form J on victim assistance. In addition, Landmine Monitor received an advance copy of Colombia’s second Article 7 Report, dated 30 April 2002, covering the period from 1 September 2001 to 31 April 2002.¹⁵ This report had not been posted by the United Nations as of 31 July 2002.

Other important documents released in this reporting period by the Office of the Vice President include the “January Report 2002” from the Program for the Prevention of Accidents and Victim Assistance,¹⁶ and the December 2001 “Antipersonnel Mines in Colombia” from the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory.¹⁷

Colombia is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not participate in the third annual conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, but did attend the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Production

In the past, Colombia produced antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 Report, Colombia said that equipment used to manufacture antipersonnel mines at the government-owned Industria Militar (INDUMIL) José María Córdoba factory was destroyed in 1999, along with 2,542 antipersonnel mines stockpiled at the factory.¹⁸

According to a January 2002 government report, INDUMIL produced 22,300 NM-MAP-1 antipersonnel mines between 1989 and 1996.¹⁹ Of these mines, 19,706 were transferred to the Armed Forces (16,410 to the Army, 2,590 to the Navy, and 706 to the Air Force), 52 were used in technical tests, and the remaining 2,542 were destroyed. In July 2001, an INDUMIL representative stated that production of the Carga Direccional Dirigida (CDD) directional fragmentation munition (a Claymore-type mine) continued.²⁰

¹² Dr. Beatriz Elena Gutiérrez Rueda, Coordinator, PAAV, and Colonel Octavio Duque López, Chief of Engineers of the Colombian Army, made a presentation on Colombia’s experience in mine action in Panel VIII: Future Challenges, “Colombian perspectives,” Mine Action in Latin America Conference, 3-5 December 2002.

¹³ “Vicepresidencia convoca a medios a foro de minas antipersonales,” *ANCOL* (Bogotá), 15 April 2002; “Palabras de Director Programa Presidencial en Clausura de Foro,” *ANCOL* (Bogotá), 17 April 2002.

¹⁴ The due date for the report was 28 August 2001. The Article 7 Report contains three annexes. Form C, Annex 1, “Report on Press releases from 1 January to 30 July 2001” is a listing of 86 mine casualty incidents. This is from Office of the Vice President, “Use of Antipersonnel Mines from January to August 2001,” 3-page document in Spanish. Form C, Annex 2, “Report on mines laid by groups beyond the law” is from “Mines: Deadly Weapons Used by Terrorists in Colombia,” no author listed and undated 6-panel brochure. Form D, Annex 3, “Report on Mine Detection and Destruction” is from Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President of Colombia, “Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia,” Bogotá: Peace Investment Fund, December 2001, 12-page document in Spanish and English.

¹⁵ The Article 7 report is dated 30 April 2002. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Dr. Beatriz Elena Gutiérrez Rueda, Coordinator, PAAV, Office of the Vice President, 16 July 2002.

¹⁶ PAAV, “January Report 2002.” This report, and an accompanying letter dated 19 February 2002, was sent to Landmine Monitor (HRW and MAC) by Reinaldo Botero Bedoya, Director, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Vice President’s Office.

¹⁷ Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Office of the Vice President of Colombia, “Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia,” Bogotá: Peace Investment Fund, December 2001.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form E, 15 March 2002. See also PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.10.

¹⁹ Yilberto Lahuerta Percipiano and Ivette María Altamar, Office of Economic Studies, “The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs,” Economic Archives Document 178, Office of Justice and Security, National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002, p. 3.

²⁰ Interview with Engineer Sergio Rodríguez, Technical Second Manager, INDUMIL, 24 July 2001.

According to the December 2001 Vice President's Office report, the Colombian Army has identified the following types of homemade antipersonnel mines used by guerrilla groups:²¹

- *Mina quiebrapatas* (a "legbreaker" mine usually buried in the ground);
- *Mina tipo sombrero chino* (a Chinese hat type mine with a radius of 25 meters);
- *Mina tipo cajón* (a wooden box mine with an "angle-shaped" metal plate);
- *Mina tipo abanico* (a fan-type mine with a radius of 10 meters and a cone for gases and shrapnel);
- *Mina cumbo* (a mine usually placed on tree branches);
- *Mina tipo Cleymore* (a Claymore-type mine often found at the side of a road and in forest);
- *Mina tipo costal* (a sack-type mine thrown from higher ground).

All of these mines are made from commonly available explosives.²²

Transfer

Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. Colombia imported antipersonnel mines from the US and Belgium in the past. In the past government officials have reportedly stated that the illicit trade of weapons into Colombia has included antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor found no evidence of this during the reporting period.²³

Stockpiling and Destruction

Colombia reported a stockpile of 20,312 landmines in its initial Article 7 Report submitted 15 March 2002. Landmine Monitor is unfamiliar with some of the designations and could not identify all the countries of origin of these mines from the information provided in the report; some appear to be antivehicle mines. The types and quantities stockpiled by Colombia (as of 31 August 2001) include: 3,036 APR mines; 1,298 Explosivas mines; 2,382 AntiExplosivas mines; 2,307 Plastic Mines; 656 A-1 mines; 131 HE mines (Claymore-type); 111 Indumil mines (Colombian-manufactured); 81 M-3 mines (US); 18 Explosivo M-21 mines (US); 772 M-18 mines (US-manufactured Claymore mines); 1,246 Sopro mines (likely Belgian NR-409 mines); 2,759 MAP mines (Colombia); 1,069 MAP-1 mines (Colombia); 1,953 MAP-1M mines (Colombia); 828 MAT-2 mines (possibly Colombian antivehicle mines); and 1,665 ATM-19 mines (possibly US antivehicle mines).²⁴

A registry of 4,194 antipersonnel mines provided to Landmine Monitor in July 2001 by the Colombian Navy does not appear to be included in the report.²⁵ A number of landmines not previously reported by Colombia are listed in the Article 7 report including the M-18, HE, A-1, M-3, M-21, ATM-19, and MAT-2 mines.

According to the Article 7 Report, the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces are developing a National Plan for Article 4 (stockpile destruction) and Article 5 (destruction of emplaced mines).²⁶ According to the new national implementation legislation, Law 759, the Ministry of Defense should present a destruction plan to CINAMA within six months after the entry into force of the law, which would be by 25 January 2003.²⁷ Previously, in February 2001, a

²¹ Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, "Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia," December 2001, p.5.

²² Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, "Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia," December 2001, p.5.

²³ See previous editions of Landmine Monitor for more details.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, 15 March 2002.

²⁵ Colombian Navy Registry Form for Stockpiled AP Mines, presented by Navy representatives at the seminar "Antipersonnel Landmines: Colombia and the Ottawa Convention," 27 February 2001. Subsequent corrections to this document were provided to the Landmine Monitor researcher in July 2001. This included 2,194 MN-MAP-1 mines; 1,986 AP-SOPRO mines; and 14 M-14 mines. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 309-310.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, Form F, 15 March 2002.

²⁷ Based on the draft "Project of Law 098/01, Ponencia para segundo debate del proyecto de ley 098/01 senado - 214/02 Cámara," p. 14.

government official stated that the Army had a plan to destroy all stockpiled landmines in time to fulfill the “Managua Challenge” goal of completion of destruction by the time of the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001.²⁸

According to its Article 7 Report, Colombia has not retained any antipersonnel mines for training purposes. However, according to Article 4 of draft Law 098/01 the Ministry of Defense will be authorized to retain up to 1,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development (as established by Article 4 of Colombia’s ratification legislation, Law 554 of the year 2000).²⁹

No information is available on numbers or types of antipersonnel mines held by non-state actors in Colombia.³⁰ In its most recent Article 7 Report, Colombia listed mines and IEDs belonging to non-state actors that it confiscated in 2001, of which the vast majority were homemade rather than manufactured.³¹

Use

Government Use

Landmine Monitor did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by the Colombian Armed Forces during the reporting period. According to the United Nations, the Colombian Armed Forces officially stated that they stopped using antipersonnel landmines in 1999, which, if true, would indicate continued use after Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997.³²

A US Department of State report, released on 4 March 2002, states that of the 130,000 antipersonnel mines estimated to be planted in Colombia at the end of 2001, the Colombian military maintained approximately 18,000 mines to defend static positions, while the remaining mines were emplaced by non-state actors.³³ Colombia reported at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines that were in place before Colombia became a State Party continue to be used to protect power lines, utilities, and other civilian infrastructure from guerrilla attack.³⁴ The Commander of the Army’s Engineer Battalion stated that there are 54 minefields containing over 20,000 mines in “strategic” sites important for the national economy, which are controlled by the Army, so “there have been no civilian casualties from these mines.”³⁵

Colombia reserves the right to use Claymore-type mines.³⁶ In December 2001, the Chief of Engineers of the Colombian Army stated that the Army maintains 54 minefields to protect 29

²⁸ Statement by Captain Mario Escobar, Direction of Navy Weapons, at the seminar “Antipersonnel Landmines: Colombia and the Ottawa Convention,” Bogotá, 28 February 2001.

²⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 15 March 2002, states “No se ha retenido;” “Project of Law 098/01, Ponencia para segundo debate del proyecto de ley 098/01 Senado-214/02 Cámara,” undated, p. 14.

³⁰ Yilberto Lahuerta Percipiano and Ivette María Altamar, Office of Economic Studies, “The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs,” Economic Archives Document 178, Office of Justice and Security, National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002, p.3.

³¹ Draft Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2002.

³² Country report on Colombia, United Nations Mine Action “Emine” website, last updated 2 May 2002, visited 18 July 2002. www.mineaction.org. Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have cited allegations of use by government forces since 1997, but no confirmed instances.

³³ US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001,” Colombia Report, released 4 March 2002. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm>. Military officials have previously told Landmine Monitor that approximately 20,000 mines were laid by government forces. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 297.

³⁴ Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Meeting Report, 30 May 2002, p.2. See www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/SCSD_Meeting_Report_30_May_02.pdf.

³⁵ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) and statement provided to MAC in writing by Colonel Julian Cardona Montoya, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 30 May 2002.

³⁶ Statement by Colonel Guillermo Leal Abadía, Colombian National Army, at the seminar “Antipersonnel Landmines: Colombia and the Ottawa Convention,” Bogotá, 28 February 2001.

military units using the Carga Direccional Dirigida (CDD) directional fragmentation munition, a Claymore-type mine.³⁷

Non-State Actor Use

Colombia remains the only country in the Western Hemisphere where antipersonnel mines are laid on a regular basis. Colombian guerrillas have used mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for more than a decade and, according to information collected by CCCM from November 2000 to February 2001, they have used “*quiebrapata*” (legbreaker) homemade mines for more than 15 years.³⁸

According to government reports, the FARC and ELN were major users of antipersonnel mines in the reporting period, in addition to AUC paramilitary groups.³⁹ The January 2002 report by the Vice President’s Office stated that the majority of mines are used randomly, without tactical purpose and, in many cases, with the sole purpose of demoralizing and terrorizing the civilian population.⁴⁰

According to the December 2001 report by the Vice President’s Office, there were 243 reported cases of mine use in the first ten months of 2001. It could not determine responsibility for mine use in 42 percent of the cases, but it attributed 57 percent of responsibility to illegal armed groups.⁴¹ Of these, FARC was responsible for 30 percent of the cases, ELN for 25.9 percent and “self-defense groups” (AUC paramilitary forces) for 1.6 percent. In one case, in Sucre department, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP, Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo) was responsible. “Common criminals” were to blame in another case. The report attributed direct responsibility in one case of “mine-related accidents or incidents” to the Military Forces at Naranjitos Military Base in the department of Arauca, in which a soldier was killed. In addition, during this period there were two mine clearance accidents by the Military Forces.

The following instances of new use of antipersonnel mines were among numerous media reports on mine use in 2001 and 2002:

- In August 2001, the Third Brigade of the Army announced the discovery of a new minefield at La Balastrerain in Santander de Quilichao municipality, reportedly laid by the Sixth Front of the FARC.⁴²
- In October 2001, units of the Counterinsurgency Battalion No.5 “Los Guanes,” located ten newly-planted antipersonnel mines in a football field in the village of El Llanón in Hacarí municipality, Norte de Santander department. The Commander of the Fifth Brigade told the media that that guerrillas had been attempting to destroy a helicopter that used the field, “but they did not take into account that children play in the field as well.”⁴³
- In November 2001, Antioquia police announced the discovery and clearance of a minefield at Remolinos, in Hispania municipality, that was allegedly laid by the ELN.⁴⁴
- In late November 2001, the Army reported the discovery and clearance of three minefields. ELN reportedly laid a minefield in Matanza municipality, Santander

³⁷ Dr. Beatriz Elena Gutiérrez Rueda, General Coordinator, PAAV, and Colonel Octavio Duque López, Chief of Engineers of the Colombian Army, presentation “Colombian perspectives,” at Mine Action in Latin America Conference, Miami, 3-5 December 2002.

³⁸ CCCM field visits to mine-affected areas in Santa Rosa del Sur, San Pablo, Bolívar, San Vicente de Chucurí, Santander department, and Apartadó, Antioquia department, November 2000 to February 2001.

³⁹ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.5; US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001,” Colombia Report, released 4 March 2002.

⁴⁰ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.2.

⁴¹ Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, “Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia,” December 2001, p. 6.

⁴² Silvio Sierra, “Atentado contra patrulla militar,” *El País* (Cali), 7 August 2001.

⁴³ Hever A. Paez, “Hallan campo minado en Hacarí,” *Vanguardia Liberal* (Bucaramanga), 22 October 2001.

⁴⁴ “Policía desactivó campo minado,” *El Colombiano* (Medellín), 7 November 2001.

department, while the FARC reportedly laid a 150-meter long minefield in San Juan de Sumapaz, Cundicamarca department, and another in Antioquia department during Operation "Neptune."⁴⁵

- In February 2002, media reported that several municipalities in Norte de Santander department, including at Teorama in Ocaña municipality, were heavily mined recently as the conflict intensified between the AUC, and the ELN, FARC and EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación) in the region.⁴⁶
- According to media reports, after peace negotiations with the FARC were suspended and the Army entered the San Vicente del Caguán region in February 2002, military intelligence reported that the FARC had mined various areas in the region. Counterinsurgency units of the Army's XII Brigade and the Southern Joint Task Force were clearing mines as part of the military campaign in Caguán.⁴⁷
- In March 2002, the Army announced that it had discovered and destroyed a minefield close to a section of the Caño Limón Coveñas oil pipeline in Arauquita, Arauca department. Seven IEDs made with household gas cylinders were discovered.⁴⁸
- Also in March 2002, explosive experts of the National Police of Norte de Santander department reportedly discovered and cleared a minefield that had been laid at Cerro la Cruz, in Arboledas municipality, Norte de Santander department. According to the media report, seven cone-shaped mines of 10 kilograms each were found.⁴⁹
- In April 2002, the Army reportedly discovered and destroyed an AUC camp in Valle del Guamez municipality, in Putumayo Department. The camp was reportedly used to produce explosive artifacts, and was surrounded by a minefield from which 26 antipersonnel mines were later cleared.⁵⁰

In August 2001, a humanitarian group, "International Caravan for Life in south Bolívar" (Caravana Internacional por la Vida en el Sur de Bolívar) delivering supplies in southern Bolívar department reported that, according to local community representatives, "during counterinsurgency operations the paramilitary groups have forced peasants to enter minefields with mules in order to clear them, and have also used local people as human shields when entering dangerous terrain."⁵¹

According to a December 2001 Venezuelan media report, guerrillas belonging to a little-known Colombian rebel group called the Latin American Popular Army (EPLA, Ejército Popular Latinoamericano) were using "explosive mines" to surround and protect their camps in Venezuelan territory.⁵²

Landmine Problem

Landmine Monitor estimates that at least 256 of Colombia's 1,097 municipalities in 28 of the 31 departments in the country are mine-affected. Previously, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*

⁴⁵ "Ejército destruyó tres campos minados," *El Espectador* (Bogotá), 26 November 2001.

⁴⁶ "La guerra está 'minando' a la provincia ocañera," *Vanguardia Liberal* (Bucaramanga), 18 February 2002.

⁴⁷ Alirio Bustos, "El avance militar por tierra," *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), 22 February 2002.

⁴⁸ "Destruyen campos minados," *El País* (Cali), 27 March 2002.

⁴⁹ "Desactivaron campo minado en Arboledas," *La Opinión* (Cúcuta), 6 March 2002.

⁵⁰ "Ejército ocupa campamento de las autodefensas en sur del país," *ANCOL* (Bogotá), 2 April 2002.

⁵¹ Rodrigo Hurtado, "Caravana por el sur de Bolívar," *El Espectador* (Bogotá), 3 August 2001; Maribel Marin, "Un grupo humanitario con 37 españoles, atrapado en una zona de combates en Colombia. La Caravana por la Vida atravesaba una zona en disputa entre guerrilla y paramilitares," *El País* (Madrid), 8 August 2001; "Nos quedamos aquí... vayan y cuéntenlo," Caravana Internacional por la Vida en el Sur de Bolívar, Bogotá, 20 August 2001. In *Wereldwijd Mail* (E-zine), No. 81, 24 August 2001. See www.wereldwijd.be/mail/karavaan.htm.

⁵² The EPLA is a splinter group of the former Popular Liberation Army (EPL, Ejército Popular de Liberación) of Colombia. Eleanora Delgado, "Muertos seis subversivos y desmantelado campamento de insurgents," *El Nacional* (Caracas), 2 December 2001.

reported that at least 168 municipalities in 27 departments were mine-affected; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* found at least 135 municipalities in 26 departments, and *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* found at least 125 municipalities in 21 departments.⁵³ All five regions of Colombia are mine-affected (Amazonian, Andean, Caribbean, Orinoquia, and Pacific). According to the Vice President's Office, there are no obvious patterns of where antipersonnel mines are laid in the country. Maps of mined areas are practically non-existent or imprecise, and the knowledge of antipersonnel mine-affected areas at the municipal level is minimal.⁵⁴

Mine-affected municipalities and departments in Colombia, identified by *Landmine Monitor* and the government, include the following. Municipalities that recorded mine casualties in 2001 are noted in *italics*.⁵⁵

1) In the Amazonian region, at least twenty-one municipalities in five departments are mine-affected:

- Amazonas department (1 municipality): Santa Sofia municipality.
- Caquetá department (9): Cartagena del Chairá, Florencia, Montañita, *Puerto Rico*, Remolinos del Caguan, and San Vicente del Caguán municipalities. In addition, the government lists Milán, Solita, and Morelia municipalities as mine-affected.
- Guaviare department (3): Calamar, Miraflores, and San José del Guaviare municipalities.
- Putumayo department (7): Puerto Asís and Orito municipalities. In addition, the government lists Puerto Leguizamo, *Valle del Gaumez*, San Miguel, Santiago, and Mocoa municipalities as mine-affected.
- Vaupes department (1): Mitú municipality.

2) In the Andean region, at least 157 municipalities in ten departments are mine-affected:

- Antioquia department (50 municipalities): Amalfi, Apartadó, El Bagre, Bello, Cáceres, Caicedo, Campamento, Carmen de Viboral, *Cocorná*, Copacabana, Currulao, Dabeiba, *Granada*, Maceo, Mutatá, Puerto Triunfo, *San Carlos*, San Francisco, *San Luis*, San Roque, *Segovia*, Tello, Turbo, Vegachi, Versalles, Yali, *Yondó*, and *Zaragoza* municipalities. In addition, the government lists Abejorral, *Anorí*, Barbosa, *Briceno*, Carepa, Carolina, *Concepción*, Guatapé, Hispania, *Medellín*, Montebello, *Peñol*, *Remedios*, Rionegro, San Pedro, San Rafael, *San Vicente*, Santa Bárbara, Tarazá, La Unión, Yarumal, and *Yolombó* municipalities as mine-affected.
- Boyacá department (10): Chisca, Pajarito, Pauna, and Pisba municipalities. In addition, the government lists Chita, *Cubará*, Duitama, Labranzagrande, San Mateo, and Tasco municipalities as mine-affected.
- Cauca department (15): Argelia, El Bordo, Caloto, Caldono, Corinto, Patía and La Vega municipalities. In addition, the government lists Almaguer, Balboa, *Cajibío*, San Sebastián, Santa Rosa, Silvia, El Tambo, and Timbio municipalities as mine-affected.
- Cundinamarca department (21): *Cabrera*, Claraval, Guayabaltal, *Junín*, Medina, Quipile, San Bernardo, Sumapaz, and Viotá municipalities. In addition, the government lists Fusagasugá, Fómeque, Gachetá, Gama, Guataquí, Jerusalén, *La Palma*, Pandi, San Juan de Río Seco, Socotá, Venecia, and Villeta municipalities as mine-affected.

⁵³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 315; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 317-320; and *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 299-301. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* listed 168 municipalities as mine-affected, but a review of the data shows the actual number was 144.

⁵⁴ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.2-3.

⁵⁵ This list is compiled from existing *Landmine Monitor* data from the 1999, 2000, and 2001 reports and is supplemented with the Colombian government's data (see comments following the list of affected areas for various government sources used).

- Huila department (7): Acevedo, Algeciras, Anzoátegui, and Suaza municipalities. In addition, the government lists Gigante, Neiva, and San Juan del Cesar municipalities as mine-affected.
- Nariño department (4): Puerres and Tuquerres municipalities. In addition, the government lists Ipiales and San Pablo municipalities as mine-affected.
- Norte de Santander department (24): Cachipa, Chitaga, Convención, Cucutilla, Los Patios, Ocaña, *San Calixto*, Teorama, Tibú, and Turra municipalities. In addition the government lists *Ábrego*, Arboledas, El Carmen, Chartas, Cúcata, *Hacarí*, Herrán, La Playa, Pamplona, *Sardinata*, Silos, El Tarra, Villa Caro, and El Zulia municipalities as mine-affected.
- Santander department (24): *Barrancabermeja*, Betulia, *Bucaramanga*, California, Carmen de Chucurí, Florida Blanca, Galán, Piedecuesta, Playón, Lebríja, Macaravita, *Matanza*, San Vicente de Chucurí, Suaita, *Suratá*, and Zapatoca municipalities. In addition, the government lists Albania, Capitanejo, Curiti, *Puerto Wilches*, *Rionegro*, Sabanagrande, Sucre, and *Tona* as mine-affected.
- Risaralda department (1): The government lists Belén de Umbria municipality as mine-affected.
- Tolima department (1): The government lists Prado municipality as mine-affected.

3) In the Caribbean region, at least forty-seven municipalities in seven departments are mine-affected:

- Bolívar department (17): Achí, Altos del Rosario, Cantagallo, *Carmen de Bolívar*, Córdoba, Montecristo, *Morales*, Río Viejo, San Martín de Loba, *San Pablo*, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití, Tiquisio, and Zambrano municipalities. In addition the government lists *Arenal*, Cartagena, and *Santa Rosa* municipalities as mine-affected.
- Cesar department (13): Chiriguana, Codazzi, Copey, Curumaní, La Jagua de Ibirico, La Jagua del Pilar, Pailitas, Pelaya, San Alberto, and Valledupar municipalities. In addition, the government lists *Aguachica*, Becerril, and La Paz municipalities as mine-affected.)
- Cordoba department (2): Tierralta and Puertolibertador municipalities.
- Magdalena department (5): El Banco, *Ciénaga*, and Parrandaseca municipalities. In addition the government lists Santa Marta and Fundación municipalities as mine-affected.
- Sucre department (5): Guaranda, Ovejas, and Toluviejo municipalities. In addition, the government lists *Colosó* and Sincelejo municipalities as mine-affected.
- Atlántico department (1): The government lists Distrito Especial, Industrial y Portuario de Barranquilla municipality as mine-affected.
- Guajira department (4): The government lists San Juan del Cesar, Majaguara, El Molino, and Riohacha municipalities as mine-affected.

4) In Orinoquia region at least twenty-four municipalities in four departments are mine-affected:

- Arauca department (7): *Arauca*, *Araucuita*, La Esmeralda, Fortul, *Saravena*, and *Tame* municipalities. In addition, the government lists Puerto Rondón municipality as mine-affected.
- Casanare department (5): Sacama and Támara municipalities. In addition, the government lists Aguazul, Hato Corazal, and Paz de Aripоро municipalities as mine-affected.
- Meta department (11): Calvario, El Castillo, Lejanías, Mapiripán, San Juanito, and La Uribe municipalities. In addition, the government lists Acacías, *El Dorado*, *Puerto Gaitán*, San Juan de Arama, and Villavicencio municipalities as mine-affected.
- Vichada department (1): The government also lists Cumaribo municipality as mine-affected.

5) In the Pacific region at least seven municipalities in two departments are mine-affected:

- Chocó department (4): Riosucio municipality. In addition, the government lists El Cantón de San Pablo, San Francisco de *Quibdó*, and Tadó municipalities as mine-affected.
- Valle del Cauca department (3): Palmira and Jamundi municipalities. In addition, the government lists *Cali* municipality as mine-affected.

The huge increase in the number of municipalities reported as mine-affected and the corresponding increase in reported casualties in 2001 and 2002, could in part be due to increased use of mines by guerrilla groups and increased population movement, but also reflects major improvements, refinements, and expansions of reporting mechanisms. According to Colombia's national implementation legislation (Law 098/01), the Ministry of Defense must send monthly reports of all events related to antipersonnel mines that the Armed Forces are aware of and local authorities must inform of any incidents involving mines to the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, in the Office of the Vice President of Colombia.⁵⁶

The December 2001 report by the Office of the Vice President used data collated by the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory to list 140 municipalities in 22 departments that reported mine incidents or accidents during the period from January-31 October 2001.⁵⁷ These include 89 municipalities not previously listed by Landmine Monitor as mine-affected. In addition, the National Directorate of Complaints of the General Command of the Armed Forces provided new information on mine-affected land in 27 municipalities, including 23 not previously listed by Landmine Monitor as mine-affected. In March 2002, the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) published this information in Humanitarian Resolution No. 10.⁵⁸ In June 2002, a PAAV project summary revealed that 14 mine-affected municipalities not included in earlier reports by the Ombudsman's Office were also mine-affected, including five not previously reported by Landmine Monitor.⁵⁹

According to the Article 7 Report, Army, Navy, and Air Force bases have marked minefields containing a total of 9,409 antipersonnel mines.⁶⁰ The Air Force and Navy bases are reportedly protected with 995 MN-MAP-1 mines, while the Army bases are reportedly protected with 8,414 antipersonnel mines.⁶¹

Mine Action Coordination

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (CINAMA) is responsible for overall implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Three bodies were created for CINAMA: a Technical Secretariat; an interministerial Technical Committee on Victim Assistance (Comité Intersectorial Técnico de Prevención y Atención a Víctimas); and an interministerial

⁵⁶ Document "Project of Law 098/01, Ponencia para segundo debate del proyecto de ley 098/01 senado - 214/02 Cámara," undated, p. 23.

⁵⁷ Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, "Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia," December 2001, p. 7 and map, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Defensoría del Pueblo, Resolución Defensorial Humanitaria No.10, "Minas Antipersonal," 1 March 2002. See http://www.defensoria.org.co/base_level2.php?Pageinfo=base_res_hum§ion=resoluciones&res=10.

⁵⁹ Balboa, Carepa, San Rafael, San Sebastián, and Timbio. Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, "Ficha Técnica de Proyecto, Programa de Prevención de accidentes por Minas Antipersonales y Atención a Víctimas," updated 5 June 2002, checked on 14 July 2002.

http://www.plancolombia.gov.co/programas/derechos/contenido/proyectos_en%20ejecución/fichas_tecnicas/ficha_tec5.html.

⁶⁰ Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 1, 15 March 2002.

⁶¹ The Army-laid mines are 2,023 M-14 mines; 1,587 Antiexplosiva M-1 mines; 1,538 Plastic mines; 865 Explosivas mines; 690 MAP mines; 514 M-18 mines; 437 M-3A1 mines; 311 SOPRO mines; 207 MAP-2 mines; 87 M-16 mines; 74 INDUMIL ATP mines; 53 M-3 mines; and 28 Explosivas M-21 mines.

Technical Committee on Prevention, Marking, Mapping, and Mine Clearance (Comité Intersectorial Técnico de Señalización, Mapeo y Desminado). These committees are responsible for developing the National Mine Action Plan, as well as developing, implementing, and evaluating actions according to their respective themes.⁶²

Earlier, on 1 January 2001, the government established the Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance (PAAV).⁶³ PAAV is part of the Presidential Program for the Promotion, Respect, and Guarantee of Human Rights and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, under direct supervision of the Vice President of Colombia and his office. UNICEF Colombia, REDEPAZ (Red de Iniciativas por la Paz), Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz, INDEPAZ, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Scouts de Colombia, and the Roosevelt Hospital are implementing agencies of PAAV.⁶⁴

PAAV has two components. The "Antipersonnel Mine Observatory" (Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal) is conceived of as a "technical instrument for collecting, categorizing and updating information, and to facilitate decision-making regarding prevention, signaling, mapping and victim assistance."⁶⁵ The second component is Victim Assistance, which includes educational integration, economic integration, health and rehabilitation centers, accessibility to transport and public spaces and buildings, and accessibility to humanitarian support.⁶⁶

An Interministerial Committee of the General Command of the Armed Forces has been created through a request by the Minister of Defense, and through a resolution by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, in order to define and coordinate mine action within the Armed Forces and with other government agencies.⁶⁷

Mine Action Planning and Assessment

The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces are in the process of designing a National Plan for stockpile destruction and mine clearance.⁶⁸ The development of mine clearance plans is the responsibility of the Technical Committee on Prevention, Marking, Mapping, and Mine Clearance.⁶⁹

The March 2002 DNP report concluded that the best option for mine clearance in the short and medium term was to create 29 mine clearance teams of 30 members each for operations over the next 20 years.⁷⁰ In this scenario, the cost of mine clearance over this period (20 years) was estimated at \$21.9 million.⁷¹ In December 2001, the Vice President's Office reported that, if the internal conflict is resolved and adequate financing obtained in the next ten years, "Colombia will be clear of mines in about 20 years."⁷²

In July 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that the Organization of American States (OAS) conduct a mission to Colombia to assess the mine problem and evaluate OAS

⁶² The CINIMA and the three bodies were established by decree 2113 of 8 October 2001. Defensoría del Pueblo, Resolución Defensorial Humanitaria No.10, "Minas Antipersonal," 1 March 2002, pp. 14-15; PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.8.

⁶³ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.5.

⁶⁴ Article 7 Report, Form J, Section 4, 15 March 2002.

⁶⁵ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.5. The Technical Committee on Victim Assistance is also responsible for the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory. Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 March 2002.

⁶⁶ Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 March 2002; PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.7.

⁶⁷ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.8; Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, "Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia," December 2001, p.10.

⁶⁸ Article 7 Report, Form F, Nota, 15 March 2002.

⁶⁹ Office of Economic Studies, "The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs," National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002, p.10; Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 March 2002.

⁷⁰ Office of Economic Studies, "The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs," National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.ii.

⁷² Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, "Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia," December 2001, p.10.

technical and financial assistance.⁷³ Representatives of the OAS Mine Action Program met with Colombian officials in April 2002 to begin coordination.⁷⁴ Also in 2001, the government requested that the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conduct a mission to assess the mine situation in the country, but this has not yet occurred.⁷⁵ The non-governmental Survey Action Center has been monitoring the situation in Colombia and may conduct an advanced survey mission as conditions permit.⁷⁶

Another project designed to facilitate the identification of mine-affected areas is the Mine Action "Peace Multiplier" Workshops, operated by the Directorate General on Reintegration of the Ministry of the Interior and the Presidential Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.⁷⁷ The project, implemented by the NGO Paz y Democracia, uses demobilized combatants to help identify areas that are known or suspected to be mine-affected and also includes mine risk education and information on treaty obligations. Funding from the Ministry of the Interior for the project totaled \$56,596 (COP 130 million).⁷⁸

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was installed in Colombia in the first quarter of 2002; training and technical advice was also provided by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. IMSMA and the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory are intended to improve knowledge of the landmine problem in the country.⁷⁹

Mine Action Funding

The total cost of the Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance is \$15.8 million over a period of three years.⁸⁰ The government has proposed that donors finance \$12.7 million of that amount.⁸¹ National funding for Program comes from the Peace Investment Fund (FIP, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz) of "Plan Colombia."⁸²

According to the FIP, funding totaled \$161,247 (COP357 million) in 2000, and approximately \$225,835 (COP500 million) in 2001. A total of \$415,537 (COP920 million) was allocated for 2002.⁸³

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided approximately \$58,610 (COP130 million) to the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory to develop prevention and awareness activities, build local capacity for identifying incidents, and strengthen information mechanisms for signaling and mapping of danger zones.⁸⁴

⁷³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 March 2002. See also Colonel (Ret.) William McDonough, "Report of the Organization of American States Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," OAS, Washington, DC, 14 March 2002.

⁷⁴ Organization of American States, "El Desminado," Electronic Newsletter of General Activities of OAS/Mine Action, Volume 2, Number 2, April 2002.

⁷⁵ Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 March 2002.

⁷⁶ See Survey Action Center report in Appendices of *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*.

⁷⁷ Article 7 Report, Form J (4), 15 March 2002.

⁷⁸ Exchange rate of \$1 = COP 2,297 (31 August 2001).

⁷⁹ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, "Updates on Activities between January and April 2002," 30 April 2002, p.4; PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.3.

⁸⁰ Defensoría del Pueblo, Resolución Defensorial Humanitaria No.10, "Minas Antipersonal," 1 March 2002, p.12.

⁸¹ Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, Subcomponente Derechos Humanos y Atención Humanitaria, Proyectos Presentados a la Mesa de Donantes en Europa, A.2.3. Prevención y Atención Integral a Personas Víctimas de Minas Antipersonales (MAP)." See

<http://www.presidencia.gov.co/plancolo/volumen2/doc1c.htm#10>, undated, checked on 14 July 2002.

⁸² Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, "Minas antipersonales un programa del Plan Colombia." 14 May 2002. See http://www.plancolombia.gov.co/contenido/fip/que_es_el_fip.html, visited on 14 July 2002.

⁸³ Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, "Ficha Técnica de Proyecto," updated 5 June 2002, visited 14 July 2002.

⁸⁴ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.8.

According to the UN Mine Action Investments Database, from 1999-2001, Canada was the only donor to mine action in Colombia. It gave \$48,437 in 2001 and a total of \$149,402 since 1999.⁸⁵ The US State Department reportedly pledged \$152,000 for mine action in Colombia for a period of 12 months after the start of the grant.⁸⁶

From 1993 to 2001 Colombia contributed thirty-three military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA mine clearance efforts by the OAS in Central America, including three in 2001 and three in 2002.⁸⁷

Mine Clearance

As reported in previous Landmine Monitor Reports, there is no systematic humanitarian mine clearance underway in Colombia, and little information is available on mine clearance in general. According to the March 2002 DNP study, mine clearance in Colombia has been exclusively carried out by the military for tactical reasons during combat.⁸⁸ According to the Article 7 Report, the Army cleared 51 minefields, and “deactivated” another 370 minefields in 1999.⁸⁹ At the Standing Committee meetings on 30 May 2002, Commander of the Army’s Engineer Battalion, Colonel Julian Cardona Montoya, stated that in 2001 the Armed Forces cleared 1,503 mines from 103 minefields. He said the Army had cleared 2,542 antipersonnel mines that it had earlier laid. Col. Montoya also stated that there are 54 minefields around “strategic” sites, but said “we won’t be able to demine these for now, because of the ‘bandidos.’” He said that while those mines cannot be removed while the war is underway, the Army will clear them as progress is made toward victory.⁹⁰

According to the January 2002 report by the Vice President’s Office, in the first 10 months of 2001 there were 296 combat situations in the country involving antipersonnel mines and abandoned explosive devices.⁹¹ Of the 296 events registered, 40% were accounted by seizures of abandoned mines and other explosive artifacts; 27% involved identification of minefields (based on where an incident was registered); 23% involved clearance of minefields; and 8% involved seizure and deactivation of explosive artifacts.

There was no information available on any mine clearance efforts by NSAs during the reporting period.

Mine Risk Education

There are few mine risk education (MRE) programs in Colombia at this time but a number of plans exist.

From July 2001 to January 2002, a pilot project on mine risk education and victim assistance was carried out in 16 municipalities in Antioquia, Bolívar, and Santander departments by UNICEF Colombia, the Scouts of Colombia, INDEPAZ, Paz y Democracia, REDEPAZ, Roosevelt Hospital, and the Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz.⁹² The Vice President’s Office, UNICEF Colombia and REDEPAZ made a special agreement to share administration of the nationally funded project.⁹³

Three of 20 planned mine risk education and training workshops were carried out in Bogotá, Cesar and Guajira in January and February 2002, with the participation of UNDP and the support

⁸⁵ Mine Action Investments Database accessed 23 July 2002.

⁸⁶ UNICEF e-Bulletin, “Things that go bang!,” Issue 4, 13 May 2002.

⁸⁷ Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America, Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁸⁸ Office of Economic Studies, “The eradication of antipersonnel mines in Colombia: Implications and Costs,” National Department of Planning, 1 March 2002, p.9.

⁸⁹ Article 7 Report, Form E, 15 March 2002.

⁹⁰ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) and statement provided to MAC in writing by Colonel Julian Cardona Montoya, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 30 May 2002.

⁹¹ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.4-5.

⁹² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.320.

⁹³ UNMAS Portfolio of Mine-related Projects: Colombia, updated 2 May 2002.

of CCCM and the Scouts of Colombia.⁹⁴ Ex-combatants, government representatives, the Armed Forces, and retired military personnel (through ACORE, the Colombian Association of Retired Officers) participated in the workshops.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted an MRE needs assessment mission in cooperation with the Colombian Red Cross, but no program is underway as of July 2002.⁹⁵

Between January 2002 and December 2003, UNICEF Colombia, CCCM, Scouts de Colombia, and the Development Program for the Middle Magdalena, plan to implement the Colombian Humanitarian Mine Awareness and Advocacy Project in at least 15 mine-affected municipalities.⁹⁶ The budget for the first year (2002) was \$450,450, of which \$92,000 had been obtained as of May 2002.

Landmine Casualties

In the first ten months of 2001, the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory recorded 201 new landmine casualties, equating to an average of approximately two casualty every three days.⁹⁷ Of the total casualties reported, 43 people were killed and 158 injured; 52 casualties were civilians, 129 were members of the Armed Forces, and the status of 20 casualties was not known. Thirty-eight casualties (19 percent) were children; five died and 33 were injured.

In the context of the armed conflict, statistics differ according to the source, and for the most part information is based on media reports, not on systematic reporting systems. It is assumed that under reporting is a significant factor.

The reported casualties represents a significant increase from the 83 new landmine casualties reported in 2000, of which 23 were killed and 60 injured, and the 63 casualties reported in 1999.⁹⁸ However, according to Ministry of Defense Technical Health Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica en Salud del Ministerio de Defensa) registries, in 2000, landmines killed 36 Armed Forces personnel and injured 181 others, and in 1999, 27 were killed and 180 injured.⁹⁹ A statistical survey by CCCM in 2000 identified 736 mine casualties in 23 departments between 1993 and 1999. The highest number recorded was 151 casualties in 1997.¹⁰⁰

In 2001, the most common activities at the time of the mine incident were military or police actions (65 percent), followed by “play or walking to school” (three percent), and traveling in a vehicle (two percent).¹⁰¹ For the remaining casualties, the activity at the time of the incident was unknown. There is little information available on casualties among non-state actors. According to the Vice President’s Office, approximately seven percent of ex-combatants who were reintegrated into civilian life in the 1990s had some form of disability due to the armed conflict.¹⁰²

For the first ten months of 2001, the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory reported a total of 243 mine incidents involving antipersonnel mines and UXO; 87 percent due to antipersonnel mines, 4.1 percent involving abandoned grenades, 7.8 percent involving abandoned gas cylinders, and one percent involving other explosives.¹⁰³

⁹⁴ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.10.

⁹⁵ Email from Laurence Desvignes, ICRC Mine Program Coordinator, 26 July 2002.

⁹⁶ UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects: Colombia, updated 2 May 2002.

⁹⁷ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.1; based on information from the Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal. Base de Datos de la Violencia de la Sala de Estrategias del Palacio de Nariño, Presidencia de la República December 2001.

⁹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 320.

⁹⁹ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.1.

¹⁰⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.320.

¹⁰¹ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.1; based on information from the Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal. Base de Datos de la Violencia de la Sala de Estrategias del Palacio de Nariño, Presidencia de la República, December 2001.

¹⁰² PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p.1.

¹⁰³ Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, “Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia,” December 2001, Table “Tipos de artefactos asociados con accidentes o incidentes...”, p. 12.

In 2001 the majority of incidents (190) occurred in 52 municipalities in sixteen departments:¹⁰⁴

- 55 in Antioquia department: in the municipalities of Cocorná (10), San Carlos (7), Granada (6), Remedios (5), Medellín (4), Concepción, San Luis and El Carmen de Viboral (3 each), Anorí, Briceño, Peñol, Segovia, Yolombó, San Vicente y Yondó and Zaragoza (2 each);
- 34 in Arauca department: Arauquita (15), Tame (10), Arauca (6), Saravena (3);
- 27 in Santander department: Barrancabermeja (11), Suratá (5), Matanza (3), Bucaramanga, Puerto Wilches, Rionegro and Tona (2 each);
- 18 in Bolívar department: San Pablo (7), Morales (5), Santa Rosa, El Carmen de Bolívar and Arenal (2 each);
- 17 in Norte de Santander department: San Calixto (5), Sardinata (4), Ábrego (3), Hacari (3), El Tarra (2);
- 7 in Putumayo department: Valle del Guamez (5), Puerto Caicedo (2);
- 6 in Cundinamarca department: Cabrera, Junín and La Palma (2 each);
- 4 in Meta department: El Dorado and Puerto Gaitán (2 each);
- 4 in Cauca department: Cajibío (4);
- 4 in Valle del Cauca department: Cali (4);
- 3 in Boyacá department: Cubara (3);
- 3 in Choco department: Quibdó (3);
- 2 in Magdalena department: Ciénaga (2);
- 2 in Cesar department: Aguachica (2);
- 2 in Caquetá department: Puerto Rico (2);
- 2 in Sucre department: Colosó (2).

Approximately 88 percent of the reported mine incidents occurred in rural areas. However, in the department of Santander, 42 percent of the incidents occurred in urban areas, while in Arauca department, 20 percent of incidents occurred in urban areas.¹⁰⁵

At a July 2002 meeting with the OAS and GICHD, Vice President Gustavo Bell Lamus released a report by the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory on antipersonnel mine incidents and casualties in the first half of 2002.¹⁰⁶ According to media reports, 129 casualties were reported in the first half of 2002, of which 47 died at the site of the incident. Approximately 95 percent of the 129 casualties were male, 81 casualties were members of the Armed Forces, and 48 casualties were civilians, including 17 children.

On 30 May 2002, Col. Montoya stated that the Colombian Armed Forces had suffered 85 casualties in 2002 from mines and added, “Yesterday in our battalion, three soldiers died and another two were injured while trying to clear a minefield.”¹⁰⁷

Survivor Assistance

Emergency care at the scene of a mine incident is reportedly deficient, medical treatment and surgery in regional hospitals is slow, and transport to medical facilities is inadequate.¹⁰⁸ In rural areas, it is difficult to get immediate medical help, and it can sometimes take hours or even days to

¹⁰⁴ PAAV, “January Report 2002,” p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5; based on information from a consultancy by the “Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento CODHES,” undated.

¹⁰⁶ “Número de víctimas de minas antipersonales se incrementa en un 40%,” *El Espectador* (Bogotá), 15 July 2002; and “Las minas antipersonales han dejado un total de 129 víctimas en lo que va del año,” *Europa Press* (Bogotá), 9 July 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) and statement provided to MAC in writing by Colonel Julian Cardona Montoya, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 30 May 2002.

¹⁰⁸ Jeanette Perry de Saravia, Director, CIREC, “Accessibility of services in the field”, presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 28 May 2002.

reach the nearest hospital. Medical and rehabilitation services for mine survivors in Colombia are for the most part located in the main urban centers, whereas most survivors live in rural areas.¹⁰⁹ Some survivors claim that they had not received any rehabilitation treatment six months after the incident and some a year afterwards. They reportedly did not want to admit to being mine survivors out of fear of being considered one of the participants in the Colombian conflict.¹¹⁰

Authorities acknowledge that medical care is made difficult by the distance between the place of the incident and the health care centers, by a lack of knowledge of first aid, and by limitations in social and economic rehabilitation. Currently, most resources for survivor assistance are going to emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation while activities focused on psychosocial support, economic and vocational reintegration are limited.¹¹¹

Military personnel have access to physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support.¹¹²

In a presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic in May 2002, it was reported that in Colombia resources destined for survivors do not always reach the intended beneficiaries, and that programs suffer from a lack of continuity as policies and structures change according to the government in place. There is a lack of norms that reflect reality, and generally the quality of service has declined and has serious deficiencies, such as not having sufficient prostheses to meet the demand.¹¹³

Five centers manufacture prostheses and provide other services to landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities in Colombia: the Hospital Militar de Colombia (Colombia's Military Hospital) in Bogotá, the San Juan Bautista Orthopedic Center in Bucaramanga in Santander department, the Antioquia Rehabilitation Committee in Medellín in Antioquia department, the REI Foundation in Cartagena and CIREC.¹¹⁴

The Bogotá-based CIREC (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia) provides integrated rehabilitation services to amputees and other persons with disabilities. CIREC produces about 500 lower limb prostheses and 3,000 orthoses a year in its facility. The center also provides medical services, physical and occupational therapy, psychological support, and direct financial assistance if necessary. Ninety percent of the landmine survivors and other patients disabled by the armed conflict that receive care at CIREC are peasants or rural inhabitants with limited economic resources. Sixty percent are men between 20 and 40 years old and are heads of family. Forty-five percent of the employees at CIREC are people with a disability. The annual budget is about \$270,000.¹¹⁵

In 2001 the Rehabilitación Integral (REI) foundation orthopedic workshop in Cartagena, supported by Handicap International Belgium (HIB), provided services to 163 patients.¹¹⁶ No specific records are kept, but some of the patients are reportedly mine survivors.¹¹⁷ The REI foundation's community-based rehabilitation program was extended to 12 communities and benefited 730 persons. The program includes psychosocial support for persons with disabilities and their families, health brigades and home-care. HIB also provided a four-week training session for three orthopedic technicians from the workshop.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 321.

¹¹⁰ Jeanette Perry de Saravia, Director, CIREC, "Accessibility of services in the field", presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 28 May 2002.

¹¹¹ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Jeanette Perry de Saravia, Director, CIREC, "Accessibility of services in the field", presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 28 May 2002.

¹¹⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 322-323.

¹¹⁵ Jeanette Perry de Saravia, Director, CIREC, "Accessibility of services in the field", presentation to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 28 May 2002; see also ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, available at <http://www.landminevap.org>.

¹¹⁶ "Colombia," *Activity Report 2001*, Handicap International Belgium.

¹¹⁷ Dominique Delvigne, Program Director in Colombia, Handicap International Belgium, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 25 June 2002.

¹¹⁸ "Colombia," *Activity Report 2001*, Handicap International Belgium.

On 1 April 2002, the Italian NGO Movimondo began a two-year rehabilitation project in two neighborhoods of Cartagena, and in Carmen de Bolívar and Magangué municipalities, Bolívar for people injured in the conflict.¹¹⁹ The project aims to directly benefit around 2,220 persons with disabilities, especially those on low incomes, through a program that includes community-based rehabilitation. The program will encourage the participation of women (both women with disabilities and women heads of families in which there is a person with a disability).

Disability Policy and Practice

In January 2001, the government launched the Program for Mine Accident Prevention and Victim Assistance. The victim assistance component of the program includes medical care and rehabilitation, educational reintegration, vocational reintegration, and accessibility to the physical environment.¹²⁰ The pilot program is being implemented in two phases in 32 municipalities in five departments.¹²¹ In the first phase the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory was launched in 16 municipalities in the three departments where 48 percent of mine casualties are found: Antioquia, Bolívar and Santander.¹²² The first phase was implemented by UNICEF Colombia, REDEPAZ [Red de Iniciativas por la Paz], Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Scouts de Colombia, and Hospital Roosevelt. It was funded by the Peace Investment Fund, \$155,420 (COP 357 million), and by UNICEF \$40,488 (COP 93 million).¹²³

The first phase of the pilot program in Antioquia, Bolívar, and Santander has been completed; however, as of June 2002, a report on the results of the program was not yet finalized.¹²⁴

In the second phase, the AMO is being extended to a further 16 municipalities in the Departments of Antioquia, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca.¹²⁵ The victim assistance component of the Program for Mine Accident Prevention and Victim Assistance is also being implemented in the 16 municipalities in Antioquia, Bolívar and Santander where the first phase was implemented.¹²⁶ The second phase began in January 2002.¹²⁷

Expected results from the second phase of the program include training 25 people in each municipality on health and education resources, identification of psychological problems that impede learning, and development of theoretical and practical instruments to deal with these problems. Another expected result is to have medical care and rehabilitation services available for landmine survivors in these mine-affected municipalities.¹²⁸

In the second half of 2002 activities will include strengthening landmine survivor organizations in the 32 municipalities, workshops on psychosocial support in the first 16 municipalities, and organization of municipal and departmental committees in Antioquia, Cauca and Valle del Cauca.¹²⁹

Landmine casualties are entitled to assistance and benefits under the following Laws and Program.

The victims of bombs and other explosive devices are entitled to medical and surgical care, and physical rehabilitation including prostheses, under the 1996 decree 1283, the 1995 Law 418

¹¹⁹ Project document sent to Landmine Monitor (HIB) by Sarah Dani, Assistant, Central American and Colombia Unit, Movimondo, 19 July 2002.

¹²⁰ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 321-322.

¹²¹ Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, "Ficha Técnica de Proyecto," updated 5 June 2002, checked 14 July 2002.

¹²² Article 7 Report, Form J, Section 4, 15 March 2002.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ UNICEF e-Bulletin, "Things that go bang!," Issue 4, 13 May 2002.

¹²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form J, Section 2, 15 March 2002.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* Section 3 of Form J of the initial Article 7 Report was not included.

¹²⁷ PAAV, "January Report 2002," p.8.

¹²⁸ Article 7 Report, Form J, Section 2, 15 March 2002.

¹²⁹ Plan Colombia, Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, "Ficha Técnica de Proyecto," updated 5 June 2002.

and the 1999 Law 548 with funding coming from the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund of the Ministry of Health (FOSIGA).¹³⁰

Under the Program for Assistance to the Victims of Violence subsidies are available for housing and services, and assistance is provided for education. The Social Solidarity Network (Red de Solidaridad Social) provides compensation in the event of death to the first direct beneficiary of the victim to the equivalent of 42.29 times the minimum monthly salary; in the event of the victim being disabled or suffering light injuries or material losses, compensation is up to 42.29 times the minimum monthly wage, according to the severity of the disability or loss.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Key developments since May 2001: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for the Republic of Congo on 1 November 2001. The Republic of Congo has reported a stockpile of 5,092 landmines, 400 of which it will retain for training purposes.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 May 2001, and the treaty entered into force on 1 November 2001. A specific law to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is being considered, but the National Penal Code already forbids import and export of all military material.¹

The Republic of Congo attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002.

Its first Article 7 transparency report, due by 4 May 2002, has been drafted, but not yet submitted to the United Nations.²

The Republic of Congo voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty, but was absent from the final vote in the General Assembly on 29 November 2001.³

The Republic of Congo is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament. It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Use, and Stockpiling

The Republic of Congo is not known to produce or export antipersonnel mines.⁴ The Republic of Congo has declared that the few mines used during the 1997 civil war have been removed and destroyed by the demining service of the Army.⁵

An inventory of antipersonnel mine stockpiles conducted between February and April 2002 revealed 5,092 antipersonnel mines: 1,083 PPM-2 mines; 517 Mle 58 plastic mines; 2,892 POMZ-2 mines; and 600 PMD mines.⁶

¹³⁰ Article 7 Report, Form J (1), 15 March 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, undated and not yet submitted to the UN Secretary-General. Landmine Monitor was given a copy at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2002.

² Ibid.

³ The absence was due to other diplomatic obligations. Interview with Léonce Nkabi, Head of the First Battalion of Engineers, Ministry of National Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 68.

⁵ Statement by Léonce Nkabi, Head of the First Battalion of Engineers, Ministry of National Defense, at the Third Meeting of State Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 69, for details on clearance.

The Republic of Congo plans to destroy its stockpiles at the beginning of 2003, using “the electric method.” Destruction will take place at a military base 23 kilometers north of Brazzaville.⁷ The Republic of Congo will retain 400 antipersonnel mines for training purposes.⁸

There are also landmines not under the direct control of the government, in the hands of individuals or groups. Under the weapons collection program of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Organisation of Migration, 29 antipersonnel mines were collected in 2001.⁹

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The Republic of Congo states that it does not have a landmine problem but is concerned that some areas in the southwest, on the border with Angola, where rebels of the “Front de Libération de L’enclave du Cabinda” (FLEC) have been very active, might be mined. Animals have reportedly stepped on landmines in that region.¹⁰ Some people living on the border with Angola have given up their agricultural activities because of the fear of mines.¹¹ Future exploratory missions should determine the extent of the problem.¹²

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, no casualties caused by antipersonnel mines were reported.¹³ However, the Republic of Congo does occasionally report casualties caused by unexploded ordnance. For example, in 2001, a man and boy were killed and a woman was injured when a UXO exploded in a blacksmith’s workshop after mistakenly being thrown into a furnace. In 2000, 11 children were killed while playing with a German-made shell in a school playground.¹⁴

Since June 2000, the UNDP has provided assistance to victims of the civil war, and their communities, to promote socio-economic reintegration and the return to a normal life through activities aimed at increasing access to basic social services and the means of subsistence.¹⁵ The International Rescue Committee is working with the Ministry of Health to rehabilitate 21 health structures and train national staff in the southern districts of Dolisie and Lekoumou.¹⁶ A local NGO, Rassemblement National des Blessés et Victimes de Guerres Civiles (National Union of Wounded and Victims of Civil War), conducts a program to assist with the reintegration of war victims.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Key developments since May 2001: The Democratic Republic of Congo acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002. On 2-3 May 2002, the government hosted an international workshop on the Mine Ban Treaty and mine action in the DRC. Landmine Monitor has received an admission of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, and allegations of use by Burundian forces. Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by DRC government forces in the reporting period. A Mine Action Coordination Center was

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form B, undated. Landmine Monitor reported last year that a Congolese military official cited a figure of 700-900,000 mines in stock. Since that time, officials have stated that estimate was not correct, and that Landmine Monitor misunderstood.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form F, undated.

⁸ Ibid., Form D.

⁹ UNDP, “Results of the Program for reintegration of ex-militias and collection of light weapons in the Republic of Congo,” Brazzaville, October 2001, p. 3.

¹⁰ Interview with Léonce Nkabi, Ministry of National Defense, Managua, Nicaragua, 20 September 2001.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form I, undated.

¹² Ibid., Form C.

¹³ Interview with Léonce Nkabi, Ministry of National Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

¹⁴ “Abandoned bomb kills two in Brazzaville,” *Pan African News Agency* (PANA), 29 October 2001.

¹⁵ See: <http://mirror.undp.org/Congo/Documents>.

¹⁶ See: www.theirc.org.

established in February 2002. As of July 2002, Handicap International Belgium was the only agency conducting humanitarian mine clearance or providing mine risk education in the DRC.

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002, and the treaty will enter into force on 1 November 2002. The government had completed the domestic procedures necessary to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty on 28 March 2001, and the decree, signed by President Joseph Kabila, states that “the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, after having examined the Convention...adheres to this Convention and commits itself to enforce faithfully all its clauses.”¹

On 2-3 May 2002, the DRC government, in cooperation with the government of Canada, hosted an international workshop on “The Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo” in Kinshasa. At the workshop, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the DRC is willing to crack down on any act that would be in contradiction with the goal and the object of the Mine Ban Treaty.”² The official also said that legislative activities were on the way to punish any act that would violate the Mine Ban Treaty, and that a national commission was going to be established in order to follow up on and implement the Mine Ban Treaty in the DRC.³ Finally, it was announced that the government, with the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was going to organize a workshop in order to educate military staff about the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴

The May workshop was opened by the Deputy Foreign Minister and Canada’s Ambassador to the DRC. Other participants included representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and seven other ministries; the armed opposition Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma); diplomats from eight foreign countries; MONUC, UNMAS, UNHCR, the ICRC, GICHD, three DRC NGOs, the ICBL, and other international NGOs.

The DRC is due to submit its initial transparency report required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 April 2003. The DRC representative at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 called for the support of experienced states and organizations in order to complete the report.⁵

The DRC did not participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, but did attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. The DRC was absent from the vote on the UN General Assembly resolution in November 2001 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The DRC is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) but has informed the ICRC that it has completed internal procedures for accession.⁶ It did not attend either the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second Review Conference of the CCW, both of which were held in December 2001 in Geneva.

RCD Mine Ban Policy

On 3 May 2002, at the mine ban workshop, a representative of the armed opposition Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)-Goma stated that “we adhere to the principles of the Mine

¹ Government Decree n°006/01 of 28 March 2001 authorizing the accession to the Ottawa Convention of 4 December 1997 on the ban on use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and their destruction adopted in Oslo, 18 September 1997, opened to signature on 3 and 4 December 1997 in Ottawa.

² Statement by Mindia Monga, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention, 2 May 2002.

³ *Ibid.*, 3 May 2002.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Statement of the DRC delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meeting, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

⁶ Email from Legal Adviser, ICRC, 13 June 2002.

Ban Treaty, and we are going to try to respect it in the best way we can.”⁷ He also provided the Canadian embassy in Kinshasa with a list of areas which the RCD-Goma knows or believes are mined.⁸ However, another RCD representative told Landmine Monitor that the RCD still intends to use antipersonnel mines (see below).

NGO Activity

On 1 March 2002, the Congolese Physicians for Peace (CPP) created the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines. This campaign includes three NGOs: CPP, Paix sur Terre, and the Centre d'Education Populaire à la Démocratie.⁹

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

The DRC is not known to be a landmine producer or exporter. The government and various rebel groups have, in the past, acquired antipersonnel mines from a number of sources. The types of antipersonnel mines identified at this stage in the DRC are: TS 50 (Italy), PMA2 (Yugoslavia), M-14 and M2A4 (USA), PMN (CIS), M-35 and NR-413 (Belgium), and MS-803 (South Africa), as well as the antivehicle mines TM46 and TM57 (CIS).

On 3 May 2002, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the DRC was now obliged to destroy the stocks of antipersonnel mines that are under its control.¹⁰ A representative of the Ministry of Defense noted that with accession, the DRC was willing to implement the Convention, which meant stockpile destruction could be launched.¹¹ According to a source from the Ministry of Defense, the DRC government forces possess thousands of antipersonnel mines in their stockpiles, mostly of Belgian origin.¹²

When asked whether it had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, an RCD-Goma representative said that the RCD-Goma had taken over stocks of weapons, including landmines, from other parties. He denied that the RCD had received mines from Rwanda.¹³ According to four different sources requiring anonymity, the RCD-Goma still possesses stocks of antipersonnel mines of Italian and Yugoslav origin.¹⁴ An officer of the 7th Brigade of the RCD-Goma declared to Landmine Monitor that the RCD-Goma still holds a stock of antipersonnel mines and that it plans to use mines to protect its positions from the Mayi Mayi forces, in South Kivu and in Maniema.¹⁵

Use

Landmines have been a significant feature in the DRC conflict. They have been widely used in many different parts of the country (see Landmine Problem section below). Virtually all forces

⁷ Comments by Commander Ngizo S.T. Louis, RCD Representative at the Joint Military Commission, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002. The Joint Military Commission was set up to oversee the implementation of the DRC Ceasefire Agreement. The following day, a daily newspaper reported that the RCD “promised to respect the provisions of the Ottawa Convention that bans antipersonnel mines, a convention signed by the government against which the rebel group is fighting.” “Révélations sur l’arrivée d’un émissaire du RCD/Goma à Kinshasa,” *Le Palmarès*, 4 May 2002.

⁸ List provided by Commander Ngizo S.T. Louis, RCD Representative at the Joint Military Commission, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002. See section on Landmine Problem.

⁹ Email from Dr. Simon Bokongo, Congolese Physicians for Peace, 7 July 2002.

¹⁰ Statement by Mindia Monga, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

¹¹ Statement by Colonel Medard Unyon Pewu, Director of Cabinet at the Ministry of National Defense, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

¹² Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defense of the DRC, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

¹³ Interview with Commander Ngizo S.T. Louis, RCD Representative at the Joint Military Commission, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

¹⁴ In March 2002, a military officer of the RCD-Goma said, “The RCD-Goma holds an important stock of antipersonnel mines.”

¹⁵ Interview with a senior officer of the 7th RCD-Goma Brigade, Kisangani, 6 March 2002.

fighting in the DRC since 1998 have, at some point, been accused of using mines, and virtually all have denied it. In particular, there have been persistent allegations of mine use by the forces of the DRC government and the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, as well as the forces of the governments of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Previous allegations of use can be found in the *Landmine Monitor Reports* for 1999, 2000, and 2001.¹⁶ In each edition, Landmine Monitor has stressed that, while it was clear mines were being laid, it was impossible to verify responsibility for that use, particularly in view of charges, counter-charges and denials by all parties. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine when mines were laid, as well as by whom. That remains the case.

The use of antipersonnel mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, even if by unknown or disputed parties, takes on a new meaning since the DRC acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002. As a State Party, the DRC will have a legal obligation to prevent, suppress and punish use of antipersonnel mines by any entity on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the DRC government.

In this reporting period, since May 2001, Landmine Monitor has received an admission of on-going use of antipersonnel mines by the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, and serious allegations of use by Burundi, a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the forces of the DRC or Uganda in the reporting period, nor of any serious allegations of use by Rwandan¹⁷ or Zimbabwean forces.¹⁸

Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)

In March 2002, an RCD-Goma officer admitted to Landmine Monitor, "We use antipersonnel mines in these territories [Uvira and Fizi] in order to protect our troops against attacks by Mayi Mayi militias."¹⁹ In the same month, another officer acknowledged that RCD-Goma holds a stock of antipersonnel mines and said it plans to use the mines to protect its positions from the Mayi Mayi forces, in South Kivu and in Maniema.²⁰ Yet another senior RCD-Goma military officer told Landmine Monitor that the RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies had laid antipersonnel mines on the road between Ikela and Opala between 1999 and 2001. In February 2002 he said, "We are currently protecting our positions against attacks from the government and its Zimbabwean allies."²¹ Other RCD-Goma soldiers said, "We mined this road to prevent a smashing attack of the Zimbabwean Army that prepares itself to take Kisangani."²²

¹⁶ In addition to the information on past use in previous reports, Landmine Monitor recently received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the Liberation Movement of Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba in 1999 and 2000 in the following regions: Boende, Basankusu and on the line Libenge-Menewiya-Boende. Interviews with aid workers, 16 March 2002; interviews with businessmen in Boende and Basankusu, February 2002; interviews with staff of Boende and Basankusu hospitals, February 2002.

¹⁷ There have been allegations that, following killings that took place in Kisangani between 14 and 18 May 2002, the RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies had laid antipersonnel mines around a mass grave located close to Bangboka airport. Information provided to Landmine Monitor by a local NGO, 5 June 2002.

¹⁸ Since 1999, there have been allegations of use of landmines by Zimbabwean forces in Ikela. In interviews in February and March 2002, local people from Ikela continued to state that Zimbabwean troops laid mines when they learned that RCD-Goma and Rwandan troops were surrounding them. In 2001, MONUC cleared some of the mines located in the center of Ikela city and at the airport. Interviews with local people, landmine victims and their families, and medical staff, Ikela, February and March 2002. Interview with an RCD-Goma officer, March 2002, who declared 92 RCD-Goma soldiers had been victims of landmines in Ikela between February and May 2001.

¹⁹ Interview with an RCD-Goma military officer, Goma, 11 March 2002.

²⁰ Interview with a senior officer of the 7th RCD-Goma Brigade, Kisangani, 6 March 2002.

²¹ Interview with a senior RCD-Goma military officer, February 2002. He said, "We are currently protecting our positions against attacks from the government and its Zimbabwean allies." The presence of mines was confirmed in interviews with local people living between Ikela and Opala, March 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 239.

²² Interview with an RCD-Goma soldier returning from the Ikela frontline, March 2002. RCD use was also mentioned in interviews with local people in Anzi, Ikela, and Opala, March 2002.

A significant number of non-governmental organizations and aid workers told Landmine Monitor that RCD-Goma forces were laying new antipersonnel mines in Fizi territory (South Kivu) at the beginning of October 2001. Mines appear to have been laid in Swima, Ake, Lusambo, Kabumbe, Mboko, and in the surroundings of Baraka.²³

Burundi

The Burundi military continues to carry out operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Local human rights organizations and others in the DRC have reported the laying of mines by Burundian soldiers around their military camps in Mboko, Swima, Ake and Kaboke in Fizi Territory. One Congolese group reported, "The Burundian military used antipersonnel mines on the main road and on secondary roads in Mboko, Ake and Kabondozi villages (Tanganyika collective, Fizi Territory). These mines caused victims, most of them children and women."²⁴ The organization took testimony on five incidents between 7 November 2001 and 5 January 2002 in which antipersonnel mines allegedly laid by the Burundi military caused nine civilian casualties, including three dead and six injured.²⁵ Another organization noted, "Several credible groups have reported their [landmine] use, including eye-witness testimony to Burundian military mining these areas."²⁶ Landmine Monitor was not able to corroborate independently these allegations.

Landmine Problem

Landmine Monitor has previously provided some information on mined areas in the DRC.²⁷ Various speakers at the May 2002 workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the DRC considered that the following areas should be considered as mined:

- Equateur province: Bomongo, Losambo, Bolomba, Bulukutu, Bofili, Yalusaka, Ikela airport, road Ikela-Sacré Cœur, road Ikela-Bomandja, road Ikela-Bongoy, road airport-Anzi, surroundings of Regideso and Lonkendu river and Anzi.
- Orientale province: Tshopo, Mangobo and Makiso (Kisangani city), La Forestière, Kandanga, and surroundings of Bangboka airport (surroundings of Kisangani).
- Eastern Kasai province: Tunta airport, road from Miabi to Mbuji-Mayi, road from Mbuji-Mayi to Munkamba, surroundings of Munkamba Lake, Kabinda district (20 km around Kabinda), and road Gandajika-Kamana.
- Western Kasai province: Bena Leka, Kajiba, Demba, and Domiongo.
- Katanga province: Kapondo, Kashumbuyu, Kisele, Nyunzu, Kakuyi, road Nyemba-Nyunzu-Kabalo (+ railway), road Kalemie-Bendera, road Kalemie-Kyoko (Nyemba), Kasinge (45 km south of Kabalo), surroundings of Kamubangwa (60 km south of Kabalo), road Kongolo-Kabambare.
- South Kivu province: road Uvira-Baraka, surroundings of Fizi, road Nzovu-Kigulube, surroundings of Luyuyu, Kilembwe airport.²⁸

The mine problem has been further described by a number of sources. In Kisangani, in the area Bangboka-La Forestière-Kandangba, about 57 hectares (570,000 square meters) of land were

²³ Email to Landmine Monitor from the NGO Shalom Congo, 4 March 2002; interview with the Head of a Congolese NGO, Bukavu, 10 and 11 March 2002; interview with the staff of general hospitals of Bukavu, Uvira and Fizi, March 2002. See also www.heritiers.org/landmine.html.

²⁴ Report of Congolese human rights organization from the first quarter of 2002. The organization has requested anonymity.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Email to Landmine Monitor from Human Rights Watch staff in Burundi, 10 June 2002.

²⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 243; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 201.

²⁸ From a collection of documents and speeches given during the Kinshasa Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, provided by Sébastien Carrière, Program Coordinator, Mine Action Team, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada, June 2002.

abandoned because of the mine threat.²⁹ In this area, 45 percent of the children are malnourished and very few go to school.³⁰

Ikela is highly mined.³¹ Many areas of forest and land, including coffee plantations, have been abandoned because of landmines. Landmines have a significant impact on the daily life of local people, including reduced access to homes, fields, forests, clean water, and hospitals.³² Mines increase the risk of starvation and the development of diseases.³³ In addition, mines make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to distribute food to the people.³⁴ In mid-March 2002, on the road between Ikela City and Ene, a UN vehicle hit an antivehicle mine, but the mine did not explode.³⁵ In May 2002, a vehicle carrying two UN military observers on patrol in the vicinity of Ikela detonated an antivehicle mine, killing one and injuring the other.³⁶ Yalusaka, nine kilometers west of Ikela, is also reported to be mined.³⁷

In Uvira, the Ruzizi plain and the sugar plantations of Kiliba refinery are reportedly mined.³⁸

In the Bas-Congo province, reports indicate the presence of landmines along the border with Angola. However, it remains unclear whether the mines are located in Angola or the DRC.³⁹

Mine Action Coordination, Survey and Assessment

A Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) was established in February 2002, with the arrival of three international staff. It is based in Kinshasa with initially one regional office in Kisangani.⁴⁰ The goal of the MACC is: "To achieve within DRC an environment where people can go about their lives free from the threat of mines and where there exists an environment conducive to growth and prosperity. This does not imply the removal of all mines, but rather limiting their effects to achieve a state of normalcy."⁴¹

Its four immediate objectives are to develop a mine action information system, to raise awareness of the problem and define the level of support needed, to provide emergency clearance, and to develop a quality management system.⁴²

No national Landmine Impact Survey has been carried out yet. Depending on the security situation, the Mine Action Coordination Center intends to launch a survey focused on mine-affected areas in the eastern part of the country.⁴³ MACC has developed and started to distribute a

²⁹ Presentation by Stéphan Jooris, Kisangani Program Director, Handicap International Belgium, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

³⁰ Nutritional survey conducted by the NGO Congolese Physicians for Peace, Kisangani, August 2001; interview with Stéphan Jooris, Kisangani Program Director, Handicap International Belgium, 19 June 2002.

³¹ Interview with an aid worker, Kinshasa, 6 May 2002.

³² Interviews with local people, Ikela, February 2002.

³³ Presentation by Didier Reck, ICRC Orthopedic Coordinator, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

³⁴ Interview with an aid worker, Kinshasa, 6 May 2002.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 5.

³⁷ Interview with an aid worker, Kinshasa, 6 May 2002.

³⁸ <http://www.heritiers.org/landmine.html>.

³⁹ Presentation by Par-Dieu Mayenikini, ADDIHAC, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the DRC, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002; email from Pascal Rigaldies, Program Director, HI Belgium, 24 July 2002; diplomatic sources.

⁴⁰ Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 8.

⁴¹ "Workplan 1 May 2002-31 October 2002," Mine Action Coordination Center, May 2002.

⁴² Ibid. See also, Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 8.

⁴³ Email from Patrick Tillet, UNMAS Desk Officer, 6 June 2002.

Rapid Impact Survey Form and a Victim Form, which it hopes the UN, international agencies and NGOs will use to collect relevant information.⁴⁴

In Kisangani, since March 2001, a survey team from Handicap International Belgium (HIB) has been collecting data on areas affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), which is then used for rapid response to communities' requests for clearance and mine/UXO risk education.⁴⁵ HIB intends to double its survey capacity in 2002.⁴⁶

Mine Clearance

Between 1997 and 2001, most parties to the conflict in the DRC conducted military mine clearance to facilitate the movement of their own troops.⁴⁷ On 3 May 2002, a representative of the Ministry of Defense urged all signatories of the Lusaka accords to provide information about their mined areas so that they can be cleared. He also called for the support of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and added that the military command of the Armed Forces had agreed that Military Engineers should be involved in clearance of landmines in general and antipersonnel landmines in particular.⁴⁸

Uruguayan demining specialists are part of MONUC. The Uruguayan Army reported that its engineering company has cleared approximately 100,000 square meters of land in the area where it is stationed (Kisangani).⁴⁹ The UN reported that the Uruguayans deminers are aiding an investigation into the incident near Ikela in which an antivehicle mine killed a UN military observer and injured another.⁵⁰ A diplomatic source told Landmine Monitor that the Uruguayans are only allowed to provide clearance for their own contingent, and in general, in order to facilitate UN troop movements.⁵¹

MONUC contracted a commercial mine clearance company from South Africa, MECHEM, to verify or clear the surroundings of Kisangani and Kindu airports; work was to begin in mid-2002. Quality Assurance of MECHEM activities will be performed by MONUC with the technical assistance of the MACC.⁵²

Handicap International Belgium is so far the only agency conducting humanitarian mine clearance in the DRC.⁵³ After eight weeks of training, clearance began in June 2001.⁵⁴ In 2001, HIB destroyed 77 antipersonnel mines, 28 antivehicle mines, 4,020 UXO and 1,418 pieces of ammunition in Kisangani; 725 of the UXO destroyed came from a stockpile that was located in the center of the city.⁵⁵ In order to speed up clearance and facilitate area reduction, HIB intends to

⁴⁴ "Workplan 1 May 2002-31 October 2002," Mine Action Coordination Center, May 2002.

⁴⁵ "Activity Report 2001, Mine and UXO Action Project," Handicap International Belgium, Kisangani, January 2002, p. 12.

⁴⁶ Email from Taz Khaliq, Desk Officer, Handicap International Belgium, 10 June 2002.

⁴⁷ Interview with a medical student returning from Ikela, 10 March 2002; interview with an RCD-Goma officer, Ikela, January 2002. Local people from Ikela showed Landmine Monitor places where Zimbabwean forces had cleared mines before leaving the city in July 2001. A landmine victim living in Mandombe, Kisangani, showed places to Landmine Monitor where the Ugandan army had cleared mines before leaving. Unfortunately, some mines were left behind and local villagers have been killed and injured.

⁴⁸ Statement by Colonel Medard Unyon Pewu, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of National Defense, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

⁴⁹ Uruguayan National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 5 April 2002.

⁵⁰ Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 5.

⁵¹ Diplomatic source, 7 June 2002.

⁵² "UNMAS Monthly Update," June 2002, p. 17.

⁵³ "Workplan 1 May 2002-31 October 2002," Mine Action Coordination Center, May 2002.

⁵⁴ "Activity Report 2001, Mine and UXO Action Project," Handicap International Belgium, Kisangani, January 2002, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

import a Tempest MK4 vegetation cutter produced in Cambodia by a non-profit organization employing landmine survivors.⁵⁶

Mine Risk Education

The only organization providing mine risk education in the DRC is Handicap International Belgium. In 2001, about 41,000 people took part in mine risk education sessions and approximately 200,000 were reached via the radio and television.⁵⁷ At this stage, the HIB program is working in Kisangani and its immediate surroundings only. The interactive approach combines drama, dance, storytelling and audio-visual presentations. The sessions usually attract big crowds (from 200 to 600 people) and last about two hours. During mine risk education sessions, the HIB staff collect communities' requests for clearance of mines and UXOs.⁵⁸

In June 2002, in the wake of the incident near Ikela in which an antitank mine killed one UN military observer and injured another, the UN reported that "MONUC personnel have been warned to exercise extreme caution with regard to the mine threat, particularly in the areas where tension is running high. In the meantime, MONUC is strengthening its mine-awareness programme."⁵⁹

Mine Action Funding

The Mine Action Coordination Center was established in February 2002 with contributions from Belgium (US\$ 575,000) and the US (approximately US\$25,000).⁶⁰ As of 30 June 2002, the entire amount appears to have been spent. Partial funding of the MACC is expected from the MONUC assessed budget, but the UN has indicated an additional US\$150,000 is needed to sustain operations until the end of the year. There is also a need to deploy a mobile mine clearance-mine risk education capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies, which is estimated to cost US\$565,000.⁶¹

Handicap International Belgium receives its mine action funding from the Belgian Directorate General for International Cooperation (US\$639,200) and the Canadian government (US\$27,835).⁶² In 2001, HIB had four international staff and 38 local staff in Kisangani.⁶³

Landmine Casualties

Instability within the DRC and the lack of communication makes comprehensive data collection on landmine casualties impossible at this stage. Landmine Monitor has analyzed data from hospital records, UN agencies, the RCD, and media on incidents reported in the provinces of Equateur, Orientale, Maniema, South Kivu, and West Kasai.⁶⁴ Between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 2002, 228 landmine and UXO casualties were reported in the DRC. In 2001, 135 new

⁵⁶ Telephone interview of Mathieu Soupart, Head of Mine/UXO Operations Unit, Handicap International Belgium, 25 June 2002.

⁵⁷ "Activity Report 2001," HIB, Kisangani, January 2002, p. 12.

⁵⁸ Interview with Odette Yalungu, Mine Risk Education Officer, Handicap International Belgium, Kisangani, 7 December 2001.

⁵⁹ Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Email from Patrick Tillet, UNMAS Desk Officer, 6 June 2002.

⁶¹ "UNMAS Monthly Update," June 2002, p. 17; email from Patrick Tillet, UNMAS Desk Officer, 6 June 2002.

⁶² UNMAS Mine Action Investments Database.

⁶³ "Activity Report 2001," HIB, Kisangani, January 2002, p. 18.

⁶⁴ Casualty data was collated by Landmine Monitor from hospital statistics from Kisangani, Ikela, Kindu, Uvira, Bukavu, and Fizi; interviews with landmine survivors and their families, March-May 2002; interview with Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC, Kinshasa, 6 May 2002; interview with RCD-Goma officer, March 2002; interview with a landmine survivor, Kisangani General Hospital, October 2001; interview with health staff, Pavilion Militaire, Kisangani; email from the NGO Shalom Congo, 7 January 2002; email from Mosala Mufungizi, 23 April 2002; email from Pascal Rigaldies, DRC Program Director, Handicap International Belgium, 28 June 2002; and media reports; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 245.

casualties were reported, including 92 military casualties. In the first five months of 2002, 12 new casualties were reported. The precise year of the incident was not clear for another 81 casualties. Details on the number of casualties killed or injured, or whether they were male, female, or a child, was not always provided. However, it is known that, of the total reported casualties, at least 33 people died and 26 were injured, including at least 26 men, 17 women, and 11 children. The high mortality rate reported appears to be due to the severity of the injuries and the weakness of health structures. As the statistics come mostly from hospital records, data generally does not include casualties who die before reaching medical assistance. Antipersonnel mines caused at least 34 casualties, antivehicle mines 7, and UXO 18 casualties, of which 14 died.

The most recent reported mine/UXO incidents occurred in Uvira, Kisangani, Bena Leka, Kabinda and Ikela. The incident in Ikela, on 13 May 2002, killed one peacekeeper, a colonel from Algeria, and injured another, a major from India.⁶⁵

In addition to the casualties reported above, during the reporting period Tanzania was receiving a stream of refugees from the DRC, some of them landmine survivors. Landmine Monitor was shown the records of three Congolese landmine survivors, two men and one woman, injured in the DRC in September 2001.⁶⁶ One of the new arrivals reported seeing two people being brought in for medical assistance after stepping on a landmine at Bwali. Information was also provided by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on landmine casualties from the DRC that had been referred to the Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital. Seven landmine casualties were recorded between August and October 2001, including five men, one woman, and a three year-old boy.⁶⁷

In August 2001, a British mine clearance technical adviser lost his thumb when a grenade detonator exploded during a training session in the Kisangani.⁶⁸

Survivor Assistance

Under the primary healthcare system, the DRC is divided into numerous health zones, and each health zone is divided into health centers. This organizational structure covers the entire country, but hospitals and health centers are often not sustainable because they lack equipment and medicine, salaries are not paid, and the staff is not motivated. However, some hospitals have been in a position to provide assistance to landmine and UXO casualties with the support of international agencies including the ICRC, UNICEF, WHO, and CARITAS.⁶⁹

In 2001, the ICRC provided 22 hospitals and health centers in Bukavu, Uvira, Kalemie, Kisangani, Goma, Bunia, and Equateur Province, with medical and surgical supplies, training and expertise. Hospitals treated 940 war-wounded, of whom 47 were mine/UXO casualties. Training was provided to more than 1,000 first aiders and to surgeons at the Kinshasa, Kalemie, and Uvira hospitals. The ICRC, Ministry of Health, and armed-forces medical services also convened a war-surgery seminar in November.⁷⁰

In Kinshasa, the DRC Red Cross and the ICRC run an orthopedic workshop. The Kalembe-Lembe prosthetic/orthotic workshop was established in 1998. In 2001, it assisted 188 patients, of which 26 percent were landmine survivors, and produced 236 prostheses, 22 orthoses, and provided

⁶⁵ "UN Peacekeeper killed by Landmine in the DRC," *Xinhua News Agency*, 13 May 2002.

⁶⁶ The three entries were recorded at the NMC reception center for refugees arriving from the DRC. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is in charge of this center. Casualties from DRC make their own way to the border way station, along with other refugees, where they are processed by the IRC who then informs UNHCR. UNHCR sends a boat and transports the casualties to hospital.

⁶⁷ The information came from Kibirizi 1, where arriving refugees have their details taken and are then moved on to various holding centers, or to hospitals if medical assistance is needed. The agency in charge is the IRC, which keeps records of all medical cases, including where injuries occurred and whether caused by bullets, landmines or hand grenades.

⁶⁸ "Mine-clearance: an activity that is always fraught with danger," Handicap International Belgium Press Release, 7 August 2001.

⁶⁹ Interviews with representatives of WHO, UNICEF, ICRC, and MSF-B, Kisangani, March 2002.

⁷⁰ Interview with Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC, Kinshasa, 6 May 2002; and ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 17.

453 crutches and walking sticks, and 71 wheelchairs. The patients pay for services according to their income. The workshop, with an annual budget of US\$275,000, also receives funding from the British Red Cross.⁷¹

In Goma, the Shirika la Umoja center provides physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration to persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. In 2001, the center provided physical rehabilitation for 1,580 persons and produced 45 prostheses and 84 crutches. The center cares for war victims referred by the ICRC. The center includes support for disabled children in the school system, as well as an outreach program aimed at raising awareness about disability among communities. The center is funded by churches and the Liliane Fund.⁷² Following the eruption of Nyiragongo volcano, in January 2002, Handicap International Belgium provided support to the center in order to rehabilitate the sections destroyed by the eruption.⁷³

In Mbuji-Mayi, Handicap International Belgium supports a rehabilitation center based in the Saint Jean-Baptiste Hospital. In 2001, the center produced 14 prostheses, 106 crutches and provided assistance to 1,217 people, but few landmine survivors are reported in the area. The budget for 2001 was EUR180,000 (US\$161,640). The project is funded by the European Union, in the framework of the PATS program.⁷⁴

In Kisangani, the Simana center provides physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration to persons with disabilities. In 2001, 1,005 patients were assisted, and six prostheses, three crutches, and 15 tricycles were produced. The expenditures for 2001 amounted to a total of EUR85,000 (US\$576,330). The center is funded by its own activities, interest on savings, various institutions (including the Liliane Fund, Milles Missievrienden, Gemeente Mill, Cordaid, Misereor, and the Limburg Fund), the Department of Social Affairs, which provides water and electricity, and private donors.⁷⁵

Disability Policy and Practice

On 3 May 2002, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative stated that, according to a decree of the transitional government, all disabled persons have access to healthcare, education and jobs within the administration. He also called for support from international NGOs and local associations.⁷⁶ At the same workshop, a Ministry of Defense representative declared that a general directive had been created to care for soldiers who had been disabled during the war,⁷⁷ and a Ministry of Health representative called for all assistance to rely on a community-based approach, as it is both cheaper and provides reference structures to disabled persons within their community.⁷⁸

COSTA RICA

Key developments since May 2001: The demining program in Costa Rica has suffered a serious financial crisis since December 2001, which has resulted in a suspension of operations. National implementation legislation, "Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines" took effect on 17 April 2002.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

⁷² "Rapport Annuel – Exercice 2001," Centre pour Handicapés Physiques "Shirika la Umoja" asbl, Goma, (no date); "Rapport annuel – Exercice 2000," Centre pour Handicapés Physiques "Shirika la Umoja" asbl, Goma, (no date).

⁷³ Interview with Taz Khaliq, Desk Officer, Handicap International Belgium, Brussels, 27 June 2002.

⁷⁴ Email from Pascal Rigaldies, DRC Program Director, Handicap International Belgium, 28 June 2002.

⁷⁵ "Rapport Annuel 2001," Centre de Rééducation SIMANA, Kisangani, DRC.

⁷⁶ Statement by Mindia Monga, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

⁷⁷ Statement by Colonel Medard Unyon Pewu, Ministry of National Defense, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

⁷⁸ Statement by Dr Mobile Kapanga, Advisor, Office of the Ministry of Public Health, Kinshasa, at the Workshop on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, 3 May 2002.

Costa Rica submitted its first Article 7 Report, which confirmed that Costa Rica has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines. The OAS expects to complete a national impact survey in August 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Costa Rica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 17 March 1999 and the treaty entered into force on 1 September 1999. On 18 March 2002, the Legislative Assembly approved Decree 8231, "Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines," which serves as national implementation legislation. On 17 April 2002, the law was published in the Official Gazette and thus entered into force.¹ The law comprehensively prohibits antipersonnel mines and provides for penal sanctions of 3-6 years imprisonment for violations, with the possibility of an increase of 25 percent in prison time if the antipersonnel mine is used to threaten national security, public infrastructure, or transport vehicles.²

Costa Rica attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001, but did not make any statement. In November 2001, Costa Rica cosponsored and voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M. Costa Rica participated in a conference on "Mine Action in Latin America" in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001.³ The director of the Mine Clearance Program in the Ministry of Public Security made a presentation on Costa Rica's experience in mine clearance.⁴ Costa Rica did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but a representative from the Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva participated in the May 2002 meetings.

Costa Rica's initial Article 7 transparency report was due 27 February 2000. It submitted its first report on 3 September 2001; it does not indicate the reporting period. On 20 February 2002, it submitted another report, with older past information, covering 1996 to 1999. Costa Rica has not yet submitted an annual Article 7 Report covering calendar year 2001, which was due by 30 April 2002.

Costa Rica is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2001. It has not submitted its Article 13 annual report for Amended Protocol II. Costa Rica did not participate in the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Costa Rica has never produced, imported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines.⁵ Though Landmine Monitor had believed this to be the case, Costa Rica's September 2001 Article 7 Report is apparently the first official confirmation of this information. The country's landmine problem is a result of mines laid on the northern border not by Costa Ricans, but by forces involved in the Nicaraguan conflict.

Landmine Problem

According to the September 2001 Article 7 Report, an estimated 1,800 mines remain to be demined in the zones of Pocosol, Upala, and La Cruz, between border markers two and twenty on the northern border.⁶ Affected areas include the sectors of Los Chiles, Tablitas, Isla Chica, La

¹ Ley 8231, "Prohibición de Minas Antipersonales." See Diario Oficial La Gaceta, Costa Rica, 17 April 2002. See http://imprenal.go.cr/gaceta/DocumentosWord/PLLE_17_04_2002.DOC.

² Artículo 6, "Delitos," Ley 8231, "Prohibición de Minas Antipersonales," 17 April 2002.

³ The Conference was sponsored by the US Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States; the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

⁴ "Mine Action in Latin America" Conference, Panel VIII: Future Challenges, "Costa Rican perspectives," Captain Freddy Hernández Drummond, Miami, 3-5 December 2002.

⁵ Article 7 Report, points 2, 4, 5, and 8, submitted 3 September 2001.

⁶ *Ibid.*, point 3.

Trocha, Pocosol, San Isidro, Tiricias, Cóbano, La Victoria, and Pueblo Nuevo, which are mainly agricultural lands near the border.

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

The OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, through its Program for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA, Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal), is responsible for coordinating and supervising the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA, Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamérica), with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

The IADB is responsible for organizing a team of international supervisors in charge of training and certification, known as the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centro América or MARMINCA).

PADCA and MARMINCA have mine action programs in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In Costa Rica, the Ministry of Security is responsible for clearance operations, along with PADCA/MARMINCA.

For the 2001 budget, the OAS PADCA program raised approximately \$4.72 million from the United States (\$1.27 million), Norway (\$1.15 million), Canada (\$979,232), Sweden (\$639,964), United Kingdom, (\$271,971), Spain (\$255,340), Italy (\$100,000), and Japan (\$45,000).⁷ This represents a decrease from \$4.92 million raised in the year 2000.

The OAS PADCA program has suffered a serious financial crisis since December 2001,⁸ which has led to a suspension of mine clearance operations in Costa Rica. In his 12 March 2002 report to the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Coordinator of the OAS Mine Action Program, Colonel (Ret.) William McDonough, reported that:

[S]ince late 2000, demining operations [in Costa Rica] had been hampered by the inconsistent availability of air medical evacuation support. Moreover, the lack of renewed donor support for the Costa Rican program led to a suspension of all activities in January 2002. Although the small AICMA office remains open and three international supervisors are on hand, further OAS support to the program in Costa Rica is suspended until dedicated donor funding can be obtained.⁹

The OAS AICMA Coordinator for Costa Rica, Leda Marín, told Landmine Monitor that mine clearance operations were suspended in early December 2001 and will not be continued until funding becomes available to, among other items, pay insurance (\$10,000) for 38 deminers working in Upala.¹⁰ Funds have been made available (\$6,500) for the maintenance of the office in Upala.¹¹ In March 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OAS were in discussions with several governments regarding funding of \$150,000 to continue with operations in Upala and to complete the planned program in La Cruz de Guanacaste.¹²

⁷ In previous years other donors to the program have included: Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, and the Netherlands. "OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001," Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁸ See "Proyecto de Resolución: Apoyo al Programa de Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal en Centroamérica," AG/doc 4094/02, 15 May 2002. Document prepared for the XXXII OAS General Assembly, Bridgetown, Barbados, 2 June 2002, http://www.oas.org/xxxiiiga/espanol/documentos/docs_esp/AGdoc4094_02.htm

⁹ Colonel (Ret.) William McDonough, "Report of the Organization of American States Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," OAS, Washington, DC, 14 March 2002.

¹⁰ Interview with Leda Marín, OAS AICMA Coordinator for Costa Rica, Coronado, 18 February 2002.

¹¹ Telephone interview with Leda Marín, OAS AICMA Coordinator for Costa Rica, 27 March 2002.

¹² Interview with Carlos Cordero, Vice Director of the Multilateral Policy Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, San José, 22 March 2002.

Despite a lack of funding, the OAS expects to complete a national impact survey in August 2002. This will form the basis for future OAS support requests to the donor community.¹³

According to the OAS AICMA National Coordinator, since 1996 OAS funding for the mine clearance program in Costa Rica has received \$134,000 annually. Funds have been used to pay insurance for deminers, to maintain the AICMA office in Upala, to purchase and repair basic equipment, to cover services for OAS AICMA supervisors, and to cover the salary of a driver.¹⁴ The salaries of OAS AICMA supervisors are paid directly by their respective governments.

Mine Clearance

In January 2001, prior to the funding crises, the Minister of Public Security told Landmine Monitor that mine clearance was due to be completed in July 2002.¹⁵ With the suspension of activities and lack of funding, this target date cannot be met.

In 2001, mine clearance operations were carried out by the Ministry of Public Security in Los Chiles (Sector 1), Upala (Sector 2) and La Cruz (Sector 3), in which 131,641 square meters of land was cleared.¹⁶

In 2002, following the suspension, some limited operations have been underway since January, and after a small contribution was received from Japan in July 2002.

Since the mine clearance program started in Costa Rica in 1996, 338 antipersonnel mines cleared, including 17 mines since September 2001.¹⁷

Mine Risk Education

The Ministry of Public Security and the OAS, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, is continuing a mine risk education campaign in the mine-affected regions. In the year 2000, the education campaign focused on the small towns of Cuatro Esquinas, Medio Queso, San Isidro, and La Guaria.¹⁸

Mine risk education is done in local schools, with neighbors as well as students and teachers participating. The campaign includes educational materials such as posters, photos and fake landmines. The OAS also distributes pencils, notebooks, physical education uniforms, and other materials that have mine awareness messages.

While the local population now has some knowledge about the landmine problem, it should be noted that migrants and visitors to the mine-affected regions do not and are therefore especially vulnerable.¹⁹ According to officials at the Ministry of Public Security, the major target population for mine risk education carried out in community meetings are school-aged children.²⁰ According to the latest Article 7 Report, these mine risk education activities have resulted in students themselves warning rural school teachers of a mine or UXO found, and teachers in turn inform the authorities.²¹

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There were no new mine victims recorded in 2001 or in the first quarter of 2002. Records of mine casualties are not kept systematically, but one source cites an overall total of eight deaths and

¹³ See OAS appendix in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

¹⁴ Telephone interview with Leda Marín, OAS AICMA Coordinator for Costa Rica, 27 March 2002.

¹⁵ Interview with Rogelio Ramos, Minister of Public Security, San José, 24 January 2001.

¹⁶ Interview with Captain Wilson Gueders, OAS MARMINCA Supervisor, Upala, 13 February 2002.

¹⁷ *La Nación* (San José), 18 September 2001, p. 12/A

¹⁸ Interview with Major Luis Carlos Calvo, Coordinator of the Mine Clearance Program, Ministry of Security, Los Chiles, 13 February 2001.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Interview with Commissioner Mario Calderón, Director of Special Operations Command, and Captain Santamaría, Coordinator of the Mine Clearance Program, Ministry of Public Security, San José, 26 March 2002.

²¹ Article 7 Report, point 5, 3 September 2001.

ten wounded due to landmines, which the OAS IADB believes is consistent with available information.²²

According to an official in the Ministry of Public Security, a helicopter and two small airplanes owned by the Costa Rican Police are available to provide emergency transportation for those injured by mines.²³

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Côte d'Ivoire signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 30 June 2000, and became a State Party on 1 December 2000. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the mine issue, and reported at the beginning of 2002 that draft national implementation legislation was to be submitted to the National Assembly.¹ As of July 2002, it had not yet been submitted.

Côte d'Ivoire's first Article 7 transparency report, due on 30 May 2001, has reportedly been sent to the Côte d'Ivoire Mission to the United Nations in New York, but it has not been officially submitted to the UN Secretary-General.² However, a copy of the report, covering the period 9 May 2001 to 31 December 2001, was sent to Landmine Monitor. It is a "nil" report, indicating Côte d'Ivoire is not mine-affected, and has never produced, imported or used antipersonnel mines; it does not have a stockpile of mines, even for training purposes.³

Côte d'Ivoire did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. There is no budget for attending these meetings.⁴ However, it has participated in a number of regional meetings dealing with the landmine issue.

It attended the Conference on Civil Society and the Ban of Antipersonnel Mines, organized by the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (Programme de Coordination et d'Assistance pour la Sécurité et le Développement, PCASED), held in Accra, Ghana, from 14 to 17 March 2001, and the national seminar on Implementation of Treaties and Conventions: the Ottawa Convention and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on Small Arms, organized by the African Center for Human Security in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, on 29 August 2001. At the national seminar, the government representative noted that Côte d'Ivoire's signing of the ECOWAS Moratorium is seen as a confirmation that Côte d'Ivoire continues to support the struggle for a mine-free world.⁵ Côte d'Ivoire also participated in the Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Treaty, in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with ECOWAS, on 10 and 11 October 2001.

In November 2001, Côte d'Ivoire co-sponsored and voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

²² Carlos Hernández, "Detectan minas en Upala. Campesinos no siembran por temor a explosiones," *La Nación*, 28 October 2000; Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from William McDonough, Coordinator, PADCA, Organization of American States, 26 July 2001.

²³ Interview with Erick Lacayo, Ministry of Public Security, San José, 25 March 2002.

¹ Interview with Col. Guie Globo Denis, Director of Defense, Ministry of Defense, Abidjan, 24 January 2002.

² Information provided by Lt. Col. Philippe Mangou, Deputy Director of Doctrine and Employment, Ministry of Defense, 10 April 2002.

³ Article 7 Report, dated 9 May 2001, sent to Landmine Monitor by Lt. Col. Mangou. The same information was given to Landmine Monitor on 4 December 2000 in an interview with Col. Guie Globo Denis. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.71.

⁴ Interview with Col. Guie Globo Denis, Ministry of Defense, Abidjan, 24 January 2002.

⁵ Statement of Marc Bany, in charge of treaties and conventions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the Seminar on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and the Ottawa Treaty, Abidjan, 29 August 2001.

At the beginning of 2002, a Ministry of Defense official reiterated the government's willingness to do whatever it could to support initiatives to ban mines.⁶

Côte d'Ivoire is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, in Geneva in December 2001.

The Côte d'Ivoire Campaign to Ban Landmines was created in December 2000. In October 2001, ACHUS, one of the founders of the Campaign, with the support of the Swiss Embassy, organized educational activities for youth in four districts of Abidjan on the issue of small arms and antipersonnel mines. Awareness programs have been organized by the Côte d'Ivoire section of the Organization of African Unity Club in some schools, including one held on 19 February 2002 at the Sainte Foi College in Abobo (Abidjan). At a moot court competition on International Humanitarian Law, organized by the ICRC in Abidjan on 27 March 2002, ACHUS did a presentation (on behalf of Handicap International) on the mine issue for 24 participants of the Police School, the Institute for Communication Science and Technologies, the National School for Administration, the University of Cocody and the University of the Atlantic.

In 2001, some 199 officers from 35 different African countries received training on the mine ban issue at the Ivorian/French-led Peace-Keeping Training School in Zambakro. These training sessions were given by ACHUS, in collaboration with Handicap International Belgium.⁷ ACHUS also initiated an e-mail group of officers to share information on small arms in general and mines in particular.

CROATIA

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, 56,028 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed, leaving a total of 132,048 mines. Croatia has served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction since September 2001. During 2001, 42.3 million square meters of land were handed over to communities for use, including 13.6 million through demining and 28.7 million through survey reduction. CROMAC reports that in 2001 it spent more than \$26 million on mine action, an increase of nearly one-quarter. In 2001, there were 34 mine and UXO casualties, including nine fatalities, while in the first six months of 2002 there were 13 mine casualties, including two deminers.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Croatia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 20 May 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation introducing penal sanctions for violations of the treaty and establishing a body to monitor the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was reported to be in "final preparation" in September 2001.¹ In May 2002, the Ministry of Defense said that the new law would be put before parliament in the second half of 2002.² Croatia's report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 14 December 2001 refers to the thorough approach taken in preparing the new legislation, with extensive interdepartmental coordination.³

⁶ Interview with Fany Inza, Diplomatic Adviser in charge of International Relations, Ministry of Defense, Abidjan, 14 February 2002.

⁷ Interview with Col. Benoit Royal, Director of Studies, Zambakro Peace-Keeping Training School, 27 February 2002.

¹ Statement by Vice Skracic, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. It was first reported to be under development in December 2000. Letter from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, President of the Commission for Demining Issues, Ministry of Defense, 5 December 2000.

² Telephone interview with Marina Juric-Matejcic, Legal Department, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 10 May 2002.

³ Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the OSCE, 14 December 2001.

Croatia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Nicaragua.⁴ Its representative called on its “fellow European countries,” including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to join the treaty without delay. It also called for assistance as “Croatia will not be in a position to cover all its remaining needs, so as to complete the National Demining Program as planned.”⁵

On 29 November 2001, Croatia cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Croatia attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. It served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from September 2001 to September 2002, along with Australia.⁶ The ICBL and other States Parties have praised the co-chairs for their very pro-active approach in identifying potential problems and solutions regarding stockpile destruction, with a focus on the looming four-year deadlines for many countries.

The annual Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2001 was submitted on 26 April 2002. Previous Article 7 reports were submitted on 3 September 1999, 26 January 2001, and 30 May 2001.

Croatia gave its consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 28 April 2002. The ratification law was published in the *National Gazette* on 23 March 2002, and entered into force eight days later.⁷ Croatia did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, but did attend, as a State Party, the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Croatia supported extending the CCW to internal conflicts, and a strongly mandated expert group aimed at the adoption of a new protocol on “explosive remnants of war.” It urged that possible violations of the CCW be addressed adequately, and recommended adoption of compliance measures similar to Article 8 of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸

Croatia participates in the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. The Pact’s Reay Group on Mine Action met in May 2001 in Geneva; June 2001 in Zagreb; November 2001 in Budapest; January 2002 in Geneva; and May 2002 in Geneva. In January 2002, the Group appointed as its new chair Dijana Plestina, Mine Action Adviser to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Croatia plays a central role in one of the Reay Group’s three fields of activities: test sites for new mine action technologies, in which it is partnered with Canada.⁹

Use

During 2001, four cases apparently involving the use of antipersonnel mines were reported. In the city of Pula, behind the back wheel of a private car parked in the backyard of a house, police found and successfully deactivated a PMA-2 mine; it is not known who laid the mine. In the other three cases PMA-3 mines were found in Vojnic municipality in August and October 2001. Because these areas were not part of the confrontation lines during the armed conflict, and the land belonged to ethnic Serb returnees, these were thought to be cases of new use and investigation is underway.¹⁰ No cases of possible new use have been reported in 2002.

⁴ Represented by Vice Skracic, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁵ Address by Vice Skracic to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁶ Vice Skracic served in this role for Croatia in the January and May 2002 meetings.

⁷ Telephone interview with Neven Mikec, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 29 March 2002.

⁸ Statement of Spomenka Cek, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December.

⁹ Interview with Dijana Plestina, Mine Action Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 13 March 2002.

¹⁰ Fax from Zinka Bardic, spokesperson, Ministry of Interior, 18 February 2002; “Croatia: Two Serb Returnees Injured in Landmine Explosion,” *SRNA* (news agency), 3 October 2001.

Stockpiling and Destruction

In both its 2001 and 2002 Article 7 Reports, Croatia indicated that it had to revise previously reported stockpile numbers due to more accurate information and other factors. In its latest Article 7 Report, Croatia reports data on 192,782 antipersonnel mines. Stockpile destruction started in June 1999, when 3,434 antipersonnel mines were destroyed. In the year 2000, 1,272 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during testing of mine clearance techniques.¹¹ In September 2001, 56,028 antipersonnel mines were destroyed at the military testing ranges in Slunj. Thus, as of the end of 2001, Croatia had destroyed a total of 60,734 antipersonnel mines, and had 132,048 remaining in stock.¹²

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Croatia explained that “the initial destruction of stockpiled [antipersonnel mines] in the summer of 1999 was not followed up till now due to the reorganization of the defense sector.” Croatia then announced that the Ministry of Defense had adopted a “Dynamic Plan for the Destruction of Stockpiled Anti-Personnel Mines,” with a target completion date of October 2002.¹³ The Plan specifies dates and quantities to be destroyed, and the locations of collection and destruction. It does not specify the types of mine to be destroyed.

Phase One of the Plan scheduled the destruction of 52,175 antipersonnel mines in September 2001 (56,028 were actually destroyed).¹⁴ The second phase from 8 April to 20 May 2002 planned to destroy a further 59,392 antipersonnel mines. The third phase from 2 September to 24 October 2002 is to destroy 65,656 antipersonnel mines.¹⁵ The total cost of the stockpile destruction program amounts to KN686,820 (US\$78,763). The cost of the first phase was KN228,025 (\$26,149). Croatia has not received financial or other support for stockpile destruction.¹⁶

The stockpile of 132,048 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2001 includes 7,000 mines to be retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Apparently, no mines were used for these training or testing purposes in 2001. Previously, Croatia had indicated it would retain as many as 17,500 mines.¹⁷

The status of stockpile destruction at the end of 2001 is shown in the table below.¹⁸

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Forms B and F, 30 May 2001; interview with Brig. Haluzan, President, Commission for Demining Issues, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 6 March 2002.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 April 2002; letter from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, President of the Commission for Demining Issues, Ministry of Defense, 24 January 2002.

¹³ Statement of Vice Skracic to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001. The Dynamic Plan was accepted by the Ministry of Defense on 28 May 2001.

¹⁴ Letter from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, President of the Commission for Demining Issues, Ministry of Defense, 24 January 2002, and interview on 6 March 2002. The quantity of 52,175 scheduled for destruction were collected from two storage sites whose stocks totaled this number; it is not clear if the additional 3,853 were found at these sites and are additional to the declared stockpile, or come from another site and form part of the stockpile already declared.

¹⁵ “Dynamic Plan for Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines,” Ministry of Defense, presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001. The Plan includes the destruction of 43,552 fuzes (41,404 were declared in stock on 31 December 2000). Mine bodies are not included in the Plan.

¹⁶ Letter from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, 24 January 2002; for the destruction method, see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 613. Exchange rate at February 2002: US\$1 = KN8.72, used throughout this report.

¹⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 656.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 April 2002; interview with Brig. Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 6 March 2002.

Type of mine	Destroyed	In Stock	Retained for training
Pressure-activated PMA-1	7,875	6,879	1,000
Pressure-activated PMA-2	9,979	31,689	1,500
Pressure-activated PMA-3	19,372	37,912	1,000
Tripwire fragmentation PMR-2A, 2AS	21,364	50,717	1,000
Tripwire fragmentation PROM-1	2,144	4,703	1,500
Tripwire fragmentation PMR-3 ¹⁹	0	148	1,000
TOTAL	60,734	132,048	7,000

Croatia has explained some of the differences from previous Article 7 Reports as reflecting the discovery that records were incorrect when removing mines from the stockpile for destruction; these differences make up an additional 3,531 mines. However, the Article 7 Report for calendar year 2001 also explains that the Zbogom Oruzje (Farewell to Arms) campaign of the Ministry of the Interior collected the extra 3,531 antipersonnel mines from the civilian population in the period to 31 December 2001.²⁰

The Farewell to Arms campaign started on 30 June 1992 and has a deadline of 31 December 2002. People can hand over weapons and mines to police stations anonymously and without sanction. The items handed over are stored in police stockpiles and then destroyed. From 1 January 2001 to 31 January 2002, 30,018 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines were handed over, in addition to other weaponry.²¹

Croatia also reported having 19,076 MRUD (Claymore-type) mines, which it does not classify as antipersonnel mines. Brigadier Haluzan explained that they are activated by an electrical command wire and cannot be victim-activated by a tripwire. It is not known if these mines have been physically modified to prevent tripwire activation, or if the tripwires have simply been removed.²²

Destruction is performed by a group of deminers from the armed forces, under an expert team from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior. Destruction takes place in two locations on military test fields designated for the destruction of ammunition. During the destruction process, spectators are invited to watch at certain, specific times. The detonation sites are surrounded by woods and are situated at a required safety distance from the inhabited areas.

On 25-26 September 2001, a Stability Pact mission visited Zagreb, as part of an assessment in several Balkan countries of "the technical options and future requirements for the destruction of APM stockpiles."²³ The mission concluded that overall the destruction plan was "pragmatic, efficient and effective," although there were concerns regarding the safety standards of explosive storage. There was some concern as to whether the process met the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and a short training course was recommended. The Ministry of Defense raised the issue of significant quantities of mines recovered from minefields or handed in by the civilian

¹⁹ Croatia has noted that since it was "discovered that the actual number of PMR-3 in stock is much smaller than 1,000 pieces (148 pieces), it will be suggested to the Minister of Defence to use other types instead." Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 April 2002.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 April 2002, and fax from Zinka Bardic, spokesperson, Ministry of the Interior, 31 January 2002. By 31 December 2001, the original quantity of fuzes (41,404 or 41,401) had also increased by 4,178 due to Farewell to Arms, and 10,847 had been destroyed, leaving a total remaining of 34,732.

²¹ Fax from Zinka Bardic, Spokesperson, Ministry of Interior, 18 February 2002; the quantity of 30,018 includes 3,531 mines.

²² Interview with Brig. Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 6 March 2002, and telephone interview 10 May 2002.

²³ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, pp. 3-4.

population, possibly in an unsafe condition. Assessment of the problem by an international Ammunition Training and Advisory Team (ATAT) was recommended.²⁴

At a Reay Group meeting in January 2002 in Geneva, the Croatian representative said that Croatia does not agree with some of the mission's conclusions, noting that the video on which the mission based its IMAS concern was taken in 1999. Both sides have since agreed that recommended ATAT should be replaced with an advisory visit of two experts to look over the notes from the visit in September 2001.²⁵

Two experts from the Ministry of Defense participated in the Seminar on Management of Stockpile Destruction in Fribourg, Switzerland on 11-15 June 2001.²⁶

Landmine/UXO Problem

Mines were commonly used weapons during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. During the four years of conflict in Croatia, mines were laid mainly to protect defensive positions on the lines of confrontation, which changed frequently, and also in areas of strategic importance (for example, railway lines, utilities such as power stations, and pipelines). Many of the mines used were low metal content (plastic).²⁷

Minifields and areas suspected of being contaminated with mines and UXO are located in 14 of the 21 counties of Croatia. In 2000, the suspected affected areas were estimated to total 4,000 square kilometers. At the end of 2001, new estimates reduced the suspected affected area to 1,700 square kilometers, of which it is thought that only 10 percent is actually contaminated. It is estimated that the contaminated area contains some 500,000 mines/UXO.²⁸

It has been explained that the reduction resulted from "general survey activities, systematic and more precise development of the County Mine Action Plans and multi-criteria analysis.... Survey was conducted on 82,078,884 square meters.... The area has been reduced as a result of continued and intense general survey activities, additional information submitted by the Croatian Army Forces, Special Police Forces and counties' administration."²⁹

All of the 14 mine/UXO-contaminated counties have made precise maps, which were not used in previous estimates of the suspected mine/UXO contaminated areas. The latest estimate is that the mine/UXO-suspected areas consist of: infrastructure, 236 square kilometers (14 percent); agricultural areas, 566 square kilometers (33 percent); houses and house-yards, 87 square kilometers (5 percent); economy infrastructure, 82 square kilometers (5 percent), and pastures, meadows, and forests, 29 square kilometers (43 percent).³⁰

When the new estimates were published, it was said that around 500 deminers, 35-40 demining machines and some €1,000 million (\$898 million) would be needed for clearance.³¹

Planning, Coordination, and Prioritization of Mine Action

The goal of the National Mine Action Program is to make Croatia mine-free by year 2010.³² Reflecting the reduced estimates, a number of changes to the National Mine Action Program will

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, Geneva, 30 January 2002; letter from Neven Mikec, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 2002.

²⁶ Letter from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, 24 January 2002.

²⁷ "UNMAAP Annual Work Plan, Croatia," United Nations Mine Action Assistance Program, 2001, available at: www.mineaction.org, accessed on 3 May 2002.

²⁸ "Za kraj razminiravanja treba nam milijardu eura" ("To Finalize the Mine Clearance of Croatia, We Need €1 billion"), interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, *Jutarnji List* (daily newspaper), 21 January 2002, p. 6.

²⁹ "Four Years of CROMAC's Operations 19.02.1998-19.02.2002," CROMAC, Sisak, February 2002, p. 5.

³⁰ Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

³¹ "Za kraj razminiravanja treba nam milijardu eura" ("To Finalize the Mine Clearance of Croatia, We Need €1 billion"), interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, *Jutarnji List* (daily newspaper), 21 January 2002, p. 6. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.898.

³² Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

be proposed in the second half of 2002. The Head of the Croatia Mine Action Center (CROMAC) said that that an Operational Plan has been set up for 2002-2006, which defines “the new dynamic of demining in Croatia.”³³

The government in February 1998 established CROMAC, to be responsible for managing all mine action programs in Croatia. At the same time, the United Nations Mine Action Center established in Croatia in 1996 changed its name to the UN Mine Action Assistance Program (UNMAAP), and worked with CROMAC in a capacity-building role. UNMAAP came to an end in Croatia on 31 December 2001. During 2001, it continued to carry out its three functions, as redefined in November 2000: assistance in interpreting and introducing IMAS into the Croatian mine action system, assistance in planning and prioritization including socio-economic impact factors, and liaising with the international community in raising funds for mine action.³⁴

The planning of mine clearance activities is described by CROMAC as a mutually interactive process between CROMAC and the users of cleared areas or objects. Mine clearance requests by cities or municipalities are all channeled through County Mine Action Plans, which each county drafts in cooperation with CROMAC. Public companies and donors may also place a mine clearance request. CROMAC prepares the Annual Mine Clearance Plan based on such requests, and a draft is forwarded to the Ministries of Development, Defense, and the Interior for comment. The government then proposes approval of the annual plan to parliament.³⁵

Mine clearance is prioritized based on land use, grouped by CROMAC as: areas close to the houses under reconstruction program; infrastructure (public company facilities: power, railways, roads, water, gas, and oil pipelines); areas of commercial importance; farm buildings, factories, arable land; National Parks; areas under the protection of cultural and natural heritage program; meadows and pastures; and forests and other areas.³⁶ Also considered priorities are areas for the return of refugees and associated reconstruction, for which mine/UXO claims are made by the Ministry of Public Works.³⁷

Prioritization of areas for marking and fencing is proposed by local branches of CROMAC, based on new discoveries, areas previously marked but where the markings have been destroyed, the frequency of people, and the proximity to roads, especially tourist routes.³⁸ The National Mine Action Program planned for 2001 the marking and fencing of 353 kilometers of mine/UXO-suspected land, but only 106 kilometers was accomplished, due to a lack of personnel, who were diverted to other tasks.³⁹ CROMAC deminers spent two weeks in Crna Gora, Montenegro, in November 2001. They marked the boundaries of minefields along the border with Croatia, and collected 17 records on mined areas and 30 records on minefields with coordinates and the precise number of mines and topographical information on the area, for future demining activities.⁴⁰

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

CROMAC reports that in 2001 it spent KN230,394,318 (\$26.4 million), an increase of 23.5 percent from the previous year. Of the KN230.4 million spent, a total of KN179.5 million (\$20.6 million), or 78 percent, came from Croatian State funding.⁴¹

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ “UNMAAP Annual Work Plan, Croatia,” UNMAAP, 2001, accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 3 May 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor 2000*, pp. 616-617.

³⁵ “Mine Action in the Republic of Croatia,” CROMAC, Sisak, September 2001, pp. 14-15.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ “Annual Report 2001,” CROMAC, p. 15.

⁴⁰ “Croatian deminers in Monte Negro,” *HINA* (Croatian News Agency), 15 December 2001.

⁴¹ “Annual Report 2001,” CROMAC, p. 25. At the May 2002 Standing Committee meetings, Croatia reported that 85 percent of demining in 2001 was financed by the State, but complete figures were not given.

State mine action funding in 2001 was initially budgeted at KN270.9 million,⁴² then reduced to KN207.7 million, but since actual spending of State funds amounted to KN179.5 million, the unspent funds are being carried over to 2002.⁴³

CROMAC reports that in addition to State funds, other sources provided KN50.9 million (\$5.8 million) in 2001, including:

- \$1,132,108 from the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Norway, via the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Trust Fund, for capacity-building (development of County Plan Projects and IMAS);
- \$884,410 from Canada to strengthen CROMAC capacities (office equipment, training and development, mine victim assistance, mine awareness program, technical survey of large agricultural areas by combined method, acquisition of a mini-flail, protective suits, marking, and fencing equipment, sponsoring mine detection dog program); the funds were donated via UNDP, except for the dog program;
- \$192,670 from the United Nations Associations of the UK and USA, and Adopt-A-Minefield, for demining;
- €1,000,000 (\$898,000) from the European Commission via the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) for three demining projects on the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- \$28,000 from the UK for demining;
- \$344,827 from Switzerland for demining (which was doubled by matching funding from the ITF);
- \$286,853 from Vukovarsko-srijemska County for demining its own land (paid directly to the Croatia Without Mines trust fund and matched by ITF);
- \$22,900 was allocated by Vukovar city, via Croatia Without Mines and the ITF, for demining its own land;
- \$200,000 from the US via the ITF (without matching funds) for demining in Dragalic municipality; and
- \$15,000 from the Roots of Peace project, matched by the ITF, for mine clearance and revitalization of vineyards.⁴⁴

The UNMAS Mine Action Investments database records financial donations to Croatia for 2001 as totaling \$7,235,159: Austria (\$80,000), Belgium (\$78,300), Canada (\$210,886), European Commission (\$2,721,039), Finland (\$3,000), Germany (\$530,743), Norway (\$588,191), Switzerland (\$365,000), and the U.S. (\$2,658,000).⁴⁵

In addition to the demining projects on the Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina border, noted above, clearance projects on the borders with Montenegro and Hungary were also allocated EC funding for 2001—to be channeled through the ITF (no amount specified), and funding for mine clearance related to reconstruction and economic development (€2 million, \$1.796 million, via the ITF), for new mine clearance technologies (€100,000, \$89,800, via CROMAC), and for CROMAC capacity-building noted as training, technical expertise, vehicles and equipment (€880,000, \$790,240, via Western European Union Demining Assistance—WEUDAM).⁴⁶

⁴² Original budget published in the *National Gazette*, No. 130/2000; increased budget published in the *National Gazette*, No. 95/2001.

⁴³ "Annual Report 2001," CROMAC, p. 25.

⁴⁴ "Donation Matrix (End of 2000 - 23 October 2001)," UNMAAP/CROMAC; interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reports different data: Can\$1 million (US\$647,390) via UNDP (Email from Lisanne Garceau-Bedner, CIDA, to Landmine Monitor, 20 June 2002; US\$ equivalent as supplied by CIDA).

⁴⁵ "Multi-year Recipient Report: Croatia," UNMAS Mine Action Investments database, accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 26 July 2002.

⁴⁶ "Summary of Mine Actions 2001," European Community, accessed at: eu-mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int on 14 May 2002. Note that disbursement of 2001 funds may not be confined to the period 1 January-31 December 2001.

A third source of funding information is the ITF, established by the government of Slovenia. The ITF acts as a channel for international funding in the region, with the benefit that most donations are effectively doubled by matching funding from the US. Some donor countries allocate a particular donation for Croatia, while in other cases the ITF decides in the distribution of funds between countries in the region. In 2001, the ITF provided funds totaling \$4,741,900 to CROMAC from donations from Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the EC, Norway, Switzerland, and the US, and from the organizations Croatia Without Mines, Diners Club Adriatic, Europa Press Holding, and Roots of Peace. Norway also donated funds for the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) program in Croatia. The ITF funds were allocated to demining (commercial, 78 percent, NGOs, 5.7 percent), mine victim assistance (0.7 percent), structural support (11 percent) and "other" (4.9 percent) including support for the ARC and SMART scientific projects.⁴⁷

A donor conference "Humanitarian Demining – Support to National Mine Action Program in the Republic of Croatia" on 24 September 2001 was co-organized by the government, CROMAC, World Bank and UNDP.⁴⁸ The main reason for the Conference was the closure of the World Bank Loan Program, and the need to find new ways of financing mine action. Present at the conference were 150 people from 34 countries. Donations were announced by the United Kingdom (\$250,000), Austria (\$80,000), Norway (\$504,000), Japan (\$317,311) and INA oil industry (an office building for CROMAC).⁴⁹

The ITF and Croatia Without Mines signed an agreement in June 2001 that all donations would be doubled through the ITF.⁵⁰ Several fundraising events and activities were carried out in 2001 and 2002, raising hundreds of thousands of kuna.⁵¹

In-kind assistance received by CROMAC in 2001 included 84 mine detectors from Austria; an MV-3 demining machine (value: \$250,000) from Canada; and an audio-video communication system (value: \$100,000) from the US.

Donations of \$7.86 million made in 2001 but unspent by 31 December will be used to fund demining projects in 2002.⁵²

Mine Clearance and Survey

In 2001, an area totaling 42,324,637 square meters was handed over to communities for use. CROMAC reports that this was achieved by these activities: general survey (329 inspections which reduced the suspected area by 26,311,976 square meters); technical survey (59 technical inspections which reduced the suspected area by 2,372,647 square meters); and clearance (188 operations which cleared 13,640,014 square meters).⁵³

Demining in 2001 involved 188 projects, carried out by 23 demining companies, the Special Police Forces of the Ministry of Interior, and the Croatian Army (which demined 114,297 square meters). The AKD Mungos company cleared the most, 5,087,016 square meters.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, pp. 12, 20.

⁴⁸ "Pocela Donatorska konferencija o humanitarnom razminiranju," ("Donor's Conference on humanitarian demining started"), *HINA* (Croatian News Agency) 24 September 2001.

⁴⁹ "Velika ocekivanja od Donatorske konferencije" ("Great Expectations from the Donors' Conference"), interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, *Nedjeljni Vjesnik* (Sunday newspaper), 26 August 2001, p. 14; D. Zovko, "Prikupljeno 9,5 milijuna dolara za nastavak razminiranja," ("9.5 Million Dollars Raised for Continuing Demining"), *Vecernji list* (daily newspaper), 25 September 2001, p. 6; "INA ustupa poslovnu zgradu HCR-u bez naknade" ("INA Supplies CROMAC with Office Building Free of Charge"), *HINA*, 18 September 2001.

⁵⁰ "Lakse do 'Hrvatske bez mina'" ("An easier way to the 'Croatia Without Mines'"), *Slobodna Dalmacija* (daily newspaper), 2 June 2001, p. 2.

⁵¹ Report on the activities of "Croatia Without Mines" Foundation for year 2001.

⁵² CROMAC, "Annual Report 2001," p. 25.

⁵³ Article 7 Report, Form C, 26 April 2002; CROMAC, "Annual Report 2001," pp. 23-24; CROMAC, "Four Years of CROMAC's Operations 19.02.1998.-19.02.2002," February 2002, p. 5.

⁵⁴ CROMAC, "Annual Report 2001," pp. 13-14.

CROMAC reports that a total of 1,877 antipersonnel mines, 1,640 antivehicle mines and 3,124 UXO were found and destroyed in 2001. The Article 7 Report for 2001 records 1,905 antipersonnel mines, 1,640 antivehicle mines, and 3,124 UXO found.⁵⁵

Most land cleared was in Vukovarsko-srijemska county (2,669,882 square meters), in Zadarska county (1,993,176 square meters), Osjecko-baranjska county (1,764,437 square meters), and Sisacko-Moslavacka county (1,049,624 square meters).

Categorized by land-use, most land cleared in 2001 was road infrastructure (37 percent), agricultural land (32 percent), houses and yards (6 percent) and electricity-infrastructure (6 percent). The use to be made of a cleared area is defined before the operation takes place, by the owner or user of that area when submitting claims for demining. Usually the claims are submitted by counties, cities, or municipalities according to their urban plans.⁵⁶

The average cost of clearance per square meter was KN13.51 (\$1.54). Final quality control was performed on 1,109 control samples covering 157,994 square meters (1.24 percent of the total cleared area).⁵⁷ There is no quality control of general survey. Quality control of technical survey is carried out in accordance with international standards and standard operating procedures, by QA officers, with the same procedures as for mine clearance.⁵⁸

There are 23 registered commercial demining companies in Croatia, of which 17 are currently working on demining. With these capacities CROMAC estimates that it is possible to do technical survey and demining of an area ranging from 6.2 square kilometers to 24.8 square kilometers per year, depending on the project's complexity, difficulty and risk.⁵⁹

Demining capacity in Croatia⁶⁰

Deminers	approx. 420
Auxiliary workers	approx. 120
Metal detectors	approx. 320
Heavy demining machines	4
Middle-weight demining machines	6
Light demining machines	8
Vegetation cutters	9
Mine detection dogs	approx. 40

CROMAC is very engaged in the testing and evaluation of new equipment, in cooperation with numerous companies, both foreign and Croatian. In 2001, 12 demining machines were in use, but CROMAC would like to increase this to 45 machines. All machines must be tested before accreditation for use in Croatia. Mine detection dogs or manual deminers always follow after mechanical clearance.⁶¹

The Breeding and Training Center for mine detection dogs was established in December 2001 near Pozega (Pozega-Slavonija County), by the Piper company.⁶² CROMAC and the Canadian International Demining Corps established mine-detection dog training facilities at Skabrnja-Zadar and Pridraga. CIDC is training ten mine detection dogs and their Croatian handlers for deployment by CROMAC.⁶³

⁵⁵ Article 7 Report, Forms C and G, 26 April 2002.

⁵⁶ Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

⁵⁷ CROMAC, "Annual Report 2001," pp. 13-14; different percentages of land-type cleared are reported in the Article 7 Report for calendar year 2001.

⁵⁸ Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

⁵⁹ CROMAC, "Mine Action in the Republic of Croatia," September 2001, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, pp. 5/65, 25/65-42/65. This report contains further information on testing and evaluation, mechanical demining and explosive detecting dogs in Croatia.

⁶² Interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

⁶³ Email from CIDC to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 30 July 2002.

NPA started a demining program in January 2002. The program started in Zadarska County and will spread its operations to eastern Slavonia. Over three to five years, NPA will conduct general and technical surveys and mine clearance, will take part in making county demining plans with its data collected in the field, and will also plan mine awareness activities.⁶⁴

The WEUDAM mission to Croatia that ended on 30 November 2001 provided CROMAC with advice, technical expertise, training in program management, planning and project development, mine information systems (MIS) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), general and technical surveys, and quality assurance.⁶⁵

Research and Development (R&D)

The EC financed two projects, ARC & SMART, during 2001. ARC, the Airborne Minefield Area Reduction project, started on 2 January 2001, for a period of two and a half years. The partners are Schiebel and Geospace (Austria), TNO (The Netherlands), FOI (Sweden), GTD (Spain), VUB (Belgium) and CROMAC. The aim is to develop a detection system for mined areas by thermal and multi-spectral passive electronic and optic recording from an automatically piloted aircraft, using multi-sensors, contextual data and GIS technology. In 2001, mined and mine-suspected areas were recorded from a helicopter, crane, and armored vehicle, as a part of an initial survey, with multi-spectral and thermal cameras.

SMART, the Space and Airborne Mined Areas Reduction Tools project, started on 2 May 2001, for a period of three years. The partners are DLR, Zeppelin, RST, IXL (Germany), RMA, Trasys (Belgium), ENST (France) and CROMAC. The goal is to develop methods for detection of boundaries of mined areas, and to reduce mine-suspected areas based on the images obtained from the air. In August 2001, the air recording of the selected areas was executed using several methodologies. Pre-processing of collected images is in progress. After that, the processing period of several months will follow, and geo-coded recordings will be obtained as a result. In September 2001, field research started in collaboration with the EC Joint Research Center based at Ispra, Italy.⁶⁶

MEDDS-NOMADICS is a new mine-detection method presented by CROMAC in September 2001, in a special polygon in Rakovo Polje near Sisak. This results from cooperation between the US Army and Mechem (South Africa). Samples of the air above mine-suspected areas are tested on mine detection dogs in laboratory conditions.⁶⁷

Two demining machines were tested in Croatia in 2001: the Slovakian Bozena-2 used by the RU-RU demining company from Zagreb, and the Danish Hydrema 910 MCV used by the German Dr. Koehler demining company.

Under EC leadership, the International Test and Evaluation Program for humanitarian demining (ITEP) launched Project No. 1 Systematic Inventory of Test & Evaluation (T&E) Activities, Capabilities & Needs in South Eastern Europe (SEE). Information was compiled through questionnaires, in-country visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia by ITEP representatives, and a regional technical workshop held in Croatia on 9-10 October 2001 at Topusko. A report of this project was presented at the Reay Group Meeting in Geneva on 30 January 2002. The report gives a detailed account of test evaluation capacities in Croatia.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ "Predstavljen norveski program razminiranja", ("Presentation of Norwegian program for demining"), *HINA* (news agency), 30 January 2002; Belinda Goslin, "Norwegian People's Aid-Mine Action in Republic of Croatia," *Humanitarian Demining*, No. 2, CROMAC, February 2002, pp. 48-50.

⁶⁵ Mirko Ivanusic, "Western European Union Demining Mission," *Humanitarian Demining*, No. 2, CROMAC, February 2002, p. 61; interview with Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 3 April 2002.

⁶⁶ CROMAC, "Mine Action in the Republic of Croatia," September 2001, p.26.

⁶⁷ "Predstavljeni usisivaci za 8 puta jeftinije razminiranje" ("A New, Eight-times Cheaper, Sucking Method Was Presented"), *j.Katancevic, Jutarnji List*, 13 September 2001, p. 16.

⁶⁸ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, pp. 50-65.

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education in Croatia is not formally integrated with mine clearance, but links are made informally on a regional level in the planning of mine action.

In 2001, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Croatian Red Cross (CRC) continued implementation of mine risk education through CRC branches in all 14 mine-contaminated counties. A total of 3,652 interactive presentations were conducted for 87,731 participants (50,801 children, 24,096 men, and 12,834 women). Television stations continued to broadcast *pro bono* mine risk education video clips almost every day.

In 2001, the ICRC and CRC community-based approach to mine risk education included 138 different local projects aiming at some 50,000 people. Local communities were the initiators of these projects producing their own promotion material (posters and flyers) with mine risk education messages. The aim was to strengthen local communities' projects and make them financially independent. Local communities collected almost 90 percent of the funds with the help of the ICRC. Local projects included a stage piece "No-No Mines" performed 36 times during 2001, puppet shows, photography and caricature expositions, football, tennis, bowling and basketball matches, children's playgrounds, radio programs, and other performances.

CRC is taking over the mine risk education program from the ICRC after May 2002. This comprises training courses for instructors and lectures for the population. In 2001, at 48 city and municipal Red Cross Associations, 125 instructors were involved in the mine risk education program. Instructors give 60-minute lectures once or twice a week for children and adults. In 2001, the Croatian Red Cross held three workshops with participation of 49 heads of city and municipal RC associations. The ICRC bore all the costs of implementation.⁶⁹ In 2001, the Croatian Red Cross conducted mine risk education training for the Bechtel company employees (1,000) working on the motorway construction, continuing in 2002.

The CRC cooperates with CROMAC and other organizations, which has resulted in numerous mine risk education lectures in 2001 (in Glina, Sunja, Petrinja, Daruvar, Pakrac, Benkovac, Škabrnja, Vinkovci, and Beli Manastir). Evaluation of the program is being carried out, by the Canadian International Demining Corps.⁷⁰

The Ministry of Education and Sports has also conducted mine risk education since 1995 with financial support from UNICEF, which ended in 2000. By June 2001, the Ministry had held six one-day seminars comprising 1,150 participants, mainly adolescents. The Ministry did not publish any new mine risk education materials in 2001.⁷¹

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, according to the CROMAC database on landmine and UXO casualties, 23 landmine or UXO incidents were recorded, causing 34 deaths or injuries. Nine people were killed and 25 injured, including a seven-year-old child, five women, and 28 men.⁷² Five incidents involved deminers, three of whom were killed and five injured. Three survivors required an amputation. Civilians were injured while cultivating land, collecting firewood, and by unauthorized or reckless handling of mines or UXO. Most casualties were registered in Sisačko-Moslavačka, Karlovačka and Požeško-Slavonska counties (seven persons per county). The total number of casualties represents an increase in the number of mine/UXO casualties in 2000, but the Article 7 report for

⁶⁹ Interview with Maja Stanojevic, Head of Department for Cooperation and Promotion of International Humanitarian Law, and Robert Pokrovac, Mine Risk Education Program Manager, ICRC, Zagreb, 7 February 2002. This information is also included in the Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 April 2002.

⁷⁰ Interview with Vijorka Roseg, Mine Risk Education Program Manager, Croatian Red Cross, Zagreb, 12 February 2002; interview with Maja Stanojevic, Head of Department for Cooperation and Promotion of International Humanitarian Law, and Robert Pokrovac, Mine Risk Education Program Manager, ICRC, Zagreb, 7 February 2002.

⁷¹ Letter from Vesna Bilic, Assistant to the Minister, Ministry of Education and Sport, 12 March 2002.

⁷² Lilijana Calic-Zmirc, Croatian Mine Action Center, presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.

calendar year 2001 notes that five of the incidents (13 casualties) were not “classic mine incidents. These cases involved unauthorized and irresponsible handling of landmines or use of explosives for terrorist purposes.”⁷³

CROMAC has hired four mine survivors for the task of entering and processing data in the database. The Norwegian Government provided financial support of KN160,000 (\$18,340) for the project.⁷⁴

People involved in Landmine/UXO Incidents 1991-2001⁷⁵

Year	Total	Killed	Injured	No Injuries	Unknown
Unknown	104	28	66	-	10
1991-1995	1,191	227	913	2	49
1996	183	45	136	1	1
1997	141	39	101	-	1
1998	99	37	62	-	-
1999	67	24	43	-	-
2000	22	9	12	-	1
2001	34	9	25	-	-
Total	1,841	418	1,358	3	62

Note: the data includes people involved in mine incidents but not injured, hence the ‘No injuries’ column.

Between September and November 2001, a research project on children and young persons to 25 years of age was carried out by CMVA, with financial support from UNICEF.⁷⁶ Research activities covered all mine-affected counties and other counties with reported mine casualties: Bjelovar-Bilogora, Brod-Posavina, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Karlovac, Lika-Senj, Osijek-Baranja, Požega-Slavonija, Sisak-Moslavina, Sibenik-Knin, Vukovar-Srijem, Zadar, and Zagreb County. In order to identify the accurate number of mine casualties among the population of children and young persons during the last ten years, a questionnaire with 81 questions was prepared. Based on information on the health status, education, occupation, income, living conditions, and other relevant factors such as family support, social life, level of happiness, it will be easier to identify what further support is needed to meet the needs of mine survivors.

After elimination of duplicated records, 146 mine casualties among children and young people have been identified. From this total, the research was able to contact 99 persons below 25 years of age. Ninety-nine questionnaires have been completed and the most relevant factors analyzed. The research has shown that the majority of casualties were boys injured while playing. The consequences of their injuries were difficult for more than half of the respondents, although their adjustment to living with disability was very good. Respondents were divided into six groups; preschoolers, first four grades, up to the eighth grade, high school, university, up to 25 years of age. The majority of casualties, 39 percent, occurred in the group of persons between 22 and 25 years of age. Second on the list, with 33 percent, is the group now between 18 and 21 years of age, and equal number of casualties (14 percent) within the groups of persons now between the ages of 10 to 14, and 15 to 17. There were no mine casualties recorded in the population of preschoolers and elementary school children. Eighty-four percent of injured persons were boys and 16 percent were girls, which led to the conclusion that boys were more eager to explore mine contaminated areas.

⁷³ CROMAC mine and UXO casualties database for year 2001, received by email on 6 February 2002; Article 7 Report, Form I, submitted on 26 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

⁷⁴ “Predstavljen projekt zaposljavanja zrtava mina kojeg podupire i norveska Vlada” (“Presentation of the project of employing mine victims with support by Norwegian Government”), *HINA*, 20 June 2001.

⁷⁵ Data provided by Lilijana Calic-Zmenc, Croatian Mine Action Center, in a presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.

⁷⁶ Interview with Davorin Cetin, President, CMVA, Zagreb, 8 February 2002.

“We were playing” was the answer by 40 percent of the respondents to the question “What were you doing at the moment of injury?” Thirty-four percent of respondents answered “other” to the same question, probably meaning that they brought an explosive device into the house, or were injured during the shelling of the city/village.

Survivor Assistance

In Croatia, clinics, clinical hospitals, clinical complexes, and state health care institutions are state-owned. General and specialized hospitals, medical centers, first aid centers, medical centers providing treatment at patients’ homes, health resorts, and county public health care institutions are county-owned. In 2001, there were 120 medical centers, 23 general hospitals, 166 clinical hospitals and clinics, two clinical complexes, 28 specialized hospitals, five health resorts, four first aid centers, 102 medical centers providing treatment at patients’ homes and 121 pharmacies. Persons with disability have at their disposal 12 rehabilitation centers: there are special hospitals for physical rehabilitation in Lipik, Daruvarske Toplice, Naftalan, Thalassoterapija-Crikvenica, Biokovka, Kalos, Thalassoterapija-Opatija, Varazdinske Toplice, Biograd, Stubicke Toplice, Krapinske Toplice, and the orthopedic hospital “Prim dr. Martin Horvat” in Rovinj.⁷⁷

The President of the CMVA, Davorin Cetin, a landmine survivor, believes that rehabilitation currently available to mine survivors in Croatia is insufficient: the 21-day hospitalization period after a mine incident is too short, and physical rehabilitation is often incomplete. Civilian victims of the “homeland war” are not granted equal rights to disabled war veterans, who are granted one treatment in a health resort once a year.⁷⁸

People with health insurance are provided with prostheses, spare parts and consumables, which is regulated by the “Book of Regulations on Orthopedic and other tools”. A person receiving an upper limb prosthesis for the first time will get outpatient or hospital rehabilitation. A person receiving a lower limb prosthesis for the first time, will get hospital rehabilitation (Article 29 N.N. 63/00). Persons with health insurance pay 10 percent of the total value of a basic appliance (Article 12 of the Book of Regulations), but, according to Davorin Cetin, if amputees want a better and more expensive prosthesis, they have to pay the difference in cost themselves. For example, a lower leg prosthesis enabling ten hours of activity a day costs between KN25,000-KN40,000 (\$2,866-\$4,587). In this case, the Croatian Health Insurance Institute covers about 10 percent of the cost.⁷⁹

The Mine Victims Section (see below) and CROMAC jointly developed a project of Mine Victims Rehabilitation, which started in July 2001. The project, costing Can\$150,000 (\$95,550), was funded by the Canadian government, and included the reconstruction of the Orthopedics and Rehabilitation Department of the Martin Horvat hospital in Rovinj, and the accommodation costs and monitoring of mine survivors. The first group of 15 young mine survivors, from all over Croatia, arrived to the Rovinj hospital on 1 July. The project was also supported by the UNHCR, ICRC, Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans, Getro company, and Zagrebbacka Bank.⁸⁰ A second program for 25 child mine survivors ran from 1-21 July 2002. Adult mine survivors will be treated in Rovinj later in 2002, with groups of 20 to 25 persons for 10 days.

In 2001, CMVA provided recreation and psycho-social rehabilitation to 60 people, including 50 mine survivors. The program was funded by the Embassy of Canada.⁸¹ In addition, the National Center for Psycho-trauma continued to offer psychological support to victims of the war, including landmine survivors.

The CMVA, established on 6 October 2001 in Rovinj, emerged from the Mine Victims Section operating under the umbrella of the Croatian Union of Physically Disabled Persons

⁷⁷ Letter from Dr Andro Vlahusic, Minister of Health, Zagreb, 22 March 2002.

⁷⁸ Interview with Davorin Cetin, President, CMVA, Zagreb, 8 February 2002.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ F. Zeravica, “Druženje uz glazbu i Zabranjeno pusenje” (“Socializing with music and Zabranjeno pusenje”), *Vecernji list* (daily newspaper), 11 July 2001, p. 10. Exchange rate at 12 May 2002: Can\$1 = US\$0.637.

⁸¹ Interview with Davorin Cetin, President of CMVA, Zagreb, 8 February 2002.

Associations since 1999, and is a humanitarian, non-profit NGO active throughout Croatia bringing together survivors injured by mines, explosives, or UXO. On the tenth anniversary of international recognition of the Republic of Croatia, the government of Croatia donated KN100,000 (\$11,467) to the CMVA.⁸² The CMVA has developed a regional network in all of the 14 mine-contaminated counties. Since 1999, CMVA's activities have included: creation of a mine casualties database (data recording and updating activities are underway); individual mine survivors program support; two projects related to psychosocial support to child mine survivors; and rehabilitation and psychosocial support to children and adult mine survivors during the summer of 2001 in Rovinj. The projects were implemented in cooperation with CROMAC, ICRC, CRC, Norwegian Embassy, Canadian Embassy, Slovenian Embassy, United Nations, and USAID.⁸³

In 2001, the ITF provided \$19,637 for mine victim assistance in Croatia.⁸⁴ Full details of the projects supported are not available, but the CMVA believes this funding was used to employ four mine survivors in CROMAC.⁸⁵

Disability Policy and Practice

No new policies regulating health care provisions and assistance to persons with disabilities were introduced during 2001.⁸⁶

NGO Activities

On 30 August 2001, the Croatian Campaign to Ban Landmines co-organized a roundtable discussion "Civil Initiative in Solving Problem of Landmines in Croatia," at the School of Public Health in Zagreb. Speakers included Dijana Plestina, Mirjana Dobranovic (Union of Physically Disabled Persons Association), Natasa Jovicic (NONA, a women's multimedia center), Heidi Kuhn (Roots for Peace), Barry Levy (Anti-nuclear Campaign), Marijana Prevendar (Croatian Campaign and Strata Research) and Jody Williams (1997 Nobel Peace Laureate, International Campaign to Ban Landmines). After attending the conference "Injuries in Adults and Children," the speakers together with members of CROMAC visited Bibinjsko Polje in Zadadar County, where agricultural land was mined in the early 1990s, and Petrinja where a Scanjack demining machine was operating in a mined area in the village of Marin Brod. The meetings and the minefield visits gained wide media coverage in Croatia.⁸⁷

CZECH REPUBLIC

Key developments since May 2001: The Czech Republic completed the destruction of its stockpile of more than 360,000 antipersonnel mines in June 2001. In October 2001, an inter-ministerial working group was established to address issues related to the Mine Ban Treaty and the CCW. Responding to an incident reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, the Czech Republic has stated that it does not consider use of antivehicle mines with tripwires to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁸² "Umjesto za prijam, Vlada ce sto tisuca kuna dati Udruzi zrtava mina" ("The Amount Allocated for a Reception, the Government Will Donate to Mine Victims Association"), *HINA*, 10 January 2002.

⁸³ Interview with Davorin Cetin, President, CMVA, Zagreb, 8 February 2002.

⁸⁴ Email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 17 May 2002.

⁸⁵ Interview with Martina Belosevic, Croatian Mine Victims Association, 15 May 2002.

⁸⁶ For information on existing policies see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 623 and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 675.

⁸⁷ Marijana Prevendar, "Report – Zagreb Round Table – Dubrovnik Conference – Visit to Bibinje (Zadar) and Petrinja, 30 August-1 September 2001," 6 September 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

The Czech Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. National implementation legislation in accordance with Article 9 entered into force on 3 December 1999.¹ The Czech Republic submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 3 May 2002. Previous reports were submitted on 15 August 2000, 30 April 2001, and 15 June 2001.²

The Czech Republic participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, where it announced that the stockpile destruction program for antipersonnel mines had been completed in June 2001. It offered to share its expertise with other countries. The Czech Republic also associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.³

In October 2001, an inter-ministerial working group was established involving the ministries of defense and foreign affairs to address issues related to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ In November 2001, an ad hoc group of experts was established by the Ministry of Defense to address issues related to landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The group has an advisory mandate and cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior. The aim is to improve the dissemination of information about landmines and UXO to relevant departments and to prepare background information and statements for international negotiations on the issue.⁵

On 29 November 2001, the Czech Republic cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Czech Republic attended the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁶

The ICBL has expressed concern that some Czech antivehicle mines, in particular those with tripwires and tilt rods, may function as antipersonnel mines, and therefore should be considered prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁷ The ICBL has noted that other State Parties have destroyed or prohibited tilt rods and tripwires for antivehicle mines. At the Third Meeting of States Parties, the Czech Republic addressed this issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices:

The Czech Republic closely follows...the debate on some anti-vehicle mines (AVMs) due to their sensitive fuzes. We are of such opinion that AVMs are not covered by the Ottawa Convention. A possible solution would be to make use of the [CCW and its Amended Protocol II]. The Czech Republic is aware of the diverse views on the issue and expects that the talks of State Parties concerning Article 2 of the Convention will chart the course for solution. Due to various aspects of the problem, we do not at this stage envisage any unilateral steps. Of course, if the State Parties agree that solutions

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 June 2001.

² Article 7 Reports, submitted on 15 August 2000 for the period to 1 July 2000; submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period to 30 April 2001; submitted on 30 June 2001 for the period to 30 June 2001; and submitted on 3 May 2002 for calendar year 2001.

³ Statement by Alexander Slabý, Director-General, Multilateral Relations Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001. In February 2002, Alexander Slabý became the Czech Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁴ Letter from Josef Vitek, Head of Unit for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2002.

⁵ Interview held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Deputy Head of International Relations, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002. The expert group consists of 15 representatives from the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Military Technology Institute, Military Academy of Brno and Department for Military Equipment at University of Vyskov.

⁶ It was represented in January by Josef Vitek, Head of Unit for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in May by Ivan Pinter, Counselor at the Czech Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 676-678.

to the problem should be explored within the Ottawa Convention, we are ready to do so in a spirit of cooperation and take appropriate measures at the national level.⁸

He added that, “there are no grounds for reporting on mines not covered by the Convention.”⁹

When asked about this issue in March 2002, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative told Landmine Monitor that “because it is our interpretation that such type of military equipment has been covered by Amended Protocol II, we don’t see any reason to be involved in any discussion on this within the Ottawa Treaty.”¹⁰

The inter-ministerial working group met in March 2002. Asked about the outcome of discussions regarding antivehicle mines of concern, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that “information from this session are of an internal character. Nevertheless, I expect that some of them will be included in statement of the Czech Republic during the Fourth Meeting of States Parties.”¹¹

According to the Czech authorities they do not possess any antivehicle mines with anti-handling devices so sensitive that they can explode from an unintentional act of a person.¹²

Regarding the possible use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with non-members of the Mine Ban Treaty, and possible transit of antipersonnel mines by foreign forces, a representative of the Ministry of Defense declared that “it is illegal in all aspects to use and transfer APMs on Czech territory.”¹³ In a letter to the ICBL, the Czech Minister of Defense, Jaroslav Tvrdík, stated that “in case the Czech Republic would participate in any military operations, that would be done in compliance with all commitments the Czech Republic has taken.”¹⁴

The Czech Republic is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and submitted its annual Article 13 Report on 2 November 2001. The report contained new information on Czech participation in the Stabilization Force (SFOR – Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).¹⁵

The Czech Republic participated in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, and the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001 in Geneva. The Czech delegation stated that it was “ready to share views and support work of an open-ended group of governmental experts” regarding proposals on explosive remnants of war. It stated its full support for the US-Danish proposal on antivehicle mines, but expressed reservations about creating a new protocol.¹⁶ The proposal does not address the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

Production and Transfer

Production of antipersonnel mines in the Czech Republic halted in 1989. In May 2001, at the IDET (International Exhibition of Defence and Security Technology and Special Information Systems) arms fair in Brno, the Czech company, Policske Strojirny, displayed and offered for sale

⁸ Statement by Alexander Slabý, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Interview with Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 6 March 2002.

¹¹ Fax from Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2002.

¹² Interview with Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Deputy Head of International Relations, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002.

¹³ Interview with Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002.

¹⁴ Letter to ICBL Coordinator Elizabeth Bernstein from Jaroslav Tvrdík, Minister of Defense, 14 December 2001 (ref. 9474/2001-8764). The Minister of Defense was responding to a letter from the ICBL to all NATO members calling on States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to make a unilateral statement opposing any use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations and refusing to participate or cooperate in any way with operations where antipersonnel mines may be used.

¹⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, submitted on 2 November 2001.

¹⁶ Letter from Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2002, and interview on 6 March 2002. The US-Danish proposal calls for all antivehicle mines to be detectable, and for remotely-delivered antivehicle mines to have self-destruct/self-deactivation devices.

Horizont PD-Mi-PK antivehicle mines in tripwire-activation mode.¹⁷ As noted above, the ICBL believes that antivehicle mines used with tripwires are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty because they will explode by the contact of a person. Asked about this at the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, the head of the Czech delegation explained that he had asked his staff for a report on the incident.¹⁸ In January 2002, another official explained that they had not made any official report since they did not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine a violation to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated in April 2002 that the "PD-Mi-PK has been considered as the legitimate military equipment which is covered and according to our understanding can be used within restrictions of the Amended Protocol II."²⁰ But it informed the company that the case had been reported in the *Landmine Monitor* and advised consultation before exhibiting the mine in future.²¹

Stockpiling and Destruction

As noted in last year's *Landmine Monitor*, the Czech Republic reported that the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile was completed on 15 June 2001.²² According to the Article 7 Report submitted on 3 May 2002, a total of 324,412 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.²³

In addition, the Czech Republic has reported that in 1997 a total of 44,353 non-detectable antipersonnel mines (type PP-Mi-Na I) were destroyed to meet the requirements of Amended Protocol II.²⁴ This would equal a grand total of 368,765 antipersonnel mines destroyed. However, in September 2001, at the Third Meeting of States Parties, the Czech delegation announced that a total of 366,349 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed since 1997.²⁵ The reason for the discrepancy of 2,416 mines is not known.²⁶

The Czech Republic reported in 2000 that it decided to retain 4,859 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty (1,385 PP-Mi-Sr and 3,344 PP-Mi-Sr II, both bounding fragmentation mines; and 130 PP Mi-S1M mines in 26 KUS rocket cargo mine containers).²⁷ The Article 7 Report covering calendar year 2001 noted that 4,849 antipersonnel mines were being retained, including 1,375 PP-Mi-Sr mines, indicating use of 10 of these mines.²⁸ The Czech Republic did not report for what purpose these mines were consumed.

Landmine/UXO Problem and Mine Action

The Czech Republic's previous estimate that clearance of the former Soviet military zone at Ralsko would be completed in 2001 had to be revised, due to the discovery of additional contaminated areas of some 3,500 hectares. The government decided to extend the clearance operations until 31 December 2003.²⁹ One press account said some areas in Ralsko were so

¹⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 677.

¹⁸ Conversation with Alexander Slabý, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managua, Nicaragua, 20 September 2001.

¹⁹ Telephone interview with Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 January 2002.

²⁰ Fax from Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2002.

²¹ Interview with Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002.

²² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 677.

²³ Article 7 Report, Form G, 3 May 2002. This figure includes 1,416 mines (type PP-Mi-Sr) destroyed before the Czech Republic became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

²⁴ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 2 November 2001.

²⁵ Statement by Alexander Slabý, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

²⁶ In another discrepancy noted by *Landmine Monitor*, the Article 7 Report of 30 April 2001 stated that 131,540 PP-Mi-Sr mines had been destroyed, but the report submitted on 30 June 2001 stated that 130,155 PP-Mi-Sr mines had been destroyed. This discrepancy was attributed to change in personnel compiling the data for the Article 7 Reports.

²⁷ Article 7 Report, Form D, 15 August 2000.

²⁸ Article 7 Report, Form D, 3 May 2002.

²⁹ Interview with Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002. The previous estimate, reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 679,

contaminated that it may take ten to 20 years before they can be returned to civilian use.³⁰ However, the April 2002 Article 7 Report notes a greatly decreased level of contamination (15 items per hectare) compared with previous Article 7 Reports (500-1,000 items per hectare).³¹ The former military area is now under local authority control; clearance is carried out jointly by military explosive ordnance disposal teams and the police pyrotechnical sanitation team.³² By the end of 2001, a total of 52,573 items of UXO, excluding infantry ammunition, had been found and destroyed.³³

The Ralsko former military area (some 250 square kilometers) is sparsely populated and mostly forested. The municipality of Ralsko has about 6,000 inhabitants. There have been no serious accidents from mines and UXO in the area. The high risk areas are marked and fenced off. People living in the area are well aware of its history as a military training ground, and have been told to report any UXO found to the local police. Following government regulations for municipalities in former military areas, information posters on the risk of UXO are posted on the municipality's information board and website. Information is also given on the regional TV news.³⁴

In other parts of the Czech Republic, there are also occasional cases of discovery of UXO left over from the Second World War. Most items of UXO are found near urban areas during construction. Clearance in these emergency cases is the responsibility of the police and the Ministry of Interior, which estimates that during 2001 some 12,000 items of UXO, excluding infantry ammunition, were found in different locations.³⁵ But due to the lack of centralized statistics, this may include some of the UXO cleared by the police pyrotechnical sanitation unit at Ralsko. Since January 2002, all regional police headquarters are supposed to report all UXO findings and incidents to the Pyrotechnical Department of the Ministry of Interior.³⁶

Czech units in SFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and KFOR (Kosovo) have participated in demining in their areas of responsibility where clearance has been needed for the fulfillment of their duties.³⁷

The Czech shoe manufacturer Zeman Shoe Ltd has created a special "blast protection boot" intended for use by deminers or others working in mine-contaminated areas.³⁸

In 2001, the Czech Republic again provided US\$50,000 to the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, based in Slovenia.

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In February 2001, the Ministry of Defense estimated that 200-300 people have been involved in mine and UXO accidents since 1960. In 1997, three people were injured by UXO; in 1998 two people were killed and two were injured; in 1999, three people were killed and 15 were injured; and in 2000, three people were killed by UXO and 14 others were injured. During 2001, in two

was repeated in the Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, submitted on 2 November 2001. The other former Soviet military area at Mlada was cleared by the end of 2000.

³⁰ "UXO Clearance in the Czech Republic," *World EOD Gazette*, Volume 4, Number 2, August 2001, p. 5.

³¹ Article 7 Reports, Form C, 15 August 2000, 30 April 2001, 30 June 2001, and 3 May 2002.

³² Site visit by Landmine Monitor researcher, Josef Vítek (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Capt. Ing. Petr Lastuvka and Plk. Ing. Jiri Kadlec (Department for Pyrotechnic Sanitation, Ministry of Defense), 7 March 2002.

³³ Letter from Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2002.

³⁴ Václav Postolka, "Conversion and Reuse of the Former Military Training Area of Ralsko," *Journal of Czech Geographic Society*, Issue 3, 1998, pp. 285-299; interview with Mayor Jindrich Solc, Ralsko Municipality House, Ralsko, 7 March 2002.

³⁵ Letter from Josef Vítek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2002.

³⁶ Interview with Milan Kollár, Deputy Head of Pyrotechnical Department, Police Presidium of Czech Republic, Ministry of Interior, Prague, 6 March 2002.

³⁷ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 2 November 2001.

³⁸ "Blast Protective Boots – Model Zeman Am," information paper distributed at the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002.

separate incidents four people were killed and one person was injured handling UXO they had found. According to the Ministry of Interior, however, these statistics do not distinguish between UXO and stolen weapons.³⁹

During Czech involvement in UNPROFOR between 1992 and 1995, one Czech soldier received a minor leg injury after stepping on an antipersonnel mine.⁴⁰

The Czech health insurance system is compulsory, although Czech citizens can choose which insurance body to use. This covers medical treatment and compensation in case of disability and loss of income.⁴¹ In the event of injury during work the employer is responsible for covering the costs of medical treatment, providing compensation in case of disability and, in the event of death, compensation to the family. A similar system applies to military personnel who have to take a special medical insurance for military personnel.⁴² In July 2001, the government required transportation subsidies to be provided to people with disabilities. With the support of numerous NGOs, it is reported that the situation of persons with disabilities in the Czech Republic has improved in recent years.⁴³

DENMARK

Key developments since May 2001: Mine action funding in 2001 totaled DKK 119.4 million (US\$14.4 million), a substantial increase from 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Denmark signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. No additional legal or administrative measures were deemed necessary for national implementation on the basis that existing weapons legislation and penal codes cover the requirements of Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Denmark participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.² A statement was delivered on behalf of European Union countries by Belgium.³ Denmark did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but did participate in May 2002.

In the May meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, during a discussion of Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Denmark stated that it shared the view expressed by the United Kingdom that the treaty does not cover antivehicle mines that may function as antipersonnel mines. This is the first time Denmark expressed this position during the intersessional meetings, although the Foreign Ministry indicates it is not a new position.⁴

³⁹ Interview with Dr. Miroslav Tuma and Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lt.-Col. Jozef Trabalík and Capt. Petr Beyr, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 19 February 2001; interview with Milan Kollár, Deputy Head of Pyrotechnical Department, Police Presidium of Czech Republic, Ministry of Interior, Prague, 6 March 2002.

⁴⁰ Interview with Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002.

⁴¹ Interview with Josef Vitek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002.

⁴² Interview with Lt.-Col. Richard Mácha, Ministry of Defense, Prague, 6 March 2002. Law 221 regulating the system for medical insurance for military personnel is under revision to comply with the transformation of the Czech Army into a professional army.

⁴³ US Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Czech Republic," 2001, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8243.htm.

¹ Interview with Emil Paulsen, Head of Section, Foreign and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 680.

² Denmark was represented by Anders Serup Rasmussen, Ambassador to Nicaragua, and members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Command.

³ See the report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor, "Since its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, Denmark has held the view that the treaty only covers anti-personnel mines." Email dated 29 July 2002.

Denmark said it shared Japan's concern that other interpretations will inhibit universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, and that Denmark considers the Convention on Conventional Weapons to be the proper forum for discussion of antivehicle mines.⁵

Denmark's annual Article 7 transparency report was submitted to the United Nations on 29 April 2002. It did not include use of voluntary Form J to report other matters such as mine action funding. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 27 August 1999, 7 August 2000, and 30 April 2001.⁶

On 29 November 2001, Denmark cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In response to a letter from the ICBL about joint military operations and possible use by the United States of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, the Defence Ministry stated that Denmark "remains firmly opposed to the use of antipersonnel mines. Denmark's views on the use of antipersonnel mines are well known among our partners in NATO. We are not aware of any use of antipersonnel mines by the coalition partners in the current U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan."⁷ The Foreign Ministry confirmed that during joint military operations Denmark would not involve itself in the planning or in the implementation of activities that are related to the laying of antipersonnel mines.⁸

Denmark is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its annual report as required by Article 13 on 14 November 2001. This notes that no additional legal or administrative measures were deemed necessary to comply with the protocol, and summarizes Danish mine action funding in 2001.⁹

Denmark attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. The Review Conference considered proposals co-sponsored by Denmark to increase the technical requirements for antivehicle mines and to consider ways of dealing with explosive remnants of war; a Group of Governmental Experts was set up to study these issues, and Denmark participated in its meetings in May and July 2002.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Denmark has not produced antipersonnel mines since the 1950s and has never exported antipersonnel mines.

Denmark completed destruction of its stockpile of 266,517 antipersonnel mines in December 1999. Following a decision in August 2000 to reduce the number of mines retained under Article 3 of the treaty, Denmark slated an additional 2,834 M58 antipersonnel mines for destruction.¹⁰ These mines were transferred to Germany for destruction,¹¹ which was completed on 3 June 2001.¹²

In its most recent Article 7 Report, Denmark indicated that it had 2,091 mines retained, including 2,031 M58 mines and 60 M56 mines. In addition to the mines sent to Germany for destruction, in the last reporting period Denmark consumed 15 M58 mines "for training in mine

⁵ Oral remarks by Louise Auken, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

⁶ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 27 August 1999 (for the period up to 27 August 1999); submitted on 7 August 2000 (for the period 27 August 1999-7 August 2000); submitted on 30 April 2001 (for calendar year 2000); and submitted on 29 April 2002 (for the period 1 May 2001 - 30 April 2002).

⁷ Letter from Judith Bergman, Head of Section, for the Minister, Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen, to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, ICBL, 5 February 2002.

⁸ Interview with Emil Paulsen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002, and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 680.

⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Forms D and E, submitted on 14 November 2001.

¹⁰ Denmark initially reported that it would retain 4,991 mines, including 4,931 M58 mines and 60 M56 mines. Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 August 1999.

¹¹ Article 7 Reports, Forms D, F, and G, 30 April 2001, and 29 April 2002.

¹² Germany Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 April 2002.

detection.”¹³ The number of M56 mines retained has not changed since 1999; these mines are being kept “for trials by Danish Defence Research Establishment.”¹⁴

Landmine Problem

The Skallingen peninsula in Denmark was heavily mine-contaminated in World War II. It is now a protected natural reserve, largely owned by the government. Mined areas are marked and at present there are no specific plans for clearance. There are no reports of mine incidents in the area.¹⁵

Mine Action Funding

The Danish International Development Agency produced a policy paper on humanitarian mine action in 2001. It presents guidelines for future Danish activities in the field of mine action, and describes activities to date and lessons learned. The paper states that funding of all aspects of humanitarian mine action will continue. Future funding will be long-term, targeted and flexible, and “promote international coordination in order to secure quality and effectiveness.... All new Danish initiatives will be based on in-depth socio-economic analyses with a view to identifying priority areas where mine clearance will be most cost-effective and of greatest benefit to the local population.”¹⁶

To do this, Denmark will focus on local capacity building. Funding from the humanitarian budget will be directed to areas where there is acute need for humanitarian assistance, and assistance should generally be “concentrated geographically in areas where it is possible to create synergy with other Danish activities.” Coordination of Danish governmental, private, nongovernmental and military actors will be secured within the Humanitarian Contact Group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ A sub-group of the Humanitarian Contact Group has been meeting in 2001 and 2002, with participation by all relevant actors.¹⁸

Mine action funding in 2001 totaled DKK 119,354,000 (US\$14.38 million), which is an increase of approximately DKK 12,685,000 (\$1.53 million) compared with 2000.¹⁹

¹³ Article 7 Reports, Forms B and D, 30 April 2001 and 29 April 2002. Denmark did not explicitly report that 15 mines were consumed, but the change in reported numbers of M58 mines show that. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to Landmine Monitor that was the case. Email from Maj. Jørn Erik Rasmussen, Section for Weapon Control, Defense Command, 16 May 2002. It would appear that another 51 M58 mines were consumed in 1999 and/or 2000.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Forms D, 29 April 2002.

¹⁵ Interview with Emil Paulsen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002. See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 680.

¹⁶ “Policy Paper on Denmark’s Support to Humanitarian Mine Action,” Danish International Development Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2001, p. 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁸ Interview with Bo Bishoff, Head of Mine Action Unit, Danish Demining Group, Copenhagen, 16 May 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Emil Paulsen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002. Exchange rate at 28 June 2002: US\$1 = DKK 8.3, used throughout.

Mine Action Funding in calendar year 2001²⁰

Country	Agency	Activity	Amount (DKK)	Amount (US\$)
Afghanistan	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Humanitarian mine action	8,000,000	963,855
Afghanistan	Danish Demining Group (DDG)	Mine action	12,500,000	1,506,024
Caucasus	DanChurchAid (DCA)/DDG	Mine risk education	800,000	96,386
Eritrea	DCA	Mine action (first installment of DKK 20 million)	11,000,000	1,325,301
Eritrea	DCA/DDG	Mechanical mine clearance (first installment of DKK 8 million)	5,900,000	710,843
Eritrea	DDG	Mine action	8,225,000	990,963
Eritrea and Ethiopia	UNMAS	Mine action	2,000,000	240,964
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	UNMAS	Humanitarian mine action	2,000,000	240,964
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	DCA	Mine action	18,700,000	2,253,012
Laos	Mines Advisory Group	Humanitarian mine action	16,300,000	1,963,855
Lebanon	UNMAS	Support to national demining program	1,000,000	120,482
Mozambique	National Demining Institute / Norwegian People's Aid / Accelerated Demining Program /UNDP	Mine action Program etc. (second installment of DKK72 million)	15,000,000	1,807,229
Nicaragua	Government	Humanitarian mine action (first installment of DKK 53.3 million)	5,100,000	614,458
Somalia (Somaliland)	DDG	Mine Action Program	7,200,000	867,470
Somalia	UNDP	Humanitarian mine action	2,000,000	240,964
International	Danish Red Cross and ICRC	Advocacy, mine risk education, rehabilitation of mine victims etc.	2,175,000	262,048 ^a
International	International Trust Fund		800,000	96,386 ^b
International	Nordic Demining Research Forum (NDRF)	Research and Development of mine action technology	150,000	18,072
International	ICBL	Assistance to conference activities	75,000	9,036
International	ICBL	Assistance to Landmine Monitor initiative	420,000	50,602
TOTAL			119,345,000	14,378,916

a. According to the ICRC, CHF419,012 was from Denmark and CHF73,108 was from the Danish Red Cross.

²⁰ Letter from Ivan Waltenburg, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 May 2001.

b. Of the total amount, \$44,175 was for victim assistance programs. Source: Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, "Overview of the Donor Support to MVA Programs through ITF," Presentation at the ITF Workshop "Defining Strategies for Success," 2 July 2002.

Funding in 2002, as identified by late June, totaled DKK 59.7million (\$7.2 million). This included: DKK 15 million (\$1.8 million) for programs in Mozambique; DKK 14 million (\$1.68 million) for Nicaragua; DKK 11.1 million (\$1.34 million) for Eritrea; DKK 8.3 million (\$1 million) for Laos; DKK 5.8 million (\$698,795) for Somaliland; and DKK 5.5 million (\$662,650) for Afghanistan.²¹

A comprehensive evaluation of all Danish assistance in humanitarian mine action is currently being carried out by an independent consultant from COWI. The report is expected by the end of 2002.

Non-Governmental Mine Action Funding

Danmark Mod Landminer (Denmark Against Landmines) continues to raise money for mine action programs. In 2002, Danmark Mod Landminer will be a part of the yearly Roskilde musical festival. Every year the festival has a humanitarian theme, and in 2002 it will be landmines—the symbol "one step" will mark the festival. Danmark Mod Landminer is cooperating with the festival in order to raise awareness about the landmine problem around the world. Other organizations in Denmark involved in the mine issue, such as the Danish Demining Center (Dandec), Danish Demining Group, and DanChurchAid, will participate in the event.²²

Mine Action Activities

The Danish Defence is involved in mine clearance in Afghanistan, with two Hydrema machines and 45 personnel (including 17 support personnel).²³

Two Danish non-governmental organizations are involved in mine clearance, survey and mine risk education: DanChurchAid and Danish Demining Group. A third, the Danish Red Cross, focuses on survivor assistance.

DanChurchAid completed mine clearance and mine risk education programs in Kosovo in 2001. It started mine clearance and mine risk education in Eritrea in June 2001 and mine clearance in Albania in April 2002. It provided an information technology consultant to the National Demining Office in Lebanon for two months in 2002 and expects to begin demining operations in the near future. It is carrying out mine risk education in Ingushetia/Chechnya.²⁴ (See Landmine Monitor country reports for more details).

An evaluation of the socio-economic impact of DanChurchAid mine clearance operations in Kosovo was completed in December 2001. It stated that "although it is too early to develop a full assessment, the findings indicate that over the years the land cleared will yield measurable economic benefit to local communities and can be shown to already provide important economic relief to families." The evaluation also concluded that "mine awareness and spot tasks played a unique psychosocial role in reducing fear and stress significantly among communities while also assisting in the reduction of threat and actual accident."²⁵

The Danish Demining Group is conducting survey, mine clearance and mine risk education activities in Afghanistan, survey and clearance in Eritrea, mine risk education in Ingushetia/Chechnya, and survey and clearance in Somaliland. (See Landmine Monitor country

²¹ Ibid.

²² Danmark Mod Landminer website, accessed at: www.landminer.dk/kontakt.asp on 12 June 2002.

²³ Email from Maj. Jørn E. Rasmussen, Section for Weapon Control, Danish Defense Command, 26 May 2002.

²⁴ Interview with DanChurchAid, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002, and emails from Sam Christensen, DanChurchAid, 2 and 3 July 2002.

²⁵ "Socio-Economic Impact Study of Danchurchaid Mine Action in Kosovo, July 1999-December 2001," Christopher Horwood and DanChurchAid Research Team (led by Pamela Zintatu Ntshanga), December 2001, p. 3.

reports for more details). All Danish Demining Group activities include a post-clearance component, either socio-economic analysis (Level 4 survey) or cooperation with other NGOs.²⁶

Research and Development (R&D)

As part of the Nordic Demining Research Forum, Denmark (with Sweden) assumed the responsibility of the European Union standardization of humanitarian mine action.²⁷ Denmark also participates in the NATO engineer working party and has been involved in development and testing of the Hydrema mine clearance machine.²⁸

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, DanChurchAid experienced five demining accidents in Kosovo; three resulted in amputations, two caused minor injuries.²⁹ In 2001, the Danish Demining Group experienced two accidents in Afghanistan, one in Somaliland and one in Eritrea; all resulted in minor injuries to local deminers.³⁰ On 6 March 2002, three Danish soldiers were killed and three others injured while defusing munitions in Afghanistan. An investigation of the incident was continuing in June 2002.³¹

DJIBOUTI

Key developments since May 2001: Djibouti is the only State Party with a 1 March 2003 stockpile destruction deadline that has not begun destruction and has not submitted an Article 7 Report or otherwise revealed information about its stockpile or destruction program. A National Commission for Demining, responsible for all aspects of treaty implementation, is reportedly being established. After May 2001, the National Army started mine clearance and marking operations in the northern districts. In September, the deminers conducted a level one survey in the same area.

Mine Ban Policy

Djibouti signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 May 1998. The treaty entered into force for Djibouti on 1 March 1999.¹ Djibouti has not put in place any domestic implementation measures, as required by Article 9 of the treaty. At the May 2002 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, a government official told Landmine Monitor that a National Commission for Demining was being established to advise the government on matters pertaining to the Mine Ban Treaty. He said, "The document has been drafted and is awaiting cabinet approval."²

He said the draft document would then require Presidential approval before taking effect. "After that process is completed we shall then move forward with implementation requirements of the Treaty."³ He said it would be an interministerial commission, with participation by local and international non-governmental organizations, associations dealing with people with disabilities, as

²⁶ Interview with Bo Bishoff,, Danish Demining Group, Copenhagen, 16 May 2002.

²⁷ Email from Ole Nymann, Nordic Demining Research Forum, 16 June 2002.

²⁸ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, submitted on 14 November 2001, and "Mechanical Demining Equipment Catalogue 2002," Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, p. 23.

²⁹ Email from DanChurchAid, 24 July 2002. See also, The Praxis Group Ltd, "Willing To Listen: an Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001," 12 February 2002, pp. 77-78.

³⁰ Interview with Bo Bishoff, Danish Demining Group, Copenhagen, 16 May 2002.

³¹ Press Release, 19 March 2002, Danish Defence Command, available at www.fko.dk/css/nyhederne/frame_pi.htm, accessed on 28 June 2002. The munitions involved were not antipersonnel mines.

¹ Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 72; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 51.

² Interview with Djibril Djama Elabe, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³ Ibid.

well as trade unions. "This is a priority issue and as soon as we get back to Djibouti, we shall report on the urgency of this process."⁴

Djibouti did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001. While Djibouti participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, it did not attend the meetings in January 2002.⁵

Djibouti has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 27 August 1999. In May 2002, an official told Landmine Monitor that the process of gathering information as required under Article 7 "has been delayed due to lack of a national body designated to handle that portfolio," a need the National Commission for Demining should fill.⁶

Djibouti voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.

Djibouti is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but has not ratified amended Protocol II. Djibouti did not participate in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling, and Destruction

Djibouti has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reported that Djibouti has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but the numbers and types of mines are not known.⁷ In January 2002, personnel at Djibouti's National Mine Action Center acknowledged that the Center has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.⁸

In May 2002, a Djibouti official told Landmine Monitor, "Information regarding stockpiles is held by the military. They are holding the key since they are the technical advisors [to the government]."⁹

Djibouti is not known to have carried out any destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines; it has not made any public comments on the matter.

Under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Djibouti is required to report details of its antipersonnel mine stockpile, including mines retained for training purposes, and to report progress in stockpile destruction. Under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Djibouti is required to complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines before 1 March 2003, except those retained for training or development purposes. Djibouti is the only State Party with a 1 March 2003 stockpile destruction deadline that has not begun destruction and has not submitted an Article 7 Report or otherwise revealed information about its stockpile or destruction program.

Landmine Problem

Djibouti has a small landmine problem as a result of the 1991-1994 internal conflict between the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and the Djibouti military. Djibouti's northern plateau contains most of the suspected minefields or mined routes, particularly in the districts of Obok and Tadjourah, north of Djibouti city. Mines were laid in towns and their immediate surroundings, as well as main roads and small paths.¹⁰ A small unexploded ordnance (UXO) threat also exists. Mine clearance operations by the national army in 1998 were not successful due to lack of maps showing where mines were laid.¹¹

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ A Djibouti delegate at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 said that Djibouti failed to attend the meeting because of lack of funds and that the country was not aware of the sponsorship program.

⁶ Interview with Djibril Djama Elabe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 72.

⁸ Interview with National Mine Action Center, January 2002.

⁹ Interview with Djibril Djama Elabe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹⁰ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 4; US State Department, "Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for Djibouti," presented at the inauguration of the Mine Action Center, 15 February 2001.

¹¹ Interview with National Mine Action Center, April 2002.

Mine Action Funding, Coordination, and Clearance

In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided \$1.18 million to fund a US military train-the-trainer program for Djiboutian military personnel, and for mine clearance supplies and equipment.¹² The US has allocated \$290,000 for mine action in Djibouti for fiscal year 2002.¹³

The National Mine Action Center was inaugurated on 15 February 2001. Thirty-five National Army deminers were trained by the US between 17 February 2001 and 7 May 2001. Shortly thereafter, the deminers started clearance and marking operations in the northern districts. Deminers also conducted a level one survey in the Obok and Tadjourah districts in September 2001 to determine the extent of the landmine and UXO problem.¹⁴

Since the demining operations started, a total of 1,623 and 4,253 square meters of land have been cleared in Obok and Tadjourah regions respectively.¹⁵ In 2001 and 2002, in Obock district, 418 antipersonnel mines (Chinese type) were destroyed.¹⁶ In Tadjourah district, 26 antipersonnel mines and 80 UXO were also destroyed in the same period.

Mine Risk Education

In mid-April 2002, a series of mine risk education activities was organized by a local non-governmental organization, Association de Soutien aux Victimes de Mines (ASSOVIM), in collaboration with the National Mine Action Center, in two primary schools located in the northern communities of Andol and Alitou Dada regions.¹⁷

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, there were no confirmed reports of landmine casualties in Djibouti.¹⁸ According to the US State Department, between 1997 and 2000, 31 people have been killed and 90 injured in landmine incidents, including seven casualties in 2000.¹⁹

Public health services in Djibouti have remained heavily impaired since the end of the civil conflict, and facilities for mine survivors are inadequate. In response to the problems faced by people with disabilities, the government initiated several actions, notably the renovation of a rehabilitation center, which has a physiotherapy unit, and an orthopedic workshop. The ICRC runs a small program that funds the travel and costs of 22 amputees to the Prosthetic/Orthotic Center in Addis Ababa every two years for the replacement of their prosthesis; the next trip is scheduled for 2003.²⁰ The center is supervised by a local organization, Assistance to the Handicapped. Beneficiaries of the program are mainly former soldiers. No vocational training or psychological support facilities are known to exist in the country. The action plan proposed by the Ministry of Health in November 2000 has not been implemented due to a lack of funds.²¹

¹² US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 4.

¹³ US Department of State Fact Sheet, "The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

¹⁴ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 4.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with Colonel Youssouf Kayad, 11 April 2002.

¹⁶ Data from the National Mine Action Center, updated in April 2002.

¹⁷ Interview with ASSOVIM and National Mine Action Center, 22 April 2002.

¹⁸ US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001: Djibouti, March 2002.

¹⁹ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 4.

²⁰ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, Geneva, July 2002, p. 18.

²¹ Interview with the President de l'Association Aide aux Handicapés Phisiques et aux Populations Défavorisées, 11 April 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 74; and Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 53-54.

DOMINICA

Dominica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 26 March 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 September 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. Dominica has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 28 February 2000. In July 2001 Dominica stated that it “has never stockpiled mines or been mine affected.... In this regard Dominica has not submitted a Transparency Report for 2001.”¹ Dominica was absent from the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001. Dominica has never produced, stockpiled, transferred or used antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine-affected.²

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 30 June 2000, and the treaty entered into force on 1 December 2000. It submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 26 September 2001 and its annual updated report on 28 May 2002 (which was a “nil” report). According to its initial Article 7 Report, the Dominican Republic has not enacted domestic implementing legislation because it is not mine-affected and does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.¹ It also does not view special implementation measures as necessary because the Armed Forces is the institution responsible for implementing the treaty and it is already legally bound by existing legislation.² The Dominican Republic cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. The Dominican Republic praised the ICBL’s Landmine Monitor initiative in its initial Article 7 Report for facilitating transparency and cooperation, as well as encouraging international debate over matters related to the banning of antipersonnel mines.

ECUADOR

Key developments since May 2001: Ecuador completed stockpile destruction on 11 September 2001. It destroyed a total of 260,302 antipersonnel mines. It revised the number of mines retained for training purposes from 16,000 to 4,000. Several mine impact surveys are reportedly underway.

Mine Ban Policy

Ecuador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 29 April 1999 and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999. Ecuador has not yet enacted legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty domestically.¹ Ecuador submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 31 May 2002.²

In September 2001, Ecuador attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua. On 17 October 2001, Presidents Gustavo Noboa of Ecuador and Alejandro

¹ Response by Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth of Dominica, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, dated 27 June 2001.

² Ibid.

¹ Article 7 Report submitted 26 September 2001.

² Such as the law provided by the Constitution of the Republic and Act No. 873 (Organic Law of the Armed Forces), Articles 54 ([section] h) and 56. Article 7 Report submitted 26 September 2001.

¹ In its Article 7 Reports, Form A (national implementation measures) mentions only the establishment of the Mine Clearance Center (CENDESMI, Centro de Desminado del Ecuador) by Executive Decree No 1247, 23 September 1999.

² The report covers the period from March 2001 to April 2002. Ecuador’s first report was submitted 29 March 2000 (covering April 1999-March 2000); its second report was submitted 23 August 2000 (covering March-July 2000); its third report was submitted on 5 March 2001 (covering July 2000-March 2001).

Toledo of Perú signed a Joint Presidential Declaration, which included in its 14 principal objectives a call to make the Andean region a zone of peace, free of weapons including antipersonnel mines.³

In November 2001, Ecuador cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Representatives from Ecuador's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Army attended a conference on "Mine Action in Latin America" in Miami from 3-5 December 2001.⁴

Ecuador participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. At the May meeting, Nelson Castillo, President of the Association of Disabled Veterans "Upper Cenepa" made a statement.

At the XXXII Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly held in Bridgetown, Barbados in June 2002, OAS members adopted a resolution calling for support for action against mines in Perú and Ecuador.⁵

On 17 June 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, and Venezuela) met in Lima and issued the "Lima Commitment."⁶ In the Lima Commitment, six points were outlined related to the Mine Ban Treaty, including complete destruction of stocks, establishing national programs for victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration, and a call for non-state actors to comply with the international norm against antipersonnel mines.

Ecuador is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but did not attend CCW meetings held in December 2001.

Servicio Paz y Justicia Ecuador (SERPAJ) has been the ICBL representative for Ecuador since May 2001 and has carried out the country report research for Landmine Monitor in 2001 and 2002.

Production, Transfer and Use

Ecuador states that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and has no production facilities.⁷ From information included in its Article 7 Reports, in the past Ecuador has received antipersonnel mines from Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, Spain, and the United States.⁸

There were no reports of mine use in Ecuador during the reporting period, including in regions along the border with Colombia. Ecuador has stated that it has not used antipersonnel mines since the 1995 Cenepa border conflict with Perú, but reports of use persisted until 1998.⁹

Stockpiling and Destruction

Ecuador officially completed its stockpile destruction on 11 September 2001, when it destroyed a final 8,051 antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ Ecuador's Vice President, Pedro Pinto, Army

³ Joint Press Release, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru, 17 October 2001; "Ecuador apoya propuesta sobre reducción de armas," *Diario Oficial El Peruano* (Lima), 18 October 2001; see "Declaración conjunta incluyó 68 temas," *El Universo* (Guayaquil), 18 October 2001; and Patricia Kadana, "Perú y Ecuador acuerdan reducir gastos militares," *La República* (Lima), 18 October 2001.

⁴ The Conference was sponsored by the US Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States (OAS); the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

⁵ OAS General Assembly Resolution 1875 (XXXII-O/02), 4 June 2002.

⁶ "Compromiso de Lima" (aka the "Andean Letter for Peace and Security towards Limits and Control of External Defense Spending"), 17 June 2002, at: www.rree.gob.pe; see also Statement by Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, 27 June 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form E, 5 March 2001; Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 31 May 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Reports, Form B, 29 March 2000 and 5 March 2001.

⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 328.

officials, representatives of the Red Cross of Ecuador, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), and Landmine Monitor witnessed this destruction event. Representatives and technical experts from the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) have "assisted and certified the process of stockpile destruction."¹¹ By completing this task ahead of the Third Meeting of State Parties, which opened on 18 September 2001, Ecuador met the key "Managua Challenge" goal.

In total, Ecuador destroyed 260,302 antipersonnel mines. In its first phase of stockpile destruction, it destroyed 101,458 mines. In its first Article 7 Report, Ecuador indicated that this destruction occurred prior to March 2000.¹² These mines were transferred to the Logistics Support Brigade No. 25 (Reino de Quito) and were destroyed by detonation at the Army's Practice Range (El Corazón) in Machaci, Pichincha province, near Quito.¹³

In the second phase, a total of 158,844 mines were destroyed by September 2001. This included: 125,831 T-A-B-1 mines, 23,272 VS-50 mines, 48 PMD-6M mines, 100 PRB M-35 mines, 7 M18A1 mines, 25 P-4-B mines and 9,561 PRB-M 409 mines.¹⁴ The destruction was a joint effort by the Mine Clearance Center of Ecuador (CENDESMI, Centro de Desminado del Ecuador) and the OAS Integrated Mine Action Program (AICMA, Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal).¹⁵

Between September 2001 and January 2002, a further 9,561 PRB-M 409 antipersonnel mines were destroyed by the CENEP Engineers Brigade (25).¹⁶

Ecuador had reported a total of 5,856 "MOH-50" antipersonnel mines in its inventory, of which it had planned to destroy 4,856 and retain 1,000 for training purposes. These are apparently ex-Soviet "Claymore" type directional fragmentation mines, usually designated MON-50. An official told Landmine Monitor that Ecuador decided to keep all of these mines after a determination that they are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty when used only in command-detonation mode.¹⁷

Mines retained for training

On 19 September 2001, Ecuador announced to the Third Meeting of States Parties its intent to reduce the number of mines retained for training from 16,000 to 4,000.¹⁸ On 31 May 2002, Ecuador reported that it has retained 4,000 mines for training as permitted under Article 3. The mines are listed as: 2,100 T-AB-1, 1,479 VS-50, 300 PRB-M 409, 80 PRB-M 35, 25 P-4-B, 10 M18A1 and 6 PMD-6M.¹⁹

Apart from those 4,000 mines, of the original 16,000 mines slated to be retained:

¹⁰ "Ecuador: Destrucción de minas antipersonal en Ecuador concluirá este martes," *AFP* (Quito), 10 September 2001; "Latinoamérica cumple tratado: Sigue destrucción de minas," *El Expreso* (Guayaquil), 12 September 2001.

¹¹ "Destrucción de almacenes en Honduras, Nicaragua, Perú y Ecuador," in *El Desminado* (OAS), Vol. 1 Number 1, November 2001.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form G, 29 March 2000. Antipersonnel mines destroyed included 93,278 MAPP 78 F-2 mines (manufactured by Chile), 4,655 MAPP 78 F-2 mines (Chile), and 3,525 MAPT 78 tracción F-2 mines (Chile). More recently, a government official stated that the 101,458 mines were destroyed in August 2001. Statement by Ambassador Mario Alemán at the General Debate of the UNGA First Committee, 11 October 2001.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form G, 23 August 2000.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 May 2002.

¹⁵ Brochure (in Spanish) by Ecuador and the OAS dated September 2001.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 May 2002.

¹⁷ Interview with Major Juan Carlos Guarderas, Comando General de Desminado, Las Malvinas Military Base, 25 May 2002.

¹⁸ Statement by Dr. Alfredo Luna Tobar, Ecuador's Ambassador to Nicaragua, Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 31 May 2002.

- Ecuador destroyed 4,500 mines on 17 January 2002 at Cerro El Corazón in Aloag sector.²⁰ A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release reported that the mines destroyed were originally intended “for training purposes.” The OAS and government officials witnessed the event.²¹
- Another 1,644 mines were transferred to the United States. On 2 January 2002, the US Embassy in Quito facilitated the transfer of 1,644 mines to the US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division in Indian Head, Maryland, where the US will use them for research purposes.²²
- Apparently 4,856 T-AB-1 mines that were originally going to be retained were destroyed as part of the phase two destruction.²³
- The 1,000 MOH-50 mines formerly counted as retained mines are still being kept, but are no longer recorded as antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Problem

Previous editions of *Landmine Monitor* have provided extensive details about the landmine problem in Ecuador. There are five mine-affected areas from the 1995 “Cenepa” border conflict with Perú: Cordillera del Cóndor in the south-east border region; Cusumaza-Bombuiza in the east-central border region; Tiwintza on the Peruvian side of the border; and El Oro and Loja provinces in the southern border region.²⁴ Montalvo in the east-central border region is suspected of being mine-affected.²⁵ In the west, the provinces of Zamora Chimchipe and Morona Santiago are mine-affected.²⁶

Mine Action Funding

In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided \$1.76 million to Ecuador for mine action.²⁷ This contribution covered the costs of US Special Operations Forces “train the trainer” programs, as well as the provision of vehicles and equipment for demining.²⁸

In addition, in 2001 contributions to the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in both Ecuador and Perú totaled \$1.59 million (\$594,000 from Japan and \$1 million from the US).²⁹ This represents an increase from \$772,347 contributed for the year 2000 (\$272,437 from Canada and \$500,000 from the US), and \$198,000 for 1999 (from Canada).

²⁰ “4,500 Anti-personnel Landmines Destroyed in Ecuador,” *Xinhua* (Quito), 22 January 2002.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, “Destruction Event Act,” 17 January 2002. The 4,500 mines were 1,334 T-AB-1, 3,121 VS-50, 40 PMD-6M and 5 P-4-B. *Landmine Monitor* notes that the PMD-6M and P-4-B mines seem to be in excess of what Ecuador reported in stock and having destroyed.

²² The 1,644 mines were 1,000 T-AB-1, 400 VS-50, 200 PRB-M 409, 20 PRB-M 35, 20 P-4-B, 4 PMD-6M. Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 May 2002. Interviews with Gustavo Anda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview with Major Juan Carlos Guarderas, Comando General de Desminado, Las Malvinas Military Base, 25 May 2002.

²³ It is possible that there was a mix-up in numbers of T-AB-1 and MOH-50 mines retained and destroyed, with 4,856 MOH-50s being included in the total of 125,831 T-AB-1 mines.

²⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 265. See also, Article 7 Reports, Form C, 31 May 2002, 5 March 2001, 29 March 2000.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form C, Tables 1 and 2, 5 March 2001; Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 May 2002.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Form G.

²⁷ US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, p. 38.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ “OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001,” Non-official table provided in email to *Landmine Monitor* (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

Total contributions for the “Managua Challenge” project, which assisted stockpile destruction by Ecuador, Honduras, and Perú prior to the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001, totaled \$487,533 (\$448,616 from Canada and \$38,917 from Australia).³⁰

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

The General Command of Mine Clearance was established together with the Mine Clearance Center of Ecuador (CENDESMI, Centro de Desminado del Ecuador) in September 1999. Both are responsible for mine action in the country.³¹ On 19 March 2001, the OAS and Ecuador signed a Framework Agreement for an Integrated Mine Action Program.³² According to the Framework Agreement, CENDESMI is responsible for mine clearance operations, training personnel, and promoting landmine survivors training programs.³³ CENDESMI’s headquarters are located near Quito at the “Cenepa” Number 23 Engineers Brigade of the Armed Forces in Sangolquí sector, Pichinca province. There are two field regional command centers, in El Oro province (“Tarqui”) and in Morona Santiago province (“Amazonas”).

The OAS AICMA established a local office in Quito in May 2001 to coordinate support for demining operations.³⁴ The Ecuadorian Army developed a two-year operational demining plan with the assistance of the OAS AICMA national coordinator.

In 2001, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was installed in CENDESMI.³⁵ In February 2002, representatives from the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted training and provided technical advice on using the database system.³⁶

CENDESMI’s National Demining School held four national courses on basic humanitarian demining and one demining instructor course in 2001. In the first quarter of 2002, one basic demining course and one IMSMA training course were conducted. Additionally, the US Army conducted one humanitarian demining course in 2001 and one in 2002.³⁷ In 2001, Spain held two courses on demining basics. CENDESMI’s school would like to become an international demining training center. In December 2001, the Commander of the “Cenepa” No. 23 Engineers Brigade of the Army made a presentation on Ecuador’s experience in mine clearance at a regional conference on mine action.³⁸

Mine Clearance and Assessment

According to the head of the General Command for Mine Clearance, an impact survey was carried out in Loja province in November 2001 and impact surveys being carried out in the provinces of El Oro, Morona Santiago and Zamora Chimchi were scheduled to be completed by

³⁰ Colonel William McDonough, “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002.

³¹ CENDESMI was created by Executive Decree 1247 of 23 September 1999. Article 7 Report, Form A, 5 March 2001.

³² OAS, “Destroying Land Mines in Ecuador, Peru,” (Newsletter), May-June 2001.

³³ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the Framework Agreement.

³⁴ OAS Brochure “Republica del Ecuador, Destrucción de Minas Almacenadas,” Quito, September 2001; Colonel William McDonough, “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002.

³⁵ Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, “Updates on Activities between January and December 2001,” 31 December 2001, p. 4.

³⁶ Landmine Monitor was present at the IMSMA presentation. See Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, “Updates on Activities between January and April 2002,” 30 April 2002, p. 4.

³⁷ Article 7 Report, Form K, 31 May 2002. Standard Article 7 Reports do not contain a Form K, however Ecuador created an additional category in order to include “other” information.

³⁸ Colonel Milton Carrera, “Ecuadorian perspectives,” at the “Mine Action in Latin America” Conference, Miami, 3-5 December 2002.

August 2002.³⁹ Previously, carried out an assessment mission in Ecuador in August 1999, and the OAS carried out a technical visit in March 2001.

Ecuador reported that it had cleared a total of 4,439 mines between March 2001 and April 2002 from Santiago (4,355 mines), Tiwintza (30 mines) and El Oro (54 mines).⁴⁰ Previously, Ecuador reported that between July 2000 and March 2001 it had cleared 2,973 mines from Santiago (2,889 mines), Tiwintza (30 mines), and El Oro (54 mines).⁴¹

Mine Risk Education

Ecuador reported in its May 2002 Article 7 Report that a risk education campaign has been developed to teach the civilian population in El Oro and Morona Santiago about the danger of landmines.⁴² The Army's psychological operations branch carries out mine risk education activities, in which it distributes posters, pamphlets, and other materials with mine risk education messages.⁴³ In March 2001, Ecuador reported that these activities were carried out in border communities in El Oro and Morona Santiago provinces.

Landmine Monitor visited El Oro in March 2002 and found that there was little awareness of the mine problem among the local population, perhaps because mined areas are not in populated centers.⁴⁴ A local merchant told Landmine Monitor that "antipersonnel mines were a part of the war, and when the war ended so did that problem."⁴⁵

Ecuador states that it has taken appropriate measures to make the population aware of the landmine problem, such as using barbed wire with signs stating "Danger," "Mines," "Mined Zone" and "Danger: Explosive Mines."⁴⁶ According to Mayor Juan Carlos Guarderas of the General Command for Mine Clearance, maintenance of marking and warnings around minefields has been difficult because the local populations steal the materials, including the barbed wire and warning signs.⁴⁷

Landmine Casualties

There is no systematic data-gathering mechanism for landmine incidents in Ecuador and exact figures are unavailable. The Ministry of Health does not have an official registry and neither does the National Statistics Institute.

In 2001, two mine/UXO incidents were reported. On 25 March 2001 in Shaymi, near the Peruvian border, a man stepped on a mine while hunting and received serious injuries.⁴⁸ He was taken to the health clinic in Guayzimi and then to the hospital in Zamora. On 29 May 2001 two children were killed and a third was seriously injured when a grenade they found exploded. The incident occurred in Parroquia Montalvo in Pastaza, while US Army Rangers and the Ecuadorian Jungle Battallion No. 49 were conducting a training exercise.⁴⁹

The most recent reported mine incident took place on 10 January 2002, when a 19 year old Peruvian citizen died after stepping on a landmine reportedly in Ecuadorian territory as he returned home after crossing the border to seek work. The incident occurred in Kanga, close to the Cenepa River and three hours from Shaima. He received first aid in a nearby town but died some

³⁹ Interview with Major Juan Carlos Guarderas, Comando General de Desminado, Las Malvinas Military Base, 25 May 2002.

⁴⁰ Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 May 2002.

⁴¹ Article 7 Report, Form G, 5 March 2001.

⁴² Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 May 2002.

⁴³ Interview with Corporal Alemán, Mine Risk Education Officer, Army of Ecuador; Article 7 Report, Form I, 5 March 2001.

⁴⁴ Landmine Monitor trip to Huaquillas, Santa Rosa and Pasaje, El Oro province, March 2002.

⁴⁵ Interview with a merchant in Huaquillas, March 2002.

⁴⁶ Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 May 2002.

⁴⁷ Interview with Major Juan Carlos Guarderas, Comando General de Desminado, Las Malvinas Military Base, 25 May 2002.

⁴⁸ "Cazador pisó mina antipersonal," *La Hora Zamora* (Zamora), 25 March 2001.

⁴⁹ Marcelo Gálvez, "Dos muertos en maniobras," *El Universo* (Guayaquil), 30 May 2001.

hours later while being transferred to another health center.⁵⁰ According to Ecuadorian officials however, the mine was in Peruvian territory, but the casualty was brought to an Ecuadorian health center since it was closer.⁵¹

The local farming population in El Oro and Loja has not reported any landmine casualties, according to personnel at a local hospital.⁵²

There have been no recorded mine casualties among deminers since the mine clearance operation began.

According to the U.S. State Department, there were about 120 landmine casualties in Ecuador between 1995 and 1999. The majority were civilians.⁵³

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

The military in Ecuador has a health care system that provides integrated care to military landmine casualties through the Armed Forces Social Security Institute (ISSFA, Instituto de Seguridad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas). Civilians injured by landmines do not receive the same level of attention as military personnel and existing services remain inadequate. Mine clearance operations have trained personnel and helicopters for evacuation available at all times.⁵⁴

In 2002, five disabled veterans from the Association received training on the IMSMA database system and once the training is completed they will be employed at CENDESMI's national headquarters and at the regional command centers to assist in developing mine action plans.⁵⁵

In March 1995, a law was enacted to support the victims of the conflict with housing, pensions and school bursaries for their children. According to the President of the Association of Disabled Veterans, victims of the conflict are receiving housing and school bursaries for their children, although at a slow pace.⁵⁶ With regards to disabled veterans who are no longer in active service, ISSFA will continue to support them, as long as they remain affiliated to the Association of Disabled Veterans.⁵⁷

In March 2002, Landmine Monitor visited mine-affected zones in the southern border as well as the public hospital in Huaquillas and the military hospital in Pasaje. According to administrative staff at the public hospital, no landmine casualties have been registered at the hospital. Hospital records reviewed by Landmine Monitor indicated that five mine casualties were treated at the hospital during the Cenepa conflict.⁵⁸ According to administrative staff, the hospital is not equipped to provide medical care to landmine survivors and does not have the capacity to provide prostheses; for this a survivor would have to be taken to the Military Hospital in Pasaje. The military hospital opened an Orthopedic Center, which provides wheelchairs, crutches, and other aids for disabled persons.⁵⁹

⁵⁰ "Joven Perúano pierde la vida al pisar mina" in *La Hora* (Zamora, Ecuador), 15 January 2002.

⁵¹ Landmine Monitor interview with Gustavo Anda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; interview with Major Juan Carlos Guarderas, Comando General de Desminado, Las Malvinas Military Base, 25 May 2002.

⁵² Landmine Monitor interview with personnel of Huaquillas Hospital, province, 11 March 2002.

⁵³ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining*, 3rd edition, U.S. Department of State, Washington, November 2001, p. 38.

⁵⁴ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 333-334.

⁵⁵ Article 7 Report, Form J, 31 May 2002.

⁵⁶ Interview with Sergeant Nelson Castillo, President, Association of Disabled Veterans "Upper Cenepa," Quito, 8 April 2002.

⁵⁷ Interview with Corporal González, disabled veteran no longer in active service. Corporal González discussed the cases of six disabled sergeants no longer in active service.

⁵⁸ Interview with staff of Huaquillas Hospital, Huaquillas, 12 March 2002.

⁵⁹ Interview with staff of the Military Hospital, Pasaje, March 2002.

EL SALVADOR

Key developments since May 2001: Legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty domestically has been drafted. El Salvador submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 31 August 2001 and an annual updated report on 29 April 2002. El Salvador reported the destruction of 1,291 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2000, leaving 5,344 in stock. In November 2001, an interagency committee on the Mine Ban Treaty was established, with responsibility for liaising with national and international organizations on demining and mine survivor rehabilitation.

Mine Ban Policy

El Salvador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, the instrument of ratification was deposited on 27 January 1999, and the treaty entered into force for El Salvador on 1 July 1999.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, provided *Landmine Monitor* with an eight-page report dated 11 February 2002 in response to the information on El Salvador contained in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.¹ According to the report, an Interagency Committee on International Humanitarian Law coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed a draft legislation law that will penalize violations of the Mine Ban Treaty.² The law had not yet been presented to the national Legislative Assembly as of July 2002.

In November 2001, an interagency committee on the Ottawa Convention (Comité Nacional Intersectorial para el seguimiento de la Convención de Ottawa) was established, with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and the National Civil Police.³ According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the committee is the official body charged with liaising with national and international organizations on demining and mine survivor rehabilitation.⁴

El Salvador attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001, with a delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In El Salvador's general statement, Minister de Ávila emphasized the "urgent necessity to create a permanent fund for landmine victims" and the need for moratoria on production, as well as a UN General Assembly resolution urging transparency in relation to this.⁵

El Salvador cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2001. A representative of the Salvadoran Army attended the "Mine Action in Latin America" conference in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001.⁶ El Salvador participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

On 31 August 2001, El Salvador submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report (originally due by 27 December 1999), which reported on the period from 1 June 2000 to 31 August 2001. It subsequently submitted its annual updated Article 7 Report on 29 April 2002, which reported on the period from 1 September 2001 to 31 March 2002.

In December 2001, El Salvador presented a list of 21 mine clearance experts from the Armed Forces El Salvador to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs in response to a request from the

¹ Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, Report for El Salvador for 2002, 11 February 2002. *Landmine Monitor* received the report in a letter from Ambassador Víctor Manuel Lagos Pizzati, Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the UN in Geneva, dated 6 March 2002. Hereinafter cited as, "Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002."

² This is the Comité Interinstitucional de Derecho Internacional Humanitario de El Salvador (CIDIH-ES). Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 4.

³ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Statement by Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001, pp. 1-4.

⁶ Col. Carlos Eduardo Cáceres Flores attended. The Conference was sponsored by the US Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States (OAS); the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

UN Secretary General regarding Article 8 (9) of the Mine Ban Treaty. These are individuals that could participate in any future fact-finding mission carried out under Article 8 (Facilitation and Clarification of Compliance).⁷

While El Salvador is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) it did not attend the CCW meetings held in December 2001.

Production, Transfer and Use

El Salvador reports that it has not produced antipersonnel mines and has no facilities to produce any type of mines.⁸ El Salvador is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines in the past. El Salvador imported considerable quantities of antipersonnel mines, including M-14, M-26, and M18A1 Claymore mines, all manufactured by the United States.⁹ The guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) made significant numbers of homemade antipersonnel mines or improvised explosive devices. Both the government and FMLN forces used mines throughout the 1980-1992 conflict.

Stockpiling and Destruction

El Salvador previously reported that in the period from March 1993 through 1994, the Division of Arms and Explosives (DAE, División de Armas y Explosivos) of the National Civilian Police (PNC, Policía Nacional Civil) destroyed all remaining antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the Salvadoran Armed Forces. In April 1997, El Salvador reported this destruction to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS).¹⁰

In May 2001, however, Landmine Monitor received a detailed response from the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, General Alvaro Antonio Calderón Hurtado, which reported that El Salvador had a stockpile of 5,657 antipersonnel landmines, including 4,937 M-14 and 720 M-26 antipersonnel mines, stockpiled in different parts of the country.¹¹

In its Article 7 Report submitted 31 August 2001, El Salvador reported different numbers for its stockpile: 5,408 antipersonnel landmines, including 4,873 M-14 mines, 46 M-26 mines, and 489 M-18 mines.¹² It is unknown why the numbers of M-14 and M-26 mines are smaller, since no stockpile destruction was reported.

In its subsequent Article 7 Report submitted 29 April 2002, El Salvador reported a stockpile of 5,344 antipersonnel landmines, reflecting the destruction of 64 M-14 mines (see below). Thus, the stockpile consisted of 4,809 M-14 mines, 46 M-26 mines, and 489 M-18 mines.¹³

Destruction

El Salvador prepared a stockpile destruction plan in early 1999, and by July a total of 1,291 mines were transferred to the Hacienda El Angel in the department of La Paz for destruction.¹⁴

⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 6.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 31 August 2001; and Article 7 report, Forms E and H, 29 April 2002.

⁹ The US State Department has reported that from 1982-1990, the US provided El Salvador 4,410 M-14s, 720 M-24s and 47,244 M18A1s. Fact Sheets, "US Landmine Sales By Country" and "Foreign Military Sales of US Mines," received by Human Rights Watch on 23 February 1994.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 269.

¹¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by General Alvaro Antonio Calderón Hurtado, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of El Salvador, 8 May 2001.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form B, 31 August 2001. The difference is 64 fewer M-14 mines, 674 fewer M-26 mines, and reporting for the first time of 489 M-18 Claymore mines.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2002. The difference is 64 fewer M-14 mines than the previous Article 7 report.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Forms A, D and F, 31 August 2001; and Article 7 Report, Forms A and D, 29 April 2002. El Salvador states that it had destroyed some stockpiled mines previously. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Salvadoran Armed Forces destroyed 1,010 M-14 antipersonnel mines in 1996 under "Operation Borbollón." The Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated this total included mines removed from the ground by deminers as well as stockpiled mines. Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 3.

Destruction was supposed to start in June 2000, but was delayed until November 2000, when 64 M-14 and 1,227 M-18 mines were destroyed.¹⁵

The method of destruction was reported as demolition in an isolated area following Ministry of Environment guidelines. No representatives of the media or civil society are believed to have witnessed the destruction.

Another 1,229 mines (including 740 M-14 and 489 M-18 mines) were transferred for destruction at the end of 2001. Destruction of these mines was scheduled to take place in January 2002, but was delayed until August 2002.¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated in May 2001 that stockpile destruction would be completed no later than July 2003.¹⁷ The deadline mandated by the Mine Ban Treaty is 1 July 2003.

In its initial Article 7 Report, El Salvador indicated that no antipersonnel mines would be retained for training under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The second Article 7 Report, however, indicates that 96 antipersonnel mines will be retained for training (50 M-14 mines and 46 M-26 mines).¹⁸

Concerns have been expressed in the past that some stockpiles of antipersonnel mines could exist outside of the control of the government in the hands of bandits or in hidden arms caches.¹⁹ In August 2001, for example, media reported that a large “*tatú*” (hidden or abandoned weapons cache) was found one kilometer east of Moropala school, on the road to Juacarán, in Moropala de Concepción Batres canton, Usulután department.²⁰ The *tatú* was assumed to have been buried during the war and subsequently exposed by rains. A local peasant alerted the Division of Arms and Explosives of the PNC, which removed and destroyed the weapons, including homemade “quitapié” (foot-removing) mines.

According to an October 2001 media report, local residents in San Fernando, in the department of Morazán in the east of the country, found a *tatú* in Ocotillo canton, which included initiators for mines and other munitions.²¹ The head of police in Morazán was quoted as saying, “We have discovered weapons in several places in San Fernando and believe there are more; I believe that the best option is to do a sweep of the entire zone.”

Landmine and UXO Problem

The Foreign Minister’s report to Landmine Monitor in February 2002 provided more details on the past mine clearance program than previously available. The National Demining Plan was implemented by the government between March 1993 and January 1994 with participation by the government, Armed Forces, and FMLN, with support from the UN Office in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and UNICEF.²²

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Forms A and G, 31 August 2001; Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 3. The M-18 Claymore mines were apparently destroyed because of their unstable condition. See, Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 April 2002.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Forms A and D, 29 April 2002. Landmine Monitor went to print before this destruction was scheduled to occur. The M-18 Claymore mines are being destroyed because of their unstable condition. Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 April 2002.

¹⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by General Alvaro Antonio Calderón Hurtado, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of El Salvador, 8 May 2001. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 336.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 August 2001; and Article 7 Report, Form A and Form D, 29 April 2002.

¹⁹ Graeme Goldsworthy and Dr. Frank Faulkner, “This Hard Land: A Renewal of Humanitarian Mine Action in El Salvador,” in “Landmines in Central & South America,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 5.2, Summer 2001, p. 21. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 336-337.

²⁰ Carlos Montes, “Hallan artefactos explosivos,” *La Prensa Gráfica* (San Salvador), 7 August 2001; Rosa Fuentes, “PNC halló varias granadas en ‘tatú,’” *El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 7 August 2001.

²¹ Evelyn Granados, “Destruyen tatú en Morazán,” *El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 31 October 2001.

²² Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 2.

During the first phase of the plan (named the “Program for the Prevention of Accidents by Mines and other Explosive Artifacts” or “PAM 1”), mine affected areas were identified and marked off with the collaboration of the Armed Forces and FMLN. Prevention messages developed by UNICEF were broadcast on radio and television. In the second phase of the plan (named “PAM 2”), the government contracted a Belgian company, International Danger Disaster Assistance (IDAS), to clear the mines and 9,511 antipersonnel mines were subsequently cleared from 425 minefields covering an area of 438 square kilometers, at a cost of \$4.6 million.²³ In addition, the Salvadoran Armed Forces cleared minefields from around military bases and economic centers, destroying 8,590 antipersonnel mines.²⁴

Upon completion of the National Demining Plan in 1994, IDAS, along with the Armed Forces, FMLN and ONUSAL, guaranteed that 97 percent of the mines were cleared. The Foreign Minister said that this made El Salvador “the first Central American country to be certified as free of antipersonnel mines,”²⁵ although a few months earlier she had acknowledged, “We still have three percent left to demine and we will do it; the Armed Forces, NGOs and civil society together.”²⁶ In May 2001, Lt. Col. José Ernesto Alas Sansur of the Armed Forces also told Landmine Monitor that, “IDAS did not guarantee us complete mine clearance, so that El Salvador has three percent of mines in those identified minefields whose removal and destruction is complex.”²⁷

In its Article 7 Reports, in the form requesting information on locations of mined areas, El Salvador states, “There is no information in this category.”²⁸ In the form requesting information on the destruction of antipersonnel mines that are cleared from the ground, El Salvador reports “not applicable.”²⁹ The 2002 Article 7 Report also states, “El Salvador is considered to be free of mines, according to the company that carried out mine clearance in the country.”³⁰

However, a UK-based mine clearance NGO named the International Demining Group (IDG) and its Salvadoran NGO partner, the Foundation for Cooperation and Community Development (CORDES, Fundación para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Comunal de El Salvador) have identified approximately 150 square kilometers for consideration for level one survey and/or demining operations in the departments of Chalatenango, Cabañas, Cuscatlán and Usulután, including 53 previously “unknown or unrecorded” mine locations.³¹

In May 2001, a national media report noted that explosions of antipersonnel mines and other UXO abandoned during the war continued, as did the list of victims to the conflict.³² Marcos Alfredo Valladares, then the Attorney General in the Office for Human Rights, told the reporter, “Many have concluded that country is mine-free, but that is in contrast to reality.”³³

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.; Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by General Alvaro Antonio Calderón Hurtado, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of El Salvador, 25 January 2001.

²⁵ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 2.

²⁶ Statement by Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001, p. 2.

²⁷ Interview with Lt. Col. José Ernesto Alas Sansur, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, San Salvador, 18 May 2001.

²⁸ Article 7 Reports, Form C, 31 August 2001 and 29 April 2002.

²⁹ Article 7 Reports, Form F and G, 31 August 2001 and 29 April 2002.

³⁰ Article 7 Report, Form C, Nota, 29 April 2002.

³¹ International Demining Group, “Pilot Programme: A proposal for community-based humanitarian mine action and development,” December 2000. Landmine Monitor has a copy of the proposal. See also, Graeme Goldsworthy and Dr. Frank Faulkner, “This Hard Land: A Renewal of Humanitarian Mine Action in El Salvador,” in “Landmines in Central & South America,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 5.2, Summer 2001, pp. 22-23.

³² Ana Lidia Rivera, “La muerte a flor de tierra,” *Vértice, El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 20 May 2001.

³³ Marcos Alfredo Valladares, PDHH, in Ana Lidia Rivera, “La muerte a flor de tierra,” *Vértice, El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 20 May 2001.

The Chief of the Arms and Explosives Division of the PNC, Sub-Commissioner Hugo Salinas, told media that while he was convinced that the country was mine-free, he accepted there were isolated cases of antipersonnel mines and UXO found.³⁴ He was quoted as saying, “There are no formal programs, what we do is survey the zone where there has been information on the presence of abandoned explosives provided by the locals.” Salinas also discussed limitations faced by his division, such as lack of personnel and resources, including only having three mine detectors in poor condition. The Division of Arms and Explosives keeps a list of landmines and UXO reported and destroyed. In 2000, reportedly 575 explosive UXO were gathered, of which 177 were destroyed and 298 deposited in stockpiles for future destruction.³⁵

Mine and UXO Clearance

The Ministry of Defense and the Division of Arms and Explosives of the PNC are the authorized national institutions responsible for clearance of any mines and UXO that might be found.³⁶ The Army started clearance operations in October 2001 from an area in the department of Cuscatlán where Doctors Without Borders (Médicos sin Fronteras) had reported that rural residents could not use the land because of the presence of mines.³⁷ The Army cleared an area of 30 blocks (*manzanas*) in an operation that took two months, but no mines or UXO were found.

The Foreign Minister reported that in November 2001 the International Demining Group presented a project titled, “Pilot Program for a Level I and II Survey on Humanitarian Mine Action” to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and National Civilian Police, with the “objective of carrying out a study on the issue in El Salvador.”³⁸ Another source states that a pilot demining program in El Salvador by IDG was due to be implemented in late 2001 in coordination with CORDES in Suchitoto and Chalatenango.³⁹

Since 1997, El Salvador has contributed twenty military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA mine clearance efforts by the OAS in Central America, including four supervisors in 2001 and four in 2002.⁴⁰ El Salvador also provides mine clearance personnel to the UN mission in Kuwait (UNIKOM).⁴¹

Mine Risk Education

The government maintains that since 1994, the Division of Arms and Explosives of the PNC has carried out educational campaigns for the prevention of mine accidents on a permanent basis in schools throughout the country.⁴²

³⁴ Sub-Commissioner Hugo Salinas, Division of Arms and Explosives of the PNC, in Ana Lidia Rivera, “La muerte a flor de tierra,” *Vértice, El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 20 May 2001.

³⁵ Ana Lidia Rivera, “La muerte a flor de tierra,” *Vértice, El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 20 May 2001.

³⁶ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Graeme Goldsworthy and Dr. Frank Faulkner, “This Hard Land: A Renewal of Humanitarian Mine Action in El Salvador,” in “Landmines in Central & South America,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 5.2, Summer 2001, p. 25.

⁴⁰ The 20 supervisors constitute nine percent of the total contributions to the program from regional countries, and include: two in 1997 and 1998, and four in 1990, 2000, 2001 and 2002. “Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America,” Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁴¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, pp. 3-5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 6. In both Article 7 Reports, however, El Salvador reports “not applicable” in the form for measures adopted to warn the population. Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 August 2001; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 April 2002.

Landmine Casualties

There is no official information available on landmine and UXO casualties in El Salvador.⁴³ However, in May 2001, a legislative assembly deputy told Landmine Monitor that there were approximately two incidents per month in rural areas because of UXO, and that in 2000 there were 25 casualties from incidents involving antipersonnel mines or UXO.⁴⁴ In a March 2002 media report, the Chief of Emergencies at Hospital Bloom in San Salvador, Dr. Carlos Gabriel Alvarenga, reported that 27 children had been admitted to the hospital with injuries caused by UXO.⁴⁵

In 2001, three UXO incidents were reported in the media, in which five people were killed and two injured. On 27 February 2001 three children were killed by an unidentified explosive while looking for crayfish in El Carrizal canton, San Simón, in the department of Morazán.⁴⁶ On 26 May 2001 one peasant was killed and another injured by a reported "military grenade," in Piedra Grande Arriba canton in northern Zacatecoluca.⁴⁷ On 9 October 2001, a 14 year-old youth was killed and his 9 year-old brother severely injured after a US-manufactured fragmentation grenade they were handling exploded in San Eugenio canton in Sonsonate.⁴⁸

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002: on 29 April, a municipal worker in San Salvador lost his hand and damaged his left eye after inadvertently detonating a homemade grenade ("granada hechiza") while cleaning out a sewage drain with a shovel.⁴⁹

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

In El Salvador, persons with disabilities are treated within the regular health care system. However, in many villages and poor urban areas access to medical care and rehabilitation is limited.⁵⁰

The Center for Professional Rehabilitation of the Armed Forces (CERPROFA, Centro de Rehabilitación Profesional de la Fuerza Armada) rehabilitates military and former military personnel.⁵¹ CERPROFA has offered technical support to Guatemala to establish a similar center and manufactures prostheses for war-disabled in Honduras and Nicaragua.⁵² The mental health clinics of the various military units also provide psychological support for personnel

El Salvador had created a committee to oversee implementation of a program within the framework of the Canada-Mexico-PAHO tripartite project.⁵³ Since April 1999 the committee, which is coordinated by Salvadoran Institute for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (ISRI- Instituto Salvadoreño de Rehabilitación de Inválidos), has carried out a number of activities including

⁴³ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by General Alvaro Antonio Calderón Hurtado, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of El Salvador, 8 May 2001.

⁴⁴ Interview with Deputy Pablo Parada Andino, Legislative Assembly, San Salvador, 28 May 2001.

⁴⁵ Néfer Muñoz, "Un total de 95 niños salvadoreños sufrieron heridas de bala el pasado mes de enero, según el Gobierno," *Europa Press* (Madrid), 1 Marzo 2002.

⁴⁶ Ana Lidia Rivera, "La Muerte a flor de tierra," *Vértice, El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 20 May 2001.

⁴⁷ Mauricio Bolaños, "Un muerto y un herido al explotar 'granada militar,'" *La Prensa Gráfica* (San Salvador), 29 May 2001.

⁴⁸ Victor Maldonado, "Un muerto y un lesionado por explosión de granada," *El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 9 October 2001.

⁴⁹ Guadalupe Hernández, "Empleado municipal pierde su mano derecha. Mi mente la tengo para seguir adelante," *El Diario de Hoy* (San Salvador), 8 May 2002.

⁵⁰ For more details see Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Database – El Salvador, accessed at www.lsndatabase.org; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 341-342.

⁵¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 2.

⁵² Statement by Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001, p. 3.

⁵³ The program involves representatives of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, the Salvadoran Institute for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (ISRI), the University of El Salvador, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Education, the Association of War Disabled of El Salvador (ALGES), and the National Commission for the Integrated Care of Persons with Disabilities (CONAIPD). Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 4.

workshops on community based rehabilitation in Metapán and La Palma, Chalatenango; a workshop on clinical aspects of community-based rehabilitation in Metapán; and training for two physiotherapists from the Association of War Disabled of El Salvador.⁵⁴

The Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) program has two community-based outreach workers, who are landmine survivors, to work with individual survivors to assess their needs, offer psychological and social support, and educate families about the effects of limb loss.⁵⁵ As of April 2002, LSN El Salvador has identified 62 landmine survivors in the departments of San Salvador and La Libertad. According to LSN, the survivors' most common needs are wheelchairs, assistance with housing repairs and maintenance, medicines, crutches, prostheses, and assistance in finding employment.⁵⁶ In 2001, LSN directly assisted 46 people, including 19 landmine survivors, made contact with 96 others, including 39 landmine survivors, and developed a national services directory used to link survivors to rehabilitation services.⁵⁷

The Association of the Organization of Disabled of El Salvador (PODES, Asociación Promotora de la Organización de Discapacitados de El Salvador) has been producing prosthetic and orthotic devices since 1993, and currently has 22 employees, including 16 war disabled. As of July 2002, PODES had assisted a total of 1,655 people, including 1,043 war disabled. Of the war disabled, 617 people were injured by antipersonnel mines, of which five percent were women. In addition to its workshop in San Salvador, PODES has smaller workshops in Morazán, Usulután, Cabañas, Cuscatlán, Chalatenango and Santa Ana. PODES has created a Social Fund to assist poor disabled persons. PODES is currently seeking additional funding support to maintain and further develop its programs.⁵⁸ The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA) provides annual financial support and training assistance to PODES.⁵⁹

The Trust for the Americas/AICMA/OAS, together with the Ministry of Labor and the National Council for the Fundamental Care of People with Disabilities implements a program of vocational training and assistance in job placement for people with disabilities. More than 300 people have received computer training, with more than 45 trainees subsequently being employed.⁶⁰

On 18-19 June 2001, prosthetics technicians from El Salvador attended the First Regional Conference on Victim Assistance and Technologies, organized by the OAS and the Center for International Rehabilitation (CIR), in Managua, Nicaragua.⁶¹ CIR has developed a Lower Extremity Distance Learning program for prosthetic technicians in El Salvador which also includes a clinical component implemented by a qualified prosthetist who provides hands-on training.⁶²

The National Family Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de la Familia), headed by the First Lady of El Salvador, is implementing a Law of Equality of Opportunities for Disabled Persons (Ley de Equiparación de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad).⁶³

In El Salvador's general statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized the "urgent necessity to create a permanent fund for landmine victims".⁶⁴

⁵⁴ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, LSN El Salvador, 3 March 2002.

⁵⁶ Email to Landmine Monitor from LSN El Salvador, 2 April 2002.

⁵⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, Berta Alicia Flores, Social Worker, LSN El Salvador, 13 March 2002.

⁵⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from José Leonidas Argueta Roldan, Executive Director, PODES, 2 July 2002.

⁵⁹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from William Brown, Deputy for Administration, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 23 July 2001.

⁶⁰ ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

⁶¹ "Ayudarán más víctimas de minas antipersonales. Primera conferencia regional de rehabilitación tecnológica." *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), 19 June 2001.

⁶² ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

⁶³ Minister of Foreign Affairs Report, 11 February 2002, p. 5.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 September 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. It has not enacted implementing legislation; in 2001 a government official told Landmine Monitor that assistance was needed in this respect.¹ Equatorial Guinea has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 28 August 1999.

The last landmine-related meeting that government representatives participated in was in Bamako, Mali in February 2001. Equatorial Guinea was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

An online media agency reported that the exiled ethnic political opposition party, the Movement for the Autonomy of the Island of Bioko (El Movimiento para la Autodeterminación de la Isla de Bioko, MAIB) issued a statement on 21 January 2002 from Madrid, Spain, denouncing the government for ordering the deployment of antipersonnel mines in the forest on the island of Bioko:

The data we have access to confirm that there are anti-personnel mines in the forests of Rebola, Baney, the Moka Valley and the coastal zone of Malabo [the national capital], more exactly from kilometre five east of Malabo.... In addition to the anti-personnel mines, whose numbers are unknown, there have also been deployed explosives working on remote control all along the road to Rebola and Baney, towards kilometre 20, east of Malabo. We know for sure that the explosives were unloaded in the port of Malabo the day before, by soldiers on night shift.²

Landmine Monitor sought a response to these allegations from the government, but had not received one as of 31 July 2002.

In February 2001, a government representative told Landmine Monitor that Equatorial Guinea has never used, produced, or imported antipersonnel mines, and does not maintain a stockpile of landmines, even for training purposes.³ He also said that Equatorial Guinea is not mine-affected and has no mine victims. If Equatorial Guinea has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, it is required by Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy them by 1 March 2003.

ERITREA

Key developments since May 2001: Eritrea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 August 2001, and it entered into force on 1 February 2002. Two NGOs carried out surveys in 2001, and initial preparations for a Landmine Impact Survey began in March 2002. Mine clearance and mine risk education activities increased greatly. The UNMEE MACC reported that from November 2000 through December 2001, over 10 million square meters of land and 989 kilometers of roads were cleared, destroying more than 1,865 mines. More than 400 Eritreans were trained as deminers in 2001. There were 154 new landmine/UXO casualties reported in Eritrea in 2001, nearly half in May-July as refugees and IDPs began returning home.

Mine Ban Policy

Eritrea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 August 2001, and it entered into force for the country on 1 February 2002. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor, "Eritrea is eager to be a partner with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in full

⁶⁴ Statement by Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001, pp. 1, 4.

¹ Interview with Ambassador Pedro Edjang Mba Medja, Bamako, 15 February 2001.

² "Equatoguinean govt accused of deploying mines," Afrol News, 24 January 2002
http://www.afrol.com/News2002/eqg001_landmines.htm.

³ Interview with Ambassador Pedro Edjang Mba Medja, Bamako, 15 February 2001.

implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.”¹ The Program Manager of the Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) told Landmine Monitor that he believes Eritrea is committed to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, although it will likely need various technical or other forms of assistance to fully implement many of the treaty’s elements.² A senior United Nations Development Program (UNDP) technical advisor will assist the Eritrean government in implementing the treaty, in addition to his other mine action responsibilities; he arrived in Asmara in January 2002.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of Eritrea’s adoption yet of any national implementation measures, as required by Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Eritrea’s initial Article 7 transparency report was due by 31 July 2002, its deadline for destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2006, and its deadline for clearance of emplaced mines is 1 February 2012.

Eritrea was scheduled to attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, but the two-person delegation could not transit en-route through the United States due to the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S.³ Eritrea did participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva.

In November 2001, Eritrea cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Eritrea is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel landmines by Eritrean forces since the end of the border conflict in June 2000.⁴

Eritrea states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging that Eritrean troops have made booby-traps and other improvised explosive devices.⁵ Eritrea claims that it has never imported antipersonnel mines, but that it obtained all of its landmines from Ethiopian forces during the war for independence.⁶

At the intersessional Standing Committee meeting in January 2002, the Eritrean delegation confirmed the figure of 450,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as reported in *Landmine Monitor 2001*, adding that 40,000 mines had been destroyed by the Eritrean Defense Force “immediately” upon the end of the liberation war.⁷ The MACC told Landmine Monitor that these figures - the number of mines in Eritrea’s possession and what it claims to have destroyed - are general estimates that are difficult to confirm as of April 2002.⁸

¹ Interview with Petros Fessehasiom, Director General for Euro-America and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asmara, 28 March 2002.

² Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

³ Interview with Director, Eritrea Mine Action Program, Asmara, 19 January 2002.

⁴ See previous Landmine Monitor Reports for details of Eritrea’s admitted use of antipersonnel mines in its war for independence and in the border war with Ethiopia from May 1998 to June 2000.

⁵ Interview with Habtom Ghebremichael, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Russom Semere, Associate Commissioner-Demining, at the Bamako Seminar on Landmines, Bamako, Mali, 16 February 2001.

⁶ Interview with Lt. Col. Associate Commissioner- Demining, The State of Eritrea Commission for Coordination with the UN Peacekeeping Mission, Asmara, 26 February 2001; also, Eritrean Ministry of Defense, “Answers to a Questionnaire Submitted by Landmine Monitor,” 16 May 2000. In its reply to the questionnaire, Eritrea states that it used mines in the past “during the armed struggle against the Ethiopian army. All the mines used were captured from the enemy. Almost all types of mines were Soviet and US origin like PMN, POMZ-2, MON-100, MON-200, M16, M14 and M3, etc.”

⁷ Interviews with Russom Semere, Director, Eritrea Mine Action Program, Geneva, 30 January 2002 and 26 March 2002.

⁸ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 14 April 2002.

Landmine Problem

The legacy of the Second World War, the thirty years of independence struggle from 1961 to 1991 and the 1998-2000 border conflict with Ethiopia have left Eritrea with a severe landmine problem. The border conflict left heavy areas of contamination in the southern portion of the country. Of the landmines and UXO from the Thirty Year Struggle, ten of the 11 major battle sites believed to contain mines are in the northern and northwestern provinces; the eleventh is in the southeast province.⁹ The Eritrean government told Landmine Monitor that a significant percentage of all mines had been cleared after the war of independence ended in 1991 but, due mostly to technical shortcomings, as many as 150,000 mines may have remained in areas previously thought to be cleared.¹⁰

In May 2001, records of 313 mined areas throughout the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), and just south of the TSZ (in Ethiopian-controlled territory), were provided to UNMEE MACC in Asmara. The mined areas are concentrated in the Shilalo/Shambuqo area in the west; around Senefe, Tsorena, and Zalanmbesa in the center; and north of Buray in the TSZ in the east.¹¹ The Eritrean government carefully recorded minefields for later removal.¹²

Based on these records, UNMEE MACC estimates about 240,000 mines were laid by Eritrea during the border conflict.¹³ It believes that Ethiopian forces removed the majority of these mines during the periods they occupied the region, as very few mines are currently being discovered during the demining operations in Eritrean minefields.¹⁴

Ethiopia has steadfastly denied any use of mines by its forces during the border conflict.¹⁵ But in April 2002, Ethiopia provided UNMEE MACC detailed maps of mines its forces laid in Eritrea during the conflict.¹⁶ These records include information on mines remaining in the ground after Ethiopian forces conducted substantial clearance operations prior to withdrawing from territories it held.¹⁷ MACC estimates Ethiopia laid approximately 150,000 to 200,000 mines in Eritrea during this period.¹⁸

Reportedly, as a result of the use of cluster bombs by the Ethiopian air force in May 2000 at the Korokon refugee camp in western Eritrea, unexploded bomblets remain from the attack. The administrator of the camp, which contained about 7,000 families at the time of the attack, reported seeing about ten "cluster bomb cases" at the time of the attack.¹⁹ Child cattle herders at the camp walked through heavily-affected areas at the camp, and were "taking the copper charges from the bomblets and using them as cow bells."²⁰ Aid and mine clearance agencies found 20 bomblets in an impromptu play area made by the children at the camp.²¹ The Adi Bare Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp also reported unexploded cluster munitions to a British NGO working in the area.²²

In total, as many as two million landmines and other UXO may have been laid in Eritrea over the past 50 years, including mines left since WWII, as well as in both wars with Ethiopia.²³ The Mine Action Support Group carried out a field trip to Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 2002 to assess

⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 5.

¹⁰ Interview with Russum Semere, Director, Eritrea Mine Action Program, Asmara, 17 January 2002.

¹¹ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 29 April 2002.

¹⁵ Letter from Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, to Landmine Monitor, 23 July 2001; see also Ethiopia country report in *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*.

¹⁶ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 23 April 2002.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Landmine Action, "Explosive Remnants of War," March 2002, pp. 50-51.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52.

²¹ Richard Norton-Taylor, "UK Bomblets Surround Refugee Camp," *The Guardian*, 26 March 2002.

²² Email from Andrew Moore, Program Director, Mines Awareness Trust, Asmara, 18 April 2002.

²³ Interview with Russum Semere, Director, Eritrea Mine Action Program, Asmara, 19 January 2002.

the impact of mine action from a donor country perspective.²⁴ It was in Eritrea from 19-23 May, and reported the following: “The complexity of the landmine and UXO contamination of the Second World War, the conflict for independence (1961-1991) and the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000), confronts the MAP and EMAP [Eritrean Mine Action Program] with daily challenges. Currently there are 592 dangerous areas and 209 mined areas, totaling 660 km², after a technical survey possibly to be reduced to 330 km². Referring to the current humanitarian mine clearance capacity of 6.5 km², one can easily illustrate the enormous task ahead. The area cleared to date in Eritrea is 17 km².”²⁵

Mine Action Coordination

The Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) is an integral part of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). UNMEE MACC began coordinating operations in the Temporary Security Zone mission area in November 2000. In 2001, it began to assist in the development of the national Eritrean Mine Action Program (EMAP).²⁶ The EMAP is responsible for coordination, tasking, quality assurance, and the National Training Centre (NTC). Operations are the responsibility of mine action NGOs. A national NGO, the Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA) has 180 deminers in three demining teams with another four EDA demining teams being sponsored and managed by international NGOs.²⁷

The United Nations Development Program began implementing a capacity-building program to assist EMAP and the EDA develop management and support capacities to carry out their work.²⁸ The program has regularly scheduled coordination meetings with all concerned mine action organizations to facilitate operations. A working group for technical mine clearance issues also meets to discuss issues related to the mine threat and technical response found in the operating theater.²⁹

Mine Action Funding

For 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Investment Database lists \$7,607,475 in mine action contributions to Eritrea from nine donors;³⁰ in addition, the United Kingdom contributed \$783,577.³¹ The UN database includes (all in US\$): Canada, \$1,072,063; Denmark, \$2,199,000; European Commission, \$1,551,228; Finland, \$99,000; Germany, \$727,851; Netherlands, \$500,000; Norway, \$333,333; Switzerland, \$75,000; United States, \$1,050,000.

Denmark has reported to Landmine Monitor funding in 2001 for the Danish Demining Group totaling \$2.075 million for demining in Eritrea, and \$3 million to DanChurchAid for their mine action capacity building in Eritrea.³² In addition, upon Eritrea’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2001, the Netherlands pledged \$500,000 to the program for assistance in implementing the treaty, which was dedicated to the Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA) for the purchase of new demining equipment.³³ The Netherlands is also the principal funder of the HALO Trust mine action program in Eritrea.

²⁴ The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) is a group of 22 donor countries and the EU. The May 2002 field trip to Eritrea and Ethiopia was the first of its kind for MASG.

²⁵ Mine Action Support Group, “June Newsletter,” New York, 14 June 2002.

²⁶ UNMEE, “Mine Action in the Mission Area,” 7 December 2001, p. 1.

²⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

²⁸ Interview with Rita Mazzocchi, National Program Officer, UNDP, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

²⁹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

³⁰ UNMAS website (<http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/>), visited 2 July 2002.

³¹ *Hansard*, 29 March 2001, col. 723W, and 21 March 2002, col. 471W; Department for International Development, *Humanitarian mine action, second progress report* (London: DFID, September 2000).

³² Email from Dorte Brun, Political Officer, Embassy of Denmark, Asmara, 25 February 2002; Danish Demining Group, “Progress Report, Eritrea, April – December 2001.”

³³ Interview with Rita Mazzocchi, National Program Officer, UNDP, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

The European Community pledged €1.4 million (US\$1.26 million) for the UNDP mine action capacity building program (specifically for the Landmine Impact Survey in 2002). Canada donated Can\$750,000 for the remaining portion of the LIS. The U.S. Department of State has pledged \$1.23 million in humanitarian demining assistance for Eritrea for 2002.³⁴

The UNMEE MACC is partly funded by UNMAS through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF). Last year's budget was listed as approximately \$1 million³⁵ and funding for 2002 was expected to remain at a similar level.³⁶

The Halo Trust (HALO) core programme in Eritrea is funded by the Netherlands.³⁷ Switzerland funds a mine detection dog team and Ireland funds a "Chubby" route antivehicle threat reduction system.³⁸ Norway is funding a technical survey team and a "Meerkat" route reconnaissance vehicle fitted with a forward mounted antivehicle mine detector. HALO expects that the program to further expand in late 2002 when a project, funded by the European Community, starts to develop a HALO/Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA) manual team.³⁹

Survey and Assessment

The Eritrean government provided detailed minefield records to UNMEE MACC on 20 March 2001 for mines used during the 1998-2000 border war.⁴⁰ In April 2002, Ethiopia provided to UNMEE MACC details of minefields that they laid in Eritrea during the 1998-2000 conflict, including minefield locations and numbers and types of mines remaining in each minefield after their clearance operations, prior to their withdrawal.⁴¹

In early 2001 the government of Eritrea requested that the UNMAS facilitate a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) for Eritrea.⁴² The Survey Action Center (SAC) and UNMAS conducted an advance survey mission in June 2001. The outcome was the decision to conduct the survey with the government as the implementing agency in the field; the first time an international NGO was not the implementing agency. A follow-on mission by UNMAS in September 2001 produced a final project proposal, budget and preliminary operations plan. In January 2002, a UNDP senior technical advisor for the Capacity Building program arrived in Asmara. In March and April 2002, three additional UNDP technical advisors, including the Senior Technical Advisor for the survey, arrived to begin preparations for the LIS.⁴³

The LIS will include the entire Eritrean territory, inside and outside the TSZ, and is intended to help facilitate the EMAP in developing a long-term national mine action strategy. Work officially began in May 2002. The survey will be implemented by the Eritrean Mine Action Programme with the technical assistance of UNDP/Asmara, the Survey Action Center, and Cranfield University Mine Action.⁴⁴ Once the survey commences in full, it should take approximately 12 months to complete.⁴⁵ The UN reported in early July that the start of the LIS was being delayed due to a lack of trained staff.⁴⁶

³⁴ US Department of State, Fact Sheet, "The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

³⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 251.

³⁶ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

³⁷ The programme began December 2000 and the entire programme became fully operation in August 2001. Fax from Tim Porter, HALO, 29 July 2002.

³⁸ The Swiss-funded project became operational in June 2001 and the Chubby system on 1 July 2002. Fax to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Porter, Africa Desk Officer, the Halo Trust, 29 July 2002.

³⁹ Fax from Tim Porter, HALO, 29 July 2002.

⁴⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 252.

⁴¹ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 23 April 2002.

⁴² A Level One Survey, as carried out by HALO Trust and DDG in Eritrea, gives an overview of the danger area while a Landmine Impact Survey focuses on the impact of mines on communities rather than the minefield itself.

⁴³ Interview with Rita Mazzocchi, UNDP, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁴ Survey Action Center Website (www.sac-na.org), 27 June 2002.

⁴⁵ Email from SAC, 24 July 2002; interview with Rita Mazzocchi, UNDP, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁶ "Landmine Survey Hampered by Lack of Staff," *IRIN* (news service), Nairobi, 12 July 2002.

As part of a process that HALO describes as “building closer links with the EMAP,” HALO provided two LIS survey teams to undertake a rapid assessment survey both inside and outside the TSZ in 2001.⁴⁷ This survey, plus the minefield data provided, revealed a total of 403 known mined areas and 506 “dangerous areas” containing unexploded ordnance or mines, as of January 2002. However, there are many more dangerous areas yet to be discovered and recorded.⁴⁸ The information was stored in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at the UNMEE MACC. HALO is also training two technical survey teams to be used by the EMAP.⁴⁹

In June 2001, Danish Demining Group (DDG) also commenced general surveys, and as of January 2002, had completed 146 surveys in the Dehub region and 30 surveys in Gash Barka. All but 37 of the survey reports, which were held back because of limited sources of information in some villages or limited experience of the surveyors, were forwarded to UNMEE MACC.⁵⁰

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance activities expanded significantly in 2001 and 2002. The various agencies conducting mine clearance in the country include the Danish Demining Group, DanChurchAid (DCA), RONCO, the HALO Trust, EDA and UNMEE demining units.

Since November 2000, more than 1,865 mines have been destroyed, over 10 million square meters of land have been cleared, and 989 kilometers of roads have been cleared.⁵¹ In addition, more than 18,900 UXO have been destroyed.⁵² The UN reported that from 1 December 2001 to 28 February 2002, 2,133,369 square meters of minefields and battlefield areas were cleared in the TSZ. Demining units also cleared 163.6 kilometers of road and 675,718 square meters of operational sites.⁵³

By the end of 2001, some 400 Eritreans were trained as deminers at the national training center, using Dutch military instructors under the direction of the UNMEE MACC training officer.⁵⁴ The deminers were trained in basic demining, leadership, communications, and mapping. They have all been deployed in the field, working for various mine action NGOs.⁵⁵

The Eritrea Demining Agency reported that in 2001 it cleared of 2,448 UXO in the Gash Barka region, including cluster bomblets, mortars, RPGs, bullets, F-1 hand grenades, fuses, and other UXO listed as unknown.⁵⁶

In 2001, HALO’s project employed 470 national staff and four resident expatriates, operating ten clearance, four EOD, four mechanical, two survey, two marking and one mine detection dog

⁴⁷ These were funded by the Dutch government (US\$4 million), as well as ECHO and the U.S. Interview with Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January, 2002; interview with Rita Mazzocchi, UNDP, Asmara, 18 January 2002; fax from Tim Porter, HALO, 29 July 2002.

⁴⁸ UNMEE, “Mine Action in the Mission Area,” 7 December 2001, p.1.

⁴⁹ Fax from Tim Porter, HALO, 29 July 2002.

⁵⁰ Danish Demining Group, “Progress Report, Eritrea, April – December 2001.”

⁵¹ UNMEE, “Mine Action in the Mission Area,” 7 December 2001, p.1.

⁵² UNMEE MACC, “Progress Update on Agency’s Mine & UXO Clearance Activity,” 31 December 2001. The UN reported that just from 1 June to 31 August 2001, a total of 2,697,136 square meters was cleared in TSZ and 436,000 square meters of minefields were marked. During the same period MACC cleared 151 kilometers of road and 130,020 square meters of operational sites. UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,” S/2002/245, New York, 8 March 2002, pp. 4-5.

⁵³ UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,” S/2002/245, New York, 8 March 2002, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 8 February 2002.

⁵⁵ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

⁵⁶ EDA/DCA Annual Report, Zone Gash Barka, 31 December 2001.

(MDD) teams.⁵⁷ According to UNMEE MACC's Program Manager, HALO is the largest NGO working on mine action in Eritrea.⁵⁸

In 2001, HALO cleared and destroyed 1,641 antipersonnel mines, fifty antivehicle mines, and 1,209 items of UXO. HALO's manual mine clearance teams cleared 240,391 square meters of mine-affected land. HALO's mechanical teams cleared 29,836 square meters of land and area reduced 862,753 square meters, while its EOD battle area clearance teams cleared 4,783,207 square meters, and the mine detection dog (MDD) team cleared 50,473 square meters. The MDD team is deployed directly onto known mined areas to speed up the process of site area reduction.⁵⁹

In the first half of 2002 (until end June 2002), HALO cleared and destroyed 510 antipersonnel mines, 69 antivehicle mines, 248 items of UXO. The manual teams cleared 330,113 square meters, the mechanical teams cleared 6,485 square meters and reduced 1,704,717 square meters, the EOD teams cleared 1,765,400 square meters and the MDD team cleared 50,473 square meters.

DanChurchAid's program in Eritrea started in June 2001. As of June 2002, a total of 210,794 square meters of land had been cleared in manual operations; a total of 50,566 square meters of land had been mechanically cleared; and, a total of 9,527,525 square meters had been cleared through the "Danger Area Eliminated" process by EOD teams.⁶⁰ The DCA program has trained two manual demining teams, and its mine risk education teams started work in December 2001.⁶¹

DDG has four quick response teams and four demining sections. It had a Mechanical Mine Clearance Team run in collaboration with DCA until an accident with one of the flails in September 2001. In 2001, DDG also had an EDD capacity with dogs temporarily transferred from its Somaliland program. In 2001, DDG used mechanical flails to clear approximately 280,000 square meters in Gash Barka, creating a safe corridor through a large minefield system near the road leading from Shelalo. EDA and DCA are clearing other parts of this same minefield system. Repatriation into the six villages in the area has been delayed until final clearance.⁶²

DDG also used mechanical flails to clear approximately 68,000 square meters of land in Debub in 2001, between Senefe and the village of Tisha. By March 2002, it had cleared 9,935 mines and UXO; of these, about 200 were mines.⁶³ Of the approximately 348,000 square meters DDG cleared in Gash Barka and Debub via mechanical flailing during 2001, about 95,500 square meters were verified fully cleared by March 2002.⁶⁴

RONCO Consulting Corporation, located in Washington, DC, provided training, equipment and oversight to the Eritrean government under a contract through the U.S. Department of State. As of February 2002, over 120 EDA deminers under RONCO supervision were trained, equipped, and began clearing areas of the Temporary Security Zone. In partnership with the Marshall Legacy Foundation, 12 mine detection dogs and handlers trained by the Global Training Academy were also provided.⁶⁵

The deminers in the peacekeeping force continued to support operational requirements and in doing so cleared a considerable amount of land and roads. In addition force demining assets assisted humanitarian mine action NGO and other agencies by conducting six support activities for humanitarian demining requested through or by UNMEE MACC. Support was provided to UNICEF, HALO, EDA, and DCA with mechanical clearance/reduction equipment.⁶⁶

⁵⁷ This section on HALO is drawn from Fax to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Porter, Africa Desk Officer, the Halo Trust, 29 July 2002.

⁵⁸ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

⁵⁹ HALO is not using the dogs on large area reduction tasks where there is no direct evidence of mines.

⁶⁰ Email from Sam Christense, DanChurchAid, Denmark, 3 July 2002.

⁶¹ DCA-ACT/EDA Mine Action Program Eritrea, Progress Report, December 2001-April 2002.

⁶² Danish Demining Group, "Progress Report, Eritrea, April - December 2001."

⁶³ Interview with Erik Willadsen, Program Manager, Danish Demining Group, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

⁶⁴ Ibid.; Danish Demining Group, "Progress Report, Eritrea, April-December 2001," p.16.

⁶⁵ Telephone interview with Richard Stickels, Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Program, 14 February 2002.

⁶⁶ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

In an expansion of typical UNMEE activities, a Slovak company will be involved in demining support to the Ethiopia-Eritrea boundary commission demarcation process (resolving the final border dispute from the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia) that was scheduled to begin in April 2002. This represents a 'major increase in the UNMEE MACC mandate,' according to the program manager.⁶⁷ Although UNMEE peacekeeping mandate in its present form is expected to end by the end of 2002, its demining mandate in Eritrea will not be affected by any UNMEE withdrawal from Eritrea. The MACC will remain in Eritrea in order to assist in demining support for the UN border commission ruling, for capacity building, and for Mine Ban Treaty assistance.⁶⁸ In mid-April 2002, the UN said it expected demining for border demarcation to be completed by April 2003 "at the latest."⁶⁹

UNMEE MACC is planning to acquire advanced technology that will identify deeply buried mines using advanced ground-penetration radar.⁷⁰

To assist the EMAP to maintain the IMAS in Eritrea the UNMEE MACC established a Quality Assurance department within the MACC.⁷¹ This cell consists of a chief, two international field monitors, two national monitors as well as a one-man administrative support unit. The QA dept has been fully functioning for a year and now fields fully qualified national capacity. The QA dept conducts a variety of External Quality Inspections on the agencies to monitor progress with each agency being visited every two weeks on average. The QA dept also supplies technical advice to the UNMEE engineering force and will be part of the boundary demarcation mine clearance program. There are plans to develop the role the QA plays in the monitoring of the UNMEE force, which will be unique in that both military and humanitarian components will be inspected by the same agency.⁷²

Mine Risk Education

A UNICEF Mine Risk Education (MRE) coordinator arrived in February 2001 to work on developing a two-year MRE strategy for Eritrea to transition from emergency response to long-term community-based programming.⁷³ An EMAP Chief of Mine Risk Education was appointed in June 2001 to integrate mine risk education with other mine action activities and other humanitarian sectors.⁷⁴ EMAP and UNICEF established an inter-agency MRE Working Group to develop a comprehensive, integrated mine risk education program for Eritrea.

Key components for a long-term MRE strategy were identified, including: establishing a training programme and qualifying instructors at the Eritrean National Training Center (NTC); creating a certification process to accredit MRE trainers; conducting MRE presentations and distributing MRE materials to returning refugees in reception centers; and organizing MRE activities in IDP camps and host communities.⁷⁵ The Eritrean MRE program will be implemented from September 2001 to December 2003.⁷⁶ The total MACC/UNICEF MRE program budget for 2002 is US\$840,000.⁷⁷

MACC identified and trained two Eritreans to be master MRE instructors assigned to EMAP's National Training Center. MACC also employed a consultant to develop a series of workbooks and training packages in MRE, and to train and develop the master trainers in MRE at all levels and for all aspects of MRE in Eritrea. The training materials were completed in July 2002. Mine risk education field teams have been trained to use the IMSMA database and prepare

⁶⁷ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

⁶⁸ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 28 March 2002.

⁶⁹ UN IRIN report quoting Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 29 April 2002.

⁷⁰ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

⁷¹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Interview with Hannoeh Barlevi, Chief of Mine Risk Education, UNICEF, Asmara, 19 January 2002.

⁷⁴ UNMACC/UNICEF, "Mine Risk Education Strategy for Eritrea," 27 September 2001, p. 3.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9; interview with Hannoeh Barlevi, UNICEF, Asmara, 19 January 2002.

⁷⁶ UNMACC/UNICEF, "Mine Risk Education Strategy for Eritrea," 27 September 2001, p. 5.

⁷⁷ Email from Hannoeh Barlevi, UNMACC/UNICEF Chief of Mine Risk Education, 21 February 2002.

weekly reports on MRE activities and mine/UXO accidents and incidents, which are integrated with the IMSMA database.

The public information aspect of the emergency MRE program expanded throughout the country in 2001 and 2002. In April 2001, UNMEE radio started to broadcast mine awareness messages in several local languages and produced special 30-minute MRE features available on cassette, which are distributed to UN Military Observers to play to civilian populations in the TSZ. In November 2001, the Eritrean government began broadcasting various weekly and bi-weekly mine risk education programs in the nine main languages of the country, and the UNMEE MACC/UNICEF MRE coordinator planned a pilot roadside billboard program for mid-2002.⁷⁸

In early 2001, Danish Church Aid gave an MRE training course to 44 Eritrean employees of humanitarian agencies and mine clearance organizations including EDA, HALO Trust, World Food Program, MSF Holland, Save the Children UK, International Medical Corps, INTERSOS, Oxfam, and Sewit Children's Theatre. In addition to a multiplying effect as these agencies began to include MRE in their other programmed non-MRE activities in the communities, mine/UXO reports from the field have been generated. DCA's five MRE teams have also reached approximately 50,000 people through various activities.⁷⁹

In October 2001, the British organization Mines Awareness Trust (MAT) began a community-based MRE program in the high-risk Barentu and Adi Keyh regions of Gash-Barka, funded by UNMAS and the United Kingdom. Local staff was recruited, and through January 2002, some 122 community leaders and 16 school teachers were trained to give MRE presentations in more than 30 villages in Gash-Barka.⁸⁰ The MAT program also works with children who do not attend school because they work as herders, which often takes them into the most dangerous areas. Three members of MAT's staff are from the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN).⁸¹

In late 2001, the UNMEE MACC/UNICEF coordinator also began implementing a comprehensive MRE program for schoolteachers in the high-risk Gash Barka and Debub regions. Some 268 teachers, mostly in elementary and junior-level schools, received training that incorporated MRE instruction into the school programs. This was the first training course conducted by the newly trained master trainers from the National Training Center.⁸² Almost all teachers in all highly affected areas in Eritrea have received MRE training.⁸³

Throughout 2001, UNMEE provided mine risk education handouts, leaflets, posters, and stickers in several languages, which were widely distributed to people living in the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas. It is estimated that by the end of 2001, MRE activities reached over 57,221 Eritrean civilians, including more than 25,000 school children and 6,000 internally displaced persons.⁸⁴

In March 2002, UNMEE MACC began an MRE monitoring and follow-up system to help permanently ensure consistency and quality assurance at all levels and among the different agencies involved in MRE.⁸⁵ The UNICEF Mine Risk Education Coordinator, under the direction of UNMEE MACC, began implementing new levels of integration between MRE and overall mine action. As of March 2002 plans were underway for MACC area clearance verification to include an MRE element as part of the UNMEE MACC Quality Assurance (QA) process.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ Mine Risk Education/Technical Working Group Meeting, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 23 March 2002.

⁷⁹ Email from Sam Christense, DanChurchAid, Denmark, 3 July 2002.

⁸⁰ Mines Awareness Trust, "Monthly Report from 7 December 2001 to 7 January 2002," pp. 5-7.

⁸¹ Interview with Andrew Moore, Program Manager, Mines Awareness Trust, Asmara, 19 January 2002.

⁸² Email from Chamutal Eitam, MRE Instructor and NTC Training Coordinator, UNMACC, 4 April 2002.

⁸³ Interview with Chamutal Eitam, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

⁸⁴ UNMEE, "Mine Action in the Mission Area," 7 December 2002, p.1.

⁸⁵ Interview with Chamutal Eitam, UNMACC, Asmara, 27 March 2002; MRE TWG Meeting, UNMACC, Asmara, 23 March 2002.

⁸⁶ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 28 March 2002.

ICRC hired in March 2002 a mine risk education advisor to work with the Red Cross Society of Eritrea, as part of a capacity building program to establish long-term national MRE programs.⁸⁷

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, 154 new landmine/UXO casualties were reported in Eritrea. Fifty-three people were killed and 101 injured.⁸⁸ Data on casualties is collated by UNMEE who receive formal reports of incidents only from within the TSZ.⁸⁹ UNMEE MACC believes many incidents outside the TSZ are not reported.⁹⁰ A report to the UN Security Council in June 2001 stated that incidents were “currently being reported at the rate of about one per day within the Temporary Security Zone. The real figure, taking into account unreported accidents, may be significantly higher.”⁹¹ Of the total casualties, antipersonnel mines accounted for 30 percent, UXO 39 percent, antivehicle mines nine percent, and the device was unknown for 22 percent of casualties.⁹²

The large-scale return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons was underway by April 2001.⁹³ Despite demining and mine risk education efforts, there was a sudden rise in reported landmine incidents that corresponded with the start of the repatriation efforts. Two casualties were reported in March, 11 in April, 17 in May, 33 in June, 25 in July, and three in August.⁹⁴ Reported incidents decreased throughout the rest of 2001 after July. However, with tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs still waiting to return to their homes in mine-affected areas, the risk of landmine incidents remains high.⁹⁵

In 2001, most of the landmine incidents were reported in the Gash-Barka and Debub regions.⁹⁶ The UNMEE MACC attributes many of the incidents to deeply buried mines that “worked their way up to the surface due to climatic and geographical conditions.”⁹⁷ Many herders use mined areas for grazing, and some mined areas are used as pathways that connect villages or lead to water holes. It is “a fact of life that civilians are forced to use mined areas to carry out their daily activities.”⁹⁸ Reports to UNMEE MACC indicate one-third of the known activity conducted by the victims at the time of the incident involved tending animals.⁹⁹

In March 2001, a Canadian peacekeeper was injured after his vehicle set off a landmine.¹⁰⁰ On 18 August, eight Jordanian peacekeepers were injured after their vehicle hit a mine in the western sector.¹⁰¹ On 29 September, an operator was injured, and a mechanical flail demining machine partially destroyed, by an antivehicle mine during a Danish Demining Group (DDG) demining operation.¹⁰² On 4 October, one Ethiopian soldier was killed and six injured when their vehicle hit a mine in Sector West.¹⁰³

⁸⁷ Interview with Paul Conneally, Communication Delegate, ICRC, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

⁸⁸ UNMEE MACC IMSMA Database, “Casualty Report, December 2000 to December 2001.”

⁸⁹ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ “Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 19 June 2001.

⁹² UNMEE MACC IMSMA Database, “Casualty Report, December 2000 to December 2001.”

⁹³ Danish Demining Group, “Progress Report, Eritrea, April-December 2001.”

⁹⁴ UNMEE MACC IMSMA Database, “Casualty Report, December 2000 to December 2001.”

⁹⁵ Interview with Rita Mazzocchi, UNDP, Asmara, 18 January 2002; email from Jeffrey Shannon, Director, Eritrea Development Foundation, 10 January 2002; Danish Demining Group, “Progress Report, Eritrea, April-December 2001,” p. 8.

⁹⁶ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ MACC IMSMA Database, “Casualty Report,” December 2000 to December 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Steven Edwards, “Landmine blasts hit Canadians, forces ordered off road after second explosion,” *National Post*, 15 March 2001.

¹⁰¹ “Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,” New York, 5 September 2001.

¹⁰² Interview with Erik Willadsen, Program Manager, Danish Demining Group, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

¹⁰³ “Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 13 December 2001.

UNMEE MACC told Landmine Monitor that, at present, UXO represent a greater threat to the civilian population than antipersonnel mines.¹⁰⁴

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. On 22 January, four teenage boys were killed and three others were seriously injured by a mine near Senafe.¹⁰⁵ In February, two Eritrean deminers working for the Eritrean Demining Agency, including the section commander, were killed by a TM 57 antivehicle mine in the Shelalo region of the TSZ during a manual clearance operation.¹⁰⁶ On 22 March, an Eritrean driver for HALO Trust died after his vehicle ran over an antivehicle mine on the Maikokah-Tokmbia road near Barentu.¹⁰⁷

Survivor Assistance

There are few medical and rehabilitation facilities in Eritrea and the capacity for emergency and post-operative care is limited.¹⁰⁸ The Ministry of Health and the Department of Labor and Human Welfare oversee assistance programs for all persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. The Ministry of Health covers the cost of treatment and rehabilitation, if the mine survivor demonstrates economic hardship. Survivors must obtain a "poverty letter" from their local administrative district to qualify for free services.¹⁰⁹

According to the ICRC, the three Eritrean prosthetic/orthotic workshops are unable to meet the demand in the country.¹¹⁰ The ICRC provides orthopedic assistance in partnership with the Ministry of Labor and Human Development, which includes an ICRC Orthopedic specialist based in Keren, who helps in securing access to prosthetics. The ICRC also sponsors a physiotherapy program for Eritrean health professionals, which includes general war-trauma management programs. As of January 2002, over 20 physiotherapists graduated from the program and are now practicing in all zones across the country; another 18 Eritreans were enrolled in the 18-month program as of March 2002.¹¹¹ In January 2002, the ICRC sponsored a disabilities workshop, with the University of Asmara. More than 4,500 medical professionals, UN and NGO representatives, and government officials attended. The program included segments about mine victims, access to prosthetics, and national disability legislation. The ICRC, in partnership with the Ministry of Health, also sponsored a war surgery seminar in March 2002, for over 130 Eritrean trauma practitioners. Landmine victims were a major focus of the seminar.¹¹² In November 2001, the ICRC and Eritrean authorities signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a physical rehabilitation program for the disabled in the country.¹¹³

In 2001, the Landmine Survivors Network continued to provide outreach and ongoing peer support services to mine survivors, which includes home and hospital visits. The program links survivors with services including wheelchairs, crutches, and psychological and rehabilitative support. LSN also translated a pamphlet, "Surviving Limb Loss," into local languages. In 2001, field workers identified and assisted 181 persons with disabilities, including 83 mine survivors, all from the central (Asmara) region.¹¹⁴ In addition, LSN organized seven social events for landmine survivors and other amputees.¹¹⁵ LSN added an additional field outreach worker in 2001, bringing the total of its outreach staff to four - all of whom are landmine survivors.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

¹⁰⁵ UNMEE Press Briefing, Asmara, 24 January 2002; email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 8 February 2002.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Russom Semere, Director, Eritrean Mine Action Program, Asmara, 26 March 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 28 March 2002.

¹⁰⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 208-209.

¹⁰⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 254.

¹¹⁰ ICRC, "Eritrea - Overview of ICRC actions - 31 May 2002."

¹¹¹ Interview with Paul Conneally, Communications Delegate, ICRC, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 18.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Tedla Gebrehiwot, Program Director, Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) Eritrea, Asmara, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 15 March 2002.

¹¹⁵ Email from Tedla Gebrehiwot, Program Director, LSN Eritrea, Asmara, 22 March 2002.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Tedla Gebrehiwot, Program Director, LSN Eritrea, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

In regions outside of Asmara, including the heavily mined Gash-Barka region, landmine survivors rarely receive support beyond emergency medical care after the mine incident. Follow-up care in physical therapy, psychological support or prosthetic care is rare outside of Asmara. LSN began an assessment in mid 2001 to determine the greatest needs in these areas.¹¹⁷ As part of this assessment, a regional survey of ten hospitals in the border areas that contain some of the most heavily affected areas in Eritrea was carried out between July and November 2001. Some of the initial findings include:

- Keren, Barentu and Adi-Kieh hospitals reported admitting from three to 10 land mine incident casualties per month.
- Surgical operations are available for amputation cases in Keren, Adi-Kieh, Dekemhare, Mendefera, and Akudet hospitals.
- Teseney hospital provides surgery for amputation cases but lacks wheelchairs and crutches, and reports that most landmine survivors it treats are unable to get any prosthetic services.
- Senafe hospital remains under a tent since the building was destroyed during the 1998-2000 border conflict with Ethiopia.
- Community Based Rehabilitation programs for general disabilities, sponsored by the Ministry for Labor and Human Welfare, are available in Barentu, Teseney, Adi-Kieh, Teseney and Mendefera hospitals but these do not include specific hospital intervention for landmine survivors.
- The May Habar Hospital, in the Southern Zone, operates under the Disabled Ex-Fighters Association and provides services to about 500 disabled veterans, including landmine survivors. The hospital serves as a residence/care facility for many disabled veterans.¹¹⁸

The UNDP Capacity Building project includes the provision of a Victims Support Technical Advisor, including a vehicle and office equipment, to work in the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare to support the further development and strengthening of the national capacity to provide assistance to victims.¹¹⁹

Disability Policy and Practice

The long-awaited revised national disability policy has yet to be passed, although a draft has been prepared and is under discussion.¹²⁰ The UNDP national capacity building initiative will include working with the government in reviewing the draft law and will assist in its implementation.¹²¹ The ICRC is providing technical assistance in formulating and implementing the law.¹²² The aim of the new disability law is to bring Eritrea more in line with internationally accepted disability law standards while keeping in sight what is economically possible.

FIJI

Fiji signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 10 June 1998. It has not yet enacted domestic implementation legislation.¹ Fiji submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, a “nil” report, on 12 November 1999, but has not submitted any subsequent annual reports. Fiji cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ LSN Eritrea, “Hospital Research Survey Report,” January 2002, pp. 2-5.

¹¹⁹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC, 1 August 2002.

¹²⁰ Interview with Tedla Gebrehiwot, Program Director, LSN Eritrea, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

¹²¹ Interview with Rita Mazzocchi, National Program Officer, UNDP, Asmara, 18 January 2002.

¹²² Interview with Paul Conneally, Communications Delegate, ICRC, Asmara, 27 March 2002.

¹ It did not complete Form A (National implementation measures) of its Article 7 Report submitted 12 November 1999.

November 2001. Fiji is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, or used antipersonnel mines. It declared no stockpile of mines, including for training, in its Article 7 report.

FRANCE

Key developments since May 2001: France has continued its prominent role in addressing Mine Ban Treaty universalization and compliance issues. In September 2001, France became co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance. CNEMA has reported new concerns about certain French antivehicle mines that may function as antipersonnel mines. France provided about \$2.7 million for mine action programs in 2001, an increase from the previous year.

Mine Ban Policy

France signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and enacted national ban legislation on 8 July 1998. France formally ratified the treaty on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Since the completion of stockpile destruction in December 1999, France has concentrated on Mine Ban Treaty universalization and compliance initiatives.

France attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 with a delegation headed by Samuel le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action. France financed the printing of commemorative stamps by the Nicaraguan post office and travel for six delegates from Africa. At the meeting, France was chosen to become co-rapporteur of the intersessional Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration.

France actively participated in the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.¹ In 2001, France continued to make financial and diplomatic contributions to encourage participation by all countries in Standing Committee meetings and Meetings of State Parties. Ambassador de Beauvais said that France is pleased about the promotion of multilingualism by Canada and European countries.²

France submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2001 on 30 April 2002, including the voluntary Form J on which mine action funding and assistance was reported.

CNEMA

National legislation established the *Commission Nationale pour l'Élimination des Mines Anti-personnel* (CNEMA, the National Commission for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines) to ensure full implementation of the treaty, including assistance to mine action projects and mine victims in other countries.³ CNEMA's annual report for 2000 was presented to Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in December 2001.⁴

The report included calls for: follow-up to proposals made at the seminar in Bamako, Mali, in February 2001; active participation in treaty implementation, especially the operationalization of Mine Ban Treaty Article 8; the inclusion in bilateral defense and cooperation agreements of a clause encouraging mine eradication; the creation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a new humanitarian demining project within the Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire (FSP, Fund for Priority

¹ France was represented variously by Ambassador de Beauvais; Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle, and other members of the Permanent Mission to the Conference on Disarmament; Brigitte Stern, CNEMA; and members of the Ministry of Defense.

² Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

³ Article 9, Law No. 98-564, 8 July 1998; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 587-588.

⁴ "Rapport 2000," Commission nationale pour l'élimination des mines antipersonnel, (Paris: La Documentation française, 2001). For details of the 1999 report and recommendations, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 687. Exchange rate as in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*: US\$ = FF7.016, used throughout.

Solidarity), with two-year funding totaling FF20 million (\$2.85 million); increased support to multilateral organizations working on mine action and Landmine Monitor.⁵

CNEMA's mandate formally expired on 8 June 2002. At the CNEMA plenary assembly on 20 December, the executive secretary explained that the then-prime minister had decided to leave the responsibility for renewing the mandate to the next government. The Mine Action Ambassador confirmed that; in the interim, CNEMA's mandate continues.⁶

Compliance Initiatives

Brigitte Stern, the president of CNEMA, delivered a statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties regarding Article 8 and facilitation of compliance.⁷ She suggested that there was a need in the short term to make Article 8 more operational, and in the longer term to develop a better mechanism to facilitate compliance. She noted that various precedents exist for the latter, including environmental conventions, which focus on follow-up and support; she suggested that these approaches could be entrusted to a "study group" composed of international lawyers and field-based mine experts.⁸

France has focused on compliance measures at Standing Committee meetings. In a letter in March 2002, Ambassador de Beauvais expressed French willingness to continue to work with Canada on this issue:

This is an essential objective of our diplomacy ... particularly with regard to the challenge posed by the multiplication of alleged cases of violation... We intend to remain active on this issue ... to bring an important juridical contribution... In addition, our presence in the coordination committee since the Managua conference gives us an additional opportunity to foster and stimulate the dynamic launched in lead-up to the Fourth Meeting of States Parties and the first review conference... The French government wants to convince States Parties that pragmatic and concerted measures can be taken in order to assure effective compliance with the Treaty, without interfering with the text of the Treaty.⁹

Ambassador de Beauvais has said that France is unwilling to denounce publicly specific States that may have committed violations, noting, "Our objective aims at improving the Convention mechanism without pointing fingers at any particular State Party."¹⁰ At the same time, he has noted the importance of ICBL and Landmine Monitor identifying specific countries and instances of concern regarding compliance.

Universalization Initiatives

On 29 November 2001, France cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Ambassador de Beauvais stated that the French delegation actively participated in efforts to win over as many countries as possible.¹¹

⁵ Commission nationale pour l'élimination des mines antipersonnel, Rapport 2000, (Paris: La Documentation française, 2001), p. 51.

⁶ "Conclusions Summary no. 11," National Commission for the Elimination of Landmines, Plenary Assembly, 20 December 2001, and Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁷ Statement of Brigitte Stern to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; all translations in this report by the Landmine Monitor researcher.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

¹⁰ Minutes of the preparatory meeting of the Third Meeting of State Parties, presided by Ambassador de Beauvais, 10 September 2001.

¹¹ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

According to Ambassador de Beauvais, during 2001 “the French government has taken advantage of each occasion to encourage non-signatories to accede to the treaty, including within the EU, and to encourage signatories to ratify the treaty.... Non-signatories who have decided not to become States Party in the near future have been encouraged to rapidly take concrete legal and practical intermediate measures. This is notably the case in Afghanistan.”¹² He also observed that almost all sub-Saharan African countries are now party to the Mine Ban Treaty since the Pan-African Seminar on universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, co-organized by France and Canada in February 2001, in Bamako, Mali.

However, when Handicap International called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take a stand on massive new mine use in India and Pakistan, the Minister declined to take any concrete measures in relation to these two countries, while reaffirming the French contribution to universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in general terms.¹³

CCW

France is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and submitted its report in accordance with Article 13 of the protocol on 26 November 2001. This report details relevant legislation and mine action assistance given from 1992-2001. It outlines the directive of 12 November 1998 from the Army Chief of Staff, banning the use of antipersonnel mines and participation in joint operations which include mine use, including the planning of operations.¹⁴

France attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. France supported the formation of a Governmental Group of Experts to look at the issues of “explosive remnants of war” and antivehicle mines.¹⁵ France has also argued that the submunitions issue must be a priority for the CCW, as submunitions represent a particular danger for the civilian population.¹⁶

Production and Transfer

France was previously a major producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines; production ceased in 1995 and export ceased in 1993.¹⁷ The Ministry of Defense indicated in 2001 that no contract for licensed production of mines or mine components has been signed since 1975.¹⁸

Information on the decommissioning or conversion of the former production facilities of Giat Industries has not been included in France’s Article 7 Reports, including the report submitted on 30 April 2002.¹⁹

In April 2001, seven machines (“enfouisseur de mines,” type Matenin PM 10) for emplacing antivehicle mines were offered for sale at a closed auction, with more proposed for sale on 11 July.²⁰ CNEMA questioned the Ministry of Defense, which replied that the machines are exclusively for burying antivehicle mines and “are technically unusable for the use of antipersonnel mines and are conceived for burying at a depth that is not adapted to antipersonnel mines.”²¹

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Letter from HI to Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2002, and response from Hubert Vedrine, to HI, 25 March 2002.

¹⁴ Amended Protocol II, Article 13 report, 26 November 2001, Forms A, D, E.

¹⁵ Letter to Handicap International from Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, 17 December 2001; letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

¹⁶ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

¹⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 590-598.

¹⁸ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 12 February 2001.

¹⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 636, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 690.

²⁰ Bulletin Officiel d’Annonces des Domaines, Ventes du 16/04/2001 au 30/04/2001, p. 41; Bulletin Officiel d’Annonces des Domaines, Ventes du 1/07/2001 au 31/07/2001, p. 97.

²¹ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Destruction of the French antipersonnel mine stockpile was completed on 20 December 1999, with 1,098,281 mines destroyed from 1996 to 1999.²² In March 2002, France's Ambassador for Mine Action confirmed that France has no Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines in its stockpile.²³

A total of 4,514 mines were initially retained for training or development purposes, as permitted by Mine Ban Treaty Article 3. In 2000, the number of antipersonnel mines retained ranged from 4,361 to 4,539. On 1 January 2001, the number retained was 4,526. On 1 January 2002, it was 4,479, indicating 47 mines were consumed during the year.²⁴ The specific purposes for which the mines are used has not been stated in any of France's Article 7 Reports. Ambassador de Beauvais noted that the mines "were destroyed in accordance with the provisions governing training and testing of equipment."²⁵

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices

The ICBL has expressed concern about certain antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices that may function as antipersonnel mines or explode from an unintentional act of a person. The ICBL and many State Parties have said such mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. France and only four other State Parties have publicly taken a contrary view. At the Standing Committee meeting in May 2002, France expressed its support for a statement by the United Kingdom that the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty does not extend to antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that may be activated by the unintentional act of a person.²⁶

Landmine Monitor has, in the past, identified three French mines of concern: HPD F2, MIACAH F1, and MI AC Disp F1.²⁷ The CNEMA report for 2000, presented in December 2001, provides information on these mines, as well as three others: HPD F3, MIACAH F2, and ACPR F1.²⁸ From information obtained in interviews with members of the Army and Giat Industries, CNEMA has identified these six types as French antivehicle mines that may function as antipersonnel mines.²⁹

The CNEMA report gave extensive details on these mines, which Landmine Monitor cannot reproduce due to space considerations, but summaries of the findings follow.

CNEMA reports that the two HPD mines, which explode from changes in the magnetic field, are so sensitive that doubts remain about possible activation by the unintentional presence of a person. CNEMA recommends that this be tested. Additional concerns are raised by information contained in the French military engineering manual *Gen 150 Edition 2000*. Regarding the HPD F2 it states:

After laying: from 10 minutes up to 30 full days, the mine cannot be lifted. The electromagnetic mine detector disturbs the mine and can activate it. It is therefore *dangerous* and *prohibited* to try to locate HPD F2 mines with a detector, during the period of activity. The movement of metal items (spades, picks, vehicles...) is detected

²² Article 7 report, 3 May 2000, Form F.

²³ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

²⁴ Article 7 report, Form D, 3 May 2000, and Letters from Ambassador de Beauvais, 12 February 2001 and 27 March 2002.

²⁵ "Les mines retirées du stock ont été détruites conformément aux textes en vigueur pour des opérations d'entraînement ou d'évaluation de matériel."

²⁶ The French delegate said that France had "nothing to add to the UK statement, nor to take away." Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 31 May 2002. For UK remarks, see report on the United Kingdom in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

²⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 636-638, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.691.

²⁸ Commission nationale pour l'élimination des mines antipersonnel, Rapport 2000 (Paris, La Documentation française), pp. 15-23.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

and can, in some cases, activate the mine. Beyond 2 meters, there is no risk of explosion.³⁰

Nearly identical language is used regarding the HPD F3.³¹ Amended Protocol II to the CCW, to which France is a party, prohibits the use of “mines, booby-traps or other devices which employ a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.”³²

The M1 AC Disp F1 also explodes as a result of variations of the magnetic field. Giat, the manufacturer, states that the activation system has been reinforced, so that the mine is insensitive to light variations in the magnetic field. Giat noted that this mine is in theory insensitive to a human’s presence, except if the mine is shaken (“agitee”).³³ Despite Giat assurances about the reinforced activation system, CNEMA is concerned about this mine’s potential antipersonnel characteristics and recommends testing.

The MIACAH F1 and F2 are activated by breaking a very thin, almost invisible wire, placed across a road or path. CNEMA reports that the diameter of the wire is such that a child can break it. The Ministry of Defense agreed, stating, “This mine explodes because of the snapping of a wire (an integral part of the mine) which can be caused by a non-intentional contact with a person. In order to find a solution, the Army General Staff initiated a study, the aim of which is to replace the activation system by a mechanism which can discriminate between people and vehicles. New equipment has already been presented to relevant departments.”³⁴ CNEMA will track these changes to ensure that both mines are taken unambiguously out of the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty.³⁵

The ACPR F1 mine has an auxiliary fuze well for a traction fuze (tripwire), which may allow unintentional activation by a person. The CNEMA regarded this mine as outside the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty, but was concerned about the need for physical modification to prevent use with a tripwire.

The French position on antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes was reaffirmed during the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001. The Mine Action Ambassador stated that “this subject belongs within the CCW... Our concern is that this debate must not hinder the main task of the Ottawa Process, which is the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Anti-vehicle mines are very important for some of the countries we want to join the Treaty. Thus I’m calling for serious reflection and not to go too fast to conclusions.”³⁶ France is studying ways to deal with this issue within the CCW, reinforcing the technical requirements for antivehicle mines.³⁷

When asked about reported stockpiling of the AT2 S3 sensor, Ambassador de Beauvais said this information was from a source dealing with in-development products or with non-final commercial agreements. He said the AT2 is a “mine head” (“tête à mine”) developed by Germany for version 2 of a multiple rocket launcher. France has bought the first version of the launcher, which uses a grenade warhead, and not a mine warhead.³⁸

³⁰ GEN 150 Edition 2000, section III, p. 19, original emphasis.

³¹ GEN 150 Edition 2000, section III, p. 22.

³² CCW, Amended Protocol II, Article 3(5).

³³ Commission nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, Rapport 2000 (Paris, La Documentation française), p. 20.

³⁴ Response from the Ministry of Defense, quoted in Commission nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, Rapport 2000 (Paris, La Documentation française), p. 17.

³⁵ Commission nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, Rapport 2000 (Paris, La Documentation française), p. 17.

³⁶ Statement of the French Delegation to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

³⁷ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Use

In December 2001, the Ministry of Defense sent to Handicap International the Army Chief of Staff directive of 12 November 1998. The directive forbids all French soldiers, without exception:

- To use antipersonnel mines during operations and to participate in planning the use of AP mines during military operations;
- To participate in all training activities involving the use of real AP mines;
- To develop a doctrine that promotes use of AP mines or to participate in tactical training which aims at validating such a doctrine;
- To give consent to a document that considers the use of AP mines, whether on French territory or on any other territory;
- To accept rules of engagement in an operation that is planning use of AP mines;
- To take under control a zone where AP mines have been placed by an allied nation if that nation has not made a minefield report before arrival of the French forces;
- To transfer, stockpile, or authorize AP mines on national territory, whether the operation is in the NATO framework or not.

Although French soldiers may participate in a multinational operation with a State that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, they must not at any time be put in any of the above situations.³⁹

Mine Problem

Regarding the suspected mined area in the military storage area of La Doudah, Djibouti, France's Ambassador for Mine Action stated in March 2002 that this was cleared in 1989, but acknowledged, "It is not impossible that some mines, still missing, are still in the area, following land slippage."⁴⁰ The Article 7 Report submitted on 30 April 2002 repeats previous statements that some of the mines may not yet have been located.⁴¹

The Article 7 Report also states, "Some possible mined areas stemming from world conflicts 1914-18 and 1939-45, could remain on French territory, are not considered in this report."⁴²

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

In addition to mine action policy described in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, the French government considers that its funding policy is part of its efforts to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty via eligibility conditions for the distribution of its bilateral assistance: "Our policy regarding assistance is a European Union one, and favors States Parties and signatories. Each situation of humanitarian emergency is reviewed case by case, and aid is exceptionally granted when the state is indicating its commitment to put into practice the Ottawa Convention principles and objectives."⁴³

The government reports that in 2001 its contribution to mine action programs was about €3 million (\$2,694,000), not including research and development funding and the mandatory national contribution to European Union mine action.⁴⁴ It includes the total of two-year (2000 and 2001) funding for projects in Cambodia and Mozambique. Comparisons with previous funding are also complicated because the reported figure for 2000 (\$1,170,000 after deducting the EU contribution) included half of the project-funding for Cambodia and Mozambique.

³⁹ Letter to HI from Alain Richard, Ministry of Defense, 17 December 2001.

⁴⁰ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁴¹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2002.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Exchange rate at 29 April: US\$1 = €0.898, used throughout.

Bilateral Funding of Mine Action Programs in 2001⁴⁵

Country	Amount in € (US\$)	Beneficiary	Allocation
Mozambique	(2000-2001) 762,245 (\$684,496)	HI	Mine Clearance
Guinea-Bissau	213,428 (\$191,658)	HI	Mine Awareness
Cambodia	(2000-2001) 807,980 (\$725,566) 121,959 (\$109,519) 106,714 (\$95,829)	UNDP TF HI HI	Mine Clearance Mine Clearance Victim assistance

Other Funding in 2001⁴⁶

Country	Amount in € (US\$)	Beneficiary	Allocation
France	60,980 (\$54,760)	HI	Advocacy
	60,980 (\$54,760)	LM	Release of 2001 annual report
	(5,550)	ICBL	Third Meeting of States Parties
Africa	106,957 (\$96,047) 2,939 (\$2,639) 259,163 (\$232,728)		Co-funding of Bamako Seminar Preparatory mission; Follow-up: creation of a demining training center
Nicaragua	3,811 (\$3,422)	Nicaraguan Post Office	Printing of commemorative stamps
Africa	35,162 (\$31,575)		Funding of six African delegates participation to the 3MSP
Kosovo	76,225 (\$68,450)	ITF	Mine clearance
Cambodia	76,225 (\$68,450)	CMAC	Mine clearance program evaluation
Cambodia	55,536 (\$49,871)	ESAG Angers	Training of 10 military officers
Nicaragua	6,098 (\$5,476)	ESAG Angers	Training of two military officers

Since 2000, €2,105,963 (\$1,891,154), or 66 percent, of the original allocation of FF20 million (\$2.85 million) to the Fund for Aid for Cooperation (FAC), has been spent.⁴⁷ The name of the FAC has been changed to the Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire (FSP, Fund for Priority Solidarity).

In 2001, most of this expenditure was dedicated to mine clearance and demining training (around €1.6 million), and €0.5 million to victim assistance and mine awareness. Ambassador de Beauvais said that more attention will be paid to victim assistance in the next two-year FSP project. He also indicated that eligibility conditions will be more flexible, so that more countries can benefit. Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated that most of the FAC/FSP funds were already engaged at the beginning of 2002 and that a new two-year project would be created for 2002-2004.⁴⁸ In March 2002 Ambassador de Beauvais explained that the new FSP project will start at the beginning of 2003, with funding of €3,048,980 (\$2,737,984).⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002. The funding for Mozambique was previously stated as for 2000-2001, but none of the funds appear to have been spent in 2000 and are shown again in the total for 2001. Abbreviations: HI – Handicap International; UNDP TF – United Nations Development Program Trust Fund; ITF – International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance; CMAC – Cambodia Mine Action Center; ESAG – Ecole Supérieure et d'Application du Génie d'Angers.

⁴⁶ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Letter from Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister to Deputy Georges Colombier, 5 June 2001.

⁴⁹ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002; this funding had been proposed, but not voted on as of 27 June 2002.

Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated in December 2001 that South-east European countries and Nicaragua will have priority in demining funding.⁵⁰ Because 98 percent of credits allocated to humanitarian demining via the Title IV budget line in 2001 (€228,673, \$205,348) have been used, credits allocated in 2001 will double in 2002, reaching €457,347 (\$410,697). In the Balkans, a particular effort will be made regarding Croatia in 2002, including funding of €78,000 for demining archeological sites in Vucedol commune in Vukovar district.⁵¹

France also prioritizes support for NGOs actively involved in mine action. Its favored partner is Handicap International. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Trust Fund also receive French support. In 2001, Handicap International received governmental funding of €60,980 (\$54,760) for its advocacy activities, and the same amount was given for the release of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.⁵²

Non-financial assistance to mine action has also been provided on a substantial scale. French military personnel have been engaged in demining operations as part of their duties during 2001 in Croatia under WEUDAM (Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission) auspices (one person, 1999-2001), in Kosovo under KFOR auspices (113 people, 1999-2001), Benin (three people, 2000-2001), Namibia (two people, 2001), and Zambia (two people, 2001).⁵³

Training in mine clearance has been provided to both military or civilian personnel, including from, Benin, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. This is mainly done at the engineering school in Angers, which contains the Minex Center and the new National Center For Humanitarian Demining Training created in May 2001.⁵⁴ The new Center provides training in accordance with international standards, and an agreement has been made with Lebanon for a five-year program to train Demining instructors. Twenty trainees per year will receive training, with one session in Angers and a training period in Lebanon.⁵⁵

Following on to the February 2001 regional landmine conference co-hosted by France in Bamako, Mali, the proposed regional military demining training center at Ouida, Benin, will open in the second half of 2002. In July 2001, an agreement was signed between Benin and France for the construction of the building, and construction started in 2002. During the first year, training will be carried out under French direction by French managers and Benin officers. The center will host a first group of 30 military trainees and 6 instructors.⁵⁶

Because of difficulties caused by the presence of mines near the Angolan border, Namibia and Zambia asked France for assistance. A team from the Angers engineering school visited the area on 27 October-7 November 2001, in order to assess the need for demining training. In March 2002, the possibility was being considered of training about 15 Zambian officers, joined by Namibian officers, to staff the demining unit, which the government in Lusaka is willing to set up.⁵⁷

Research and Development (R&D)

France continues to devote significant funds to R&D in mine clearance technologies. In 2001, France dedicated €14,914,000 (\$13,393,000) to R&D programs on “contreminage,” including €1,093,000 for research into detection of mines, €821,000 for neutralization, and

⁵⁰ Letter from Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Xavier Darcos, Deputy, 3 December 2001.

⁵¹ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, 26 November 2001, Form E. Abbreviations: WEUDAM – Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission, KFOR – Kosovo Protection Force.

⁵⁴ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002. Note on the National Center of Humanitarian Demining, presented during the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, in Managua, Nicaragua.

⁵⁵ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁵⁶ Ibid.; for details of the Bamako seminar and recommendations made, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 689.

⁵⁷ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

€13,000,000 for demining systems.⁵⁸ Handicap International is concerned that funds dedicated to R&D are five times higher than funds dedicated to mine action programs.

The CNEMA pointed out in 1999 that these projects appear to have military rather than humanitarian demining applications. Addressing this issue, Ambassador de Beauvais explained that the Délégation Générale pour l'Armement (DGA, General Delegation For Armaments) is participating in relevant civil projects. The Technical Establishment of Bourges is involved in the International Test and Evaluation Program, and DGA representatives participate in seminars on humanitarian demining organized by the European Commission.⁵⁹

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

On 2 April 2001, a French soldier serving with SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was killed by a landmine explosion near the southwestern town of Prozor, during a reconnaissance operation.⁶⁰

The Minister of Defense informed HI that demining work has caused nine deaths and tens of injuries to French soldiers in the last ten years.⁶¹ However, the Mine Action Ambassador said the Army's epidemiological data does not separate out injuries or deaths caused by landmines. This data should be available later. He added the relevant military departments had no record of any deaths or injuries to French military personnel as a result of landmines or unexploded ordnance in 2001.⁶²

As co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration, France stated at the meeting on 28 January 2002, "We have to take field realities into account, without dogmatism, and to accept the particularity of each situation.... If such an approach can be extended in a more or less near future, our Standing Committee will despite everything keep a major role within the international demining community, as a nerve center for information and as a place dedicated to the sharing of methodologies, programs and available funds. It's not up to it to initiate national projects, but it has its own responsibility for their working out and their effective execution."⁶³

As to concrete measures that the government will take to promote this bottom-up approach, Ambassador de Beauvais said, "In order to be efficient, efforts must promote exchange of information and confrontation of methods at the international level, while the field approach advocated by Handicap International, which is pragmatic and concerned about local realities, must be favored."⁶⁴

NGO Activities

In 2001, Handicap International continued its work to gain greater recognition of the rights of mine victims and to encourage universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. On 1 March 2001, the anniversary of the treaty's entry into force, HI launched a campaign to gain the United States' accession. The *Shoe for Bush* campaign asks French citizens to send a shoe to President Bush, either a real shoe by post-mail or a virtual one by email. In September 2001, HI organized the seventh shoe pyramid in 30 cities across France, and called on all non-signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty to join the mine ban process as soon as possible.

HI also pursued its campaign for increased funding of mine action and increased diplomatic effort to gain universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Letters were sent to all parliamentarians and to the government on 1 March 2001 and on several other occasions, including the presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2002.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ "Mine Blast Kills French Soldier," *The Independent* (British daily newspaper), 5 April 2001.

⁶¹ Letter to HI from Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, 17 December 2001.

⁶² Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

⁶³ Statement by Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, SC on Victim Assistance, 18 January 2002.

⁶⁴ Letter from Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Ambassador for Mine Action, 27 March 2002.

HI has launched an initiative of regional networking among actors involved in victim assistance in four countries in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. This process started with a series of national workshops, followed by a regional conference organized in Thailand in November 2001, bringing together representatives from all areas of civil society and government. The workshops and conference were the opportunity for technical actors in each area of victim assistance to exchange views and information and learn from each others' experience.

In December 2001, HI released the second edition of its report on victim assistance, "Landmine Victim Assistance: World Report 2001," which gives information on the number of reported casualties, describes services offered and legal structures existing in the countries concerned by the problem of landmines.

From 17-19 April 2002, 90 researchers from 75 countries met in Paris to discuss their finalized country reports prepared for the ICBL's *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*. The National Commission for the Elimination of Anti-Personnel Mines hosted the meeting, working in close cooperation with the ICBL. Several pro-ban governments participated in the meeting and Paris-based diplomats from over 30 countries attended the opening plenary, which featured remarks by France's Minister of Development Cooperation, Charles Josslin, and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams, 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate.

GABON

Gabon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 8 September 2000, and became a State Party on 1 March 2001. At the May 2001 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Gabon distributed a document labeled as Article 7 Report, Form A (National Implementation Measures). It indicated that a national authority charged with implementing the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty is being established.¹

However, Gabon is not known to have taken any domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Its first Article 7 transparency report due on 28 August 2001 has not yet been submitted to the United Nations. An official at the Permanent Mission of Gabon at the UN in New York said the delay is because Gabon is not a mine-affected country, therefore writing the Article 7 Report did not merit serious attention. He promised to take necessary action for Gabon to fulfill its treaty obligations.²

Gabon did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001. It did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. Gabon cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Gabon has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.³ In January 2001, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that Gabon has a small quantity of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.⁴ A Gabon official told a regional landmine conference in Bamako, Mali, in February 2001 that Gabon has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines.⁵ The May 2001 document states that Gabon does not possess antipersonnel mines.⁶

Gabon is not mine-affected and there have been no reports of mine casualties.

¹ Landmine Monitor has a copy of this one-page document, which has the signature of Jean Ping, Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is dated 3 May 2001.

² Telephone interview with Alfred Mougara Moussotsi, First Counselor in Charge of Small Arms at the Permanent Mission of Gabon to the United Nations, New York, 21 February 2002.

³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 75.

⁴ Interview with Willfried Otchanga, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libreville, 26 January 2001.

⁵ Oral remarks during the Article 7 workshop at the Bamako Seminar, 16 February 2001. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor/HRW.

⁶ It states, "Le Gabon ne possède pas de mine antipersonnel."

GERMANY

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, Germany provided about €13.7 million (\$12.3 million) in mine action funding. For 2002, it has budgeted more than €17 million (\$15.3 million) for mine action. Germany has clarified its positions on joint military operations with non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty, and on US stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines in Germany. Initiatives and actions regarding a ban or restrictions on antivehicle mines are increasing.

Mine Ban Policy

The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation legislation was previously enacted on 9 July 1998. Germany was an early supporter of a ban on antipersonnel mines, adopting an export moratorium in 1994, banning use of antipersonnel mines in 1996, and completing stockpile destruction in December 1997.¹

Germany attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. At the meeting, Germany was named co-chair of the intersessional Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies. During discussion of whether Article 2 of the treaty defines antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices as antipersonnel mines, the German delegation supported concerns expressed by France about the possible negative effect on universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty of such an interpretation. According to the delegation, the treaty bans one type of weapon, and doubt should not be cast on its scope.²

Germany participated actively in the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. In May 2002, the delegation presented Germany's interpretation of Article 1 of the treaty with respect to the obligations on States Parties engaged in joint military operations with non-States Parties:

Germany is very mindful of her obligations under the Ottawa Treaty. Therefore, Germany, as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention will not support planning or use of antipersonnel mines in a joint operation. Germany prohibits the planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by her military personnel. With this in mind, all German Armed Forces personnel receive detailed information outlining their obligations with respect to the Convention.³

Previously, on 8 January 2002, the Ministry of Defense had informed the German Initiative to Ban Landmines (GIBL) that there is no evidence that the United States has used antipersonnel mines during the military operations in Afghanistan, and confirmed that the Federal Armed Forces would in all military operations act in compliance with the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ On 18 April 2002, Jürgen Chrobog, State Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, speaking to the European Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Berlin, said, "The standards which we have set for ourselves should not be undermined—not even when we are facing murderous threats like terrorism."⁵

¹ For details, see the full version of the 1999 German report, available at: www.landmine.de.

² Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

³ Statement on Article 1 by Germany to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 27 May 2002.

⁴ Letter from the Ministry of Defense to the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, 8 January 2002.

⁵ Speech of Jürgen Chrobog, State Secretary of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at the Sixth Regional Conference of the European Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Berlin, 18 April 2002. Translated by Landmine Monitor researcher. Original text: "Die Wertmaßstäbe, die wir uns selbst gesetzt haben, dürfen in Krisenzeiten - auch nicht angesichts einer mörderischen Bedrohung wie der des Terrorismus - aufgeweicht werden." (original emphasis).

With regard to the stockpiling or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines in Germany, the delegation to the May 2002 Standing Committees noted:

Another question that has been raised with respect to Art. 1 concerns the issue of stockpiling and transit of foreign antipersonnel mines. The relevant provisions of the German War Weapons Control Act clearly stipulate that it is prohibited to manufacture, acquire, import, export or transfer anti-personnel mines.... Failure to comply with this regulation is punishable by long terms of imprisonment. Germany therefore is not of the opinion that transit of anti-personnel mines is permitted under the Ottawa Treaty except under the provisions of Art. 3.... However, Germany considers the Ottawa Treaty - *per se* - not applicable to allied forces, which in accordance with the 1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany are permanently stationed in Germany, unless a sending state itself is party to the Treaty. Therefore any weaponry of allied stationed forces covered by this Convention is not under German jurisdiction or control within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Ottawa Treaty. Therefore, Germany will not comment on transit or storage of weaponry belonging to and for the equipment of such allied stationed forces nor will she report on stockpiles of Non-Signatories on her territory. Germany has, nevertheless, fully complied with her obligations in respect to stocks that were under her jurisdiction and control.⁶

The German delegation also described the four-year deadline for completion of stockpile destruction by States Parties under Article 4 as a very important “test case” in the implementation of the treaty. It remarked that any States Parties expecting difficulties in meeting the deadline would be well advised to join the informal contact group on stockpile destruction, and that Germany was willing to offer assistance.⁷

The transparency report for the calendar year 2001 as required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty was submitted on 16 April 2002. It includes the voluntary Form J, on which is noted three victim assistance projects supported by Germany in 2001. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 31 August 1999, 30 April 2000, and 30 April 2001.⁸

On 29 November 2001, Germany cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Germany is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. It submitted the annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II on 15 October 2001.⁹ Germany attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. The delegation co-sponsored a proposal by Denmark and the US to prohibit use of non-detectable antivehicle mines and remotely delivered antivehicle mines without self-destruct/neutralization and self-deactivation mechanisms. Germany welcomed the establishment of an expert group to consider the possibility of amending the CCW to deal with explosive remnants of war and mines other than antipersonnel

⁶ Statement on Article 1 by Germany to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 27 May 2002.

⁷ Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 31 August 1999 for the period 1 March-27 August 1999; submitted on 30 April 2000 for calendar year 1999; submitted on 30 April 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 16 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, submitted on 15 October 2001. This summarizes practical assistance to mine action programs worldwide, gives details of German mine action funding in 2000, and lists German companies involved in humanitarian demining.

mines.¹⁰ In May 2002, Germany produced the draft European Union “Food-for-Thought Paper on Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines.”¹¹

The established German policy that any developments on the antipersonnel mine issue in the Conference on Disarmament must not “fall behind the achievements of the Ottawa Convention” was confirmed in February 2002.¹²

Antivehicle Mine Ban Parliamentary Appeals

Since starting its campaign in 2001 to ban *all* landmines, the GIBL reports success in gaining popular support and media attention. In 2002, two parliamentary appeals were made by political parties to ban certain types of antivehicle mines.

In the first appeal, on 20 March 2002, the opposition parties CDU and FDP called for a ban on all landmines which are not detectable and which do not self-destruct. According to the appeal document, the ban would include the DM-21 antivehicle mine held by the German Army. The appeal also called for further consultation within the CCW process with the aim of banning antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes that can be detonated by the unintentional act of a person.¹³

In a second appeal, on 24 April 2000, the government parties SPD and the Green Party called for a national step-by-step approach banning all antivehicle mines that can pose a threat to civilians.¹⁴ With respect to the CCW process, the parties call for the banning of mines which are not detectable and which do not self-destruct, and antivehicle mines that can be detonated by an unintentional act. The parties asked the government to strengthen the Ottawa Process by including all sensitive antivehicle mines that can be detonated by a person, and to undertake this initiative in preparation for the Review Conference to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004.¹⁵

During discussion in the Committee for Foreign Affairs this appeal was amended to call on the government to work with the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to establish the understanding that antivehicle mines which can be detonated by persons due to the design of their fuzing system are banned by the treaty. The original appeal did not include the phrase “due to the design.” The defense spokesperson for the Green Party complained that the Ministry of Defense had attempted to break up political compromises and consensus.¹⁶

On 13 June 2002, in the second reading in the parliamentary plenary, the appeal of the opposition parties (CDU and FDP) was rejected and the updated appeal of the governmental parties (SPD and the Green Party) was adopted by the governmental parties and the socialist opposition party PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), with the abstention of the CDU and FDP.¹⁷

¹⁰ “Die internationale Antwort auf das Landminenproblem: Das Ottawa Übereinkommen, Stand: April 2002,” (“The international response to the landmine problem. The Ottawa Convention, Update: April 2002”), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausssenpolitik/friedenspolitik/.

¹¹ European Union, Draft EU Food-for-Thought Paper on Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines, dated 25 April 2002 (UN doc. CCW/GGE/WP.1).

¹² “Conference on Disarmament pays tribute to its secretary-General Vladimir Petrovsky who is retiring. Four Countries Recall Importance of Ottawa Convention After it Entered into Force,” Press Release, United Nations Office, Geneva, 28 February 2002, available at: www.unog.ch/new2/documents/nesen/dc0208e.htm.

¹³ Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament) Document 14/8654, Joint Appeal by the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and FDP (Free Democratic Party), 20 March 2002.

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament) Document 14/8858, 24 April 2002, Joint appeal by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, 24 April 2002.

¹⁵ Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Document 14/8858 (Social Democratic Party/Green Party), in: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/9438 [German Parliament, document 14/9438], 12 June 2002.

¹⁶ “Beer wirft Verteidigungsministerium Blockade vor” (“Beer blames the Ministry of Defense for blocking”), *Berliner Zeitung* (daily newspaper), 14 June 2002.

¹⁷ Plenarprotokoll des Deutschen Bundestages; 242. Sitzung [Plenary Protocol of the German Parliament; 242. Session], 13 June 2002.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Stockpile destruction was completed in December 1997.¹⁸ Additionally, in June 2001 the Ministry of Defense confirmed that the DM-39 (variously described as an anti-lift device or explosive charge, used to protect antivehicle mines) is no longer in the inventory of the Federal Armed Forces.¹⁹

Germany's April 2002 Article 7 Report records the transfer for destruction, and actual destruction, of 78,144 mines in 2001. These include: 2,834 M58 mines (transferred to EBV GmbH in Vogelgesang, destruction completed on 3 June 2001); 38,959 M18A1 mines (transferred to Spreewerk Lübben, "destruction completed"); and 36,351 M74 mines (transferred to Spreewerk Lübben, "destruction completed").²⁰

The German Article 7 Report does not identify the origin of these mines.²¹ However, Denmark has reported transferring the M58 mines to Germany for the purpose of destruction as part of its program to reduce the quantity of mines it retains under Article 3 of the treaty.²² The M18A1 and M74 mines are known to be in US stockpiles, so it is possible that they have been transferred from US stockpiles in Germany or elsewhere.²³ Italy has also reported transferring antipersonnel mines to Germany for the purposes of destruction, without identifying the type.²⁴

Mines Retained Under Article 3

Germany reported retaining a total of 2,574 antipersonnel mines under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty at the end of 2001. This compares to 2,753 at the end of 2000, and 2,983 at the end of 1999. The April 2002 Article 7 Report does not identify the specific purposes for which the 179 retained mines were used in 2001. Of those being retained, it has indicated 46 DM11 mines will be used for testing the Rhino mine clearance machine, but has not reported the intended uses of other mines.

One of the institutions authorized to hold retained mines in 2000 is not included in the Article 7 Report for calendar year 2001 (Rheinbach Ammunition Depot), while two new institutions are included (Bundeswehr School of Dog Handling, and Deutsch-franzosisches Forschungsinstitut St Louis in Weil am Rhein).²⁵

Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes or Antihandling Devices

The German Initiative to Ban Landmines has for a number of years identified several antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices that might be capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person, and which therefore would be prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁶

¹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 620-621.

¹⁹ Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000; telephone interview with representative of the Ministry of Defense, 1 June 2001.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, 16 April 2002. The report does not give any of the required details of the destruction of these mines. Institutions permitted to hold stocks of antipersonnel mines are obliged to inform the *Bundesausfuhramt* (Federal Department for Exports) of types and quantities of antipersonnel mines possessed or under their control.

²¹ In previous German Article 7 Reports, these mines were not recorded as being in German stockpiles, nor retained under Article 3.

²² Denmark, Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2002.

²³ The M18A1 is a directional fragmentation mine commonly known as the Claymore. The M74 mines are used in the U.S. GEMSS remotely delivered mine system. No other country is known to have GEMSS.

²⁴ Landmine Monitor Italy interview with Col. Giuseppe Cornacchia, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, Rome, 11 March 2002.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 16 April 2002.

²⁶ For information on German antivehicle mines and other devices identified by the GIBL as having antipersonnel capabilities, and the Ministry of Defense's comments about those mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 701. See also, www.landmine.de.

In April 2002, former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel accused Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping of violating the Mine Ban Treaty, alleging that the Air Force was still keeping 80,000 antipersonnel mines.²⁷ It is likely that Mr. Kinkel was referring to the MUSPA device, which has been classified by the United States and Italy as an antipersonnel mine. It is one of the mines of concern listed by GIBL.²⁸

The CDU and FDP appeal calls for a ban on the DM-21 mine. It is one of the oldest German antivehicle mines; 150,000 were procured from 1980 to 1982.²⁹ According to German military authorities, the detonator of the DM-21 has been replaced to avoid unintentional ignition, because the old, corroded detonators caused the pressure fuze to set off the mine below the standard pressure of 180 kilograms.³⁰

It appears that Germany is adapting another mine of concern, the DM-31. Budget documents show that DM44 million (US\$20 million) was requested to improve an antivehicle mine, replacing the mine fuse to avoid unintentional activation of the mine.³¹ Internal information from the Federal audit division identified this as the DM-31 antivehicle mine, which is equipped with a magnetic fuze suspected of being liable to be activated by the presence or proximity of any metal-containing material.

The DM-31 is also owned by the armed forces of the Netherlands and Sweden (designated as the FFV 028). In response to concerns that the DM-31 may explode when a standard metal detector is swept over it, the Netherlands in November 2001 gave assurances that its 80,000 mines will be adapted to prevent detonation "when detected with regular devices.... If adaptation is not feasible or too expensive the mines will be replaced by types that fully comply with CCW regulations. As long as they are not adapted, DM-31 mines will not be used."³² The Dutch DM-31 mines were reported in 2001 as having "a number of technical and operational drawbacks."³³

These serious issues about antivehicle mines and the scope of the mine ban in Germany is also being discussed in the so-called Lew Kopelew process, which started in April 2001 and which held a second roundtable in September 2001.³⁴ It is also notable that in 2001, the Federal audit division criticized the German Army's strategic concept regarding landmines as generally outdated and not appropriate to current security policy.³⁵

Mine Action Funding

Between 1992 and 2001 the German government provided a total of €83.1 million (\$74.6 million) for mine action projects in 32 countries.³⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the allocation of mine action funding, and provides over 90 percent of the funds. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development also supports demining, but only if it is part of a

²⁷ "Scharping gerät wegen Airbus-Kaufes stärker unter Druck" ("Scharping is getting more and more pressure for the Airbus purchase"), *Die Welt* (daily newspaper), 26 April 2002.

²⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 647, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 699-702. GIBL has reported a German stockpile of 90,000 MUSPA mines.

²⁹ Thomas Küchenmeister and Otfried Nassauer, "'Gute Mine' zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany" ("'Good mines', bad games? Landmines made in Germany") (Idstein: KOMZI-Verlag, 1995).

³⁰ Telephone interview by Thomas Küchenmeister, GIBL, with the Ministry of Defense, May 2002.

³¹ Bundesrechnungshof [Federal Audit Division], *Bemerkungen zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes* [remarks on budgeting and auditing issues], 2001, p. 166.

³² The Netherlands, CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 14 November 2001.

³³ "Netherlands to plan landmine order," *Jane's International Defense Review*, March 2001, p. 6.

³⁴ For details of the Lew Kopelew process, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 697-698.

³⁵ "Bundesrechnungshof, Bemerkungen zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes" ("Federal Audit Division, remarks on budgeting and auditing issues"), 2001, pp. 164-165.

³⁶ Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.898, used throughout. The 32 countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Georgia (Abkhazia), Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Russian Federation (Chechnya), Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia (Kosovo), and Zimbabwe.

broader development project. The Ministry of Defense provides military experts and training, surplus equipment and information from its mine documentation center.³⁷

In 2001, mine action funding totaled about €13.7 million (\$12.3 million). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a budget of €12.7 million (\$11.4 million) for humanitarian mine action activities, including €2 million for the Stability Pact for South East Europe. In addition, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development supported projects (survivor assistance) with approximately €1 million. Spending on mine action in 2001 is slightly less than the previous year (DM 26.8 million in 2001 and DM 27.5 million in 2000).

In 2001, mine action was funded in 20 countries. Mine action funding by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (including in-kind assistance) in 2001 is shown in the table below.³⁸

³⁷ Email from Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the GIBL, 24 May 2002.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Governmental funding and in-kind assistance of mine action programs in 2001

Country	Type of Assistance	Total (€/ \$)
Afghanistan	Funding, in-kind-donation and donation of equipment for the national Mine Detection and Dog Center (MDC); Funding of mine clearance and mine risk education by the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); Donation of equipment (trucks, detectors, ambulances) for MDC and OMAR; Secondment of two German experts for the Mine Action Program Afghanistan (MAPA) to train OMAR and MDC deminers about the threat posed by the latest mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); Donation of detectors and other equipment for MAPA	1,824,501 \$1,638,402
Albania	Funding of demining project by the German NGO HELP in the border area with Kosovo	364,825 \$327,613
Angola	Funding of integrated mine by the NGOs Medico International and Mines Advisory Group (MAG); Funding of project by the German NGO Stiftung St. Barbara; Funding of project by the German NGO Menschen gegen Minen (MGM); Funding (part) of victim assistance by the GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit - Society for Technical Cooperation)	1,138,142 \$1,022,052
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Funding of mechanical demining by the NGO DEMIRA and Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft company in northern Bosnia (Posavina); Funding of quality assurance with dogs for the mechanical demining in northern Bosnia (Posavina), by Securatec company; Funding of demining by the German NGO Kölnische Franziskanerprovinz in northern Bosnia; Funding of demining in Bihac region by the NGO Handicap International (HI); Donation of detectors for the local demining NGO ZOM; Funding of mine risk education for teachers by HI; Funding of quality assurance for demining by the NGO Help in central Bosnia; Funding of transport of demining machine from Austria to Bosnia for HELP	1,042,373 \$936,051
Cambodia	Funding of the Cambodian Mine Action Center for Demining Unit 6; Funding of the German company GPC for setting up and improvement of the national database for the Cambodian mine action and victim authority; Secondment of two experts to the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining to evaluate a German-funded project in Cambodia.	1,416,627 \$1,272,131
Chad	Funding of demining/UXO clearance by HELP; Funding of the UN Office for Project Services program	446,659 \$401,100
Croatia	Funding of accreditation of a German demining machine for a mine clearance project by German company Dr. Koehler; Funding and donation of detectors for the Croatian Mine Action Center; Funding of demining by German NGO Arbeiter Samariter Bund in three priority areas; Secondment of personnel to the Western European Union Demining Mission	599,784 \$538,606
Eritrea	Funding of UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) for road clearance in temporary security zone; Funding and donation-in-kind to UNMEE for building up national training center; Donation of detectors to HALO Trust	800,504 \$718,853
Ethiopia	Funding for advance survey in preparation for a country-wide impact survey by Survey Action Center	168,726 \$151,516
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Secondment of military officers to the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center as liaison officers with KFOR; Funding of demining by HELP; Funding of mine clearance by the NGO CARE-Germany	691,706 \$621,152
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Funding of mine and UXO clearance project by HALO Trust	163,613 \$146,924
Guinea-Bissau	Funding of demining by NGO HumAid	154,410 \$138,660
Laos	Funding of UXO project by German NGO Potsdam Communication	933,935 \$838,674

Country	Type of Assistance	Total (€/€)
Mozambique	Supply of detectors, personal protection equipment and tools for the Accelerated Demining Program (ADP); Secondment of experts for ADP; Funding of demining project MGM	1,448,764 \$1,300,990
Nicaragua	Financial support of the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua	11,760 \$10,560
Somalia (Somaliland)	Funding of mine clearance by Stiftung St. Barbara	511,292 \$459,140
Sudan	Funding of mine risk education by UNICEF	112,484 \$101,011
Thailand	Funding of regional workshop on mine victim assistance, organized by HI; this is included in the Article 7 Report, Form J.	25,565 \$22,957
Vietnam	Funding of mine/UXO clearance by German NGOs Solidaritätsdienst International and Potsdam Communication in Quang Tri and Hue; Funding of victim assistance by GTZ (this is included in the Article 7 Report, Form J, as €491,000).	1,276,089 \$1,145,928
Yemen	Secondment of an expert to support the UN mine action program; Funding for setting up mine detection dog program for national mine action program by GTZ	372,220 \$334,254
Other	ICBL Landmine Monitor Report 2001; Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (mine clearance equipment catalogue), International Trust Fund (support of conferences, travel etc)	216,377 \$194,307
TOTAL		13,720,356 \$12,320,880

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that in 2002 a total of €17 million (\$15.3 million) is budgeted for humanitarian mine action. Those funds are made up of €9.5 million (\$8.5 million) for mine clearance and mine risk education, €2 million (\$1.8 million) for the Stability Pact for South East Europe, and €5.5 million (\$4.9 million) for the Afghanistan Stability Pact.³⁹

Non-governmental mine action funding

Since 1995, the member organizations of the GIBL have provided approximately €18 million (\$16.2 million) for mine action in 20 countries.⁴⁰ Their activities range from mine clearance and mine risk education projects to emergency aid and physical, psychological and socio-economic rehabilitation of mine victims, their families and communities as described in the Guidelines for Mine Action from a Development-Oriented Point of View.⁴¹ Member organizations of GIBL played a decisive role in developing the Guidelines, whose fundamental principle is that humanitarian mine action and development require the combination of mine clearance, mine risk education, and mine victim rehabilitation with reconstruction, reconciliation, and peacekeeping/building activities.

In 2001, GIBL member organizations allocated €2.7 million (\$2.4 million) for humanitarian mine action in 11 countries. Mine action funding by these NGOs is shown in the table below.⁴²

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Germany, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Vietnam. This report concentrates on the activities of GIBL member organizations. Some of these programs are co-financed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Cooperation and Development; their contributions are subtracted from the total in order to show the public donation contribution.

⁴¹ See: "Mine Action Programs From A Development-Oriented Point Of View – The Bad Honnef Framework," GIBL, revised version, 1999, available at: www.landmine.de.

⁴² GIBL Questionnaire 2001 to member organizations, Markus Haake, Berlin, May 2002.

Non-governmental funding and related activities in 2001

Country	Type of Assistance	Total (€/\$)
Afghanistan	Aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, by Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need); Mine risk education in Kandahar, by Handicap International Germany	77,512 \$69,606
Angola	Support of resettlement of refugees in highly mine-affected areas, by Bread for the World (BftW); Reintegration of demobilized soldiers and unemployed persons into professional life in Cuene by BftW; Integrated mine action project in Luena, by Medico International: Mine clearance, emergency aid, socio-economic, psychological and cultural reintegration in cooperation with other organizations, implemented by Centro de Apia à Promoção e Desenvolvimento de Comunidades; Emergency demining in the vicinity of Luena, implemented by Mines Advisory Group (MAG); Support of the integrated Mine Action Program in the province Cunene, by Misereor; Mine risk education in the provinces Caxito and Cuando Cubango, by Handicap International Germany	431,739 \$387,701
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Orthopedic workshop in Zavidovici: Orthopedic treatment of war disabled, by Christoffel Mission for Blind	36,872 \$33,111
Cambodia	Mine clearance in the context of village development in cooperation with BftW, Lutheran World Federation and MAG; Treatment of mine victims within a program to prevent blindness and rehabilitate traumatized persons, by Christoffel Mission for Blind; Medical treatment and socio-economic rehabilitation of mine victims in the province Battambang, by Handicap International Germany; Education for young adults in Pursat, by Terre des Hommes Mine risk education, victim assistance, rehabilitation of newly resettled mine affected communities, advocacy, and public information in Cambodia, by UNICEF Germany	923,860 \$829,626
Chad	Support of the Association of Disabled People in Chad, by EIRENE International; Support of grass-roots initiatives of disabled people, by EIRENE International (organizational consultation, income generation, rehabilitation, and advocacy)	32,000 \$28,736
El Salvador	Support of PODES center for rehabilitation of war disabilities, by Medico International; Support of war disabled running a workshop for prosthetics, professional training of local people (yearly production of 300 prosthetics); Support for a social fund by Misereor to finance prosthetics for poor war disabled and mine victims in San Salvador; In cooperation with BftW and IDG, mine clearance and training of local demining teams for mine risk education and demining	127,571 \$114,559
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Mine risk education and mine clearance in cooperation with BftW and Action by Churches Together; Support of mine risk education in Kosovo, by German Caritas	406,775 \$365,284
Germany	Mine risk education and advocacy for refugees from Kosovo, by Handicap International Germany; Support for refugees and disabled people from Kosovo living in Berlin, by Handicap International Germany; Advocacy and campaigning in Germany, by member organizations of GIBL	133,308 \$119,711
Nicaragua	Mine risk education and peace education in Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Esteil and Madriz, by Misereor	16,873 \$15,152
Sri Lanka	Development and food program (emergency aid, disabilities program, aid for war victims) in Sri Lanka, by Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need); Medical care and rehabilitation of mine victims in the North of Sri Lanka, by Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need)	359,183 \$322,546
Vietnam	Integrated mine action program in Vietnam, mine clearance and resettlement of internal displaced persons, by Solidaritätsdienst-international	111,700 \$100,307
TOTAL		2,657,392 \$2,386,388

Comparison of governmental and non-governmental funding of mine action shows that between 1992 and 2001, 62 percent of governmental funding went to mine clearance and mine risk education activities, while 36 percent went to humanitarian mine action accompanied by development, reconstruction, resettlement or peace-building activities and/or victim assistance (two percent was allocated to advocacy and miscellaneous). In contrast, between 1992 and 2001, 80 percent of the mine action funding by German NGOs went to activities which connect mine clearance and victim assistance with development, reconstruction, resettlement and/or peace-building measures while 18 percent went into mine clearance and mine risk education activities (two percent to advocacy and miscellaneous).

NGO Activities

On 28 September 2001, GIBL re-launched its campaign to ban all landmines. This gained the support of popular figures, including Wolfgang Thierse (President of Parliament), Anne Will (TV anchor woman for ARD-Tagesthemen), and Marius Müller-Westenhagen (musician). On 1 March 2002, the GIBL presented campaign advertising which showed well-known Germans posing as mine survivors; radio spots with the famous supporters were broadcast daily by the major radio stations in June and July 2002.

Since the re-launch, the GIBL and its member organizations have collected about 25,000 signatures calling for a total ban on all landmines. On 16 March 2002, Misereor organized a protest march for a ban on all landmines in Munich. The ICBL Ambassador Tun Chanareth joined the protest march with 10,000 students.⁴³ On 17 May 2002, the GIBL sent a public letter to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer calling for a total ban on all landmines at the G8 summit in Canada on 26/27 June 2002. On 11-15 June 2002, member organizations of the GIBL organized nationwide action days for a ban on all mines. .

Landmine/UXO Problem and Casualties

On 9 May 2002, a German and an Italian member of the NATO peacekeeping force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were killed when a German KFOR vehicle carrying a mine clearance team hit an antivehicle mine near the northwestern village of Lesnica, close to the border with Kosovo.⁴⁴

Although the government announced in December 1995 that all mine-affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared, mine are still found occasionally. On 11 July 2001, it was reported that significantly more explosives were discovered in North Rhine-Westphalia in 2000 than in previous years. According to the Ministry for Internal Affairs of North Rhine-Westphalia, 71,000 bombs, grenades, mines and other explosives were cleared, without any incidents. The costs amounted to €40.39 million (approx. \$36.3 million).⁴⁵ On 26 September 2001, during reconstruction work at Söder castle in Lower Saxony approximately 15 antivehicle mines from World War II were found in the moat.⁴⁶ In Munich, six high-explosive bombs, ten incendiary bombs, 31 grenades, 12 fuzes and mines, as well as 8,030 rounds of munitions, were cleared in

⁴³ "Über 10.000 Schüler/innen demonstrierten in München für Verbote der Landminen und der Einsätze von Kindersoldaten" ("More than 10,000 students protested in Munich for a ban on landmines and on the use of child soldiers"), *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16 March 2002.

⁴⁴ "Peacekeeper killed in Macedonia landmine blast," *Agence France Presse*, 9 May 2002.

⁴⁵ "Kriegs-Sprengsätze belasten NRW" ("Remnants of War Pollute North Rhine-Westphalia"), *Lippische Landes-Zeitung* (daily newspaper), 11 July 2001; "Mehr Munition im vergangenen Jahr in NRW gefunden" (More munitions Found in North Rhine-Westphalia in the Last Year), *Aachener Zeitung* (daily newspaper), 11 July 2001.

⁴⁶ "Minen im Schlossgraben" ("Mines in the moat"), *Nordwest-online* (daily newspaper – online edition), 27 September 2001; "Wie kamen die Waffen in den Schlossgraben?" ("How did the mines get into the moat?"), *Hildesheimer Allgemeine Zeitung* (daily newspaper), 28 September 2001.

2001.⁴⁷ On 23 May 2002, five antivehicle mines from World War II were blown up *in situ* near the train station of Gramzow in Brandenburg.⁴⁸

A mine problem also exists in former military training areas. In Königsbrück (Lower Saxony) three live grenades and mines were cleared in a former training area that became a nature reserve in 1996.⁴⁹ In Brandenburg, experts assume that 4,000 square kilometers are polluted by bombs, grenades, and mines from World War II. An additional 2,000 square kilometers may be polluted by explosives and munitions of the armed forces of the former German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. In 2001, 2,323 mines, 122,000 grenades, 2,300 bombs, and 3,800 missiles were found in Brandenburg. Costs are estimated at €51,000 (\$45,798) per bomb plus additional costs for transport and further handling at €26,000 (\$23,348).⁵⁰ No injuries or deaths have been reported as a result of these explosive remnants of war.

GHANA

Ghana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 30 June 2000. The treaty entered into force for Ghana on 1 December 2000. Ghana's initial Article 7 transparency report was due on 30 May 2001. As of 31 July 2002, the United Nations had not received the report. However, a report has been prepared, and a copy was provided to Landmine Monitor.¹ The report indicates that no national implementation measures have yet been enacted.

Ghana participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. Ghana participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but not in May 2002. It cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.

Ghana has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines.² The Article 7 Report obtained by Landmine Monitor indicates that Ghana has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It also indicates that there are no mined areas in Ghana. There have been no reports of mine casualties.

GRENADA

Grenada signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 19 August 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. It has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation.¹ Grenada submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 13 July 2001, reporting on the period from 28 August 1998-30 April 2001. This was essentially a "nil" report. Grenada cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Grenada has never produced, stockpiled, or held antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine-affected.²

⁴⁷ "München bleibt Pulverfass" ("Munich Remains a Powder Keg"), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (daily newspaper), 22 April 2002.

⁴⁸ "Vier Explosionen erschüttern Gramzow" ("Four Explosions Shook Gramzow"), *Nordkurier-Online* (daily newspaper – online edition), 24 May 2002.

⁴⁹ "Die Idylle von Königsbrück täuscht" ("The deceptive paradise of Königsbrück"), *Lausitzer Rundschau-online* (daily newspaper – online edition), 19 April 2001, www.lr-online.de.

⁵⁰ "Explosives Erbe" ("Explosive Remnants"), *Märkische Allgemeine* (daily newspaper), 11 January 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, dated May 2002, covering calendar year 2001.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 75-76.

¹ Grenada did not complete Form A (National implementation measures) of the Article 7 Report submitted 13 July 2001.

² Article 7 Report submitted 13 July 2001.

GUATEMALA

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, the Army cleared an area covering 7,749 square meters. In 2001, the Association of Volunteer Firefighters conducted mine risk education in six communities in San Marcos department, which reached an estimated 80,000 people.

Mine Ban Policy

Guatemala signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 26 March 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 September 1999. In 1997 Guatemala passed national legislation to ban antipersonnel mines in the form of Legislative Decree 106-97, which prohibits the production, purchase, sale, importation, exportation, transit, use, or possession of antipersonnel mines and explosive artifacts or their composite parts.¹

Guatemala submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 5 June 2002, covering the period from March 2001 to March 2002.

Guatemala attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. In November 2001, Guatemala cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M. Guatemala sent representatives to the “Mine Action in Latin America” conference in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001.² In January and May 2002, Guatemala attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Guatemala is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and ratified Amended Protocol II to the CCW on 29 October 2001 with no reservations or interpretative statements. It attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Guatemala has not produced or imported antipersonnel landmines, possesses no stockpile, and has not retained any mines for training purposes.³

Guatemala maintains that it did not use landmines during its long-running internal conflict, and there is no concrete evidence to the contrary. However, the guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) did make limited use of crude, homemade mines, and improvised explosive devices during the war.

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

The OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, through its Program for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA, Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal), is responsible for coordinating and supervising the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA, Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamérica), with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

The IADB is responsible for organizing a team of international supervisors in charge of training and certification, known as the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centro América or MARMINCA).

PADCA and MARMINCA have mine action programs in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua. In Guatemala, the Army and the Association of Volunteer Firefighters are responsible for clearance operations, along with PADCA/MARMINCA.

For the 2001 budget, the OAS PADCA program raised approximately \$4.72 million from the United States (\$1.27 million), Norway (\$1.15 million), Canada (\$979,232), Sweden (\$639,964),

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 March 2001.

² The Conference was sponsored by the US Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States (OAS); the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

³ Article 7 Report, Forms B, D and H, 2 March 2001; and Article 7 Report, Form D, 5 June 2002.

United Kingdom, (\$271,971), Spain (\$255,340), Italy (\$100,000) and Japan (\$45,000).⁴ This represents a decrease from \$4.92 million raised in the year 2000.

According to Jhony M. Cabrera Perez, Coordinator of the Executive Coordination Unit (UCE), the annual budget for the OAS Guatemala program for 2001 was \$1 million, with the government contributing an additional \$120,000. The Association of Volunteer Firefighters is responsible for administering the funds.⁵

Since 1993, Guatemala has contributed fourteen military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA mine clearance effort, including three in 2001 and two in 2002.⁶

UXO/Mine Problem

In its annual Article 7 Report submitted 5 June 2002, Guatemala indicated that thirteen departments are considered at high-risk from unexploded ordnance: northern Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Chimaltenango, Escuintla, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango, Quiché, southern Petén, Retalhuleu, San Marcos, Sololá, Suchitepéquez, and Totonicapán. The departments of Santa Rosa and Jutiapa are considered low-risk.⁷

The OAS/AICMA Guatemala Coordinator told Landmine Monitor that the program has not found landmines, only UXO, and estimated the number of items of UXO remaining to be cleared at 6,000.⁸

UXO/Mine Clearance

In 1995, a Demining Coordinating Committee (Comisión Coordinadora de Desminado) was established by Legislative Decree 60-95.⁹ In 1997, Guatemala established an Executive Coordinating Unit (UCE, Unidad Coordinadora Ejecutiva), which prepared a "National Plan for Demining and the Destruction of Unexploded Ordnance." It is under the auspices of this plan that the OAS and IADB are now assisting Guatemala with its demining and UXO clearing efforts.

According to the OAS, PADCA clearance operations continued in 2001 and 2002 with the participation of the Association of Volunteer Firefighters (Cuerpo Voluntario de Bomberos), the Engineer Corps (Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ejército, CIEG) of the Guatemalan Army, reintegrated former URNG members and MARMINCA personnel.¹⁰

The civilian Association of Volunteer Firefighters (Cuerpo Voluntario de Bomberos) engages 38 people in mine action activities including mine/UXO risk education, information gathering and marking of mine- and UXO-affected areas. The Army destroys the UXO where they are found.¹¹

⁴ In previous years other donors to the program have included: Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, and the Netherlands. "OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001," Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁵ Interview Jhony Cabrera, Coordinator, Executive Coordination Unit (UCE), Guatemala City, 11 February 2002.

⁶ The fourteen supervisors constitute six percent of the total contributions to the program from countries in the region, and include: two in 1993, 1998, and 1999, three in 2000 and 2001, and two in 2002. "Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America," Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form C and National Demining Plan attachment, 5 June 2002.

⁸ Interview Jhony Cabrera, Coordinator, Executive Coordination Unit (UCE), Guatemala City, 11 February 2002.

⁹ "La Comisión Coordinadora para el "Programa para la Reducción de Riesgos a los Habitantes de Zonas Afectadas por el Enfrentamiento Armado, a través del Rastreo y Desactivación de Minas y otros Artefactos Explosivos." Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 March 2001.

¹⁰ OAS, "Informe del Secretario General sobre la implementación de las Resoluciones 1745 (apoyo a PADEP) y 1751 (apoyo a PADCA)," CP/doc.3432/01 rev.1, 7 May 2001.

¹¹ Interview with Sergio Vasquez, Public Relations Officer for Mine Clearance, Association of Volunteer Firefighters, Guatemala City, 10 March 2000.

The Volunteer Firefighters use GPS and portable radios in their work.¹² The UNRG cooperates with the Volunteer Firefighters' activities, including raising awareness of the mine/UXO problem.

In April 2001, clearance began in the southern part of El Quiché department and was completed in June 2001.¹³ In 2001, the Volunteer Firefighters located 26 UXO (compared to 80 in the year 2000) and the Army cleared an area covering 7,749 square meters.¹⁴ From January 2001 to March 2002, one Claymore mine and 34 UXO were cleared in the provinces of Chimaltenango, Quiché, and San Marcos.¹⁵

Clearance in San Marcos department started in June 2001 and was scheduled for completion by June 2002, but this date has since been moved back to December 2002.¹⁶

Completion of the National Demining Plan, with clearance of all thirteen high-risk departments, is scheduled for 2005.¹⁷

Some clearance difficulties identified in the National Demining Plan include rough terrain and difficult weather conditions.¹⁸ Inaccessible roads during the rainy season mean that helicopters are the only way that emergency medical assistance can be provided. Maintenance of vehicles and equipment is also a problem, due to the need to travel long distances over rough terrain. A lack of accurate maps makes planning more difficult.

Mine Risk Education

With the support of the OAS and with additional logistical and financial assistance provided by the government, the Association of Volunteer Firefighters provides mine risk education using television, radio, and the print media. In 2001, the firefighters conducted mine risk education in six communities in San Marcos department (San Pablo, Rafael de la Cuesta, San Cristobal, El Tumbador, El Rodea, and Esquipulas Palo Gordo), which reached an estimated 80,000 people.¹⁹

Further education efforts are planned for Quetzaltenango, Totonicapan and Retalhuleu departments in 2002, with completion scheduled for 2003.²⁰

Landmine Casualties

In December 2001, four brothers, aged six, eight, ten and fourteen, were killed in Salama, Baja Verapaz department when they handled a grenade.²¹

No other mine or UXO casualties were reported in 2001 or in the first half of 2002. Since 1994, approximately fifteen people have been injured by landmines or UXO; before that time no official records were kept.²²

The ASCATED/UNICEF Landmine Victim Support Program has identified approximately 320 casualties from 1972 to the end of June 2002, of which all but five were children.²³ Most survivors are male, and were injured when they were aged 15 or 16 years-old. All the survivors

¹² Two GPS receivers and five portable radios were reported in use by the Volunteer Firefighters. National Demining Plan attached to Article 7 Report, 5 June 2002.

¹³ Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, Coordinator, OAS/AICMA, Guatemala City, 24 July 2001.

¹⁴ Interview Jhony Cabrera, Coordinator, Executive Coordination Unit (UCE), Guatemala City, 11 February 2002.

¹⁵ National Demining Plan attached to Article 7 Report, 5 June 2002.

¹⁶ Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, Coordinator, OAS/AICMA, Guatemala City, 10 July 2002.

¹⁷ Elizabeth Berry Adams, e-mail interview with Guillermo Pacheco, Coordinator, OAS/AICMA, *Journal of Mine Action*, Volume 5.2, July 2001, online version at <http://maic.jmu.edu/>.

¹⁸ National Demining Plan attached to Article 7 Report, 5 June 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, Coordinator, OAS/AICMA, Guatemala City, 10 July 2002.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 23 January 2002

²¹ Interview with William de Leon, Coordinator, Landmine Program of the Volunteer Firefighters, Guatemala City, 10 July 2002.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 274.

²³ Interview with Fidel Arévalo Coordinator, Landmines Victim Support Program, ASCATED/UNICEF, Guatemala City, 15 June 2002.

grew up in rural communities and continue to live in extreme poverty. Fifteen percent of the survivors are blind and depend on their families for support.

Survivor Assistance

UNICEF has been supporting the community-based rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of mine survivors in Guatemala since 1999.²⁴ UNICEF's program is carried out in the five most heavily mine- and UXO-affected departments of Guatemala (Chimaltenango, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango, Quiché, and San Marcos). UNICEF works in cooperation with two local agencies, ASCATED (Asociación de Capacitación y Asistencia Técnica en Educación y Discapacidad) and the University of Valle. As of February 2002 the achievements of the program included: 153 survivors had received a professional evaluation of their physical or sensorial disability; 253 mine and UXO survivors had received a specialized evaluation of their disability and/or received direct assistance for their rehabilitation; and five reference centers began to offer assistance to disabled people. The five reference centers are located in Nebaj, Chajul, Cotzal, San Marcos at Aldea la Laguna, Quetzaltenango, and are operated by the community under the supervision and evaluation of UNICEF and ASCATED. In 2002, funding is being sought to establish a National Managerial Information System on Demining Action (based on IMSMA); and to strengthen the organizational structure of the reference centers.²⁵

Other organizations providing assistance to mine/UXO survivors in Guatemala include the Asociación Guatemalteca de Rehabilitación (AGREL), the OAS, the local NGO Transitions, Queen's University, the Center for International Rehabilitation (CIR), and for war-wounded veterans, the Centro de Atención al Desapacitado del Ejército de Guatemala (CADEJ).²⁶

On 18-19 June 2001, prosthetic technicians from Guatemala attended the First Regional Conference on Victim Assistance and Technologies, organized by the OAS and the CIR, in Managua, Nicaragua.²⁷ CIR has developed a Lower Extremity Distance Learning program for prosthetic technicians in Guatemala which also includes a clinical component implemented by a qualified prosthetist who provides hands-on training.²⁸

GUINEA

Guinea signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 October 1998. It entered into force on 1 April 1999. Guinea has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 28 September 1999. Guinea is not known to have undertaken any national implementation measures, as required by Article 9.

Guinea did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, and was not present at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. Guinea cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Guinea is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Guinea is one of the only States Parties that has not publicly and officially acknowledged whether or not it maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has received possibly contradictory information from Guinean sources. The Guinean military told Landmine Monitor in

²⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 347.

²⁵ United Nations Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, February 2002, p. 125.

²⁶ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 347-348.

²⁷ "Ayudarán más víctimas de minas antipersonales. Primera conferencia regional de rehabilitación y tecnología," *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), 19 June 2001.

²⁸ ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 347.

February 2001 that it had no stockpile.¹ However, two members of the army have independently said that there could be a stock in Guinea, but strictly for training purposes.²

If Guinea were to have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, they would have to be destroyed by 1 April 2003, except those retained for training purposes.

There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in Guinea. After May 2001, Guinean armed forces were no longer engaged in combat with various armed dissident groups on Guinean soil, although military operations took place in Sierra Leone to clear the area of elements that Guineans considered a menace. In the military zones, no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines has been found.³

Guinea is not mine-affected, although there is some contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO).⁴ Guinea reportedly has never had a mine incident on its soil.⁵ Although the hospitals of Kissidougou and Conakry have received many victims of the hostilities, most notably between September 2000 and February 2001, no incidents involving a mine casualty have been recorded.⁶

GUINEA-BISSAU

Key developments since May 2001: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Guinea-Bissau on 1 November 2001. In March 2002, an inventory of antipersonnel mines was carried out, revealing a stockpile of 4,997 mines. In September 2001, a National Commission for Humanitarian Demining was formally established. Between November 2000 and April 2002, 175,000 square meters of land were cleared. Guinea-Bissau's initial Article 7 Report, due by 30 April 2002, has not yet been submitted.

Mine Ban Policy

Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1999, ratified on 22 May 2001, and it entered into force on 1 November 2001. No implementing legislation has been enacted. Guinea-Bissau's initial Article 7 Report was due by 30 April 2002. In May, the Director of the National Mine Action Center (CAAMI) said the report was to be sent during the month of June and the delay was due to a desire "to include the [landmine] inventory, and we already have it, but we also wanted to know when the Government plans to destroy the stockpile."¹ As of 31 July 2002, the report had not been deposited at the UN, although according to the UN Technical Advisor for CAAMI, "The report was sent in mid-June."²

Guinea-Bissau attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee

¹ Interview with Michel Lamah, Ministry of National Defense, at the Bamako Seminar, Mali, 15 February 2001.

² Informal interview with army officer, Kissidougou, 6 May 2001, and a second officer, Guéckédou, 8 May 2001.

³ Visit of the LM researcher to the Forest Region of Guinea, including the border area with Sierra Leone known as the "Languette," May 2001. The researcher's observations were confirmed in talks with volunteers and soldiers involved in fighting in February 2001.

⁴ Certain border areas and the towns of Guéckédou, Pamelap, and the Simbaya areas in the capital Conakry are UXO-affected.

⁵ Interview with Michel Lama, Guinean government representative, Bamako Seminar, Bamako, Mali, 15 February 2001.

⁶ Interview with Sékou Cissé, Director of the regional hospital in Kissidougou, 9 May 2001; interview with the Felice Dindo, Acting Head of Delegation, ICRC, Conakry, 3 May 2001.

¹ Interview with Eng Cesar Lopes de Carvalho, Director of National Mine Action Center (CAAMI), Geneva, 29 May 2002.

² Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, National Mine Action Center (CAAMI), Bissau, 17 June 2002.

meetings in January and May 2002.³ Guinea-Bissau was absent from the vote on the 29 November 2001 UNGA Resolution 56/24 M, calling for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In response to a question about the absence, an official said, "Guinea-Bissau is totally committed to the Convention."⁴

Guinea-Bissau is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and did not attend either the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Guinea-Bissau is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In February 1998, the government destroyed several thousand mines, but there has been no destruction of stocks since.⁵ According to CAAMI, "This gesture of goodwill [1998 destruction of mines], which was stopped due to the war, will be resumed. And hopefully, I think, we will be able to destroy most of our mines by the end of the year."⁶ The treaty-mandated deadline for destruction of the entire stockpile is 1 November 2005.

Between 25 and 27 March 2002, a joint delegation including representatives of CAAMI, the Ministries of Internal Administration, Economy and Finance, and Defense, UNICEF, and UNDP visited military facilities in the country to inventory stockpiled landmines. The UN Technical Advisor for CAAMI told Landmine Monitor that "4,997 mines, including PMD-6 mines, are stockpiled in Gabu and other locations in the country such as Bafatá. Their destruction will be planned soon."⁷

According to CAAMI, the stockpile is "around 5,000 antipersonnel mines, most of which are concentrated in the city of Gabu, in the east of Guinea-Bissau. The concentration was due to the recent conflict. Part of the mines were previously in Bambadinca. The government forces, realizing the strength of the Junta forces, took those mines and brought them to Gabu, which was the safest location for them. The mines were left there."⁸

The stockpile is composed of "old mines that have expired...of the seventies or so, of Portuguese and Belgian origin, but also some of Soviet origin. So when we went there [the army magazines], most of the mines that were found were of Soviet origin such as the PMD-6 and the POMZ-2."⁹

According to CAAMI, Guinea-Bissau will retain "a maximum of 50 mines" for instruction purposes, under the provisions of Mine Ban Treaty Article 3, and "the majority will be inert" mines. "We will also keep about five live mines as you cannot have an Engineering Unit without having real mines; you cannot have military forces which have never seen real mines."¹⁰

Landmine Problem

On a visit to CAAMI in February 2002, Guinea-Bissau's Prime Minister Alamara Nhassé said landmines are "hampering the nation's development. The mines are a problem for us all as they restrict various activities, from agriculture (involving 80 percent of the population) to children

³ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The original number given for mines destroyed was between 2,000–2,300, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p.167; *Le Soleil*, 9 February 1998. In a 17 June 2002 telephone interview, Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor for CAAMI, stated that a total of 4,711 mines had been destroyed in February 1998.

⁶ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁷ Telephone interview with Gerard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

⁸ Interview with Eng^o César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

playing.”¹¹ According to the Prime Minister, the government “will support CAAMI’s actions as one of its priorities.”¹²

With the outbreak of conflict in 1998-1999, landmines became a real problem in the capital of Guinea-Bissau.¹³ In December 2001, a report by HUMAID (a local NGO) estimated that the number of mines remaining in the city of Bissau could range from about 2,000 to 4,000 landmines, depending on mine concentrations in different areas.¹⁴

Mines were used principally in five locations: around the Bissau airport, along the demarcation line within Bissau, around the psychiatric hospital in Bissau, along the border with Senegal, and along main routes in the south of the country.¹⁵ The mine-affected neighborhoods in Bissau include: Enterramento, Antulo-Bono, Bôr, Bairro das Pescas, Brá, and Plack.

Whereas only three areas (Bissau, Falacunda, and Buba) were reported as mined in the 1998-99 conflict, a UNDP map provided to CAAMI identifies at least 12 other locations reported as still mined due to the liberation war: São Domingos, Bigene, Dungal, Mansaba, Contuboel, Sonaco, Pitche, Buruntuma, Bissasseme de Cima, Galomaro, Boe, and Cutar.¹⁶

According to CAAMI’s Director, the “boundary, with no markings except for a few posts, with Senegal is a seriously contaminated area. It was mined to disrupt the activities of the rebels of Casamance who used the territory of Guinea-Bissau as a shelter and to improve relations with Senegal. There are mines and booby-traps. The government hasn’t yet given the green light so that we can send people there do to an assessment, so this is why this is our last priority.”¹⁷

Guinea-Bissau and Bissau itself also have a very serious UXO problem, particularly at an army arsenal in Brá that exploded during the last war. On 10 April 2002, a demining technical coordination team from Handicap International visited this site and reported various types of munitions “are strewn over a radius of 5 kilometers around the epicenter.” According to their report, four accidents were recorded in the area since the beginning of 2002. It noted, “The polluted fields are cultivated and the copper belts of the munitions are recovered ... by the locals.”¹⁸

Mine Action Funding

According to CAAMI’s Director, “The strategy was to put an end to the plague of landmines by 2004. But the government hasn’t the funds. For many donors, Guinea-Bissau is not a priority. At first we had presented a plan which totaled \$5.8 million for the whole country. But after one year of work, we reduced our funding call to approximately \$4 million. With this money, we would solve the problem. However, we are not receiving these funds.”¹⁹

It would appear that about \$1.62 million was provided for mine action in Guinea-Bissau in 2001. The UN Mine Action Database indicates that in 2001, the following countries gave

¹¹ Statement by Prime Minister, Alamara Nhassé, “Landmines Hinder Development” (English article version), *LUSA* (Portuguese International News Agency), Bissau, 20 February 2002.

¹² Statement by Prime Minister Alamara Nhassé, “Minas condicionam desenvolvimento do país” (Portuguese article and long version), *LUSA* (Portuguese International News Agency), Bissau, 20 February 2002.

¹³ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp.154-156; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 167-168; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.79. Landmine Monitor reported use of mines by all fighting forces in that conflict, including by Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, although all denied use.

¹⁴ HUMAID, “Estimates of the number of square meters and mines remaining in the City of Bissau,” 14 December 2001. Estimates of the total number of mines in the country have ranged from 5,000-40,000. The generally used figure is about 5,000.

¹⁵ Major Hervé Petetin, “Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” UNMAS, December 1998, p. 1.

¹⁶ Report by CAAMI, 2002.

¹⁷ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, National Mine Action Center, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹⁸ “Technical Mission Report, Handicap International in Guinea-Bissau,” Lyon, April 2002; e-mail and telephone communications with Manuel Gonzal, Technical Coordination Mission, Handicap International, Lyon, 14-19 June 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

\$1,189,000 for mine action in Guinea-Bissau: Finland, \$60,000; the Netherlands, \$500,000; the United States, \$489,000; the United Kingdom, \$140,000.²⁰

The Netherlands provided \$500,000 to support all of the activities of CAAMI, including awareness-raising.²¹ In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided \$489,000 in assistance, “primarily to support the nongovernmental organization HUMAID’s mine clearance operations, the remainder for the purchase of equipment for Guinea-Bissau’s Mine Action Center....”²²

In addition to the above funds reported to the UN, for 2001 Germany has reported providing \$138,660 to HUMAID, Sweden has reported providing \$100,000 to HUMAID, and France has reported providing \$192,685 to Handicap International for its work in Guinea-Bissau.²³ Handicap International also received \$288,000 over three years from the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund for HI’s survivor assistance program in Guinea-Bissau.²⁴

HUMAID’s Administrator told Landmine Monitor in June 2002 that since November 2001, HUMAID “is solely working on US funds, which will enable HUMAID to last six months.”²⁵ He said in the past HUMAID had received funding from Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. During the period 1 June 2001 through 31 May 2002, HUMAID’s expenses totaled US\$355,841.²⁶

UNDP financed and launched the MAX (Mine Action Exchange) Program, which seeks to maximize the regional competence in humanitarian technical demining standards within the Portuguese-speaking countries. The project uses ADP Mozambique deminers as trainers. The UNDP budget is \$246,712 to train and equip two mine action groups (61 deminers) and \$312,715 for the two groups to operate for 12 months.²⁷ In May 2002, two experts began training deminers for a new Guinea-Bissau mine clearance NGO, LUTCAM.

Mine Action Coordination

The National Mine Action Center (CAAMI) was established in March 2001, and a draft National Humanitarian Mine Action Program (PAAMI) was prepared in early 2001. On 10 September 2001, Decree 55/001 formally created the National Commission for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH), which works as the steering committee appointed by the government. UNDP and other UN agencies are full members of CNDH.

According to the UNDP, its priorities in support of the national mine action program include: developing a level one initial impact survey in Bissau and outside to be able to adequately mark suspected areas; fostering further development of a national mine action NGO; providing training in humanitarian standards; and developing a national mine action database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).²⁸

In April 2002, CAAMI requested a needs assessment mission by Handicap International (HI). According to the HI Demining Technical Coordinator, “The coordination between the different demining actors is incomplete and there are some gaps at the organizational level. The basic techniques are present but the methods for managing the space of the site and regarding security need to be perfected. The security problems are often due to lack of means.... However, the

²⁰ Mine Action Database, figures provided by <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/frameset.asp>.

²¹ “Report of the Secretary-General on the developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in that country,” S/2002/312, New York, 26 March 2002, p. 3.

²² U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001. p. 7.

²³ See individual country reports for each donor in this edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*.

²⁴ Email from Sheree Bailey, HIB and Landmine Monitor thematic coordinator for survivor assistance, 19 July 2002.

²⁵ Telephone interview with John Blacken, Administrator, HUMAID, Bissau, 18 June 2002.

²⁶ E-mail from John Blacken, HUMAID, 19 June 2002; telephone interview with John Blacken, 18 June 2002.

²⁷ “Support to the Guinea-Bissau National Humanitarian Mine Action Program,” UNDP, November 2001.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

mission noticed a great receptivity to the commentaries and a will to increase the knowledge of demining security criteria."²⁹

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance priorities are based on the extent of the mine problem, the consequences for civilians and the government policy as far as the border with Senegal is concerned. Therefore, according to CAAMI's Director, "The first priority is Bissau, because it's our capital and almost one-third of the population of Guinea-Bissau is concentrated there, and because the mines are located between houses and schools. Then, we will work in the South, where there are mines from both wars - the colonial war and the recent one. After that, the Eastern region, where we verified that most mines are Portuguese antitank mines, in the area of Buruntuma e Canquelifá, in the Gabu region. Once we're finished with these regions, we will concentrate all our work on the border with Senegal."³⁰ With regard to the capital area, the UN technical advisor considers that the priorities are already quite clear: "Bra, Enterramento, the northern outskirts of Bissau really."³¹

Although there was some minor military demining within Bissau just after the war, the military is no longer involved in clearance.³² HUMAID has been the sole mine clearance NGO in the country, operating since early 2000. HUMAID has 35 deminers.³³ Its deminers received two weeks of refresher training in May 2002 from ADP Mozambique.³⁴ In 2001 and 2002, HUMAID worked in Bairros Brá, Bor, Enterramento, and Manuel Água.

CAAMI's UN Technical Advisor told Landmine Monitor that between November 2000 and April 2002, 175,000 square meters of land were cleared and 5,000 UXO and 2,500 mines were destroyed, of which 86 percent were antipersonnel mines.³⁵ Between 1 June 2001 and 31 May 2002, HUMAID reported clearing 136,477 square meters of land; it destroyed 976 antipersonnel mines, 30 antitank mines, and 6,277 UXO.³⁶

A new mine action NGO, LUTCAM, is scheduled to begin activities with 12 deminers in late July 2002.³⁷ The sappers were trained in humanitarian demining and survey techniques by ADP Mozambique. With the support of UNDP, they will train other deminers, with a goal of 70 deminers working for LUTCAM. LUTCAM is to carry out a survey to determine demining priorities within Bissau itself, due to be completed by September 2002.

In addition to clearance, minefield marking is also a priority. According to the UN technical advisor, while some marking was carried out by the military "after the last war," it was not done to standard, so the "marking is sometimes inadequate."³⁸ Between 1 June 2001 and 31 May 2002, marking activities were limited to replacing signs that had been stolen or otherwise removed from minefields.³⁹ CAAMI reported, "We are waiting for some material which is about to arrive. HUMAID already did some marking but the population innocently took these metal signs and

²⁹ E-mail and telephone communication with Manuel Gonzal, Technical Coordination Mission, Handicap International, Lyon, 14-19 June 2002; "Compte rendu de la Mission de Coordination Technique" ("Technical Mission Report"), Handicap International in Guinea-Bissau, Lyon, April 2002.

³⁰ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³¹ Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

³² Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³³ Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

³⁴ E-mail from John Blacken, Administrator, HUMAID, 19 June 2002.

³⁵ Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

³⁶ E-mail from John Blacken, Administrator, HUMAID, in response to a questionnaire, 19 June 2002. Most of the UXO were collected near Ilonde, which HUMAID cleared in May 2002. Thousands more were scheduled to be destroyed in June and many thousands remain scattered over an area with a radius of about a kilometer.

³⁷ Telephone Interview with Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, 14 June 2002; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in that country," S/2002/312, New York, 26 March 2002.

³⁸ Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

³⁹ E-mail from John Blacken, Administrator, HUMAID, 19 June 2002.

placards for domestic use. So, we will have to mark the mine-affected areas again in Bissau but only after the Level one survey.”⁴⁰

The HI Technical Coordination Mission noted, “The population does not respect the marking of the mined zones. The population works in the suspected areas planting rice crops and collecting salt. This disrespect for the marking is due to the fact that the markings were not taken out after the end of demining work in a site. The marking is partial (25 percent - meaning that only one side of the field is marked and the other three are not) or insufficient. UXO are strewn on the edges of the roads without any specific marking of the area.... In a country deprived of various things and where the population sells almost anything, one should expect the recovery of explosives and metal. Rockets are used as boundary-marks for the fields.”⁴¹

Mine Risk Education

UNICEF established a Mine Awareness Committee (COAM) that has met bi-weekly since April 1999, to plan and coordinate mine risk education. There are three main focus areas: information, training, and logistics. Funded by the government of Canada, the program includes the production of marking ropes, marking triangles, T-shirts, labels, billboards, comic books and mine awareness posters. According to CAAMI, at least eight NGOs are participating in some kind of mine awareness activities.⁴² To fully implement the program, a total of US\$127,000 is needed.

Mine awareness teams and activists are working in all neighborhoods of Bissau and its outskirts. Outside Bissau, mine awareness teams had covered the main mine-affected areas of the country, except for the São Domingos area and the northern region beyond the Cacheu river due to the security situation.⁴³ ANDES, a local NGO, and Handicap International requested a permit for mine risk education activities in the northern area of the country, notably working with radio stations.⁴⁴ ANDES and Handicap International have been training mine awareness activists in various parts of the country. ANDES has a total of 26 mine awareness instructors.

In April 2002, the mine awareness tools were analyzed and updated and the mine awareness sessions were reinforced in risk areas of Bissau, Enterramento, Brá, and Bor. HI also supported a mine risk education PEPAM theater in Buba (South).⁴⁵

The mine risk education activities are supported by UNDP, UNICEF and FCILD (Canadian Fund for Local Initiative). ANAPRODEM and ANDES also work in the east part of country toward Gabu.⁴⁶ HUMAID personnel also “brief the residents near the minefields concerning the dangers posed by mines and UXO. In radio and TV interviews, HUMAID personnel have explained the dangers and urged people not to enter the areas marked with warning signs.”⁴⁷

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, mine and UXO casualties continued to be reported, however, no comprehensive statistics are kept. Between June 2000 and March 2001, HUMAID reported five mine incidents.⁴⁸ In March 2001, one incident involved eight children in Bolama.⁴⁹ According CAAMI’s UN Technical Advisor, “There is a regular victim rate of two to three persons per month, and this

⁴⁰ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴¹ E-mail and telephone communication with Manuel Gonzal, Technical Coordination Mission, Handicap International, Lyon, 14-19 June 2002; “Compte rendu de la Mission de Coordination Technique” (“Technical Mission Report”), Handicap International in Guinea-Bissau, Lyon, April 2002.

⁴² Interview with Eng. Cesar Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴³ Telephone Interview with Irene Laval, Mine Risk Education Assistant, CAAMI, Bissau, 14 June 2002.

⁴⁴ Report by Handicap International, “Rapport d’activités du programme Handicap International en Guinée Bissau,” Bissau, January to April 2002.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Telephone Interview with Irene Laval, Mine Awareness (PEPAM) Assistant, CAAMI, Bissau, 14 June 2002.

⁴⁷ E-mail from John Blacken, Administrator, HUMAID, 19 June 2002.

⁴⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.83.

⁴⁹ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, Director of CAAMI (National Mine Action Center), Geneva, 29 May 2002.

number increases to four or five a month during the months of the cashew and rice harvest season.”⁵⁰ Several incidents have been reported between January and June 2002. On 26 January, a 12-year-old girl was injured by a grenade blast while lighting a fire in the Enterramento area. On 26 February, another incident in Enterramento involved two children, who were severely injured by shrapnel, while burning household garbage. In March, a soldier was injured by a grenade in São Domingos, near the Senegalese border.⁵¹ Also in March, a man was killed in a UXO explosion. In April, a man lost his leg after stepping on a landmine in the Bôr area. Another incident took place in April when, after a power failure, a Waters and Electricity of Guinea-Bissau employee stepped on a mine and lost a leg below the knee.⁵²

Survivor Assistance

The health care system was seriously affected by the 1998/1999 conflicts, and capacities for the care and rehabilitation of mine/UXO casualties are limited. Most landmine casualties are treated at either the Simões Mendes Hospital or the Military Hospital at the airport. The government reportedly does not have the resources to assist mine/UXO survivors, but it is working with Handicap International and ANDES to rehabilitate the disabled.⁵³ There are two prosthetics facilities in Bissau; one is governmental and the other is run by ANDES, with the support of HI.

ANDES runs the orthopedic center called the Casa Amiga dos Deficientes (the Friendly House of the Disabled) and supports 16 mine/UXO survivors with physiotherapeutic treatment and ten others are waiting for prosthetic care. The patients, mostly children, receive regular care in the Center. ANDES has reported problems maintaining an adequate supply of prosthetic material. In the past, ANDES supported the social and vocational reintegration of its patients, but as of mid-2002 no funds were available to provide these services. ANDES provides psychological support for survivors when needed. ANDES will also assist disabled soldiers of the liberation war, but is waiting on details of the intended beneficiaries. ANDES receives funding from HI, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to ANDES, CAAMI has the responsibility for data on landmine casualties.⁵⁴

There are several other local civilian associations working with people with disabilities, including mine survivors, such as ANAPRODEM, UNDEMO and AGUIPADE.⁵⁵

A census on the victims of landmines and other explosive remnants of war is underway, with at least 57 casualties identified to May 2002. Full details of the census should be available later in 2002.⁵⁶ Handicap International recently completed a study on the reintegration of disabled soldiers for the Program of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (PDRRI).⁵⁷ An independent study provided by Handicap International identified 1,687 disabled soldiers but no details are given on the cause of injury.⁵⁸

Disability Policy and Practice

There is no law or decree to assist disabled civilians in Guinea-Bissau. However, fighters in the liberation war against Portugal are entitled to medical and pharmaceutical care in a special

⁵⁰ Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

⁵¹ Report by Handicap International, Rapport d'activités du programme Handicap International en Guinée Bissau, Bissau, January to April 2002.

⁵² Telephone interview with Gérard Chagniot, UN Technical Advisor, CAAMI, Bissau, 17 June 2002.

⁵³ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁵⁴ Telephone interview with several unnamed members of ANDES, Bissau, 18 June 2002.

⁵⁵ Report by Handicap International, “Rapport d'activités du programme Handicap International en Guinée Bissau,” Bissau, January to April 2002.

⁵⁶ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁵⁷ Report by Handicap International, “Rapport d'activités du programme Handicap International en Guinée Bissau,” Bissau, January to April 2002.

⁵⁸ Handicap International, “Annual report on Guinea Bissau,” 22 March 2002; telephone Interview with Eric Debert, HI Guinea-Bissau Program Director, 20 June 2002.

clinic and pharmacy. For others not injured as a direct result of the liberation war – including the military serving in the last war – there is no such entitlement. The demobilization plan, PDRRI, does not have any specific provisions for landmine survivors. According to CAAMI's Director, survivor assistance is not within its mandate.⁵⁹

HOLY SEE

The Holy See signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 February 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999.

The Holy See attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

The Holy See submitted an Article 7 transparency report on 5 April 2002, for calendar years 2000 and 2001. This stated that the Holy See believes that implementation legislation "is unnecessary because it has never possessed or used anti-personnel mines."¹ The initial Article 7 Report was submitted on 28 August 1999. The Holy See has previously stated that it does not possess, produce, transfer, or use antipersonnel mines and is not mine-affected.²

The Holy See is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

HONDURAS

Key developments since May 2001: Clearance operations, originally targeted for completion in 2001, are now scheduled to be completed by the end of 2002. In April 2002, Honduras stated that the country had met 98.59 percent of its mine clearance objectives. Since September 2001, Honduras has served as co-chair of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration.

Mine Ban Policy

Honduras signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, deposited its instrument of ratification on 24 September 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. Honduras has not yet enacted national implementation legislation.¹

Honduras participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001. Since the Meeting, Honduras has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, together with Canada. It actively participated in all the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

On 11 April 2002, Honduras submitted its third Article 7 Report.² Both the 2002 and 2001 Article 7 reports included information on survivor assistance under the optional Form J.

Honduras cosponsored and voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, in November 2001.

Honduras is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

⁵⁹ Interview with Eng César Lopes de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted on 5 April 2002, covering January 2000-December 2001.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 712.

¹ The only national implementation measures Honduras has reported have been related to stockpile destruction. Article 7 Report, Form A (for the period from 3 December 2000 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001.

² Honduras has submitted three reports, dated 30 August 1999, 10 August 2001, and 11 April 2002. The time frame covered has varied for the different Forms within the annual reports.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Honduras has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. On 2 November 2000, Honduras destroyed its stockpile of 7,441 antipersonnel mines.³ It is retaining 826 antipersonnel mines (159 M-969, 469 M-4, and 198 FMK-1 mines) for training purposes.⁴

Landmine Problem

Landmines were planted during the 1980s by combatants in the Nicaragua conflict on both sides of the Nicaragua/Honduras border. More than 2,000 mines have been cleared and destroyed on the Honduran side of the border.⁵ None of the mines cleared in Honduras have been located more than a few hundred meters from the frontier.

Honduras has identified the departments of Choluteca, El Paraíso, Olancho, and Cortes as being mine-affected.⁶ Honduras maintains that all suspected mine-affected areas have been marked and properly recorded.⁷

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

The OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, through the Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines Program (Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), is responsible for coordinating and supervising the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamérica, PADCA), with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

The IADB is responsible for organizing a team of international supervisors in charge of training and certification, known as the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centroamérica, MARMINCA).

PADCA and MARMINCA have mine action programs in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In Honduras, the Army is also responsible for demining operations, along with PADCA and MARMINCA.

For the 2001 budget, the OAS PADCA program raised approximately \$4.72 million from the United States (\$1.27 million), Norway (\$1.15 million), Canada (\$979,232), Sweden (\$639,964), United Kingdom, (\$271,971), Spain (\$255,340), Italy (\$100,000) and Japan (\$45,000).⁸ This represents a decrease from \$4.92 million raised in the year 2000.

³ Article 7 Report, Forms B and G (for the period of 2 November 2000 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001. This report also states that Law 92-98 was published in the Official Gazette on 29 August 1998, ordering the destruction of all stockpiled landmines, and that on 1 September 2000, the Senior Chief of Staff (Señor Jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto) announced the Plan of Destruction of Stockpiled Landmines, which was executed in the period from 30 October to 2 November 2000. Article 7 Report, Form A (for the period from 3 December 2000 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form D (for the period of 2 November 2000 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001. There were significant discrepancies between the stockpile numbers reported in Honduras' 1999 Article 7 Report, and the numbers later reported as destroyed. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 350. A Honduran official has confirmed that the latter figures are correct. Telephone interview with Octavio Salomon Nuñez, Director of Special Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2002.

⁵ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from William McDonough, Coordinator, PACDA, Organization of American States, 24 July 2001.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form C (for the period 28 September 1995 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001. Cortes, some 300 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border, is not truly "mine-affected." An accidental explosion of a munitions storage area several years ago contaminated a wide area near the facility with unexploded munitions of various types. The area still requires clearance operations. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from William McDonough, Coordinator, PACDA, Organization of American States, 5 August 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form I (for the period 1994 to 2001), 10 August 2001.

⁸ In previous years other donors to the program have included: Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, and the Netherlands. "OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001," Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

The budget for the Honduras program for 2001 was \$650,456, and the same amount for and in 2002.⁹

According to the OAS, funding for the “Managua Challenge” project, which saw destruction of stockpiles by Honduras, Perú, and Ecuador prior to the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001, totaled \$487,533, and was provided by two donors: Canada (\$448,616) and Australia (\$38,917).¹⁰

Honduras has contributed military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA program since 1993, including four in 2001 and four in 2002.¹¹

Mine Clearance

According to the OAS, the completion of clearance operations in Honduras was anticipated by December 2001, but poor weather, adverse soil conditions, and maintenance difficulties with medical evacuation aircraft resulted in delays. Demining activities are now expected to be completed by the end of 2002, when the last remaining mined areas along the border with Nicaragua in Choluteca Department should be cleared.¹² In its April 2002 Article 7 Report, Honduras stated that the country had met 98.59 percent of its mine clearance objectives.¹³ Once the mine clearance is completed, technical supervisors will assist the Honduran Army in conducting quality assurance.¹⁴

From the beginning of the program in 1995 through the end of 2001, demining operations had resulted in the clearance of 380,385 square meters of land, and the destruction of 2,165 landmines and 56,009 UXO from the departments of El Paraíso, Olancho and Choluteca.¹⁵

Mine Risk Education

The Central American Bank for Economic Integration supports an OAS mine risk education program in Honduras and Nicaragua.¹⁶

The Canada/Mexico/PAHO Joint Program for the Rehabilitation of Victims in Central America is training mine risk educators in Honduras to carry out courses in communities and schools in mine-affected areas, delivering materials along with mine awareness messages.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

The last reported mine incident occurred on 18 March 2001, when a Honduran civilian attempting to cross into Nicaragua to hunt, lost his leg and an eye when he stepped on a landmine

⁹ Article 7 Report, “Necesidades de Financiamiento Programa de Desminado” (dated 20 March 2002), 11 April 2002.

¹⁰ Colonel William McDonough. “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002. “OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001,” Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

¹¹ Honduras has provided 13 supervisors or 6% of the total contributions to the program from countries of the region, including: one in 1993 and four in 2000, 2001 and 2002. Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America, Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

¹² See OAS contribution in Appendices of *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*. Technical difficulties with metal detection equipment also delayed the project. In January 2002, two Schiebel Company technicians arrived to inspect the equipment and the operation was restarted on 4 February 2002. Telephone interview with Miguel Barahona, Coordinator OAS/AICMA, 7 February 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, “Resumen Estadístico del Avance del Desminado” (for the period 1995 to 31 December 2001), 11 April 2002.

¹⁴ OAS, “Informe del Secretario General sobre la implementación de las Resoluciones 1745 (apoyo a PADEP) y 1751 (apoyo a PADCA),” 7 May 2001.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, “Resumen Estadístico del Avance del Desminado” (for the period 1995 to 31 December 2001), 11 April 2002. Also, Article 7 Report, Forms C (for the period 28 September 1995 to 10 August 2001) and G (for the period 2 November 2000 to 10 August 2001), 10 August 2001.

¹⁶ OAS, “Informe del Secretario General sobre la implementación de las Resoluciones 1745 (apoyo a PADEP) y 1751 (apoyo a PADCA),” 7 May 2001.

on the Nicaraguan side of the border.¹⁷ In September 1995, Honduran officials estimated that over 200 civilians had been killed in landmine incidents since 1990.¹⁸

With respect to the treatment of mine-related injuries, Honduras provides programs, training, equipment and transportation to medical care. The Secretary of Health of Honduras (Secretaría de Salud de Honduras) through the National University of Honduras (UNAH, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras) is working on developing information systems on the rehabilitation of disabled persons, community-based rehabilitation programs, economic reintegration programs, studies on prosthetic and orthotic services, and developing resources such as seminars and workshop. The Honduran Foundation for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (FUHRIL- Fundación Hondureña de Rehabilitación e Integración del Limitado) and NGOs, as well as the Mexican government, were involved in the economic reintegration of mine survivors. There are prosthetic workshops at the Honduras Social Security Institute (Instituto Hondureño de Seguro Social) in Teleton and the general hospital in San Felipe.¹⁹

In 2001, the orthopedic workshop at the San Felipe General Hospital in Tegucigalpa produced or repaired 470 prostheses. A new orthopedic workshop in San Pedro Sula, created and equipped by the Teleton Foundation, commenced production in August 2001.²⁰

The Canada-Mexico PAHO is supporting the Department of Health General Hospital regarding the rehabilitation program for survivors and the manufacture of prostheses.²¹

In Danli, the Gabriela Alvarado Rehabilitation Center continues to support disabled people with a wide range of services including physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration.

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) provides support to a network of prosthetic and orthotic workshops in Honduras and to organizations assisting people with disabilities, civil society coordination bodies, technical training programs, and to the creation of a national information system. While HIB does not directly provide services to disabled people, it supports more than twenty private and public Honduran institutions and five international organizations with training, technical, and financial assistance. More than 3,000 disabled persons benefited from the programs in 2001, with each patient paying for services according to their capacity. HIB activities are supported by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of the Presidency and the National Statistics Institute. The annual budget is \$230,000 and donors including the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, Canadian Cooperation, and private donors.²²

Honduras has laws on the rights of disabled persons.²³

HUNGARY

Key developments since May 2001: There is increasing information about the considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance, including mines, from the Second World War and later Soviet occupation uncovered each year. Hungary has a landmine alternative under development. Hungary has not confirmed whether it has completed the destruction of its UKA-63 antivehicle mines with tilt rod fuzes, which function like antipersonnel mines.

¹⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 352.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form J (for the period from 1995 to August 2001), 10 August 2001; see *also Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p 353.

²⁰ Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001.

²¹ Telephone interview with Lic. Octavio Salomon Nuñez, Director of Special Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 2002.

²² Thierry Gonthier, Program Director, Handicap International Belgium, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 30 June 2002.

²³ *Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2001*, Handicap International, Lyon, December 2001, p. 306.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Hungary signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 6 April 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and criminalizing violations entered into force on 7 March 1998.¹

Hungary attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, where it associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union. Hungary also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.²

The annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report was submitted on 24 April 2002. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 1 October 1999, 25 April 2000, and 30 April 2001.³ Hungary transmitted an annual report on antipersonnel landmines for 2001 to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).⁴ On 29 November 2001, Hungary cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

On the issue of joint military operations and exercises with non-States Parties, in May 2001, the Ministry of Defense repeated a previous statement that: "Hungarian soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines abroad during NATO army exercises, and foreign soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines in Hungary during NATO army exercises."⁵ The Hungarian Army took part in "63 NATO-NATO/PFP-PFP, and 22 bilateral and multilateral army exercises and programs" at home and abroad in 2001.⁶

Hungary is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. Hungary attended the Third Annual Conference to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Hungary associated itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union by Belgium. The annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II was presented at the annual conference. At the Second CCW Review Conference, Hungary supported the creation of a group of governmental experts to look at the issue of explosive remnants of war, and also co-sponsored the US-Danish proposal on antivehicle mines.⁷

Previously, a regional expert meeting on explosive remnants of war was held by the local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Budapest, on 21-22 June 2001.⁸ This was attended by 60-70 participants from 23 States in Central and Eastern Europe and concerned NGOs. Hungary was represented by 10-15 experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Military Technology.⁹

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 658.

² At all these meetings, it was represented by László Szűcs, Counselor in the Department for Security Policy and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Szűcs succeeded László Deák as Hungary's representative at antipersonnel mine conferences in August 2001.

³ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 1 October 1999 for the period 1 March-27 August 1999; submitted on 25 April 2000 for the period 27 August 1999-25 April 2000; submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period 1 May 2000-30 April 2001; and submitted on 24 April 2002 for the period 1 May 2001-30 April 2002.

⁴ Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the OSCE for 2001.

⁵ Statement by Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing on antipersonnel mines held by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest, 23 May 2001, p. 5. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 714-715.

⁶ Speech by General Lajos Fodor, Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Army, at the General Staff meeting, 7 March 2002, *Magyar Honvéd*, (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 15 March 2002, supplement, p. 11.

⁷ Letter from György Balogh, Security Policy and Arms Control Department (FEBIFO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2002.

⁸ "Nemzetközi konferencia a háborús fegyverekről," ("International conference on weapons of war"), Budapest, Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI, Hungarian News Agency), 20 June 2001.

⁹ Letter from Lt. Zsolt Nemes, First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (MH HTHE), 13 March 2002.

Hungary also took part in the regional seminar “Understanding the Ottawa Convention” held in Poland on 18-19 June 2001. In October 2001, Hungary attended a workshop on regional mine action that was organized by the NATO Partnership for Peace and held in Athens.

The *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* report on Hungary was published in Hungarian in the military technology journal of the Hungarian Association of the Art of War.¹⁰ Previous Landmine Monitor reports on Hungary have also been published locally. In November 2000, and again in January 2001, the Landmine Monitor researcher requested that issues raised in the reports be discussed by three Boards of the Hungarian Parliament (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board). On the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first two Boards declined to consider the report, but the third Board did consider it. László Deák (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Colonel József Tián (Ministry of Defense) and the Landmine Monitor researcher took part in the Board’s hearing on 23 May 2001. The hearing considered the researcher’s findings on MON type mines, the 1,500 GYATA-64 mines retained for permitted purposes, the POMZ-2 mines already destroyed, and the mined area at Nagybjom-Mesztegnő, and considered the views of the authorities on these issues. Mr. Deák told the Board that “since Hungary fulfilled her national level obligations included in the Ottawa Treaty ... we do not think that there are any open questions regarding the execution of the treaty that would be justified to discuss in public.”¹¹ He added that “for the government’s part, we have no aversion to so-called civilian oversight of the implementation of an international treaty.”¹² The Board closed the hearing without passing a resolution or proposition.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpile Destruction

Hungary stated in 1995 that it no longer produced or exported antipersonnel mines and has previously reported that it completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 29 June 1999.¹³ The April 2002 Article 7 Report clarifies that the entire stock of POMZ-2 mines (16,955) was destroyed by 16 June 1999.¹⁴ There remains conflicting information about when some other types of mines (M-49 and M-62) were destroyed.

Hungary’s Article 7 Reports provided little information on destruction methods, and safety and environmental standards, during stockpile destruction at the MWS site.¹⁵ The full environmental impact report on the site, including mine production and stockpile destruction, due by 31 August 2001, is now expected by September 2002. The latest estimate is that complete cleaning may cost HUF1.5 billion (US\$5,408,913).¹⁶

Hungary initially reported that 1,500 GYATA-64 mines would be retained under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁷ Then the April 2001 Article 7 Report noted a “change in policy,” with the

¹⁰ Dr. Tamás Csapody, “A gyalogsági aknák Magyarországon” (“Landmines in Hungary”), *Műszaki Katonai Közlöny* (Military Technical Journal), Technical Section of the Hungarian Association of the Art of War, No. 1, (special edition) 2002, pp. 3-35.

¹¹ Official minutes of the session held on 23 May 2001 by the Human Rights, Minority, and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, pp. 6-7 (unofficial translation).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 9 (unofficial translation).

¹³ See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Landmine Monitor Report 2000 and Landmine Monitor Report 2001.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form G, 24 April 2002.

¹⁵ On 11 December 2000, the regional environmental protection body found that “the geological medium is obviously contaminated by gunpowder” and MWS was reported as admitting that, “significant and only partly known pollution had been caused by the military and industrial manufacturing of explosives.” Resolution of the Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin on Binding MW Special PLC to Implement a Comprehensive Environmental Investigation of its Plant in Törökbálint, Budapest, 15 December 2000, p. 3.

¹⁶ Letters from MMS (MWS) to the Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin, 18 //December 2001 and 29 January 2002, and letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from Roland Spitz, authorized supervisor, Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin, 7 February 2002. Exchange rate at 24 March 2002: HUF277.32 = US\$1.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, 1 October 1999.

suggestion that they would be destroyed by the end of 2001.¹⁸ Now the April 2002 Article 7 Report states the mines will be retained for development of demining techniques.¹⁹

In February 2002, the Mechanical Works Special PLC in Törökbálint, where these mines are stored, requested the Technology Bureau of the Hungarian Army to state its plans for these mines. MWS added that it could either return the mines to the competent authority or disassemble the whole quantity within an eight-hour shift, if instructed.²⁰ The Ministry of Affairs has agreed to consider civil participation in inspecting the 1,500 GYATA-64 mines.²¹

In addition, 6,548 inert training mines of the same type are stored at three training centers and the Ministry of Defense site at Budapest-Háros.²²

While not mandatory under Article 7, the ICBL has asked States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure that directional fragmentation mines cannot be used in victim-activated (i.e., tripwire) mode, as use in victim-activation mode would constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Hungary has not reported on its MON directional fragmentation mines or possible modifications.²³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs's most recent statement on the issue says that "the MON-50, MON-100, and MON-200 type antipersonnel mines possessed by the Hungarian Army are directed splinter mines, and belonging to that type, they do not fall in the scope of the prohibitory orders of the Ottawa Treaty, therefore Hungary as a State Party is not obliged by international law to report them."²⁴

The UKA-63 antivehicle mine with tilt rod fuze remains a matter of concern, since it functions like an antipersonnel mine. Hungary previously indicated in March 2000 that it had destroyed half its inventory of UKA-63s, and would destroy the remaining 100,000 by March 2002. No confirmation of this has been received, and no mention is made in the CCW Article 13 Report of 29 November 2001 or the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report of 30 April 2002.

At the parliamentary board's hearing in May 2001 the Ministry of Defense representative repeated a previous statement that "there are no antipersonnel mines stockpiled at the Taszár base, used by the USA."²⁵ Since the military operations started in Afghanistan "the international forces has not increased their presence in Hungary, there has not been any growth in movements at Taszár, there are no special units of the NATO or the USA there."²⁶ The Ministry of Defense has agreed to check if the leasing agreements for foreign use of Hungarian military ranges prohibit mine use.²⁷

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2001.

¹⁹ Article 7 Reports, Form D, 30 April 2001 and 24 April 2002.

²⁰ Letter from Dr. László Molnár, deputy director-general, Mechanical Works Special PLC (MMS), 12 February 2002.

²¹ Email from László Szücs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002. The Landmine Monitor researcher's initial request to witness the transfer or destruction of these mines was refused. Letter from Árpád Adorján, Procurement and Marketing Director, Procurement and Security Investment Office, Hungarian Army, on behalf of Dr. János Kárász, deputy under-secretary, 28 February 2002, and letter from Tamás Ráth, director-general, Technology Bureau, Hungarian Army, (Rec. num: 154/2002), 18 February 2002.

²² Letter from Major László Kiss, Deputy Manager, Technical Service and Support Center of the Hungarian Army, Budapest-Háros, 8 March 2001, and email from László Szücs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 2002.

²³ See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 660-661, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 713.

²⁴ Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Deputy Head of the Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rec. num. 2518/2001, 12 March 2001.

²⁵ Statement by Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing on antipersonnel mines held by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest, 23 May 2001, p. 5.

²⁶ Brig. János Isaszegi, commander of the Interservice Operational Centre, Hungarian Army, "Egyeztetés a tájékoztatásról," ("Agreement on giving information"), MTI, 12 October 2001.

²⁷ Email from László Szücs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002.

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

In 2001, Hungary contributed HUF15 million (US\$54,089) to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund established for the destruction of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine, and HUF10 million (US\$36,059) to the PfP Moldovan project.²⁸

There have been no developments in the creation of a “regional mine destruction center” at Nyírtelek, as proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000 and at a seminar on the PFM mine in February 2001. The Ministry states that Hungary does not now want to destroy foreign mines in her territory (including the Ukrainian stockpile) and there are no negotiations ongoing.²⁹

Hungary has a seven-person mine clearance unit in Georgia as part of UNOMIG.³⁰ The Hungarian military contingent in Kosovo includes a four-person bomb disposal squad under KFOR. Soldiers of this unit attend weekly mine instruction drills.³¹ There is a four-person bomb-disposal squad within the Hungarian SFOR technical contingent in Croatia. A practice area was established in the Hungarian camp, so that soldiers can familiarize themselves with landmines.³²

Hungary took part in the international donor conference held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 25 September 2001. Hungary declared its readiness to help in demining, but there were no bilateral discussions.³³

Research and Development

Hungary is a member of NATO and regularly takes part in the twice-yearly meetings of its military technology committee (Army Armaments Group Landgroup 9 on Battlefield Engineering). Hungary participates in the Antipersonnel Landmine Alternative project (APL-A) of this committee with “above average” work and activity, according to Hungary’s representative. At the committee’s session in Budapest on 27-28 September 2001, Hungary reported on its development of a three-stage defensive system to replace antipersonnel mines. The first stage consists of a sensor-based signaling system of combined light, smoke, and sound emitting charges. The second stage is a “quickly deployable wire-entanglement” and the third is a “directed splinter charge.” This was described as a “territory defense antipersonnel weapon,” and “similar to MON type mines,” but with a more modern detonator.

The “special splinter grenade” was described as “quickly and easily deployable and removable.” It “can be separately activated and deactivated” and “is set into operation by remote control.” It could be used against tanks and infantry as well as personnel. It was said to cost ten times more than antipersonnel mines, and would not be left in the battlefield if only because of its price. At the same time, this new weapon was said to be more “humanitarian, since it endangers only the fighting parties.” Development is in progress.³⁴

²⁸ Report of the Hungarian Mission to the OSCE, (undated), and email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 2002.

²⁹ Letter from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 714.

³⁰ Editorial, “Magyar rendfenntartók Boszniában” (Hungarian peace-keeping forces in Bosnia), Népszabadság (daily newspaper), 7 March 2002, p. 3, and Szurmay Zoltán, “Aknák között a megbecsülését” (‘Striving for esteem among landmines’), Magyar Honvéd (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 31 August 2001, p. 4.

³¹ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Árpád Korpás, commander, Hungarian KFOR unit, 5 February 2002.

³² Telephone interview with Col. József Tián, commander of the Hungarian SFOR technical contingent, 5 February 2002; Col. Tián, previously the MoD representative, was appointed to the SFOR position on 1 July 2001.

³³ Lajos Bencze, “Tíz évig tartó aknamentesítés Horvátországban” (“Demining Croatia in the next ten years”), MTI, Zagreb, 25 September 2001; Hungary was represented by László Szűcs, Security Policy and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁴ Letter from Col. István Budai, head of Technical Engineering Branch of Logistics, General Management of Hungarian Defense Forces, 18 February 2002. Col. Budai is Hungary’s representative on the NATO military technology committee.

Landmine Problem and Mine/UXO Clearance

Hungary has reported officially that “there have been no identified or suspected minefields” and therefore no mine clearance programs in Hungary.³⁵ In March 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “According to available documentation, there are no mined areas subject to point 1c of Article 7 of the Treaty in Hungary.”³⁶ However, there is increasing information about areas contaminated by mines and UXO.

At the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, Lieutenant Zsolt Nemes presented a report by the 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Battalion of the Hungarian Army.³⁷ The battalion is responsible for all EOD in Hungary, and undergoes two trainings each year. The report indicated there are 2,600-2,800 calls per year requesting the clearance of UXO. The report included “mortars, shells, mines and bombs” in its definition of UXO.

Since World War II, the battalion has destroyed 20 million mines and UXO, and 20,000 tons of other ammunition and explosives, clearing an area of 10 square kilometers. From 1945 to 1957, most UXO were destroyed and minefields cleared; since 1957, the battalion has dealt with newly-discovered mines and UXO. Lieutenant Nemes identified the most contaminated areas as Pest, Fejér, Komárom-Eszetgom, Veszprem, Gyor, and Vas, resulting from World War II and later Soviet occupation.³⁸

According to the Ministry of Defense, the First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (HTHE) destroyed 141,180 explosive items in 2001, including 103 bombs, 282 mines, 1,197 mine-grenades, 1,275 hand-grenades, 5,074 artillery missiles, and more than 100,000 pieces of infantry ammunition. The bomb-disposal experts visited 2,836 sites, including 929 urgent cases.³⁹ Between 1 January and 24 March 2002, there were 477 calls.⁴⁰ In 2000, bomb-disposal experts turned out 2,775 times to deal with explosives, including 977 urgent cases. They destroyed 124,816 pieces of explosives.⁴¹

Captain Lajos Posta, Head of Reconnaissance Department, reported that in 2001 a total of 247 mines were found and destroyed in Hungary (95.2 percent were Soviet-made, 1.6 percent Hungarian, 3.2 percent German World War II mines). This included 39 antipersonnel mines, 15 of which were live mines, found near the Croatian border, on its Hungarian side, in former Soviet military areas, in a World War II battlefield in the Pilis Hills, and in the attic of a privately-owned house. Also included in the total were 25 live antivehicle mines. Most were found in former Soviet military areas.⁴²

In 2001, the investigation of mine/UXO contamination of Lake Balaton continued. In the Pilis hills, an October 2001 excavation of the WWII Soviet defense trenches showed that Soviet troops created a minefield of two lines of POMZ tripwire mines.⁴³ It was reported in 2001 that there may be “still about 100-120 WWII mines in the Hungarian section of river Danube, mostly in

³⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 November 2001.

³⁶ Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Deputy Head of Department, Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Rec. num. 2518/2001), Budapest, 12 March 2001.

³⁷ “Hungarian Army 1st EOD Battalion, 21-22 June 2001,” Report presented at the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, and Landmine Monitor notes.

³⁹ Z. T., “A tüzserészek statisztikája” (“Statistics for bomb-disposal experts”), *Magyar Honvéd*, (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 25 January 2002, p. 5. In 2001, HTHE became the legal successor of the First Bomb-disposal and Mine-searcher Battalion (HTAZ).

⁴⁰ “Telefax rovat,” (“telefax column”), *Magyar Honvéd* (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 29 March 2002, p. 5.

⁴¹ László Szűcs, “Kétezer-nyolcszáz bejelentés,” (“Two thousand eight hundred calls”), *Magyar Honvéd* (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 2 February 2001, p. 5.

⁴² Letter from Capt. Lajos Posta, head of Reconnaissance Department, First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (MH HTHE), Budapest, 20 February 2002.

⁴³ Dr. Lajos Négyesi, lecturer of the Faculty of History of War, Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, “A pilisi német áttörés” (“German breakthrough in Pilis”), 6-14 January 1945; Dr. Lajos Négyesi, “Csatateremtés a Pilisben” (“Battlefield research in the Pilis”), 26-28 October 2001; and telephone interview with Dr. Lajos Négyesi, 25 February 2002.

the environs of the capital ... these mines might cause harm only if they are poked. The Danube has probably covered these mines with a thick layer of river gravel and silt.”⁴⁴

In the State-owned woods around Nagybjom and Marcali, the remains of exploded munitions and unexploded mines and other munitions dating from World War II “caused serious problems in the last year.” Three lumber projects had to be stopped in recent years for these reasons.⁴⁵ Part of the contaminated area is in the Boronka Tájvédelmi Körzet (BTK - Boronka Landscape Protection Area) owned by the Somogy Természetvédelmi Szervezet (Somogy Nature Reserve Organization). The forestry director said that “there have not been any explosions for decades.”⁴⁶ The area “is not fenced, and there are no notice-boards of possible danger.”⁴⁷ The Marcali Forestry has submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Country Development an application each year in recent years for explosive clearance, but without any agreement being concluded.⁴⁸

Army experts describe the Mesztegyő area as “the single mined area remaining from World War II.”⁴⁹ Battlefield researchers of the Faculty of History of War of the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense plan to start explorations in the area in 2002.⁵⁰ Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed support for mine/UXO clearance of the Nagybjom-Mesztegyő area.⁵¹

Croatian firms have conducted clearance in a number of areas near the Hungarian border in 2001 and 2002.⁵² It has been reported that, “demining of the whole borderline will be executed in 2002.”⁵³ There is said to be good cooperation between the Hungarian and Croatian border guard authorities, and joint inspection of demined areas is carried out.⁵⁴

Landmine/UXO Casualties

The most recent Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report referred to a “lack of victims with specifically mine-related injuries.”⁵⁵ However, there have been casualties from UXO, and it is not clear how mine and UXO casualties are distinguished. In December 2001, Hungary distributed a report to the CCW, which stated that in the last 50 years, 300 EOD personnel had been killed. Lt.

⁴⁴ Lt. Col. Hubert István, commander of the Danube Fleet of the Hungarian Army, Zoltán Haszán, László Rab, “Elbocsátott flottilla” (“Dismissed fleet”), *Népszabadság* (Hungarian daily newspaper), 26 May 2001, p. 22.

⁴⁵ Telephone interview with István Borosán, director of the Marcali Forestry, Forestry and Timber Industry PLC, Somogy County (SEFAG Rt.), 28 March 2002.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ József Takács, director of Nagybjom Forestry. SEFAG Rt., and József Fehér, “Akik minden nap a halálba indultak,” (“Those who every day started out for death”), *Marcali Helytörténeti Füzetek* (Booklets on the Local History of Marcali) No. 24, 2002, p. 28.

⁴⁸ Telephone interview with Dr. Gyula Jákó, retired colonel of the Hungarian Army, director of POLIGON 22 Industrial and Trade Service Provider Ltd, 28 March 2002.

⁴⁹ Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, 23 May 2001, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Email from Dr. Lajos Négyesi, lecturer of the Faculty of History of War of the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, 13 March 2002.

⁵¹ Email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002, and letter from Dr. Ferenc Gazdag, Head of the Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 2 April 2002.

⁵² Protocol of the Delegation of the Hungarian Local Joint Commission of the Hungarian Republic. Border section 3. Pécs, 2001. Documents No. 1, 2, 3, received from the Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior.

⁵³ Delegation of the Hungarian Local Joint Commission of the Hungarian Republic. Border section 3. Discussion No. II, held on 7 December 2001, Pécs. Document No. 5, received from the Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior.

⁵⁴ Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Pál Ancsin, Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior, 5 February 2002.

⁵⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 November 2001.

Nemes also remarked during a noontime presentation that there were civilian casualties during 2001, and an average of two to three deaths per year, “mainly because people mishandle what they find.” No more details were given.⁵⁶

ICELAND

The Republic of Iceland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 May 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 November 1999. National implementation legislation was enacted on 7 May 2001.¹ Violations are punishable by a fine or up to two years imprisonment, which, if grave or repeated, can be up to four years.²

Iceland did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, nor the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. On 29 November 2001, Iceland cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Iceland’s initial Article 7 transparency report was not submitted by the deadline of 29 April 2000. An Article 7 Report for the period 1999 to 2002 was submitted on 29 May 2002. This report notes as “N/A” all questions regarding stockpiles, transfer, destruction, mined areas, and so forth. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed previous statements that there are no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Iceland, and that they have never been manufactured.³

Iceland has no military forces of its own, but is a member of NATO and has a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. In June 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to express any view on joint military operations with non-party States.⁴

Iceland is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

During 2001 and the start of 2002 Iceland did not contribute financial or other assistance to any mine action program. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that Iceland participates in NATO peace-support operations in the Balkans, which include demining activities.⁵

IRELAND

Key developments since May 2001: Ireland provided €2,243,204 (US\$2,014,397) in mine action funding in 2001, a significant increase from 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Ireland signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Implementation was achieved by the Explosives (Landmine) Order of 12 June 1996. Because the Order does not apply to the Irish Defence Forces, an amendment was made to the Defence Forces Tactical Doctrine in 1996 prohibiting the use of antipersonnel landmines. However, there are no legally-based punitive measures if a violation of the treaty occurs. Government authorities are reviewing the legislation.¹

Ireland attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, and meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002.

⁵⁶ “Hungarian Army 1st EOD Battalion, 21-22 June 2001,” Report presented at the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001, and Landmine Monitor notes.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted on 29 May 2002 for the period 1999-2002.

² Email from Haukur Ólafsson, Minister-Counselor, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 2002. Violations are dealt with according to provisions in Chapter III of the Icelandic Penal Code.

³ Email from Haukur Ólafsson, Minister-Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

¹ Interview with Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2002.

The annual Article 7 transparency report was submitted on 2 May 2002 for calendar year 2001. This included the voluntary Form J, in which Ireland reports mine action funding. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 16 August 1999, 14 April 2000, and 18 June 2001.²

On 29 November 2001, Ireland cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ireland is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and submitted its annual report under Article 13 on 6 December 2001. It attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Ireland has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.³ In June 2001, Ireland recorded retaining 127 EXPAL antipersonnel mines of Spanish manufacture for training purposes as permitted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ The December 2001 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report states that Ireland “currently possesses” 126 mines for permitted purposes.⁵ The May 2002 Article 7 Report records 125 mines retained.⁶

Mine Action Funding

Ireland reports that it has made substantial contributions to demining and victim assistance in some of the most severely affected areas, and gives details in an annex to its Article 13 report. As regards funding policy, Ireland assesses mine action programs to be supported through Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance funds according to “their relevance to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in terms of disaster relief and recovery in the field. This connectedness is an essential criterion for mine action funding from these funds.... Since 1994, Ireland has spent over £7 million [US\$7.9 million]⁷ on a wide variety of demining and rehabilitation projects.”⁸

Mine action is also funded by Ireland Aid, the development cooperation division of the Department for Foreign Affairs. It is described as committed to providing mine action support as relevant to its respective humanitarian interventions, taking into account whether such support is under threat from resumed conflict or use of mines, and whether countries are members of Mine Ban Treaty.⁹

Total Irish mine action funding in 2001 was €2,243,204 (US\$2,014,397), according to the Department of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰ The Article 7 Report for 2001 gives funding data in Irish pounds, totaling Ir£1,769,710 (\$1,990,902) divided between programs supported by Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance funds totaling Ir£1,133,030 (\$1,274,645) and “demining assistance”

² Article 7 Reports, submitted on 16 August 1999 for the period 3 December 1997-16 August 1999; submitted on 14 April 2000 for the period 16 August 1999-14 April 2000; submitted on 18 June 2001 for the period 14 April 2000-27 April 2001; and submitted on 2 May 2002 for calendar year 2001.

³ Article 7 Reports, 16 August 1999 and 14 April 2000. Regarding non-use of mines in the Irish conflict, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 630, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 666.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form D, 18 June 2001.

⁵ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 6 December 2001.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 2 May 2002. If the two mines were expended for training purposes, Ireland did not explicitly report that fact, and it did not report any mines having been transferred for training or destruction.

⁷ Currency conversions from Irish Pounds to US Dollars in this section done by Landmine Monitor using inter-bank rates, 31 December 2001.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2002; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Annex I, 6 December 2001.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Email and fax from Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2002; interview with Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 16 May 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = \$0.898, used throughout.

totaling Ir£636,680 (\$716,257). In 2000, Ireland donated Ir£1,252,105 to mine action, and in 1999 donated Ir£1,566,000.¹¹

Mine Action Funding by the Irish Government in 2001¹²

Country	Implementing Agency	Activity	Amount €
Afghanistan	ICRC	Victim assistance	316,445
Angola	HALO Trust	Demining	181,012
Angola	UNICEF	Mine awareness	126,582
Cambodia	Handicap International	Victim assistance	189,873
Cambodia	HALO Trust	Demining	373,455
Vietnam	Mines Advisory Group	Demining	246,835
Mozambique	HALO Trust	Demining	282,745
Mozambique	Accelerated Demining Program	Demining	304,737
	UN Mine Action Service	Demining	221,520
Total			2,243,204 (US\$2,014,397)

Funding in Afghanistan was for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) program of orthotic-prosthetic centers. In Angola, funding of the HALO Trust was for an emergency clearance of 80,000 square meters of land for internally displaced persons. Funding of the UNICEF mine awareness program was aimed at 500,000 internally displaced persons and 100,000 children in 11 provinces of Angola. In Cambodia, HALO was funded for continuation of a long-term program of mine clearance and HI for victim assistance to mine survivors and other disabled people.¹³

Funding of some of the programs continued in 2002, with addition of a donation of €50,000 (US\$44,900) to the Implementation Support Unit of the Mine Ban Treaty at the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. Funding decisions for 2002 by the end of April totaled €1,097,000 (\$985,106).¹⁴

It is planned that Ireland's development aid funding will continue to rise until 2007, reaching 0.7 percent of GDP, which will include possibilities for increased mine action funding.¹⁵

ITALY

Key developments since May 2001: As of May 2002, only 460,000 antipersonnel mines from an original stockpile of 7.1 million remained to be destroyed. Italy provided about €5.6 million (\$5 million) to mine action in 2001, an increase from 2000. The implementation regulation for the new Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining was adopted on 17 December 2001. The National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action was reconvened in March 2002.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2002; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Annex I, 6 December 2001. These reports give funding data for 2000 that differs from that in the Article 13 Report of 13 December 2000, on which the previous Landmine Monitor report for Ireland was based.

¹² Email and fax from Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2002; interview with Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 16 May 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2002; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Annex I, 6 December 2001.

¹⁴ Email and fax from Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 April, and interview with Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 16 May 2002.

¹⁵ Interview with Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 16 May 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Italy signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999.¹ National mine ban legislation (Law 374/97) was approved on 29 October 1997, and amended by the Mine Ban Treaty ratification law (Law 106/99), which was approved on 26 March 1999.

Italy participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.² It made interventions regarding stockpile destruction, mines retained for training and development purposes, and antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, among other things (see below for details). Italy continued to participate actively in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including in January and May 2002.³

In the May intersessional meeting, the delegation commented on the issue of joint military operations, noting that cooperation in military activities with non-States Parties is permitted by Italy's national legislation only if this cooperation is compatible with Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Italian troops in Afghanistan have been given written instructions "to categorically abstain from any participation in actions contrary to the letter and the spirit" of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ Similarly, a December 2001 government report stated that Italian law requires the Mine Ban Treaty prohibitions to be observed by Italian armed forces in operations even when performed in a multinational context, with the participation of States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵

On 29 November 2001, Italy cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Italy submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 2 May 2002, for the period 17 October 1998-31 December 2001. The report includes the voluntary Form J summarizing funding of mine action in 2001.⁶

Italy is a State Party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol on 5 December 2001. This notes the technical assistance provided for mine action, which was not included in previous Article 13 reports.⁷ Italy participated in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. A statement was delivered on behalf of European Union (EU) countries by Belgium.⁸

On 14 December 2001, Italy submitted its report on landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including details of mine action funding and other assistance in 2001.⁹

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 713-715.

² It was represented by Maurizio Fratini, Ambassador to Nicaragua, Angelo Persiani, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Brigadier-General Piero Luchetti, Head of Joint Arms Verification Centre, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michele Oliva, Section Chief, Ministry of Defense.

³ The delegations included Ambassador Mario Maiolini and Angelo Persiani, Deputy Permanent Representative, Conference on Disarmament, Paolo Cuculi, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Brigadier-General Piero Luchetti, Head of Joint Arms Verification Centre, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michele Oliva, Section Chief, Col. Giuseppe Cornacchia, Office Chief, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alfonso Iafusco, Ministry of Defense, retired Rear Admiral Manfredo Capozza, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vincenzo Celeste, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Italy's Statement on Article 1 of Ottawa Convention, Joint Military Operations, to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2001.

⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, submitted on 5 December 2001.

⁶ Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 29 March 2000, and 30 April 2001. Article 7 Reports, submitted on 29 March 2000 (reporting period stated "as of 31 January 2000"); submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period 17 October 1998-31 December 2000; and submitted on 2 May 2002 for the period 17 October 1998-31 December 2001.

⁷ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, submitted on 5 December 2001.

⁸ See the report on Belgium in this edition of the *Landmine Monitor*.

⁹ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001.

Production and Transfer

Italy was formerly a major producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ Information on the conversion or de-commissioning of two production facilities (Tecnovar and Valsella) has been included in Article 7 Reports, but not for a third former producer (Misar/SEI).¹¹

Regarding the issue of transit of foreign antipersonnel mines, Italy has stated that the national legislation forbids activities not compatible with the Mine Ban Treaty, and transit is allowed only for the purpose of destruction of mines.¹²

Stockpiling and Destruction

Destruction of the stockpile of more than 7.1 million antipersonnel mines began in February 1999. National legislation requires that destruction be completed by 29 October 2002, in advance of the 1 October 2003 deadline set by the Mine Ban Treaty. Italy has said it expects to complete destruction in time for the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.¹³

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, and at the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, updates of the progress of stockpile destruction were given. There were about 1.1 million mines left to destroy in September 2001, about 500,000 left in January 2002, and about 380,000 left in May 2002.¹⁴

More precisely, as of 15 May 2002, Italy had destroyed a total of 6,661,861 antipersonnel mines, and 460,928 remained to be destroyed, including 386,789 “warfare” mines and 74,139 “practice” or “training” mines.¹⁵ Last year’s Landmine Monitor noted 4,086,057 mines had been destroyed as of March 2001. Thus, more than 2.57 million mines were destroyed from March 2001 to May 2002.

Italy has stressed on a number of occasions that its experience has shown that the four-year deadline for the destruction of antipersonnel mine stockpiles is achievable even by States Parties with very large stockpiles. Italy has emphasized the need for political will in meeting the treaty deadline. Italy has also declared its willingness to share its expertise in stockpile destruction with other States, and has supported the creation of an informal contact group on stockpile destruction, to help ensure that all States Parties can meet this obligation.¹⁶

Stockpile destruction has been carried out at the Baiano di Spoleto (all types) and Noceto di Parma (Valmara 69) military plants. Italy’s Article 7 Reports have stated that there has been “no transfer outside of Italian territory” for the purposes of destruction.¹⁷ However, in March 2002, the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that destruction of some Italian mines, particularly those held by the air force, had been assigned to private companies “in countries of the Western

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 717-729.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form E, submitted on 2 May 2002 for the period 17 October 1998 - 31 December 2001; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 670, where this omission was noted in more detail.

¹² Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2001.

¹³ Italy’s Statement on Stockpile Destruction, to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2001. Regarding the total of 7.1 million antipersonnel mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 721.

¹⁴ Oral remarks at Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; oral remarks at Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2002 and 30 May 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

¹⁵ “Dati della relazione semestrale del Ministro alle Commissioni Parlamentari. Riportati sul Registro delle mine 8 edizione e su Rapporto ONU 2002” (Data from interministerial report to Parliamentary Commissioners. Register of Mines 8th edition and UN Report 2002 included), presented orally to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002. These interministerial reports and the Register of Mines included are required by Law 374/97, and were submitted to Parliament in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. For costs, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 721.

¹⁶ Oral remarks at Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001; oral remarks at Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2002 and 30 May 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Forms D and G, 2 May 2002.

European Armaments Group,” with specific mention of a company based in Germany.¹⁸ However, Germany has not reported the transfer or destruction of any mines from Italy.¹⁹

Mines Retained Under Article 3

Italy’s May 2002 Article 7 Report states that 7,992 antipersonnel mines have been retained as permitted under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, including 811 “warfare” mines and 7,181 “practice” mines. This is a reduction of eight warfare mines from the totals reported in the previous Article 7 Report.²⁰ Italy noted in the May 2002 intersessional meeting that it had previously decided to reduce the number of mines retained from 10,000 to 8,000, and added that some of those retained were in fact only “parts” of mines, not functioning live mines. It said, “We have realized that the number of 8,000 should probably be more correctly assessed to a lower level,” noting that 2,500 units are components that should not be counted as mines.²¹

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Italy stated its view that no State Party should retain in excess of 10,000 antipersonnel mines, and agreed with the recommendation of the Standing Committee co-chairs that the precise purpose for which retained mines were used should be reported.²²

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices

States Parties have discussed at some length the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices that may function as antipersonnel mines. Italy has noted that the Italian national law does not permit antihandling devices and that Italy has no antivehicle mines with antihandling devices.²³ Italy has encouraged other States Parties to follow the example of Italian legislation which defines an antipersonnel mine as any device which is designed or capable of being adapted to detonate as a consequence of the presence, proximity or contact of a person. Italy has said it attaches much importance to this issue and has called for States Parties to discuss the matter openly as transparency is essential. In May 2002 it said that States Parties “should explore all possibilities available, through the avenue of a best practices approach, as suggested by the ICRC and Belgium as a means of moving forward.”²⁴

Mine Action Funding Policy

The legislation ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty required that a Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining be created, and required specific funding for mine victim assistance. After much parliamentary discussion which amended the amounts of funding, the Trust Fund was established on 7 March 2001 by Law 58/2001. This law sets the goals of the Fund, provides guidelines for

¹⁸ Interview with Col. Giuseppe Cornacchia, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, Rome, 11 March 2002. These could be German-produced KB44, MIFF, MUSA and MUSPA mines, which the Italian Air Force has in stock as part of MIX-1 and MIX-2 systems. Article 7 Report, Form G, H, 2 May 2002; Article 7 Report, Form B1, 29 March 2000; “Registro delle Mine” (Register of Mines), 16 November 1998, released 30 April 1999/29 October 1999.

¹⁹ See country report on Germany.

²⁰ Article 7 Reports, Forms D, 2 May 2002 and 30 April 2001.

²¹ Italy’s Statement on Article 3 of Ottawa Convention, APLs Retained for Training Purposes, to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002. Apparently, Italian national law requires counting the components as retained mines, but the Mine Ban Treaty would not.

²² Oral remarks at Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

²³ *Ibid*; Remarks at Standing Committee on General Status, 1 February 2002 and 31 May 2002; Italy’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, dated 5 December 2001, also notes that the Italian legal definition of an antipersonnel mine allows no exception for antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices.

²⁴ Italy’s Statement on Article 2 of Ottawa Convention, AVMs Equipped with Anti-Handling Devices Which Could Be Assimilated to APLs, to the Standing Committee on General Status, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

Italian mine action, and requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide for its implementation by means of a regulation. The law also requires an annual report on implementation to be sent to Parliament. The first report was sent on 5 April 2002.²⁵

The implementation regulation was adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 December 2001. This states that activities undertaken are to be coherent with Italian foreign policy, harmonized with international community aid programs, linked to the objectives of Law 47/1997 on cooperation and aid to development, coordinated with the ministry's other disarmament initiatives, and must promote universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Within the ministry, the department dealing with multilateral political affairs and human rights is to set priorities for mine action projects. The projects are to be managed by the department responsible for cooperation and development. In the case of multilateral projects, the ministry will make agreements with the implementing organizations, requiring periodic reports of activity before further disbursement of funds.²⁶

During scrutiny of the implementation regulation, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense Commissions both suggested in their written statements to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the amounts allocated to the Trust Fund after 2002 be increased from the proposed L15 billion (€7.5 million, \$6.735 million);²⁷ that mine action funding for Afghanistan be increased; that formal recognition be given to the CNAUMA (Comitato Nazionale per l'Azione Umanitaria Contro le Mine, National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action); and that funding of Italian NGOs should be accorded priority. This last recommendation was partially rejected by the Ministry, because it is incompatible with other rules and principles.²⁸

The CNAUMA was reconvened on 5 March 2002, under the presidency of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Luigi Mantica, after last meeting in September 2000.²⁹ The meeting was attended by a wide range of those involved in mine action, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Industry, Education and Research, many NGOs, and MAS (Italian Enterprise for Demining). It was agreed that the work of CNAUMA would be open to all interested parties and would be permanent, with twice-yearly plenary sessions and group meetings in four areas following the pattern of the Standing Committees, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will act as the secretariat.

The meeting on 5 March 2002 set, as priorities, defining the strategies and areas of intervention for Italian mine action, promoting the exchange of information nationally and internationally, informing the public on mine issues, identifying research into demining technologies and equipment, and surgery/prosthetics, and monitoring the actual level of mine action funding from 2003.³⁰ Law 58/2001 states that funding will decrease to L5 billion (€2.5 million, \$2.245 million) in 2003 and thereafter the amount allocated for mine action must be set by the annual budget. A CNAUMA group meeting took place on 9 April 2002, to discuss the objectives and funding of Italian mine action. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other participants tabled proposals, which remain in discussion.

Mine Action Funding

At the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002 Italy distributed an itemized list of mine action projects funded in 2001. Mine action funding in 2001 totaled €5,628,386 (\$5,054,291).³¹ This includes some commitments made in 2001 with disbursement of funds

²⁵ Camera dei Deputati/Senato della Repubblica, Doc. CLXXIII, no. 1, 5 April 2002.

²⁶ "Decreto Ministeriale del Ministro degli Affari Esteri" (Ministerial Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), No. 41067, 17 December 2001.

²⁷ Exchange rate: L2,000 = €1; €1 = \$0.898.

²⁸ Resoconto Commissioni Congiunte Esteri e Difesa, Seduta del 14.11.2001, Chamber of Deputies, Resoconto Commissioni Congiunte Esteri E Difesa, Seduta del 21.11.2001, Senate.

²⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 668-669, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 719-720.

³⁰ Report of CNAUMA meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2002.

³¹ "Italy - 2001. Mine Clearance, Rehabilitation and Victim Assistance Programmes," distributed at Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, January 2002.

continuing in 2002. Italy's most recent Article 7 Report records similar funding data for calendar year 2001 on Form J, totaling €5,576,477 (\$5,007,676).³² This compares to mine action funding of \$2 million in 2000 and \$6.5 million in 1999.³³ Project funding in 2001 was as follows.³⁴

Funded via the Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining (€2,582,285, or \$2,318,892):

- Afghanistan – €1,570,030 to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to support emergency demining by the NGO Intersos. This was pledged at the Bonn conference on Afghanistan in November 2001.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina – €224,142 to UNICEF for mine risk education.
- Ethiopia – €224,142 to UNICEF for mine risk education.
- Yemen – €280,436 to UNMAS to support humanitarian demining programs implemented by the UN Development Program (UNDP), with other funding by Saudi Arabia, Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Yemeni government requested Italian support on the basis of a five-year action plan to free the country from landmines.
- UNMAS – €100,709 to support the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines, and €182,826 un-earmarked.

Funded via the International Cooperation Aid to Development and other funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (€3,046,101, or \$2,735,398):

- Afghanistan – €1,032,920 to Emergency via UNDP for assistance and rehabilitation of victims of war and landmines. This is additional funding of projects financed in 2000 and reported in last year's Landmine Monitor.
- Kosovo – €258,000 to Intersos through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for mine clearance. Funding of this project was completed in 2001.
- Lebanon – €25,822 for the supply of equipment for humanitarian demining.
- Organization of American States – €114,000 to support humanitarian demining programs in Nicaragua and Honduras.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina – €242,734 to Intersos for assistance and rehabilitation to victims of war and landmines.³⁵
- Libya – €1,265,320 to support humanitarian demining programs, as a precondition to implementation of the bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy signed in 2000 for support in developing agricultural areas remaining heavily mined since World War II. The terms of the larger program have not yet been agreed, so funds for demining have been allocated but not yet disbursed.
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining – €67,305 for the sponsorship program for less developed countries to participate in Mine Ban Treaty activities, and €40,000 as a contribution to the Implementation Support Unit. (In 2002, Italy donated a further €47,000 to the Unit.³⁶)

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there are other sources of mine action funding, such as the geographic departments, but usually in small amounts. Mine action projects are sometimes included in larger cooperation and development programs, or financed through un-earmarked funds allocated to UNMAS.

³² Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2002.

³³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 723-724.

³⁴ Based on "Italy – 2001. Mine Clearance, Rehabilitation and Victim Assistance Programmes," distributed at Standing Committee meetings, January 2002, and telephone interviews with Counselor Vincenzo Celeste, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March and April 2002.

³⁵ This figure is given as €245,160 by Intersos. Email from Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, 13 June 2002.

³⁶ Email from Kerry Brinkert, Manager, Implementation Support Unit, to Landmine Monitor, 21 June 2002.

Research and Development

Italy participates in two research projects on demining technology funded by the EU.³⁷ The Demand project involves an effort to field a prototype composed of a trolley carrying three different kind of sensors: a metal detector, a ground penetrating radar and a biological vapour sensor. The five project partners, including the Italian Ingegneria dei Sistemi Spa, hope to develop a fully-engineered detector within one to one-and-a-half years after completion of the research project in June 2003.

The Diamine project is carried on by eight partners including the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare and is led by the Laben SPA (a private company within the partially state owned Finmeccanica). It aims to develop a prototype hand-held mine detector using the neutron backscattering technique, integrated with a metal detector, in order to detect plastic mines. Diamine started in January 2001 and will continue for three years.

Several smaller research and development activities on mine detection technologies have started at research laboratories and universities in Italy.

Mine Clearance

During 2001, Italian armed forces in the three countries carried out mine risk education, training and clearance activities as part of their wider duties. In Kosovo, this included destruction of 32 antipersonnel mines and 373 antivehicle mines. In Bosnia, the Italian battle group organized mine risk education for two groups of Bosnian boy scouts, and other children in the Boracko Lake area, in June and July 2001. Training in mine clearance was provided to the Bosnian armed forces. Thirty-two antipersonnel mines were destroyed.³⁸ In Afghanistan, the Italian armed forces supplied troops in February 2002 for security duties and mine clearance as part of the international forces deployed to Afghanistan.³⁹

The Italian NGO INTERSOS⁴⁰ carried out clearance in Kosovo from August 2000 to December 2001. It also trained local personnel, and conducted mine risk education. The Intersos mine clearance project in Angola's Huila province and Kanongondo area, which started in October 1999, ended in September 2001. It also trained a local team of deminers and provided mine risk education. From September 2001 to February 2002, Intersos demined near the city of Missombo in the province of Cuando Cubango.

In Yugoslavia, during June-July 2001 Intersos carried out a general survey to assess the presence of UXO and cluster bombs. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from September 2001 to March 2002, INTERSOS carried out mine clearance of houses in support of an EC-funded housing-reconstruction program.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, INTERSOS started a mine clearance project in January 2002 in Hrasnica, a suburb of Sarajevo. In Afghanistan, INTERSOS created a rapid intervention unit in January 2002, in collaboration with the Afghan NGO Technical Consultants. INTERSOS also provides training in clearance of cluster munitions and explosive ordnance disposal.

CESVI (Cooperazione E Sviluppo, Cooperation and Development) carried out demining operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Eritrea in 2001, using demining teams from other organizations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the municipalities of Drvar, Grahovo and Glamoc, CESVI worked with two demining teams from Help UDT, a German demining organization. In Afghanistan, CESVI in cooperation with the Aiutare I Bambini foundation cleared

³⁷ Information in this section is from an interview with Giancarlo Nebbia, Istituto Nazionale Di Fisica Nucleare, member of CNAUMA, Rome, 5 March 2001.

³⁸ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, 5 December 2001; Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001, pp. 1-2.

³⁹ "Afghanistan – Unos 600 hombres que constituirán el primer batallón del futuro Ejército afgano llegaron el domingo a Kabul," *Europa Press* (Madrid), 14 February 2002.

⁴⁰ Information on INTERSOS activities in this section is taken from an interview with, and documents supplied by Stefano Calabretta, INTERSOS, Rome, 3 April 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 727.

mines and UXO from a high school in Taloqan, Takhar region. In Eritrea, CESVI in cooperation with the UN mission organized a survey in the town of Omhajer.⁴¹

Mine Risk Education

In Kosovo, INTERSOS integrated mine/UXO clearance activities with a mine risk education program. Working with the deminers, the Intersos Mine Awareness Support Team (MAST) informed the local population and received information from it. With a private donation of €10,000 from BNP Paribas, a section of the MAST gave direct presentations to each family in 25 villages, contacting 4,658 people, during clearance operations from January to June 2001. Mine risk education was also carried out in schools and villages near cleared areas, reaching an estimated 10,000 people in 2001.⁴²

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, community liaison was carried out during survey and clearance operations by Intersos.⁴³

In 2001, the Italian National Committee for UNICEF collected funds from private donors (€1,500,000) for an emergency program in Afghanistan, which included mine risk education.⁴⁴

Movimondo, which provided support to the demining program of the Nicaraguan army in agricultural areas, carried out a mine risk education project jointly with the army in the San Francisco Libre municipality, and helped collaboration between the local population and deminers. The project is part of a food security project by Movimondo, funded by the European Union.⁴⁵

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, an Italian soldier serving with NATO as part of the peacekeeping Operation Amber Fox was killed by an antivehicle mine near Tetovo on 8 May 2002.⁴⁶

Several Italian NGOs support survivor assistance programs in mine-affected countries. Additional information on the programs can be found in the relevant Country report.

INTEROS provided support to the orthopedic center for mine survivors in the Menongue-Cuando Cubango province of Angola from 1999 until March 2002. The program cost from October 1999 to March 2001 was €800,000, provided by the EU (€430,000), Italy's Cooperation Aid to Development fund (€300,000), and by Intersos with local NGO Mbwembwa (€70,000). The cost from April 2001 to March 2002 was €382,870, provided by the EU (€295,000) and Intersos (€87,870).⁴⁷

The NGO AVSI (Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale) started a three-year program in July 1998, providing medical rehabilitation for war victims in northern Uganda, with financial support from the EU (\$105,676 per year).⁴⁸

The Padua-based NGO CUAMM (Medici Per L'Africa) provides medical care in Angola which includes assistance to mine survivors.

The NGO, Emergency, carried out survivor assistance activities in Cambodia, northern Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001.⁴⁹ Emergency provides its own funding for the project in Cambodia, while the program in northern Iraq is funded by Emergency and UNOPS within the UN oil for food program. In Afghanistan, activities are funded by Emergency and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the UNDP.

⁴¹ Email from Stefano Piziali, CESVI, 11 April 2002.

⁴² Interview with Stefano Calabretta, INTERSOS, Rome, 3 May 2002.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Fax and questionnaire from Anna Orlandi Cantucci, UNICEF Italy, 11 March 2002.

⁴⁵ Emails from Vincenzo Pira, Movimondo, 11 and 14 March 2002.

⁴⁶ "Peacekeeper Killed in Macedonia Landmine Blast," *Agence France Presse*, 8 May 2002.

⁴⁷ Interview with Stefano Calabretta, INTERSOS, Rome, 3 May 2002.

⁴⁸ Email and questionnaire from Alberto Repossi, Program Officer for Africa, AVSI, 7 March 2002.

⁴⁹ Email and questionnaire from Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, 24 April and 16 May 2002.

JAMAICA

Jamaica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 17 July 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. In 2001, drafting instructions for implementation legislation were sent to the Jamaica Chief Parliamentary Council.¹ Jamaica did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings during the reporting period, but it welcomed progress made in implementation of the treaty and called for more assistance for demining and mine victims when it gave a statement on behalf of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members to the UNGA First Committee debate on disarmament in October 2001.² It also cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Jamaica submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 20 June 2000, and an annual updated report on 1 May 2002. Jamaica has never produced, stockpiled, transferred, or used antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine-affected.³ In a letter to the ICBL, the Foreign Minister stated, "Jamaica remains committed to international action aimed at eliminating landmines" and noted that "Jamaica supports the provision of rehabilitative assistance to countries whose citizens are affected by landmines as per article 6 of the Treaty...."⁴

JAPAN

Key developments since May 2001: Japanese mine action funding fell about 40 percent in 2001, to 741 million Japanese Yen (US\$6.98 million). In January 2002, Japan pledged \$19.22 million in emergency funds for mine action activities in Afghanistan. Japan has destroyed 605,040 antipersonnel mines, including 382,680 between March 2001 and February 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Japan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and ratified it on 30 September 1998. Japan became a State Party on 1 March 1999 and at the same time domestic legislation, the Law on the Prohibition of the Manufacture of Anti-personnel Mines and the Regulation of the Possession of Anti-personnel Mines, entered into force.¹

In June 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs named Ms. Kanako Nozawa, Secretary of Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, as Japan's "Focal Point" on Victim Assistance.² In August 2001, Japan participated in the regional stockpile destruction seminar in Malaysia.

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Japan's one-year term as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration came to an end. Japan also decided to end the position of Ambassador Hisami Kurokouchi as Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Problems of Mines.³ In April 2002, the Ministry established a Conventional Weapons Division, in charge of Small Arms and Landmines, within the Foreign Policy Bureau.

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted 1 May 2002.

² HE M. Patricia Durrant, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations, CARICOM Statement to the First Committee of the UNGA, New York, 12 October 2001, p. 4.

³ Article 7 Report, submitted 1 May 2002.

⁴ Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade K.D. Knight to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, ICBL, 11 July 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 24 April 2002.

² The ICBL has long advocated that each government name such a focal point, and the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance has encouraged States Parties to do so in Article 7 Form J.

³ Meeting between the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Association for Aid and Relief Japan, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 3 October 2001. The Special Advisor position had been created for Ambassador. Kurokouchi in December 2000, after which time she also served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee.

Japan participated actively in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Japan also attended the regional seminar, "Landmines in Southeast Asia," hosted by Thailand in Bangkok in May 2002. At that seminar, Japan's representative said, "Japan has been urging the governments of countries that have not ratified the Convention to do so. For example, Japan called on China, India and Russia last October and November, and some Asian countries this April and May to accede to the Ottawa Convention."⁴

Japan voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, promoting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 24 April 2002, Japan submitted its fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, again utilizing the optional "Form J" to report on its victim assistance efforts worldwide.

Japan is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Japan submitted on 10 December 2001 its annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. Japan attended the Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, as well as the Second Review Conference of the CCW, in Geneva in December 2001. In its statement to the Review Conference, Japan expressed support for: extension of the scope of the CCW to internal conflicts; the proposal for new restrictions on mines other than antipersonnel mines; and, the proposal to establish a group of governmental experts to consider ways and means to deal with problems caused by explosive remnants of war.⁵

Japan believes that the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuses or antihandling devices should be dealt with in the CCW, not the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶

The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) requested the government to clarify Japan's position on antipersonnel mines stockpiled by United States in Japan, and possible transit of those mines through Japan.⁷ On 3 October 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, "The government of Japan (GOJ) does not bear any responsibility to prevent or prohibit the transportation of landmines by US military forces."⁸ It also noted that because the US mines are not under Japan's jurisdiction or control, Japan is not obliged to destroy them under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty or to report on them under Article 7.⁹

The Executive Summary of *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* was translated into Japanese by the JCBL and was published in June 2001. The JCBL and the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) held symposiums in June 2001 on current Korean landmine issues in Tokyo and Osaka. (See below for additional NGO activities).

Production, Transfer, Use

Japan stopped production of antipersonnel mines in 1997 and manufacturing facilities were decommissioned by 31 March 1999.¹⁰ Japan has never exported antipersonnel mines and has not used antipersonnel mines since the establishment of the Defense Force in 1954.

⁴ Address by Yusuke Shindo, Director of Conventional Weapons Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the ASEAN Landmine Seminar, Bangkok, 13 May 2002.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru to the Second Review Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 11 December 2001.

⁶ Written response to JCBL by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conventional Weapons Division, 9 July 2002.

⁷ The US is believed to have some 115,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines stored in Japan. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 333.

⁸ Written response to JCBL by Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2001.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form E, 27 August 1999.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Japan reported that on 31 December 2001 it possessed 436,837 antipersonnel mines in stockpiles, including 218,212 Type 67; 182,623 Type 80; 22,707 Type M3; 11,049 Type 63; and, 2,246 Type 87 scatterable mines.¹¹

Before Japan began its destruction program, it held 1,000,089 antipersonnel mines in stock. By the end of February 2002, it had destroyed 605,040 antipersonnel mines, including 382,680 in fiscal year 2001 (1 March 2001 – 28 February 2002). The final 380,049 mines will be destroyed by the end of February 2003, the deadline established by the Mine Ban Treaty.¹²

Japan decided to retain 15,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.¹³ This was among the highest number of mines retained by any State Party. In September 2001, Japan stated that it needed these mines to “conduct training by exploding actual mines, as part of the educational training process of SDF (Self Defense Forces), aimed at safe and appropriate mine detection and mine clearance,” as well as to “examine the performance of hardware of mine detection and clearance.”¹⁴

Of the 15,000 retained mines, Japan had “consumed” 3,777 from 1999 through 2001, leaving 11,223.¹⁵ The mines remaining include Type 63 (2,219), Type 67 (2,254), Type 80 (2,259), Type 87 scatterable (2,246), and Type M3 (2,245).¹⁶

The total amount contracted by the Japan Defense Agency to destroy landmines was Japanese Yen (JPY) 817,216,000 (about US\$7.8 million) in FY 2001, and JPY 831,200,000 (about US\$7.8 million) in FY 2002. Asahi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. contracted for about \$3.54 million in FY 2001 and \$3.72 million in FY 2002. Hokkaido NDF Co., Ltd. contracted for about \$3.97 million in FY 2001 and \$4.05 million in FY 2002. Nippon Koki Co., Ltd. contracted for about \$268,000 in FY 2001.¹⁷

Mine Action Funding

Japan contributed 741,342,000 Japanese Yen (JPY) (US\$6.979 million) to mine action programs worldwide in 2001. After increasing significantly from JPY 1 billion (\$8.7 million) in 1998 to JPY 1.6 billion (\$13.2 million) in 1999, Japanese mine action funding fell about 22 percent to JPY 1.246 billion (\$11.9 million) in 2000 and plummeted another 40 percent in 2001.

After four years, Japan has contributed about 46 percent (JPY 4.6 billion or \$40.8 million) of its five-year JPY 10 billion target for mine action. Taking into account the JPY 2.06 billion (\$19.22 m.) Japan pledged for Afghanistan in January 2002 (see below), Japan has contributed approximately 67 percent of the target for the period from 1998 to 2002.

Funding in 2001 followed the pattern of previous years in that the vast majority went to demining projects, with smaller amounts for victim assistance and mine risk education. The

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 24 April 2002.

¹² Written response to JCBL from the Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Japan Defense Agency, 1 March 2002. In its Article 7 Report, Form F, 24 April 2002, Japan reported the destruction of about 220,000 AP mines in JFY 1999 and the destruction of about 380,000 in JFY 2000. The destruction of another 380,000 contracted in JFY 2001 is expected to be completed by the end of February 2003.

¹³ Article 7 Reports, Forms D and F, 27 August 1999 and 28 April 2000.

¹⁴ Written response to JCBL by Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2001.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 24 April 2002. Japan consumed 1,148 in 1999; 1,339 in 2000; and, 1,290 in 2001, according to each of its annual Article 7 Reports. Another 456 mines were consumed in the first two months of 2002, leaving 10,767. Written response to JCBL from the Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Japan Defense Agency, 1 March 2002.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 24 April 2002.

¹⁷ Written response to JCBL from the Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Japan Defense Agency, 16 February 2001 and 1 March 2002.

breakdown in 2001 was: demining \$6.12 million (88 percent); victim assistance \$668,000 (nine percent); mine risk education \$195,000 (three percent).¹⁸

In a major shift, however, in 2001, Japan contributed 57 percent (\$4 million) of its mine action funds to NGOs and others under the “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects,” 41 percent (\$2.8 million) on a multilateral basis, and only 2 percent (\$154,000) on a bilateral basis.¹⁹ The previous year, 69 percent had gone to bilateral programs and less than four percent for Grassroots Projects.²⁰

In 2001, Japan’s mine action contributions went to: Cambodia (43.5 percent), Mozambique (13.3 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.9 percent), Ecuador (8.6 percent), Lebanon (8.5 percent), Afghanistan (5.4 percent), Croatia (4.9 percent), Angola (1.9 percent), and other (two percent).

In response to the situation in Afghanistan, on 18 January 2002, the government of Japan pledged JPY 2,056,540 (US\$19.22 million) in emergency funds to mine action activities in Afghanistan. This pledge was made just before the opening of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002. The funding is earmarked as follows: \$15.4 million for UNDP for rehabilitation of mine clearance equipment; \$2.82 million to UNOCHA for costs related to mine clearance; \$780,000 to the ICRC for prosthetics; \$220,000 to the ICRC for mine risk education.²¹

¹⁸ Written response to JCBL by Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 459, for the breakdown for 1998-2000.

¹⁹ Written response to JCBL by Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2002.

²⁰ Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects was introduced in fiscal 1989 to meet the diverse aid requirements of developing countries. Under this scheme, Japanese embassies abroad and other overseas governmental establishments play a key role in funding projects implemented by local public bodies, research/medical organizations, and NGOs operating in such countries. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 460, for the breakdown for 1998-2000.

²¹ Written response to JCBL by Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2002.

Mine Action Funding in 2001***In Thousands of US\$***

Country	Type of Aid	Recipients	Description	Amount
Cambodia	Multilateral	CMAC	Overall Assistance for Mine clearance	900
	Multilateral	UNMAS/UNDP/ World Rehab. Fund	Socio-economic Reintegration Training	273
	Bilateral	CMAC	Dispatch of Planning Researcher to CMAC	51
	Bilateral	CMAC	Dispatch of Planning Researcher to CMAC	20
	Bilateral	CMAC	Donation of Computer Related Equipment	83
	Grass Root	MAG	Donation of Grass-cutter, 4-wheels trucks	328
	Grass Root	JAHDS	Mine clearance in Battambang Province	581
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Grass Root	World for Balkan in Europe	Mine clearance in the Brcko District	306
	Grass Root	HELP	Support Civil Defense army of B&H	461
	Grass Root	Buro Education Institute	Mine Risk Education in the Brcko District	65
Croatia	Grass Root	Cro-MAC	Mine clearance in East Srabonia District	342
Mozambique	Grass Root	National M.Clear Instit	Mine clearance of Gaza Province	846
	Grass Root	POWER	Donation of wheelchairs	86
Angola	Multilateral	UNMAS/UNICEF	Mine Risk Education	130
Afghanistan	Multilateral	UNMAS/UNICEF/CDAP	Rehabilitation and reintegration Training by Artificial Limb	309
	Grass Root	UNDP	Mine clearance I Herat Province	70
Lebanon	Multilateral	UNMAS	Mine Survey in South Lebanon	250
	Multilateral	UNMAS	Coordination to establish a MAC	250
	Grass Root	MAG Lebanon Office	Mine clearance in Navatia	93
Ecuador	Multilateral	UNMAS	Mine clearance	600
UN	Multilateral	UNMAS	Security Standard - 2nd Phase	130
Total				6.979

NGO Mine Action Activities

The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines has been financially supporting the Outreach Prosthetic/Orthotic Programme of the British NGO, the Cambodia Trust, since April 2000, and mine risk education for Afghan and Pakistani NGOs since November 2001.²²

Humanitarian Orthotic/Prosthetic Endeavour (HOPE) has collaborated with a Japanese NGO, Phnom Penh no Kai, and British NGOs, Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthopedics, Cambodian Trust, POWER and Laotian Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), in implementation of victim assistance projects. HOPE has provided expertise in prosthetics and orthotics and has trained Cambodian nationals in various districts of Cambodia since 1993 and Laotian nationals in Laos since 1998.²³

Association for Aid and Relief-Japan (AAR) has been implementing victim assistance and mine clearance projects in various regions around the globe. Since December 2001, in Afghanistan, AAR is operating three mine risk education teams in Kabul, Parwan, and Baghrum for children in cooperation with HALO Trust. AAR also supports three survey teams of HALO Trust in Northern provinces. In May 2002, AAR also started a physiotherapy project in Takhar province, Afghanistan for disabled persons, including landmine survivors.

²² For further information contact: JCBL, Toshiro Shimizu, email: banmines@jca.apc.org.

²³ For further information contact: HOPE, Kazuyuki Negishi, email: negishi@rehab.go.jp.

In Cambodia, AAR has been running the Kien Khleang Vocational Training Center for the physically challenged in Phnom Penh since 1993. It also operates a wheelchair production workshop within the center. In Burma, AAR has been operating a vocational training center for the physically challenged in Yangon since 1999. About 20 percent of its trainees are landmine survivors. In Laos, AAR operates a wheelchair production project at the National Center for Medical Rehabilitation in cooperation with JICA.

In May 2001, the Committee of Project "Mine Free" launched the "Zero Landmine project" releasing a music CD called "Zero Landmine (No More Landmines)" in cooperation with artists such as Ryuichi Sakamoto and Cyndi Lauper. More than 600,000 copies were sold and using the profit and donations, the committee has been funding mine clearance operations in Cambodia, Georgia, Mozambique and Angola conducted by HALO Trust. The committee includes the Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), Warner Music Japan, Nichion, and AAR Japan. The assistance for clearance activities will last till 2005. On 1 May 2002, AAR published its fifth volume of a picture book series, "A Heartfelt Not Mines But Flowers - Sunny heads for Afghanistan" in Japan for public awareness. The profit will be used for mine action programs in Afghanistan.

The Japanese Red Cross Society is fully funding and implementing the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Center in Battambang in Cambodia. A Japanese prosthetist/orthotist is working in the center to assist in the training of local staff. The Japanese Red Cross financial contribution for 2001 amounted to 1,008,426 CHF.²⁴

Japan Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS), a consortium of industrial and charity groups, has been supporting projects in Cambodia and Thailand. JAHDS provided 28 motorcycles to the Landmine Impact Survey in Thailand conducted by Norwegian People's Aid. In 2001, JAHDS also provided logistic support for landmine clearance in Battambang, Cambodia in cooperation with Mines Advisory Group. Over 1,300 people in Battambang benefited from the cleared land.²⁵

Cambodia Mines-Remove Campaign in 2001 organized exhibitions of cartoons and photographs, providing images on demining and victim assistance, in Fukuoka, Kumamoto and Tokyo. In the exhibitions, 537 cartoons and photographs by Japanese illustrators and photographers were presented. As part of the campaign's efforts to educate the Japanese public, two study tours to Cambodia and the DMZ area (North and South Korea Border), as well as workshops and symposiums were organized in Japan. The campaign also provided funds, amounting to US\$5,000, to a hospital in Battambang, Cambodia, through an Italian NGO Emergency.²⁶

Mulindi Japan One Love Project (MJOLP) is a joint Rwandan/Japanese NGO that produces prostheses and orthoses free-of-charge and promotes the socio-economic reintegration of people with disabilities. It produced about 500 prostheses and orthoses from July 1994 to April 2002. The MJOLP inaugurated a new workshop in Kigali on 29 September 2000.²⁷ In February 2002 MJOLP began a mobile workshop service to reach disabled people in remote areas.²⁸

JORDAN

Key developments since May 2001: Jordan destroyed another 10,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in April 2002. Since the national demining program began in 1993, 116 minefields containing 84,157 mines and covering 8 million square meters of land have been cleared.

²⁴ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 45.

²⁵ For further information contact: JAHDS, Hiroshi Tomita, email: info@jahds.org.

²⁶ For further information contact: C.M.C. Kenji Otani, email: c.m.c.@nifty.com.

²⁷ "One Love Tsushin," No. 18, January 2001. email: onelove@abox8.so-net.ne.jp.

²⁸ "One Love Tsushin," No. 22, May 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Jordan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 August 1998, ratified on 13 November 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. Jordan's Law of Explosive Materials (1953) serves as the legal mechanism to enforce the treaty. In an interview with Landmine Monitor, Prince Ra'd Bin Zeid expressed pride in Jordan's attention to the landmine issue.¹

Jordan participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001. It cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002.

On 5 June 2002, Jordan submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report.² While it submitted transparency measures reports in 1999 and 2000, Jordan did not provide an annual report in 2001.

Jordan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Jordan attended the annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II and the second CCW review conference, both held in Geneva in December 2001. Jordan has not submitted a national annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II.

Jordan has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and has not used mines since 1973.³

Stockpile Destruction

Destruction of Jordan's 93,342 stockpiled antipersonnel mines began in September 1999.⁴ A total of 46,552 mines were destroyed in six different destruction events from September 1999 to April 2002.⁵ In April 2002, 10,000 mines were destroyed in the first destruction event since December 2000.⁶ In May 2002, a representative of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the body responsible for implementation of the stockpile destruction plan, stated that the destruction would be completed by 1 May 2003, which is the country's four-year deadline for stockpile destruction. Plans call for destruction of 30,000 mines in June, September, and December 2002, with the remaining 15,790 mines destroyed in February and April 2003.⁷

Jordan will retain 1,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, but has not reported on the intended purposes and use of these mines in its transparency reports.

Landmine Problem

According to the Armed Forces Command, Jordan's mine problem once totaled over 306,000 mines laid in 497 minefields along the northern and western borders, contaminating 6,000 hectares (60 million square meters) of land. As of October 2001, 381 minefields remained to be cleared from 4,229 hectares (42.29 million square meters) containing an estimated 222,303 mines.⁸ Landmine Monitor was subsequently told in July 2002 that 373 minefields remained, containing

¹ Interview with His Royal Highness Prince Ra'd, Amman, 28 March 2002.

² As Landmine Monitor went to print, the United Nations listed the report as "Pending Input" and in Arabic.

³ Interview with Brigadier General Naser Majali, Commander of the Royal Corps of Engineers, Amman, Jordan, 25 January 2000.

⁴ For a list of the types of mines stockpiled, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 896.

⁵ On 5 September 1999, 4,555 unidentified mines were destroyed. Then 8,000 M14 mines were destroyed on each of the following dates: 6 December 1999, 4 October 2000, 9 December 2000, and 18 December 2000. At that point, the program was stopped "due to financial and technical reasons." Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

⁶ Intervention by Colonel Akram Al Majali, Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002. Notes from Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch.

⁷ *Ibid.* The destruction planned for June apparently took place on 20 July 2002. Landmine Monitor interview with Gen. Fayez Al Duwari, Director of Royal Corps of Engineers, Amman, 23 July 2002.

⁸ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

208,718 mines.⁹ These figures are different than those cited in Jordan's transparency measures reports and previous Landmine Monitor reports, apparently reflecting new and better information about mined areas.

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

In March 2000, King Abdullah commissioned by royal decree a civilian-led demining organization, including a National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC). But, it did not meet until another decree was issued in April 2002 appointing General Yousef Malkawi as the new president. The NDRC is responsible for integrating all aspects of demining, including mine risk education, information management, mine clearance, and survivor assistance.

The Royal Engineers Corps (RCE) of the Army is the sole demining operator in Jordan. Other institutions, however, operate in various aspects of mine action including the Hashemite Society for Soldiers with Special Needs, Landmine Survivors Network, the ICRC, and the Al Hussein Foundation for the Habilitation and Rehabilitation of the Disabled. All have taken part in mine action activities in Jordan including mine risk education, data collection, and survivor assistance.

The Royal Engineers Corps estimates the total cost of mine clearance in Jordan could be US\$90 million dollars.¹⁰ Jordan has received over US\$9 million in mine action assistance from 1998-2001 from donor countries including Canada, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This assistance has included heavy and light equipment, safety gear, and training.¹¹

In 2001, Jordan received about US\$1.57 million in mine action assistance from three donors. The United States provided US\$997,000 for demining equipment, spare parts, and contract services.¹² Canada provided US\$103,331 to the engineering corps for demining and ambulance services and US\$25,832 for survivor assistance to the Landmine Survivors Network. Norway provided US\$442,222 for mechanical mine clearance machines.¹³

Mine Clearance

Since the national demining program began in 1993, until October 2001, a total of 116 minefields containing 84,157 mines and covering 800 hectares (8 million square meters) of land had been cleared.¹⁴ An update provided by the RCE in July 2002 indicated 124 minefields and 95,740 mines had been cleared.¹⁵ The areas cleared are in the Jordan Valley, Gulf of Aqaba, and Dead Sea regions.

The Commander of the Engineering Corps, General Muhammad Najeeb Mahaftha, said it is working in its full capacity using new technologies, and more creative approaches, taking into consideration the set priorities, including the demining of inhabited areas, cultivated areas, tourist and historical areas. The Royal Engineers Corps deploys five field companies (each of which contains four demining teams) and nine mechanical clearance machines (Aardvark).¹⁶

⁹ Interview with Gen. Fayez Al Duwari, Director of RCE, Amman, 23 July 2002.

¹⁰ Intervention by Colonel Akram Al Majali, Intersessional Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 May 2002; interview with Lt. Col. Abu Sitteh, Director, Jordanian Demining Project, Amman, 14 July 2002.

¹¹ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001; UN Mine Action Service, Mine Action Investment database.

¹² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 41.

¹³ UNMAS, Mine Action Investment database, at <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>.

¹⁴ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

¹⁵ Interview with Gen. Fayez Al Duwari, Director of RCE, Amman, 23 July 2002.

¹⁶ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

In June 2002, the UK-based NGO the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) completed a 3-month training course on the maintenance and deployment of the Minecat 230 mini-flail to the Engineering Corps Demining Group.¹⁷ The Norwegian Demining Consortium AS (NoDeCo) contracted MAG for this task.

Since 1997, 41 engineers have been injured while engaged in mine clearance; there have been no fatalities.¹⁸

The U.S. Department of State has reported that "Level Two Surveys of minefields along the Syrian border" are underway.¹⁹ Jordan's Demining Plan for 2001-2002 calls for continued demining in the western border (with Israel), with the goal of clearing 40 minefields containing 18,500 mines.²⁰

Mine Risk Education

The Royal Engineers Corps continues to provide mine risk education programs in schools, remote villages, and in cities near by affected areas such as Irbid and Ramtha in the north, Shouneh in the Jordan Valley, and in Karaq, Tafileh, and Aqaba in the south. The Royal Engineers Corps assigns officers and deminers to carry out the programs, who use inert mines, posters, slides, and videotapes to illustrate the risks caused by mines and preventative measures.

On 3 March 2002, the Center for Refugee Studies at Yarmouk University in Irbid held a mine awareness lecture followed by a landmine exhibition in cooperation with the Royal Engineers Corps, ICRC and LSN. In May 2002, Jordan University held a second landmine awareness week, which included a mine risk education training workshop, a landmine exhibition, and a sports event.

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, three mine/UXO incidents were reported in which four people were killed and four injured; two incidents were caused by landmines. All the casualties were male civilians. The incidents occurred in the South governorate in Aqaba, the Mafraq governorate, and north of Irbid governorate. In 2002, up to mid-June, another four landmine incidents and one UXO incident were recorded: three people were killed and five injured. All the casualties were male, and the injured included a deminer, a military officer, and an Iraqi civilian.²¹

In October 2001, a military official reported there have been 505 landmine casualties in Jordan since the end of the 1967 war, including 311 military personnel and 194 civilians, of which 106 were killed (58 military and 48 civilians).²² However, a U.S. Department of State publication cites the Jordanian Armed Forces Medical Services as reporting 636 mine casualties, including 370 civilians. The report states that in 2000, nine military personnel and three civilians were injured by mines.²³

In 2001, nationals were also injured by landmines outside of Jordanian territory. On 18 August, eight Jordanian peacekeepers were injured after their vehicle hit a mine in the Temporary Security Zone in Eritrea.²⁴

¹⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Communications, Mines Advisory Group, 19 July 2002.

¹⁸ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 41.

²⁰ Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

²¹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Landmine Survivors Network (Jordan), 10 July 2002.

²² Presentation by Major Yasin Al Majali, NATO Partnership for Peace Workshop, Athens, 19 October 2001.

²³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 41.

²⁴ "Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea," New York, 5 September 2001.

Survivor Assistance²⁵

Landmine survivors are entitled to medical care and rehabilitation under the standard health care system in Jordan.²⁶ However, there is limited local outreach for physiotherapy and rehabilitation services for mine survivors. Smaller physiotherapy centers do exist at several of the regional hospitals, including the Princess Basma Hospital and Ramtha Hospital in the north, at the Mafrak Hospital in the east, and at Salt Hospital in midwest. Other hospitals report irregular access to physiotherapists.

In practice, more complex cases of mine injuries are transferred to the national institutions in Amman for prosthetics and rehabilitation services. The main institutions are the public al-Bashir Hospital and the King Hussein Medical Center, under the Royal Medical Services. Al-Bashir's rehabilitation unit and prosthetic center is the primary provider of such services to civilians in the country. There are 11 rehabilitation specialists working at the center, including physiotherapists and occupational therapists, however, the center does not offer facilities for social workers or psychologists. As a referral hospital for all of Jordan, with a very high number of patients, al-Bashir operates on the margins of its capacity. There is a waiting list to receive treatment, and its facilities and equipment are run-down.

The second main institution for rehabilitation and prosthetic care in Jordan is the military King Hussein Medical Center (KHMC), with the attached Farah Rehabilitation Center. The hospital is primarily for Jordanians with military insurance.

The Al-Hussein Society for the Habilitation/Rehabilitation of the Physically Challenged, affiliated with the Jordan University, provides practical training for orthotic/prosthetic technicians.²⁷ The Society also offers medical and physical rehabilitation, psycho-social support and vocational training for all persons with disabilities, with particular emphasis on children. It also operates a mobile clinic in its community-based rehabilitation/outreach program.²⁸

The Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) program engages community-based outreach workers, who are also amputees, to work with individual survivors to assess their needs, offer psychological and social support, and educate families about the effects of limb loss. In 2001, LSN conducted home and hospital visits to 392 people, and helped more than 320 people access services that provide mobility devices, health services, or exemptions from school fees or uniform expenses. If no such services exist, LSN intervenes to ensure the needs of survivors are met, and in 2001 provided direct assistance to 156 survivors, including the provision of 16 prostheses, 3 wheelchairs and 34 crutches, and adapting home environments. It provided vocational training and support to small business and existing projects to approximately nine survivors, and held a training workshop on small business skills in July 2001. Mine survivors account for about 50% of people benefiting from these services. LSN works alongside local associations to increase awareness about disability rights. LSN also maintains a Rehabilitation Services Directory with information on 122 service providers in Jordan.²⁹

Disability Policy and Practice

The 1993 law for the "Welfare of Disabled Persons" remains unchanged.³⁰

²⁵ Information in this section comes from various reports on Jordan's health structure from the WHO, UNDP, and FAFO, and Jordanian web sites, as well as Landmine Monitor field visits January-March 2002.

²⁶ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 854.

²⁷ Meeting Society Director, Amman, 15 January 2002.

²⁸ For more details see website at <http://www.althusseinrehab.org.jo>.

²⁹ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Landmine Survivors Network (Jordan), 19 February 2002; and Adnan Al-Aboudi, Director, Landmine Survivors Network, Amman, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 11 March 2002.

³⁰ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 900.

KENYA

Key developments since May 2001: Kenya submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 27 December 2001. It declared it has a total of 38,774 antipersonnel mines, some 3,000 of which will be retained for training. In September 2001, Kenya was chosen as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance. Kenya's military is involved in the UN demining operation along the Eritrea/Ethiopia border.

Mine Ban Policy

Kenya signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 January 2001. The treaty entered into force for Kenya on 1 July 2001. Kenya submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 27 December 2001, covering the period from 28 January 2001 to 28 December 2001. It submitted its first annual update on 15 May 2002, covering the period 29 December 2001 to 30 April 2002. While Kenya has not yet enacted national implementation measures as required under Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty, it reported such measures would "follow in legislation."¹

When addressing a Landmine Monitor researchers meeting in Nairobi on 30 November 2001, a top Kenya government official said, "It is encouraging to note that since the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, the international community has made significant progress towards creating a world free from the threat of landmines. The drastic decline in the production, transfer, stockpiling and use of landmines and the destruction of stocks undertaken by some of the states parties is a clear indication that the new international norm established by the Ottawa Convention is taking hold. Kenya is fully committed to fulfill its obligations under the convention."²

Landmine Monitor Report 2002 researchers from throughout Africa met in Nairobi from 27-29 November 2001 to discuss their research and also engage in advocacy planning. On 30 November, the researchers held a roundtable meeting with Nairobi-based diplomats and Kenyan government officials to discuss universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty throughout the region.

Kenya participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, where, together with Belgium, it was elected to serve as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, and Mine Action Technologies. Kenya participated in the interessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, and took its seat as a co-rapporteur.

Kenya cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, on 29 November 2001.³

Kenya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Production, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Kenya has not produced or exported landmines. In its initial Article 7 Report, Kenya for the first time, revealed it has a stockpile of 38,774 antipersonnel mines of British, Belgian, and Israeli origin.⁴ The Kenya military is in the process of preparing a plan for the destruction of its stockpile in 2003, noting that details on the destruction program would follow in subsequent reports.⁵ The treaty mandated deadline for Kenya to destroy its stockpile is 1 July 2005.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 December 2001 and 15 May 2002.

² Statement by Mr. P.R.O. Owade, Director for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, at the Landmine Monitor Researchers Meeting, Nairobi, 30 November 2001.

³ See <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ga9983.doc.htm>.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 December 2001. Identical numbers are contained in the updated report of 15 May 2002.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 December 2001. Kenya has stated the destruction of mines will take place at Archer's Post Military Range, using electrical and manual detonation methods, beginning in 2003. The

Type	Quantity	To be Destroyed
No 6 HE Blast (UK)	5,216	4,716
No 4 HE Blast (Israel)	9,665	8,965
No 12 Jumping Frag. (Israel) ⁶	9,937	9,237
NR 413 Fragmentation (Belgium)	4,744	4,344
No 409 Blast (Belgium) ⁷	9,212	8,512
Total	38,774	35,774
To be Retained	3,000	

Kenya intends to retain 3,000 of its antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It will keep 700 each of the No. 4, No. 12 and No. 409 mines; 500 No. 6 mines; and 400 NR 413 mines.

Landmine/UXO Problem and Clearance

Unlike in the previous year,⁸ there were no reports that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ethiopian rebel group, laid landmines in northern areas of the country near the Ethiopian border.⁹ Kenya does not have a landmine problem, but is contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO), especially in the pastoral north of the country and in areas where the Mau Mau rebellion was intense.¹⁰

British regiments train in Kenya for several months each year at the Archer's Post training grounds. Nearby communities have persistently complained that the live firing ranges are within their grazing zones and as a result they and their animals are exposed to injuries, mental anguish, and material losses. In a response to Landmine Monitor, the British Army said that clearance of unexploded ordnance in the Archer's Post area started in April 2001 as "part of a normal 'housekeeping' operation, which is carried out in conjunction with the Kenyan authorities."¹¹ No casualties have occurred among the personnel involved. The British government also stated, "No anti-personnel mines of any kind are involved and the clearance is being carried out only on gazetted training areas and private farms."¹²

A case was lodged in a London court last year by 228 Masai and Samburu tribespeople, and in July 2002 they won an out of court settlement of £4.5 million from the UK Ministry of Defence.¹³

Mine Action and Mine Risk Education

Kenya's military is involved in the demining operation along the Eritrea/Ethiopian border under the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).¹⁴ A senior military officer

government claims that this is an isolated military live firing range with no civilian population, but it is also a pastoral grazing sector of the country.

⁶ In its Article 7 Report, 15 May 2002, Kenya describes this bounding fragmentation mines as No 12 and as 13 AI. Israel designates it No 12 or M 12 AI.

⁷ In its Article 7 Report, 15 May 2002, Kenya describes this as a "British/Israel" mine, but Landmine Monitor is only aware of production of the No 409 by Belgium.

⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p.172.

⁹ US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights for 2001, online at

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001>.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 84; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 172-174.

¹¹ Letter of response from the British High Commissioner, H.E. Edward Clay, Nairobi, 29 January 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Paul Redfern, "UK to pay munitions victims £4.5m," *News Sunday*, 21 July 2002.

¹⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.251.

involved in the operation told Landmine Monitor no casualties had been reported among the Kenyan deminers.¹⁵

There is no mine/UXO risk education in Kenya despite the presence of victims in areas contaminated with unexploded ordnance and in camps for refugees from mine-affected neighboring countries. An estimated 600,000 people in UXO-contaminated areas and in refugee camps would benefit from mine risk education.¹⁶

The Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, with support from the ICRC Regional office in Nairobi, OSILIGI¹⁷, and the Jesuit Refugee Services, conduct campaign workshops to educate opinion leaders, legislators and the affected communities on general landmine issues.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, seven people were injured in reported UXO-related incidents.¹⁸ Four of these incidents were reported in the expansive Rift Valley Province, two occurred in Eastern Province, and in August 2001, a male herdsman lost a limb after he picked up a bomblet in Sambura district, northern Kenya. It is believed there could be more UXO casualties that go unreported in remote areas of northern Kenya, which are used for annual military drills. Reported cases are not identified specifically as UXO incidents in police files, but are generally classified as explosive incidents.

Landmine Monitor did not find any reports of landmine/UXO incidents occurring along the Kenya border with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda, or in the four main refugee camps of Dadaab, Liboi, Kakuma, and Lagderra.

Survivor Assistance

Public health facilities in Kenya are varied, ranging from rural health centers to provincial and national referral hospitals ready to provide first aid as well as advanced medical care to patients. The provision of support services to people with disabilities in Kenya is a collective responsibility of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Social Services, local and international non-governmental organizations as well as United Nations agencies. There is no coordination policy in place and there are no controlled funding mechanisms for the provision of health care services to people with disabilities. The Kabete Orthopedic Workshop and the Jaipur Foot Project in Nairobi manufacture orthopedic appliances for the all disabled persons, which are available for free or at a subsidized cost.¹⁹

The ICRC's Lopiding Hospital, with its annexed prosthetic-orthotic center in Lokichokio, has continued to provide physical rehabilitation to amputees and other disabled people from across the border in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan since 1992. In 2001, 365 prostheses were fitted, of which 91 were for mine survivors. In addition, 1,299 crutches and walking sticks were produced using recycled polypropylene, and 23 tricycles, produced by the Physically Disabled of Kenya, were also distributed.²⁰

In 2001, two technicians followed a one-month prosthetic training course in Addis Ababa, which was funded by the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled. Four technicians from south Sudan received training in prosthetic repairs plus the required equipment. Two students from the Kenyatta Medical Training College followed a four-month practical training program, after which one remained at the center as a permanent employee.²¹

¹⁵ Interview with an unnamed senior military officer, Department of Defense, Nairobi, 21 March 2002.

¹⁶ Population estimate based on figures obtained from local administrators responsible for the strand of communities in northern Kenya.

¹⁷ OSILIGI is not an acronym. The local NGO takes its name from a Maasai word that connotes hope and the desire for survival.

¹⁸ Landmine Monitor media search of local newspapers, January-December 2001; information provided by NGO OSILIGI, telephone interview, 30 January 2002.

¹⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 175; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 159-160.

²⁰ ICRC Special Report: Mine Action 2001, p. 21.

²¹ *Ibid.*

KIRIBATI

Kiribati acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 September 2000. It submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 4 December 2001, reporting for the period from 7 September 2000 to 28 August 2001. In the report, Kiribati stated with respect to national implementation measures, “No action taken since Kiribati, nor does any of its territories, use, nor stockpile, produce, transfer, nor destroy anti-personnel mines.” Kiribati was absent from the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. While there is unexploded ordnance left over from World War II, especially on Tarawa, there is not believed to be any landmines.

LESOTHO

The Kingdom of Lesotho signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 2 December 1998. The treaty entered into force for Lesotho on 1 June 1999. Lesotho has not passed domestic implementing legislation, as the Internal Security Act of 1984 is deemed adequate.

Lesotho submitted its first Article 7 transparency report on 17 August 2000, which had been due on 27 November 1999. In this report, Lesotho officially declares, that it does not use, produce, or have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Lesotho is not mine-affected.

Lesotho has not submitted its annual updated Article 7 Reports, due on 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002. A government official stated the delay was due to the fact that “all government employees have been busy preparing for the crucial general elections of 25 May 2002.”¹

Lesotho did not participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua or the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva. Lesotho cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

LIBERIA

Mine Ban Policy

Liberia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 December 1999 and it entered into force for Liberia on 1 June 2000. Liberia is not known to have undertaken any national implementation measures as required by Article 9. Liberia has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 28 November 2000.

Liberia did not attend the Third Meetings of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, nor did it attend the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. Liberia was absent for the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. Liberia is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not participate in CCW meetings in December 2001 in Geneva.¹

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Liberia is not known to have produced landmines. While Liberia has acted as a conduit for illegal arms to the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, the presence of landmines among these arms shipments has not been proven.²

¹ Interview with a Spokesperson of Lesotho's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2002.

¹ The explanation for Liberia's diplomatic inaction, which stands in contrast with the previous year, is likely the sanctions regime put in place against the country by the UN on 7 May 2001. The sanctions prohibit, among other things, travel by senior government officials unless a waiver is obtained.

² See among others, “Report of the panel of experts, appointed pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone,” December 2000, paragraph 183; Global

Antipersonnel landmines were used by all factions during the 1989-1997 civil war, including the former National Patriotic Front of Liberia, which has now transformed into the ruling political party. While Landmine Monitor has, for the past three years, reported that Liberia is likely to still have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, the government of Liberia is one of the very few States Parties that have not yet officially confirmed or denied the existence of a stockpile. If Liberia does have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, it is bound by the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy it by 1 June 2004.

Since 1999, new fighting has taken place in increasingly larger areas of the country. Landmine Monitor has seen no evidence and received no allegations of use of landmines, although on-site research is virtually impossible.³

Mine Problem

Liberia remains a mine-affected country. The extent to which it has been affected and the severity of the human and material damage caused by landmines is difficult to ascertain as a result of the ongoing turbulence in the country. Areas that could be mine-affected as a result of the previous 1989-1997 civil war are inaccessible, especially counties and areas like Lofa, Grand Capemount, Bong Mines, and Kakata, which have all also been affected by the new civil war.

The Buchanan-based local research group that contributes to Landmine Monitor reports that there are still landmines in the greater Buchanan area, and that inhabitants in some areas are afraid to farm because of the fear of landmines.⁴ Liberia's rural economy is completely dominated by subsistence agriculture and so the loss of land due to fear of landmines is particularly damaging.

Mine Action, Landmine Casualties, and Survivor Assistance

There is no mine clearance carried out in Liberia. In view of the ongoing war, this is clearly not a priority. There are no known marking exercises to indicate mined or suspected mined areas and no mine risk education programs are in place.⁵

In 2001, no new landmine casualties were reported. In 2000, a Liberian newspaper reported that thirteen people had been killed and six injured in landmine incidents, however, it was not clear if all incidents occurred in 2000.⁶

There are no specific landmine survivor assistance programs, although limited assistance is available through programs for all persons with disabilities. Transport remains a major constraint, and rehabilitation and reintegration services are extremely limited. There are two prosthetic workshops in the country; one is in Ganta, run by the Ministry of Health, and one is in Monrovia, run by Handicap International Belgium. There is very little psychological support or vocational training available in Liberia, though there are a few services for those able to pay for it.⁷

The Buchanan-based research group is continuing its work of identifying landmine survivors. The four survivors interviewed so far reported similar experiences. In the immediate aftermath of the incident there was some assistance from first aid workers who took the victim to the nearest hospital though this may have been many miles away, where if necessary, amputations were performed. The survivors have experienced psychological problems since the incident. All of the survivors identified by the Buchanan group are parents and none are able to provide for their

Witness, "Taylor Made, the Pivotal Role of Liberia's Forests and Flag of Convenience in Regional Conflict," September 2001.

³ The war receives continuous coverage in the local media, but nowhere has the use of landmines been mentioned. None of the media persons contacted by Landmine Monitor while in Monrovia had heard of landmines being used.

⁴ Submission of the Buchanan research group to Landmine Monitor, 28 August 2001. For an inventory of the locations of mines, see *Landmine Monitor 2001*, p. 88.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor 2001*, pp. 88.

⁶ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 89.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

families; none of the children of these survivors are able to go to school. This group of landmine survivors were injured during the civil war and have been living in dire poverty ever since.⁸

The planned nationwide survey of former fighters by the National Commission of Ex-Combatants has not begun. The limited resources available are being used to assist ex-combatants in more practical ways, including new ex-combatants emerging from the current war.⁹

No disability laws exist in Liberia.

LIECHTENSTEIN

Liechtenstein signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. The annual Article 7 transparency report was submitted on 14 May 2002. It states: "Nothing new to report. The provisions of the Convention are fully implemented.... Due to the fact that Liechtenstein has never produced, stockpiled or used anti-personnel landmines, there is nothing to report ... and no implementing measures have been necessary."¹ Previous Article 7 reports were submitted on 3 October 2001, and 18 September 2000.

Liechtenstein did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. On 29 November 2001, Liechtenstein cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Liechtenstein is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and attended the Third Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001.

The latest Article 7 Report declares that Liechtenstein, "actively supports various efforts to eradicate anti-personnel mines as well as activities in the fields of demining and mine victims assistance. Between 1996 and 2001 voluntary contributions ... came to CHF380,000 [US\$253,333]."² Based on previous funding information, it appears that in 2001 Liechtenstein's contribution was CHF75,000 (\$50,000).

The breakdown for the contributions from 1996 to 2001 was given as follows: CHF160,000 for the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance; CHF10,000 for the Croatian Mine Action Center; CHF150,000 for the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining; and CHF60,000 for the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance.³

LUXEMBOURG

Mine Ban Policy

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 June 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 December 1999. National legislation includes penal sanctions for violation of the treaty.¹ Separate legislation developed by the Ministry

⁸ Observation based on four interviews conducted by the Buchanan-based research group. Information contained in its submission to Landmine Monitor, 28 August 2001.

⁹ Informal interview with officials at the National Commission for Ex-Combatants, Monrovia, 11 March 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted on 14 May 2002 (reporting period not stated).

² Article 7 Report, General Remarks, 14 May 2002. Exchange rate at 3 July 2002: US\$1 = CHF1.50.

³ Article 7 Report, General Remarks, 14 May 2002.

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 730.

of Foreign Affairs dealing with import, export, and transit of weapons, munitions and military equipment and technology is being examined by Parliamentary bodies.²

Luxembourg did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Nicaragua, nor the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva. On 29 November 2001, Luxembourg cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The annual Article 7 transparency report for 2001 was submitted on 20 June 2002.³

Luxembourg is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its annual report as required by Article 13 on 24 October 2001. Luxembourg attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Luxembourg has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The stockpile of 9,600 antipersonnel mines was destroyed in 1997.⁴ In 1999, the Army stated that it had retained 500 mines of each type (the Belgian M35 Bg, the US M2A1 and the US M16) for permitted training purposes in accordance with Mine Ban Treaty Article 3.⁵ However, all four Article 7 Reports (1999-2002) indicate that 499 M35 Bg mines and 499 M16 mines have been retained for training purposes, but no M2 mines.⁶ These retained mines are described as obsolete and reserved for training in demining and for demonstration.⁷ As the numbers have not changed in four years, it is not clear what training has taken place or is intended. Luxembourg has stated that its army does not take part in demining activities.⁸

Mine Action Funding

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Landmine Monitor with details on mine action funding in 2001 that totaled \$718,896.⁹

- **Angola** – €247,894 (\$222,609) for a victim assistance project run by Handicap International Luxembourg (HIL) and Handicap International Belgium (HIB);
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina** – €100,000 (\$89,800) for the treatment and rehabilitation of mine victims, and for survey activities; donated via the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF);
- **Cambodia** – €9,916 (\$8,905) for a victim assistance project run by HIL and HIB.
- **Laos** – €278,396 (\$250,000), for the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from agricultural fields, through the United Nations Development Program and UXO LAO.
- **Moldova** – \$65,000 to the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for its project to destroy mine stockpiles and other material in Moldova.
- **Yugoslavia (FRY)** – \$82,482 for assessment of mine and UXO contamination, donated via the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.¹⁰

² Fax from Jean-Louis Wolzfeld, Director, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Handicap International Belgium, 12 June 2002.

³ Article 7 Report, submitted on 20 June 2002, for calendar year 2001.

⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 685, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 731.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 731.

⁶ This was confirmed in the fax from Jean-Louis Wolzfeld, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 June 2002.

⁸ Amended Protocol II, Article 13 report, Form E, submitted on 24 October 2001.

⁹ Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 11 June 2002, p. 2. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1=\$0.898, used throughout. According to its annual report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Luxembourg contributed US\$502,000 to support "demining activities" in 2001, and €354,000 (US\$317,892) in 2000. Report to the OSCE, 30 January 2002.

¹⁰ The ITF reports this amount to FRY as \$86,660. ITF Annual Report 2001, p. 12.

Two other programs have a mine action component. An orthopedic center in Pristina (Kosovo) run by HIL and Handicap International was funded with €91,851 (\$82,482) in 2001; this center deals with all people with disabilities as well as mine victims. In Afghanistan, HIL has assisted in refugee camps, including a small amount of mine risk education; funding from October-December 2001 was €100,000 (\$89,800).

A NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund project to destroy mine stockpiles in Georgia is scheduled to start at the end of 2002. Luxembourg is the lead nation in this project, and has allocated a contribution of \$450,000 to it.¹¹

NGO Activities

Handicap International Luxembourg organized its annual public awareness day on 6 October 2001, building a shoe pyramid on the Place d'Armes in the center of Luxembourg city. Events involved the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Cooperation and Defense, the Minister of the Family, and the Minister of the Interior.¹² HIL also raised public awareness of the mine issue through other actions, including the "personalities project" in which 99 famous people (politicians, musicians, actors, etc.) were displayed on posters and on banners all over Luxembourg city. All the personalities were depicted as mine survivors.¹³

MACEDONIA (FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF)

Key developments since May 2001: As of June 2002, FYROM had not started destruction of its stockpile of 42,871 antipersonnel mines, but had a plan in place to complete destruction before the 1 March 2003 deadline. FYROM decided to retain 4,000 mines for training instead of 50. The MACC in Kosovo and the ICRC conducted mine assessment missions to FYROM in 2001. In September 2001, the UNMAS opened a Mine Action Office in Skopje. Two Bosnia and Herzegovina NGOs cleared 1.7 million square meters of land in the FYROM in the last three months of 2001. The ICRC developed a mine/UXO awareness program in collaboration with the Macedonian Red Cross. Rebel NLA forces have stated that they have used and will continue to use mines, though there are no confirmed instances of new use in this reporting period. Data compiled from media reports indicates at least 28 deaths and 20 injuries from mines and UXO in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor in June 2002 that no specific administrative or legislative measures have been introduced to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. There are, however, a number of laws "which prohibit citizens of Macedonia from engaging in activities prohibited" by the treaty: Criminal law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 37/96; Law for protection of hazardous materials, Official Gazette No. 4/78; and Instructions for storage and handling of ammunition and mine explosive devices.¹

¹¹ Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor, 11 June 2002, p. 2.

¹² Fax from Jean-Louis Wolzfeld, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2002.

¹³ Interview with Christina Schür, Handicap International Luxembourg, 23 May 2002.

¹ Email response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Ruzica Zanteva Angelova, Counselor, Multilateral Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002. National implementation measures had previously been unclear. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 732. None of these measures are included in FYROM's Article 7 Reports. In contrast to the information provided to Landmine Monitor, FYROM said, "[W]e have undertaken all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited by the Convention." Statement by Mrs Dragica Zafirovska, Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the FYROM to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

FYROM did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, but did participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.² In January 2002, FYROM told States Parties, “The Republic of Macedonia attaches particular importance to the elimination of all types of landmines... The landmines laid down by the terrorist organization NLA, in the northern part of the country, have already caused a number of casualties among the Macedonian civilians and security forces, and even among the members of international organizations present in the field.”³

On 29 November 2001, FYROM cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

FYROM submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 25 June 2002, for the period 30 April 2001-30 April 2002. It had submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report to the UN on 25 May 1999, for the period 4 December 1997-31 March 1999. According to the United Nations FYROM did not submit its annual updated reports due 30 April 2000 and 30 April 2001. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the “situation with the mines in the Republic of Macedonia remained the same for the period from 31.03.1999 to 30.04.2000. We submitted Article 7 report for the period from 30.04.2000 to 30.04.2001 at the beginning of 2002.”⁴

FYROM is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but has not ratified Amended Protocol II. In June 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the necessary legislation for ratification has been drafted but “due to the crisis situation in 2001 the process was stopped.” Ratification is now expected by the end of 2002.⁵ FYROM did not attend, in December 2001, the Second CCW Review Conference or the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II.

Production and Transfer

Some of the former Yugoslavia’s mine production facilities were apparently located in FYROM, but production had ceased “even before it [FYROM] signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty,” according to the Foreign Ministry.⁶ There is no evidence of any production or export of antipersonnel mines by FYROM.

Stockpiling and Destruction

At the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, the FYROM delegation announced that “stockpiled mines are in our possession, although in small numbers, are under our complete control, and no transfers have taken place. My country is in the process of preparing a program for the destruction of stockpiled mines, which will soon be completed.”⁷

In 1999, FYROM reported that it had a stockpile of 42,921 antipersonnel mines.⁸ In October 2001, at a NATO Partnership for Peace seminar of regional mine action, a member of the Ministry of Defense provided the same figure for complete mines, but clarified that in addition, FYROM had 8,353 PMA-1 fuses and 8,353 PMA-1 detonators.⁹

² It was represented in January by Dragica Zafirovska, Minister-Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and Zoran Dinovski, Ministry of Defense, and in May by Nazif Dzaferi, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and Blagoj Tasevski, Ministry of Defense.

³ Statement by Mrs Dragica Zafirovska, Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the FYROM to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

⁴ Email response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Ruzica Zanteva Angelova, Counselor, Multilateral Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002.

⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002. Previous responses from the Ministry indicated ratification of Amended Protocol II by the end of 2000 and by mid-2001. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 733.

⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 687.

⁷ Statement by FYROM to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 1 February 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 May 1999.

⁹ Maj. Metodija Velickovski, Department of Engineering, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, “Anti personnel mine situation in Republic of Macedonia,” Workshop on Regionally-focused Mine Action, NATO

The Article 7 Report submitted on 25 June 2002 states that FYROM has 42,871 antipersonnel mines in stock.¹⁰ It reports that 50 “antimagnetic from plastic material” mines were destroyed at the “Souvenir” factory on 8 June 2000. These are the mines that FYROM had previously identified as retained for training purposes. FYROM’s initial 1999 Article 7 Report stated that 50 Souvenir antimagnetic plastic mines antipersonnel mines would be retained for permitted training purposes.¹¹

However, in its June 2002 response to Landmine Monitor, FYROM stated that it now intends to retain 4,000 mines: 1,400 PMA-1, 600 PMA-2, and 2,000 PMA-2A.¹² FYROM did not, though, report that it intended to retain these 4,000 mines in its June 2002 Article 7 Report; the relevant Form D is left blank.

At the NATO seminar in October 2001, FYROM said the target date for completion of stockpile destruction is 10 February 2003. The Mine Ban Treaty-mandated deadline is 1 March 2003. FYROM said that preparations were being made for destruction of an initial batch of 2,800 mines, described as “APM-2A” (likely PMA-2). But it was also noted that in order for the destruction of antipersonnel mines to proceed, “a legal act adopted by Macedonian parliament is necessary.”¹³

The Foreign Ministry said in June 2002 that no other mines, beyond the 50 in June 2000, had been destroyed. The Ministry said the plan calls for destruction of 22,800 antipersonnel mines by the end of 2002, and an additional 16,071 mines by the end of February 2003, with the remaining 4,000 kept for training.¹⁴

Use and Landmine Problem

Use of mines during the conflict that broke out in early 2001 between ethnic Albanian insurgents (NLA) and the FYROM government was reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor. In the latter half of 2001 and start of 2002, no clear-cut instances of the new use of mines have been identified, although casualties from mines have continued to occur.

Under a NATO-brokered peace accord signed in August 2001, the NATO Task Force Harvest collected and destroyed weaponry handed over by insurgents, including 1,045 mines and grenades, and 354 other explosive devices.¹⁵

In August 2001, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo carried out a two-day assessment of contamination by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in FYROM. The assessment team reported that “by far the greatest threat in the area is that posed by UXO. Where mines have been used they are very specific and localized and are generally not present at the same locations as concentrations of UXO.”¹⁶ The UXO contamination resulted largely from bombardment of occupied villages (about 80) by FYROM security forces. This has “limited the ensuing UXO problem to specific areas and confines it to very basic items of ordnance.” As regards the mine threat, the mines available to both sides were the same as those used by the Yugoslav Army and Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo: PMA and PMR antipersonnel mines, TMA antitank mines, and (possessed by the NLA only) Albanian and Chinese copies of former Warsaw Pact antitank mines.

Partnership for Peace, Athens, 18-19 October 2001. He also clarified that the first Article 7 Report misreported PMA2 mines as PMA3.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 June 2002. The mines are 8,353 PMA-1; 4,030 PMA-2; 560 PMA-3; 29,918 PMR-2A; and 10 unidentified antipersonnel mines. The Foreign Ministry told Landmine Monitor the unidentified mines are PROM-1 mines.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 25 May 1999.

¹² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002.

¹³ Maj. Velickovski, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, “Anti personnel mine situation in Republic of Macedonia,” 18-19 October 2001.

¹⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002.

¹⁵ “Rebels Disarmed, Macedonia Disputes NATO Presence,” *Associated Press*, 26 September 2001.

¹⁶ “UNMIK MACC Update-10/08/2001,” UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 10 August 2001.

Regarding possible government use of mines, MACC said:

Both the FYROM military and police have stated that they have not deployed mines of any type, nor do they intend to do so... [T]he police have little or no tactical requirement to lay mines and it is considered unlikely that they have done so. The military are assessed as having very limited resources of mines, and there is currently no direct evidence to show that they have laid any within FYROM. Should this non-use statement prove false, it is assessed that the most likely scenario for their deployment will be in small groups of protective mines in front of their trench positions. Any such use will be very localized and closely associated with occupied front line military positions.¹⁷

The MACC team reported that the insurgent NLA forces have stated that they have used and will continue to use mines, “a statement substantiated by a series of recent mine strike accidents”:

Their method of deployment is assessed as being standardized and closely conforms to that used by the KLA during the Kosovo conflict. The NLA currently hold positions to the west and north of Tetovo and to the extreme north and northeast of Skopje. Some of the tracks approaching these positions have had obstacles erected... According to monitors from the [OSCE], and statements by local NLA commanders, several of these obstacles have been reinforced by the deployment of both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, while it is likely that some anti-tank mines have also been deployed in a command detonation mode to act as the trigger for ambushes. It is estimated that this use is not widespread, but limited to certain areas and confined to road and track approaches to NLA held villages. It is also apparent that on a number of occasions the NLA have stated that they have mined an area, when they have not, in order to deter International agencies from entering, an issue substantiated by the OSCE Border Monitoring Team.¹⁸

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also carried out an assessment of the mine/UXO problem in FYROM in mid-2001, concluding, “Due to the reported use of old or low quality ammunition, it is estimated that the ratio of unexploded ordnance is higher than the average on other theatres of conflict.” Antitank mines “present less of a threat to civilians because their locations are known” and there is no evidence of widespread laying of antipersonnel mines. The “threat is confined to people living or about to return to areas where the fighting took place—namely the areas of Tetovo, Kumanovo and surroundings of Skopje.... The threat thus differs significantly from that facing post-conflict communities in other parts of the Balkans where antipersonnel landmines, unexploded ordnance and cluster bombs are the main problem.”¹⁹

In March 2002, the UN Mine Action Office in Skopje described this mine/UXO problem as “a constraint hampering safe return of IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] and refugees, as well as delivery of humanitarian assistance.”²⁰

Prior to 2002, there was no mine problem in FYROM, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 2002.²¹ Previous reports of mined areas on the border with Kosovo may be explained by the lack of marking of the border and dispute over its exact location. An agreement with Yugoslavia to mark the border signed in February 2001 was disputed in March 2002 by the

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ “Mine/UXO Awareness Programme in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 28 January 2002.

²⁰ “UNMAO Macedonia Assistance to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” UN Mine Action Office Macedonia, 11 March 2002.

²¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002; see also Article 7 Report, Form E, 25 May 1999.

newly-elected Kosovo President Rugova, and Prime Minister Rexhepi. A joint committee involving Skopje and Pristina has been set up by UNMIK to deal with border issues.²²

Mine Action Coordination, Survey and Mine/UXO Clearance

The FYROM Ministry of the Interior maintains a specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability, consisting of four units which the Kosovo MACC described as “suitably trained and equipped to deal with this level of problem. In addition, a recently formed Joint Anti-Terrorist Unit also retains a capability to respond to this type of problem plus an Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) capability. The military also maintain a small engineer capacity capable of resolving small mine clearance and/or obstacle tasks.”²³

In September 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) opened a Mine Action Office (MAO) in Skopje, to coordinate mine action responses by various agencies and to develop a strategy aimed at rapid implementation of mine action, especially clearance and mine risk education. It reported that in 2001 the national teams initiated mine/UXO emergency clearance. The MAO is equipped with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system. With the aim of completing “the clearance of all minefields and UXO affected areas before winter 2002, it [the MAO] will ensure that national EOD units obtain additional training and equipment, if still necessary...[and] additional commercial EOD teams could also be employed.”²⁴

At the Standing Committee meeting in January 2002, the Macedonian delegation reported that “NATO has already provided demining units and experts... The difficult and dangerous task of demining the roads in crisis regions of Macedonia was undertaken jointly by Macedonian security forces and NATO units. In parallel, the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance from Slovenia has provided six teams for demining in inhabited places.... The successful demining is also one of the preconditions for the complete return of displaced persons.”²⁵

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) started activities in FYROM in 2001, with an assessment that identified the main problem areas in the north (Kumanovo region) and northwest (Tetovo region). The ITF proposed demining and battle area clearance of villages in these regions, by the Bosnia and Herzegovina NGOs BH Demining and STOP Mines, under monitoring of Terra Prom. These operations started on 17 October 2001 and ceased (due to weather conditions) on 16 December 2001. By that date, the teams had cleared 1,739,257 square meters (including 879 houses, 1,394 buildings, and 75,060 square meters or 18.8 kilometers of railway and roads, and the destruction of 153 items of ordnance including four mines). Donors were Slovenia (US\$19,685) and the United States.²⁶

From September 2001 to March 2002, the Italian NGO INTERSOS carried out mine clearance of houses in support of a housing reconstruction program funded by the European Commission. The survey team included a coordinator, an Italian EOD expert, two Bosnian clearance experts, first aid and local support staff, working in coordination with the MAO in Skopje.²⁷ However, in late 2001 clearance efforts were hampered by adverse weather and limited clearance/EOD capacity available, with the result that by March 2002 only eight villages had been

²² “Kosovo: UN Mission to Set up Joint Committee with Skopje on Border Issues,” UN News Service, 19 March 2002.

²³ “UNMIK MACC Update-10/08/2001,” UNMIK, 10 August 2001.

²⁴ “Mine Action Assistance in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),” undated, available at: www.mineaction.org, accessed on 3 May 2002.

²⁵ Statement of the FYROM to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 1 February 2002.

²⁶ “Annual Report 2001,” International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, p. 19; Article 7 Report, Form C (attachment Table 1), 25 June 2002.

²⁷ Interview with Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, Rome, 3 April 2002; “An INTERSOS Mine Action Unit Team Working in FYROM to Facilitate IDPs Return,” INTERSOS, 9 October 2001.

completely cleared. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) expressed concern “over possible incidents as UXO-Mines have migrated over the winter and farmers prepare their fields for spring planting...[and] the decrease in International Trust Fund mine clearing teams from six teams to three.”²⁸ UNOCHA reported that “additional clearance capacity is essential to mitigate potential accidents as families resume normal activities... The Government has recently approved deployment of additional clearance teams through Care International and Handicap International that will join ITF to step up clearance efforts as soon as the necessary funding is obtained.”²⁹

In February 2002, the MAO reported that several new areas of mine/UXO contamination had been discovered in the border areas close to the villages of Malina Mahla, Tanacevski and Brest. Reportedly, some routes leading to the border with Kosovo had been mined.³⁰

In 2002, the ITF planned to deploy three teams for mine/UXO clearance for three months starting in April, and a “train and equip” program for Macedonian personnel. Between 2 April and 26 May the Bosnia and Herzegovina NGOs BH Demining, STOP Mines and PRO-VITA reported clearing 1,304,754 square meters, including 345 houses and 357 other buildings. They found 31 items of ordnance, but no mines.³¹

In March 2002, the first batch of 16 persons attended the EOD training course at Ig, Slovenia. The plan was to train and equip five Macedonian teams to carry out UXO and mine clearance.³²

Mine Action Funding

Total funding by the ITF for mine action in FYROM in 2001 was \$474,592.³³ Canada reported a donation of US\$57,461 for mine action in FYROM, which went to the Canadian International Demining Corps (an NGO).³⁴ Funding of the Intersos survey in 2001-2002 was provided by the European Agency for Reconstruction (€279,376).³⁵

The United States reports that in its fiscal year 2001, “the Department of State set aside another \$1 million for deposit into the ITF to support an expanded effort in Macedonia. State Department, ITF, and Macedonian government officials jointly are developing a plan to use those funds in landmine/UXO awareness and clearance programs.”³⁶

A donors conference for funding of post-conflict reconstruction and other activities, including mine action, took place in Brussels on 12 March 2002. A report indicated the funding allocated to mine clearance as €1.9 million (via the European Agency for Reconstruction), to which Norway will add €130,000.³⁷

Mine Risk Education

In 2001-2002, mine risk education was carried out by the ICRC and UNICEF, with the ICRC taking the lead. Following an assessment in June 2001 of the extent of the mine/UXO problem, the ICRC developed a mine/UXO awareness program in collaboration with the Macedonian Red Cross, focused on UXO as the main threat. It was judged that a community-based, carefully targeted approach aimed at those most at risk—resident and displaced populations from directly affected

²⁸ “Humanitarian Situation and Issues in South Eastern Europe Jan-Feb 2002,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 9 March 2002.

²⁹ “Humanitarian Update FYR of Macedonia March 2002,” UNOCHA, 9 March 2002.

³⁰ “Mine Action Office Macedonia Situation Report: 24 February 2002,” 24 February 2002.

³¹ Document supplied by Ruzica Zanteva Angelova, Counselor, Multilateral Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002.

³² Email from Eva Veble, Head of International Relations, ITF, 23 March 2002.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See the Canada country report in this Landmine Monitor edition. See also, UNMAS Mine Action Investments database, available at www.mineaction.org, accessed on 3 July 2002.

³⁵ Interview with Stefano Calabretta, INTERSOS, Rome, 3 April 2002; “An INTERSOS Mine Action Unit Team Working in FYROM to Facilitate IDPs Return,” INTERSOS, 9 October 2001.

³⁶ US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” November 2001, p. 31.

³⁷ “Donor Pledges Push Forward Progress on Addressing Humanitarian Priorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” UNOCHA, 22 July 2002.

villages—was preferable to blanket coverage. Specialists from the ICRC teams in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo were used to train local staff and to initiate the program. Officials in all villages affected were visited to enlist their cooperation and identify people suitable for training as mine awareness instructors.³⁸

The program started early in September 2001 in Aracinovo, then extended to Brnjarci and the Lipkovo region, and to other affected villages in a prioritized list. Regular sessions were conducted with villagers, complemented by leaflets and posters aimed at a range of age groups distributed with food assistance. One leaflet was aimed at young children, featuring a cartoon character based on the famous Shara dog which originates in FYROM. In this first phase, 50,000 leaflets were distributed.³⁹ In the following phases 35 local mine awareness instructors continued the program. It was planned to use them in support of Community Liaison Teams during clearance operations in 2002. Information gathered in the course of these activities has been shared with the MAO.⁴⁰

In 2001, UNICEF started mine risk education in FYROM using materials from Kosovo, with the intention of adapting them in the light of experience.⁴¹

Mine/UXO Casualties

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that in 2001 there were 12 mine/UXO casualties in the FYROM military (excluding the police), with no further military casualties up to June 2002. In 2001 there were seven civilian casualties and to June 2002 one casualty. The nature of the casualties (injured or killed) or other details were not reported. In addition, three foreign nationals were killed in 2001; none to June 2002.⁴²

Data compiled from a limited number of media reports by Landmine Monitor shows 28 people killed and 20 injured from mines and UXO in FYROM in 2001.⁴³ Casualties have continued to occur in 2002. Reports of mine/UXO incidents included the following.

On 19 July 2001, a European Union Monitoring Mission vehicle was destroyed by an antitank mine on a track near Novo Selo; the three occupants (a Norwegian, a Slovak, and an Albanian interpreter) were killed.⁴⁴ On 29 July 2001, one woman was killed and her family injured when their car detonated an antitank near Jazince village.⁴⁵ On 10 August 2001, eight soldiers were killed and six injured when an army truck ran over a mine near Ljubanci, north of Skopje.⁴⁶ On 4 December 2001, one child was killed and three others injured by a mine they had found in Brnovica, near Tetovo.⁴⁷ In February 2002, one person was killed and four others seriously injured in an explosion in Bervenica commune in Tetovo.⁴⁸ On 8 May 2002, two members of the KFOR international peacekeeping forces were involved in a mine incident in the Lesnica area, northeast of

³⁸ ICRC Press Release, "ICRC Launches UXO/Mine Awareness Programme," 7 September 2001; "Things That Go Bang" (e-bulletin), UNICEF, Issue 1, 11 February 2002.

³⁹ ICRC, "Update 05.09.01—Crisis in FYROM" and "Update 04 Oct 2001—Crisis in FYROM," 5 September 2001.

⁴⁰ ICRC, "Mine/UXO Awareness Programme in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," 28 January 2002; "Mine Action Office Macedonia Situation Report: 24 February 2002," 24 February 2002.

⁴¹ "UNICEF Kosovo Situation Report 16 Aug-17 Sep 2001," 17 September 2001; "UNMIK MACC Update-10/08/2001," 10 August 2001.

⁴² Email response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Ruzica Zanteva Angelova, Counsellor, Multilateral Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2002.

⁴³ Data collated from 11 ICBL media reports during the year ended 31 December 2001.

⁴⁴ "UNMIK MACC Update-10/08/2001," 10 August 2001.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ "Eight Soldiers Killed, Six Injured in a Mine Blast," *Agence France-Presse*, 10 August 2001.

⁴⁷ "One Child, at least Three Injured in Macedonia Mine Blast," *Agence France-Presse*, 4 December 2001.

⁴⁸ Ifan Agushi, "Macedonia: Mine Menace," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, 22 February 2002.

Tetovo, when their vehicle, carrying a mine-clearance team, hit a mine; an Italian soldier was killed and a German soldier injured.⁴⁹

Survivor Assistance

The ICRC supplied medical and surgical supplies to hospitals in Skopje, Tetovo and Kumanova, the State University Hospital, City Hospital, the Military Hospital, and the Special Police Forces Rescue Unit for the treatment of 650 war-wounded patients, including mine/UXO casualties. The ICRC also assisted with the evacuation of the wounded to the hospitals.⁵⁰

The Kosovo MACC reported in August 2001, "FYROM has a well-developed medical and hospital system and should be more than capable of dealing with any mine/UXO casualties. Follow on psychiatric care and counseling of victims is outside the expertise of this report but is assessed as being adequate."⁵¹

MADAGASCAR

The Republic of Madagascar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 16 September 1999. It entered into force on 1 March 2000. No domestic legislation to implement the treaty is known to exist.

Madagascar did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings in 2001 or the first half of 2002. It cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, promoting implementation of the treaty.

On 20 June 2001, Madagascar submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, covering the period from 31 January 2000 to 31 January 2001. Madagascar has not submitted its annual Article 7 Report, due by 30 April 2002.

Madagascar is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In its Article 7 Report, Madagascar stated that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. According to a senior Madagascar Defence Force officer, Madagascar has a small amount of mines retained for training or research purposes.¹ According to information from the French government, "the mines that are still in stocks in Antananarivo [the capital of Madagascar] are no longer usable."²

Madagascar has experienced a crisis since presidential elections were held on 16 December 2001. Landmine Monitor has received allegations and "rumors" from a number of sources of use of antipersonnel mines by governmental forces of President Marc Ravalomanana and by opponents of the new government, forces loyal to the former president Didier Ratsiraka.³ However, knowledgeable governmental and nongovernmental sources say they have no evidence to support the allegations. There have been no reports of mine casualties treated in local hospitals.

At the request of the President of France's National Commission for the Elimination of Anti-Personnel Mines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France made inquiries into the allegations. The Ministry, drawing on information provided by its Embassy in Madagascar following a local investigation in the areas concerned, said that the "rumors appear not to be justified." It noted that

⁴⁹ "Macedonia—Muere un soldado de la KFOR y otro resulta herido al pisar su vehículo una mina cerca de Tetovo," *Europa Press* (news agency), 8 May 2002; "Peacekeeper Killed in Macedonia Landmine Blast," *Agence France-Presse*, 9 May 2002.

⁵⁰ ICRC, "ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001," Geneva, July 2002, pp. 32-33.

⁵¹ "UNMIK MACC Update-10/08/2001," 10 August 2001.

¹ Interview with General Brigadier Rene Bournas, Director of the War Victims and Veterans Office (ONMAC), Madagascar Defence Force, Bamako, Mali, 16 February 2001.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, letter (via email) to Brigitte Stern, President, National Commission for the Elimination of Anti-Personnel Mines, 2002.

³ On 30 April 2002, a member of a French/Malagasy organization said antipersonnel mines had been laid around the residence of the Governor of Fianarantsoa, and appealed to the ICBL for help. Several humanitarian agencies in Madagascar told Landmine Monitor they had heard rumors of antipersonnel mine use by government forces around the presidential palace, and by opposition forces at a roadblock around Brickaville bridge, approximately 150 kilometers south of Tamatave.

in 1991 antipersonnel mines were used around the Ivahola Palace, and concluded that this earlier incident in part explained rumors that mines had been used again in 2002.⁴

The Embassy of Madagascar in Mauritius also responded to a request from Landmine Monitor for clarification on the use allegations.⁵ The Embassy referred to the Article 7 Report which declares that the Armed Forces do not possess antipersonnel mines, and the “Directive on antipersonnel mines” issued to the Armed Forces that states that “it is prohibited to use antipersonnel mines during operations, to participate in planning for mine use or in any instructions and/or training during which such devices would be used, to give one’s approval for the use of such devices, be it on Malagasy territory or elsewhere, to transfer, stock or authorize the transit on Malagasy territory of such devices.”⁶

MALAWI

Mine Ban Policy

Malawi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 August 1998. It entered into force for Malawi on 1 March 1999. Malawi has as yet not enacted domestic legislation, though it said it was in the process last year. The delay is reportedly due to capacity problems in the Ministry of Justice.¹

Malawi did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, nor the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in January and May 2002, reportedly due to logistical problems.²

Malawi has not submitted its initial transparency report as required by Mine Ban Treaty Article 7. An official in the Foreign Ministry reports that the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs both lack capacity and have a shortage of staff, which is hampering Malawi’s ability to submit its report. The official noted that the government rates the Mine Ban Treaty highly and that it occupies a high priority both at domestic and foreign policy levels, but that current constraints besetting the government create a negative picture, which is regretted.³

Malawi does not produce or stockpile antipersonnel mines and has discouraged other countries from manufacturing, transferring, using or stockpiling landmines. In 2001, Landmine Monitor reported that the Malawi Army has only inert dummy mines in stock, which are used for training purposes as allowed under Article 3 of the treaty.⁴

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

It has been estimated that 1,000 kilometers of Malawi territory bordering Mozambique is infested with landmines.⁵ However, no survey has been conducted to evaluate the impact of

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, letter (via email) to Brigitte Stern, President, National Commission for the Elimination of Anti-Personnel Mines, 2002.

⁵ Communication to Landmine Monitor from the Embassy of the Republic of Madagascar in Mauritius, 23 May 2002.

⁶ “Directives pour les Forces Armees relatives aux mines antipersonnel,” document attached to Article 7 Report, submitted 20 June 2001. Translated from French by Landmine Monitor.

¹ Correspondence with Ernest Makawa, Treaties Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, Malawi, 12 April 2002.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Interview with Col. Macloyd Chidzalo, former Army Spokesperson, Lilongwe, Malawi, 12 December 2000.

⁵ Press Briefing by Kaire Mbuende, Former SADC Executive Secretary, Blantyre, Malawi, September 1998.

landmines on civilians or the communities living along the suspected border areas. Suspected mines areas have not yet been marked or mapped.⁶

The Army plans to conduct a technical survey in areas suspected to have mines in 2002.⁷ Funding is being sought for a full Landmine Impact Survey, which would, in turn, determine the priorities for demining.⁸ Malawi does not have a budget for mine action.⁹ Proposals are currently being formulated by the Ministry of Defense to solicit funds from donors for survey, demining operations, and mine risk education.¹⁰

Although the Malawi Army engineers have the capacity to clear mines, there are currently no clearance activities taking place. There are also no demining institutions or humanitarian demining NGOs working in Malawi.

The Malawi Army has emphasized the need for continuous mine risk education (MRE). A military officer said, "It is prerequisite for all Malawians since most of them living along the suspected areas are ignorant of the lethal weapon."¹¹ The Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) has been conducting MRE through its already existing outreach civic education program. The Army's mine awareness program focuses on its officers only.¹²

Landmine Casualties and Survivors Assistance

In 2001, there have been no reports of people killed or injured by antipersonnel mines. In 2000, two people were killed and three others injured when a landmine exploded in the Muloza River.¹³ There are no specific programs in Malawi for landmine survivors and the hospitals have limited capacity to deal with casualties.¹⁴ Assistance to survivors is mainly through the provision of first aid, medical treatment, and artificial limbs where possible. There are a number of both governmental and non-governmental organizations providing services to persons with disabilities, such as, the Malawi Council for the Handicapped (MACOHA). Services provided include physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration.¹⁵ The government is in the process of formulating a national disability policy.¹⁶ The Minister of State Responsible for Persons with Disabilities is a cabinet-level position and is currently held by a disabled person.¹⁷

⁶ Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, "Report on Landmine Survey," 1998. According to an email from CHRR on 17 July 2002, this survey was an information collecting exercise by CHRR to try to establish the extent of the problem of landmines in the country and the impact on the lives of people in the affected areas by collecting information in the border areas and interviewing a limited number of experts.

⁷ Correspondence with Colonel A.S.H. Kwaligana, Office of the Secretary for Defense, Lilongwe, Malawi, 22 March 2002.

⁸ Interviews with Major Chisunkha, Army Military Engineer, Army Headquarters, Lilongwe, 25 January and 6 February 2002.

⁹ Correspondence with Colonel A.S.H. Kwaligana, Office of the Secretary for Defense, Lilongwe, Malawi, 22 March 2002.

¹⁰ Interview with Major Chisunkha, Army Military Engineer, Lilongwe, 6 February 2002.

¹¹ Correspondence with Colonel A.S.H. Kwaligana, Office of the Secretary for Defense, Lilongwe, Malawi, 22 March 2002.

¹² Interview with Major Chisunkha, Army Military Engineer, Army Headquarters, 6 February 2002.

¹³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 93; for earlier reported casualties see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁴ Interview with a Ministry of Health official, Lilongwe, 12 December 2001.

¹⁵ Correspondence with W.A. Kachingwe, for the Secretary Responsible for Persons with Disabilities, Office of the Minister of State Responsible for Persons with Disabilities, Blantyre, 29 January 2002; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 94.

¹⁶ Correspondence with W.A. Kachingwe, for the Secretary Responsible for Persons with Disabilities, Office of the Minister of State Responsible for Persons with Disabilities, Blantyre, 29 January 2002.

¹⁷ US Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001: Malawi," March 2002.

MALAYSIA

Key developments since May 2001: In August 2001, Malaysia hosted the first seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Munitions in the ASEAN region.

Mine Ban Policy

Malaysia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 22 April 1999; it entered into force on 1 October 1999. Malaysia enacted the Anti-Personnel Mines Implementation Act on 15 June 2000.¹ Malaysia submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 27 February 2002, covering calendar year 2001.

Malaysia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. On 20 September 2001, on the side of the Third Meeting, Malaysia participated in an ASEAN informal group meeting. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand agreed that the best approach to engaging ASEAN countries in landmine issues would be to focus on humanitarian aspects such as victim assistance, mine awareness, and socio-economic development for mine-affected areas.²

Malaysia participated actively in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January 2002 and May 2002. Malaysia organized another informal ASEAN meeting on the side in January to discuss the issue of landmines within the ASEAN context. Malaysia also attended the Regional Seminar on Landmines in Southeast Asia, hosted by Thailand in Bangkok on 13-15 May 2002.

At the UN General Assembly in November 2001, Malaysia cosponsored and voted in favor of Resolution 56/24M, which calls for the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Ambassador Hasmy Agam told the General Assembly, "We remain committed to the attainment of a truly universal ban of antipersonnel landmines.... Malaysia is firm in its conviction that humanitarian sufferings caused by antipersonnel landmines far outweigh its military utility. It remains our hope and expectation that there will be a stronger political push for universal acceptance of this treaty."³

A Malaysian official told Landmine Monitor in May 2002 that Malaysia remains committed to the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty by fully supporting and working closely together with other States Parties, and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental; Malaysia's effort is reflected in its active participation in the Standing Committees and in other international and regional initiatives promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴

In the government's first statement on the issue, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor, "Malaysia Armed Forces may participate in joint operations with armed forces of non-signatory states, but will not participate in joint operations that involve the use of APM."⁵

Malaysia is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on landmines. Malaysia did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties of Amended Protocol II, or the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

The government of Malaysia, with the support of Canada, hosted a Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Munitions on 8-9 August 2001, in Kuala Lumpur. ASEAN Regional Forum members, other governments, international organizations, and NGOs, including the ICBL, attended the meeting. A total of 21 countries participated, including

¹ Laws of Malaysia, Act 603, Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act 2000. The full name of the legislation is "An Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; and for other matters connected therewith."

² The Philippines, Article 7 Report, 5 April 2002.

³ Statement by Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the UN, at the General Debate of the First Committee, New York, 12 October 2001.

⁴ Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, Principal Assistant Secretary, Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2002.

⁵ Ibid.

eight non-States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. In his opening address Hon. Datuk Haji Mohd. Shafie bin Haji Apdal said, "Universalization will remain the greatest challenge to be faced by us when countries in possession of anti-personnel mines have yet commenced destruction plans on their stockpiles.... Malaysia feels that today's forum is another serious effort to engage countries within and beyond this region toward that end.... Given the scale of the challenge, Malaysia would like to call on all nations, particularly within the region, to be a part of the family and to carry out its duties, particularly that of stockpile destruction."⁶

At the Standing Committee meeting on Stockpile Destruction in January 2002, Malaysia presented the results of the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction. Participants agreed that there was a need for a coordinated and comprehensive approach in the ASEAN region, that takes advantage of synergies, information exchange and past experience.⁷ Among the recommendations were: to discuss antipersonnel mine issues at future ASEAN regional forum meetings; to develop a comprehensive approach to encourage countries that have not yet, to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty; to promote confidence building measures in the region through the synergy between governments, strategic institutions and NGOs. A series of "best practices" were identified during technical discussions.⁸

Stockpile Destruction

In January 2001, Malaysia destroyed its entire stock of 94,721 antipersonnel mines. It included details on technical characteristics of the mines destroyed in its second Article 7 transparency report.⁹ Malaysia chose not to retain any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes. The Deputy Minister of Defense said, "Malaysia's stand to maintain 'zero retention' of live mines is evidenced by our serious commitment towards the earth being free from indiscriminate weapons."¹⁰

According to a Ministry of Defense official, all Claymore mines possessed by Malaysia are designed to be used in command-detonated mode only and no tripwires have been supplied by the manufacturer.¹¹ In addition, he stated that technical steps are ongoing to ensure that the command-detonated mode of operation of the Claymore mines cannot be modified. Malaysia has thus far chosen not to report voluntarily under Article 7 on its stockpiled Claymore mines.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Malaysia is no longer a mine-affected country. No mines remain planted from the insurgency in the 1960s-1980s.¹²

In 2001, Malaysia started a Defense Cooperation Program with an annual budget of 5 million Malaysian Ringgit (around US\$1.3 million), which includes a component to help train developing countries in demining and mine destruction. Malaysia received a request for such training from

⁶ Statement by Datuk Haji Mohd Shafie bin Haji Apdal, Deputy Minister of Defense, to the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines and Other Munitions, Kuala Lumpur, 8-9 August 2001.

⁷ Raja Reza Raja Zaid Shah, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN Office in Geneva, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2002. See, www.gichd.ch.

⁸ Summary of the Co-Chairs, Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction, Kuala Lumpur, August 8-9, 2001.

⁹ Article 7 transparency Report, 27 February 2002. For more details on stockpile destruction see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 465.

¹⁰ Statement by Datuk Haji Mohd. Shafie bin Haji Apdal, Deputy Minister of Defense, to the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines and Other Munitions, Kuala Lumpur, 8 - 9 August 2001.

¹¹ Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2002. They are US-supplied Claymore mines. Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, 16 July 2002.

¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 466.

Ecuador.¹³ Ten Ecuadorian military officers are expected to undergo a two-week training course in Malaysia in September 2002.¹⁴

In the past, Malaysian peacekeeping forces undertook mine clearance operations in Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

During the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, an officer died in an antipersonnel landmine incident.¹⁵ The government maintains that during the communist insurgency that ended in 1989, there were less than 100 casualties due to booby-traps, and none to landmines; all casualties were military personnel.¹⁶

Military personnel, when seriously injured in military operations including mine clearance, receive free medical care and other assistance, which includes prosthetic services, financial aid from the Warrior's Fund, special pension schemes for disabled veterans, vocational training, and scholarships for the education of their children.¹⁷

MALDIVES

Maldives signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 October 1998 and ratified it on 7 September 2000. The treaty entered into force for Maldives on 1 March 2001. Maldives has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 28 August 2001. It is not known if Maldives has undertaken any national implementation measures, as required by Article 9.

Maldives has not attended any of the annual meetings of States Parties, nor any of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings. Maldives has voted in favor of all UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including the November 2001 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M.

Maldives acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on 7 September 2000. It did not participate in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, or the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

Maldives is not mine affected, and states that it has not produced, used, transferred or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.¹ Maldives is not known to have contributed to any mine action program or taken part in any mine clearance operations.

MALI

Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 2 June 1998 and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation implementing the ban treaty was adopted on 27 September 2000 and 15 November 2000, including penal sanctions.¹

In June 2002, an interministerial decree created a national commission on landmines.² It reportedly will be composed of 13 members, including representatives of parliament, civil society and media.³

¹³ Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2002.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2002.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; and 16 July 2002.

¹⁷ Email from Cdr. Muhamad Ridzwan Abd. Rahman, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2002.

¹ Statement by Ambassador Ahmed Mujthaba, UN General Assembly, First Committee General Debate, New York, 23 October 1997.

² For detail on the legislation, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 95.

³ Telephone interview with Mamadou Lamine Ouatara, Technical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 2002. The decree will enter into force after official publication.

Mali's first Article 7 transparency report, due on 28 August 1999, was submitted on 17 May 2001. The annual updated Article 7 Report, due on 30 April 2002, has not yet been submitted. Preparations for the Presidential and the National Assembly elections of April 2002 reportedly delayed preparation of the report.⁴

Mali attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January 2002, but not in May 2002. Mali also participated in the regional "Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention" in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001. On 29 November 2001, Mali cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mali does not produce or export antipersonnel mines. Mali states that it has never used antipersonnel mines. Since their destruction in 1998, Mali possesses no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. It retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes.⁵

Mali is not mine-affected and there are no reports of any mine victims on its territory.⁶

However, contingents of the Malian Army have been trained in the United States, France, Germany, and China in demining techniques. Although Mali is often involved in military peacekeeping operations in the region, no antipersonnel mine casualties have been reported by the Army.⁷

MALTA

Key developments since May 2001: Malta became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 November 2001. Malta submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 30 April 2002.

The Republic of Malta signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 7 May 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2001. National implementation measures enacted on 27 April 2001 use a design-based definition of "antipersonnel mine" without reference to antihandling devices as in Article 2.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Malta attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, represented by Ambassador Michel Bartolo and Annabelle Mifsud, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, but not in May 2002.

Malta submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 30 April 2002. This describes as "not applicable" the requirements to report on stockpiled antipersonnel mines, mines retained under Article 3, conversion/decommissioning of production facilities, destruction programs and locations of mined areas. The voluntary Form J is included in the Article 7 Report, which records that in 2001 Malta contributed US\$2,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.²

³ Interview with Mamadou Lamine Ouatarra, Technical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 28 January 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 May 2001. For details on the stockpile and its destruction, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 96-97.

⁶ *Landmine Monitor report 2001*, p. 96.

⁷ Interview with Mamadou Lamine Ouatarra, Technical Adviser, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 28 January 2002.

¹ Legal Notice 97 of 2001, *Government Gazette* No. 17087, 27 April 2001, issued under the National Interest (Enabling Powers) Act (CAP. 365).

² Article 7 Report, submitted on 30 April 2002 for the period 1 November 2001 - 30 April 2002.

On 29 November 2001, Malta cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. In a statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly regarding Malta's participation in the Third Meeting of States Parties, Malta declared that it was "greatly heartened to witness the sterling work of those delegations and members of Civil Society that have, in a few short years, transformed the Anti-Landmines Movement into a workable Convention whose provisions are respected not only by the ever increasing number of states parties but also by non-states parties whose actions are coloured by the moral strength of the Convention."³

Malta is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Amended Protocol II. Malta participated as an observer in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

MAURITANIA

Key developments since May 2001: The Mines Advisory Group carried out a mine assessment mission in December 2001, and UNMAS conducted an assessment in 2002. Mauritania submitted its first Article 7 Report, dated 20 June 2001, and its annual update on 12 June 2002. Mauritania reports a stockpile of 5,728 mines, all of which will be retained.

Mine Ban Policy

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 21 July 2000, and the treaty entered into force for Mauritania on 1 January 2001.

Mauritania submitted its first Article 7 Report on 20 June 2001, for the period from 1 June to 1 November 2001. It submitted its annual Article 7 Report on 12 June 2002, for the period from 1 June 2001 to 1 June 2002.

Both Article 7 Reports refer to Law 99-07 of 20 January 1999 under national implementation measures. According to the National Humanitarian Demining Office (NHDO), the law is still in draft and not yet final.¹ Under this law, any use, production, buying, selling, retaining, importing, exporting, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines will be punishable by imprisonment of 10 years and a fine of MRO 10 million (US\$37,827).²

Mauritania participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, and attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. It made a statement at the "Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa" in Tunis on 15-16 January 2002, in which it reaffirmed the country's commitment to banning antipersonnel mines.³

A National Committee, established in December 2001, is in charge of the landmine issue.⁴ The permanent secretariat of the committee is provided by the National Humanitarian Demining Office.⁵

³ Statement of Dr. Julian Vassallo, Representative of Malta, at the general debate in the First Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, 9 October 2001.

¹ Email to Landmine Monitor (Handicap International Belgium) from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, National Humanitarian Demining Office, 22 June 2002.

² Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 June 2001; Article 7 Report, Form A, 12 June 2002. Exchange rate: US\$1 to MRO 264 on 31 July 2002.

³ Statement by Lt. Col. Abdi Ould Ahmed T'feil, Director, National Humanitarian Demining Office, to Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa, Tunis, 15 January 2002.

⁴ Members of the National Committee include the Ministries of Defense, the Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; a member of Parliament; a member of the Senate; and a civil society representative (unspecified). The Committee meets twice a year. Email to Landmine Monitor (Handicap International Belgium) from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, National Humanitarian Demining Office, 22 June 2002.

In November 2001, Mauritania cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Mauritania states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines,⁶ and it is not believed to have exported landmines.

Mauritania provided detailed information on the country's stockpile of antipersonnel mines in its June 2001 Article 7 Report. It reported a stockpile of 5,728 antipersonnel mines, including: 1,890 plastic "model 51" mines manufactured by France,⁷ 1,838 PMN Soviet manufactured mines, and 2,000 MP mines (believed to be the PMA-3 manufactured by the former Yugoslavia).⁸ Mauritania indicated that it would retain all of these 5,728 antipersonnel mines for training, under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁹

In its Article 7 Report, Mauritania also reported that 8,084 non-detectable type "51" mines had been transferred for destruction, though it did not report the actual destruction of the mines.¹⁰ In a February 2001 document, Mauritania indicated that over the past three years it had destroyed 8,084 antipersonnel mines, of which 60 percent (about 4,850) came from stockpiles and 40 percent (about 3,234) came from demining operations.¹¹

Landmine Problem and Survey and Assessment

The mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem in the north of Mauritania is the result of its involvement in the conflict over the disputed region of Western Sahara. Between 1975 and 1978 Mauritania occupied the southern third of Western Sahara, and, along with Moroccan Forces, fought against the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) independence movement for Western Sahara. All parties to the conflict used mines extensively.

From 8-15 December 2001, the British mine action NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) carried out an assessment mission in Mauritania, with financial support provided by Canada. In its assessment mission report, MAG noted that both the Mauritanian and Moroccan military laid protective and defensive minefields and belts, primarily around urban centers and key economic assets, while Polisario used mines to disrupt communication, provide cover during retreat, and/or to disrupt Mauritania's key economic asset: the iron ore mines at Kedia d'Idjill, Guelb El Rhein, and M'Haoudat and the railway that transported the ore to the coast.¹²

To a lesser extent explosive devices left over from the colonial period have been found in other parts of the country. In addition, the shifting of dunes, the instability of soils and the absence of natural barriers present huge obstacles to clearance operations and increase the danger for the civilian population.¹³

The exact scope of the mine and UXO problem remain largely undefined, no records exist and only limited information gathering has taken place.¹⁴ Mine- and UXO-affected areas are

⁵ Email to Landmine Monitor (Handicap International Belgium) from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, NHDO, 22 June 2002.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 June 2001.

⁷ MAG said this antipersonnel mine, which it called the APID 51, was perhaps the most common mine laid in the ground. Mines Advisory Group, "Mauritania: Assessment Report on behalf of Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)," December 2001, p. 2.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 June 2001 states 2,400 MP mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 12 June 2002 states 2,000 MP mines. Mauritania confirmed to Landmine Monitor that 2,000 is the correct number. Email to Landmine Monitor (Handicap International Belgium) from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, NHDO, 22 June 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 June 2001.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ NHDO, "Information sur la Situation Générale des Zones Minées en Mauritanie," February 2001.

¹² Mines Advisory Group, "Mauritania: Assessment Report on behalf of Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)," December 2001, p. 2.

¹³ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁴ MAG, "Mauritania: Assessment Report," December 2001, p. 2.

located in the northern regions of Dakhlet Naoudhibou, Adrar, and Tiris Zemour where the mines and UXO are for the most part located around the urban centers of Nouadhibou, Zouerate, and Bir Moghrein.¹⁵ The towns of Choum, F'derick, Atar, Chinguiti, and Boulenoir, as well as more remote locations along the northern and western borders are also mine-affected.¹⁶

According to MAG, "given the size and density of the minefields MAG saw," the prior estimate of 50,000 to 100,000 mines remaining in the ground, "does not seem unreasonable."¹⁷

According to NHDO, mine- and UXO-affected areas total approximately 310,000 square kilometers and impact about 294,000 people, mainly urbanized former nomadic populations who continue their pastoral activities.¹⁸ Major economic activities are hindered by the presence of mines and UXO: iron ore extraction, fishing on the coast, trade through the overland route from Morocco, and tourism in coastal and desert areas.¹⁹

From 3-11 April 2002, the UN Mine Action Service organized a UN interagency mine action mission to "define the scope and nature of the landmine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem in Mauritania," and make recommendations for the implementation of mine action activities.²⁰ No report is available yet.

Mine Action Funding

Mauritania has allocated approximately \$850,000 annually from its national defense budget to the NDHO for mine clearance.²¹

The US donated \$729,000 in its 2001 financial year for construction of a regional demining facility in Nouadhibou, the main economic center of Mauritania.²² The US also provided radio communication equipment to NDHO in April 2002.²³

Mine Clearance

The NHDO, established in 1999 within the Military Engineers of the Mauritanian Army, remains the only active mine action body in Mauritania, conducting both clearance and mine risk education.²⁴ Its activities are, however, limited by a lack of personnel, equipment, and financial resources.²⁵

Between June 2001 and June 2002, Mauritania reported that mine clearance operations took place in Zouerate and Nouadhibou, but no information was provided on the amount of land or quantity or types of mines cleared.²⁶ According to Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane of the NHDO in the first half of 2002, a total of 250 antipersonnel mines and 180 antitank mines were cleared and destroyed.²⁷ It is unclear if these include the 280 explosive devices cleared in April 2001 during a demining operation of a 14 kilometer-long stretch of road between the Moroccan border checkpoint at Bin Gandouz and the Mauritanian railway by a joint Moroccan-Mauritanian team.²⁸ On 4

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 5.

²⁰ UNMAS, "Assessment Mission to Mauritania, Terms of Reference," undated, sent to Landmine Monitor by e-mail from NHDO, 1 April 2002.

²¹ MAG, "Mauritania: Assessment Report," December 2001, p.6. Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane specified the funding is for mine clearance. Email to Landmine Monitor, 22 June 2002.

²² US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 8.

²³ Email to Landmine Monitor from Deborah Netland, Program Manager, Humanitarian Demining Programs, US Department of State, 2 July 2002.

²⁴ MAG, "Mauritania: Assessment Report," December 2001, p. 5.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, Form I, 12 June 2002.

²⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, NHDO, 22 June 2002.

²⁸ Interviews with Lt. Col. Ould Ahmed T'feil Abdi, Director, NHDO, Managua, 16 September 2001, and Geneva, 29 January 2002.

October 2001, a joint Moroccan-Mauritanian demining operation took place on the road used by the Paris-Dakar rally.²⁹

Mine Risk Education

The US assistance program provided equipment and training to the NHDO to allow it to establish its own mine risk education (MRE) campaigns, but according to MAG, the NDHO is very limited in the people it can reach.³⁰

UNICEF led a seminar on mine risk education in Zouerate from 24 June to 4 July 2001 for fifty nomads on basic awareness techniques.³¹ MAG indicated that further support to implement MRE in Mauritania was needed.³²

The NHDO has submitted a project proposal to UNICEF to add mine risk education in the official school curriculum.³³

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In January 2001, a Portuguese national was injured when his vehicle hit a landmine during the Paris-Dakar rally. No other incidents were reported in 2001. However, because of the size of the country and the nomadic way of life of the population, it is possible that not all mine incidents are reported.

Between 1978 and 2000, 343 people were killed and 239 seriously injured in reported landmine incidents.³⁴ MAG's assessment report, however, reported data collated by the NDHO that listed slightly fewer recorded fatalities, 324, but the same number of injuries.³⁵ It also listed 584 camels and donkeys reported killed by mines and UXO and 32 vehicles destroyed.

Government policy makes no distinction between landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities. Emergency cases are sent to Nouakchott or to regional hospitals, but the capacity of facilities is limited. Community-based rehabilitation programs have been set up in the country. However, specialized facilities for rehabilitation of the disabled are based in Nouakchott and are therefore accessible to only a minority of the population.³⁶ In January 2002, the NDHO reported plans to establish a survivor assistance program, however no precise details are available.³⁷

MAURITIUS

Key developments since May 2001: Mauritius submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 20 May 2002, indicating that the Special Mobile Force of the Mauritius Police Force possesses 93 non-metallic antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Mauritius both signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Mauritius enacted domestic legislation, *The Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act (No. 1 of 2001)*,

²⁹ Email from Cdr. Alioune Ould Mennane, NHDO, 22 June 2002.

³⁰ MAG, "Mauritania: Assessment Report," December 2001, p. 10.

³¹ The workshop cost US\$10,000. E-mail from Cdt. Alioune Ould Mohamed El Hacem, NHDO, 12 August 2001.

³² MAG, "Mauritania: Assessment Report," December 2001, p. 10.

³³ E-mail from Cdt. Alioune Ould Mennane, NHDO, 22 June 2002.

³⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 104.

³⁵ Mines Advisory Group, "Mauritania: Assessment Report on behalf of Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)," December 2001, p. 5.

³⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 104-105.

³⁷ Séminaire Régional sur la Convention d'Ottawa en Afrique du Nord, by Lt-Col Abdi Ould Ahmed T'feil, Director, NHDO, Tunis, 15 January 2002.

prohibiting the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines in April 2001.¹

Mauritius submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 20 May 2002, for the period 30 April 2001-30 April 2002. The report had been due on 27 August 1999; the delay was reported to be mainly “administrative.”²

In October 2001, the National Humanitarian Law Committee was established under the chairpersonship of the Prime Minister’s Office. This inter-ministerial Committee’s task is to promote the effective implementation, application, and dissemination of international humanitarian law instruments, including the Mine Ban Treaty.³

While the government did not participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Nicaragua, it was present at all sessions of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, represented by its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. Mauritius cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mauritius acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II in May 1996 and attended the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Mauritius has never produced, exported or used antipersonnel mines and “no area in the Republic of Mauritius is known/suspected to be implanted with anti-personnel (or anti-tank) mines.”⁴

There is no military as such in Mauritius. The Special Mobile Force, the para-military element of the Mauritius Police Force, reported a stock of 93 non-metallic mines of Indian origin, brought into the country by the Indian army.⁵ Mauritius reported that the mines are “retained for purpose of destruction.”⁶ Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Mauritius is obliged to destroy all stocks of mines (other than those retained for training) by 1 March 2003. Mauritius reported that as of 30 April 2002, destruction was “not yet programmed.”⁷

Landmine Casualties

No Mauritian national is known to have been killed or injured in an incident caused by landmines. Since May 2002, Mauritians travelling to Marromeu, Beira, Mozambique, to work on a sugar estate, are issued with notices in English and French warning them of the dangers and presence of landmines. The practice previously was to warn expatriate workers verbally.⁸

MÉXICO

México signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 9 June 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. México has not enacted separate domestic implementation legislation because in most cases international agreements in México are self-

¹ For some detail on provisions of the Act, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 105.

² Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation, Ref: TS/M/76/1, 26 June 2002.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form I, 20 May 2002.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 May 2002; information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Ref: TS/M/76/1, 26 June 2002.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 May 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form F, 20 May 2002.

⁸ E-mails from the Human Resource Manager of Companhia de Sena, SARL, in Beira, Mozambique, 22 and 23 May 2002.

executing.¹ The treaty is considered a supreme law in the national territory according to Article 133 of the Constitution.

México attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, with a delegation led by Ambassador Francisco del Río. It called for greater financial and human resources for mine clearance, stockpile destruction, and victim assistance; it also called on the two remaining states in the hemisphere that have not joined the treaty [Cuba and the United States] to do so.² In November 2001, México cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

México actively participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in January and May 2002. During the January 2002 Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, México announced their initiative at the United Nations to establish an international convention for the promotion and protection of the rights of the disabled.

On 8 April 2002 México submitted its fourth Article 7 report, which consisted solely of Form J detailing efforts in victim assistance.

México is a State Party to the original Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Amended Protocol II, as it views it as too limited and surpassed by the Mine Ban Treaty.³ México attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001 as an observer. México also participated in the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, where it was elected as one of ten Vice Presidents of the Conference.

México has never produced, transferred, used or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, nor does it retain any mines for training purposes.

México has stated that it is mine-free on numerous occasions, including in its Article 7 reports. In 2001, as part of the Tripartite Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration Program, Mexican government agencies carried out a number of workshops in México and in Central America on topics including information analysis, training the trainers, rehabilitation medicine, and regional analysis of the Information System on Diseases and Disabilities (SIEDIS).⁴

MOLDOVA

Key developments since May 2001: Moldova submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 8 April 2002, declaring a stockpile of 12,121 antipersonnel mines. Moldova and NATO signed an agreement in June 2001 for assistance in the destruction of the mine stockpile, which should be completed in 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Moldova signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001.¹ Moldova has not reported the enactment of any national implementation measures. Moldova submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 8 April 2002; it had been due on 28 August 2001.

¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 353.

² Statement by Ambassador Francisco del Río, Head of the Mexican Delegation to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001.

³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 279.

⁴ The Mexican Institute of Social Security, the National Rehabilitation Center, the Labor and Social Prevention Secretariat, the Mexican Center for Disease Classification (CEMECE) and the Mexican Commission for Cooperation with Central America of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat all organized workshops. Article 7 Report, Form J, 8 April 2002.

¹ For background on Moldova and the breakaway Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic (PMR), see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 743-744.

Moldova attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. On 29 November 2001, Moldova cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Moldova is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and ratified its Amended Protocol II on 16 July 2001. Moldova states that it participated in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II in December 2001.²

From 19-22 June 2002, the destruction of antipersonnel mines in Moldova was discussed during a regional seminar "Understanding the Ottawa Treaty," in Warsaw, organized by the governments of Poland and Canada.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Moldova is not believed to ever have produced, imported, or exported antipersonnel mines, but has a stockpile inherited from the Soviet Union.³ In its Article 7 Report, it reported a stockpile of 12,121 antipersonnel mines, including the following: 9,992 PMN blast mines, 936 PMN-2 blast mines, 944 MAI blast mines, 59 OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, 12 MON-50 fragmentation mines, and 178 MON-100 mines.⁴

On 28 June 2001, Moldova, one of 27 members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NATO in Brussels for assistance from NATO's Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in the destruction of antipersonnel mines, liquid propellant oxidizer (known as Melanj), and surplus munitions.⁵ The agreement is for NATO to provide material assistance and training for the implementation of the project. The initiative will be financed through one of NATO's PfP Trust Fund projects and NAMSA will be the executing agency. The Netherlands is the lead NATO sponsor of the project and, to date, Canada, Luxembourg, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States have pledged financial support. The total project cost is said to be US\$1 million.⁶

The Moldovan Parliament ratified the agreement in October 2001 and the same month, a NAMSA delegation arrived in Moldova to discuss its implementation.⁷ In January 2002, NAMSA organized training in the United Kingdom for Moldova military specialists, who will manage the programs.

Moldova's Article 7 Report states that it intends to destroy its antipersonnel mines using "electric methods of destruction" in the summer of 2002.⁸ The mines earmarked for destruction will be "transferred from the storage in Floresti, in Bulboaca and in Marculesti" to the Training Center of the Army at Bulboaca.¹⁰

In accordance with Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Moldova intends to retain the following 849 mines for development and training: 200 PMN blast mines, 200 PMN-2 blast mines, 200 MAI blast mines, 59 OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, 12 MON-50 fragmentation mines, and 178

² Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova to ICBL-Ukraine, 20 January 2001. Moldova does not appear on the official list of participants for the annual conference, or the CCW Review Conference, also held in December 2001.

³ Moldova claims no production in its initial Article 7 Report. Article 7 Report, Form H, 8 April 2002.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 April 2002.

⁵ Statement of Valeriu Rusu, Ministry of Defense, in "NATO to assist Moldova's effort to neutralize Melanj oxidant and antipersonnel mines," BASA (press agency), Chisinau, 14 November 2001.

⁶ "NAMSA Support for Stockpile Destruction," Peter Courtney-Green, NAMSA, available at: www.isn.ethz.ch/pfparchive.

⁷ Statement of Valeriu Rusu, Ministry of Defense, in "NATO to assist Moldova's effort to neutralize Melanj oxidant and antipersonnel mines," BASA (press agency), Chisinau, 14 November 2001.

⁸ Statement of General Korobchanu, Chief of General Staff, Moldova Armed Forces, to the regional conference on landmines in Yalta, Ukraine, 15-16 November 2001.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 8 April 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form F, 8 April 2002.

MON-100 mines. Moldova states that the PMN, PMN-2 and MAI-75 mines will be used for "instruction and training" and the others will be used "as tactical mines and for training."¹¹

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Moldova is affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II and the 1992 Transnistria conflict. In its Article 7 Report, Moldova reports having destroyed 333 mines from the northern Pohrebea minefield during the reporting period: 326 PMN blast mines, 1 PMN-2, 5 OZM bounding fragmentation mines, and 1 POMZ-2M (a type of mine which it does not claim to possess).¹² According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between January and May 2002, 120 mines and UXO were cleared.¹³ More than 10,000 mines have been cleared in Moldova since it attained independence in 1992.¹⁴

There is no new public information on mine incidents. Statistics on mine casualties are not available to the public.

Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic (PMR)

The Transnistrian (Pridnestrovian) region of Moldova declared independence in 1990 and calls itself Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic (PMR). PMR is not internationally recognized. Fighting broke out between Moldova and PMR in 1992 and both sides used landmines.¹⁵

On 29 May 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov received a document certifying that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would cover the expenses in connection with the withdrawal or destruction of Russian weapons based in eastern Moldova.¹⁶ On 15 June 2001, representatives of the OSCE, the Russian Defense Ministry, and the Transnistrian industrial complex signed a tripartite agreement on the establishment of a Joint Working Group to investigate the possibility of industrial reprocessing and the disposal of mines and ammunition of Russian stockpiles, including the large Colbasna stockpile.¹⁷ The Tripartite Working Group identified over 26,000 tons of mines and ammunition suitable for reprocessing and disposal (out of over 40,000 tons).¹⁸ In March 2002, OSCE Mission Head, David Swartz, was quoted as saying that the destruction and withdrawal of more than 40,000 tons of ammunition in Colbasna was in its final stages.¹⁹

In addition to Colbasna, large stockpiles of Russian munitions, including landmines, are stored in Tiraspol, the capital of the PMR. The stockpile there reportedly is in unstable condition and more than 350 tons of landmines and engineer ammunition need immediate destruction.²⁰

According to various sources, the mines found in PMR include: PMN-1, PMN-2, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, OZM-72, and POMZ.²¹

Some of the OSCE donor countries have expressed a desire to see the destruction process in PMR carried out in strict accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty requirements, given that Moldova itself is party to the treaty.²²

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 8 April 2002.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form G, 8 April 2002.

¹³ Telephone interview with Valerio Chiveli, Department of European Security and Military Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2001.

¹⁴ Statement of General Korobchanu, Chief of General Staff, Moldova Armed Forces, to the regional conference on landmines, Yalta, Ukraine, 15-16 November 2001.

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 742.

¹⁶ *Olvia* (press agency), 15 June 2001.

¹⁷ Statement of Vjacheslav Saponov, Head of the PMR State Committee for Military Industrial Complex, to the regional conference on landmines, Yalta, 15-16 November 2001.

¹⁸ Statement of General Bernard Aussedat (France) to the regional conference on landmines, Yalta, 15-16 November 2001.

¹⁹ *Olvia*, 18 April 2002.

²⁰ Alexey Tikhonov, "Chronicles of incidents on Russian stockpiles," *Grani.Ru* (Internet Press Agency), at: www.grani.ru/incidents/articles/ivanov_reports.

²¹ See for example, Statement of Marcel Hanus, Military Institute of Technology of Arms and Ammunition of Czech Republic, to regional conference on landmines, Yalta, Ukraine, 15-16 November 2001.

At the OSCE's request, a German company, "MDSG Logistic," has been researching and evaluating mine and munitions stockpiles in the region, possibilities for their disposal, budgeting and estimated timeframe of the project. "MDSG Logistic" will act as the principal manager of the destruction project.²³

Moldovan, Russian, and PMR peacekeeping units that were located in the safety zone in 2001 have continued checking and clearing territory from mines and UXO.

In 2001, PMR claims to have provided full support for medical, social, and professional rehabilitation for victims of war and military conflicts, and to have provided special care for war-disabled.²⁴

MONACO

The Principality of Monaco signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. National legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty in accordance with Article 9 was passed on 30 August 1999.¹

Monaco did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, nor did it attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, but it did attend in January 2002, represented by Anne Medecin from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

On 29 November 2001, Monaco cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Monaco submitted its annual Article 7 Report on 14 March 2002, listed as a "Nil" report. Its initial Article 7 Report was submitted on 10 May 2001.²

Monaco is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted a report as required by Article 13 of the Protocol on 12 March 2001. This confirms that Monaco has never used, stocked, or produced landmines.³ In December 2001, Monaco attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference.

Monaco contributed US\$14,000 in 2000 and the same amount in 2001 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.⁴

MOZAMBIQUE

Key developments since May 2001: The final conclusions of the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey were published in September 2001. Some 791 communities affected by 1,374 suspected mined areas were identified. At the end of 2001, the National Demining Institute produced its first Five Year National Mine Action Plan (2002-2006). In September 2001, Mozambique destroyed its first 500 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The remaining 37,318 mines must be destroyed before 1 March 2003. In 2001, 60 mine incidents were reported, resulting in 80 casualties.

²² Statement of Oswald Schneidratus, Deputy Head, OSCE Mission to Moldova, to press conference, Chisinau, 24 March 2002.

²³ Statement of Oswald Schneidratus, OSCE, to a regional conference in Kiev, 22 March 2002.

²⁴ *Olvia*, 15 December 2001.

¹ Report of the Monaco Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 10 December 2001, p. 3. The legislation includes penal sanctions applicable also to Monegasques living abroad.

² Article 7 Report, submitted on 14 March 2002 (no data reported), and submitted on 10 May 2001 (reporting period not stated).

³ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, submitted on 12 March 2001.

⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph E.

Mine Ban Policy

Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 25 August 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999.¹ A government task force has begun the process of drafting legislation to enforce the Mine Ban Treaty; it is to be completed by the end of 2002.² One of the stated objectives of Mozambique's National Mine Action Policy is to "avoid any future use of landmines in the country through the creation of the necessary supervision mechanisms."³

Mozambique submitted its first annual updated Article 7 transparency report to the UN on 30 March 2001. The report covers the period from 1 March 1999 to August 2000. It submitted another report on 30 October 2001 covering the period 1 September 1999 to 31 December 2000. Mozambique submitted its annual update on 2 July 2002. It covers the period from January 2001 to December 2001.⁴

Mozambique attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, with a delegation led by its Minister of Defense, Tobias Dai.⁵ In a statement to the plenary, Minister Dai stated that their presence in Nicaragua "testifies [to] our strong and irreversible determination in putting an end to the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of these deadly weapons worldwide."⁶

Mozambique participated in the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002, with representatives from the capital as well as from its Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva. Mozambique cosponsored and voted in favor on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, on 29 November 2001.

Mozambique is not party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It attended, as an observer, the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW in December 2001 in Geneva.

Production, Transfer, Use, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Mozambique has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁷ In the past, it imported antipersonnel mines from a number of sources.⁸ There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period by any entity.

In its first Article 7 Report, submitted in March 2000, Mozambique reported details of its stockpile of 37,818 antipersonnel landmines.⁹ In 2001, the Armed Forces of Mozambique drew up a plan for the destruction of all antipersonnel mines over a three-year period (2001-2003) at a rate of approximately one-third of the stock per year.¹⁰ Mozambique's treaty mandated deadline for completion of stockpile destruction is 1 March 2003. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Mozambique's Defense Minister said destruction would be concluded "up to the

¹ A resolution approved by the Council of Ministers formally recognized the Mine Ban Treaty on 10 June 1999; Decree 37/99, as published in *Boletim da Republica*, No. 29, 10 June 1999.

² Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, 6 July 2002.

³ Article 7 Report, submitted 30 March 2000, for the period 1 March 1999 to 31 August 1999.

⁴ All reports were submitted late. Annual updated reports are due on 30 April each year.

⁵ The Mozambican delegation included Mr. Artur Verissimo, Director, National Demining Institute, Mr. Fernando Chomar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation as well as a Senior Advisor to the National Demining Institute.

⁶ Statement by Mr. Tobias Dai, Mozambican Minister of Defense, to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, September 2001.

⁷ Mozambique reports, therefore, that there are no production facilities to be converted or de-commissioned. Article 7 Report, Form E, 30 March 2000.

⁸ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 45.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 March 2000; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 109.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 October 2001. For a detailed plan for the destruction of stockpiled mines see, National Demining Institute/Ministry of Defense "Grafico de Stocks de minas a ser destruidas no periodo 2001-2003."

end of the year 2003.”¹¹ Mozambique’s Ambassador to the UN stated in October 2001, “Our commitment is to conclude by 2003 the destruction of all stockpiled mines.”¹²

On 19 September 2001, Mozambique’s Boquisso Army Engineering College destroyed the first 500 stockpiled mines, which included: PMN-2, PMN, PMD-6, OZM-72, OZM-4, POMZ and POMZ-2 mines.¹³ The symbolic destruction took place in Moamba, Maputo province, in a public ceremony.¹⁴ Apparently no other destruction had taken place as of July 2002, indicating that Mozambique is far behind its initial destruction schedule. It still has 37,318 antipersonnel mines to destroy before 1 March 2003.

All three of Mozambique’s Article 7 reports have indicated that it has not retained any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes.

Landmine Problem, Survey, and Assessment

Mozambique is considered one of the African countries most affected by mines. Most of the mines were planted during a two-decade-long civil war that ended in 1992. In August 2001, the National Demining Institute (IND) published the final results of the country’s first comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey. Carried out by the Canadian International Demining Corps, the survey aimed to “collect, record and analyze information on the location of known or suspected mines areas throughout the country, and to provide an overview of their social and economic impacts.”¹⁵ The Survey Action Center (SAC) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided a Quality Assurance Monitor.¹⁶

The survey indicates that virtually every part of Mozambique experiences negative social and economic consequences from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). It is estimated that approximately 1.5 million people are directly impacted by landmines and UXO. Landmines affect 123 of the 128 districts and all ten provinces. Some 791 communities affected by 1,374 “Suspected Mined Areas” (SMA) were identified. Suspected Mined Areas make up some 562 square kilometers. Landmine incidents continue to occur, with 172 new victims being recorded for the two years preceding the study.¹⁷

While the survey was not the first to have been conducted in Mozambique, it was an important achievement in humanitarian mine action in the country and represents a significant step in an ongoing process to collect and interpret data to assist in setting national priorities for mine action – priorities that are responsive to the socio-economic impact of mines. The survey’s significance has been described as two-fold: “Firstly, it is the first time that an impact survey has been conducted on a standardized national basis beyond emergency demining and including all ten provinces of Mozambique. Secondly, it strengthens the capacity of the National Demining Institute of Mozambique (IND) to integrate humanitarian mine action within the framework of the government’s national priorities.”¹⁸

¹¹ Statement by Mr. Tobias Dai, Mozambican Minister of Defense, to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, September 2001, p. 4.

¹² Statement by Carlos dos Santos, Ambassador to the United Nations, General Debate of the First Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, 15 October 2001.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form G, 2 July 2002.

¹⁴ Government representatives, foreign dignitaries and other accredited diplomats witnessed the destruction. These included: Maputo governor, Hon. E. Alfredo Namitete; UNDP representative, Emmanuel de Casterle; Ambassador Pedro Comissario, Director at the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, and Mr. Felisberto Nuvunga, National Demining Institute’s Deputy Director.

¹⁵ Canadian International Demining Corps and Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc, “Landmine Impact Survey,” August 2001; *Landmine Monitor 2001*, pp. 109-112.

¹⁶ Preliminary results of the Landmine Impact Survey were available in June 2001 and reported on in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 110-112.

¹⁷ Canadian International Demining Corps and Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc, “Landmine Impact Survey,” August 2001; email from CIDC to Landmine Monitor Coordinator, 22 July 2002.

¹⁸ Neuma Grobbelaar, “Impact Survey in Mozambique: an Essential Development Tool,” *Demining Debate*, Issue VIII, October 2001.

Mined Areas or Areas Suspected to be Mined ¹⁹

Province	Affected Communities		Affected Population		Number of suspected mined areas		
	Number	%	Number	%	< 1000 m2	> 1000 m2	Total
Cabo Delgado	84	12.1	170,566	11.4	81	85	166
Gaza	46	5.1	90,766	6.1	32	38	70
Inhambane	157	18.9	373,033	25.1	101	160	261
Manica	60	8.0	89,823	6.0	51	59	110
Maputo	100	13.4	126,592	8.5	81	103	184
Nampula	81	9.5	178,152	11.9	30	100	130
Niassa	40	4.5	60,379	4.1	25	37	62
Sofala	52	7.4	134,156	9.0	36	66	102
Tete	58	6.5	93,596	6.5	43	46	89
Zambezia	113	14.6	171,527	11.5	86	114	200
Total	791	100.0	1,488,998	100.0	572	802	1374

Mine Action Funding

Thirteen donors reported to Landmine Monitor a total of about US\$15.1 million in mine action contributions to Mozambique in 2001: Australia, \$0.77 million; Canada \$1.07 million; Denmark \$1.8 million; Finland \$1.06 million; France \$0.68 million; Germany \$1.3 million; Ireland \$0.53; Japan \$0.93 million; Netherlands \$1.2 million; Norway \$1.67 million; Sweden \$1 million; Switzerland \$0.95 million; United States \$2.2 million.²⁰

However, it is unlikely that is a complete picture of mine action funding for Mozambique. The National Demining Institute indicates that other donors for 2001 included Austria, the European Union and the UN Mine Action Service.²¹ One demining organization, HALO Trust, reports funding from the United Kingdom.

By comparison, Landmine Monitor estimated that mine action funding in 2000 totaled about \$17.1 million.²²

The United States has been the largest donor to Mozambique, providing nearly \$28 million since 1993. In 2001, the U.S. funded demining operations on the Sena rail line and training for National Demining Institute staff.²³ For its fiscal year 2002, the United States allocated \$2.11 million for mine action in Mozambique.²⁴

Mine Action Coordination

The National Demining Institute (IND) is a semi-autonomous governmental institute, reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is directed to "successfully establish and develop a coordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a national mine action plan."²⁵ At the end of 2001, the IND produced its first Five Year National Mine Action Plan (2002-2006).²⁶

This, together with the Landmine Impact Survey, the introduction of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and UN Development Program's

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 July 2002.

²⁰ See individual Landmine Monitor country reports. See also UN Mine Action Investments database at: <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>.

²¹ Email from National Demining Institute, 6 July 2002.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 112-113.

²³ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 9.

²⁴ US Department of State, Fact Sheet, "The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

²⁵ National Demining Institute, "Strategy for the Development of an Integrated Mine Action Coordination Capacity in Mozambique," p. 2.

²⁶ National Demining Institute, "The Five Year National Mine Action Plan 2002-2006," 19 November 2001.

Capacity Building Project housed at the IND, has significantly improved the overall management of mine action in the country. An Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee chaired by the Director of IND has also been created.

The National Mine Action Plan outlines the mission for Mozambique: to be Mine Impact Free within ten years. According to the plan, "Impact Free" means "the elimination of impediments to fundamental socio-economic activity and significant reduction in the risk of encountering landmines." To reach this goal, at the end of the first five years, the accomplishments should include the following:

- All High and Medium Impact Sites Cleared;
- All UXO Destroyed;
- All Existing Stockpiles Destroyed;
- Remaining Low Impact Areas Surveyed and Marked;
- Fully operational National Mine Risk Education/Marking Program; and
- Long-term Survivor and Victim Assistance Programs Established.²⁷
- The IND has based the 2002-2006 Mine Action Plan and its priorities on the information and findings of the Landmine Impact Survey.²⁸

On 30 August 2001, the Second National Meeting of Demining Operators deployed in Mozambique was convened in Nampula by the IND. The agenda included a briefing by IND on Mine Action in Mozambique; progress reports by demining operators; a briefing on the CIDC Survey; a reflection on the future of mine action in Mozambique; and, the need for a National Mine Action Fund.²⁹

Mine Action

There are conflicting official numbers from Mozambique regarding the total amount of land cleared in 2001. According to figures in one table in a National Demining Institute report for the period 1997-2001, a total of 12.41 million square meters was cleared in 2001.³⁰ According to other, more detailed IND charts, showing clearance activities for 2001 by province, town, and operator, a total of 7.86 million square meters of land was cleared in 2001.³¹

From the information available to Landmine Monitor, as reported below, it appears that approximately 8.88 million square meters of land were cleared in Mozambique in 2001. However, more than half of this total, and the IND total of 7.86 million square meters, is accounted for by one operator, Afrovita, which reported clearance of 4,559,501 square meters in 2001.³² This number is strikingly high and could not be confirmed.

In compiling the numbers, Landmine Monitor found that at least one operator, HALO Trust, was not included in the IND total of 7.86 million square meters. IND explained that it does not enter data until the clearance task is complete.³³ In another instance, the amount of land cleared by an operator, Norwegian People's Aid, was listed as nearly 700,000 square meters less than that reported directly to Landmine Monitor by NPA.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁹ Report of the Second National Meeting with Demining Operators, 30-31 August 2001, at www.ind.gov.mz/en/nampula.htm.

³⁰ National Demining Institute, "Demining Activities in Mozambique from 1997 to 2001," Maputo, 30 January 2002, Table II, p. 6.

³¹ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002. Landmine Monitor is not reproducing this detailed information in this report due to space limitations, but it is available upon request. See also the IND website at www.ind.gov.mz.

³² In response to Landmine Monitor inquiries, IND said it had adjusted Afrovita's figure to 3,359,401 square meters, but also indicated that it did not have confidence in the numbers provided by Afrovita. Email and telephone communications with IND, 15-16 July 2002.

³³ Telephone communication with IND, 16 July 2002.

There are similar discrepancies with regard to numbers of mine cleared. Mozambique's Article 7 Report, submitted in July 2002, reports a total of 5,521 antipersonnel mines destroyed in cleared areas.³⁴ IND, however, has given a figure of 2,282 antipersonnel mines destroyed.³⁵

There are a number of major humanitarian mine clearance organizations in Mozambique, including Accelerated Demining Program (ADP), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), HALO Trust, and Handicap International (HI), as well as a number of other humanitarian and commercial mine clearance agencies. In addition to the government's National Demining Institute and the Mozambican Armed Forces, there are approximately 15 private firms accredited to work in Mozambique, including 11 local and 4 international businesses.³⁶

Afrovita. Afrovita conducts commercial mine clearance using manual clearance methods. It operates in Maputo, Sofala, and Zambezia provinces, with quality assurance provided by Qualitas.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). NPA has a staff of approximately 570 in Mozambique, six fully operational mine detection dogs and 25 additional dogs under training. The national authorities in Mozambique are involved in the NPA mine action program as partner organizations in priority setting activities, needs assessment, and the implementation of demining activities. NPA is in the process of introducing its "Task Impact Assessment" tool on both ongoing and planned clearance tasks, which is used to prioritize areas for clearance based on civilian needs and organizational capacities. NPA has made plans to include a mechanical mine clearance component to its programs, to be deployed in suspected mined areas to determine the presence and accurate location of mines. In addition to mine action, the program also conducts small scale, rural community service, focused on primary health care, in areas where demining teams are working. Furthermore, a crosscutting issue HIV/AIDS awareness campaign is held in areas of operations.³⁷ In 2001, NPA cleared a total of 1,726,760 square meters of land, with a total budget of US\$3.53 million. Donors were the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation (SIDA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Netherlands.³⁸

Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) / Programa Acelerado de Desminagem (PAD). ADP conducts humanitarian mine clearance in the south of the country in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces. In 2002, the ADP is evolving from a UN-operated program to an independent, national NGO as required by the government of Mozambique. In 2001, ADP cleared a total of 1,745,542 square meters.³⁹

HALO Trust. The HALO Trust conducts manual and mechanical humanitarian mine clearance in the north of the country in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia provinces, supported by four governmental donors (UK in Zambezia, Ireland in Niassa, Switzerland in Cabo Delgado and Netherlands in Nampula). The Tokyo Broadcasting System funds operations across the four provinces. HALO currently has 12 manual teams working on minefields prioritized for clearance by a process involving the operator, the local provincial and district authorities and the regional IND presence. The manual teams range in size from 10-20 persons. HALO has also established a mine-detection dog (MDD) training school in Mozambique and currently has 10 dogs undergoing training, three of which were operational in July 2002. Handlers are Mozambicans, as well as staff from other HALO programs who will, in the future, deploy back to these countries. In

³⁴ Article 7 Report, Form G, 2 July 2002.

³⁵ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002.

³⁶ Artur Verissimo, Speech delivered to the intersessional Standing Committee meeting, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

³⁷ Norwegian People's Aid Humanitarian Mine Action Portfolio 2002.

³⁸ Answers to Mine Action Questionnaire, provided by Steinar Essen, NPA Technical Advisor, Southern Africa, Oslo, 22 May 2002; email from Janecke Wille, NPA, Oslo, 15 July 2002. IND reported the area cleared by NPA as 1,054,654 square meters. Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002.

³⁹ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002.

2001, HALO cleared a total of 320,459 square meters, destroying 1,166 landmines and 392 items of UXO. In 2002, as of the end of June, HALO Teams had cleared a total of 289,064 square meters of ground, destroying 3,104 mines and 457 items of UXO. HALO Mozambique staffing levels in 2002 stand at 425 persons with two supervisory expatriates.⁴⁰

Empresa Moçambicana de Desminagem, Lda. (EMD) was engaged in clearance operations in the Inhambane province. It cleared a total of 298,460 square meters in 2001.⁴¹

Menschen gegen Minen (MgM). In 2000, MgM started a mine clearance operation in Mozambique using manual and mechanical methods with the assistance of explosive detecting dogs. They are presently working to clear a railroad from Mabalane to Monte Alto in the Gaza province. While the IND reports that MgM cleared 51,858 square meters of land in 2001,⁴² MgM itself reports 169,262 square meters cleared.⁴³ MgM's 2001 budget was \$804,375. Its current mine action capacity includes 70 staff (43 deminers) and four mine detection dogs.⁴⁴

Handicap International (HI). HI conducts "proximity demining" in Inhambane province using manual clearance methods and explosive detection dogs as part of the Inhambane Mine Clearance Project. HI employs 110 persons and has two dog teams. HI cleared a total of 20,914 square meters in 2001.⁴⁵

In 2001, **Mechem** cleared 55,436 square meters; **Mozambique Mine Action** cleared 53,920 square meters; **Ronco** cleared 44,925 square meters.⁴⁶ Other agencies that also are or have been engaged in mine action in Mozambique include ArmorGroup, Minetech, Desminagem de Sofala (Dessof), Special Clearance Service (SCS), Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias de Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA), Lince Lda and Necochaminas.⁴⁷

The Forças Armadas da Defesa de Mozambique (FADM). Recognizing that Mozambique needs a long term demining capacity, the United States has been providing training and equipment to the 1st Battalion of the Mozambican infantry.

Because of the competence of Mozambican mine clearance operators, a **Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF)** has been established in Mozambique with a global scope.⁴⁸ Training started in May 2001 for four mine clearance teams with ten persons in each, including medics and dog handlers, and the QRDF was launched in August 2001. The QRDF is to receive tasks from the IND and deploy within ten days to anywhere in the world that the US Department of State, in coordination with UNMAS, directs them. Since the establishment of QRDF, Mozambican demining teams have been dispatched to Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Nigeria.⁴⁹ In November 2001, the U.S. government said, "The QRDF would be deployed to demining situations as directed by the United States Government, which will also oversee the recruitment, provision of equipment, training and supervision of QRDF personnel, both within and outside the Republic of Mozambique. When QRDF units are not deployed by the United States elsewhere, they will perform demining missions within Mozambique, as requested by the GRM [Mozambique government]"⁵⁰

Mozambican deminers from ADP are also involved in a UNDP-funded Mine Action Exchange (MAX) project as trainers. The MAX program seeks to maximize regional competence

⁴⁰ E-mail from Andrew Fimister, Country Manager, The HALO Trust - Mozambique, 9 July 2002.

⁴¹ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Email from Hans Georg Kruessen, Chairman, MgM, Maputo, 15 July 2002.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the National Demining Institute, from the IMSMA database, received by email on 9 July 2002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ For more details on these organizations see, *Landmine Monitor 2001*, pp. 115-117.

⁴⁸ Charles Cobb Jr., "Mozambique Leads the World - in Clearing Land Mines," *allAfrica.com*, 27 May 2002, at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200205270904.html>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. A-47.

in humanitarian technical demining standards within the Portuguese-speaking countries. In May 2002, two Mozambican trainers began training deminers for a new Guinea-Bissau mine clearance NGO, LUTCAM.⁵¹

In June 2002, the US Department of State's Office of Humanitarian Demining funded the "Mine Action Managers Middle Management Training" program in Mozambique. Some 35 African middle-level mine action managers have been trained since the program started in June 2001.⁵²

Other Weapon Destruction Initiatives

Between 1995 and September 2001, a number of mines, both antipersonnel and antivehicle, have been destroyed under a bilateral cooperation agreement on arms destruction between the South African Police Service and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, called Operations Rachel. The aim of Operations Rachel is to destroy arms caches left in Mozambique following the country's civil war. Between May and September 2001, 48 antipersonnel mines were destroyed through this process.⁵³ In a three-week operation in May 2002, an additional 39 antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines were recovered and destroyed.⁵⁴

In 1995, the Christian Council of Mozambique established a project to transform "arms into ploughshares" through the collection and exchange of weapons for developmental tools. Between October 1995 and March 2002, among the over 230,000 different pieces of weaponry collected, have been 136 antipersonnel mines and eight antivehicle mines.⁵⁵

Mine Risk Education

Handicap International has been participating in the creation of a national capacity for mine risk education (MRE) coordination since 1995.⁵⁶ In 1999, HI formally ended its field activities and handed over the tasks of coordination to the IND. The introduction of MRE into the national curriculum of education at the national level has been virtually completed, as well as the strengthening of technical competencies of local partners such as the Mozambican Red Cross.⁵⁷ HI is finalizing tools to accompany the transfer of capacities.⁵⁸

Because of flood emergencies (February 2000 and March 2001), HI also developed intensive campaigns aimed at the population of the central region districts, which were affected by the floods.⁵⁹ More than 80,000 people of the Limpopo and Save valleys have benefited from targeted mine risk education activities and 100 agents were trained to work with communities.⁶⁰ At the end of 2001, IND had assumed the overall responsibility for the network and program established by HI.

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, 60 mine incidents were reported resulting in 80 new casualties, of which 60 were men and 20 were women.⁶¹ It was not reported how many of these casualties were killed or

⁵¹ "Support to the Guinea-Bissau National Humanitarian Mine Action Program," UNDP, November 2001.

⁵² US Department of State, Media Note, "Lusophone African Humanitarian Deminers Management Training Course," 11 June 2002.

⁵³ E. Hennop, "Operation Rachel, 1995-2001," *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 54*, November 2001.

⁵⁴ Statistics of Operation Rachel VIII (1), Special Task Force, South African Police Service, 11 June 2002.

⁵⁵ Christian Council of Mozambique (Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Section), "Project Weapons Collection Report, October 1995-March 2002."

⁵⁶ Email from Erik Lamontagne, Handicap International, 23 July 2001; see also, Handicap International, "Tools for MRE in Mozambique and in the East of Ethiopia, Capitalisation," 2002.

⁵⁷ E-mail from Karine Gavand, Handicap International, Paris, 8 July 2002.

⁵⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 117-118, for details.

⁵⁹ E-mail from Karine Gavand, Handicap International, Paris, 8 July 2002.

⁶⁰ Article 7 Report, Form I, 2 July 2002.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

injured. The reported casualties in 2001 represent a large increase from the 29 new casualties reported in 2000, of which eight were killed and 21 injured.⁶² However, it should be noted that the casualty statistics for 2000 are believed to be understated as those working in the field know the number were much higher.⁶³ On 16 July 2001, a deminer and four mine detecting dogs were killed, and seven others injured, when a vehicle carrying seven NPA deminers and a driver hit an antivehicle mine in Manica province.⁶⁴ In the first six months of 2002, another two deminers were killed.⁶⁵

Data collection for the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey was completed in May 2001. The Survey identified 172 "recent" landmine casualties, of which 53 were killed. In total, 2,145 casualties were recorded. However, the report acknowledged that this figure is probably understated as 31 communities reported "many" casualties, but did not estimate an actual number. The activity at the time of the majority (71 percent) of recent incidents included being involved in economic activities, such as collecting food/water, farming, herding, or household work, while incidents during travel (seven percent) and tampering (one percent) were rare.⁶⁶

Survivor Assistance

The responsibility for landmine survivor assistance in Mozambique is shared between the Ministry of Health (MINSAU) and the Ministry for Women and the Coordination of Social Action (MMCAS). According to Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), facilities for evacuation, transportation, emergency and hospital treatment, and rehabilitation are inadequate to meet the needs in Mozambique. Because of a lack of transport many facilities are inaccessible to landmine survivors. The health infrastructure was severely damaged during almost thirty years of armed conflict. The floods of 2000 also damaged four hospitals, and 48 other health centers. Mozambique is dependent on international funding to support its health care infrastructure. Programs for the disabled are being developed in the eleven provinces of Mozambique.⁶⁷ The Institutional Support Program, established by Handicap International in 1997, assists landmine survivors and includes transport, medical care, rehabilitation, and cooperation between agencies in the provision of socio-economic reintegration.⁶⁸

In 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated a training program for trainers in pre-hospital care for trauma victims, including landmine casualties. By the end of 2001, twenty trainers, including twelve doctors and eight medical technicians, had participated in the program at a national level and will now initiate pre-hospital trauma care training programs throughout Mozambique.⁶⁹

Mozambique has a national rehabilitation policy for persons with disabilities. There are eleven orthopedic workshops, run in cooperation by the Ministry of Health and international and local NGOs. In addition, there are rehabilitation centers and physiotherapy centers, some of which are managed by the Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Section of the Ministry of Health.

In 2001, Handicap International supported six orthopedic center in the cities of Vilanculos, Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba, and Nampula, which are now fully integrated into the Ministry of Health. The HI program also provided training to local staff. HI works with the MMCAS and the Forum of Mozambican Associations of Disabled Persons to improve the access of disabled

⁶² IMSMA database, Victim Statistics, National Demining Institute, 31 January 2001.

⁶³ World Rehabilitation Fund, "Mine Victim Assistance Support Visit: Mozambique Country Visit," November 2001, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Norwegian People's Aid Press Release, "Serious AT mine accident in Mozambique," 26 July 2001.

⁶⁵ IMSMA database, Victim Statistics, National Demining Institute, 8 July 2002.

⁶⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 118-119; see also Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey, accessed at http://www.sac-na.org/surveys_mozambique_executive_summary.html (17 July 2002).

⁶⁷ For more details see Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Database, accessed at www.lnsdatabase.org.

⁶⁸ Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 July 2002.

⁶⁹ Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

persons to Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation services, and to promote the rights of disabled persons.⁷⁰

POWER, a UK-based NGO, supported the Ministry of Health prosthetic and orthotic services until the end of May 2002. The program focused on the quality of production and logistics. In 2001, 608 patients were assisted, 575 prostheses produced and 248 fitted, and 125 wheelchairs and 1,663 crutches distributed. The program assisted all persons with disabilities, and was funded by USAID and UNICEF.⁷¹ In 2002, POWER changed its emphasis from prosthetics and orthotics to assisting the disabled in Mozambique to participate fully in civil society by empowering disability organizations to build capacity and services for their members, working closely with the Association of Disabled Mozambicans (ADEMO).⁷²

The Jaipur Limb Campaign, in partnership with the Mozambique Red Cross Society, opened the Jaipur Orthopedic Center in February 2000 in Gaza province, Manjacaze district. It is the first rehabilitation center to be wholly run by a Mozambican NGO, the Mozambique Red Cross Society (MRCS), and is located in a rural district to facilitate and improve rural people's access to services. The center provides mobility appliances, vocational training, disability awareness and social support programs. From January 2001 to March 2002, the center assisted 343 people, of which about 80 percent were landmine survivors. Funding for the center in 2001/2002 was provided by the UK-based Comic Relief, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Khalatbari Foundation, and private donors.⁷³

The Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) has been active in Mozambique since 1999. The LSN program engages community-based outreach workers, who are also amputees, to work with individual survivors to assess their needs, offering psychological and social support, and educating families about the effects of limb loss. LSN assists survivors in accessing services that provide mobility devices, health services, or vocational training. If no such services exist, LSN intervenes to ensure the needs of survivors are met, which in some cases can include direct assistance including covering the cost of prostheses, house repairs or emergency food aid. The recipient is required to provide a community service in return for the aid. In 2001, LSN assisted 114 landmine survivors. LSN works alongside local associations, including ADEMO and the Association of Military Disabled (ADEMIMO), to increase awareness about disability rights.⁷⁴ LSN headquarters are in Quelimane and it is currently working in the areas of Quelimane, Ile, Maganja da Costa, and Nicoadala.

The World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF), in partnership with UNDP, is developing a number of projects including: a rural economic development project for a community with a high percentage of landmine survivors; supporting POWER and ADEMO with two vocational training programs in metal work and baking; providing technical consultation to IND in the development of policies for survivor assistance; and providing technical assistance to Beira Hospital to improve services to landmine survivors.⁷⁵

Mozambique reports that "the mine victim's support system faces great difficulties due to problems of getting financial resources to implement projects ...also difficulties... for establishing specific professional training for disabled people.... The orthopaedic centres existing in the country are not enough to assist the growing needs of the disabled people."⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Handicap International Review of Activities 2001, pp. 18-19.

⁷¹ Sarah Hodge, Chief Executive, POWER, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 17 July 2002.

⁷² Ibid., 12 July 2002.

⁷³ Isabel Silva, Projects Officer, Jaipur Limb Campaign, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 11 July 2002.

⁷⁴ Nando, Executive Assistant, Landmine Survivors Network Mozambique, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 12 March 2002.

⁷⁵ Mozambique, *Our World*, Volume 3, Issue 1, Fall 2001, p. 5; see also Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

⁷⁶ Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 July 2002.

Disability Policy and Practice

Legislation to support the rights of the disabled remains unchanged.⁷⁷ In 1999, the Cabinet approved the first national policy on persons with disabilities that included principles and strategies to encourage the active participation of disabled people in the country's socio-economic development. However, the plan had not been fully implemented due to funding constraints.⁷⁸

Following a Mine Victim Assistance Workshop, sponsored by WRF, on 11 November 2001, the IND has developed a draft policy for Survivor and Victim Assistance that attempts to define the role and responsibilities of IND concerning mine survivor assistance.⁷⁹ The policy includes plans to "develop appropriate strategies and methodologies for providing long-term assistance" for landmine survivors.⁸⁰

NAMIBIA

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, at least nine people were killed and 41 injured in reported mine/UXO incidents, a significant decrease from the previous year. The International Committee of the Red Cross initiated a new mine risk education project in Namibia in 2002. Namibia has not submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, which was due by 28 August 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Namibia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 21 September 1998. It entered into force on 1 March 1999. Although no formal national implementation legislation has been passed, as with all international treaties to which the country is party, it becomes part of national law under the provisions of the Namibian Constitution. Namibia is reportedly looking into the possibility of promulgating domestic legislation.

As of June 2002, Namibia had not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 August 1999. Namibia did not participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, nor did it attend meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva in January or May 2002. Namibia did, however, attend the seventh meeting of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Acting Committee on Landmines, held on 27-28 June 2002 in Luanda, Angola. The meeting was held simultaneously with the first SADC Conference of Demining Operators.¹

Namibia cosponsored and voted in favor of the November 2001 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW); it did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II nor the Second Review Conference of the CCW, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

⁷⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 120; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 80.

⁷⁸ US Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001: Mozambique*, March 2002.

⁷⁹ World Rehabilitation Fund, "Mine Victim Assistance Support Visit: Executive Summary – Mozambique Country Visit," World Rehabilitation Fund and UNDP, November 2001.

⁸⁰ National Demining Institute, "The Five-Year National Mine Action Plan: 2002-2006," 19 November 2001, p. 21.

¹ "SADC experts defend enlargement of campaign against landmines," ANGOP, Luanda, 29 June 2002.

Production and Stockpiling

Namibia denies past production or export of antipersonnel mines.² In a letter to Landmine Monitor in July 2001, the Namibian government said that it had destroyed its stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 1998, except for those retained for training.³

In October 2001, Deputy Defense Minister Victor Simunja informed the National Assembly that the Mine Ban Treaty authorized countries to have in stock a limited number of landmines for training purposes. Minister Simunja noted that the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was engaged in demining and detonation of antipersonnel mines laid by UNITA in the northeastern parts of the country, and said, "It will be senseless to commit troops in demining and mine disposal if they do not possess the necessary knowledge of the devices they are going to handle, hence the small quantity we have."⁴ No information on the numbers and types of mines destroyed or those retained has ever been disclosed.

Since it has not submitted an Article 7 Report or made statements at a meeting of States Parties or an intersessional meeting, Namibia has never officially informed the other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties about the status of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. The treaty mandated deadline for destruction of any stockpiled mines (other than those for training purposes) is 1 March 2003.

Use

In 2000 and 2001, Landmine Monitor reported on mine use in Namibia by UNITA forces and Angolan government forces (FAA).⁵ The U.S. State Department reported in November 2001 that UNITA and FAA forces had been laying mines since December 1999 in the Caprivi and Kavango regions of northeast Namibia, which endanger the rural population and affect farming and tourism.⁶

In last year's report, Landmine Monitor also noted unsubstantiated allegations of use by Namibian forces, as well as concern that Namibian forces could have been "assisting" FAA troops in mine use in their pursuit of UNITA rebels. Such assistance could be a violation of Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁷ In a 23 July 2001 letter to Landmine Monitor, Namibia said, "Since the ratification of the [Mine Ban Treaty], the Namibian Defence Force has never used anti-personnel mines or assisted any other forces in the use thereof, both in its internal and international military operations.... The Government of the Republic of Namibia ... denies any use or assistance to use anti-personnel mines by its forces."⁸

During this reporting period, since May 2001, there have been no serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Namibian forces.⁹ There were a small number of reports of use by Angolan and UNITA forces, but Landmine Monitor was unable to corroborate them. Since the April 2002 peace agreement in Angola, there have been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Namibia or Angola by any party.

² Questions regarding PMD-6 mines either being assembled or produced in Namibia have yet to be resolved. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 121; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 81; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 65-66.

³ Letter from Gerhard Theron, Charge d'Affaires, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations, New York, to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 23 July 2001. See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 121-122.

⁴ "NDF Allowed Limited Number of Landmines," *GRN News*, 26 October 2001.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 81-83; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 123-124.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 10.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 124-125.

⁸ Letter from Gerhard Theron, Charge d'Affaires, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations, New York, to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 23 July 2001. See also, "Army not breaking landmine treaty," *IRIN*, 9 January 2001, citing MOD spokesman Frans Nghitila.

⁹ Landmine Monitor is only aware of one allegation, that on 5 October 2001, three NDF soldiers placed a mine in the house of a Kavango resident. This was denied by the NDF army commander and the Namibian Deputy Defense Minister.

Landmine Problem

A 1999 UN Mine Action Service assessment mission to the country concluded: "The landmine situation in Namibia constitutes neither a humanitarian emergency nor a major obstacle for development."¹⁰ In November 2001, the US government stated that landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect some 100,000 square kilometers of land, or about 12 percent of Namibian territory; however, the US also reported, "With the clearance of its ten known minefields and 410 electric pylons, Namibia continued its progress toward becoming a mine-safe country."¹¹

Upon completion of its work in Namibia in February 2001, the commercial demining firm RONCO declared all of Namibia free of mines, except the area of conflict on the Angola border in the Kavango Region.¹² In May 2002, the Director of the State Department's Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Donald Paterno, observed that if not for the "intrusion" of mines laid by the Angolans in the northwest corner of the country, "Namibia would be mine safe."¹³

Mine Action and Funding

A US-sponsored mine clearance program in Namibia ended in February 2001. The US has noted, "Overall, the establishment of Namibia's demining program is complete.... Namibia now possesses a modern demining capability and a dedicated unit of 1,000 deminers."¹⁴ More than one million square meters of land has been cleared, and more than 5,000 mines and 1,300 UXO destroyed.¹⁵ The project was completed without casualties to the deminers.

The US has been almost the sole donor to mine clearance in Namibia, providing nearly \$9 million from 1994-2001. The US provided \$40,000 in 2001 and allocated \$65,000 for 2002 for mine action.¹⁶ The US has said it will continue to fund "mine action activities as appropriate."¹⁷

In July 2002, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa requested assistance from Namibia in Zambia's demining process. "Any personnel, equipment or experience, which Namibia could share in that regard, would be greatly appreciated," he said.¹⁸

Mine Risk Education

In 2001, the US funded a \$40,000 nationwide mine awareness program.¹⁹ Local radio and television broadcast mine risk education messages in five local languages. In January 2001, a local mine awareness initiative by several local and foreign entities, including Western embassies, government departments, local NGOs and financial institutions, was launched under the theme "Namibia Against Landmines."²⁰

Humanitarian Force, a registered NGO in Namibia formerly known as Force XXI, conducted mine risk education classes in the Kavango region during January 2002, supported by the NDF, the

¹⁰ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Namibia," 6 April 2000, p. 3.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 10.

¹² http://www.roncoconsulting.com/demining_activities/namibia.html.

¹³ Charles Cobb, "Mozambique Leads the World - in Clearing Land Mines," *allAfrica.com*, 27 May 2002, at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200205270904.html>.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; also, US Department of State, Fact Sheet, "The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002. For details on past mine action funding and other support, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 126.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 10.

¹⁸ "Zambia Appeals for De-mining Assistance," *GRN News*, 5 July 2002.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 10.

²⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 128.

Namibian Police's Explosives Division, and the US Embassy in Windhoek. They indicated that their effort reached "hundreds" and they are continuing their MRE activities.²¹

The International Committee of the Red Cross initiated a new mine risk education project in Namibia in 2002.²² An assessment mission was conducted in the country to help the national Red Cross Society determine how to implement mine risk education programs.²³

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, at least nine people were killed and 41 injured in reported mine/UXO incidents.²⁴ The Namibian Police's (NAMPOL) Explosives Division, reported that between May 2001 and March 2002, one person was killed and 25 injured in ten antipersonnel mine and four UXO incidents.²⁵ A number of Namibian soldiers have been injured by mines while conducting military operations with FAA in Angola.

The number of new reported mine casualties has fallen significantly since 2000 when it was reported that 14 people had been killed and 126 injured in mine/UXO incidents.²⁶

At the launch of an exhibition on landmines in August 2001, Foreign Affairs Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that "just over 100 Namibians have died as a result of landmine explosions and a further 255 have sustained injuries since Independence."²⁷

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

The Windhoek Central State Hospital has a rehabilitation center that provides prostheses as well as physiotherapy services and psychological support for war victims. The government has adopted a Community Based Rehabilitation approach to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of persons with disabilities. A lack of resources prevents the establishment of specific programs for mine survivors. Landmine survivors receive assistance, in the form of monthly pension payments from the Ministry of Health and Social Services.²⁸

In 2001, the ICRC organized surgical training seminars for health professionals from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense. Sufficient medicines and surgical supplies were donated to five hospitals in the Kavango regions to treat 300 war-wounded patients. In the Rundu central hospital 88 war-wounded were treated between March and September 2001, which included 35 amputees. On 25 October 2001, the ICRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Health on a prosthetic/orthotic program which was to start in January 2002.²⁹

The National Assembly adopted the National Policy on Disabilities in April 1997; however, the implementation of the policy is still lacking.³⁰ The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation is primarily responsible for the coordination of disability matters, and implementation of the National Policy on Disabilities. Within the Ministry, the main function of the Rehabilitation Division is "to facilitate increased access to services by people with disabilities

²¹ Telephone Interview with Ralph William Haynes, President, Humanitarian Force, Namibia, 3 July 2002.

²² ICRC Contribution to *Landmine Monitor*, ICRC, Geneva, 1 June 2002.

²³ ICRC website, see:

<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/29BB6AB9412203E6C1256B66005F821E>.

²⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 129; see also National Society for Human Rights, "Three women lose legs in three landmine incidents," *Press Release*, 28 September 2001; and National Society for Human Rights, "Gunmen kill young woman, plant mines in Kavango," *Press Release*, 12 December 2001.

²⁵ Letter from Col. J. T. Theyse, Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ausspannplatz, Namibia to the Executive Director, National Society for Human Rights, 20 May 2002.

²⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 129.

²⁷ Absalom Shigedha, "Landmines claim 100 since 1990," *The Namibian*, 24 August 2001, accessed at <http://www.namibian.com.na/2001/August/news/01C47B368.html>; for more details on prior years see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 128-129.

²⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 130.

²⁹ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, p. 19.

³⁰ "OPM's Disability Advisory Office Sets Objectives," accessed at http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/February/Week3/opm_rpt.htm (11 July 2002).

so as to enhance their integration into the larger community and improve their dignity and social well-being.”³¹

On 1 March 2001, the National Federation of People with Disabilities in Namibia met with the Prime Minister to lobby for the establishment of a Disability Desk within the Prime Minister’s office to advice on issues relating to people with disabilities. On 24 September 2001, the Disability Advisory Office started operations.³²

NAURU

The Republic of Nauru acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 August 2000. It is not believed to have any domestic implementation legislation in place and has not submitted its initial Article 7 Report, due 31 July 2001. Nauru voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. It is believed to have never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines. In August 2001, leaders attending the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum encouraged early ratification of and accession to the Ottawa Convention in the Forum Communiqué.¹

THE NETHERLANDS

Key developments since May 2001: The Netherlands continued to play a leadership role in promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Netherlands served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance until September 2001. The Netherlands is coordinating work on explosive remnants of war in the CCW. In 2001, the Netherlands contributed €15.5 million (about \$13.9 million) to mine action.

Mine Ban Policy

The Netherlands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 12 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. The Netherlands continued to state that the treaty will be implemented “on the basis of existing legislation, such as the Import and Export Act of 1962 and the Arms Control Act. The latter will be amended to establish the powers for the implementation of the verification procedure by an international fact-finding mission in accordance with Article 8” of the treaty.¹ In May 2002, the Justice Department told Landmine Monitor that it was still working on the amendments, and awaiting the appointment of a new Minister of Justice following the elections of 15 May.²

The Netherlands submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 19 April 2002. This includes the Voluntary Form J on “Other Relevant Matters,” which gives details of Dutch funding of mine action in 2001. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 20 April 2001 and 7 January 2000, providing comprehensive information.³

³¹ http://www.op.gov.na/Decade_peace/lands.htm (accessed 11 July 2002).

³² “OPM’s Disability Advisory Office Sets Objectives,” accessed at http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/February/Week3/opm_rpt.htm (11 July 2002).

¹ Point 27 (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament), Forum Communiqué, Thirty-Second Pacific Islands Forum, Republic of Nauru, 16 - 18 August 2001, PIFS (01)12.

² The same statement appears in Article 7 Reports submitted on 19 April 2002 and 20 April 2001. The Arms Control Act (Articles 54, 55, 56), 5 July 1997, includes penal sanctions for the possession, use, production and transfer of explosives, including antipersonnel mines, without license.

³ Telephone interview with Jim Bruinsma, Legislation Directorate, Ministry of Justice, 23 May 2002, and with Mr. de Munck, Legal Affairs Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 March 2002.

³ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 7 January 2000 for the period 1 March-31 December 1999; submitted on 20 April 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 19 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

The Netherlands participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua.⁴ The Netherlands, as outgoing co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, and Mine Action Technologies, reported that the focus of the Standing Committee's work in the last year was on improving the efficiency of mine clearance, on gaining wider usage of the International Mine Action Standards, on encouraging sustainable, affordable and reliable technology, and on funding. The Netherlands delegation concluded by saying that in the next 10 years, increased and sustained levels of funding would be needed if mine-affected countries are to meet their treaty obligations.⁵

The delegation intervened during a discussion of antivehicle mines equipped with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, to re-emphasize the Netherlands' position that any device that functions like an antipersonnel mine is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and is banned by the treaty. The Netherlands urged State Parties to review their inventories of antivehicle mines to ascertain that they do not function as antipersonnel mines.⁶

On 29 November 2001, the Netherlands cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Netherlands participated extensively in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva.⁷ The Netherlands is a very active member of the Universalization Contact Group, which was established at the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000. The Netherlands has brought the treaty to the attention of representatives of many States which are not yet members. Two workshops on mines and the Mine Ban Treaty were organized jointly with Canada, in Suriname and Guyana, in May 2001. Cooperation with Eritrea contributed to that country's rapid accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, and has continued with support for implementation and mine action.⁸ The Netherlands is also active in the Article 7 Contact Group, which attempts to facilitate timely Article 7 reporting by all States Parties.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

The Netherlands is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and submitted its annual report under Article 13 of the Protocol on 14 November 2001. This presents updated information on mine action funding, cluster bomb units, and legislation.⁹

The Netherlands attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. The Netherlands played a leading role in preparatory meetings for the Review Conference, and Ambassador Chris Sanders acted as one of the "Friends of the Chair on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)" in the preparatory process and at the Review Conference. In March 2001, the Netherlands organized a workshop on ERW, and at the third preparatory meeting in September 2001 proposed that there be an expert group created to study the issue and ways to deal with them in the CCW. This proposal was refined and at the Review Conference it was agreed that there be a group of governmental experts to study explosive remnants of war and antivehicle mines and make recommendations to States Parties,

⁴ The delegation included Kees Rade, Chargé d'Affaires and M. Wolters, First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nicaragua, Thymen Kouwenaar, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the Conference on Disarmament, and Pim Kraan, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The Netherlands was represented variously by Thymen Kouwenaar, Head of the Permanent Delegation of the Netherlands for Disarmament, Pim Kraan, Human Rights and Peace Building Department, Alexander Verbeek, Deputy Head, Security Policy Department, and Sjoerd Smit, Policy Advisor, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸ Interview with Sjoerd Smit, Policy Advisor, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Landmine Monitor meeting, Paris, 17 April 2002.

⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form D, submitted on 14 November 2001.

including whether to proceed with negotiating a legally-binding instrument. Ambassador Sanders is serving in 2002 as the coordinator of the group's work on ERW.¹⁰

Production, Transfer, and Use

According to the Ministry of Defense, production of antipersonnel mines ceased over 20 years ago, and a partial export moratoria became a complete ban on transfer with entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in October 1999.¹¹

The Netherlands has stated that it understands the Mine Ban Treaty to prohibit involvement in activities related to antipersonnel mines during joint military operations with non-States Parties, and has encouraged States Parties to further clarify the issue with a view to attaining maximum transparency.¹²

Stockpiling and Destruction

Prior to the entry into force of the treaty, large quantities of antipersonnel mines were destroyed. In its first Article 7 Report, submitted on 7 January 2000, the Netherlands reported a stockpile of 272 CBU-89 Gator cluster bombs described as "non-Ottawa Convention compliant," which would be destroyed by the 1 October 2003 deadline set by the treaty. This is repeated in later reports.¹³ However, no information has been given about the status of the destruction program. The 272 CBU-89s contain a total of 5,984 BLU-92B antipersonnel mines, as well as BLU-91B antivehicle mines.

The April 2002 Article 7 Report records that 4,180 antipersonnel mines were retained for permitted training and development purposes under Article 3 of the treaty: 3,316 of type AP NR 22, and 864 of type AP DM31.¹⁴ This represents a decrease of 216 mines from the previous year, all type nr 22. The precise purposes for which these mines have been consumed is not reported.¹⁵ Apparently no type AP DM31 mines were consumed.

In 1997, for the stated purposes of protecting personnel and preventing clearance of antivehicle mines, 822 directional fragmentation (Claymore-type) mines were purchased, with further quantities to be purchased in 2003. The Netherlands has stated it will use these mines only in command-detonated mode, which is not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. No tripwires, for operation of the mines in victim-activated mode, remain in stock.¹⁶ The Netherlands has not reported if these mines have been otherwise modified, such as by filling in the fuze-well for tripwire attachment.

As previously noted by Landmine Monitor, the Netherlands has 80,000 DM-31 antivehicle mines in stock,¹⁷ and concerns have been raised that the DM-31 may explode when a standard metal detector is swept over it. In November 2001, the Netherlands repeated previous assurances that the mines will be adapted to prevent detonation "when detected with regular devices.... If adaptation is not feasible or too expensive the mines will be replaced by types that fully comply

¹⁰ "Resultaten Van De Tweede Toetsingsconferentie Van Het Conventionele Wapensverdrag" (Results of the Second CCW Review Conference), 11-21 December 2001, Letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to Parliament, Dvb/Ww-044/02, 14 March 2002.

¹¹ For details of past production, import and export, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 749-750, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 692.

¹² Oral remarks to Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 20 September 2001. Notes by Landmine Monitor. See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 746-747.

¹³ Article 7 Reports, Forms B, submitted on 7 January 2000, 20 April 2001, and 19 April 2002.

¹⁴ The numbers were totaled incorrectly in the report, but the government confirmed that the subtotals listed are the correct numbers.

¹⁵ Article 7 Reports, Forms D, submitted on 20 April 2001 and 19 April 2002.

¹⁶ Letter from the State Secretary of Defense H.A.L. Van Hoof to Parliament on Anti-Tank Mines and Alternatives for AP Mines, The Hague, 19 December 2000. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 749.

¹⁷ Letter from the State Secretary of Defense H.A.L. Van Hoof to Parliament on Anti-Tank Mines and Alternatives for AP Mines, The Hague, 19 December 2000.

with CCW regulations. As long as they are not adapted, DM-31 mines will not be used.”¹⁸ The Ministry of Defense has no new information about adaptation or alternatives for the DM-31 antivehicle mines.¹⁹

In Standing Committee meetings and at the Third Meeting of States Parties, the Netherlands has expressed the view that mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, which may be activated by the unintentional act of a person, are to be considered as antipersonnel mines and are banned by the treaty. Dutch future procurement plans follow this policy.²⁰

Research and Development

The HOM 2000 research project into new demining techniques was terminated in 2001, with Dfl7.4 million (US\$2.9 million) remaining from the project budget.²¹ On 19 April 2001, the Minister of Defense informed Parliament that these funds had been used to finance several research projects of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO).²² These include: a two-year project to improve detection of tripwire mines with infrared cameras (Dfl950,000, \$371,093); research into “smart prodders” (Dfl360,000, \$140,625); a two-year project to develop ground penetrating radar for mine detection (Dfl1.55 million, \$605,469); and a two-year project to examine clearance of mines with small caliber munitions (Dfl360,000, \$140,625).²³ Additionally, Delft Technical University has a two-year project looking into mine-detection by neutron dispersion technology (Dfl1.3 million, \$507,812). The Netherlands is also supporting the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (Dfl500,000, \$195,313).

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

In 2001, the Netherlands’ contribution to mine action was €15,463,269 (Dfl32 million or US\$13.9 million). This is a reduction from Dfl35.4 million in mine action funding in 2000. For 2002, the Netherlands has budgeted mine action expenditure totaling \$13.5 million. The Netherlands plans to allocate €13.6 million (\$12.2 million) each year, but as some projects have a longer duration than the calendar year actual expenditures may vary from year to year.²⁴

In discussion of mine action funding at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the Netherlands delegation explained that Dutch mine action policy “is based on planning and ownership by the affected country and long-term commitment by us. This policy leads us to conclude multi-year arrangements between the government and mine action operators, with the objective to make funding predictable and therefore proper planning possible. To avoid loss of investment, pending projects are given priority over new projects where it comes to funding.” As a result, the Netherlands started 2002 with an approximately 75 percent carry-over of ongoing commitments, making it difficult to commit new funding.²⁵

From the total funding of \$13,886,015 in 2001, approximately \$10.44 million was contributed to mine action in 13 countries:

¹⁸ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, submitted on 14 November 2001.

¹⁹ Telephone interview with Folkert Joustra, Ministry of Defense, 26 June 2002.

²⁰ For details of other mine purchases planned, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 746.

²¹ Letter from F.G.H. de Grave, Minister of Defense, to Parliament, 27 October 2000.

²² Letter from F.G.H. de Grave, Minister of Defense, to Parliament, 19 April 2001. Exchange rate as in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*: US\$1 = Dfl2.56, used throughout.

²³ The tripwire project is being done in cooperation with the FOI research institute from Sweden and the UK-based Defence Evaluation Research Establishment; the prodder research with the Canadian CCMAT/DRES research institute; and the ground penetrating radar with Delft Technical University.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form J, 19 April 2002, and “Annual Donor Report for Netherlands: 2001,” UNMAS Mine Investments database accessed at: www.mine.action.org on 14 May 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.898. The Article 7 Report records €15,463,269 as approximately \$13.3 million. In the rest of this section, € amounts are taken from the Article 7 Report and \$ amounts from the UNMAS database.

²⁵ “Funding Needs for Meeting Obligations”, Statement by the Netherlands, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

- *Afghanistan*: €2,272,727 (\$2 million) to UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) and Mine Action Program for Afghanistan for mine clearance (manual and mechanical), mine detection dogs, capacity building and coordination.
- *Angola*: €1,298,641 (\$1,143,170) consisting of €738,400 (\$650,000) to Norwegian People's Aid for explosive ordnance disposal, Aardvark and mine detection dogs, and €560,241 (\$493,170) to HALO Trust for mechanical support to manual demining.
- *Bosnia and Herzegovina*: €1,136,136 (\$1 million) to the UN Development Program (UNDP) to support coordination of the Mine Action Center.
- *Cambodia*: €642,583 (\$565,654) to Norwegian People's Aid for demining and development.
- *Eritrea*: €568,000 (\$500,000) to the UNDP to support creation of a national mine action capacity.
- *Ethiopia*: €1,136,000 (\$1 million) to UNDP for support to the Mine Action Center (€738,400, \$650,000) and for a Level 1 survey (€397,600, \$350,000).
- *Guinea-Bissau*: €568,000 (\$500,000) to UNDP for supporting the national mine action structure.
- *Northern Iraq*: €1,133,258 (\$997,587) consisting of €292,538 (\$257,516) to Handicap International Belgium for victim assistance, and €840,720 (\$740,071) to Mines Advisory Group for three mine action teams. These projects received additional funding from the NGO Stichting Vluchteling.²⁶
- *Laos*: €568,000 (\$500,000) to UNDP and UXO LAO for clearance of unexploded ordnance.
- *Mozambique*: €1,362,681 (\$1,199,554) consisting of €568,000 (\$500,000) to Norwegian People's Aid for mine action in Tête, Manica and Sofala provinces, and €794,681 (\$699,544) to HALO Trust for the Nampula mine action program and training of mine detection dogs.
- *Somalia*: €181,505 (\$159,776) to HALO Trust for the Somaliland project.
- *Yemen*: €568,000 (\$500,000) to UNDP for support of the national mine action program.
- *Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)*: €428,000 (\$376,761) to HALO Trust for mechanical clearance with manual support in Kosovo.

Also included in the Netherlands mine action funding in 2001 was:

- UN Mine Action Service: €1,704,000 (\$1.5 million) for the Voluntary Trust Fund.
- International Committee of the Red Cross: CHF 638,023 (\$459,000). This is part of €1,379,757 (\$1,214,575) for the special appeal for victim assistance for 2001-2003.
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines: €136,320 (\$120,000) for the Landmine Monitor 2001.
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining: €113,445 (\$100,000).
- Nicaraguan Government: €12,706 (\$11,290) for supporting the Third Meeting of States Parties.
- NATO Maintenance & Supply Agency: €140,471 (\$124,822) for stockpile destruction in Albania.

In addition to funding the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund project to destroy Albania's stockpile of antipersonnel mines, the Netherlands is co-sponsor with Moldova of another PfP Trust Fund project to destroy Moldova's stockpile of about 12,000 antipersonnel mines and a

²⁶ The government's contribution of \$740,071 to Mines Advisory Group (MAG) includes \$21,555 overhead fee for Stichting Vluchteling, so MAG receives \$758,516, and the government contribution to Handicap International includes \$7,500 overhead fee for Stichting Vluchteling, according to interview with Jan Habraken, Stichting Vluchteling, 9 April 2002 and email of 11 April 2002.

large quantity of potentially dangerous munitions and rocket fuel. In 2002, the Netherlands will support this project with \$100,000.²⁷ The Netherlands will also contribute to a PfP Trust Fund project for destruction of PFM mines in Russia.²⁸

The Dutch armed forces has a pool of 29 deminers. In 2001, three technical mine clearance advisors were deployed in Eritrea in the framework of the UN peacekeeping mission, and two more were sent at the start of 2002. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, one Dutch advisor was deployed with the Federation Mine Action Center in 2001 and 2002.²⁹

In 2002, the Netherlands mine action funding of \$13,534,616 covers 10 countries. Two countries are receiving Dutch funding for the first time in 2002:

- Azerbaijan: \$518,181 for mine clearance by HALO Trust in Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Georgia: \$376,015 for mine clearance by HALO Trust.³⁰

Five countries received funds in 2001 but not 2002: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Iraq, Laos, and Yugoslavia (Kosovo).

In 2002, the Netherlands has also provided financial support (CHF88,787, or \$60,892) to the Implementation Support Unit created by States Parties to assist in the intersessional process of the Mine Ban Treaty.³¹

Nongovernmental Mine Action Funding

Stichting Vluchteling (the Netherlands Refugee Foundation) co-financed two projects in Northern Iraq for the period 1 October 2001-31 December 2002. It provided \$40,000 for three mine action teams of the Mines Advisory Group, and \$40,000 for a Handicap International Belgium victim assistance and rehabilitation project.³²

KerkinActie (Action by Churches Together) donated to mine action in El Salvador (\$56,4501 for a project with the Salvadoran organization, CORDES) and Kosovo (a DanChurchAid project valued at \$121,000).³³

NOVIB provided \$1.1 million for mine action in Afghanistan to OMAR (Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation) in 2000-2001. NOVIB also provided \$180,000 for a cluster bomb removal project by OMAR after the US air strikes in Afghanistan in 2001.³⁴

NEW ZEALAND

Key developments since May 2001: New Zealand has continued its international advocacy in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, and increased its contributions to mine action programs.

Mine Ban Policy

New Zealand signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, enacted implementation legislation (the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998) on 9 December 1998, and deposited its

²⁷ Telephone interview with and email from Sjoerd Smit, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002.

²⁸ Telephone interview with Alexander Verbeek, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002.

²⁹ Email from Christianne Vermuë, Public Information Desk, Ministry of Defense, 29 March 2002; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 14 November 2001.

³⁰ "Current and planned Donor Activity for Netherlands," accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 14 May 2002.

³¹ Email to Landmine Monitor from Kerry Brinkert, Manager, Implementation Support Unit, 17 June 2002.

³² Telephone interview with Jan Habraken, Stichting Vluchteling, 27 March 2002.

³³ Telephone interview with Ms. Maas, ACT-Netherlands, 28 March 2002.

³⁴ Email from Shamilkha Samarakoon, Financial Officer, Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia Desk, NOVIB, 28 March 2002.

instrument of ratification on 27 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for New Zealand on 1 July 1999.

New Zealand participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001 with a two-person delegation, a government representative and an NGO representative from the New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines (CALM).¹ In its statement New Zealand outlined its efforts to promote universalization of the treaty in the Pacific and its contributions to mine clearance activities. It expressed support for the development of universally understood and agreed compliance measures and warned, "It would not be in the Convention's interests for it to be perceived as a lame duck when allegations and evidence of non-compliance arise."²

Representatives from the Mission to the UN in Geneva actively participated in the January and May 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, and New Zealand has continued its involvement in the "Universalization Contact Group." New Zealand also attended the regional stockpile destruction seminar hosted by Malaysia in August 2001, and the Regional Seminar on Landmines in Southeast Asia hosted by Thailand in May 2002.

New Zealand submitted its third Article 7 transparency report on 29 April 2002, covering the calendar year 2001. It is essentially a "nil" report, with no new developments to report, except for Form J, which details New Zealand's mine action contributions in 2001.

In November 2001, New Zealand cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In the UNGA First Committee debate, Ambassador Clive Pearson stated that the treaty process "stands out as a uniquely successful humanitarian and disarmament endeavour" in a year in which he claimed the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agenda suffered "some serious setbacks. The 'can do' dynamic among the Convention's partners...is a pertinent reminder...that leadership in disarmament can be a potent and positive force" and "a reminder of the power of collective will."³

In December 2001, New Zealand participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, with a delegation that included a representative from the Ministry of Defence. It submitted its Article 13 annual report on 30 November 2001.⁴

New Zealand has participated in the work of the CCW Experts Group on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). New Zealand has stated that "industry-driven improvements to munition or fusing design, while attractive, will never be enough" and expressed a strong preference for a "legally-binding instrument" on ERW, "if necessary after an expert process to explore appropriate modalities."⁵

In November 2001, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* was distributed at a function in Parliament Buildings and CALM continues to distribute the report to local universities and governments of Pacific Island states. The Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Matt Robson, described the 2001 report as "excellent" and said it "will continue to be a useful tool for encouraging transparency and promoting universalisation" of the ban treaty.⁶ CALM continued its campaign work, distributing a regular newsletter, updating its website, meeting with government departments and lobbying diplomats from other countries.

¹ Paul Tipping, New Zealand's Ambassador to Mexico, and John Head, Spokesperson of the New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines (CALM).

² Statement by Paul Tipping, New Zealand's Ambassador to Mexico, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 19 September 2001, p. 2.

³ Statement by the Ambassador for Disarmament of New Zealand, Clive Wallace Pearson, to the First Committee General Debate, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 11 October 2001.

⁴ New Zealand National Report, CCW/AP.II/CONF.3/NAR.26.

⁵ Statement by the Ambassador, Clive Wallace Pearson, to the First Committee General Debate, United Nations General Assembly Fifty-Sixth Session, New York, 11 October 2001.

⁶ Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Matt Robson, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 8 April 2002.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

New Zealand has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has taken the formal position that transit of antipersonnel mines through New Zealand territory is prohibited by New Zealand's law.⁷

The Chief of Defence Force confirmed to Landmine Monitor that New Zealand, "...at the time of the ban in 1996 had no anti-personnel landmines (APL) in service. It did however...have a number of surplus training/practice APL, which were destroyed in 1997, as they were superfluous to future training requirements." He indicated New Zealand retains a "very limited quantity of 'inert practice mines,' used solely for training personnel in counter-mine clearance operations."⁸ Since these are inert mines, they are not reported in the annual Article 7 Report.

New Zealand also has command-detonated Claymore mines, which are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Action

New Zealand has contributed approximately NZ\$12.8 million (US\$6.23 million) in both financial and in-kind contributions to mine action programs since 1992/1993.⁹

Financial and in-kind funding by the New Zealand government is shown in the accompanying tables, which reflect NZ\$2,269,753 (US\$953,296) in expenditures in the last financial year (1 July 2000-30 June 2001).¹⁰ This includes NZ\$1,244,203 (US\$522,565) in funding for mine action programs and an additional NZ\$1,025,550 (US\$430,731) for in-kind contributions. This represents an increase of 25 percent (NZ\$454,144) over the previous financial year. New Zealand funds programs in Cambodia, Laos, and Mozambique.

New Zealand Mine Action Funding in 2000/2001¹¹

Recipient	Amount NZ (USD) ¹²
Cambodia Mine Action Center Trust Fund	\$199,525 (\$83,800)
Lao PDR UXO Programme	\$250,000 (\$105,000)
Lao PDR UXO Programme Trust Fund	\$344,678 (\$144,765) ¹³
UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance	\$350,000 (\$147,000)
Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme	\$100,000 (\$42,000)
Total	\$1,244,203 (\$522,565)

In its most recent Article 7 Report, New Zealand indicated that in 2001 it provided grants totaling NZ\$144,000 (US\$60,480) to Rehabilitation Craft Cambodia (an NGO that provides employment for mine survivors) and NZ\$116,000 (US\$48,720) to the Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics for staff training costs.¹⁴

New Zealand views its in-kind contributions of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) technical advisors as "a cornerstone of our assistance," and "an effective way of developing capacity among local communities."¹⁵

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 469.

⁸ Letter to Landmine Monitor (N.K. Mander, Convenor of CALM) from B.R. Ferguson, Air Marshal, Chief of New Zealand Defence Force, ref: NZDF 1540/1, 17 May 2002.

⁹ Landmine Monitor used the following conversion rate: NZ\$= US\$0.48. Letter to NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Matt Robson, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 13 May 2002.

¹⁰ Unless otherwise noted all information in this section is drawn from Letter to NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Matt Robson, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 8 April 2002.

¹¹ Financial Year: 1 July 2000 - 30 June 2001.

¹² Landmine Monitor used the following conversion rate: NZ\$1 = US\$0.42.

¹³ This figure represents two years of funding as grants for 2000 and 2001 were both paid in 2000/01.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form J, 29 April 2002.

¹⁵ Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor, NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Hon. Matt Robson, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 13 May 2002.

New Zealand In-kind Mine Action Contributions in 2000/2001¹⁶

Programme	Contribution	In-kind value NZ (US\$) ¹⁷
Cambodia	Two NZDF personnel serve as technical advisers with CMAC.	\$225,250 (\$94,605)
Mozambique	Two New Zealanders currently work in the programme, now administered by UNDP.	\$277,000 (\$116,340)
Laos	New Zealand has deployed two personnel (a logistics/procurement adviser and a national technical adviser) to the Laos UXO programme since 1997.	\$236,500 (\$99,330)
UNHQ New York	One NZDF adviser serves in the Mine Action Service in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.	\$286,800 (\$120,456)
Total		\$1,025,550 (\$430,731)

In December 2001, Major John Flanagan of the NZDF returned home from successfully directing the Kosovo Mine Action Center and was awarded the Officer of New Zealand Order of Merit medal for his contribution.¹⁸

The Landmine Research Group in the School of Engineering at the University of Auckland has continued to investigate new technologies for detecting landmines, including stimulated thermal imaging and ground-penetrating radar, as well as data fusion as a way of increasing the reliability of detection systems.¹⁹ In 2001, a new project was started on tripwire detection, especially for fragmentation mines such as the PROM-1, which pose a major hazard for deminers.²⁰ The research group has links with similar research teams overseas, and especially with workers at the Joint Research Center of the European Commission.²¹

No reports have been received of injuries or deaths to New Zealanders overseas due to mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the past year.²²

NICARAGUA

Key developments since May 2001: From 18 to 21 September 2001, Nicaragua hosted the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. As President of the Third Meeting of States Parties, Nicaragua has also served as Chair of the Coordinating Committee since September 2001. From September 2000 until September 2001, Nicaragua served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance. Nicaragua has destroyed 115,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and plans to destroy the remaining 18,313 mines by September 2002. As of June 2002, Nicaragua had cleared more than 2.5 million square meters of land and 78,374 mines. Nicaragua now expects to complete mine clearance in 2005, not 2004 as previously estimated.

Mine Ban Policy

Nicaragua signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 30 November 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. On 7 December 1999 then President Arnoldo

¹⁶ Financial Year 1 July 2000 - 30 June 2001.

¹⁷ Landmine Monitor used the following conversion rate: NZ\$1 = US\$0.42.

¹⁸ Email to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines from Major John Flanagan, New Zealand Army, 20 May 2002.

¹⁹ Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Hon. Matt Robson, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 8 April 2002.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

Alemán Lacayo signed implementing legislation, which included penal sanctions for violations of the law.¹

Nicaragua hosted the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua from 18-21 September 2001. This was the largest diplomatic meeting that Nicaragua had ever hosted, and the first United Nations-sponsored meeting following the tragic events in the United States on 11 September 2001. Despite some daunting travel difficulties, representatives of 95 governments participated in the meeting, including 67 States Parties, making it the best-attended Meeting of States Parties to date. Nicaragua's extensive efforts on logistics and planning resulted in a smoothly run and very successful meeting under trying circumstances.

Nicaragua's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, was elected President of the meeting, a role that Nicaragua held until the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.² In remarks to the opening plenary, Minister Sacasa said that the treaty showed what could be achieved by cooperation, including with the essential role of civil society. At the end of the meeting, the Foreign Minister held a joint press conference with Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams and the head of the ICBL delegation, Stephen Goose.

As President, Nicaragua, represented by Minister Counsellor Cecilia Sanchez Reyes, has chaired the Coordinating Committee of States Parties, and played a key role in the intersessional work program, including the development of the Implementation Support Unit following the approval of its establishment at the Third Meeting of States Parties and its start of operations in January 2002. Under Nicaragua's leadership, enhancements to the intersessional work program were implemented, with a renewed focus on the core humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the approaching deadlines for stockpile destruction and clearance of mined areas, as well as the Art. 6.1 obligations regarding victim assistance and socio-economic reintegration. Also in its role as President, Nicaragua's Permanent Mission in Geneva sent out letters to all States Parties reminding them of their Article 7 reporting obligations and urging participation in the intersessional meetings.

At the intersessional meetings in January and May 2002, Nicaragua made a number of important interventions and presentations in the various Standing Committees, as well as chairing two briefings for missions based in Geneva. In January, Nicaragua and Honduras arranged an informal briefing for donor countries to meet with mine-affected countries from Central America and learn about the mine situation in those countries. In May, Nicaragua co-hosted a ceremony and breakfast reception to acknowledge the landmine survivors participating in the "Raising the Voices" advocacy training program. From September 2000 until September 2001, Nicaragua served as co-chair, together with Japan, of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness.

Nicaragua introduced UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, along with Norway and Belgium, the past, present and future presidents of the meetings of States Parties. The resolution, which called for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, passed on 29 November 2001 with 138 votes in favor, none against and 19 abstentions. Nicaragua encouraged states to support the resolution in its October 2001 statement to the UNGA General Debate on disarmament.³

¹ *Law for the Prohibition of Production, Purchase, Sale, Import, Export, Transit, Use and Possession of Antipersonnel Landmines*, Law No. 321, published in the Official Gazette on 12 January 2000. Article I of this law adds, "installation" to the prohibition on antipersonnel mines. Article III states that the Armed Forces must destroy its stockpiles in the "period determined by the relevant authorities." Article VI states that persons who violate the Law will be charged with "exposing the public to danger," and will be charged accordingly. See "Prisión para vendedores de minas," *Confidencial*, No. 158, 5-11 September 1998, p. 5.

² Final Report, Third Meeting of State Parties, 10 January 2002. See www.gichd.ch/mbc/all_meetings/3MSP.

³ Statement by Mario H. Castellón, Alternate Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations, New York, 12 October 2001.

Nicaraguan representatives made presentations at a “Mine Action in Latin America” conference in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001.⁴

Nicaragua submitted its annual Article 7 Report on 22 May 2002, covering an unspecified period until 30 March 2002. Previously, it submitted its initial report on 18 May 2000, and an annual report on 7 May 2001.⁵

Nicaragua is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but did not attend the annual Amended Protocol II conference, or the Second CCW Review Conference, held in Geneva in December 2001.

The Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Landmine Monitor’s country researcher, published its third report on landmines in Nicaragua during the Third Meeting of State Parties.⁶ CEI and several other NGOs are members of the National Demining Commission (CDN).

Production, Transfer, and Use

Nicaragua states that it no longer produces antipersonnel landmines and does not have production facilities.⁷ Nicaragua imported mines in the past and reported Cuban, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles.⁸

No use of antipersonnel mines by any armed group has been reported in 2001 or 2002. However, on 9 November 2001, Army and Police units raided the hideout of the criminal gang “Frente Unido Andrés Castro,” led by Pilar Lira, and seized a range of weaponry, including two antipersonnel mines.⁹

There are reports of civilians storing and using antipersonnel mines for non-military purposes. Danis Hernández, a landmine survivor who carries out on mine risk education workshops, says that some peasants do not want mines cleared since they prevent cattle theft; others use them for fishing. In one case, a resident of the town of San Fernando kept a stock of antipersonnel mines to trade for materials or for money, since he had heard that the Army was paying for them. Hernández reported that in a four-month period in 2001, some 58 antipersonnel mines were received from civilians in Nueva Segovia. Some had brought live mines to the workshops to hand them over; some kept them under their beds at home; some even used them as doorstops, oblivious to the danger.¹⁰

On 1 April 2002, the Police in San Fernando Municipality, Nueva Segovia Department, seized eight antipersonnel mines from local residents who had been keeping them in their homes since 1994. They were destroyed by Army mine clearance specialists on 3 April 2002. According to the media article, from one resident the Police seized three PP-MiSr-II, two POMZ-2M, and two PMN antipersonnel mines; from another resident, a PP-MiSr-II mine. The first resident reportedly told the authorities that he had kept the mines at home for eight years, as souvenirs, since he thought they were harmless.¹¹

⁴ The US Department of Defense and the Organization of American States (OAS) sponsored the conference. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

⁵ While the reporting period is not specified in either report, the first report contained information as of 30 September 1999 and the second contained information as of 20 April 2001.

⁶ Centro de Estudios Internacionales, “Las minas antipersonales en Nicaragua: Tercer Informe Independiente,” undated, 72-page booklet.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form E and Form H, Point 1, 22 May 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 7 May 2001.

⁹ Moisés Martínez and Heriberto Jarquín, “Golpean al FUAC,” *La Prensa* (Managua), 10 November 2001; “‘Tyson’ se salva descalzo y armado sólo de revólver,” *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), 15 November 2001. It is not known if any charges were brought according to the domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.

¹⁰ Landmine Monitor (MAC) interview with Danis Hernández, intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹¹ Roger Olivas, “Convivió 8 años con la muerte. Guardó minas como ‘recuerdo,’” *El Nuevo Diario*, 6 April 2002.

Stockpiling and Destruction

At the beginning of 1999 Nicaragua had a stockpile of 136,813 antipersonnel mines.¹² From April 1999 to September 2001, Nicaragua destroyed 90,000 antipersonnel mines in eight separate destructions.¹³

On 17 September 2001, 20,000 antipersonnel mines were destroyed at the National Sergeant School near Managua in the eighth destruction event, the day before the opening of the Third Meeting of States Parties. Over 300 people witnessed the destruction including then President Arnoldo Aleman, diplomatic and NGO participants to the meeting of States Parties as well as media at a public ceremony.

While this destruction should have left Nicaragua with 46,813 mines in stocks, in its May 2002 Article 7 Report, Nicaragua reported that following a process of certification of the stockpile, a total of 43,313 antipersonnel mines were left as of 30 March 2002.¹⁴

On 25 April 2002, 15,000 mines were destroyed by the Infantry Battalion of the Army's Second Regional Military Command, in Chinandega department in an event attended by the newly elected President, Enrique Bolaños, and other distinguished guests.¹⁵ On 20 June 2002, another 10,000 mines were destroyed at the National Sergeant School.¹⁶

Nicaragua plans to destroy the remaining mines by September 2002.¹⁷ The treaty-mandated deadline for completion of stockpile destruction is 1 May 2003. During the 2002 intersessional meetings, Nicaragua stated that it was willing to share its technical expertise in stockpile destruction with other countries.

In its March 2002 Article 7 Report, Nicaragua confirmed that it is retaining 1,971 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, as permitted under Article 3.¹⁸ Of this total, 286 mines were transferred to the OAS/IADB MARMINCA program for canine training, beginning on 29 September 1999.¹⁹ The number of mines retained has not changed since 1999, indicating that Nicaragua has not yet expended any of the mines.

Landmine Problem

Nicaragua's landmine problem is a result of the 1979-1990 internal conflict. In addition to mines, a large quantity of unexploded ordnance (UXO) such as bombs, fragmentation grenades, mortars, and ammunition were also left in areas where combat took place.²⁰ The mine and UXO problem is located along the northern border with Honduras and also in a number of interior locations, including the departments of Jinotega, Madriz, Nueva Segovia, and the Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN).²¹

In its March 2002 Article 7 Report, Nicaragua stated that there were an estimated 61,875 mines still left in the ground, and of the 313 kilometers of the northern border that were mine-

¹² For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 282.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, Table 3, 22 May 2002.

¹⁴ This includes 14,680 PMN; 9,843 PMN-2; 1,640 PP-Mi-Sr-II; 1,042 POMZ-2; and 16,108 POMZ-2M mines. Article 7 Report, Introduction and Forms B and D, 22 May 2002.

¹⁵ "Declaran a Chinandega territorio libre de minas," *La Prensa*, 26 April 2002; Esteban Solís R., "Declarada Villanueva 'libre de minas,'" *El Nuevo Diario*, 26 April 2002.

¹⁶ Luis Felipe Palacios, "Ejército destruye diez mil minas," *La Prensa*, 21 June 2002; Vladimir López, "Ejército on amenaza en RAAN. Destruyen 10 mil minas en la Escuela de Sargentos 'Andrés Castro,'" *El Nuevo Diario*, 21 June 2002.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002.

¹⁸ This includes 500 PMN, 500 PMN-2, 100 PP-MiSr-II, 50 OZM-4, 50 PMFH, 100 POMZ-2, 500 POMZ-2M, 100 MON-50, 11 MON-100, and 10 MON-200 mines. Article 7 Report, Form D, Table 1, 22 May 2002.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 22 May 2002. The OAS/IADB MARMINCA program is explained in a later section. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 358.

²⁰ UNICEF, "Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness (UXO) Education in Nicaragua through Community Liaison," UN Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, April 2001, p. 184.

²¹ Country report on Nicaragua, United Nations Mine Action "Emine" website, last updated 2 May 2002, www.mineaction.org (23 July 2002).

affected, 129 kilometers have been cleared and 184 kilometers remain.²² Mined areas were located in: Bayuncun, La Cantina, La Explosión, El Guayabo, Gualacatu, Llano Guapinol, Murupuchi, Namasli, El Porvenir, Río Poteca, San José, and El Ural.²³

Nicaragua also reported that the identification of suspected mine-affected areas is ongoing. Civilians informed authorities of suspected mined areas in Boaco, Chinandega, Chontales, Estelí, Jinotega, Madriz, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Río San Juan, Zelaya Norte, and Zelaya Sur.²⁴

In April 2001, Nicaragua reported that it had completed clearance of mines that had been mapped and registered along 96 kilometers of the southern border with Costa Rica, and declared the border the country's first mine-free region.²⁵

Despite the government's demining efforts, UNICEF reported in 2002 that "locals are often forced to carry out mine clearance activities themselves in order to use their land."²⁶ (See below for more on "amateur deminers").

Mine Action Funding

Nicaragua's National Demining Plan, first introduced in April 1999, stated that approximately \$27 million was needed to complete stockpile destruction and mine clearance in the country.²⁷

The Organization of American States (OAS) Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, through its Program for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA, Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal), is responsible for coordinating and supervising the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA, Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamérica), with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

The IADB is responsible for organizing a team of international supervisors in charge of training and certification, known as the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (MARMINCA, Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centro América).

PADCA and MARMINCA have mine action programs in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras. In Nicaragua, the Army is responsible for clearance operations, along with PADCA and MARMINCA.

For the 2001 budget, the OAS PADCA program raised approximately \$4.72 million from the United States (\$1.27 million), Norway (\$1.15 million), Canada (\$979,232), Sweden (\$639,964), United Kingdom, (\$271,971), Spain (\$255,340), Italy (\$100,000) and Japan (\$45,000).²⁸ This represents a decrease from \$4.92 million raised in the year 2000.

The OAS PADCA program has suffered a serious financial crisis since December 2001.²⁹ In Nicaragua, the OAS had to provide "bridging funds" until donors renewed commitments to

²² Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002.

²³ Article 7 Report, "Tasks carried out regarding IMSMA" Section, 22 May 2002, pp. 30-32.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002.

²⁵ *Ibid.*; see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.359.

²⁶ Country report on Nicaragua, United Nations Mine Action "Emine" website, last updated 2 May 2002, www.mineaction.org (23 July 2002).

²⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 360. According to the Organization of American States, based on over eight years of operational experience, the OAS coordinated program requires approximately \$400,000 to fund a front-sized unit for each six-month period of field operations. Consequently, 6.5 fronts at \$800,000 per year over a five-year period (2000-2004), produced a general requirement for approximately \$26 to \$27 million. (A front is a company-sized, 100 person unit). Letter to Landmine Monitor from Sergio Caramagna, Director, OAS National Office in Nicaragua, 11 January 2001; Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from William McDonough, Coordinator, PACDA, Organization of American States, 26 July 2001.

²⁸ In previous years other donors to the program have included: Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, and the Netherlands. "OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001," Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

²⁹ See "Proyecto de Resolución: Apoyo al Programa de Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal en Centroamérica," AG/doc 4094/02, 15 May 2002. Document prepared for the XXXII OAS General

Nicaragua's demining operational fronts three and four.³⁰ According to Sergio Caramagna, the Director of the OAS National Office in Nicaragua, approximately \$3 million is required for mine action in 2003, and approximately \$8.5 million is needed through 2005.³¹ According to the Chief of the Operational and Planning Directorate of the Nicaraguan Army, Nicaragua requires \$6.5 million to cover costs for completion of mine clearance operations.³² In addition, funding is being sought for two helicopters for medical evacuations, and to acquire more metal detectors.

Funding sources for mine action activities derive from a number of areas. The three operational fronts (3, 4 and 5), the canine unit and the activities of the independent platoon are funded via the OAS. Two other fronts (1 and 2) are funded bilaterally by an international donor, as are the activities of the heavy equipment unit. Still other activities like those related to UNICEF are funded from other sources. Many of these projects, activities and contributions span timeframes not easily captured and described as "calendar year" expenditures.³³

According to the Minister of Defense, the US Department of State provided \$50,000 through the OAS to strengthen the operational capacity of the National Demining Commission.³⁴ The US reports that in addition to its funding of the OAS/IADB program, in 2001 the Defense Department helped Nicaragua in conducting a metal detector evaluation.³⁵ UNOPS reports that it has worked with UNMAS to provide program management services needed to implement programs in Nicaragua.³⁶

Mine Action Coordination

The Comisión Nacional de Desminado (CND), established in November 1998, is the government body responsible for mine action in Nicaragua. In January 2001, Nicaragua's Deputy Minister of Defense, María Auxiliadora Cuadra de Frech, was appointed as Executive Secretary, and three subcommittees were established to oversee mine action: stockpile destruction and mine clearance; victim assistance and rehabilitation; and education, prevention, and minefield signaling. Representatives of the government, NGOs, and international organizations are members of the subcommittees. As of June 2002, 27 governmental and non-governmental institutions were represented on the CND.³⁷ The CND does not have its own budget, but relies on the financial support of the Ministry of Defense. It has three full-time staff.³⁸

In the half of 2002, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) established its first Regional Support Centre (RSC) in Managua. It has set up the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), a database system that houses information on mine-affected land and those suspected of being mine-affected, progress on mine clearance in each

Assembly, Bridgetown, Barbados,

http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/espanol/documentos/docs_esp/AGdoc4094_02.htm.

³⁰ Col. William McDonough. "Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," 14 March 2002.

³¹ Response by Sergio Caramagna, Director, OAS National Office in Nicaragua, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 25 June 2002.

³² Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Brigadier General César Delgadillo Cardenal, Chief of the Operational and Planning Directorate of the Nicaraguan Army, 14 March 2002.

³³ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Col. William McDonough, Coordinator, OAS PADCA, 5 August 2002.

³⁴ Response by Minister of Defense José Adán Guerra, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 28 June 2002.

³⁵ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 37.

³⁶ See United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* appendices.

³⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Minister of Defense José Adán Guerra, 28 June 2002.

³⁸ Response by Minister of Defense José Adán Guerra, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 28 June 2002.

area and complete information on incidents and landmine casualties.³⁹ The primary task of the RSC is “the provision of first level user support, including on-site training, technical advice and maintenance, for IMSMA users in Latin America.”⁴⁰ The GICHD also held regional briefings on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in Nicaragua in 2001.⁴¹

In its 2002 Article 7 Report, Nicaragua reported that a plan for information gathering for IMSMA was developed at Level I for the whole country and at Level II in regions where mine clearance operations have been completed (the departments of Río San Juan and Nueva Segovia).⁴²

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance is the responsibility of the Pequeñas Unidades de Desminado (PUD), or Small Demining Units, of the Engineer Corps of the Nicaraguan Army. Approximately 650 Army members are trained and equipped to engage in mine clearance.⁴³ As envisaged in the 1999 National Demining Plan, mine clearance is conducted along five operational fronts; each front is a company-sized 100-person unit. In addition, there are three platoon-sized units, with approximately 50 persons per unit:⁴⁴ the Chontales- Jinotega mechanized unit; a marking unit; and an independent unit that includes a mine detecting dog team.⁴⁵

As of March 2002, Nicaragua reported that a total of 2,515,487 square meters of land had been cleared for agriculture and grazing. Comparing figures in the two most recent Article 7 Reports, it would appear that 395,350 square meters of land were cleared from April 2001 to March 2002.⁴⁶

From 1989 to 30 March 2002, a total of 73,768 landmines were destroyed and 225 kilometers of border were cleared (129 kilometers of the northern border and 96 kilometers of the southern border).⁴⁷ Nicaragua reported that 668,069 people had benefited from mine clearance operations.⁴⁸

According to a June 2002 update provided to Landmine Monitor by the Nicaraguan Army, 703 of 991 objectives had been demined, leaving 288. A total of 78,374 laid mines had been destroyed, leaving 57,269 mines in the ground.⁴⁹

In 2002, Nicaragua expects to declare Boaco, Chinandega, Chontales departments and the Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) landmine free.⁵⁰ Nicaragua now expects that mine clearance will be completed in 2005, not 2004 as previously estimated.⁵¹

³⁹ Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), *Annual Report 2000*, 25 April 2001; also OAS, “Informe del Secretario General sobre la implementación de las Resoluciones 1745 (apoyo a PADEP) y 1751 (apoyo a PADCA),” CP/doc.3432/01 rev.1, 7 May 2001.

⁴⁰ See Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* appendices.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Article 7 Report, “Tasks carried out regarding IMSMA” Section, 22 May 2002, pp.30-32.

⁴³ Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002.

⁴⁴ Letter from Sergio Caramagna, Director, OAS National Office in Nicaragua, to Landmine Monitor, 11 January 2001; email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Col. William McDonough, Coordinator, OAS PADCA, 26 July 2001.

⁴⁵ Article 7 Report, Form E, “Cronograma de Operaciones de Desminado Proyectado para el Año 2002,” 22 May 2002, p.21-23. The independent unit functions in operational fronts 3 and 5.

⁴⁶ Article 7 Report, Form G, Table 2, p. 26, Table 2, p. 33, and Introduction, 22 May 2002; Article 7 Report, 7 May 2001. Comparing the two reports, it also appears that Nicaragua destroyed 8,894 mines, and cleared the areas around a hydroelectric station, eight bridges, six high-tension electrical towers, and a landing strip from April 2001-March 2002.

⁴⁷ Article 7 Report, Form E, Table 3, p. 20; Form G, Table 2, p. 26, 22 May 2002. The numbers reported in Table 3 do not seem to add up correctly, citing 211 square meters cleared instead of 225.

⁴⁸ Article 7 Report, Form G, Table 2, p. 33, 22 May 2002.

⁴⁹ See Nicaraguan Army, “Statistical summary of national mine clearance from 1989 to 30 June 2002,” 28 June 2002.

⁵⁰ Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002; Article 7 Report, Introduction, 7 May 2001.

⁵¹ Article 7 Report, Introduction, 22 May 2002.

“Amateur Demining”

In an article published by James Madison University in mid-2001 on amateur deminers in rural areas of Nicaragua, one farmer reported that he had cleared 500 mines, of which nearly 200 still had the safety pin fitted because “the reservists and recent recruits who laid them did not take the risk of removing the safety pin in case the mine went off.” The same farmer added that he was fed up with local people breaking down his fences and stealing his mines to use in illegal river fishing. Another farmer, near the town of Mulukukú, reportedly cleared 200 mines for a large landowner who only paid him approximately \$200 for the clearance work. These amateur deminers use machetes and sticks to clear mines.⁵²

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) in Nicaragua is conducted by a number of actors, including the Comisión Conjunta de Discapacitados de Madriz para la Paz y Reconstrucción (ORD/ADRN), the Nicaraguan Red Cross, the OAS, UNICEF, and NGOs. According to the OAS PADCA Nicaragua Coordinator, a number of significant advances in MRE were made in 2001.⁵³

The CND’s Sub-Commission on Education, Prevention and Reintegration has reportedly been designing and implementing a series of actions and campaigns for the prevention of mine accidents with the objective of implementing a National Plan of Preventive Education for Antipersonnel Mine Accidents (Plan Nacional de Educación Preventiva de Accidentes con Minas Antipersonales).⁵⁴ The plan includes: dissemination of educational materials through radio and television; educational materials approved by the CND placed in mine-affected zones; signaling of mined areas as well as warning signs on roads near the most mine-affected areas; and activities of the mine clearance units in the mine-affected areas.⁵⁵

In addition, the Nicaraguan Army developed and implemented a Dissemination and Mine Accident Prevention Campaign (Campaña de Divulgación y Prevención de Accidentes con Mina).⁵⁶

According to the CND, a National Prevention Guide (Guía Nacional de Prevención) for the production of MRE materials, has been prepared with the support of UNICEF and OAS PADCA. In addition, the CDN published a “popular version of the Ottawa Convention which details advances made in mine action in Nicaragua, and includes prevention messages.”⁵⁷

UNICEF plans to carry out most MRE activities in close cooperation with CND and its Sub-Commission. In 2002 and 2003, efforts will center on the establishment and consolidation of common standards for MRE. According to UNICEF, clarification and consensus building has yet to be achieved in methodology and monitoring of MRE programs.⁵⁸ UNICEF’s budget of the project in 2002 was \$175,000.⁵⁹

According to UNICEF, together with the OAS as an implementing partner and in direct coordination with the Nicaraguan Army, a community liaison project will be carried out to improve confidence building and information sharing with affected communities located close to the northern border.⁶⁰

According to the ICRC, the Nicaraguan Red Cross, with the support of the ICRC and UNICEF, continued a child-to-child mine/UXO-awareness program in 2001, which targeted

⁵² Russell Gasser, “Interview with an amateur deminer,” in “Landmines in Central & South America,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 5.2, Summer 2001, p.46-48.

⁵³ Landmine Monitor interview with Sergio Caramagna, Director, OAS National Office in Nicaragua, 4 March 2002.

⁵⁴ Article 7 Report, Form I, 22 May 2002.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Comisión Nacional de Desminado, “Memoria de Labores 2001.”

⁵⁸ Country report on Nicaragua, United Nations Mine Action “Emine” website, last updated 2 May 2002, www.mineaction.org (23 July 2002).

⁵⁹ UN Mine Action, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects: Nicaragua, updated 2 May 2002, checked 20 July 2002.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

children of school age. Thirty-three young people were trained under this program to lead dissemination sessions in school in the RAAN, where Army mine clearance activities were taking place.⁶¹

According to the coordinator of the Joint Commission of Disabled Persons of Madriz (Comisión Conjunta de Discapacitados de Madriz), Uriel Carazo, the Commission is providing mine awareness training in 27 schools in the northern border zones.⁶² The Commission also reports to be teaching children the different types of mine warning signs to prevent them entering dangerous zones, and how to mark mines they find without touching them. The Commission also has a mine awareness project involving baseball teams, which reaches all communities in the northern border zone.⁶³

UNICEF has expressed concern that local populations seem to have lost their sense of fear towards mines and UXO.⁶⁴ Danis Hernández, a landmine survivor who carries out mine risk education workshops in rural communities in Jalapa and San Fernando Municipalities in Nueva Segovia department, has also remarked on the problem of loss of fear towards mines and UXOs in Nicaragua. According to Hernández, who is a member of ADRN (Asociación de Discapacitados de la Resistencia Nicaragüense) and works the OAS PADCA program in Nueva Segovia, estimates that 70 percent of local residents in the two municipalities have no fear of mines, including most males; even some landmine survivors continue to take risks.⁶⁵

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, OAS PADCA reported 16 new landmine/UXO casualties; two people were killed, 12 injured, and the status of two other casualties was unknown.⁶⁶ Four deminers were injured in two separate accidents in 2001. On 26 January 2001, a deminer lost a leg and two others suffered facial injuries at Panchito airstrip in San Francisco Libre municipality near Managua, after one stepped on a mine while working.⁶⁷ On 3 September 2001, a 24 year-old deminer was injured after stepping on a landmine in Abisinia, Jinotega department.⁶⁸

As of June 2002, OAS PADCA had recorded 509 casualties, of which 37 were killed and 472 injured. Of the total casualties, 40 were deminers, including five killed and 35 injured.⁶⁹ Most of the casualties were male peasants between 30 and 40 years old.⁷⁰ The first casualties were reported in 1982.

In an accident on 3 June 2002, a mine clearance instructor was killed at the National Sergeant School near Managua, and another two instructors, a soldier, and the School's cook were severely injured.⁷¹

Mine/UXO casualties have been recorded in 13 departments.⁷² Casualties occurred in the following departments: Estelí, 2; Madriz, 22; Nueva Segovia, 188; Chinandega, 26; León, 2;

⁶¹ International Committee of the Red Cross contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* appendices.

⁶² Interview with Uriel Carazo, Joint Commission of Disabled Persons of Madriz, 1 July 2002.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Country report on Nicaragua, United Nations Mine Action "Emine" website, last updated 2 May 2002, www.mineaction.org (23 July 2002).

⁶⁵ Landmine Monitor (MAC) interview with Danis Hernández, at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

⁶⁶ IMSMA Web Services Country Edition test in cooperation with Nicaragua. Presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18-21 September 2001. Accessed at www.imsma.ethz.ch/en/project/countryedition.asp#reports (2 August 2002).

⁶⁷ "Tres heridos en explosión de mina," *La Prensa* (Managua), 29 January 2001.

⁶⁸ "Mina hiere a zapador," *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), 16 September 2001.

⁶⁹ OAS PADCA, Victims Report, June 2002, accessed at <http://www.oadesminado.org.ni/reportes/junio.pdf> (2 August 2002).

⁷⁰ Interview with Sergio Caramagna, Director, OAS National Office in Nicaragua, 4 March 2002.

⁷¹ Mario Sánchez P., "Mina destroza a sargento," *La Prensa* (Managua) 4 June 2002; "Un soldado muerto y tres heridos por explosión de mina en Nicaragua," *El Colombiano* (Medellín, Colombia) 4 June 2002.

Managua, 10; Rivas, 1; Rio San Juan, 4; Chontales, 18; Jinotega, 106; Matagalpa, 60; R.A.A.N, 36; and R.A.A.S, 34. The total number of casualties was 509.

Survivor Assistance

In 2001, the government of Nicaragua claimed a “shift in course” in mine action, towards “placing people and community rehabilitation at the heart of new programs.”⁷³ According to the Minister of Defense, efforts are being made to ensure that survivor assistance becomes an integral part of the public health system, and of other State institutions including the Ministry of the Family (MIFAMILIA), the Institute for Youth, and the National Technological Institute (INATEC).⁷⁴

Nicaragua’s May 2001 Article 7 report included a completed Form J on victim assistance which listed organizations and agencies involved in first aid, medical care, rehabilitation, and socio-economic reintegration.⁷⁵ The Regional Directory of Rehabilitation Resources lists 231 organizations in Nicaragua that provide services to persons with disabilities, including medical and psychosocial care, professional rehabilitation, awareness and information, economic support and community-based rehabilitation.⁷⁶

Survivor assistance falls within the mandate of the CND. Consultations are being held between CND and the National Council for Prevention and Rehabilitation [Consejo Nacional de Prevención y Rehabilitación] to find effective mechanisms to improve the social reintegration of mine survivors.⁷⁷ However, according to the CND, there is no consensus on appropriate rehabilitation policies for landmine survivors at present, and the CND, through the National Council for Prevention and Rehabilitation, needs to play more of a facilitating role between the Ministry of Health and civil society organizations.⁷⁸

Handicap International (HI) provides support to the services of physical medicine and rehabilitation at one orthopedic center and four physiotherapy centers in Trinidad, Estelí department. The project provides material, organizational and technical support, and is restarting a community-based rehabilitation network. In June 2001, HI signed a partnership agreement with the National Demining Commission, under which HI will provide technical advice to help it to assume its functions.⁷⁹

The Polus Center for Social and Economic Development Inc. continues to assist persons with disabilities in Nicaragua, particularly those who have lost limbs due to war, landmines and disease.⁸⁰ Walking Unidos is the Polus Center’s Prosthetic Outreach Program in León, Nicaragua. The program provides prosthetic/orthotic services, which are free of charge or at a reduced cost for the poor. The center produces above and below knee prostheses. Since 2000, Walking Unidos has provided over 280 prostheses, and repaired another 250. A “cyber café”, opened in León, employs some of the beneficiaries of the prosthetic program, with revenues used to support the Walking Unidos project.⁸¹

⁷² OAS PADCA, Victims Report, June 2002, accessed at <http://www.oadesminado.org.ni/reportes/junio.pdf> (2 August 2002).

⁷³ Statement by José Adán Guerra, Minister of Defense, on the occasion of the XV Meeting of the CND, 29 January 2001.

⁷⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by José Adán Guerra, Minister of Defense, 26 February 2002.

⁷⁵ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 369.

⁷⁶ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by José Adán Guerra, Minister of Defense, 26 February 2002.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Comisión Nacional de Desminado Humanitario, “Memorias de Labores 2001.”

⁷⁹ See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 369; see also ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at www.landminevap.org.

⁸⁰ UN Mine Action, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects: Nicaragua, updated 2 May 2002, checked 20 July 2002.

⁸¹ ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 370.

In March 2002, the U.S. Global Care Unlimited, based in Tenafly Secondary School in New Jersey, made a donation of \$1,500 to the OAS, to support the rehabilitation of a 20 year-old landmine survivor in Juigalpa who lost both legs when she stepped on a landmine under a high-tension electrical tower in 1992.⁸²

On 18-19 June 2001, prosthetic technicians from Nicaragua attended the First Regional Conference on Victim Assistance and Technologies in Managua, organized by the OAS and the Center for International Rehabilitation (CIR).⁸³ CIR has developed a Lower Extremity Distance Learning program for prosthetic technicians in Nicaragua which also includes a clinical component implemented by a qualified prosthetist who provides hands-on training.⁸⁴

The OAS, Landmine and Victim Assistance Program has provided over 409 people who have no social security or army benefits, with transportation to a rehabilitation center, lodging, food, prostheses, therapy, surgery and medications. In 2001, 139 people received rehabilitative or specialized medical attention through this program.⁸⁵

The OAS AICMA, in conjunction with the National Technological Institute of Nicaragua (INATEC) and supported by Global Care Unlimited, a U.S. non-profit organization established by a group of New Jersey students and teachers, developed the Post-Rehabilitation Job Training Project. INATEC coordinated training for 42 landmine survivors at national facilities in courses that included auto mechanics, computer skills, carpentry, shoemaking, tailoring, and cooking.⁸⁶

The joint Canada-Mexico-Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) tripartite survivor assistance project continues in Nicaragua. The project supports prosthetic-orthotic services, vocational training and placement programs for persons with disabilities, and the integration of community-based rehabilitation into the networks of primary health care services.⁸⁷

The Canadian NGO Falls Brook Centre continues to implement a survivor assistance project in northern Nicaragua called Creating Energy and Building the Future which provides landmine survivors with prostheses, if needed, and training in solar electrification. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funding for the project ended in May 2001, and since then funding has been provided by private donors and through small income generation activities by the landmine survivors themselves, who sell and install solar energy systems in rural areas. To July 2002, the project has provided 40 landmine survivors with prostheses and other medical assistance, trained 25 landmine survivors in solar energy technology, and provided solar electrification in 56 rural communities. Falls Brook Centre is also in the second year of a CIDA-funded Kitchen Garden project which assists landmine survivors in four rural communities suffering from high levels of malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty. The project involves organic food production including vegetables, small tree nurseries, perennial plants, medicinal plants, small animal production, and grains, in survivors own backyards.⁸⁸

Landmine survivor assistance programs in Nicaragua are reportedly not meeting the needs of survivors. It is necessary to increase the physiotherapy and orthopedic capacities of the Ministry of Health; to extend coverage of services; to increase the prosthetic production capacity; and to ensure the organizational and financial sustainability of these services in the medium and long term. In addition, the reintegration of mine survivors is extremely complex in a poor country like Nicaragua,

⁸² "Vítima de mina recibió donación de niños EEUU," *La Prensa/EFE* (Managua), 8 March 2002.

⁸³ "Ayudarán más víctimas de minas antipersonales. Primera conferencia regional de rehabilitación y tecnología," *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), 19 June 2001.

⁸⁴ ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 370.

⁸⁵ Colonel William McDonough. "Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," 14 March 2002; see also ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs.

⁸⁶ Colonel William McDonough. "Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," 14 March 2002.

⁸⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 370.

⁸⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Peter Sundberg, Project Coordinator, Falls Brook Centre, Somoto, Nicaragua, 30 July 2002.

where most of the population does not have access to the labor market. The OAS/INATEC project will improve the situation, but it is far from being able to respond to all needs.⁸⁹

Disability Policy and Practice

Law 202 on Prevention, Rehabilitation and Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, approved on 21 September 1995, relates to social reintegration; and on 25 August 1997, Executive Decree No.50-97 established the legal framework for improving the quality of life and assuring the full integration of persons with disabilities into society.⁹⁰

Nicaragua was co-chair, with Japan, of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration for the year to September 2001.

NIGER

Key developments since May 2001: Niger reported that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, contrary to previous information.

Mine Ban Policy

Niger signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified it on 23 March 1999 and became a State Party on 1 September 1999. The National Commission for the collection and Control of Illegal Weapons is in charge of the mine issue.¹

Niger's first Article 7 transparency report was due on 28 February 2000. As of 31 July 2002, it had not been officially sent to the United Nations. However, a report has been prepared, and a copy has been provided to Landmine Monitor.² The report is dated 9 August 2001 and covers the period from September 1999 to April 2001. Among other things, the report states that Niger is "engaged" in the process of enacting national implementation measures.

Niger did not attend the Third Meeting of State Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. Niger participated in the regional "Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention" in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001. Niger co-sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but was absent during the vote.

Niger adhered to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its three original Protocols, but not to amended Protocol II. It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II nor the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Niger is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines.³ In the Article 7 Report supplied to Landmine Monitor, Niger states that, as of April 2001, it had no stockpile of

⁸⁹ Interview with Philippe Dicquemare, Program Director, Handicap International, Managua, 14 March 2002.

⁹⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by José Adán Guerra, Minister of Defense, 18 March 2002.

¹ Phone interview with Mahamadou Koudi, Administrative Secretary of Col. Maï Moctar Kassouma, President of the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illegal Weapons, 23 May 2002.

² Draft Article 7 Report, dated 9 August 2001, for the period September 1999 to April 2001. A copy was faxed to Landmine Monitor on 27 June 2002. It contains handwritten entries on the standard Article 7 reporting forms.

³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 88.

antipersonnel mines, and no mines retained for training purposes.⁴ This would seem to be at odds with the statement made in February 2001 by a military official who informed Landmine Monitor that Niger planned to proceed with destruction of stocks as soon as possible.⁵ Antipersonnel mines have been used in the past, allegedly by the Army and by the Tuareg and Tubu rebels.⁶

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Niger's mine problem dates back to World War II. More recently mines were reportedly laid in the Air mountains in the north and central regions of the country and the Ténéré desert.⁷ The Article 7 Report supplied to Landmine Monitor identifies areas suspected to be mined: Air, Mangueni, and northeast (Tibesti).⁸ The Peace Agreements signed in D'jamena, Chad, in December 1998, with the FARS Tubu rebellion foresaw demining in the mine-affected areas. To date, no mine action activities have taken place. Niger has indicated it will need international assistance to locate, mark, and clear mined areas, and to train qualified personnel.⁹

NIGERIA

Key developments since May 2001: Nigeria acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 September 2001. Antipersonnel mines were among the debris after massive explosions at an ammunition transit depot in January 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

President Obasanjo signed Nigeria's instrument of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 July 2001, and Nigeria formally deposited it with the United Nations on 27 September 2001, making all sixteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) party to the treaty. The treaty entered into force for Nigeria on 1 March 2002.

At a major conference on International Humanitarian Law, the Minister of State for Defense stated, "[W]e have sincerely supported the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty and its implementation, because we believe it is a question of military professionalism and humanity. With antipersonnel mines, there is no way to compromise and accommodate limitation: the only realistic solution is a total ban."¹

The government has stated that it is "looking into" the domestic implementation legislation of the treaty.² Nigeria's first Article 7 transparency report is due 28 August 2002.

Nigeria did not attend the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. A representative of the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations in Geneva attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Nigeria cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, calling for the full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁴ Draft Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 9 August 2001. It also indicates in Form F that no stockpiled antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in the reporting period of September 1999 to April 2001.

⁵ Interview with Col. Mai Moctar Kassouma, President of the National Commission for Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons, Bamako, Mali, 16 February 2001, reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 131.

⁶ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 88.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 88.

⁸ Draft Article 7 Report, Form C, 9 August 2001.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹ Keynote address presented by the Minister of State for Defense (Navy), Mrs. Dupe Adelaja, at the Conference on Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Ottawa Treaty, held at the ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, 10-11 October 2001.

² Interview with Desk Officer on Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria, 20 February 2002.

Nigeria is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva. However, the government has said that the CCW is “an indispensable complement to the prohibition of antipersonnel mines and we should, therefore, consider the two treaties together,” noting that “antipersonnel mines are not the only weapon or ammunition that creates unimaginable suffering.”³

The International Committee of the Red Cross, in collaboration with ECOWAS, organized a “Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Treaty,” in Abuja from 10 and 11 October 2001, which was attended by fourteen countries of the region.⁴

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Nigeria is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Nigeria has stated that it has not acquired or used antipersonnel mines since the 1967-1970 Biafra Civil War.⁵ In February 2001, the Chief of Operations of the Nigerian Army said that most Nigerian antipersonnel mines were used up in the war, and remaining stocks were destroyed shortly thereafter. He said that no antipersonnel mines are kept even for training or development purposes.⁶

However, slides presented to States Parties in May 2002 indicate Nigeria still had antipersonnel mines in stocks. On 27 January 2002, the Ammunition Transit Depot in Ikeja Cantonment, Lagos, caught fire resulting in a large number of explosives being activated, with massive destruction of property and loss of lives. At the 30 May 2002 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, a representative of Munitions Consultants (United Kingdom) gave a presentation on the Lagos incident, and several slides showed antipersonnel mines that had been recovered from the wreckage.⁷ The press reported an injury due to a mine the day after the incident (see Landmine Casualties section).

The United States donated \$2,668,000 for explosive ordnance disposal following the Lagos incident. This included provision of fully equipped and trained U.S. unexploded ordnance clearance and verification teams, and training of 20 Nigerian military to complete clearance.⁸

Landmine Casualties

Nigeria is not mine-affected. There were casualties from landmines laid in the civil war, but no further information is available. It is not known if any Nigerian soldiers involved in peacekeeping operations have been killed or injured by landmines. The day after the explosions at the Ammunition Transit Depot, a young man was reportedly injured by stepping on a landmine at the scene.⁹

³ Address by the Minister of State for Defense (Navy), Abuja, Nigeria, 10-11 October 2001.

⁴ Participants to the meeting included: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 256-257. Nigeria denies allegations that its ECOWAS troops used mines in the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 203.

⁶ Interview with Major General Yellow-Duke, at the Bamako Regional Seminar on Landmines, Mali, 15 February 2001.

⁷ The presentation was given by Bob Scott, Munitions Consultants, UK, to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002. See page 12 at

http://www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/speeches_sd/Scott_Nigeria.pdf. US experts involved in the clean-up confirmed to Landmine Monitor the presence of antipersonnel mines.

⁸ US Department of State Fact Sheet, “The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding,” 5 April 2002; email from State Department Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 16 July 2002.

⁹ “Today in the Nigerian Papers,” *P.M. News*, 29 January 2002.

NIUE

Niue signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 15 April 1998. It has not enacted domestic implementing legislation. Niue submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 2 September 1999 and an annual report on 18 February 2002. Both are “nil” reports as Niue has never produced, transferred, used or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

NORWAY

Key developments since May 2001: Norway continued to play a key leadership role in promoting full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and developing the intersessional work program. Norway served as President of the Second Meeting of States Parties until September 2001 and co-chair of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention since September 2001. Financial contributions to mine action in 2001 totaled NOK176.85 million (\$19.65 million).

Mine Ban Policy

Norway signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 9 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Implementing legislation was passed on 16 June 1998. Norway submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report for 2001 on 30 April 2002.¹

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, Norway was represented by Ambassador Steffen Kongstad, Head of Delegation and President of the Second Meeting of States Parties, and other members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. As President of the Second Meeting of States Parties and Chair of the Coordinating Committee from September 2000 to September 2001, Norway shared its extensive experience and provided substantive and practical guidance throughout the preparatory process for the Third Meeting of States Parties, which contributed to its success.

Ambassador Kongstad opened the Third Meeting of States Parties saying the objective of the Convention was to put an end to the human suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. Norway's opening remarks, as outgoing President, focused on the success and consolidation of the Convention; the progress made to date; its humanitarian objectives and need for continued practical implementation; the establishment of the norm; sustaining the credibility and integrity of the Convention by securing a sound understanding of its key obligations; the necessity to clarify allegations of non-compliance; the need to strengthen the intersessional work and develop adequate support functions; and finally, the importance of partnership between States with different social and economic conditions and between governments and civil society, in particular the “indispensable” partners, ICBL and ICRC.²

Ambassador Kongstad also stressed the need for adequate funding for mine action programs: We cannot take it for granted that the present level of funding will be maintained for all future... We must make sure that available resources are used in the best possible way. All relevant actors must support each other. Mine-affected States must take ownership of mine action activities. It is essential that mine action responds to local needs. Effective coordination at the national and local levels is key to achieving efficient use of our mine action efforts. The Norwegian pledge to allocate US\$120 million over a five-year period stands. But beyond this period, we will continue to be engaged in this

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted on 30 April 2002, for calendar year 2001. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 26 August 1999 (for the period 1 March-26 August 1999); on 23 August 2000 (for the period 26 August 1999-22 August 2000); and, on 11 June 2001 (for calendar year 2000).

² Ambassador Steffen Kongstad, President of the Second Meeting of States Parties, Opening Statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001.

issue, politically and financially. Together with other donors, we will seek arrangements to secure sustainable funding.³

With respect to Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty dealing with the definition of an antipersonnel mine, Ambassador Kongstad noted that: "During the Oslo negotiations in 1997, there was agreement on an effect oriented definition of APMs... it does not matter how a weapon is labeled or defined. As long as it de facto functions as an APM, it falls within the scope of article 2.... What counts is the humanitarian impact."⁴

The Norwegian delegation also stated that Norway has found no practical need to retain live mines for training purposes, and noted that humanitarian mine action NGOs, which are the main mine clearance operators, have stated they do not need live mines for training. The delegation expressed concern that the exception laid down in Article 3 should not be allowed to become a loophole, and therefore stressed the importance of including information on the number of mines used and retained in annual Article 7 Reports.⁵

Norway was elected by the Third Meeting of States Parties to become co-chair of the intersessional Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. In this key role, Norway continues to promote full implementation of the treaty, with a focus on its humanitarian imperative. Throughout the year, Norway contributed to work on enhancements to the intersessional work program, on preparations for the Fourth Meeting of States Parties and on initiating thinking about a preparatory process for the Review Conference in 2004.

Norway participated actively in the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. At the meetings in January 2002, Norway expressed its concern about allegations of non-compliance by States Parties and stressed that the "spirit of cooperation must be the guiding principle for States Parties in seeking clarifications on matters pertaining to non-compliance."⁶ In this regard, Norway has sought clarifications, on a bilateral level, in some instances where there have been allegations of non-compliance.

At the General Status meetings in May 2002, Co-Chair Norway, summarizing discussions from the floor, stressed that the intersessional work should focus on the core humanitarian objectives, while using the guiding principles which have served the process well to date - those of "flexibility, partnership, inclusivity, continuity, effective preparation and, perhaps most importantly, informality."⁷

Norway made interventions in the other Standing Committees in May, as well, stressing that humanitarian needs must guide donor countries and there must be landmine impact surveys to ensure the best strategic use of resources in mine-affected countries.⁸ Norway also expressed its desire to put landmine survivors at the center of discussions as "the Mine Ban Convention is primarily a humanitarian instrument, dealing with humanitarian issues."⁹

Norway was instrumental in the establishment of the Implementation Support Unit for the Mine Ban Treaty, which was agreed to by States Parties in Managua, and became operational in January 2002. Norway participates in the Universalization Contact Group, which promotes new accessions and ratifications of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the Article 7 Contact Group, which facilitates timely Article 7 reporting by all States Parties. On 29 November 2001, Norway

³ Statement of the Delegation of Norway to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁶ Statement by Norway on Compliance Concerns to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002, available at www.gichd.ch.

⁷ Remarks to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002. Notes by ICBL.

⁸ Statement by Norway to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002, available at www.gichd.ch.

⁹ Statement by Norway on Mine Victim Assistance, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2002, available at www.gichd.ch.

cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It had introduced the resolution along with Nicaragua and Belgium—the past, present and future Presidents of Meetings of States Parties.

September 2002 marks the fifth anniversary of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty in Oslo. Joint activities are being organized by the Norwegian government and Norwegian non-governmental organizations, demonstrating Norway's ongoing commitment to and leadership in the international effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

Norway is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and submitted a report as required by Article 13 on 10 February 2001. This report, covering the period to the end of 2000, was later re-submitted to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001. The report notes that modification of all directional fragmentation charges to prevent indiscriminate use was completed in 1999.¹⁰

Norway attended the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. The delegation gave a statement supporting extension of the CCW to internal conflicts, progress on dealing with explosive remnants of war,¹¹ and increased technical requirements for antivehicle mines.¹²

In December 2001, Norway also submitted its annual report on landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; this contained information from the Article 7 and Article 13 reports.

Production and Transfer

Investment by the Norwegian Petroleum Investment Fund in a Singaporean company that produces antipersonnel mines was discussed in Parliament in mid-June 2001. During the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002 the delegation announced that “the government has decided for the Petroleum Fund to refrain [from] investment in companies that engage in activities that violate international conventions to which Norway is party.”¹³

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the official position remains unchanged regarding the issue of possible transfer or transit of US antipersonnel mines into, out of, or across Norway. Norway takes the view that unless property rights are transferred, a transfer has not taken place according to the treaty.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Norway's stockpile of antipersonnel mines was destroyed by October 1996, with the exception of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines FFV-013, M19 and M100 which were modified to ensure command-detonation only. These modifications were completed in December 1999.¹⁴

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has given assurances that US antipersonnel mines stored in Norway will be removed by 1 March 2003—four years after the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, the legal deadline for destruction of antipersonnel mines under the jurisdiction or control of Norway. As of May 2002, bilateral discussions about the removal of these mines were said to be ongoing, but Norway has provided no details. Norway's April 2002 Article 7 Report contained no

¹⁰ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, 10 February 2001.

¹¹ For a preparatory meeting in May 2002, Norway and the British NGO, Landmine Action, prepared a joint discussion paper on warnings to civilians in relation to explosive remnants of war.

¹² Statement by Ambassador Sverre Bergh Johansen to the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11 December 2001.

¹³ Statement by Norway on Article 1 to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002, available at www.gichd.ch. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 752.

¹⁴ Letter from Annette Bjørseth, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, 21 May 2002; see also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 752-753.

information on the antipersonnel mines stored in Norway by the United States, which Landmine Monitor has reported number some 123,000.

Norway has retained no antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes, as permitted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, as reported in last year's *Landmine Monitor Report*, the Ministry of Defense reserves the right to import antipersonnel mines for purposes permitted by the treaty. In May 2002, this position was reiterated, although no mines have been imported yet, and there are no immediate plans to do so. If mines are imported for permitted purposes, it will be announced.¹⁵ Presently, Norway has 100 inert antipersonnel mines that are used for training.

Stocks of antivehicle mines were examined in 1997 and it was determined that all were in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁶

Use

The Ministry of Defense confirmed its previous position that Norway can participate in joint operations with States which are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines. Norway has stressed that under no circumstances will Norwegian personnel use antipersonnel mines. In a May 2002 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Ministry of Defense stated, "The prohibition against use, as written in Norwegian criminal law, is also valid for Norwegian international commitments," and claimed that "use" is understood to be "the physical placing of mines."¹⁷

With regard to military operations in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defense stated that it has no knowledge of any use of mines by allied forces. But as Norwegian personnel are under US command, there is a written agreement that the precondition for Norway's participation is that the soldiers are under Norwegian jurisdiction and can under no circumstances be ordered to conduct any activities that will violate Norwegian law or international treaty commitments.¹⁸

Mine Action Funding¹⁹

Norway's five-year commitment of US\$120 million to mine action activities comes to an end in 2002. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this funding will not automatically be renewed, but Norway has stated on several occasions that a high level of funding will be maintained.²⁰ Financial contributions to mine action in 2001 totaled NOK176,852,354 million (\$19.65 million), roughly the same level as 2000 (NOK178,641,004).

For 2002, approximately NOK215 million (US\$23.9 million) is budgeted, but the total may change depending on needs for other important humanitarian projects.

The annual funding totals include allocations from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). In 2001, mine action funding was allocated as shown below.²¹

¹⁵ Interview with Annette Bjørseth, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, at the Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹⁶ Interview with Annette Bjørseth, Ministry of Defense, 29 May 2002, and letter, 21 May 2002.

¹⁷ Letter from Annette Bjørseth, Ministry of Defense, 21 May 2002.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Exchange rate at 27 June 2002: US\$1 = NOK9, used throughout.

²⁰ Interviews with Ambassador Hans Fredrik Lehne, Special Advisor for Humanitarian Questions, Department of Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance and Democracy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 11 April and 21 May 2002, and Statement of the Delegation of Norway to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

²¹ Funding tables provided during interview with Ambassador Hans Fredrik Lehne, Special Advisor for Humanitarian Questions, Department of Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance and Democracy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 21 May 2002.

Norwegian Government Mine Action Funding in 2001**Funding by Country**

Country	Activity	Implementing Agency	Total in 2001 – NOK and US\$
Afghanistan	Mine clearance appeal	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid in Afghanistan (UNOCHA)	5,000,000 \$555,555
Afghanistan	Emergency humanitarian assistance plan	UNOCHA	4,997,000 \$555,222
Afghanistan	CDAP rehabilitation of disabled	UN Office of Project Service (UNOPS) and UN Development Program (UNDP)	1,385,311 \$153,923
Albania	Stockpile Destruction	NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund	900,220 \$100,024
Angola	Mine Injury Management	Trauma Care Foundation	1,092,000 \$121,333
Angola	Mine Clearance	Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	19,047,000 \$2,116,333
Bosnia	Mine Clearance - NPA	International Trust Fund (ITF)	14,469,179 \$1,607,686
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mine Action Center – BHMACH	UNOPS/UN Development Program	500,000 \$55,555
Balkans Region	Mine Action Program – MineCat	NPA	4,815,548 \$535,060
Cambodia	Mine Injury Management	Trauma Care Foundation	970,000 \$107,777
Croatia	Mine Clearance	NPA	3,043,725 \$338,191
Croatia	Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance	Croatian Mine Action Center	2,250,000 \$250,000
Eritrea	Mine Risk Education	Danish Church Aid	3,000,000 \$333,333
Ethiopia	Mine Clearance	UNDP	6,000,000 \$666,666
Guatemala	Mine Clearance	Norwegian Embassy	432,000 \$48,000
Honduras	Mine Action Program	Organization of American States	10,000,000 \$1,111,111
Iran	Mine Injury Management	Trauma Care Foundation	370,000 \$41,000
Iraq	Mine Injury Management	Trauma Care Foundation	1,750,000 \$194,444
Iraqi Kurdistan	Mines clearance	NPA	5,000,000 \$555,555
Kosovo	Mine Clearance Program	ITF/NPA	13,778,141 \$1,530,904
Jordan	MineCat	Norwegian Demining Consortium	3,980,000 \$442,222
Laos	Advisor to UXO Lao	NPA	3,500,000 \$388,888
Laos	UNDP	UXO Lao	2,500,000 \$277,777

Country	Activity	Implementing Agency	Total in 2001 – NOK and US\$
Lebanon	Mine Action Team	Mines Advisory Group (MAG)	2,200,000 \$244,444
Lebanon	MineCat	MAG	3,496,671 \$388,519
Lebanon	UN Development Program	Study tour, National Mine Action Program	68,000 \$7,555
Mozambique	Mine Action Program	NPA	15,000,000 \$1,666,666
Nicaragua	Costs of Third Meeting of States Parties	Nicaraguan Government	270,000 \$30,000
Thailand	Landmine Impact Survey	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation	721,000 \$80,111
Research and development:			
	Land mines - molecules	Norwegian Defense Research Institute (NDRI)	500,000 \$55,555
	Nordic Demining Research Forum	NDRI	150,000 \$16,666
	Nordic project for mine clearance standards	NDRI	160,000 \$17,777
	Mine Dogs Detection System study	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)	2,630,000 \$292,222
Total Country Specific			133,975,795 \$14,886,199

Non-Country Specific Mine Action Funding in 2001

Activity/Organizations	Total in 2001 - NOK and US\$
Global	
Study by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) on assistance to mine-affected communities	1,798,300 \$200,000
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)	2,500,000 \$277,777
GICHD, Establishment of Implementation of Support Unit ²²	530,000 \$58,888
ICBL and Landmine Monitor, via NPA	1,500,000 \$166,667
Nordic Peace 2001, via NPA	500,000 \$55,555
Norwegian Church Aid, Landmine Campaign	85,000 \$9,444
UN General Trust Fund, Third Meeting of State Parties	83,259 \$9,250
Norwegian Medical Doctors Against Nuclear Arms, Campaign against AP Mines	500,000 \$55,555
Global: victim assistance	
Landmine Survivors Network, Raising the Voices	2,027,000 \$225,222
Trauma Cara Foundation, Textbooks, Save Lives Save Limbs	1,331,000 \$147,900
Trauma Care Foundation, Financial Support	1,910,000 \$212,222
Trauma Care Foundation, Global	11,000 \$1,222
Norwegian Red Cross, Mine Victim Assistance	30,000,000 \$3,333,333
Global: consultancies	
Scan Team, Channel Research: Review NPA Mine clearance program	201,000 \$22,333
Total Non-Country Specific	42,976,559 \$4,755,173
Total Mine Action Funding In 2001	176,852,354 \$19,650,261

Funding Policy

Norway considers mine action to be an integrated development activity, and a precondition for other development activities in mine-affected countries. Priority is given to countries that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, but exceptions are made in cases of humanitarian need and where there is a strong willingness to join the treaty. The same policy is used in the evaluation of what other humanitarian projects to support.²³

²² The GICHD reports receiving CHF96,698 (\$44,145) in 2001 and CHF100,778 (\$46,017) from Norway for the Implementation Support Unit: email from Kerry Brinkert, ISU, 17 June 2002. Exchange rate at 3 June 2002: US\$1 = CHF 2.19.

²³ Interview with Annette Bjørseth, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

Mine Action

Norwegian defense forces have conducted mine clearance operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In September and October 2001, they also participated in Operation Essential Harvest in FYROM, collecting weaponry from rebel forces.²⁴

Thirty Norwegian soldiers were participating in mine and explosives clearance in Afghanistan during the first half of 2002, after which mine clearance work will continue with reduced personnel.²⁵ In May 2002, the media reported that Norwegian military personnel in Afghanistan included 15 "land mine experts who have been clearing mines from the Kandahar and Kabul airports since January." The 15 personnel were to be withdrawn in July 2002, but another group of 16 explosives experts were to remain in Afghanistan until the end of the year.²⁶

The NGO Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) is involved in 10 mine action programs, in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, and northern Iraq/Iraqi Kurdistan. The total budget for NPA mine action programs in 2001 was approximately \$14.69 million. The main activities for NPA are the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and survey of mine-suspected areas. In order to prioritize areas for clearance and get the best possible use of mine clearance resources, NPA has introduced task impact assessment into most programs. This ensures that the process of setting demining priorities is transparent and holistic: "The evaluation takes into consideration: 1) target group needs, 2) prospects and potentials for post-demining activities and how these fit with the needs of the target population, and 3) NPA's internal capacity and limitations to commit to a task in terms of logistics, human resources, safety, among other things."²⁷

Details on NPA operations are available in the country reports in this edition of the Landmine Monitor. In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to grant NOK10 million (\$1.1 million) to NPA's mine clearance in Angola as a result of the signing of the peace agreement.²⁸ The mine action program in Croatia was officially opened in early 2002; the total budget for 2002 is approximately \$2 million. NPA also planned to start a program in Sri Lanka in mid-2002. The Lebanon project is the only NPA program with a focus on war victims, including landmine victims. The program is carried out together with three local partners and the National Demining Office in Lebanon.²⁹

The Norwegian Red Cross, Trauma Care Foundation, and Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Center continue to give support to landmine survivors around the world. Norwegian Red Cross runs three bilateral orthopedic centers in Somalia and two delegated projects from the ICRC in Iraq. The Norwegian Red Cross also supports the ICRC mine victim support program and the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled. Its total budget in 2001 was about NOK37 million (\$4.1 million). The three projects in Somalia, based in Hargesia, Galkayo, and Mogadishu, focus on the production and fitting of prostheses, physiotherapy and education. This is carried out jointly with the Somali Red Crescent Society. The annual budget is about NOK5.5 million (\$611,111). The two projects in Iraq are in Erbil and Mosul, focusing on physical rehabilitation of mine and war victims. Prosthetics limbs are also produced. The annual budget is about NOK5.5 million (\$611,111) and the project is delegated from the ICRC.³⁰

²⁴ Report to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, December 2001.

²⁵ Letter from Annette Bjørseth, Ministry of Defense, 21 May 2002.

²⁶ "Norway Announces Changes in its Afghanistan contingent," *Associated Press*, 28 May 2002.

²⁷ "Humanitarian Mine Action 2002," Mine Action Portfolio, Norwegian People's Aid.

²⁸ Interviews with Ambassador Hans Fredrik Lehne, Special Advisor for Humanitarian Questions, Department of Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance and Democracy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 11 April and 21 May 2002. This donation was given to Norwegian People's Aid in addition to what it receives from NORAD in 2002.

²⁹ Email from Janecke Wille, NPA, Oslo, 26 July 2002.

³⁰ Response of the Norwegian Red Cross to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 6 May 2002.

The Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Center is a joint effort of the University Hospital of Northern Norway, Trauma Care Foundation and the World Health Organization. The Center focuses on self-reliance and empowerment in rural communities affected by epidemics of trauma and disease. It develops guidelines and teaching aids for low-tech, low-cost trauma care in the field and district hospitals in the South. The Center works with all victims of war, disaster, everyday accidents and emergencies, as well as mine survivors. The Trauma Care Foundation has worked in Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Iran, and Iraq.³¹

Research and Development (R&D)

Norway is a member of the NATO EODICT-system and the NATO combat engineer working group. Norway has bilateral agreements in demining-related R&D with several NATO members and participates in the Nordic Demining Research Forum.³²

The Norwegian Demining Consortium AS has produced the Compact 230 Minecat with multi-purpose capabilities. NPA evaluated the Minecat in 1999 in Kosovo, after which the machine underwent numerous modifications. The Minecat in Kosovo has been moved to Croatia and donated to the HALO Trust; there are two machines in Iran in use by NPA, and one machine in Jordan.³³

The company Hågglunds Moelv AS is developing another demining machine, the Viking system, with a flail and power pack.³⁴ One prototype is undergoing tests in the US and the final test will take place in Norway. The system should be available in late 2002.³⁵

The Defense Research Institute (FFI) is cooperating with the Swedish research institute FOI to develop a model identifying the molecules emanating from antipersonnel mines buried in soil. FFI also studied the consequences of the antipersonnel mine ban as part of the NATO SAS-023 working group; this project evaluated several alternatives for antipersonnel mines.³⁶

Rofi Industries, in a joint project with UNOCHA, the Mine Action Program in Afghanistan (MAPA) and Danish Demining Group, developed in 2001 a demining apron for protection of the deminers operating in the UN program in Afghanistan. The ballistic performance and functionality/comfort was tested in 2001, and at the start of 2002 all deminers in the UNOCHA/MAPA program were equipped with it.³⁷

Norway, Sweden and Denmark are involved in the Nordic Demining Research Forum, whose activities aim to improve demining efficiency and safety. The Forum led to setting up the CEN Working Group 126, which focuses on standardization of mine action. This has now been entrusted to the Swedish and Danish standardization organizations, closely supported by Norway.³⁸

The AMAC (Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities) project at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo focused in 2001 on training courses for field personnel related to capacity building and long-term commitments. The Manica study, a pilot community impact study, was conducted in Mozambique as a joint training effort with NPA. The objective was to create an analytical capacity within the institution. The project trained 11 supervisors and led to the implementation of the task impact assessment at NPA-Mozambique. As a follow-up, a comprehensive eight-week combined methods training course was held in Mozambique with participants from Angola, Eritrea, Malawi and Mozambique; 18 local staff from supervisor level participated.

³¹ Trauma Care Foundation website: www.traumacare.no, accessed on 27 June 2002.

³² Report to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, December 2001.

³³ Norwegian Demining Consortium (NoDeCo) website: www.nodeco.no/indexIE.html, accessed on 27 June 2002; email from Janecke Wille, NPA, 26 July 2002.

³⁴ Mechanical Demining Equipment Catalogue, GICHD, 2002, p. 46.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³⁶ Email from Defense Research Institute (FFI), 14 June 2002.

³⁷ Email from Stein Hagen, Rofi AS, 18 June 2002.

³⁸ Email from Ole Nymann, Nordic Demining Research Forum, 16 June 2002. CEN working groups are organized under the auspices of the European Committee for Standardisation.

The AMAC project participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, and the intersessional standing committee meetings in 2001 and 2002. AMAC also participates in European standards meetings related to the CEN working group 128. AMAC receives its funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.³⁹

The AMAC project carried out an evaluation of the Swedish International Development Agency's contribution to humanitarian mine action. Another evaluation report in 2001 by PRIO was described as "reassessing the impact of mine action: illustrations from Mozambique."⁴⁰

Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In July 2001, a Norwegian working as a European Union observer in Macedonia was killed when the vehicle in which he was traveling hit a landmine. Two others, a Slovakian and an Albanian, were also killed in the incident.⁴¹ In April 2002, a deminer working for the Norwegian Army conducting mine clearance in Afghanistan was injured in a mine incident while clearing for mines at Bagram airport.⁴²

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Norway described victim assistance as "a part of humanitarian mine action." But it also has to be a part of "broader efforts to improve the situation of disabled persons and the wider development agenda. Mine victim assistance comprises different aspects, such as prevention, immediate lifesaving and medical care, physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration. Sustainability and the need to build local capacity are central elements in responding effectively."⁴³ Norway contributes 20 percent of the budget for mine action to victim assistance projects. In 2001, this was approximately \$4.3 million. However, Norway takes the view that ownership and responsibility for victim assistance lies with the recipient. "Mine-affected countries, which demonstrate that they will spend domestic resources on victim assistance programs, will be better positioned to attract external funding. Physical, social and psychological rehabilitation, as well as reintegration of landmine survivors must be part of national health programs as well as development strategies."⁴⁴

In 2001, Norway, together with Switzerland and Germany, provided support to Handicap International in the organization of the regional conference on victim assistance, held in Thailand on 6-8 November 2001.⁴⁵

PANAMÁ

Mine Ban Policy

Panamá signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 7 October 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 April 1999.

In February 2002, Landmine Monitor was told that national implementation legislation was under consideration, but no specific legislation with regard to antipersonnel landmines had been introduced into parliament as of July 2002.¹

Panamá submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 16 April 2002;² it had been due on 27 September 1999. Panamá reported on existing domestic legislation applicable to

³⁹ Email from Ananda Millard, PRIO, 17 June 2002.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "France Expresses Shock over Death of EU Observers in Macedonia," *Xinhua*, 20 July 2001.

⁴² *Nettavisen* (Norwegian internet newspaper), 5 April 2002 (untitled article).

⁴³ Statement by Norway on mine victim assistance to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2002, available at www.gichd.ch.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ "Presentation of Paul Vermuelen, Director, Handicap International Switzerland, "Regional Conference on Victim Assistance in the Framework of the Mine Ban Treaty," 6-8 November 2001.

¹ Interview with Angela Healy, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Panama City, 15 February 2002.

antipersonnel mines, including Article 237 of the Panamá Penal Code, which provides for a prison sentence of two to six years for “anyone who attempts to commit a crime endangering collective security by manufacturing, supplying, acquiring, removing or possessing bombs and explosive materials, or materials intended for their preparation.”³ It also referred to Act No. 53 (Article 4) of 12 December 1995, which considers the transfer of any arms prohibited by law a crime punishable by five to ten years in prison; Article 3 of the same Act, which sanctions a prison sentence of four to seven years for “any person engaged in the import and export of illegal arms;” and provisions in the Penal Code that provide for a prison sentence for “any person that endangers or destroys persons or property in order to carry out an explosion.”⁴

In the report, Panamá confirmed that it has never produced, does not export and does not stockpile antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes.⁵

Panamá participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001 and a representative from its diplomatic mission in Geneva attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but not May 2002.

Panamá cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

While Panamá is a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), it did not participate in CCW meetings held in December 2001.

UXO Problem and Awareness

Panamá is not reported to be mine-affected, but it has a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of US military exercises and weapons testing in military ranges in the Canal Zone during the three decades prior to 1997.⁶ According to the Article 7 Report, the Panamanian government has demarcated areas that had formerly been used for military purposes and it is prohibited to enter or use any of these areas.⁷

The Ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs, the National Authorities of the Inter-Oceanic Region and the Environment, UNICEF and the Centro Juvenil Vicentino have continued with a UXO awareness program for people living near the UXO-affected areas, and the time frame for the program was extended to June 2003.⁸ Educational materials produced to date include two documentaries and television spots based on case histories of UXO victims, instructional flyers, a coloring book, a children’s book, and a puppet show. The program has trained teachers, fire fighters, police, community leaders and students.⁹

UXO Casualties

There were no reports of mine or UXO casualties in 2001 or the first half of 2002.¹⁰ Panamá has stated that at least twenty-one people have been killed by UXO since 1940, while the US gives a figure of seven fatalities since 1984.¹¹

There are no disability policies that specifically address UXO survivors in Panamá.¹² People that were injured inside the ranges as a result of coming into contact with UXO were reimbursed in

² The time period for the report was not specified.

³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 16 April 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., Forms B, D, and H.

⁶ For further information, please see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 372.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 April 2002.

⁸ United Nations, “Portfolio of Mine-related Projects,” February 2002, p. 196; interview with Xochitl MaKay, Director of Education in Health, Ministry of Health, Panamá, 19 February 2002.

⁹ United Nations, “Portfolio of Mine-related Projects,” April 2001, p. 198.

¹⁰ Interview with Angela Healy, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2002.

¹¹ Andrea Stone, “Deadly Reminders of US in Panama,” *USA Today*, 9 August 1999, p. 7.

¹² No policies were discovered during Landmine Monitor research at the Ministry of Health, at the Center of Legal Research, Panama University, or at the Legislative Archives, November 201-February 2002.

cash or in kind by the US government during the period of US control of the installations of Empire, Piña and Balboa West, even in cases where entrances to the area were restricted.¹³

PARAGUAY

Paraguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. The National Congress approved it through Law 1339 on 6 October 1998, and the instrument of ratification was deposited on 13 November 1998. The ban treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999.

In response to Landmine Monitor's inquiries into domestic legislative steps to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, Paraguay stated that in May 2002 it adopted national legal measures to curb the manufacture, possession, and traffic of firearms, explosives, and other related materials, in the Law of Firearms, Munitions, and Explosives.¹

Paraguay did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2001 or the first half of 2002, but it cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. It also voted in support of three resolutions on landmines by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in June 2001.²

On 13 June 2001, Paraguay submitted its first official Article 7 transparency report, covering the period from 17 December 2000 to 1 May 2001.³ It has not yet submitted its annual updated Article 7 Report, due 30 April 2002. According to the initial Article 7 report, Paraguay has no stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes.⁴

Paraguay is not believed to have ever produced, transferred or used antipersonnel mines. Paraguay is not mine-affected. Paraguay has not contributed to international mine action programs.

PERÚ

Key developments since May 2001: Perú has played a leadership role in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program, and in promotion of full implementation of the treaty. Perú served as co-chair of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance until September 2001 and since then, has served as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation. In September 2001, Perú completed destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It reduced the number of mines retained for training to 4,024, and destroyed a total of 322,892 mines. In June 2002, the Peruvian Army completed mine clearance along 18 kilometers of the Zarumilla Canal on the border with Ecuador.

Mine Ban Policy

Perú signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 17 June 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. On 16 May 2002, Perú submitted its third Article 7

¹³ Telephone interview with Lourdes Lozano, Institute of National Studies, University of Panama, 18 February 2002.

¹ Response to Landmine Monitor from the Office of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, faxed 24 May 2002.

² On 5 June 2001, Paraguay also voted in favor of Resolutions AG/1792, AG/1793 and AG/1794 of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), supporting mine action in Peru and Ecuador, the mine-clearing program in Central America, and the goal of the western hemisphere as an antipersonnel landmine-free zone, respectively. Response to Landmine Monitor from Direction of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 2002.

³ Previously, in December 1999, Paraguay provided a copy of its initial Article 7 transparency report, dated 17 November 1999, to Landmine Monitor, which has still not been officially submitted to the United Nations, as required.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 13 June 2001.

Report, covering the period from March 2001 to March 2002.¹ It included information in optional Form J.

While Perú has reported thirteen different implementation measures, there is no specific legislation in place to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.² A number of provisions in Perú's Criminal Code apply to possession and trade in weapons and include criminal sanctions; these would apply to antipersonnel mines.³

Perú attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, where it announced completion of its stockpile destruction.⁴ Representatives from Perú's diplomatic mission in Geneva and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

Perú continued to play a leadership role in the intersessional work program in general. It served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, along with the Netherlands, from September 2000 to September 2001. Following the Third Meeting of States Parties, it took on the role of co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, together with Austria.⁵

At the May 2002 meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Perú made an intervention with respect to Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty (on the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices), in which it encouraged States Parties to evaluate their positions taking into account humanitarian aspects, and to make an "authentic interpretation" of the Mine Ban Treaty according to its spirit as well as its letter.⁶

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Perú and the ICRC organized a Spanish-language information seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty and related topics such as antivehicle mines, explosives remnants of war, and the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its protocols, which was attended by government representatives from the region, as well as the OAS, ICRC, GICHD, UN, and ICBL.

Perú cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.

Perú is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW and the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001. Perú submitted its annual Article 13 report, on 10 December 2001.

Bilateral and Regional Initiatives

Perú continues to promote implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in bilateral and regional efforts. On 9 September 2001, the Perú-Chile Permanent Committee on Consultations and Policy Coordination, which was established in July 2001, met for the first time, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of both countries participating.⁷ One of the first measures agreed on was to hold simultaneous stockpile destruction events on 13 September 2001 in Calama, Chile and

¹ The first report was submitted on 2 May 2000, covering up to March 2000. The second report was submitted on 4 May 2001, covering March 2000-March 2001.

² Article 7 Report, Form A, 4 May 2001; interview with Dr. Marcela Arriola, Chairperson, National Commission of International Humanitarian Law Application (CONADIH), 31 May 2002.

³ Interview with the Air Force General Luis Raygada Cáceres, member of the Working Group Foreign Affairs-Defense, Lima, 25 April 2001.

⁴ Statement by Minister Heli Pelaez Castro, Head of Delegation of Perú, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18 September 2001.

⁵ Gustavo Laurie, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Perú to the United Nations in Geneva, served as the co-rapporteur at the January and May 2002 meetings.

⁶ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) at the Standing Committee meeting on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 31 May 2002.

⁷ "Dan primer paso reducir gastos militares," *El Comercio*, Lima, 10 September 2001.

Pucusana, Perú.⁸ The Ministers agreed on a ten-point declaration that included a commitment to eradicate landmines from their common border as soon as possible.⁹

On 23-25 November 2001, Perú hosted the XI Iberoamerican Summit, attended by the 21 member nations.¹⁰ The 43rd point of the Lima Declaration focused on the landmine problem in the region and stated, “[T]aking into account the devastating effect of antipersonnel mines on civilian populations, we highlight the importance of the Third Meeting of State Parties and reaffirm our expectations for finding solutions to eliminate this problem, to improve the situation of victims and facilitate their reinsertion in the socioeconomic life of their countries. In this sense, we make a call to States that have the necessary resources and technologies to continue to provide assistance.”

Representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army attended a conference on “Mine Action in Latin America” in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001, where Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives made a presentation on Peruvian perspectives in mine action.¹¹

On 17 June 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela) met in Lima and issued the “Lima Commitment.”¹² In the Lima Commitment, six points were outlined related to the Mine Ban Treaty, including complete destruction of stocks, establishing national programs for victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration, and a call for non-state actors to comply with the international norm against antipersonnel mines.

On 25 June 2002, Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Perú’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Lima. In a joint press release, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to eradicate antipersonnel mines, according to the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and expressed satisfaction that Chile had decided to implement a national mine clearance plan to eradicate mines along the common border.¹³

Production, Transfer and Use

The Navy’s Center for Weapons Manufacturing used to produce antipersonnel mines. Perú has reported that production facilities were permanently closed in 1997.¹⁴ The National Police also produced antipersonnel mines, but stopped in 1994.¹⁵ In its most recent Article 7 report, Perú disclosed that antipersonnel mines were also manufactured at the “Los Cibeles” Police Barracks.¹⁶

A senior Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that Perú never exported antipersonnel mines.¹⁷ In the past, Perú imported mines from Belgium, Spain, the United States, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.

⁸ *Ibid.*; Patricia Kadena, “Chile ratifica que comprará más aviones F16 y fragatas,” *La República*, Lima, 10 September 2001; “Simbólica destrucción de minas,” *El Mercurio de Calama*, Calama, Chile, 13 September 2001; “Ejército destruye 14,000 minas antipersonales en el norte de Chile,” *AFP* (Calama), 13 September 2001.

⁹ “Cancilleres y ministros de Defensa de Perú y Chile acuerdan erradicar minas,” *AFP* (Lima), 9 September 2001.

¹⁰ The summit included countries of Central and South America, as well as Spain and Portugal. See <http://xicumbre.rree.gob.pe> and Iberoamerican States Organization at www.oei.es/xicumbreddec.htm.

¹¹ Presentation by Colonel Celso Salazar Lloreda of the Peruvian Army and Chief of the Countermine Office, and Mrs. Stella Maris Chirinos Llerena, Third Secretary, Vice-Directorate of OAS and Hemispheric Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Panel on Future Challenges, “Peruvian Perspectives,” 5 December 2001. See <http://hdc.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

¹² “Compromiso de Lima” (aka the “Andean Letter for Peace and Security towards Limits and Control of External Defense Spending”), 17 June 2002, at: www.rree.gob.pe; see also Statement by Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, 27 June 2002.

¹³ Comunicado de Prensa Conjunto and “Canciller de Chile realiza visita oficial a nuestro país,” Nota de Prensa 100-02, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, 25 June 2002.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form E, 16 May 2002.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Past production by the National Police was not reported in Perú’s initial Article 7 Report, though it was reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 296.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form E, 16 May 2002.

¹⁷ Telephone interview with General Raúl O’Connor, Director, Information Office, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.

In mid January 2002, a *Newsweek* magazine article reported that guerrillas from one of Colombia's main guerrilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army, FARC-EP) were seen deep in the Peruvian jungle 450 kilometers from the border with Colombia, equipped with weapons including landmines.¹⁸

Perú maintains that it did not use landmines during the "Cenepa Conflict" with Ecuador in 1995.¹⁹

Stockpiling and Destruction

On 13 September 2001, the Engineering Service of the Army destroyed the final 27,025 antipersonnel mines from Perú's stockpiles. The destruction took place at Quebrada Cruz del Hueso in Lurín, in the department of Lima.²⁰ Government officials, diplomats, and representatives of international and regional agencies attended the event. By completing this task ahead of the Third Meeting of State Parties, which opened on 18 September 2001, Perú met the key "Managua Challenge" goal.²¹

Perú destroyed a total of 321,730 antipersonnel mines, all in a period of three and a half months, from 30 May to 13 September 2001. An additional 926 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in December 2001, in keeping with a decision to reduce the number of mines retained for training purposes, bringing the total to 322,892 destroyed mines.²²

In May 2002, Perú reported that it is retaining 4,024 antipersonnel mines for training.²³ This represents a decrease of 1,554 mines from the number previously reported.²⁴ The Army has retained 4,000 antipersonnel mines: 500 PMD-6 (USSR-manufactured), 775 CICITEC (Perú), 600 M18-A1 Claymore (USA), 100 M35 C/ESP M5 (Belgium), 525 M-409 (Belgium), 500 PMA-3 (former Yugoslavia), 500 PMD-6M (USSR), and 500 POMZ-2M (USSR).²⁵ The other 24 mines are CICITEC mines being retained by the National Police DIVSAM-DEXA (División de Seguridad de Activación de Minas-Dispositivos Explosivos de Autoprotección).

¹⁸ Sharon Stevenson, "The FARC's Fifth Column," *Newsweek*, 15-21 January 2002.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 16 May 2002.

²⁰ "Record of Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines." Document certifying the destruction, dated 13 September 2002.

²¹ "Perú culmina destrucción de 321,368 minas antipersonales," *La República*, (Lima), 13 September 2001, "Perú culmina destrucción de minas antipersonales, anuncia ministro," *AFP* (Lima), 13 September 2001, "Respuesta por la vida" *El Peruano* (Lima), 14 September 2001; "Minas antipersonales peruanas ya son historia," *Expreso*, (Lima), 14 September 2001 "Ni una mina más en el arsenal," *El Comercio*, (Lima) 14 September 2001.

²² Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 May 2002. Perú had indicated a total of 315,312 stockpiled mines in its 2001 Article 7 Report, but in its 2002 report stated that following further evaluation by the Ministry of Defense, and the discovery of an additional number of CICITEC and P4 A1 mines, the total number of mines in stock, and subsequently destroyed was 322,892. Article 7 Report, Form G, Nota, 16 May 2002, and Article 7 Report, Form B, 4 May 2001.

²³ Article 7 Report, Form B and D, table 1, 16 May 2002.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form D, table 1, 4 May 2001. Of the 1,554 mines, it appears that 462 were destroyed before September 2001 (50 PMA-3 mines, 50 PMD-6M mines, 108 Navy M-16 mines, and 254 other Navy mines variously designated MA, MGP30 or AP60510), then 926 were destroyed in December 2001 (again various Navy mines). The remaining mines no longer listed as retained are likely M18A1 Claymore mines that are no longer classified as antipersonnel mines.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form B and D, table 1, 16 May 2002. The 100 M-35 mines being retained were not listed in the May 2001 Article 7 Report.

Destruction of Perú's Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines²⁶

Date	Destruction location (Institution)	Number (Mine Type)
30 May 2001	Coscobamba, Piura, First Military Region (Army)	33,421 (PMA-3, CICITEC and P4A1)
17 Jul 2001	Lima (Navy)	108 (M-16)
17 Jul 2001	Lima (Navy)	254 (MA)
25 Jul 2001	Coscobamba, Piura (Army)	72,301 (PMA-3, CICITEC, POMZ-2M, PMD-6, PMD-6M)
3 Aug 2001	Quebrada Bocapán, Tumbes (Army)	63,596 (PMA-3, CICITEC, POMZ-2M, PMD-6/M-35)
17 Aug 2001	Arequipa (Army)	44,016 (PMA-3, M-35, M-409, FUZE M-5, POMZ-2M, PMD-6M, EXPAL P4A)
24 Aug 2001	Quebrada del Espíritu, Tacna (Army)	81,009 (EXPAL, M-35, POMZ-2M, PMD-6M)
13 Sept 2001	Quebrada Cruz del Hueso, Lima (Army)	27,025 (EXPAL P-4, PMA-3, M-409, M-35)
14 Dec 2001	Lima (Navy)	926 (MA)
Sub-total		322,656
Unknown		236 (DEXA and CICITEC)
Total		322,892

Landmine Problem

Perú is affected by landmines on the northern border with Ecuador, as a result of the border conflict in 1995; on the southern border with Chile; and in two coastal departments (Lima and Ica) and five departments in the Andean Highlands (Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Junín, and Puno) where the Armed Forces and National Police laid mines around public infrastructure and electrical installations²⁷ during Perú's internal conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s. Past reporting by Landmine Monitor has provided extensive detail of the landmine problem and affected areas.²⁸ Landmine Monitor has found no evidence of mine-affected areas in regions along the border with Colombia.

In May 2002, Perú provided additional information on departments in the northern border areas that are suspected mine-affected, due to mine incidents in the areas. These include six suspected areas in Tumbes, three in Piura, four in Amazonas and six in Loreto.²⁹ With respect to the departments of Amazonas and Loreto, Perú reported that it did not use mines before, during, or after the 1995 "Cenepa Conflict," and that it does not possess maps or registries of mines in these areas.³⁰

Perú's mine problem has been affected by climate changes such as El Niño. Heavy rainfall along the border with Ecuador creates the danger of mine displacement.³¹ It is also suspected that

²⁶ Based on Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 May 2002; and "33,421 Minas Antipersonas Fueron destruidas por el Ejército," Editorial, *Actualidad Militar*, No. 412, June-July 2001. The article is available at www.ejercito.mil.pe in the publications section.

²⁷ For details on the more than 53,000 antipersonnel mines laid around 1,655 high-tension electrical towers in six departments, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 379; Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 2, 16 May 2002. The Article 7 Report does not provide additional information on electrical towers in the Paramonga area of Lima, or areas in the former Armed Forces training center in La Chira, Lima, that are suspected to be mine-affected.

²⁸ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 298-299.

²⁹ Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 2, 16 May 2002.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Interview with Advisor Manuel Talavera, Subdirector of International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and member of the Foreign Affairs-Defense Working Group, Lima, 24 April 2001; interview with Daniel Soria and Susana Kliem, Commissioners of the Constitutional Affairs Department at the Ombudsman Office, Lima, 15 May 2002.

in the south, Chilean mines might have been displaced into Peruvian territory by rain and erosion. According to an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the landmine problem along the border with Chile was not included in the Article 7 Report because Perú had not laid mines there.³²

Most mine incidents occur in the departments of Huancavelica, Ica, Junín, and Lima, and, according to the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Público) which published the first national independent study about the landmine problem in Perú, the mined areas around the electrical towers pose a greater threat for the civilian population than mine-affected areas along the northern border.³³

In March 2002, the ICRC and Ombudsman were reported as saying that people in the highlands often take down the protective fencing around the electrical towers to use it in their own fields. Then mine incidents occur when cattle enter the area to graze, and people ignore the warnings and try to recover their animals.³⁴

The DEXA antipersonnel mine, used in the tens of thousands around the electrical towers, is believed to pose the greatest threat to civilians because it looks like a container which people usually associate with food or humanitarian aid supplies.³⁵ Children mistake the DEXA for toys or try to use them as toy boxes.³⁶

Mine Action Funding

In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided over \$1.66 million for mine action activities in Perú.³⁷ This contribution covered the costs of US Special Operations Forces “train the trainer” programs, as well as provision of vehicles and equipment for demining.³⁸

In addition, in 2001 contributions to the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in both Ecuador and Perú totalled \$1.59 million (\$594,000 from Japan and \$1 million from the US).³⁹ This represents an increase from \$772,347 contributed for the year 2000 (\$272,437 from Canada and \$500,000 from the US), and \$198,000 for 1999 (from Canada).

Total contributions for the “Managua Challenge” project, which assisted stockpile destruction by Perú, Ecuador, and Honduras prior to the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001, totalled \$487,533 (\$448,616 from Canada and \$38,917 from Australia).⁴⁰

In May 2002, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the National Police and the electric energy company ETECEN had signed a \$371,000 agreement for mine clearance around 350 ETECEN high-tension towers.⁴¹ A \$100,000 OAS contribution will be used for insurance for the demining personnel, equipment, food, and lodging.⁴² In its 2002 budget, ETECEN allocated \$45,136 to purchase mine incident insurance for Divsam-Dexa personnel.

³² Interview with Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lima, 10 May 2002.

³³ Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe Defensorial N° 35: *El problema de las minas antipersonales dentro del territorio nacional*, March 2000; interview with Commissioners Daniel Soria and Susana Kliem, Defensoría del Pueblo, Lima, 15 May 2002.

³⁴ Gastón Agurto, “Jaque a las Torres,” *Caretas*, No. 1713, Lima, 21 March 2002.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Interview with Dafne Martos, ICRC, 3 May 2002; Special Report by Julia María Urrunaga, “Meshac y Pedael buscaban pita para sus trompos,” *El Comercio* (Lima), 20 January 2002; Julia María Urrunaga, “Víctimas de las minas olvidadas,” *El Comercio*, Lima, 20 January 2002.

³⁷ US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, p. 38.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ “OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001,” Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

⁴⁰ Colonel William McDonough, “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002.

⁴¹ Interview with Minister Manuel Talavera and First Secretary Hugo Contreras, 10 May 2002; also Aide Memoire of Foreign Affairs, given to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002; letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.

⁴² *Ibid.*

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

Perú is in the process of establishing the Peruvian Center for Mine Action, to be known as "Contraminas." Contraminas is already preparing a draft mine action plan,⁴³ and setting up an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.⁴⁴ Until Contraminas is officially launched, coordination of mine action activities in Perú remains the responsibility of the Mine Action Working Group, made up of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and established in September 1999.⁴⁵

In February 2002, the Peruvian Army drafted a plan for the continuation of mine clearance along the border with Ecuador, as well as around the electrical towers inside the country.⁴⁶ Periodic visits by AICMA personnel are planned to provide assistance to this effort until a joint OAS-IADB technical team is established in mid-2002.

In May 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman asserted to Landmine Monitor that there is no coordination among the various institutions that deal with landmine issues.⁴⁷ It also said the absence of the landmine issue in the media is a problem, and this is because the issue is not an urban problem; victims are usually poor people from the interior of the country.⁴⁸

Mine Clearance

Border with Ecuador

As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Perú and Ecuador agreed to demine the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Perú Multinational Observation Mission, MOMEPE.⁴⁹ Mine clearance operations are the responsibility of Peruvian Army Engineers.

The demining battalion has 140 persons, in ten teams of fourteen each, trained in 1999 with the support of the US and Spain.⁵⁰ Perú reported that by the end of 2001, 95 people (officers and NCOs) had been trained in mine clearance and stockpile destruction.⁵¹ Between May 1999 and June 2000, the Engineering School of the Peruvian Army conducted five courses on demining and on stockpile destruction.⁵²

Perú has completed three important mine clearance projects along the Ecuadorian border. The first, between January and March 1999, involved clearance of 82,814 square meters of land, and destruction of 438 mines, in order to permit placement of border markers between the two countries.⁵³

The second, completed between October 1999 and March 2000, together with Ecuador, involved mine clearance of a 7.1 kilometer-long and 5 meter-wide trail that joins the Tiwinza

⁴³ Email to Landmine Monitor (Perú) from First Secretary Hugo Contreras, Chair of the International Security and Disarmament Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 May 2002.

⁴⁴ In 2001, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining trained a police officer, a cartographer and an Army Engineer technician to use the IMSMA software. GICHD, "Updates on Activities between January and December 2001," 31 December 2001, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Aide Memoire given by the Foreign Affairs Minister to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002.

⁴⁶ Colonel William McDonough. "Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security," 14 March 2002.

⁴⁷ Interview with Commissioner from the Office of the Ombudsman, 15 May 2002.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Telephone interview with Minister Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2002.

⁵⁰ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 38.

⁵¹ CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 7.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Statement by the Peruvian Delegation to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 May 2001.

Memorial, located on the Peruvian side of the border, with Ecuador.⁵⁴ Some 963 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the demining operation, which cost \$2,854,012.⁵⁵

The third project, initiated in July 2001, involved mine clearance of the 18 kilometers of the Zarumilla Canal and its source at La Palma. In 2002, further clearance took place because flooding in December 2001 raised concerns about possible displacement of mines.⁵⁶ On 14 June 2002, the Army declared clearance of Zarumilla Canal complete and said that 906 mines and 1,259 UXO had been found.⁵⁷

Electrical Towers

Mine clearance operations around public infrastructure and high-tension electrical towers is the responsibility of the electrical companies and executed by a specialized division of the National Police, DIVSAM-DEXA.

Clearance of 178 mined high-tension towers owned by the private electricity company EDEGEL was completed on 16 February 2001, and 9,168 mines were destroyed, according to the National Police.⁵⁸ Between March and December 2001, DIVSAM-DEXA destroyed 212 mines laid around eight high-tension towers owned by ETECEN.⁵⁹

As noted above, the National Police and the electric energy company ETECEN have signed an agreement to demine 350 ETECEN high-tension towers.⁶⁰ The clearance of the towers is being carried out with the support of the OAS, and priority is being given to transmission lines located around populated centers.⁶¹

DIVSAM-DEXA and ETECEN have also carried out inspections and installed barbed wire and concrete barriers around high-tension electrical towers. Officers at the DIVSAM-DEXA's Santa Inés base submit reports, including photos, on the status of warning signals and barbed wire fencing around mined electrical towers.

According to officials at DIVSAM-DEXA, in October 2001, nineteen National Police personnel participated in their eighth training course on mine clearance. In early 2002, DIVSAM-DEXA organized a short refresher course on mine clearance and first aid for all DIVSAM-DEXA personnel.⁶² Between April and May 2002, the first phase of an OAS training course on humanitarian demining was held with support from MARMINCA instructors. Forty individuals were trained in mine clearance and another 30 in planning humanitarian demining operations. A second phase will train officers to supervise operations, and will update DIVSAM-DEXA procedures.⁶³

⁵⁴ Telephone interview with Minister Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2002; CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 6; Aide Memoire given by Chancellery to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 10 May 2002, p. 2.

⁵⁵ CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 7.

⁵⁶ Aide Memoire provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 10 May 2002, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Milagros Rodríguez, "Culminan desminado humanitario en 18 kilómetros de la frontera norte," *El Comercio*, Lima, 15 June 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release 91-02, "Ejército Peruano entregará desminado del canal de Zarumilla."

⁵⁸ Interview with Pilar Campana, EDEGEL SA, Lima, 22 February 2001; Letter from Colonel Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.

⁵⁹ Letter from Colonel Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA, to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002. Article 7 Report, Form G, Table 2, 16 May 2002, reports this as 236 mines.

⁶⁰ Interview with Minister Manuel Talavera and First Secretary Hugo Contreras, 10 May 2002; also Aide Memoire of Foreign Affairs, given to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002; letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.

⁶¹ Letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002; interview with Major Víctor Andrés Patiño and Commander Silva, DIVSAM-DEXA, 21 May 2002.

⁶² Letter from Colonel Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

Mine Risk Education

Army personnel are in charge of mine risk education (MRE) campaigns in communities close to the border with Ecuador. They work with bilingual teachers, and produce and disseminate magazines, posters, and other graphic materials.⁶⁴ MRE activities take place in schools and local communities.

In 2001, DIVSAM-DEXA conducted 63 MRE activities including eleven in Huancayo, Junín department; eleven in Huancavelica; nine in Pisco, Ica department; and 32 in the department of Lima.⁶⁵

DIVSAM-DEXA and ETECEN published a safety brochure that includes mine risk education messages. The brochure contains little visual information and does not accurately depict an antipersonnel mine. It is written in Spanish, but in remote areas such as Huancavelica department, most of the population speaks the local language (Quechua) and in addition, there is a high illiteracy rate. The brochure also includes emergency numbers in Huancavelica and other cities but many of Huancavelica's villages lack telephone service.⁶⁶

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, four civilians were injured in three landmine incidents (two incidents in Chilean territory and one in Perú):

- On 7 April 2001, a 23-year old Peruvian civilian attempting to illegally enter Chile with two companions stepped on a mine in Escritos ravine in Chilean territory, six kilometers east of border marker 5.⁶⁷ He was taken to the hospital in Arica (Chile) by Chilean authorities, where his right leg was amputated.
- On 6 November 2001, a 34-year old Peruvian citizen severely injured both his legs after stepping on an antipersonnel landmine while entering Chile illegally at Quebrada de Escritos.⁶⁸ He was then taken to the Juan Noé hospital in Arica (Chile).
- On 19 December 2001, two 13-year-old shepherds crossed a protection fence around a high-tension electrical tower at Paso Mullaca, in Tayacaja, in Huancavelica department.⁶⁹ The children grabbed an "orange box", a DEXA AP mine containing 120 grams of TNT, which exploded. One child lost his right arm and some fingers of his left hand while the other child was blinded. ETECEN and the ICRC provided medical services, including a prosthesis, at no cost for one child while the other child's medical expenses were paid by ETECEN.⁷⁰

As of June 2002, two civilians had been injured and one killed in two mine incidents in 2002, (one incident in Ecuadorian territory and one in Perú):

- On 2 January 2002, two children, aged 10 and 11 years received severe injuries, including to their eyes, in an explosion caused when they pulled a string on a device on the side of an electrical tower some twenty meters from their home.⁷¹ ETECEN covered their medical expenses in both cases.⁷²

⁶⁴ Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 May 2002.

⁶⁵ Letter to Landmine Monitor (Perú) from Colonel Alfonso Miranda and Major Víctor Patiño, DIVSAM-DEXA, 27 May 2002.

⁶⁶ Landmine Monitor researcher observations.

⁶⁷ "Cuando intentaba entrar ilegalmente a Chile. Peruano resultó herido por mina antipersonal," *La Tercera* (Santiago, Chile), 9 April 2001; "Pierde pie derecho por ingresar en forma ilegal a Chile," *El Comercio* (Lima), 10 April 2001; Editorial, "Frontera con Chile," *La Industria de Trujillo* (Trujillo), 11 April 2001.

⁶⁸ "Peruano herido por mina antipersonal al entrar a Chile" *El Mostrador* (Santiago), 7 November 2001.

⁶⁹ Article 7 Report, Form J, table 2, 16 May 2002.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Julia María Urunaga, "Meshac y Pedael buscaban pita para sus trompos" (Meshac and Pedael were looking for some string for their spinners) in *El Comercio* (Lima), 20 January 2002. A March 2002 report by DIVSAM-DEXA defined the device as an "anti-escalation" device. See Report 028-2002-DIRSEG/JESSEE-

- On 10 January 2002, a 19-year old Peruvian died after stepping on a landmine in Ecuadorian territory, when he was returning home after crossing the border to seek work. The incident occurred in Kanga, close to the Cenepa River and three hours from Shaime. He received first aid in a nearby town but died some hours later while being transferred to another health center.⁷³

There were no reported Peruvian military or police casualties in 2001 or 2002.⁷⁴

A project to establish a national registry of landmine casualties did not start in 2001.⁷⁵ Officials from the DP told Landmine Monitor that there is no coordination yet between the National Institute for Rehabilitation and the Ministry of Health to determine causes of trauma or injury of patients they received.⁷⁶ The ICRC Lima has kept records of mine incidents and casualties in the country since 1992. According to a March 2002 media report, between 1992 and 2001 the ICRC recorded 64 civilians injured by mines laid around high-tension electrical towers; most of them were children.⁷⁷

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

The Army and the National Police provide medical assistance, physical rehabilitation, and prostheses to their personnel injured by mines. Assistance for civilians is more limited, particularly in rural areas close to the border with Ecuador and in the central highlands. Most mine and UXO survivors are children from extremely poor rural areas, who face problems with social, economic and educational reintegration following medical care and physical rehabilitation.⁷⁸ In general their relatives do not have the economic resources available for transportation or to accompany the child for medical treatment, and their capacity to provide psychological support to a person in need of additional attention in the home is limited. Huancavelica, one of the most heavily affected departments is also the poorest department in the country, with some of the highest rates of illiteracy.⁷⁹

DIVSAMDEXA-APO of 2 March 2002, submitted to the Ombudsman, Walter Albán, who requested information to the Ministry of the Interior on 14 January 2002.

⁷² Article 7 Report, Form J, table 2, 16 May 2002.

⁷³ "Joven Peruano pierde la vida al pisar mina" in *La Hora* (Zamora, Ecuador), 15 January 2002.

⁷⁴ Perú did not include information on any casualties in the Army or National Police in its May 2002 Article 7 report. DIVSAM-DEXA officials did not reported or recorded any antipersonnel mine casualties. Landmine Monitor Interview with Major Patiño and Commander Silva from Divsam-Dexa, National Police, Lima, 21 May 2002. For details on Army and National Police mines casualties in the period from 1990 to 2000 see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 384.

⁷⁵ The planned project was reported in Perú's Article 7 Report, Form J, submitted 4 May 2001 and the institutions to be included were the National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS), the Ombudsman's Office of Perú, the Army, National Police, the National Confederation of the Disabled CONFENADIP, the Association for the Development of Disabled Persons, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Perú office.

⁷⁶ Interview with Daniel Soria and Susana Klien, Commissioners of Constitutional Affairs of the Ombudsman Office, 15 May 2002. See also Agurto, Gastón. "Jaque a las torres" in *Caretas* N° 1713, 21 March 2002. The document notes that the Ministry of Health has no official records of landmine casualties in the country.

⁷⁷ Agurto, Gastón. "Jaque a las torres" in *Caretas* (Lima), N° 1713, 21 March 2002.

⁷⁸ Interviews with Daniel Soria and Susana Klein, Office of the Ombudsman, and Dafne Martos, ICRC. See also testimonies of survivors' relatives in "Niños deben cambiar prótesis cada seis meses", *El Comercio* (Lima), 21 January 2002. A relative is quoting as saying "if I do not work on the crops, what do my children eat?"

⁷⁹ See "El reino de la desesperanza", *Somos* magazine (Lima), 1 June 2002, pp. 18-24.

In 2001, the ICRC provided prostheses for two new mine survivors, and to May 2002, supplied two pairs of crutches and four prostheses.⁸⁰ The ICRC also covered the medical expenses of 21 people, six of whom had been injured by landmines or UXO.⁸¹

An agreement between the National Rehabilitation Institute in Callao and the ICRC has allowed mine survivors to receive physical therapy at the Institute, as well as rehabilitation including psychological support and skills training in areas such as shoe repair, computers or knitting.⁸² Most mine survivors, however, are very poor and do not have the funds needed to start a business when they return to their community after rehabilitation, and depending on the injury suffered and the location of their community, also some survivors cannot return to school.⁸³

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited CONADIS (National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities) to provide a representative to assist in the development of a National Plan for Victim Assistance, but it declined due to a lack of funds to do this task.⁸⁴

Perú has enacted a number of measures related to disabled persons, including mine survivors.⁸⁵

PHILIPPINES

Key developments since May 2001: Two rebel groups continued to use antipersonnel mines – the New People’s Army and Abu Sayyaf. The government recovered a stockpile of homemade mines apparently belonging to a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front; this was the first landmine-related incident involving the MNLF since 1996. Another rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, re-committed in writing to a total ban on antipersonnel mines in April 2002; however, there continued to be allegations of MILF use of mines in 2001 and 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

The Philippines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 15 February 2000. The treaty entered into force on 1 August 2000. In July 2001, Hon. Neptali Gonzales II tabled national implementation legislation, House Bill 346, which prohibits the use, manufacture, acquisition, sale, and transfer of landmines.¹ This bill was still pending approval of the House of Representatives as of May 2002. Legislation previously introduced in June 2000 was

⁸⁰ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Fanny Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, 17 May 2002.

⁸¹ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 29.

⁸² Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Fanny Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, 17 May 2002. Since 1989, the medical assistance program of the ICRC has used the infrastructure of the Ministry of Health of Perú for medical or surgical treatment of persons injured by armed violence or antipersonnel mines.

⁸³ “Historias de vidas mutiladas” (Stories of mutilated lives) and “Niños deben cambiar de prótesis cada seis meses,” in *El Comercio* (Lima), 21 January 2002.

⁸⁴ Email from Luis Miguel del Aguila Umeres, Gerencia de Cooperación y Proyectos, Consejo Nacional de Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad (CONADIS) to Landmine Monitor, 14 June 2002.

⁸⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* p. 385.

¹ The title is “An Act Prohibiting the Use, Manufacture, Acquisition, Sale, and Deployment of Landmines and Prescribing Penalties Therefore.” Sanctions include: 20 years and one day to 40 years of *reclusion perpetua* if a prohibited act causes death; 12 years and one day to 20 years of *reclusion temporal* if no death but serious injuries are sustained; and six years and one day to 20 years of *prison mayor* for violations not resulting in death and serious injury. If the offender is a military officer, additional penalties are prescribed, including dishonorable discharge from the service.

not enacted.² House Bill 346 applies not just to antipersonnel mines, but also antivehicle mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices.³

The Philippines participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Lauro L. Baja, Jr., stated, "By participating in the Third Meeting of State Parties, the Philippine Government can lend its voice and active support to the global campaign to eradicate anti-personnel mines, especially considering that the Philippines became the spokesperson of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention for the Asia-Pacific region during the process of campaigning for its early entry into force."⁴

Undersecretary Baja expressed concerns on mine use by Non-State Actors: "The Philippines also recognizes that armed groups, acting against or beyond the control of States also produce, stockpile, and use landmines. This and concern for people on mined land under non-state control make it clear that an inter-state ban alone is insufficient to stop new landmines from being placed in the ground nor to clear those already planted. The Philippines supports the efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Working Group on Non-State Actors in its appeals to renounce the use of anti-personnel mines as means of warfare.... [W]e believe that full cooperation of Non-States Parties is essential in ensuring the successful implementation of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines."⁵

On 20 September 2001, on the side of the Third Meeting of the States Parties, the Philippines participated in an ASEAN informal group meeting. Participants, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, agreed that the best approach to engaging ASEAN countries in landmine issues would be to focus on humanitarian aspects such as victim assistance, mine awareness, and socio-economic development for mine-affected areas.⁶

The Philippine government participated in the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines and other Munitions held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 8-9 August 2001. Representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines attended the meeting. The Philippines cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001 endorsing the Mine Ban Treaty. The Philippines attended the January and May 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva. It also participated in the Regional Seminar on Landmines in Southeast Asia, hosted by Thailand from 13-15 May 2002.

After its initial incomplete Article 7 transparency report, the Philippines submitted a full Article 7 Report on 13 August 2001 for the period 12 September 2000 to 29 April 2001. On 5 April 2002, it submitted the required annual update Article 7 Report, covering the period from 29 April 2001 to 4 April 2002.

The Philippine Senate ratified Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 4 June 1996. The Philippines attended the Third Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II, and the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001.

² This was House Bill No. 222, "An Act Prohibiting the Use, Manufacture, Sale and Deployment of Landmines and Prescribing Penalties Therefore." See, Article 7 Report, 5 April 2002; and, Statement of Lauro L. Baja, Jr., Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

³ "Landmine" in this bill is defined as, "any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways; it shall also include: (1) booby trap which is a device or material designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparent safe act; (2) other devices which are manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time."

⁴ Statement of Lauro L. Baja, Jr., Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Article 7 Report, 5 April 2002.

The Philippines has not submitted its annual report required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II.

On 10 October 2001, the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) held a forum, "Universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty, A Post-Managua Briefing," in Quezon City. The PCBL discussed with representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the draft national implementation law. Representatives of the governments of Cambodia and Canada, as well as other NGOs, also attended the forum. The PCBL produced a paper, "Framework for National Legislation on Anti-Personnel Mines," with recommendations for provisions to be included in the legislation.⁷

Use

There has been no reported use of antipersonnel mines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) since its stockpile was destroyed in July 1998. In late January 2002, AFP Southern Command spokesperson Maj. Noel Detoyato stated that the U.S. would not bring landmines for the joint military training exercises and operations between the Philippine and U.S. military forces that began February 2002.⁸ In early February 2002, Col. Horacio Lactao, Director for Training of the Philippine Army, confirmed that no antipersonnel mines would be used in the exercises, pledging that the Philippine government will abide by its international commitments, including the Mine Ban Treaty.⁹

NPA

Several newspaper reports of encounters in 2001 and early 2002 involving the Philippine military and the New People's Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front, indicate continuing use of improvised landmines by the rebel group.

- In June 2001, two policemen died and another was seriously wounded when a landmine laid by the NPA rebels exploded in Paluan, Occidental Mindoro. Chief Inspector Nicasio E. Pedraja, Occidental Mindoro police operations head, said the policemen were on their way to Paluan town for a spot inspection when rebels exploded a landmine.¹⁰
- In November 2001, a truck loaded with Army soldiers hit a landmine in Barangay Aliwagwag, Davao Oriental. NPA guerillas then opened fire at the soldiers with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Eighteen soldiers died and ten other members of the 27th Special Forces Company, including the commander, were wounded.¹¹
- On 28 February 2002, the Hummer vehicle sent to pursue retreating NPA rebels in Motiong town, Samar (Eastern Visayas), passed by a mined road. A Claymore mine exploded after the vehicle passed the road near the Paranas Cemetery. The police recovered in the area three other landmines.¹² No landmine-related injury was reported.

⁷ Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Framework for National Legislation on Anti-Personnel Mines," 10 October 2001.

⁸ Interview with Maj. Noel Detoyato, Southern Command Headquarters, Zamboanga City, 25 January 2002.

⁹ Academe Meets Government Series 2002, "The Return of G.I. Joe, US Troops in Mindanao," organized by the University of the Philippines Third World Studies Center, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, Quezon City, 7 February 2002.

¹⁰ Alfred Dizon, Joel J. Jabal and Ferdinand Zuasola, "Rebels kill 4 soldiers, 2 cops," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 14 June 2001, p.12.

¹¹ Ferdinand O. Zuasola, "18 soldiers killed in NPA ambush," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 19 November 2001, p.1. It was not reported if the deaths and injuries were due to the mine explosion or the other weapons.

¹² Vicente S. Labro and Cynthia A. Borqueta, "Samar cop chief, town's entire police force sacked after raid," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 2 March 2002, p.12.

- In March 2002, following an encounter with NPA guerrillas in the hinterlands of Magpet, Cotabato, AFP soldiers recovered an unspecified number of landmines and blasting caps, along with grenades, rifles, and communist documents.¹³

An AFP list of landmine incidents from 1999 to March 2002 shows eight incidents when the AFP recovered landmines allegedly belonging to the NPA. The last recovery, of one improvised antipersonnel mine in Rizal, Cagayan, Isabela, occurred in August 2001; the other seven incidents took place in 1999 and 2000. In total, the AFP found five antipersonnel mines/improvised explosive devices, six improvised antivehicle mines, and two firing devices for Claymore mines.¹⁴

The NPA claims that it only uses command-detonated antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, which are not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty. A spokesperson of the Willie Zapanta Command of the NPA in Davao Oriental said that “depriving us of the use of these command-detonated mines will further favor the...Armed Forces of the Philippines which already enjoys overwhelming advantage over the NPA in terms of number, arms and logistics.”¹⁵ Davao Oriental was the site of renewed NPA operations and AFP counter-attacks in the first quarter of 2002. The Command’s argument echoes the April 2001 written reply to interview questions of the PCBL by Ka Julian, a CPP Central Committee member: “Anti-personnel mines covered by the anti-mine ban are not such significant offensive or defensive weapons of NPA units. Command-detonated mines, the type we use, are not covered by the ban. They prove to be valuable in preventing armored intrusions and attacks of enemy forces into NPA territories. Since we have no anti-armor weapons, we have to rely on such if we have to stop armored tanks and vehicles from entering or going through NPA territories. Most of the time, we can do with just the use of rifles and grenades. But these have no effective stopping power against armored tanks and vehicles.”¹⁶

Abu Sayyaf

A published account of the travails of a group of hostages kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on 20 March 2000 in Tumahubong, Basilan, reveals regular use of landmines by ASG. Twenty-two teachers, including a Claretian priest and 27 students, were herded off to the ASG’s Camp Abdurazzal in Mount Puno Mahadji. Children hostages said they could have escaped, but were afraid because the ASG claimed they planted landmines around the area. An adult hostage, Lydia Ajon, claimed that she saw soldiers trying to penetrate the camp, but they were hit by bullets and wounded by landmines.¹⁷

Fr. Cirilio Nacorda, parish priest of Lamitan, Basilan, also reported ASG use of landmines, although he did not see them plant mines during the period he was held hostage in 1994. He recalled there were areas in Mount Puno Mahadji that the ASG avoided passing through because of the mines.¹⁸

The government says that its soldiers have fallen victim to ASG mines. According to one report, intelligence sources claim that the ASG has built up an inventory of some 3,000 homemade landmines.¹⁹

¹³ Edwin O. Fernandez, “NPA rebel killed,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 22 March 2002, p.17.

¹⁴ “Landmining Incidents (1999-Mar 2002),” provided by AFP Colonel Levy Zamora of the 45th Infantry Brigade based in San Mariano, Isabela, in Northern Luzon, to the PCBL, postmarked 25 March 2002.

¹⁵ Ferdinand Zuasola, “NPA leader justifies use of landmines vs. military,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 5 April 2002.

¹⁶ Written response by Ka Julian, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, 28 April 2001.

¹⁷ Jose Torres, Jr., *Into the Mountains: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), pp. 53, 97.

¹⁸ Interview with Fr. Cirilia Nacorda, Lamitan, Basilan, 26 January 2002.

¹⁹ Yael Shahar, “Libya and the Jolo Hostages, Seeking a new image, or polishing the old one?,” 20 August 2000.

MNLF

On 29 November 2001, stocks of improvised explosive devices (homemade mines) were recovered at the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao government complex in Cabatangan, Zamboanga, after armed loyalists of the ousted chair of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Nur Misuari, withdrew from the complex.²⁰ While no use of mines was reported, this is the first landmine-related incident involving the MNLF since it forged a Peace Agreement in September 1996 with the Philippine government.

The AFP Southern Command reportedly recovered from the government complex occupied by the MNLF five improvised antipersonnel mines, 10 antivehicle mines, and 200 kilos of improvised explosives, among other items.²¹ Members from the Army's Explosives and Ordnance Division and the Police Anti-Crime Task Force cleared the complex of explosives and landmines using metal detectors and mine-detection dogs.²² A soldier posted at the checkpoint during the clearing operation said the area was heavily mined.²³

A former MNLF official who did not wish to be identified claimed that the explosives found came from a fishing vessel apprehended by the military a day before and utilized by the Army to prevent the fielding of reinforcements by MNLF-Misuari supporters.²⁴ There is no evidence, however, to substantiate this claim. The Army denied this counter-accusation.²⁵

MILF

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the NGO Geneva Call's "Deed of Commitment" banning the use of antipersonnel mines in March 2000. As reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, there continued to be allegations of MILF use of mines in 2000 and early 2001.²⁶

In an abandoned training camp of the MILF, discovered in early 2001 in Maguindanao, 16th Infantry Battalion soldiers reportedly found improvised landmines, as well as 40 rocket-propelled grenades, rifle grenades, bomb-making materials, and fuses of mortars.²⁷

In August 2001, peace negotiations resumed and a cease-fire agreement was forged in Malaysia. However, an Agence France Press report of 24 March 2002 said that five improvised mines, believed to be planted by the MILF, were recovered following clashes between the group and the AFP in southern Philippines.²⁸

Geneva Call, in coordination with the PCBL, concluded in April 2002 an international fact-finding mission regarding mine-planting by the MILF.²⁹ However, specific landmine incidents reported by the AFP, and landmines recovered being attributed by the AFP to the MILF, could not be independently verified as members of the mission were unable to travel to Mindanao.

²⁰ Julie S. Alipala and Rolly A. San Juan, "Misuari HQ a bomb factory, AFP finds out," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 1 December 2001, pp.1, 21.

²¹ Ibid. The report referred to five "gallons" of mines. The cache was also shown in television footages aired by the news program, TV Patrol, ABS-CBN Channel 2 on 29 November 2001.

²² Interview with Maj. Noel Detoyato, Southern Command Headquarters, Zamboanga City, 25 January 2002.

²³ Al Jacinto, "Soldiers clear Cabatangan," *Zamboanga Today*, 30 November 2001, p.2.

²⁴ Interview with a former MNLF State Secretary, Zamboanga City, 24 January 2002.

²⁵ Interview with Maj. Noel Detoyato, Southern Command Headquarters, Zamboanga City, 25 January 2002.

²⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 473-474.

²⁷ Edwin O. Fernandez, "Soldiers stumble on abandoned camp of MILF," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 25 February 2001, p.17.

²⁸ "Five killed in southern Philippines fighting," *Agence France Press*, 24 March 2002.

²⁹ The mission was headed by retired Indian general Dipankar Banerjee and coordinated by Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., Director for Asia of Geneva Call. The four other members of the mission were Frenchman Andre-Marc Farineau of the Swiss Federation for Mine Action, Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer of the PCBL, Faiz Mohammad Fayyaz of the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, and Alfredo Lubang of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute.

The MILF nonetheless signed an expanded “Deed of Commitment” under Geneva Call on 7 April 2002. MILF Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs, Chief of Staff of its Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, and MILF Peace Panel Chair Al Haj Murad was the person who signed of the new Deed. The Deed commits the MILF to a total and unconditional ban on antipersonnel mines, whereas before the MILF justified mine use on “defensive and discriminate” grounds.

RPA-ABB

The Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (RPM-P, Revolutionary Party of Workers-Philippines) is a breakaway group from the NPA/CPP, and operates largely in the Visayas group of islands. The RPM-P signed the Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment to a total ban on landmines on 10 April 2001. The RPM-P has a standing cease-fire and peace agreement with the Philippine government since December 2000.

In response to a request for a report on compliance by the Geneva Call, RPM-P Central Committee Chair Andres Nava wrote that the RPM-P is reiterating its “unwavering belief and commitment” to a total ban on antipersonnel mines. The RPM-P also declared that no landmines were employed in six encounters with the New People’s Army.³⁰ (Hostility between the two groups erupts intermittently.)

Use by Unknown Parties

In the AFP’s Landmine Incident Journal, it reported at least 23 mine incidents occurred between 26 April 2001 and 1 April 2002 in different parts of Mindanao (Misamis Oriental, Maguindanao, Sulu, Cotabato, Davao Oriental, Agusan del Sur, General Santos City), Western Samar in the Visayas, and Cagayan Valley in Luzon. The journal alternately described the mines as improvised landmines, improvised antivehicle mines, landmines fashioned from an 81mm/60mm mortar, improvised Claymore mines, or simply anti-personnel mines or landmines.³¹ There is no way to determine which armed group was responsible for each incident.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

In its April 2002 Article 7 transparency report, the Philippine government reported that no antipersonnel mines had been obtained, procured, or manufactured by AFP since July 1998. It also reported destruction of its entire antipersonnel mine stockpile of 2,460 Claymore mines in July 1998, and that it was retaining no mines for development or training purposes.³²

Landmine Monitor reported last year that the AFP was considering acquiring new Claymore mines, but according to Col. William Estrada of the Office of Chief Ordnance and Chemical Services, they decided not to re-stock after conferring with the PCBL.³³

However, a military spokesperson told Landmine Monitor in January 2002 that some military personnel in fact did possess Claymore mines. He clarified that these were used in command-detonated mode.³⁴ The statement raises doubts as to whether all mines in the AFP stockpile were destroyed and/or if new Claymore mines have been acquired. Some Claymore mines may also have fallen into the possession of rebel groups like the NPA as suggested by the incident on 28 February 2002 (see section on NPA Mine Use).

³⁰ Letter of Andres Nava, Chairperson, Central Committee of the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas, to Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, President of Geneva Call, 7 January 2002.

³¹ The AFP’s Ordnance and Chemical Services Landmine Incident Journal (CY 2002). The copy given to PCBL and Geneva Call in April 2002 also included landmine-related incidents that took place in 1999 and 2000.

³² Article 7 Report, 5 April 2002.

³³ Statement made during the PCBL-organized forum on “Universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty, A Post-Managua Briefing,” Quezon City, 10 October 2001. This public statement was a reiteration of information given to the PCBL by Col. Estrada in August 2001.

³⁴ Interview with Maj. Noel Detoyato, Southern Command Headquarters, Zamboanga City, 25 January 2002.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The AFP has conducted several small-scale clearing operations for mines and UXO in affected areas in Mindanao since 2001, but implementation and mapping have not been very systematic. In any case, there are no large-scale mined areas; mines are found sporadically, usually around rebel camps or battle areas.

At the Third Meeting of the States Parties, the Philippines offered “to extend humanitarian assistance to the global anti-personnel mines campaign by contributing technical experts for demining projects being implemented by the United Nations and other international organizations in mine-affected countries.”³⁵

Balay, Inc., a human rights group involved in rehabilitation efforts in Central Mindanao, reported that evacuees from the villages of Sarakan, Sapal, Sarmiento, Tiba, Langkong, and Minantao, all in Matanog, Maguindanao, refused to return to their homes because of fear of landmine explosions. Hundreds of war refugees are temporarily residing along the Narciso Ramos Highway. They have been prohibited by the military from going beyond one kilometer from the highway because of the danger of mines. Balay, Inc. has called on the government to clear the war-affected villages of landmines.³⁶

Landmines and shrapnel in farms in five war-ravaged towns in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao provinces have been slowing down government efforts to reopen these lands to agricultural production.

The PCBL initiated a negotiation with the MILF and the Philippine government for a collaborative demining effort in mine-affected areas in Mindanao, notably in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. The proposal for joint mine clearance operations was also discussed by PCBL representative Alfredo Lubang with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in a dinner meeting of peace advocates at the Malacanang Palace on 18 January 2002. President Macapagal Arroyo expressed interest in the proposal and immediately instructed the Office of the Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process to explore the mechanics of joint clearing as part of the government’s confidence building measure with the MILF. Consultations are being made in coordination with Geneva Call, the Swiss Federation for Mine Action, the MILF and the government, for mine mapping and clearing of affected areas in Maguindanao, Cotabato, and Lanao.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, there were reports of 22 new casualties in at least six mine and UXO incidents: two were killed and 20 injured. Five were civilians, including one 11-year-old child, and 17 were military personnel or police officers. In addition, 18 soldiers died and 10 were wounded in an ambush in November 2001, but it is not clear if casualties were due to the impact of the antivehicle mine explosion or other weapons used in the ambush.³⁷ In 2000, the AFP reported 64 new casualties, of which 11 died and 53 were injured, including 19 civilians.³⁸

On 30 June 2001, in the western part of Poblacion (Barangay Bugasan), Matanog, Maguindanao, four corn farmers clearing land with the slash-and-burn method were injured by an explosion triggered by the fire set to burn the grass. Since the area was heavily bombed by the military in the offensive launched against the MILF in 2000, it was not ascertained whether the explosion was due to landmines planted by the MILF or UXO from military planes.³⁹

³⁵ Statement of the Honorable Lauro L. Baja, Jr., Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

³⁶ Aquiles Zonio, “Landmines scourge of Mindanao folk,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 31 October 2001, p.13.

³⁷ Ferdinand O. Zuasola, “18 soldiers killed in NPA ambush,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 19 November 2001, p.1. See also Ferdinand Zuasola, “NPA leader justifies use of landmines vs. military,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 5 April 2002. The latter report, however, said that the incident occurred in December 2001.

³⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 476.

³⁹ Landmine Monitor interview with survivors in Barangay Bugasan, Matanog, Maguindanao, 17 November 2001. See also Aquiles Zonio, “Landmines scourge of Mindanao folk,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 31

The casualties were brought to the nearby DIGS (Development Initiative of the Government for Society) hospital in Parang, Maguindanao, however, the hospital did not have adequate facilities to treat the injuries, so the casualties were then transported to the Cotabato Regional Hospital in an ambulance. One survivor lost his left eye and spent three months out of work as a result of the incident. The Department of Social Welfare and Development gave P1,000 (approx. US\$20) assistance to each of the survivors. They were also treated and given free medicine by Red Cross medical missions.

On 16 June 2001, in the same area of Matanog, Maguindanao, a 40-year-old farmer, the father of eight children, was harvesting coconuts when one hit the ground, triggering an explosion. He was brought first to the DIGS hospital and later transferred to the Cotabato Regional Hospital for treatment of multiple shrapnel injuries.⁴⁰

In June 2001, in an NPA-related landmine incident in Occidental Mindoro, two police officers died and a third police officer was injured.⁴¹ Several incidents were reported by the AFP/DND: on 9 March 2001, two enlisted personnel (EP) were injured in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, after an improvised mine believed to have been planted by the MILF exploded; on 10 October 2001, eight EPs and two officers were injured after a landmine was detonated by their vehicle in Indanan, Sulu; and on 11 November 2001, two soldiers were injured following a landmine explosion while conducting mine clearance in Ampatuan, Maguindanao.⁴²

AFP landmine casualties in Central Mindanao are transported by helicopter to the Camp Navarro General Hospital for emergency treatment. They are subsequently referred to the V. Luna AFP Medical Center in Quezon City for prostheses and rehabilitation.⁴³

PORTUGAL

Key developments since May 2001: Portugal corrected its stockpile numbers, reporting that at the end of 2001, it had 231,781 antipersonnel mines in stockpiles, or 40,629 less than previously reported. Destruction began in 2002, and as of May, 36,654 mines had been destroyed. Portugal also reported that the number of mines retained for permitted purposes would be reduced to 1,115. In February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that new implementation legislation is not needed because the Portuguese penal code already criminalizes the prohibited activities.

Mine Ban Policy

Portugal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 February 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 August 1999. National legislation had been under consideration since then, but in February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that new legislation is not needed because “the Portuguese penal code already typifies and punishes the activities forbidden by the Convention as dangerous crimes (see particularly Article 26 and 272 to 275 of the Portuguese penal code).”¹

October 2001, p.13. However, the newspaper story wrongly reported that the casualties were killed in the explosion.

⁴⁰ Landmine Monitor interview with landmine survivor, Matanaog, Maguindanao, 17 November 2002. See also Aquiles Zonio, “Landmines scourge of Mindanao folk”, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 31 October 2001, p.13.

⁴¹ Alfred Dizon, Joel J. Jabal and Ferdinand Zuasola, “Rebels kill 4 soldiers, 2 cops”, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 14 June 2001, p.12.

⁴² AFP Landmine Incident Journal (CY 2002). Other victims were reported for the years 1999 and 2000. However, in a number of cases it is not clear if the cause of injury or death is directly attributable to mines, and whether the mines were antipersonnel or antitank.

⁴³ Interview with Maj. Noel Detoyato, Southern Command Headquarters, Zamboanga City, 25 January 2002.

¹ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Director, Defense and Security Service Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 8 February 2002. Landmine Monitor researcher’s

Portugal participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, represented by its Ambassador to Mexico. Belgium delivered a statement on behalf of the European Union member States, which includes Portugal. Portugal did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but did attend the meetings in May 2002, represented by Fernando de Brito, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

Portugal submitted Article 7 transparency reports on 1 February 2000 and 30 April 2001. A copy of the annual report for calendar year 2001, with a submission date of 27 March 2002, was supplied to Landmine Monitor, but as of 31 July 2002 was not yet posted on the relevant UN website.² The report includes use of the voluntary Form J.

On 29 November 2001, Portugal cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Portugal is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Landmine Monitor has no record of Portugal submitting its transparency report required under the protocol's Article 13 in 1999, 2000, or 2001, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that an Article 13 report for 2000 was submitted in December 2000.³ Portugal did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II on 10 December 2001. It did participate in the Second CCW Review Conference on 11-21 December 2001. A statement was delivered by Belgium on behalf of European Union member States.

In its report of January 2002 to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Portugal stated that it "accepts the principle of complementarity of all international and regional fora, leading to the universalization of the Ottawa Convention. In no case will be acceptable any negotiation which can set up exceptions to the ultimate goal of the Ottawa Convention."⁴ During the Portuguese chairmanship of the OSCE in 2002, the mine issue was not prioritized in any of the documents available as of July 2002.⁵

A national campaign on landmines and other remnants of war – ALEM-SOLVIG - involving Portuguese and Angolans was launched in March 2002 to advocate the full and rigorous implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including assistance for mine-affected countries, particularly those suffering from Portuguese-made mines, and Lusophone countries such as Angola and Mozambique.⁶

Production, Transfer and Use

Portugal stopped production of antipersonnel mines in 1988 and has prohibited export since 1996. Eight types of antipersonnel mine were produced, and Portuguese mines have been found in 10 countries.⁷

translations throughout this report. The articles referred to are general provisions, not specifying antipersonnel mines. Article 273 refers to nuclear devices. Article 275 prohibits the import, production, possession, selling, transportation and use of items classified as "weapons of war" and devices or explosive substances, with penalties of two to five years' imprisonment. For previous official positions on legislation, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 761.

² Article 7 Reports, submitted on 1 February 2000 for the period 3 December 1999-31 January 2000, and submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period 3 December 1997-31 January 2001. A copy of the latest report was supplied to the Landmine Monitor at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2002.

³ Landmine Monitor has requested copies of all available reports from Portuguese authorities and consulted CCW document lists.

⁴ Report of the Portuguese Delegation to the OSCE, 18 January 2002, p. 1. Similar statements were made in previous OSCE reports.

⁵ www.osce.org/cio/programme.

⁶ ALEM-SOLVIG - Acção Lusófona de Erradicação das Minas e de Solidariedade para com as Vítimas de Guerra, National Registry of Collective Persons, Lisbon, provisional number P506077543.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 708. Portuguese mines have been found in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Mozambique's initial Article 7 Report indicated its stockpile included Portuguese M966, M969, and M971 mines.

In response to inquiries about Portugal's position on the issue of joint operations with non-States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that, "in a operational situation, Portugal will not use antipersonnel mines and will have, in general, a behavior consistent with the obligations assumed in the scope of the Ottawa Convention."⁸ In 2001, Portugal was involved in various military exercises with NATO and PALOPS (African Portuguese-speaking countries), including Angola, which has used landmines.

Regarding the issue of possible transit of antipersonnel mines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002 repeated a statement from last year indicating it would not be permitted, adding "naturally, Portugal as a state party of the Ottawa Convention, would not give the authorization to a transfer."⁹

Stockpiling and Destruction

Portugal's Article 7 Report for 2001 provides revised stockpile data, confirming information given previously by the Ministry of Defense in interviews.

Revised data on stockpile of antipersonnel mines¹⁰

Type of mine	Quantity
Antipersonnel blast mine	190,517
Antipersonnel fragmentation mine	38,189
Inert antipersonnel mine	2,501
Antipersonnel mine	574
Total	231,781

The revised total represents a reduction of 40,629 antipersonnel mines from the original total of 272,410 stated in Portugal's two previous Article 7 Reports. The discrepancy is explained in Form J of the Article 7 report for 2001 as resulting from "a more specific, methodical and accurate mine counting."¹¹ However, the original stockpile data was more precise and detailed, listing 11 types of mine.

Original data on stockpile of antipersonnel mines¹²

Type of mine	Quantity
Blast antipersonnel Mine M969	216,939
Blast antipersonnel M969 (inert)	391
Antipersonnel Mine M972	23,863
Antipersonnel Fragmentation Mine M966	14,332
Antipersonnel Fragmentation Mine M966 (inert)	107
Booby-trap Fragmentation Grenade M969	10,237
Booby-trap Fragmentation Grenade M969 (inert)	25
Antipersonnel Fragmentation Mine M18A1 (Claymore, US)	5,004
Antipersonnel Fragmentation Mine Valmara (Italy)	500
Blast antipersonnel Mine VS-50 (Italy)	500
Antipersonnel Landmines (no designation)	512
Total	272,410

⁸ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Director, Defense and Security Service Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 8 February 2002.

⁹ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 March 2002.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 March 2002.

¹² Article 7 Reports, Form B, 1 February 2000 and 30 April 2001.

The Article 7 Report for calendar year 2001 also noted a reduction in the number of antipersonnel mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 of the treaty. A total of 1,115 mines will be retained, instead of the 3,523 originally declared.¹³ The types of mines, and the purposes for which they are retained, are not reported.

There have been several reports previously, both official and unofficial, giving different stockpile quantities. In October 1998, Portugal stated that it possessed a total stockpile of 244,000 mines and that it would destroy 187,000 mines from November 1998 to November 2000.¹⁴ In October 2000, the Ministry of Defense gave three different sets of numbers for the mines awaiting destruction: 187,000, 184,000 and 183,000.¹⁵

Asked previously about the discrepancy between the stockpile numbers given by the Ministry of Defense and the first two Article 7 Reports, a spokesperson in January 2002 said that the Article 7 Reports gave estimates which were excessive.¹⁶ A different defense spokesperson confirmed a few days later that the numbers in the first two Article 7 Reports were excessive because Portugal “in 1999, had no time to make a precise evaluation of the numbers of mines.” Using “the method of volumetric reading estimate,” Portugal calculated having 272,410 antipersonnel mines, but the correct number was now known to be 231,781.¹⁷

In a letter dated 19 July 2002, Portugal stated that as of May 2002, a total of 36,654 mines had been destroyed. It said, “In view of the data available and the current level of destruction, it is foreseen that the deadline established by the Convention for stockpile destruction will be achieved.”¹⁸ Portugal’s treaty-mandated deadline to complete stockpile destruction is 1 August 2003. A Ministry of Defense spokesperson said that plans call for destruction of 220,000 antipersonnel mines by February 2003, and the remaining mines by August.¹⁹

It is unclear when stockpile destruction began. The second Article 7 Report, submitted on 30 April 2001, said that stockpile destruction “is expected to take place in 2001.”²⁰ Between September 2001 and January 2002, three different dates for the start of stockpile destruction (December, late January, and mid- February) were announced by the Ministry of Defense or IDD (Indústria de Desmilitarização e Defesa – Demilitarization and Defense Industry), the public company under Ministry of Defense control.²¹ In January 2002, Portugal’s OSCE report stated that “the destruction is in progress.”²² In contrast, the most recent Article 7 Report claimed, “The beginning of the destruction process is expected to take place in February 2002.”²³ In February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the destruction program had been delayed due to technical problems, but said destruction would start in the first three months of 2002, at the Alto do Estanqueiro facility in Alcochete municipality.²⁴

The July 2002 letter explained, “The process of stockpile destruction should have started in 2001 but it suffered delays due to a need for an environment impact study of the area where the destruction was scheduled to take place. There were also technical problems with the equipment to

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 March 2002.

¹⁴ José Vegar, “Portugal Destrói Minas” (“Portugal Destroys Mines”), *Expresso* (weekly newspaper), 3 October 1998.

¹⁵ “Explosões assustam Rego de Amoreira” (“Explosions Frighten Rego da Amoreira”), *Jornal de Notícias*, 26 October 2000; Statement by the Ministry of Defense, *LUSA* (news agency), 11 and 23 October 2000; Statement by the Minister of Defense Castro Caldas, *LUSA*, 23 October 2000.

¹⁶ Aires Marques, Press Attaché and Counselor, Ministry of Defense, *LUSA*, 23 January 2002.

¹⁷ Interview with Col. Bom de Sousa and the Landmine Monitor researcher by Carlos Silva, *Radio Renascença*, 24 January 2002.

¹⁸ Letter from the Permanent Mission of Portugal in Geneva to the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, DESARM-268/2002, 19 July 2002.

¹⁹ Aires Marques, Press Attaché and Counselor, Ministry of Defense, *LUSA*, 23 January 2002.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2001.

²¹ Statements by the Ministry of Defense and IDD, *LUSA*, 27 September 2001, 14 December 2001, and 23 January 2002.

²² Report to the OSCE, 18 January 2002, p. 2.

²³ Article 7 Report, Form G, 27 March 2002.

²⁴ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2002.

be used for the said destruction which contributed to the delay. However, those problems have since been resolved and the process of stockpile destruction is well under way.”²⁵

There has also been conflicting information about the location of stockpile destruction. The Article 7 Reports dated 30 April 2001 and 27 March 2002 state that stockpile destruction will take place at two designated destruction sites (Alto do Estanqueiro and Campo de Tiro) in Alcochete municipality. However, in May 2000, the Ministry of Defense had authorized IDD to conduct the destruction program at Rego da Amoreira, in the former *Explosivos Extra* factory, in the same municipality. In September 2001, Rego da Amoreira was again identified as the destruction site.²⁶

The conflict reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* between the State and the Municipal Assembly of Alcochete over the environmental safety of the destruction process continued in 2001. The Ministry of Defense and IDD rejected claims for an environmental impact study and public consultation. In June 2001 IDD submitted a new offer to the municipality, which after further negotiation was accepted in September 2001. The agreement included payments for the Fire Department to train IDD staff, a survey in which city council and municipal assembly members will be included, changes to the liquid residues treatment system, reporting of all solid residues to the municipal assembly, and agreement that foreign munitions will not be involved.²⁷ However, an *Actio Popularis*—a law suit—was brought in December 2001 to prevent setting up of the destruction unit without an environmental impact assessment and public consultation.²⁸

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

Portugal has reported little information about mine action funding in 2001. No data has been submitted to the UNMAS Mine Action Investments database.²⁹ No funding information is included in the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports. Portugal’s report to the OSCE in January 2002 gave no details, although previous OSCE reports cited demining and training in Angola.³⁰

Since 1999, Portugal has been assisting Angola through a program of physiotherapeutic care in Portugal, at Coimbra Military Hospital, for Angolan children who are amputee war victims. (See below for details). In 2000, the funding of this project totaled 10,122,856 escudos (\$44,166), and in 2001 it totaled 12,853,415 escudos (\$56,080). The funding went to the Military Hospital.³¹

Research and Development

The System and Robotics Institute (ISR – Instituto de Sistemas e Robóticas) of Coimbra University has carried out since the start of 2001 a mine detection research program using a robot equipped with a multi-sensor system (infra-red, a Schiebel metal detector and possibly an olfactory sensor). The project is financed by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia- Foundation for Science and Technology). The system, called Demine, has not yet been tested in operational conditions.³²

²⁵ Letter to the GICHD, DESARM-268/2002, 19 July 2002.

²⁶ Statements by the Ministry of Defense and IDD, *LUSA*, 23 October 2000 and 27 September 2001; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 764-766.

²⁷ “Autarquia Desiste Do Processo” (“Autarky Gives Up Law Suit”), *LUSA*, 27 September 2001; Statement of Alcochete Municipality, *LUSA*, 27 September 2001; Statement by Miguel Boeiro, President of the Municipal Assembly, *LUSA*, 27 September 2001.

²⁸ Statement by Arnaldo Fernandes, former President of Alcochete Municipal Assembly, *LUSA*, 14 December 2001.

²⁹ www.mineaction.org, accessed on 1 May 2002.

³⁰ Report to the OSCE, 18 January 2002, p. 2.

³¹ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2002.

³² Telephone interview with Lino Marques, ISR’s DEMINE research program director, Coimbra, 7 March 2002; email from Lino Marques, 8 March 2002, and www.isr.uc.pt.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 1996, four Portuguese officers were injured by landmines in Bosnia.³³ On 1 July 2000, three Portuguese UN soldiers were injured by shrapnel at a popular beach ten kilometers from Dili when they disturbed an unidentified unexploded device.³⁴

Portugal is not mine-affected, but there are mine survivors in Portugal from the colonial wars and more recently from Angola and Mozambique. Studies indicate that mine accidents accounted for over half of all casualties in the Portuguese Army during the colonial wars.³⁵

The latest Article 7 Report states that in 2001 Portuguese authorities provided assistance to a group of 12 children from Angola at the Military Hospital of Coimbra.³⁶ In February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that, to date, twenty boys have been treated, and twelve girls are awaited.³⁷ However, in March 2002, the doctor responsible for the physiotherapeutic department stated, "There are no children in hospital, most of them returned. Of the total of 32 children that were treated in the hospital, only four of them are still in Coimbra, living in the headquarters of Madre Teresa Association and only one awaits surgery on his stump." Besides the physiotherapeutic care, the children also receive psychological support. The criteria for selection are determined by the military hospital.³⁸

Some mine survivors residing in Portugal are waiting to receive a pension from the Portuguese government, but cannot before being declared Portuguese nationals. This process has been very slow. According to one survivor, Mozambican law does not provide pensions for those that did not fight for the regular Mozambican armed forces. The mine survivors interviewed do not have financial resources enabling them to live on their own, most of them do not have jobs, and seemed confined to the military facilities. Most of them wanted to "return to Mozambique and to their families."³⁹

QATAR

Key developments since May 2001: In 2002, Qatar's Foreign Minister confirmed to the ICBL that Qatari Armed Forces do not use antipersonnel mines, and have no stockpile of mines except for training. Qatar has not said if U.S. mines stored in Qatar must be removed before its 1 April 2003 deadline for stockpile destruction. Qatar has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 September 1999.

Qatar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 13 October 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 April 1999. It is not known if Qatar has enacted any national implementation measures, as required by Article 9. Qatar has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 September 1999. Qatar did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings during 2001 or 2002.¹ It voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. Qatar is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

³³ www.caleida.pt/ifer. Portuguese peace-keeping force website on Bosnia and Kosovo.

³⁴ "UN Soldiers Injured in Beach Explosion in East Timor," *Associated Press*, 1 July 2000.

³⁵ Aniceto Afonso and Carlos De Matos Gomes, "Minas," in *Guerra Colonial*, (Editorial Notícias, 3rd Edition, September 2001), pp. 312-323; Carlos de Matos Gomes, *Mozambique 1970, Operação Nó Gordão*, (Edição Prefácio); John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1972-1976)*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1978).

³⁶ Article 7 Report, Form J, dated 27 March 2002 covering calendar year 2001.

³⁷ Letter from Manuel Carvalho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2002.

³⁸ Telephone interview with Dr Fontes, Physiotherapeutic Department, Coimbra Military Hospital, Coimbra, 28 March 2000.

³⁹ Visit by Quim Pipa and Tiago Douwens Prats to the Electro-mechanics Military School in Paço de Arcos, suburbs of Lisbon, and to Graça's (Lisbon) Military Transmissions Regiment, Lisbon, 4 March 2002.

¹ Qatar registered but did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, possibly because of the travel problems surrounding this meeting.

Qatar is not believed to have ever used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines. In response to a letter from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Qatari Foreign Minister stated in July 2002, "As for the legality of the joint operations with the non-signatories relating to stock-pile, use of antipersonnel mines or transporting or transiting them, we assure you that the Qatari Armed Forces never practice any of these acts."²

The Foreign Minister also stated, "We assure you that the State of Qatar does not own any stock-pile of mines nor does it have mined areas, and it uses sound mines which are harmless to people and the environment in training its armed forces."³ In a letter written in 2002 to the co-chairs of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Qatar said it did not possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.⁴ In September 2000, Qatari military officers told Landmine Monitor that Qatar possesses a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes. They did not disclose the size or composition of the stockpile.⁵ The deadline for Qatar to destroy any mines it may have in stock (except those retained under Article 3 for training purposes) is 1 April 2003.

The United States stores 216 artillery-delivered ADAM projectiles containing 7,776 antipersonnel mines at Camp As-Saliyah in Qatar, as part of U.S. Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Five (APS-5). Another 142 US Air Force Gator air-delivered mixed munitions containing 3,126 antipersonnel mines are believed to be stored at Al-Udeid.⁶

Qatar has not clearly indicated if any of these US mines fall under Qatar's jurisdiction or control; if they do, they must be destroyed or removed before the 1 April 2003 deadline. The Qatari Foreign Minister's statement quoted above seems to indicate that Qatari Armed Forces would not be involved in the stockpiling or transporting of US mines. It is not known if that applies to Qatari citizens working at the military camps.

Qatar is not mine-affected. In the past, it donated to the Slovenian International Trust Fund, but no donations or in-kind contributions to international mine action programs were recorded in 2001 or in the first quarter of 2002.

ROMANIA

Key developments since May 2001: In September 2001, Romania was chosen co-rapporteur of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction. Romania began its own stockpile destruction in August 2001 and by April 2002 reported the destruction of 130,474 antipersonnel mines. It expects to complete stockpile destruction by 2004, a year in advance of its deadline.

Mine Ban Policy

Romania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 November 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 May 2001. On 31 January 2002, at an intersessional Standing Committee meeting, Romania announced that with respect to national implementation measures required under Article 9: "a government decision" was being adopted which "draws the necessary restrictions at national level;" the legal framework for implementation was being set up at the national level; and an "Interdepartmental Working Group" for coordination and developing a

² Letter from Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, ICBL, Washington, DC, provided by the Embassy of Qatar, Washington, DC, with cover letter dated 3 July 2002.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, "Update on Implementation of Article 4," 30 May 2002, endnote 36; available at:

http://www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/speeches_sd/Co_Chairs_Article_4_update.pdf.

⁵ Interview with Colonel Hassan Al Mohandi, Geneva, Switzerland, 13 September 2000.

⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 901-902.

national implementation plan was being established.¹ Romania reported on 18 April 2002 that the government decision to establish a “National Authority” in charge of implementation of the treaty remains “underway.”²

Romania attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. The head of delegation, Radu Horumba, noted that his country was attending the meeting for the first time as a State Party. He declared that Romania was fully committed to the treaty, and associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.³ At the meeting, Romania was chosen as co-rapporteur of the intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, a position subsequently carried out by Radu Horumba.

Romania participated in the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁴ At the January meeting, Romania presented a breakdown of its antipersonnel mine stockpile and detailed plans for its destruction by March 2004.⁵ At the May meeting, it reiterated its intention to complete destruction by March 2004, more than a year in advance of the treaty deadline.⁶

Romania’s initial Article 7 transparency report was received by the United Nations on 27 January 2002, though officials have said it was submitted on 16 November 2001. A second report was submitted on 18 April 2002, giving updated information on stockpile destruction.⁷

On 29 November 2001, Romania voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Romania has not yet adhered to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties in December 2001. Romania did attend, as a State Party, the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. The delegation was headed by Ambassador Anda Cristina Filip, who declared that:

The international community has addressed the issue of anti-personnel mines in the CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention. We believe that these instruments are complementary and Romania will initiate next year the domestic procedures for the ratification of the CCW Amended Protocol II, while already implementing the provisions of the Ottawa Convention. We also believe that the time has come to address the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines...⁸

Subsequently, on 7 March 2002, at the Conference on Disarmament, the Minister of Defense, Ioan Mircea Pascu, stated that “this year Romania will ratify the amendment to Article 1 of the CCW, together with the Amended Protocol II and Protocol IV to this convention. Also it will pursue an active contribution to the Ottawa Convention process, in a period of time when the first deadlines for full implementation of Article 4 provisions are coming to term.”⁹

¹ Statement by Radu Stanicel, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Defense, to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 31 January 2002.

² Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted on 18 April 2002, for the period 2 October 2001-8 April 2002.

³ Statement by Radu Horumba, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001. For details of the European Union statement, see the report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

⁴ The Romanian delegation included: Elena-Anca Jurcan, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Radu Stanicel; and Radu Horumba.

⁵ Statement by Radu Stanicel, Ministry of Defense, to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 31 January 2002. Romania distributed two documents describing, respectively, the antipersonnel mine stockpile and the destruction program.

⁶ Email from Radu Horumba, 6 June 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 27 January 2002, for the period 1 May-1 October 2001, and submitted on 18 April 2002, for the period 2 October 2001-8 April 2002.

⁸ Statement of Ambassador Anda Filip, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva.

⁹ Statement of Ioan Mircea Pascu, Romanian Minister of Defense, to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 7 March 2002.

Production and Transfer

The report of a Stability Pact mission in September 2001 stated that Romania ceased production of antipersonnel mines in 1995. It said, “No APM have been produced since that date and the production facilities have been converted for other industrial use.”¹⁰ However, Romania’s 18 April 2002 Article 7 Report stated that no information is yet available on conversion or decommissioning of production facilities.¹¹

Stockpiling and Destruction

The first comprehensive stockpile data for Romania was given at a seminar in Warsaw on 18-19 June 2001, as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. The total provided of 1,076,629 antipersonnel mines was subsequently corrected in Romania’s first Article 7 Report, to a total of 1,076,839.¹² (See chart below for details on mine types).

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Romania announced that “the process of destruction of the Romanian Army APL stockpile has commenced on August 31, 2001, when a first lot of 10,000 mines were eliminated. The event took place in the presence of government officials, diplomats and military attaches accredited in Bucharest.... Moreover, destruction of the entire APL stockpile in custody of the Romanian Ministry of Interior – 27,445 items... was completed on August 28, 2001.”¹³

Romania’s capacity to destroy its stockpile was assessed by a Stability Pact mission on 28 September 2001; the mission was conducted for the Reay Group on Mine Action. The mission assessed Romania’s destruction program as “well prepared, pragmatic, efficient and effective.” The mission witnessed one demolition at the Cislau base, which is being used for open detonation of the MSS mine. It reported that “explosive standards were high.” The remaining stocks are being demilitarized by disassembly under field processing conditions at 15 locations, “although only eight of these are major production facilities.” The mission confirmed that there are “no APM stockpiled in the Romanian military or civil industrial base.”¹⁴

As of 8 April 2002, Romania reported destruction of 130,474 antipersonnel mines.¹⁵ The cost of destruction is reported as averaging US\$1.5 per mine, with the MSS mine being more expensive to destroy.¹⁶

¹⁰ “Overview of Capability Reports,” Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, p. 7. Ambassador Filip previously reported that production had ceased in 1990—see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 768. The latest production date noted in the initial Article 7 report is 1994.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form E, 18 April 2002.

¹² The difference was an additional 210 MAI-75 mines. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that at the time of the Warsaw seminar the process of stockpile accounting was not complete.

¹³ Statement by Romania to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.

¹⁴ “Overview of Capability Reports,” Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, pp. 7-9.

¹⁵ Article 7 Reports, Forms B and G, 27 January 2002, 18 April 2002, and 8 April 2002.

¹⁶ Statement by Romania to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 31 January 2002.

Romania's Stockpile and Destruction As of 8 April 2002¹⁷

Types	Original Stockpile as of August 2001	Total Destroyed as of 8 April 2002	Total Remaining as of 8 April 2002
MAI-2	114,737	47,685	67,052
MAI-6	115,988	31,231	84,757
MAI-68	135,343	18,746	116,597
MAI-75	668,111	44,048	624,063
MSS*	42,660	16,659*	26,451*
TOTALS	1,076,839	130,474	918,920

*There is a discrepancy in the records for the MSS mine. The initial Article 7 Report noted a total stock of 42,660 MSS mines of which 450 were destroyed through November 2001 and a further 16,209 were destroyed through 8 April 2002, giving a total remaining stock of 26,001. However the second Article 7 Report notes a quantity of 26,451 MSS mines remaining in stock in April 2002, or 450 mines more.

Stockpile destruction has continued at a rapid pace since the April report. In June 2002, Romania stated: "As provided by the Romanian National Plan for destruction, by August 2002 the destruction of the entire stockpiles of MAI-68, MAI-2 and MAI-6 types will be completed."¹⁸ That would constitute destruction of some 267,000 mines from 8 April to 1 August 2002, and bring Romania's total stockpile destruction to about 398,000 mines. The destruction plan calls for completion of destruction of MSS mines by 30 June 2003 and MAI 75 mines by 1 March 2004.¹⁹

Both Article 7 reports give considerable detail of destruction methodologies and locations, though the locations for destruction of the mines are different in the two reports.

Romania is retaining 4,000 antipersonnel mines for purposes permitted under Mine Ban Treaty Article 3 (3,000 MAI-75, 400 MAI-68, 200 MAI-6, 200 MAI-2, and 200 MSS.). The purposes for which these mines will be used has not been reported.²⁰

Mine Action and NGO Activities

Although Romania has provided contributions to mine action in the past, Landmine Monitor is not aware of any financial or other assistance to mine action internationally in 2000 or 2001. Field hospitals in Angola, Kuwait, and Somalia, which previously provided medical assistance to mine victims, were closed in 1997.²¹

The NGO Sibieni Pacifisti (People of Sibiu for Peace) continued its campaigning activities. On 3 December 2001, a one-day seminar entitled "One Year Since Ratification," was held in Sibiu with a press conference. A poster competition on the mine issue concluded in May 2002, and in August 2002 a national meeting will be held with the title, "Are there any more landmines in Romania?" RNGO-APM ("Romanian Non-Governmental Organization on Anti-Personnel Mines") announced its formation in September 2001. It is dedicated to the eradication of antipersonnel mines and the "implementation and enforcement" of the Mine Ban Treaty in Romania and elsewhere.²²

¹⁷ Article 7 Reports, Forms B and G, 27 January 2002, and 18 April 2002.

¹⁸ Email from Radu Horumba, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations in Geneva, 6 June 2002. Romania made this comment at the 30 May 2002 Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction meeting in Geneva as well.

¹⁹ Romania, "Ottawa Convention Implementation Measures: Antipersonnel Landmines Stockpile Destruction," undated brochure distributed at 2002 Standing Committee meetings.

²⁰ Article 7 Reports, Form D, 27 January 2002 and 18 April 2002.

²¹ Telephone interview with Captain Tiberiu Fratila, Ministry of Defense, 16 March 2002.

²² Letter from RNGO-APM, October 2001.

RWANDA

Key developments since May 2001: Some 20 of the more than 35 mined areas in the country have been cleared; in 2001, 9,712 square meters of land were cleared, including 3,648 mines and UXO. Rwanda submitted its first Article 7 transparency report, indicating that it has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines. RCD-Goma rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with whom the Rwandan military cooperates closely, have admitted ongoing mine use.

Mine Ban Policy

Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 June 2000. The treaty entered into force for Rwanda on 1 December 2000. A presidential order of 24 December 1998 confirms the incorporation of the Mine Ban Treaty into domestic law, but no specific implementation legislation or other measures have been undertaken.¹

Rwanda submitted its first Article 7 transparency report on 4 September 2001, for the period 1 February-31 August 2001. It had been due to 30 May 2001. Rwanda has not submitted the annual update due 30 April 2002.

Rwanda attended the Third Meeting of State Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January 2002, but not in May 2002.

Although Rwanda was a cosponsor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation on the Mine Ban Treaty, it was absent from the vote on the resolution on 29 November 2001.

Use

Since 1998, there has been no reported new use of antipersonnel mines in Rwanda. However, in recent years there have been allegations of mine use in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by various fighting forces, including by Rwanda and opposition forces it supports. There were particularly serious and credible allegations that Rwandan forces used antipersonnel mines during the fighting around Kisangani in the DRC in June 2000.² Rwandan officials have repeatedly denied allegations of mine use in the DRC.

In this reporting period, since May 2001, Landmine Monitor does not have evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC.³

Assisting Mine Use

Landmine Monitor is concerned that Rwanda could be at risk of violating the Mine Ban Treaty by virtue of close military cooperation, including joint combat operations, with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma). In 2002, several RCD-Goma military officers admitted to Landmine Monitor past and ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by RCD-Goma soldiers.⁴

Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not “under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Rwanda should make clear the nature of its support for the rebel forces that admit to using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with the RDC. As a party to the treaty, Rwanda should state

¹ Order of the President, nr. 38/01, 24 December 1998.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 132-134.

³ There have been allegations that, following killings that took place in Kisangani between 14 and 18 May 2002, the RCD-Goma rebels and their Rwandan allies laid antipersonnel mines around a mass grave located close to Bangboka airport. Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm this allegation. Information provided to Landmine Monitor by a local NGO, 5 June 2002.

⁴ See the Democratic Republic of Congo country report in this edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*.

categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines. The matter is all the more serious since the Democratic Republic of Congo acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002, and now has a legal obligation to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited by the treaty.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Rwanda reports that it has never produced antipersonnel mines.⁵ In the past, Rwanda imported an unknown number of antipersonnel mines; some 35 types of mines from at least eight countries have been found in Rwanda.⁶ In its Article 7 Report, Rwanda states that it has no stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines, and no mines retained for training purposes.⁷ It also reports that no destruction of stockpiled mines took place in its reporting period of February–August 2001.⁸ No information was provided on when or how Rwanda's previous stockpile of antipersonnel mines was destroyed.

Landmine Problem and Survey

Rwanda has reported that between 1990 and 1994 mines were placed in the provinces of Umutara (northeast), Byumba (north), Ruhengeri, and Gisenyi (northwest), urban and rural Kigali and Gitarama (center). The latter province is reportedly affected by "scattered mines" only, and all the others by both "minefields and scattered mines."⁹ More than 35 areas have been identified as mined or suspected to contain mines, of which some 20 have been cleared. The majority of these areas are smaller than 50,000 square meters. Rwanda reports that approximately 200,000 antipersonnel mines and UXO are scattered through the country.¹⁰

According to the National Demining Office (NDO), antipersonnel mines that have either been turned into household utensils or traded at the market for metal are a great danger to the population.¹¹

A database maintained by the National Demining Office is based on information gathered by its survey teams, as well as reports from local communities. NDO is planning to carry out a level one survey in mid-2002, and Rwanda requested "all governments and NGOs to help us carry out this survey."¹²

Mine Action

In September 2001, Rwanda stated, "Having a mine-free country remains among the priorities of the Rwandan government."¹³ It established the National Demining Office in 1995. The main functions of the NDO are to: propose policies and strategies to the government, develop and supervise a sustainable and integrated mine action plan, coordinate all demining activities and maintain a national database.¹⁴ Rwanda notes the need to improve its national mine action capacity.

According to the NDO, in 2001, 3,648 mines and UXO were cleared from an area covering 9,712 square meters.¹⁵ From January to June 2002, 783 mines and UXO were cleared from an area of 2,437 square meters.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form E, 4 September 2001.

⁶ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 162, and *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance*, edition 2000-2001, p. 663.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form B, 4 September 2001.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Forms F and G, 4 September 2001.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 September 2001.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ "Abatoragura ibisafurya muritonde mutazaba nka Bisuperi" ("Those gathering big pans, beware of the plates"), *Imvaho (Information)*, weekly magazine of ORINFOR, Ministry of Information, 4 March 2001.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 September 2001.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 4 September 2001.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ National Demining Office Report provided to Faustin Rwahama, Second Counselor, Rwandan Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, 26 July 2002, faxed to Landmine Monitor 26 July 2002.

Since September 1995, 27,473 mines and UXO have been cleared from an area of 6,275,192 square meters, as well as 57 kilometers of the road from Gisenyi to Kibuye.¹⁶ In September 2001, Rwanda reported that of the more than 35 areas that have been identified as mined or suspected of being mined, and some twenty areas had been cleared.¹⁷

In 2001, the US provided \$400,000 to the NDO to help it continue its mine risk education campaigns, replenish equipment, and provide deminers and medics with refresher training.¹⁸ The US has allocated \$350,000 for Rwanda for fiscal year 2002.¹⁹

Mine risk education (MRE) activities started immediately after the establishment of the National Demining Office in 1995. NDO carries out its MRE through media, lectures, theater, and by distributing educational material in every province of the country. Rwanda considers this effort to be an important factor in the 80 percent decrease in casualties since the establishment of the NDO.²⁰

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, twenty-three landmine casualties (seventeen men and six women) were recorded, according to the National Demining Office: six in Byumba, one in Gysenyi, twelve in Kigali (city), one in Mutara, and three in Ruhengeri.²¹ In the first half of 2002, two mine casualties were recorded (both male): one in Byumba and one in Kigali (rural).²²

Since 1990, 617 mine casualties have been recorded, of which 446 were male.²³

In 2001, the National Prosthesis and Orthopedic Rehabilitation Service of Kigali Hospital Center treated 289 patients with amputations, of which 120 were mine victims (95 men, 17 women, and eight children).²⁴ The Service produced 289 prostheses in 2001.²⁵

Handicap International provides technical support to the Service at Kigali Hospital Center. In 2002, HI was strengthening its collaboration with the physiotherapy department so as to promote all-round patient care. HI supports disabled people and local structures and associations for social and professional reinsertion of people with disabilities in twelve districts.²⁶

The Mulindi Japan One Love Project (MJOLP) is a joint Rwandan/Japanese NGO that produces prostheses and orthoses free of charge for disabled persons and promotes the socio-economic reintegration of people with disabilities.²⁷ It produced approximately 500 prostheses and orthoses from July 1994 to April 2002. The MJOLP inaugurated a new workshop in Kigali on 29 September 2000.²⁸ In February 2002, MJLOP began a mobile workshop service to reach disabled people in remote areas.²⁹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 September 2001.

¹⁸ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 11.

¹⁹ US Department of State Fact Sheet, "The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form I, 4 September 2001.

²¹ The casualty figures provided did not distinguish between deaths and injuries. NDO Report provided to Rwandan Embassy in Brussels, 26 July 2002.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Email to Landmine Monitor from H el ene Pouget, Coordinator Rehabilitation Program, Handicap International, 23 July 2002.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Review of Activities 2001, Handicap International, p. 22. The districts are: Butare, Cyangugu, Gahini, Gisenyi, Kabgayi, Kibuye, Kigeme, Ngarama, Nyanza, Ruhengeri, Rutongo, and Rwamagana.

²⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 137.

²⁸ "One Love Tsushin," No. 18, January 2001.

²⁹ "One Love Tsushin," No. 22, May 2002.

In 2001, Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF) described its pressing health concerns in Rwanda as including mental trauma from the genocide and war-related injuries. After fighting in northwestern Rwanda in June 2001, MSF began a surgical intervention in Ruhengeri.³⁰

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Saint Kitts and Nevis signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 December 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 June 1999. Saint Kitts and Nevis has not enacted domestic implementing legislation.¹ Saint Kitts and Nevis was absent from the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, but it has supported similar pro-ban resolutions in the past. Saint Kitts and Nevis submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 16 May 2000, but has not yet submitted any subsequent annual reports. Saint Kitts and Nevis has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.²

SAINT LUCIA

Saint Lucia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 13 April 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. Saint Lucia cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Saint Lucia has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 March 2000, but Foreign Affairs officials are aware of this treaty obligation.¹ Saint Lucia has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.²

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 1 August 2001, and the treaty entered into force on 1 February 2002. It has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation.¹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was absent from the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, but it has supported similar pro-ban resolutions in the past. Its initial Article 7 transparency report is due 31 July 2002. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.²

³⁰ "Activity Report 2000-2001, Africa, Rwanda," Médecins Sans Frontières, www.msf.org.

¹ It responded "not applicable" in Form A (National implementation measures), Article 7 Report submitted 16 May 2000.

² Article 7 Report submitted 16 May 2000.

¹ In July 2001, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that Saint Lucia intended to file its transparency report. Telephone interview with Peter Lansiquot, Head of the Political and Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2001.

² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1 February 1999.

¹ In August 2002, it requested from ICBL a copy of the ICRC handbook to help draft implementing legislation, as well as the VERTIC Guide on Article 7 reporting. Fax to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, from Judith Jones-Morgan, Attorney General of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 31 August 2001.

² Response to *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* questionnaire, 22 April 1999.

SAMOA

Samoa signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 23 July 1998. Samoa submitted its initial Article 7 report on 24 June 2002, reporting on the period from January 1999 to June 2002. The report lists the “Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Act 2002” under national implementation measures and notes that the Act took effect on 25 April 2002. Samoa states that while the Act is not specific to antipersonnel mines, in Part II it prohibits “the use of any devices that endangers human life and personal safety. Any person found guilty under this provision is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years.”¹ Samoa cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, as it had done on similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. In March 2002, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs confirmed that Samoa does not produce, export, import, or stockpile antipersonnel mines, nor does it allow for their transfer through Samoa.² There has never been any use of antipersonnel mines in Samoa at any time and the islands are not affected by mines or unexploded ordnance.

SAN MARINO

The Republic of San Marino signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 March 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. San Marino submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 29 October 2001. This consists solely of a statement that San Marino “has not taken any measures to increase transparency of, not to prevent, [sic] the use, stockpiling, production or presence of landmines on its territory because it never used, stocked, produced or had landmines on its territory.”¹

San Marino did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. On 29 November 2001, San Marino voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. San Marino is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

SENEGAL

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, 54 new landmine/UXO casualties were reported, a small decrease from the previous year. No systematic demining has occurred, although the Army engages in some mine clearance. From mid-2000 to mid-2001, Handicap International’s mine risk education program reached the population in 680 of 776 accessible villages, and benefited 59,583 school children.

Mine Ban Policy

Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 23 September 1998 and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. There is no specific implementation legislation, but violations of Mine Ban Treaty provisions would be sanctioned by national constitutional law and under the 2001 Penal Code.¹ The National Commission on Small Arms is in charge of the mine

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 19 June 2002.

² Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor, NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Perina J Sila on behalf of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Samoa, 11 March 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted on 29 October 2001 (reporting period not stated).

¹ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Director of Study Control and Legislation, Ministry of Armed Forces, and Papa Diop, Director of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Union and Senegalese Abroad, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

issue,² but a separate National Commission on Legal Texts³ is studying various legislative reforms and considering national legislation vis-a-vis international treaties ratified by Senegal.⁴

Senegal submitted its third Article 7 transparency report on 22 April 2002, for the period from 1 January 2001 to 1 April 2002.⁵

Senegal attended the Third Meeting of State Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. In an interview with Landmine Monitor during the January 2002 meetings, a military official stated that Senegal would refuse to participate in joint military operations where antipersonnel mines might be used by militaries of another state.⁶

Senegal participated in the regional "Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention" in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States on 10-11 October 2001. In November 2001 Senegal voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Senegal is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to the Amended Protocol or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Senegal states that it has never produced, transferred or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.⁷ Authorities claim to have never used antipersonnel mines.⁸

In the Banjul Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese government and the rebel Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC) committed themselves not to use antipersonnel landmines.⁹ Past editions of Landmine Monitor have shown ongoing use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines by MFDC rebels in Casamance since that time. However, Landmine Monitor has not received any specific allegations of use by MDFC in this reporting period, since May 2001. A government official claimed that MDFC use of mines continues.¹⁰

Landmine Problem

The most mine-affected area is the region of Niaguis, Southern Casamance bordering Guinea-Bissau.¹¹ According to Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, the number of casualties in general has decreased significantly, because fewer new mines have been laid and because more mined areas are marked.¹² However, despite a slight decline in the number of new victims of landmines in

² For details on the commission, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 96.

³ The commission is composed by members of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces and Papa Diop, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁵ Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 1 September 1999, covering 1 March-30 August 1999, and on 27 March 2001, covering calendar year 2000.

⁶ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, 22 April 2002.

⁸ Phone interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces, 3 April 2002. In the past, Landmine Monitor has reported allegations of use of mines by Senegalese Armed Forces in Guinea-Bissau in 1998; see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 99.

⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 98.

¹⁰ Interview with Col. Ousmane Sarr, Director of Military Engineering and Infrastructure, Ministry of Defense, Dakar, 16 May 2002. For details on allegations of use by rebel forces, see *Landmine Monitor 2001*, pp. 138-139.

¹¹ Interview with Colonel Ousmane Sarr, Ministry of Defense, Dakar, 12 January 2001.

¹² Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces, Geneva, 29 May 2002; Article 7 Report, Form I, 22 April 2002.

Casamance, the suspected presence of landmines continues to concern many people in the region, who view the mine problem as the main obstacle to the development of the region.¹³

Regional agricultural production has decreased dramatically because of landmines. One account states, "The regional service for Agriculture for the Ziguinchor region estimates that the agricultural activities decreased 80% in the southwest region of Casamance, which was the richest zone of the region thanks to the diversity of agricultural activities."¹⁴ Even when crops are harvested, it remains extremely difficult to ensure transport of the produce as few are willing to risk their lives and vehicles on roads suspected of being mined. Tourism, another key economic activity in Casamance, has suffered from the presence of mines, especially in the Cap-Skiring area, one of the most visited sites in Africa.¹⁵

In its 2002 Article 7 Report, the government for the first time identified the types of emplaced mines found in Senegal: EXPAL, PMN, TM46, PRB ENCRIER, and K 35 BG.¹⁶

Mine Clearance

Most mine-related humanitarian initiatives in Senegal target survivor assistance and mine risk education programs, rather than mine surveys, assessments, mapping, marking or clearance.¹⁷

During his official visit to Geneva in September 2001, the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, met with the Director of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, to seek assistance for mine clearance in the Casamance region. The President reaffirmed the importance of the mine clearance in Casamance as a prerequisite for real development of the region.¹⁸

According to Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, systematic humanitarian mine clearance remains impossible as long as there is no peace agreement with rebel forces.¹⁹ The Army has occasionally conducted mine clearance in the regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda to allow populations to get back to their homes.²⁰ In its Article 7 Report of April 2002, the government reports that 133 antipersonnel mines, 47 antivehicle mines, and three "mixed" mines have been destroyed as a result of such operations.²¹

Mine Risk Education

Handicap International is the main provider of mine risk education (MRE) in Casamance.²² Through its MRE program, people in affected areas of the region are informed through community activities, and children are reached through the educational network.²³ HI reports that from mid-2000 to mid-2001, the program reached the population in 680 of 776 accessible villages, via 101 community volunteers. The MRE program has benefited 59,583 school children through the work of 1,074 primary school teachers. The HI Casamance program's budget (excluding structural costs)

¹³ Bertrand Diamacoune, 'La paix est irréversible' en Casamance" ("Peace is irreversible in Casamance"), *Le Soleil* (daily newspaper), 8 March 2002.

¹⁴ "Mouvement des Populations et Déminage," Bamako, Mali, 15 February 2001, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 140.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 April 2002. EXPAL is listed as Portuguese, but is a Spanish manufacturer. The TM 46 is a Russian antivehicle mine. The PRB ENCRIER is listed as Russian, but is likely Belgian. The K 35 BG is listed as French, but is likely the Belgian M-35.

¹⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 141.

¹⁸ "Le CIDHG prêt à aider au déminage de la Casamance" (The International Center for Humanitarian Demining of Geneva willing to help clear mines in Casamance), *Le Soleil* (daily newspaper), 5 October 2001.

¹⁹ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Article 7 Report, Forms C and G, 22 April 2002.

²² Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndao, Ministry of Armed Forces, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

²³ Interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gaye, Program Coordinator in Casamance, Handicap International, 15 May 2002.

for 2001 was 100 million FCFA (US\$150,000). Donors include ECHO (until March 2001), HIF (April-July 2001), and USAID since August 2001.²⁴

UNICEF has developed a landmine awareness campaign for the region. A song was composed in five local languages and recorded on CD and tape. Murals have been painted on the walls of the main high schools of the Ziguinchor region, and notebooks for children attending primary schools feature a message on how to prevent mine accidents.²⁵

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, 54 new landmine/UXO casualties were reported, of which eight people were killed and 46 injured, including 48 men, three women, and three children.²⁶ This represents a small decrease from the 65 new casualties reported in 2000, which included 22 killed and 43 injured.²⁷ Handicap International has recorded another 452 landmine/UXO casualties between 1993 and 1999, including 91 killed, 324 injured, and 37 casualties where the date of the incident could not be determined.²⁸

It is believed that the reported figures on mine casualties may not reflect the true reality of the number of new landmine/UXO victims in the region because of the influence of Islamic practice (burials take place as soon as possible after a death) and the absence of death registries.²⁹

In Form C of its Article 7 report, Senegal reported that 89 antipersonnel mines, 59 antivehicle mines, one "mixed" mine and four other ordnance had been victim activated in the period 1 January 2001 to 1 April 2002.³⁰ It could be supposed that this caused more than the 65 casualties reported in 2001. NGOs and other mine survivor initiatives in the region are encouraging the local population to report landmine incidents.

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. Handicap International recorded three men injured in mine incidents in January,³¹ and in March, a landmine explosion killed eight people, including a Gambian national.³²

Survivor Assistance

Due to a lack of national resources, assistance to mine survivors is limited.³³ Prosthetics and rehabilitation services are provided at the Ziguinchor hospital and the Centre d'Appareillage orthopédique (Center of Orthopedic Appliances) in Dakar. Handicap International is the main mine action actor. In addition to data collection, HI supported the decentralization of the orthopedic surgery and physical rehabilitation services of the Ziguinchor hospital. Two departmental centers were created in Bignona and Oussouye, the two chief towns of the region.³⁴ HI also supports the training of physiotherapists and orthopedic technicians. Until February 2001, HI financed the

²⁴ Email from Cathy Badonnel, MRE Coordination, HI, Lyon, 4 July 2002.

²⁵ *Things that go Bang!* (monthly e-bulletin of UNICEF), Issue Four, 13 May 2002.

²⁶ Data on mine and UXO victims in Casamance from 1988 to January 2002, Handicap International, sent to Landmine Monitor on 8 May 2002.

²⁷ Revised casualty data for 2000 was provided to Landmine Monitor by Handicap International in an email dated 30 November 2001.

²⁸ Data on mine and UXO victims in Casamance from 1988 to January 2002, Handicap International, sent to Landmine Monitor on 8 May 2002.

²⁹ "Les Victimes de Mines en Casamance," Handicap International, November 2000, p. 21.

³⁰ Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 April 2002.

³¹ Data on mine and UXO victims in Casamance from 1988 to January 2002, Handicap International, sent to Landmine Monitor on 8 May 2002.

³² "Eight Killed in Landmine Explosion," *The Independent* (Gambian newspaper), 15 March 2002.

³³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 101.

³⁴ Email from Sophie Wiseur-Gaye, Program Coordinator in Casamance, Handicap International, 8 May 2002.

KAGAMEN victim transit center in Ziguinchor, and provided survivors with prostheses and with financial support for income generating activities. The program has now ceased activities.³⁵

In July 1999, mines survivors created the Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines (ASVM) to help empower survivors to achieve sustainable economic reintegration. Since its creation, ASVM has received forty prostheses from Handicap International, and CFA 2,400,000 (about US\$3,300) from the national football team. This money is being used for a micro-credit program targeting mine survivors in the Casamance region.³⁶

The “Centre de Guidance Infantile et Familiale,” a NGO based in Casamance, provides psychotherapeutic support for war victims, including landmine survivors, through group discussion and sensitization.³⁷

SEYCHELLES

Key developments since May 2001: Domestic implementation legislation had been drafted and is awaiting approval by the Cabinet of Ministers. Seychelles has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due in May 2001.

The Republic of Seychelles signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1999, ratified it on 2 June 2000, and became a State Party on 1 December 2000. Seychelles has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due 30 May 2001.

Domestic implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty is in progress. A draft *Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Bill, 2001* has been circulated to all members of the National Humanitarian Affairs Committee and is presently awaiting approval by the Cabinet of Ministers.¹ The inter-ministerial National Humanitarian Affairs Committee was established in July 2001 with the mandate to ensure the translation of International Humanitarian Law into domestic legislation.

Seychelles did not participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, September 2001, nor did it attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. On 29 November 2001 Seychelles voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Seychelles is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons' (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to the Amended Protocol, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

A Foreign Affairs spokesperson confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Seychelles has not produced, imported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.² According to the law in Seychelles, it is illegal for anyone other than the military to handle any type of explosives.

³⁵ Telephone interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gaye, Program Coordinator in Casamance, Handicap International, Ziguinchor, 2 May 2002; email from Sophie Wyseur-Gaye, 8 May 2002; interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gaye, Ziguinchor, 15 May 2002.

³⁶ Abdoulaye Seye, “Ziguinchor : des GIE pour les victimes de mines,” *Le Soleil* (daily newspaper), 10 August 2001.

³⁷ Interview with Emile Dieme, Coordinator, Centre de Guidance Infantile et Familiale, Ziguinchor, 14 May 2002.

¹ Presentation by a member of the Government of Seychelles to the Southern African Regional Seminar on International Humanitarian Law, Pretoria, South Africa, 21-23 May 2002.

² Telephone interview with a representative of the Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2002. See also *Landmine Monitor 2002*, p. 144.

SIERRA LEONE

Key developments since May 2001: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Sierra Leone on 1 October 2001. It has not submitted its initial Article 7 Report, which was due on 20 March 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Sierra Leone signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 1998, ratified on 25 April 2001 and it entered into force on 1 October 2001. Sierra Leone is not known to have yet enacted domestic implementation measures as required by Article 9. The first Article 7 transparency report was due on 30 March 2002, but had not been submitted by the end of July 2002.

Sierra Leone attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001, represented by the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Sierra Leone was not present at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002. Sierra Leone cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, calling for full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Sierra Leone is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not participate in the CCW meetings in December 2001 in Geneva.

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

During the 1991-2001 civil war, very limited use was made of landmines, either antipersonnel or antivehicle. The rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) confirmed that it had made minimal use of landmines.¹ Sierra Leone is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. In February 2001, Sierra Leone acknowledged having a stockpile of 900 antipersonnel mines, but there has been no more information revealed about the stockpile.² The Mine Ban Treaty requires that all stocks of antipersonnel mines, except those retained for training, must be destroyed by 1 October 2005.

The UN operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has managed a program for the voluntary handover of weapons, including landmines, known as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rehabilitation (DDR). During Phase I, which expired on 18 May 2001, five antipersonnel mines were handed in and destroyed at the UNAMSIL Teamsite in Kenema and three antipersonnel mines were handed in and destroyed at the UNAMSIL Teamsite in Port Loko.³ From 18 May 2001-28 February 2002 (Phase II), one antivehicle mine was handed in at the UNAMSIL Kabala Teamsite and destroyed. In addition, a total of 121 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed at the Matru Teamsite, a rather sizable number given the government's statement that its armed forces have only 900 mines in stock.⁴

Mine/UXO Problem and Casualties

Although Landmine Monitor has, in the past, classified Sierra Leone as mine-affected, in the words of one UN official, there is no threat of landmines in the country.⁵ Landmines used during the civil war have, with few exceptions, been removed, either by the West African intervention

¹ Interview with Kenneth McCauley, former Chief of Protocol for RUF President, Foday Sankoh, Freetown, 27 February 2002.

² Sierra Leone acknowledged having this stockpile at the Bamako Seminar on Landmines, Mali, February 2001, as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 144.

³ Information contained in the Ammunition Destruction statistics up to 18 May 2001, supplied by the DDR Cell at UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown.

⁴ Information contained in the Ammunition Destruction Statistics since 18 May 2001, supplied by the DDR Cell at UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown. No explanation could be given by any of the ammunition experts in UNAMSIL about the origin of this large number of antipersonnel mines. Also, interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Dimitri Pankratov, DDR Cell, UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 13 February 2002.

⁵ Interview with Major Aden, ammunition expert at UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 25 February 2002.

force, ECOMOG, or the British intervention force IMATT. It is expected that when UNAMSIL extends its operations to the most remote corners of the country where fighting was particularly severe (e.g., the Kailahun and Koidu areas), mines may sporadically be found.⁶ Sierra Leone does face dangers from unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than landmines.⁷

In 2001, there were no confirmed reports of landmine casualties; however, there are reports of possible improvised explosive device (IED) or UXO incidents causing casualties. The surgical ward in Kenema Hospital has never treated a landmine casualty.⁸ MSF Belgium also confirmed not having treated a single landmine casualty.⁹ According to medical records at the Military Hospital at Wilberforce, 45 people were killed and eleven injured by landmines during the civil war.¹⁰

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Key developments since May 2001: Slovakia served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction until September 2001. Six mine clearance teams from Slovakia are operating with the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Mine Ban Policy

The Slovak Republic (Slovakia) signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 February 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 August 1999. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reiterated previous statements that national implementation legislation was not needed and that the existing penal codes cover violations of the treaty.¹ Slovakia submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 9 December 1999 and subsequent annual reports on 12 June 2000, 25 July 2001, and 30 April 2002.² The most recent report utilized voluntary Form J to report on mine action activities.

Slovakia participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.³ Slovakia associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union. As the outgoing co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Slovakia offered its assistance to other States in stockpile destruction: "Slovakia, with its expertise, wants to take its share and contribute to international assistance.... Slovakia possesses technical

⁶ Interview with Major Ahsan, UNAMSIL EOD Division, UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 26 February 2002.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Interview with Dr. Ben Mark, Surgeon General, Kenema Hospital, 21 February 2002.

⁹ Telephone interview with Frederic Capelle, Technical Coordinator, MSF Belgium, Freetown, 12 February 2002. Other aid agencies also confirmed that landmines are not an issue in Sierra Leone.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 145.

¹ Interview with Peter Kormúth, Director, and Igor Kucer, Department of OSCE, Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, 5 March 2002. Regulations on landmines are also included in Law 179/1998, which covers trade with all kind of military equipment, and Law 246/1993 on the use of a number of weapons and ammunition. Amendments on penal sanctions for violations of these laws remain under revision, as reported previously.

² Article 7 Reports, submitted on 9 December 1999 for the period 3 December 1997-30 November 1999; submitted on 12 June 2000 for the period 1 December 1999-30 April 2000; submitted on 25 July 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 30 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

³ Its delegation was led by Ivan Korcok, Director General of the Directorate of International Organizations and Security Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Karol Mistrík, Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. Correction: *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* incorrectly identified the title of the head of delegation at the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000. It was Ján Figel, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

and personal capacities for destruction of stockpiled landmines... Our capacities in this regard are fully available and can be used to help other countries to deal with the mine problem.”⁴

Slovakia also participated in the Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. On 29 November 2001, Slovakia cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Slovakia is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and on 22 October 2001, submitted the annual report required by Article 13, offering technical cooperation for ammunition and mine destruction.⁵ It attended the Third Annual Conference of State Parties to the protocol as well as the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. At the Review Conference Slovakia cosponsored the US-Danish proposal to increase the technical requirements for antivehicle mines and supported a strongly-mandated expert working group on explosive remnants of war. Slovakia associated itself with the statement made by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Destruction⁷

Slovakia completed the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 31 August 2000, destroying 185,560 out of the original stockpile of 187,060 mines.⁸ It has retained 1,500 mines (1,000 PP-Mi-Šr II and 500 PP-Mi-Na 1) in accordance with Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Ministry of Defense stated that, as of March 2002, none of these mines have been consumed.⁹ While the latest Article 7 Report states the retained mines are for the “development of demining technology and for training in mine destruction,”¹⁰ the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that the Slovak armed forces did not need mines for training, but only for testing new demining equipment.¹¹ Slovakia reports that *Guidelines for the use of the APMs retained for development of demining technology and mine detection training* were issued after the completion of stockpile destruction.¹²

In March 2002, the Ministry of Defense stated that an inventory has been made of antivehicle mines in stock and under development to identify which may be considered prohibited or permissible by the Mine Ban Treaty, and will consider any measures necessary to prevent antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes from functioning as antipersonnel mines. When the financial resources and technical capacity are ready, details of measures to be taken and the time-frame will be announced.¹³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that it had not attended the special consultation on antivehicle mines convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva in March 2001, because it had not been invited.¹⁴

⁴ Statement by Ivan Korcok, Director General of the Directorate of International Organizations and Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001.

⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, submitted on 22 October 2001.

⁶ Letter from Peter Kormúth, Director of Department of OSCE, Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2002.

⁷ For previous information on these issues, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 772.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 July 2001; however, the total destroyed is incorrectly reported as 186,560.

⁹ Interview held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Vladimír Valusek, Director, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2002.

¹¹ Interview with Vladimír Valusek, Director, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2002.

¹³ Interview with Vladimír Valusek, Director, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002. It was previously announced in April 2000 that the PT-Mi-K antivehicle mine with antilift firing mechanisms had been destroyed and that the status of other antivehicle mines that may function as antipersonnel mines would be considered after completing the destruction of antipersonnel mine stockpiles. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 714, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 773.

¹⁴ Letter from Peter Kormúth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2002.

Mine Action Assistance

In 2001-2002, Slovakia has not reported providing financial assistance to mine-affected countries. Consultations on assistance in stockpile destruction have continued with Peru, and with Canada regarding Ukraine.¹⁵ Since December 2000, Slovakia has participated in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with 198 engineering troops engaged in demining activities. In 2002, Slovakia has six mine clearance teams (totaling about 60 deminers) with UNMEE.¹⁶

From September 1999 to March 2002, Slovakia contributed an engineering unit of 43 troops to the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) mission in Kosovo; within this unit, ten deminers have been involved in mine clearance activities.¹⁷

The Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report and the latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report include details of the Slovak mine clearing machines Bozena and Belarty.¹⁸ Slovak military forces use both machines as a complement to manual demining in international missions. In Kosovo, Slovak deminers used one machine of each type, and in Eritrea they are using one Belarty and two Bozena machines.¹⁹

Landmine/UXO Problem and Casualties

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that, in rare instances, items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from Second World War are found. The procedure is to report this to the police who fence off the area and call in an explosive ordnance disposal specialist.²⁰

On 20 July 2001, a Slovak military observer with the European Union monitoring mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was killed along with a Norwegian colleague and their Albanian interpreter when their car hit an antivehicle mine.²¹ There were no other serious accidents involving landmines during Slovak participation in international missions in 2001.²²

SLOVENIA

Key developments since May 2001: By 22 May 2002, Slovenia had destroyed 121,919 antipersonnel mines, and had a total of 46,979 remaining to be destroyed. Domestic implementation legislation was being examined by ministries as of May 2002. In 2001, Slovenia contributed US\$418,373 to the ITF. In 2001, the ITF raised a total of \$20.5 million, a significant decrease from 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Slovenia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 27 October 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 April 1999. With a view to ensuring its effective national implementation, Slovenia enacted two administrative measures, on 1 December 1998 and

¹⁵ Interview with Peter Kormúth and Igor Kucer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vladimír Valusek, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

¹⁶ Interview with Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

¹⁷ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 18 October 2000; and email from Peter Kormúth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002.

¹⁸ See Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form G, 18 October 2000, and Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

²⁰ Email from Peter Kormúth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2002.

²¹ Interview with Vladimír Valusek, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

²² Interview with Peter Kormúth and Igor Kucer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vladimír Valusek, Lt.-Col. Frantisek Zák, and Capt. Martin Sabo, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, 5 March 2002.

14 April 1999.¹ Legislation including the penal sanctions required by Article 9 was being examined by the Ministries of Defense, Justice and Foreign Affairs in May 2002, with the expectation that it would be approved by the end of 2002.²

Slovenia did not participate at the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. On 29 November 2001, Slovakia cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Slovenia attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.³ Slovenia submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 16 April 2002.⁴

In 2001, domestic procedures were started for ratification of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which were expected to be concluded by the end of 2002.⁵ Slovenia did not attend the Third Annual Conference to Amended Protocol II, but did attend as a State Party the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Slovenia has stated previously that it never produced antipersonnel mines, has no production facilities, and has never imported or exported antipersonnel mines.⁶

Stockpiling and Destruction

Slovenian antipersonnel mine stockpiles originate from the time when it was a republic of the former Yugoslavia. In April 1999, when the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Slovenia, its antipersonnel mine stockpile totaled 171,898. By 30 April 2001, 15,364 mines had been destroyed, after which the pace of stockpile destruction increased, with 101,750 mines destroyed by 30 April 2002.⁷ At that date, 67,148 antipersonnel mines remained for destruction by the treaty deadline for Slovenia of 1 April 2003, with another 3,000 mines retained under Article 3.

¹ "Execution Plan confirmed by the Minister of Defense," 1 December 1998, and "Order by the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Army concerning the destruction of anti-personnel mines in the Slovenian Army," 14 April 1999. See Article 7 Report, Form A, 7 September 1999.

² Letter from Irina Gorsic, Attache, Department of Political Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2002.

³ In January, Ambassador Gregor Zore, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and Irina Gorsic, Attache, Department of Political Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participated, and in May, Irina Gorsic.

⁴ Article 7 Report, submitted 16 April 2002 for the period 1 May 2001-30 April 2002. Three previous Article 7 Reports were submitted: Article 7 Report, 7 September 1999 for the period 1 April-30 September 1999; Article 7 Report, 30 January 2001 for the period 1 October 1999-30 April 2000; and Article 7 Report, 1 April 2001 for the period 1 May 2000-30 April 2001.

⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002.

⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 716.

⁷ Article 7 Reports, Form G, 1 April 2001 and 16 April 2002.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpile Destruction Program as of 30 April 2002⁸

Mine Types	Original Stockpile	Destroyed 1 Apr 99 - 30 Sep 99	Destroyed 1 Oct 99 - 30 Apr 00	Destroyed 1 May 00 - 30 Apr 01	Destroyed 1 May 01- 30 Apr 02	Mines Retained under Article 3	Remaining for destruction at 30 Apr 02
PMA-1	70,487	6,634		1,500	21,051	200	41,102
PMA-2	44,390	1,470		700	39,750	300	2,170
PMA-3	12,960			730	9,440	700	2,090
PMR-2A	28,085		2,016	1,544	12,535	800	11,190
PROM-1	15,976			770	3,610	1,000	10,596
Sub-Total	171,898	8,104	2,016	5,244	86,386	3,000	67,148
Cumulative Total Destroyed	0	8,104	10,120	15,364	101,750		

Slovenia has given regular updates of its progress in stockpile destruction at the Standing Committee meetings. At the meeting in May 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Slovenia had destroyed an additional 20,169 antipersonnel mines since submitting its Article 7 Report.⁹ Thus, by 22 May 2002, Slovenia had destroyed 121,919 antipersonnel mines, and had a total of 46,979 remaining to be destroyed.

Slovenia's capacity to destroy its stockpile was assessed by a Stability Pact mission on 24 September 2001. The mission concluded that the stockpile destruction program is "pragmatic, efficient and effective." Slovenia is "progressing well towards the destruction of their APM stockpile. They require no international assistance at the moment." The mission reported that the Ministry of Defense estimates the cost of destruction as approximately US\$2 per antipersonnel mine, including the salaries of military personnel used for the task.¹⁰

In December 2000, Slovenia announced that it would reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained under Mine Ban Treaty Article 3 from 7,000 to 1,500 after 2003.¹¹ The Article 7 Report submitted on 16 April 2002 indicates that a total of 3,000 mines are being retained (see chart above for types and numbers). At the May meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Slovenia stated that the number of retained mines had been reduced from 7,000 to 3,000.¹² The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the retained antipersonnel mines.¹³

In its Article 7 Reports, Slovenia has not reported consumption of any of the retained mines. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in March 2002 that the mines would be used for training of personnel assigned to peace operations, especially in parts of former Yugoslavia, and training of foreign armed forces and others (including the activities of the Training Centre for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief in Ig, and of the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance).¹⁴

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that Slovenia initially proposed destroying all the "classical" antipersonnel mines and purchasing as substitutes Claymore-type directional fragmentation devices. The Ministry notes that a Claymore mine is permissible because it "enables

⁸ Article 7 Reports, Forms B and D, 7 September 1999, 30 January 2001, 1 April 2001, and 16 April 2002. Revised quantities of mine types retained under Mine Ban Treaty Article 3 were noted in Form D of the Article 7 Report, 6 April 2002. The final column of mines remaining for destruction is calculated from the Article 7 Report data.

⁹ Statement by Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002; letter from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2002.

¹⁰ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, p. 2.

¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 777.

¹² Statement by Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 16 April 2002.

¹⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002.

controlled use of the device for a precisely defined military objective.”¹⁵ Slovenia has a total of 220 Claymore-type mines, 38 of which are inert dummies.¹⁶

The Ministry reports that Slovenia possesses 59,500 antivehicle mines, but none with antihandling devices; all types enable detection with standard mine detectors in compliance with Amended Protocol II of the CCW.¹⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Slovenia does possess 8,032 TRMP-6 antivehicle mines.¹⁸ Human Rights Watch has identified the TRMP-6 as a mine of concern, because it can be fitted with a tilt rod and a tripwire.¹⁹

Landmine/UXO Problem

All of Slovenia’s Article 7 Reports to date claim that there are no areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. A report by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in October 2001 stated that “Slovenia no longer has a mine problem, however there still remains a problem associated with the disposal of UXO [unexploded ordnance] from previous conflicts.”²⁰

A summary of previous mine contamination explained that when the Slovenian war ended in July 1991, the Yugoslav Army declared that all the minefields had been destroyed. But in fact it left behind active minefields around army barracks and warehouses, though no maps. Inspection and clearance was carried out 1992-1994. Two teams from Civil Protection and the Slovenian Army inspected and demined 18 military locations covering around 15 million square meters. They found and destroyed 572 mines. Since 1994, there have been no more casualties from mines laid in the war.²¹

Mine Action Funding

In mid-2001, the government made its annual decision on financial support for the work of International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). In 2001, Slovenia contributed US\$418,373 to the ITF.²² Of this, \$165,807 was for victim assistance programs.²³ Funds were provided by the three ministries that established the ITF – the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health and Defense. For 2002 the total donation will be \$254,363.²⁴

International Trust Fund

The ITF is a non-profit organization established in March 1998 by the government of Slovenia. The original aim was to provide this assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but operations have spread throughout Southeastern Europe. In 2002, the ITF plans to extend its

¹⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002, and email, 12 June 2002.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Letter from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2002.

¹⁹ Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, “Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes or Antihandling Devices,” 25 February 2002.

²⁰ “Overview of Capability Reports,” Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, p. 24, 65.

²¹ “Demining Operations in Slovenia,” Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 5; Letter from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2002.

²² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002; Letter from Irina Gorsic, 22 May 2002. Exchange rate at 11 February 2002: US\$1=254.2 SIT, used throughout this report.

²³ Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, “Overview of the Donor Support to MVA Programs through ITF,” presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 2 July 2002.

²⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002; Letter from Irina Gorsic, 22 May 2002; “The Summer is the Season for Demining and Donating,” August 2001, accessed at: www.sigov.si/itffund on 5 November 2001.

activities, on a small scale, outside the region, using funds pledged for demining projects in the Caucasus and mine-related training in Afghanistan.²⁵

In addition to demining and mine victim assistance, the ITF places emphasis on training in mine action, promotion of regional cooperation, and development of a regional Geographic Information System for Mine Action. Demining contracts are usually awarded through an open bidding procedure conducted by ITF, or can be awarded directly if the donor so wishes. ITF staff and consultants monitor execution of the operations, visiting demining sites on a daily basis. Since March 1998, more than 30 companies and eight NGOs have been involved in demining, clearing more than 22 million square meters of land.²⁶

In 2001, the ITF continued demining operations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. In October 2001, the ITF began demining operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and opened a temporary office in Skopje. On 8 November 2001, the ITF signed an agreement for mine/UXO clearance with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In November 2001, an office was opened in Zagreb to improve coordination and monitoring of its work in Croatia, and to facilitate the tendering process.²⁷

Donations: In 2001, a total of \$20.5 million was raised by the ITF from 16 governments, the European Commission, and 11 companies and organizations.²⁸ In comparison, in 2000 \$29.4 million was received from 11 governments, the European Commission, and 12 companies and organizations.

In 2001, the arrangement for donations to be matched by the United States contributed \$5.6 million to the total. By April 2001, these matching funds appropriated by the US Congress were used up. In December 2001, the Congress decided to allocate a further \$14 million to the ITF as matching funds. Donations of \$7.25 million received from other donors after April 2001 will be doubled by US matching funds retroactively in 2002.²⁹

The table below shows the donations received by the ITF in 2001. However, funds received in 2001 were not necessarily used during the year, and funds allocated by donors in one year may be received by the ITF in the next year, and in several separate amounts.

²⁵ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 3; "The Summer is the Season for Demining and Donating," August 2001, accessed at: www.sigov.si/itffund on 5 November 2001.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁹ Email from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 23 March 2002. The administrative agreement for the second tranche of US matching funds was signed on 27 February 2002.

Donations to the ITF in 2001³⁰

Donor	Amount in US\$
Adopt-A-Minefield@	279,409
Austria	39,972
Belgium	113,304
Canada	2,209,926
Community Center Sarajevo, BiH	16,255
Croatia	245,200
Croatia Without Mines	31,148
Czech Republic	50,000
Denmark	94,380
Embassy of Croatia	7,648
Elektroprivreda Mostar	116,921
Elting Pale	18,587
European Commission	90,260
Euromarketing Pale	9,973
France	152,661
Global Care Unlimited	15,000
Germany	237,188
Korea	30,000
Luxembourg	88,660
Miklosic Education Center	440
Norway	3,823,925
Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute	5,971
Roots of Peace	30,000
Slovenia	418,373
Sweden	373,224
Switzerland	1,075,424
United Kingdom	718,913
United States (matching funds)	5,627,507
United States (unilateral)	4,522,963
Vietnam Veterans of America Found.	84,470
Night of a Thousand Dinners	6,695
TOTAL	20,534,397

NB The sum of the amounts as listed in the table is slightly different because of rounding up without the cents.

In July 2001, the ITF signed an agreement with the NGO Adopt-A-Minefield for demining projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. The projects will be financed by donations raised by Adopt-A-Minefield and matched by the ITF. This new partnership will increase donations from the private sector, which has represented only one percent of all donations to the ITF. By December 2001, 17 sites had been cleared with Adopt-A-Minefield funds.³¹

Expenditures:

In 2001, \$26.3 million was allocated by the ITF to the following activities:³²

- Demining: \$20,463,569 (78 percent). In 2000, \$18.76 million (84 percent).
- Victim assistance: \$1,325,053 (5 percent). In 2000, \$1.42 million (6 percent).

³⁰ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 10.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24; "Adopt-A-Minefield Program—Demining Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia with ITF Partnership," Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 2.

³² "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 11.

- Mine awareness: \$101,363 (0.4 percent). In 2000, \$915,745 (4 percent).
- Structural support of regional mine action centers: \$2,477,677 (9 percent).
- Training support: \$191,230 (0.7 percent).
- Other regional activities: \$1,014,421 (4 percent). In 2000, \$50,577 (2 percent).
- ITF projects and running costs: \$712,323 (3 percent). In 2000, \$655,084 (3 percent).

The funding was distributed by countries in 2001 as follows:³³

- Albania: \$2,506,286
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: \$8,305,216
- Croatia: \$5,665,936
- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: \$474,592
- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (excluding Kosovo): \$31,052
- Kosovo: \$7,179,650
- Regional activities (including support for the Geographic Information System project and South Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council): \$1,410,580.

In 2002, the ITF plans to fund the survey and clearance of 3.5 million square meters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 5 million square meters in Croatia, to continue demining and the “train and equip” program in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Yugoslavia, and to continue demining in Albania. It will also continue to fund rehabilitation of mine survivors at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute and support other victim assistance programs. This involves allocating 29 percent of ITF funds in 2002 to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 46 percent to Croatia, 5 percent to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 5 percent to Yugoslavia.³⁴

Mine Clearance and Training Activities

The ITF-funded Sava project is described as the first *regional* demining project, involving several countries in Southeastern Europe, to clear mine-affected areas near the border between Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The project covers 680,632 square meters of land (Croatia: 326,000 square meters, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 354,632 square meters). During 2001, the Sava project surveyed and cleared 174,164 square meters in Croatia, and 252,545 square meters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, uncovering more than 180 mines and 20 items of UXO. By the end of March 2002, a further 75,000 square meters in Croatia were scheduled for survey and clearance.³⁵

Bosnia and Herzegovina: In 2001, the ITF provided \$6,266,014 for projects, which demined a total area of 3,001,837 square meters of land (commercial companies: 1,804,433 square meters; NGOs: 1,197,404 square meters). In the process, 1,875 mines and 896 UXO were found and destroyed. The NGO demining was carried out by Akcija Protiv Mina, BH Demining, Handicap International, Norwegian People’s Aid, Provita, and Stop Mines. Additionally, the ITF channeled \$1,382,041 into support for the demining structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was seriously under-funded.³⁶

Croatia: In 2001, ITF provided funding of \$4,741,900 for projects which demined 2,797,571 square meters of land, with 730 mines and 195 UXO found and destroyed. Through eight open

³³ Email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 5 June 2002. Excluded from this breakdown are funds spent on “ITF projects and running costs”.

³⁴ “Plan of ITF Activities for the Year 2002,” Newsletter No. 8, ITF, April 2002, p. 5.

³⁵ “The Works for the Sava Demining Project Supported by the European Union and United States Contributions to the ITF have been Awarded,” Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 1, and “Second Donation of European Union to International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance,” February 2002, accessed at: www.sigov.si/itffund on 8 March 2002.

³⁶ “Annual Report 2001,” ITF, p. 17. See the report on Bosnia and Herzegovina in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

tenders, 14 commercial companies were involved. Contracts for an additional 300,000 square meters were awarded in late 2001, with work to start as soon as weather permitted.³⁷

Albania: In 2001, ITF provided funding of \$2,506,287 for two demining projects, implemented by RONCO and the Swiss Federation for Mine Action (SFMA). The RONCO project from 22 May to 20 October cleared 108,773 square meters of land, and found 267 mines and 19 items of UXO. SFMA started training local staff in April 2001 and started demining and battle area clearance on 21 May 2001. By the end of 2001, SFMA cleared 190,854 square meters and found 334 mines and 137 items of UXO. The ITF also provided financial support to the Albanian Mine Action Executive and in-kind contributions of computer equipment and software.³⁸

Kosovo: In 2001, ITF provided funding of \$6,065,697 for demining and battle area clearance (BAC) in Kosovo. In total, 2,740,752 square meters were cleared through demining and BAC, with 711 mines and 847 UXO found. Organizations involved were the HALO Trust, RONCO, HELP, Norwegian People's Aid and Mine-Tech. The ITF also supported the Handicap International mine detection dog program and HI's training of the Kosovo Protection Corps. Funding was also provided to the mine awareness program of HMD Response, which finished in August 2001.³⁹

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: The ITF started activities in FYROM in 2001, with an assessment of UXO and mine contamination. The Bosnia and Herzegovina NGOs BH Demining and STOP Mines, under monitoring of Terra Prom, began operations started on 17 October 2001, and ceased, due to weather conditions, on 16 December 2001. By that date, the teams had cleared 1,739,257 square meters (including 879 houses, 1,394 buildings, and 18.8 kilometers of railway and roads).⁴⁰

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: In 2001, ITF began funding a mine action program in Yugoslavia. A \$31,052 survey started in mid-May 2001 by the Italian NGO Intersos to assess mine- and UXO-contamination. An agreement with the Yugoslav authorities was signed on 8 November 2001, for ITF-funded mine/UXO clearance and also the training and equipping of Yugoslav teams.⁴¹

On 26 June 2001, the ITF hosted a South Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council (SEEMACC) meeting at the Training Center for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, in Ig, Slovenia. Directors of all the region's mine action centers attended. Issues discussed included the UNDP course, reciprocal accreditation of demining machines and mine detection dogs between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, training needs and capabilities, and the Geographic Information System.⁴²

The Geographic Information System for Mine Action (GIS) is being implemented by the ITF to increase regional coordination. Lack of information and common information systems have contributed to confusion, duplication, and inefficiencies in the demining operations in Southeastern Europe.⁴³

Within the Reay Group for Mine Action, the ITF has taken responsibility for training, testing, and evaluation. To establish what training capacities and needs exist in Southeastern Europe, in 2001 the ITF sent out questionnaires to all demining authorities in the region. The essential findings were that no comprehensive approach to training exists in the region, and that there is a

³⁷ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, pp. 18, 25.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 25, and email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 5 June 2002.

³⁹ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, pp. 20, 25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22; "ITF Spreads Its Operations to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 6.

⁴² "Third Meeting of The South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council held at Ig on 26 June 2001," Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 7.

⁴³ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, pp. 12-13, and "Geographic Information System (GIS) Workshop Held at the Training Center for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief at Ig, Slovenia," Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 6.

need to make an inventory of training available and to broaden the training opportunities related to mine action available in the region.⁴⁴

Under the International Test and Evaluation Program (ITEP) for humanitarian demining, an inventory of regional facilities was made in 2001. The Slovenian Training Center for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, at Ig, and the ITF headquarters were visited on 14-15 May 2001 by an ITEP team. The assessment was that the Center can provide "very good facilities" for training courses and that the ITF "has proven to be a valuable facilitator for contacting demining agencies throughout the Balkans...and could play a role in the funding of regional T&E projects and/or facilities."⁴⁵

Survivor Assistance

The ITF allocated \$1,325,053 to victim assistance programs in 2001, which is a reduction from the amount allocated in 2000 (\$1,419,814). This continues reductions in previous years of the percentage of the total funds expended by ITF on victim assistance (2001: 5 percent; 2000: 6.4 percent; 1999: 8.8 percent).

The ITF implements its mine victim assistance program on three levels: rehabilitation of mine survivors at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute, rehabilitation at the centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other programs by various NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other mine-affected countries in the region.

Up to the end of 2001, some 615 mine survivors from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro had been treated at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute and at the rehabilitation centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁶ In 2001, the Institute treated 102 mine survivors (30 from Albania, 44 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 28 from Kosovo), and trained 63 health practitioners. Donors for rehabilitation of mine survivors from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Austria, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute, and the US.⁴⁷ The donor for rehabilitation of mine survivors from Kosovo was the US.⁴⁸

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the ITF funded (\$656,850) programs in 2001, including the International Rescue Committee (concluded on 30 April 2001), a study by the Mobile Orthotic and Prosthetic Service (MOPS) and Landmine Survivors Network (continuing with additional funding to December 2002). The ITF also funded a week-long stay (9-16 June 2001) at the Youth Health Resort at Debeli rtič on the Slovenian coast for 15 child mine survivors and their guardians from Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁹

In 2001, the ITF funded a victim assistance program of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation in Kosovo.⁵⁰

The ITF also provided funding in Croatia for the Croatian Association of the Disabled.⁵¹

The Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute received CAD/CAM (Computer Aided Design/Computer Added Manufacturing) equipment in 2001, funded by the US through the ITF. This is expected to significantly improve the rehabilitation of mine survivors from South-Eastern

⁴⁴ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, section on Needs and Capabilities in the Field of Training in the Region of South-East Europe.

⁴⁵ "Overview of Capability Reports," Reay Group on Mine Action, Working Table III (Security Issues), Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 17 October 2001, pp. 19/65-24/65.

⁴⁶ "Annual Report 2001", ITF, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; email from Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, ITF, 5 June 2002; and presentation by Eva Veble at ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 2 July 2002.

⁵⁰ "Annual Report 2001," ITF, p. 17.

⁵¹ Eva Veble, Head of Department for International Relations, at ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 2 July 2002.

Europe. It allows high precision measurements to be taken so that better fitting prostheses may be made. The CAD part of the system is portable so it can also be used for field treatment of patients. It will be possible to use the system in all mine-contaminated countries of Southeastern Europe that are the subject of ITF operations.⁵²

On 1-2 July 2002, the ITF organized a workshop, "Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success," on landmine victim assistance in Southeastern Europe. The aims of the workshop were to discuss the regional needs and capacities in mine victim assistance, and identify gaps in current provision.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

The Solomon Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 26 January 1999. The Solomon Islands voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. In May 2002, for the first time, a representative of the Solomon Islands participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings. The Solomon Islands has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 December 1999. At the Standing Committee meeting, the delegate explained that the Solomon Islands was aware of its obligation, and that internal difficulties had contributed to the delay; it was working to submit the report prior to the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002. He confirmed that the Solomon Islands has never produced, transferred, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.¹ A diplomatic source told a researcher that the country has never used the weapon but stated that during the internal conflict of 1999 and 2000, some "primitive" improvised explosive devices were used.² There is a "significant" problem with unexploded ordnance left over from World War II, especially on Guadalcanal, but this is not believed to include landmines. In September 2001, a member of the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) described the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) division of the Police as "grossly under resourced."³

SOUTH AFRICA

Key developments since May 2001: South Africa has continued to play a leading role in the intersessional work program of the Mine Ban Treaty and was instrumental in the establishment of the treaty's Implementation Support Unit. It has also been a leader in promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in Africa.

Mine Ban Policy

South Africa was the third country to sign the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. It ratified on 26 June 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. In May 2002, South Africa's Foreign Minister assured the ICBL that "As a State Party that is committed to the terms of the Treaty, South Africa remains active in the universalization of the MBT [Mine Ban Treaty]. In this context, South Africa participates in the discussions of the Universalization Contact Group and uses bilateral contacts to encourage the ratification of the MBT amongst African countries."¹ At

⁵²"Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute Receives Cad-Cam Equipment Donated by the U.S.," Newsletter No. 6, ITF, July 2001, p. 4.

¹ Oral remarks of Mr. Jeremiah Manele, Counsellor, Embassy of the Solomon Islands to the United Nations, New York, to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW).

² Interview by David Capie, small arms researcher, with diplomatic source, Honiara, 24 September 2001. Information provided by Capie in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 2 December 2001.

³ Ibid.

¹ Letter from Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ms. Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 23 May 2002.

the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2002, South Africa said it “firmly believes that the Mine Ban Convention has irreversibly established itself as the international norm in banning anti-personnel mines.... we cannot de-mine today simply to re-mine tomorrow, and the only guarantee we have to prevent re-mining is to implement policies banning antipersonnel mines.”²

Under its Constitution, South Africa is bound by all international agreements it signs once both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces have approved them, at which time the international agreement becomes national law.³ Since 1999, South Africa has been developing implementation legislation.⁴ In June 2001, Mines Action Southern Africa (MASA) – the national member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – was requested by the Defence Secretariat and the South African government’s MBT Enabling Legislation Drafting Committee to organize a number of workshops to facilitate civil society input into South Africa’s domestic legislation. Six workshops were held including three with the mine clearance community and three with a range of non-governmental organizations. The draft document was approved by Cabinet on the 29 May 2002 and, as of July, was being reviewed by the State’s legal advisors before being debated by various Parliamentary Standing Committees and the National Assembly for Parliamentary promulgation.⁵ It is envisaged that the South African parliament will approve the “Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill” before the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.⁶ MASA is confident that South Africa’s legislation will be seen by the international and regional community as “international best practice,” as its definition of antipersonnel mine refers specifically to its impact or effect and because it makes provision for not only international inspections, but also domestic inspections to enforce compliance.

As with previous meetings of States Parties, the government sent a large delegation to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. In its statement to the Meeting, South Africa called for universalization initiatives to be coordinated in both a structured manner and in such a way that specific regional and sub-regional sensitivities and priorities are considered.⁷ It also played an instrumental role in the establishment of the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU), for which it pledged US\$3,000 in support. South Africa led consultations on formation of the ISU, and drafted the concept paper for presentation at the Coordinating Committee, mission briefing and Third Meeting of States Parties. The ISU is based at the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD); South Africa is a member of the Council of Foundation of the GICHD.

South Africa continues to play a leading role in the intersessional work program and the various Standing Committees; it was an active participant in the Standing Committee meetings in both January and May 2002. South Africa has said, “We are heartened by the fact that States Parties, other States, the ICBL, ICRC and many other nongovernmental and international organisations have participated actively in the work of all the Committees. Together we have through the continued spirit of inclusivity and partnership lived up to the intentions of the negotiators at Oslo.”⁸

² Statement by Thomas Markram, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the Office of the United Nations and other International Organisations in Geneva, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001.

³ *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 14 231(4), (Wynberg: Constitutional Assembly, 1997).

⁴ Article 7 Report, 1 September 1999.

⁵ Interview with Mr. D. Dladla, Defense Secretariat, DOD: Policy and Planning, 5 June 2002.

⁶ “The Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill,” (Version 6:A), 20 February 2002. The Bill will provide for the implementation and enforcement of the Mine Ban Treaty in South African Law, ensuring the destruction of antipersonnel mines, and providing for domestic inspections, for international fact-finding missions to South Africa, for domestic as well as international cooperation; and for other matters relating to the obligations of the Republic under the Convention.

⁷ Statement by Thomas Markram, Third Meeting of States Parties, 18 September 2001.

⁸ *Ibid.*

South Africa also was an active contributor to substantive and practical planning for the Third and Fourth Meetings of States Parties and to initial thinking about the process leading up to the Review Conference in 2004.

South Africa submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report on 28 May 2002, covering calendar year 2001.⁹ South Africa cosponsored and voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

South Africa has been a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) since October 1995 and its Amended Protocol II since June 1998. The government participated in both the Annual Meeting of Amended Protocol II and the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW in December 2001 in Geneva, and was elected as one of 10 Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

In its statement, South Africa observed that, 18 years after the Convention's entry into force there were only 88 State Parties and stressed that the promotion of wider accession should be a high priority for the Review Conference.¹⁰ It proposed that there should be regular meetings of the States Parties in order to foster closer cooperation and consultation among them and to encourage further accessions. South Africa asserted that the CCW and the Mine Ban Treaty were not mutually exclusive, since the former goes beyond the realm of one specific weapon. The international community's ultimate objective should be universal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty and to the CCW and its annexed Protocols.¹¹

South Africa supported the call for an extension of the scope of the CCW to non-international conflicts and the proposal that a group of experts should undertake work on explosive remnants of war (ERW) with a view to a future legally binding instrument on ERW. South Africa also submitted a Working Paper on "Additional Articles on Consultations and Compliance."¹² Because there were no changes to South Africa's original report, it did not submit Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports in 2000 and 2001.¹³

Universalization in Africa

South Africa is an active member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mine Action Committee. This Committee met in June 2002 to finalize five EU/SADC funded projects, develop future mine action programs for the region, and to discuss the Committee's role in promoting the Mine Ban Treaty among member states. This Committee falls under the newly created SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation.

Also in June 2002, SADC, under the auspices of this Committee, convened a meeting of Southern African mine operators in Luanda, Angola. The meeting discussed the problems faced by mine action operators in the region, the development of a regional network, and the establishment of regional standards. It also discussed the need to facilitate resource and investment mobilization.

South Africa, along with Nigeria and Senegal, has developed a strategic framework to enhance poverty eradication in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development in the world economy. As a political framework, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) recognizes that combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines is one of the important conditions for sustainable development. NEPAD was endorsed by all African leaders at the Organization of African Unity summit on 11 July 2001.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 May 2002.

¹⁰ Statement by Ambassador George Nene to the Second Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 11 December 2001.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Report of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious Or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001.

¹³ Interview with Bennie Lombard, Councillor, South African Mission, Geneva, 27 May 2002.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Delegation in Pretoria, under the auspices of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held its second annual regional seminar on international humanitarian law (IHL). Governmental representatives from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, and Police from 12 of the 14 SADC member states attended the seminar, which took place in Pretoria from 21-23 May 2002. One workshop was dedicated to the domestic legislation required to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and used South Africa's recent experience as an example.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

South Africa is a past producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.¹⁴ It no longer has an antipersonnel landmine production capability.¹⁵ Destruction of its stockpile of mines was completed by October 1998.¹⁶ In June 2002, a trunk containing a cache of old military equipment was discovered in Durban harbour's Maydon Wharf. Police found among other items two landmines that were described as potentially dangerous and unstable.¹⁷

South Africa retains a number of antipersonnel mines for the training of soldiers to deal with antipersonnel mine threats during peacekeeping operations, as well as for the development of effective demining equipment, demining research purposes and military/civilian education purposes as provided for under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁸ In 1997, the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) transferred 5,000 retained mines to Mechem.¹⁹ In its Article 7 reports, South Africa has reported that Mechem used 170 Rain 51103-05 antipersonnel mines for demonstration and training purposes in 1999, another 325 in 2000, and another 50 in 2001. Thus, as of 31 December 2001, 4,455 Rain 51103-05 mines remained in stock, under the control and authority of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research's Defencetek.²⁰

Mine Action

Mozambique: Between 1995 and September 2001, a large number of mines, both antipersonnel and antivehicle, were destroyed under a bilateral cooperation agreement on arms destruction between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), called Operation Rachel. The aim of Operation Rachel is to destroy arms caches left in Mozambique following that country's civil war and transition to democratic rule. Between May and September 2001, 48 antipersonnel mines were destroyed through this process.²¹ In a three-week operation in May 2002, an additional 39 antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines were also recovered and destroyed.²²

Afghanistan: In January 2002, South Africa pledged to assist Afghanistan with demining. On her return from the Tokyo Conference where about US\$4.5 billion was pledged toward Afghanistan's reconstruction, Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, stated that "ridding the country of mines was vital towards the safety and security of Afghan civilians" and while South Africa "could not pledge any money for Afghanistan, it was prepared to cooperate in

¹⁴ For information on past production, transfer, and stockpiling see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 83-84, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 103-104, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 148-149.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, 1 September 1999.

¹⁶ As reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 104, this included about 309,000 mines. An additional 2,586 antipersonnel mines that were found or seized were destroyed in 1999.

¹⁷ F. Ismael, "Stevadore's 'Treasure Chest' a Big Letdown," *Sunday Tribune*, 1 June 2002.

¹⁸ South African National Defense Force, "Fact Sheet: South Africa's Initiatives on Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines," 8 September 1999; South African National Defense Force, "Fact Sheet: South Africa's Initiatives on Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines," 6 April 2001. See also, Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999 and Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 May 2002.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Forms D and G, 28 May 2002.

²¹ E. Hennop, "Operations Rachel, 1995-2001," *Institute for Security Studies Paper 54*, November 2001.

²² Statistics of Operation Rachel VIII (1)," Special Task Force, South African Police Service, 11 June 2002.

the area of demining" as it had the necessary technology.²³ South Africa would seek to cooperate with other countries, particularly Sweden and Japan, in this regard.

Ethiopia: In April 2002, a delegation from the Ethiopian Mine Action Office held a series of meetings with South African entities involved in mine action about their assisting Ethiopia with mine clearance. It is envisaged that South Africa will become involved in mine clearance operations in Ethiopia sometime in 2002.

Mechem Consultants, a specialized engineering division and subsidiary of the South African state-owned arms company Denel, has been involved in the detection of landmines, protection against landmine explosions, and in clearing of minefields for over four decades. In March 2001, Mechem's research and development wing was sold to the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a parastatal falling under the Department of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology. The operational part of Mechem remains in the Denel group. As a State-owned enterprise, Denel would still be undertaking humanitarian mine clearance on behalf of the government.²⁴ Mechem has, in the past, been contracted by UN agencies, governments, and private electrical or road-building companies for demining operations in various locations including Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, and northern Iraq. Mechem maintains offices in both Bosnia and Croatia. In 2002, it is working in Kurdistan, northern Iraq, removing mines around power lines, providing Evaluation and Assessment services and training Kurds as dog handlers.²⁵ From March to October 2001, Mechem returned to Mozambique under a Japanese-funded contract with the government of Mozambique to clear mines.²⁶

Other South African-based firms: In addition to Mechem, there are several other South African-based firms offering mine action services, including Pretoria-based BRZ International.²⁷ The regional office of Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias De Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA) is located in South Africa, as is European Landmine Solution (ELS). CGTVA worked in Mozambique during 2000; ELS-Africa has worked with CARE in Angola. TNT De-mining focuses mainly on the training and provision of demining personnel at all levels. The Institute for Military Engineering Excellence in Southern Africa (IMEESA) provides, among other services, training in demining, mine awareness programs, management of demining projects and surveying. UXB Africa provides a number of turnkey services including in the area of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and customized landmine-related training courses.²⁸ Demining Enterprises International (DEI) supplies fully trained mine detection dog teams internationally. Another company called Specialist Dog Services (SDS) breeds mine detection dogs and trains handlers and has operational experience through activities undertaken under the auspices of Mechem, BRZ International Ltd, Tamar Consulting Services, CGTVA, The Humanitarian Foundation of People Against Landmines (MgM), Mozambique Mine Action, Handicap International, United Nations Office for Project Services, and Afrovita in countries such as Angola, Croatia, Mozambique, Namibia, Northern Iraq and Uganda.

Mine Action Research and Development

South Africa has emerged as a leader in the field of mine clearance equipment and believes that it possesses leading demining technology and expertise, as well as medical capability and experience to assist mine victims. In South Africa, demining equipment is classified as armaments and, as such, sales and exports by South African companies are controlled and regulated by the government. Mechem has a number of research contracts with the US government and private companies. Other key South African research and development companies include: RSD, a division of Dorbyl Ltd; UXB, an American company with offices in Cape Town; Reutech Defense

²³ "SA to help demine Afghanistan," *South African Press Association*, 24 January 2002.

²⁴ Solomon Makgale, "Denel Signs R10m Contract with CSIR," *Business Report*, 30 March 2001.

²⁵ Lumka Oliphant, "Sniffing Out Landmines in Kurdistan," *Saturday Star*, Johannesburg, 27 January 2001.

²⁶ Interview with Braam Rossouw, Mechem Consultants, 9 April 2001.

²⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 106, for BRZ mine action activities.

²⁸ See: www.uxb.com.

Industries (RDI); Vickers OMC; Armscor; and, the Center for Scientific Information and Research.²⁹ DEMCO (PTY) LTD, a demining equipment manufacturing company, combines landmine clearing with infrastructural development. DEMCO has developed a landmine detonating mechanism that can be fitted to a range of earthmoving machines such as bulldozers, loaders, and excavators.³⁰ Securicor Gray (Africa) offers survey and quality assurance services, landmine clearance and UXO disposal teams, as well as community mine risk education training.

Other companies and organizations active in the mine action field as researchers, policy formulators, evaluation, conference organization, and facilitators include: Management & Conference Services Africa (Pty) Ltd; Mines Action Southern Africa; South African Institute for International Relations (SAIIA); and the African Demining Institute. A regional workshop on "Humanitarian Mine Action and Development: the Missing Link?" is being planned by the Finnish-funded SAIIA Landmine Project for October 2002.

A number of these organizations held a meeting in April 2002 with relevant sections of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Arranged by the newly formed African Demining Institute, discussion centered on: the need for all operators to adhere to UN Mine Action Service standards; regional accreditation; corruption in the industry; and how to develop more appropriate channels of communication between mine action operators and government.

Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In April 2002, a South African deminer under contract with Empresa Moçambicana de Desminagem, Lda (EMD) was seriously injured in an incident in Mozambique.³¹

In May 2002, a newly established South African Company, Africa Medical Assistance (ASA), entered into an agreement with the Institute for National Social Security in Burundi for the supply of prostheses. The first phase of the project is prostheses for approximately 100 patients. The provision of prostheses is linked to a physical rehabilitation training program and support for local authorities.³²

South Africa provides a number of international humanitarian organizations with financial and material aid aimed mainly, but not exclusively, at SADC member States. In fiscal year 2001-2002, the ICRC received a donation of R200,000 (US\$20,000) specifically for the rehabilitation of landmine survivors in Angola.³³ South Africa has reported that in fiscal year 2000-2001 it donated R350,000 (US\$35,000) to the ICRC for the rehabilitation of mine survivors in the SADC region.³⁴

SPAIN

Key developments since May 2001: Spain opened an International Demining Training Center, and conducted two courses for Lebanese and Central American participants. Mine action funding in 2001 totaled €741,357 (\$667,221). Spain sent three demining teams to Afghanistan. In September 2001, Parliament approved a "green paper" intended to increase the funding for mine action.

Mine Ban Policy

Spain signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 January 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 July 1999. National legislation, Law 33/1998, was passed in October 1998. In response to concerns that the law does not include penal sanctions as required by Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Spanish government states that "penal sanctions...were already

²⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 107-108.

³⁰ See <http://www.demcomine.com>.

³¹ De Wet Potgieter, "Landmyn Tref Ororlogsheld Wat Vrederswerk Doen," *Rapport*, 21 July 2002.

³² Interview with Christo Schutte, Africa Medical Assistance, 2 July 2002.

³³ Information provided by Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa, 8 April 2002.

³⁴ Article 7 Reports, Form J, 17 September 2001 and 28 May 2002.

included before its adoption, at least in the Ordinary Penal Code, the Military Penal Code and the Constitutional Law 12/95, on the repression of smuggling.”¹

Spain attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.² In its general statement, the delegation emphasized the challenges to be met by States Parties in fulfilling obligations, including ensuring that international cooperation required by Article 6 occurs in practice. Spain called on all countries to join the treaty as soon as possible, and noted that eradication of mines is part of European common foreign policy.³

On 26 September 2001, a “green paper” was approved by parliament that, among other things, called for more initiatives, especially in the European Union (EU) context, to encourage all countries to join the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ (See below for more on the paper). On 29 November 2001, Spain cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in a response to Landmine Monitor inquiries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported no specific activities undertaken by Spain during its presidency of the EU in the first half of 2002 to encourage other countries to join the treaty.⁵

Spain participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. In May 2002, the delegation was led by Ambassador Carlos Miranda, who presented a statement on behalf of the EU Member States, which referred to EU support for dealing with antivehicle mines within the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).⁶

Spain submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 7 June 2002. It included the voluntary Form J, in which Spain reports details of funding and other mine action assistance. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 15 December 1999 and 15 April 2001.⁷

Spain is a State Party to Amended Protocol II to the CCW. It attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II and the Second Review Conference of the CCW in December 2001. Spain submitted its Article 13 annual report for Amended Protocol II on 24 January 2002.⁸

Spain’s annual report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was submitted on 14 December 2001.⁹

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices

The Spanish Campaign to Ban Landmines has raised concerns about two Spanish antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that may function as antipersonnel mines, the SB-81/AR-AN and the C-5.¹⁰ The Spanish Campaign has noted that the national Law 33/1998 prohibits both

¹ Letter from Manuel Morato Ferro, Department of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, 24 October 2001; letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Department of International Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002. Landmine Monitor researcher’s translations throughout this report.

² The delegation was led by Ignacio Matellanes, Ambassador to Nicaragua, and composed of representatives from the Spanish Embassy in Managua, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ Discurso del Secretario General de la AECI ante la Tercera Reunión de Estados Parte en la Convención de Ottawa, Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.

⁴ Green Paper 161/000696. Motion presented by Grup Parlamentari Català (CIU) and published in BOGG, Congreso de los Diputados, Series D, No. 166, 23 April 2001.

⁵ Letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 April 2002.

⁶ Statement on Behalf of the European Union by Ambassador Carlos Miranda, Permanent Mission of Spain to the Conference on Disarmament, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 15 December 1999 for the period 1 July-28 December 1999; submitted on 15 April 2001 for the period 28 December 1999-31 December 2000; and submitted on 7 June 2002 for the period 28 January-31 December 2001.

⁸ Article 13 Report, submitted on 24 January 2002 for the period 1 October 2000-15 December 2001.

⁹ Report of the Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 14 December 2001.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 785 and 787, for additional discussion of these mines and Spain’s views. The government has said that a third mine of concern, the CETME, is not in stock.

antipersonnel mines and “similar weapons” (minas antipersonal y armas de efecto similar), and argues that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes are therefore banned under Spanish law, as well as the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs restated their view that since Article 2.1 of the Mine Ban Treaty excludes antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, these two Spanish mines are not covered by the treaty, and therefore there is no need to report on such mines in Article 7.¹¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, as well as cluster bombs and unexploded ordnance (UXO), should be regulated in the CCW, not the Mine Ban Treaty.¹²

However, at the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the Mine Ban Treaty “uses an approach based on the effects which characterize antipersonnel mines.... For that reason it is already possible to include in the framework of the [Mine Ban Treaty] those weapons designed to have similar effects. This is the interpretation made by the Spanish Parliament in approving Law 33/1998 on the total prohibition of landmines and weapons with similar effects.”¹³

Production, Transfer, Use, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Production of antipersonnel mines ceased officially in May 1996. Export has been prohibited since 1994. Spain last used antipersonnel mines on the Moroccan border in 1975.¹⁴ There have been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines by non-State actors in Spain.

The 1998 national law obliged Spain to destroy existing stockpiles of antipersonnel mines within three years, which was achieved on 3 October 2000.¹⁵

In March 2000, Spain decided to reduce the number of mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 of the treaty from 10,000 to 4,000. Two types of blast antipersonnel mines were retained: the P-5 (3,784 mines) and P-4B (216 mines). The specific purposes for which these mines are retained have not been stated. The numbers are unchanged since December 1999, so it appears that none have been consumed yet for the permitted purposes.¹⁶

The Ministry of Defense states there are no foreign antipersonnel mines on Spanish territory, including at the US installations at Torrejón near Madrid and at Rota and Morón de la Frontera near Cadiz. Spain described these installations not as military bases but as “use installations” which are commanded by Spain and subject to Spanish legislation.¹⁷ The Ministry of Defense added that once Law 33/1998 was approved and the treaty was ratified, the US was requested to remove all mines from the installations.¹⁸

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

Criteria for mine action funding and assistance used by the Spanish Cooperation Agency (AECI) were summarized in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. Spain prioritizes programs in Central America, Peru, Ecuador, Angola, and Mozambique.

¹¹ Letter from Manuel Morato Ferro, Ministry of Defense, 24 October 2001; letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002.

¹² Letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002.

¹³ Letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002. Similar statements about Law 33/1998 have been made in the past. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 722-723.

¹⁴ For details of past production, transfer, and use, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 650-654, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 785-786.

¹⁵ Article 13 Report, Form C, 24 January 2002; Article 7 Report, Form G, 7 June 2002.

¹⁶ Article 7 Reports, Form C, 15 April 2001 and 7 June 2002; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 20 November 2000; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 2000, p. 1.

¹⁷ Letter from Manuel Morato Ferro, Ministry of Defense, 24 October 2001: “EEUU no dispone de bases un España, sino instalaciones de uso.”

¹⁸ Telephone interview with official at Ministry of Defense, 8 December 2001.

In September 2001, Parliament approved a “green paper” intended to increase the funding for mine action.¹⁹ The paper urged the government to increase resources for demining and victim assistance programs through bilateral and multilateral financial aid, education and information programs for civilian populations in mine-affected areas, mine detection and decontamination in other countries, and Spanish contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. The paper also urges increased allocation of military personnel for demining, and increased funding through AECI for NGOs working on victim assistance. The green paper does not specify the method or the date when the mine action budget should be increased, and does not specify which ministry is responsible.²⁰

Spain’s latest Article 7 Report gives details on mine action funding totaling €741,357 (\$667,221) in 2001. These include: €416,811 (US\$375,130) for two training courses in humanitarian demining for Lebanese and Central American participants;²¹ €300,506 (\$270,455) to the Organization of American States for training in humanitarian demining; €24,040 (\$21,636) to the Association for the Cooperation and Development of Cambodia (ACADICA) for a mine risk education program.²²

Spain has reported providing a total of almost €4.2 million (\$3.78 million) for mine action funding in the period 1995-2001.²³ This includes €2.4 million for demining in Central America, €1.08 million to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for demining in Angola, Mozambique and Kosovo, and €600,000 for demining on the Peru-Ecuador border.²⁴

In 2001, Spain opened an International Demining Training Center, which aims to provide training in accordance with the UN International Mine Actions Standards. From 16 to 25 May 2001, a course on humanitarian demining was conducted for 20 Lebanese officials, organized in cooperation with the Russian Federation Ministry of Emergency. From 22 October to 30 November 2001, a course was held for 15 humanitarian demining instructors from Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.²⁵

For 2002, the following international courses were planned: humanitarian demining for Angolan and Mozambican officials; recognizing and deactivating explosives for Central American countries; humanitarian demining operations management; and a humanitarian demining seminar for civilians involved in demining. The cost of these courses is estimated at €712,220 (\$640,998), to be funded by the Ministry of Defense and AECI.²⁶ The International Demining Training Center has also planned a training course for Afghan demining instructors so that they can, in turn, train people in Afghanistan on demining tasks.²⁷

Spain has cooperated with the International Security and Assistance Force, sending three demining teams to Afghanistan. Their mission includes inspection, transfer and decontamination of explosives (mostly antivehicle mines, antipersonnel mines and unexploded ordnance).²⁸ It was

¹⁹ Green Paper 161/000696. Motion presented by Grup Parlamentari Català (CIU) and published in BOGG, Congreso de los Diputados, Series D, No. 166, 23 April 2001.

²⁰ Email from AECI, 2 April 2002.

²¹ The Ministry of Defense stated in October 2001 that these courses were funded by the Ministry of Defense and AECI, totaling €198,334. Letter from Manuel Morato Ferro, Ministry of Defense, 24 October 2001. The 24 January 2002 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report indicates the Ministry of Defense contributed €300,000 of the funds for the two training courses.

²² Article 7 Report, Form J, 7 June 2002. The Ministry of Defense reported €741,367 for the same programs. Letter from Jose A. Beltran Dona, Sub-Director for Cooperation and Civil Defense, Ministry of Defense, 15 April 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.9, throughout this report.

²³ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001, p. 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

²⁵ Letter from Manuel Morato Ferro, Ministry of Defense, 24 October 2001.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ M. G., “Un Centenar de Afganos Aprenderá en España Cómo Desactivar Minas,” (“A Hundred Afghans will learn demining landmines in Spain”), *El País*, 7 March 2002.

²⁸ Ciro Krauthausen and Miguel González, “Cinco Soldados Europeos Mueren en Kabul al Desactivar un Misil Ruso” (“Five European Soldiers Die in Kabul during Deactivation of a Russian Missile”), *El País*, 22 March 2002.

reported on 15 March 2002, that the Spanish teams had dealt with 616 mines since the start of the mission on 26 February.²⁹ The involvement of Spanish military personnel in KFOR in Kosovo and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina included mine detection and clearance duties; further details are not reported.³⁰

In 2001, the NGO *Moviment per la Pau* (MxP) organized a fundraising football match between RCD Español veterans and a team of Spanish actors and journalists. The funds will be used for demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the Bosnian NGO *Akcija Protiv Mina* (Action Against Mines). MxP has also produced postcards and teaching packs to maintain public awareness of the mine issue.³¹ The NGO *ACADICA* received AECI funding for a mine awareness program in Cambodia.³²

Research and Development (R&D)

The Spanish company *GTD Ingeniería de Sistemas y de Software* is participating in the Eureka project “ANGEL.” The objective is to create, test and consolidate a set of technologies and equipment to find, identify and neutralize antipersonnel mines. This project is a joint investment totaling €40 million and involving more than 15 European companies and scientific organizations. *GTD* has been part of this project since its inception, and shares 35 percent of the total investment in the six-year R&D plan. The Spanish Army is collaborating with the program, providing technical assistance and a controlled area for testing and training.³³

Survivor Assistance

In 2001, the NGO *Vida sin Barreras* held a fundraising concert for victim assistance on 17 December 2001, and used the funds (in cooperation with the national transport company *MRW*) to develop a project called “Stop Antipersonnel Landmines.” This involved collection of prostheses, wheelchairs, and crutches all around Spain from April to July 2001, which were then distributed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during August and September 2001. Several Bosnian NGOs participated in the project: Red Cross in Livno, H.O. *Altius* in Sarajevo, *Klinicki Centar Univerziteta Sarajevo*, Association of Paraplegics of Sarajevo, and Association *Umerno* in central Bosnia. A budget of €1,000 was allocated to the project; there was no governmental funding.³⁴

SURINAME

Key developments since May 2001: Suriname ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 May 2002. Suriname is conducting an inventory of its small stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Suriname signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 23 May 2002. The treaty will enter into force for Suriname on 1 November 2002. Suriname’s initial Article 7 transparency report will be due by 30 April 2003.

Suriname did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Nicaragua, or the intersessional meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva. Suriname was absent from the vote on the pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001.

²⁹ “Comienzan los Primeros Relevos de Militares Españoles en las Misiones en Afganistán” (“Beginning of First Spanish Military Deployments in the Afghanistan Missions”), *Europa Press*, 15 March 2002.

³⁰ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001, p. 2; Article 13 Report, Form E, 24 January 2002.

³¹ Email from *Moviment per la Pau*, 30 October 2001. Further information from: movpau@suport.org or *Moviment per la Pau* c/ Providència, 42 08022 Barcelona, Spain.

³² Information obtained from website: información@acadica.org.

³³ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, submitted on 24 January 2002 for the period 1 October 2000-15 December 2001; see also: www.gtd.es.

³⁴ Email from *Vida sin Barreras*, 26 March 2002.

On 9 May 2002, a seminar was held in Paramaribo on implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The seminar was organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Canada, and the Netherlands, in cooperation with the government of Suriname. Suriname's Minister of Defense, Ronald Assen, opened the seminar. It received good local media coverage. Suriname deposited its instrument of ratification two weeks after the seminar.¹

The Disarmament Division of the Ministry of Defense is in charge of initiating mechanisms for the development and/or adaptation of national legislation to implement the treaty domestically, with the support of the Ministry of Justice and Police.²

Suriname is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Suriname's Ministry of Defense has acknowledged a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines, believed to number 296 as of July 2002, but the Ministry of Defense is still conducting an inventory.³

Mine Problem

During Suriname's internal conflict from 1986 to 1992, an estimated 1,000 antipersonnel mines were laid in the country. The Army of Suriname cleared nearly all mined areas after the conflict, with the assistance of the OAS, who provided technical assistance, Brazil, who donated mine clearance equipment and provided technical support, and the Netherlands, who provided financial support. Rebel forces used homemade mines during the conflict, but have reportedly removed all of them.

According to the Minister of Defense, some 13 antipersonnel mines emplaced by the Army on 26 February 1987 remain uncleared at Stolkertsijver, about fifty kilometers east of Paramaribo, because dense vegetation made clearance too difficult.⁴ Warning signs around the area are still intact and the Ministry of Defense has an agreement with local veterans that they will monitor the area and alert the Ministry to any unusual activity or trespassing.⁵ Suriname lacks the proper equipment to remove the remaining mines.

At least two landmine casualties in Suriname have been recorded, one soldier and one civilian, but no more details were available.⁶

SWAZILAND

The Kingdom of Swaziland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 23 December 1998, and the treaty entered into force for Swaziland on 1 June 1999. In its first Article 7 transparency report, submitted on 16 February 2000, Swaziland reported that full implementation "[l]egislation is presently being drawn up."¹ No progress on this has been reported. Swaziland has not submitted its annual updated Article 7 Reports, due 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002.

Swaziland did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 "due

¹ "Universalization News," Newsletter of the Ottawa Convention's Universalization Contact Group, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 2002, p. 1.

² Interview with Captain John Achong, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Defense, Paramaribo, 16 July 2002; telephone interview with Inez Huyzen-Sedney, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Justice and Police, 18 July 2002.

³ Interview with Major Jozef Laurens, Engineering Division, Ministry of Defense, Paramaribo, 16 July 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Notes from the Mine Action Seminar sent to Landmine Monitor (MAC) by Sheila Ketwaru-Nurmohamed, gender and development consultant, 14 May 2002.

¹ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form A, 16 February 2000; interview with Major Moses M. Fakudze, Umbutfo Defense Force, 17 April 2001.

to a shortage of funds."² Swaziland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In its Article 7 Report, Swaziland confirmed that it does not and has never possessed antipersonnel landmines for any purpose.³

Swaziland has a small mined area just east of the Lomasha Customs point near the town of Mananga on the border with Mozambique.⁴ In June 2000 an Army Spokesperson told Landmine Monitor that Swaziland intended to clear the area.⁵ In January 2002 the Swaziland government stated its intention to investigate the extent of landmine spillover along the whole of the Swaziland-Mozambique border as soon as possible.⁶ There have been no reports of injuries or deaths caused by landmines for about ten years.⁷

The Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force is responsible for mine action activities. Forty demining instructors of the Umbutfo Defense Force were trained by American soldiers from August to October 1999. Swaziland reports, "At the end of that course they went to a suspected mine area to mark it, warning members of the public about the danger zone."⁸

In January 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Swaziland confirmed that no demining had taken place and stated that no further progress had been made in arranging for the area to be cleared.⁹

The U.S. government had set aside \$289,000 for mine action in Swaziland, undertaken by the Swaziland forces trained by the U.S. military personnel.¹⁰ As of January 2002, Swaziland had not submitted a request to use these funds, resulting in the funds no longer being available.¹¹

Landmine Monitor was told in late June 2002 that Swaziland has requested financial support from the US to re-train its deminers, and that the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force is waiting for Cabinet approval to establish a base in the mined area, from which to coordinate mine clearance operations.¹²

SWEDEN

Key developments since May 2001: Sweden completed the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in December 2001. Sweden is retaining 13,948 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes, the second highest number of any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Mine action funding in 2001 totaled SEK91.6 million (\$8.5 million), an increase from 2000. In November 2001, Sweden finalized its new policy guidelines on mine action funding.

Mine Ban Policy

Sweden signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. National implementation was achieved by additions to existing legislation, entering into force at the same time.¹

² Interview with Mr. Bernard Gumede, Under Secretary (Political Affairs), Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 17 January 2002.

³ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 16 February 2000.

⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 153, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 110, for more details.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 110.

⁶ Interview with Mr. Bernard Gumede, Under Secretary (Political Affairs), Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 17 January 2002.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 154.

⁸ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 February 2000.

⁹ Landmine Monitor interview with a spokesperson for Mr. Thomas Jung, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, 17 January 2002.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 153-154.

¹¹ Interview with Thomas T. Jung, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, 17 January 2002.

¹² Email to Landmine Monitor, 29 June 2002.

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 726.

Sweden submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 25 April 2002, covering the period from 1 April 2001 to 1 April 2002. The report includes the voluntary Form J, reporting details of mine action funding.²

Sweden participated in the Third Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.³ A statement was delivered by Belgium on behalf of European Union (EU) member States. Sweden also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁴ At the meetings in January 2002, the delegation reported completion of the stockpile destruction program in December 2001, and that its Claymore-type mines had been modified to be compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵ At the meetings in May 2002, Sweden stated its position on the issue of States Parties assisting non-States Parties in joint military activities involving antipersonnel mines (see below).

On 7 February 2002, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh gave a speech, which included the issue of universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. She said, "The rapid entry into force of the Ottawa Convention and its large number of States Parties has led to an international norm against the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines. But still some States continue to stay outside the framework of the Convention. I call upon those States to adhere to the Convention so that we can rid the world of anti-personnel mines."⁶

The Ministry of Defense said that the issue of accession to the treaty is on the agenda when Swedish officials plan dialogue with countries not party to the treaty. During the Swedish Presidency of the European Union (1 January-30 June 2001) Sweden did not consider it possible to make universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty an issue, since not all Member States are parties to the treaty.⁷

On 29 November 2001, Sweden cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Sweden was chief sponsor of UNGA Resolution 56/28, calling on States to adhere to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) without delay. During its Presidency of the EU, Sweden started a process which resulted in a common EU position at the Second CCW Review Conference in Geneva in December 2001.⁸

At the Review Conference, Sweden delivered a statement stressing the challenges concerning "explosive remnants of war" (ERW) and the need for a CCW protocol on ERW. Sweden supported the CCW's extension to internal armed conflicts, compliance mechanisms, and proposals to increase the technical regulations on antivehicle mines, noting that the "threat from mines forces humanitarian relief operations to use expensive air transports."⁹ Sweden also attended the Third

² This is Sweden's fourth report. Article 7 Reports, submitted on 29 October 1999 for the period 1 May-30 September 1999; submitted on 14 June 2000 for the period 1 September 1999-1 April 2000; submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period 1 April 2000-1 April 2001; and submitted on 25 April 2002 for the period 1 April 2001-1 April 2002.

³ Sweden was represented by Ambassador Markensten, from the Embassy in Nicaragua, and Counselor Lindahl Kenny, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁴ It was represented variously by Ambassador Henrik Salander and Counselor Lindahl Kenny, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Lieutenant-Colonel Olof Carelius, Armed Forces, Daniel Nord, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Johnny Kjellstrom, Ministry of Defense, and Magnus Carlqvist, Swedish International Development Agency.

⁵ Remarks to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.

⁶ Speech by Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 7 February 2002.

⁷ Interview with Anna Hammarlund, Desk Officer, and Johnny Kjellström, Desk Officer, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 9 January 2002. Finland is the only EU member that has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Statement by Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the Second CCW Review Conference, 12 December 2001.

Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II in December 2001, and submitted the annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol in December 2001.¹⁰

Early in 2002, the government prepared a comprehensive policy on issues related to mine clearance, such as humanitarian and military demining, victim assistance, mine awareness, and assistance to other States in the destruction of their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. The aim is to assure that all state actors involved in mine action work towards the same goals and have the same vision, and to facilitate better coordination between state actors and give support and guidance in their practical work. The policy was to be presented to Parliament before June 2002.¹¹

Joint Military Operations

Regarding the issue of participation in joint military operations with countries not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, a policy document “Swedish position on the significance of Article 1(c) of the Ottawa Convention as regards participation in international peace operations” was published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2001.¹² Article 1(c) says that States Parties undertake never under any circumstances to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

The Swedish policy document states, “Article 1(c) ought not to be interpreted so that any kind of participation in a joint military operation with a non-party would be considered as an encouragement to activities under the Ottawa Convention.” Sweden believes that Article 1(c) is intended “to prevent *active participation* in activities prohibited by the Convention.”¹³

The document states that Sweden will decide to participate in joint operations with States not party to the treaty on a case-by-case basis. In the event of participation on a bilateral basis in joint operations with States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, “Sweden will bring its obligations under the [treaty] to the attention to the other State.”¹⁴

In February 2002, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh told Parliament: “Our cooperation in a joint military operation in which one of the participating states uses antipersonnel mines could be considered a violation of the spirit of the convention if we not in all ways counteracted the use of antipersonnel mines.”¹⁵

At the Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002, Sweden summarized its position on this issue, noting that mere participation in a joint military operation with a non-State Party using antipersonnel mines would not be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Sweden would “do its utmost” to prevent use of antipersonnel mines by others.¹⁶

Sweden is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but does currently participate in joint peacekeeping operations with States that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Stockpiling and Destruction

On 19 December 2001, the Defence Material Administration reported that destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been completed, in accordance with Parliament’s decision in

¹⁰ Article 13 Report, submitted on 6 and 10 December 2001 (there are two versions of the report). This reports on the legislative implementation of the Protocol in Sweden, information exchange and funding of mine action programs.

¹¹ Email from Dick Börjesson, Advisor, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 8 March 2002.

¹² “Swedish position on the significance of Article 1(c) of the Ottawa Convention as regards participation in international peace operations,” Memorandum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 September 2001.

¹³ *Ibid.*; emphasis added.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ “Vårt deltagande i en gemensam militär operation där någon av de deltagande staterna använder antipersonella minor skulle kunna anses strida mot konventionens anda om vi inte på alla sätt motverkade användandet av antipersonella minor.” Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, written answer to question (2001/02:619) in Parliament, 13 February 2002.

¹⁶ Remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW).

1996, with the exception of mines retained for permitted purposes.¹⁷ National legislation preceding the Mine Ban Treaty obliged destruction of all antipersonnel mines by the end of 2001, earlier than the treaty deadline of 1 May 2003.

The most recent Article 7 Report confirms completion of stockpile destruction, and reports that 2,348,149 antipersonnel mines were destroyed after entry into force on 1 May 1999. This included a final 13,080 Truppmina 10 mines from April-December 2001.¹⁸ The total number of antipersonnel mines destroyed by Sweden is not known, because the size of Sweden's stockpile when the destruction program began in 1998 has not been reported; from partial data, Landmine Monitor has previously estimated the initial stockpile at 3.2 million antipersonnel mines.¹⁹

The destruction sites, methodology (dismantling), safety, and environmental standards are noted in the Article 7 Report. At least 90 percent of explosives have been recovered, and burning of waste was carried out in accordance with EU directives.²⁰

Mines Retained Under Article 3

In its April 2002 Article 7 Report, Sweden reports that it is retaining 13,948 antipersonnel mines, including 13,530 Swedish mines and 418 foreign mines.²¹ It is the second highest number of mines retained by any State Party. It includes 4,000 mines that Sweden did not report last year among the mines it intended to retain.²²

Sweden reports retaining: 9,030 Truppmina 49B mines;²³ 4,500 Truppmina 10 mines; 100 PMA 2 mines; 96 PMR 2A mines; 88 PMA 1 mines; 85 MRUD mines; 39 PMA 3 mines; and 10 PROM 1 mines.²⁴

Before deciding how many antipersonnel mines to retain, the Armed Forces, in cooperation with public authorities such as the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Total Defence Research Establishment, and the Defence Material Administration, analyzed the need for mine clearance activities (education, research, testing of techniques, and development of methods). Based on this, the Armed Forces decided to keep complete mines, mine bodies, and mine fuzes to put in wood and gypsum dummies.²⁵

The Armed Forces calculate that the 733 mines are needed for training each year. Some 200-300 personnel will be trained annually, with each trainee detecting and destroying two and four mines.²⁶ In addition to the mines used for training purposes, the Armed Forces calculate that 2,200 mines are needed for testing and development of mine clearance and detection equipment over next ten years.²⁷ Out of this total, 200 Swedish mines and the 418 foreign mines will be used to test

¹⁷ Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 22 January 2002.

¹⁸ Article 7 Reports, Form G, 30 April 2001 and 25 April 2002.

¹⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 792.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form F, 25 April 2002; email from Johnny Kjellström, Desk Officer, Ministry of Defence, 8 February 2002.

²¹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2002. Sweden also has 1,590 Truppmina 11 mines that it counted last year as retained mines. However, it has determined that since it is not keeping any mine fuzes that could be connected to Truppmina 11, the mine bodies of Truppmina 11 should not be counted as retained mines. Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 20 March 2002.

²² Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2001. The additional mines are 1,800 Truppmina10 and 2,200 Truppmina 49B, all to be kept by the Bofors Defence/Saab Bofors Test Center for development of mine clearance equipment.

²³ 2,840 of these are mines without fuzes, but which could be connected to fuzes kept for dummies. Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2002.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2002.

²⁵ Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 20 March 2002.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 25 April 2002. In addition to the complete live mines, the Armed Forces are also keeping mine bodies of Truppmina 10, Truppmina 11, Splittermina 48, and Granatmina 43 T mines for training purposes. Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 20 March 2002.

²⁷ Article 7 Report, Form D, 25 April 2002.

mine detection equipment.²⁸ The rest will be used for testing of Mine Protected Vehicles and other mechanical equipment used in mine clearance.²⁹

The Ministry of Defence tasked the Armed Forces to analyze the consequences if Sweden decided to retain only 5,000 antipersonnel mines. They concluded that this would necessitate purchase of mines from abroad to carry out planned activities, and consider the alternative of obtaining foreign antipersonnel mines to be difficult and expensive.³⁰

In February 2002, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated, "In the preparatory work for the annual report that shall be submitted according to article 7 of the Ottawa Convention Sweden will follow the recommendations to include information about intended purposes and actual use of the antipersonnel mines that are retained in accordance with article 3."³¹

Claymore Mines and Antivehicle Mines

The April 2002 Article 7 Report states, "All other devices of claymore-type have been reconstructed and rendered useless as antipersonnel mines."³² Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius told Landmine Monitor that during the last half of 2001, Truppmina 12 mines were modified so that they can only be used in command-detonated mode, as a weapon that has to be discharged by a soldier.³³

The Article 7 Report adds, "It was also planned to do the same with anti-vehicle mines of claymore-type. However, due to prohibitive costs...it was decided instead to focus on measures to ensure that the mines are not used with tripwires. Thus, it is now prohibited to take the mines out from the storage without removing the tripwires, furthermore, it is also prohibited to train soldiers using any kind of tripwires for these mines."³⁴ The order to this effect was issued on 2 March 2001, and the order prohibits use and distribution of the fuze as well as tripwires for these mines (Fordonsmina 13 and Fordonsmina 013R).³⁵

With regard to the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Parliament in February 2002 that "the Swedish government is of the opinion that generally you can't say that antivehicle and antitank mines with antihandling devices are comparable to antipersonnel mines."³⁶ She also stated, "The government considers those antitank mines with antihandling devices possessed by Sweden to be compliant with the Ottawa Convention."³⁷ Defense Minister Björn von Sydow stated, "The government does not have the intention to do a specific inventory of antivehicle and antitank mines with antihandling devices for reporting to the parties to the Convention."³⁸

Mine Action Funding

Calculations of Swedish mine action funding can be based on funding agreements or actual disbursements of funds. Funds are often disbursed years after the funding agreement is reached.

²⁸ Ibid.; telephone interview with Daniel Nord, Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2002.

²⁹ Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 20 March 2002. The Truppmina 11 mine bodies and mine fuzes will also be used for these purposes.

³⁰ Interview with Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, Stockholm, 1 March 2002.

³¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh, written answer to question (2001/02:691) in Parliament, 14 February 2002. Translated by Landmine Monitor researcher.

³² Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2001.

³³ Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 22 January 2002; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 6/10 December 2001.

³⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2002.

³⁵ Email from Lt.-Col. Olof Carelius, Armed Forces Headquarters, 8 March 2001.

³⁶ Minister of Foreign Affairs answer to question (2001/02:621) in Parliament, 11 February 2002.

³⁷ Ibid., 14 March 2002.

³⁸ Minister of Defense Björn von Sydow, written answer to question (2001/02:857) in Parliament, 13 March 2002.

Mine action funding agreements in 2001 totaled SEK91.6 million (\$8.5 million), according to the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).³⁹ This compares to SEK76.7 million in 2000, SEK94.5 million in 1999 and SEK129.5 million in 1998.⁴⁰

Sweden detailed its mine action funding in its report to the OSCE in November 2001.⁴¹ However, SIDA discovered that the report was incomplete, and has provided Landmine Monitor with additional information, which is reflected in the following chart.⁴²

Main recipients of SIDA mine action funding in 2001⁴³

Country	SEK (million)	US\$ (million)	Implementing agency
Afghanistan	15.2	1.4	UNOCHA
Angola	11.0	1.0	NPA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.0 ⁴⁴	0.4	UNOPS/BHMAC, ITF
Cambodia	18.5 10.0 ⁴⁵	1.7 0.9	CMAC, mine dog project UNDP TF, CMAC
Eritrea	4.2 5.0	0.4 0.4	UNOPS/UN MACC DDG
Guinea-Bissau	0.8	0.1	HUMAID
Kosovo	2.3	0.2	SRSA/UN MACC
Mozambique	10.5	1.0	NPA, HI
Northern Iraq	4.0	0.4	MAG
Somalia	3.1 3.0	0.3 0.3	DDG Survey Action Centre
Total	91.6	8.5	

Most of the programs have been running with Swedish support for several years. The new programs for 2001 are in Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia. The work of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency with the UN MACC in Kosovo was phased out by the end of 2001.⁴⁶

³⁹ Email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, Swedish International Development Agency, 22 March 2002. Exchange rate at 7 February 2002: US\$1 = SEK10.786, used throughout except where indicated.

⁴⁰ "SIDA support to mine action 1990-2000," Fact Sheet, Swedish International Development Agency, October 2000.

⁴¹ Report to the OSCE, 14 November 2001. This report indicates mine action agreements in 2001 totaling SEK67.4 million.

⁴² Email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, Swedish International Development Agency, 22 March 2002.

⁴³ This table reports on decisions taken (agreements) during 2001 to fund mine action programs. Sources for the funding are an email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, SIDA, 22 March 2002, and Sweden's report to the OSCE, 15 December 2001, p. 3. The funding figures in US\$ are as included in the OSCE report. Information for the column "Implementing agency" has been collected from SIDA's assistance decision documents and from the annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 6 December 2001, pp. 4-5. Abbreviations used: UNOCHA – United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, NPA – Norwegian People's Aid, UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services, BHMAC – Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre, ITF – International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, CMAC – Cambodian Mine Action Center, UNDP TF – UN Development Program Trust Fund, UN MACC – UN Mine Action Coordination Center, DDG – Danish Demining Group, SRSA – Swedish Rescue Services Agency, HI – Handicap International, MAG – Mines Advisory Group.

⁴⁴ The agreement totals SEK10 million for the period 2001-2003 (SEK4 million 2001, SEK4 million 2002, SEK2 million 2003). Email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, Swedish International Development Agency, 22 March 2002.

⁴⁵ The agreement totals SEK25 million for the period 2001-2003 (SEK10 million 2001, SEK10 million 2002, SEK5 million 2003). Email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, Swedish International Development Agency, 22 March 2002.

⁴⁶ Email from Anders Berg, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 14 December 2001.

The above totals do not include SEK5 million donated in April 2001 to the UN Trust Fund for Assistance in Humanitarian Mine Action.⁴⁷ Of the SEK5 million, SEK500,000 was earmarked for mine action in Yemen, SEK1.7 million to the work of WG 126 on standardization, and SEK2.5 million in secondment of personnel to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.⁴⁸

Other funding related to mine action, but not included above is:

- Sweden's contribution to the ICRC.
- Sweden's support to demining efforts and survivor assistance through the EU action against antipersonnel mines.
- Sweden's support to Afghanistan after the United Nations Donor Alert on 17 November 2001. SIDA gave SEK20 million (\$1.84 million) to OCHA in Afghanistan for "Co-ordination support, demining, protection, communication (aviation, radio etc.)."⁴⁹ The UN reports that \$1.17 million of the Swedish funding for Afghanistan went to mine action.⁵⁰

Mine Action Funding Policy

In November 2001, SIDA presented a final report on its policy regarding support to mine action.⁵¹ According to the report, SIDA support to mine action is to be characterized by flexibility and knowledge about specific contexts. The mine-affected country has ownership of the mine problem, and SIDA's support should therefore be long-term and aim at building local structures and competence. The consequences of conducted activities must be evaluated continually and the resulting knowledge must be passed on to new programs. In order to do this, there is a need for thorough analysis of technical and socio-economic conditions before any decision about mine action support. Generally, SIDA support shall be directed towards:

- Continuing the engagement in areas where SIDA currently is active.
- Integrating mine action with other aid programs. Mine action is to be viewed as a method to overcome a serious obstacle to development.
- Contributing to the building of sustainable national structures and local capacity.
- Supporting short-term activities for humanitarian purposes
- Regarding humanitarian demining, SIDA support shall be directed towards:
 - surveys about the mine problem, including increased competence to conduct socio-economic impact-assessment analysis,
 - providing expertise in areas where Sweden has comparative advantages, such as mine detection dogs and mechanical mine clearance,
 - support to mine clearance, which will be the largest activity and the activity that will need the most comprehensive financing.

Survivor assistance programs will be supported by SIDA within the framework of ordinary health aid and through its support to organizations such as the Red Cross. SIDA prefers to earmark as little of the funding as possible, and gives a general contribution to the ICRC, which then makes its own priorities.⁵² SIDA has provided the ICRC with 212 million SEK over the last 10 years.⁵³

⁴⁷ Report to the OSCE, 14 November 2001, p. 3, and interview with Sara Uddenberg, Desk Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 20 December 2001.

⁴⁸ Article 7 Report, Form J, 25 April 2002.

⁴⁹ "Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan 2001 Including Donor Alert 2001-2002," Fact Sheet, SIDA, November 2001.

⁵⁰ "Update on mine action in Afghanistan," UN, 15 January 2002.

⁵¹ "Inriktning för SIDA:s stöd till minverksamheter" ("Direction for SIDA's support to mine action"), Swedish International Development Agency, November 2001.

⁵² Email from Magnus Carlquist, Desk Officer, SIDA, 8 May 2002.

⁵³ Article 7 Report, Form J, 25 April 2002.

Mine awareness will be supported by SIDA within the framework of support to mine clearance or as an independent activity.

Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)

During 2001, SRSA continued working with the UN Mine Action Coordination Center in Kosovo, with three personnel for quality control and information management. This support ended with the closure of the Center at the end of 2001.⁵⁴ On 15 November 2001, the Swedish government decided that the SRSA, with financing from SIDA, would provide personnel to the UN Mine Action Center for Ethiopia and Eritrea. The personnel will provide quality control of health care, IT support and mine clearance training.⁵⁵ SRSA works in cooperation with SWEDEC (Swedish EOD and Demining Center). SRSA also has one person seconded to GICHD. Since the beginning of 2001, the SRSA has participated in two EU projects, the BIOSENS and the DEMAND projects (see below).⁵⁶

Swedish Armed Forces

Until 2002, Sweden was lead nation in the Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM) in Croatia. Sweden is now contributing one person to the mission.⁵⁷ Sweden is also contributing six people to the Cambodian Mine Action Center, in a project with mine detection dogs.⁵⁸ Sweden is also providing support to the humanitarian demining effort by the Baltic States, including naval demining.⁵⁹

The Swedish battalion in Kosovo includes one ammunition clearance platoon. A Swedish Mine Awareness Team (MATT) supported KFOR in Kosovo until December 2001.⁶⁰ SWEDEC conducted mine awareness training for the MATTs in Kosovo, as well basic ammunition and mine clearance training for the platoon and for future members of the international ammunition clearance pool.⁶¹

Sweden provides personnel as well as financial support for the standardization work of UXO clearance carried out by the GICHD for UNMAS. Sweden also takes part in the work on standardizing mine action conducted through WEU and NATO, through the Partnership for Peace.⁶² During 2002, Sweden has provided one staff person to the Joint Research Centre Secretariat in Ispra, Italy.⁶³ Sweden is involved in research coordination in the Nordic Demining Research Forum and within the EU (Action for Research and Information Support in Humanitarian Demining).⁶⁴ Sweden also participates in the International Test & Evaluation Program.

Research and Development

During 2001, the Swedish Defence Research Agency continued to conduct research within the area of ammunition and mine clearance at the request of the Swedish Armed Forces, SRSA, GICHD, EU, and some other institutions.⁶⁵

The Biosensor project was launched in 1995 to develop an "artificial dog nose" sensor system to detect the presence of the explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT) in vapor form for humanitarian

⁵⁴ Email from Anders Berg, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 14 December 2001.

⁵⁵ Press release from the Swedish Ministry of Defence, 15 November 2001.

⁵⁶ Email from Anders Berg, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 14 December 2001.

⁵⁷ Article 13 Report, Form F, 6/10 December 2001.

⁵⁸ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, 6/10 December 2001; Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report 2001, International Activities: Developments in the field of EOD and mine clearance for international peace support and humanitarian operations," p. 77.

⁵⁹ Report to the OSCE, 14 November 2001, p. 4.

⁶⁰ Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report 2001, International activities, p. 77.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶² Article 13 Report, Form E, 6/10 December 2001.

⁶³ Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report 2001, International Activities, p. 78.

⁶⁴ Report to the OSCE, 14 November 2001, p. 4.

⁶⁵ Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report 2001, International Activities, p. 73.

demining. More than SEK150 million (US\$14 million) has since been invested.⁶⁶ The DEMAND project will support the development of a Biosensor technology system within a multi-technology mine detector. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency has received a prototype of the mine detector.⁶⁷ During 2001, Sweden contributed approximately SEK23 million (\$2.13 million) to development of the Biosensor system for mine clearance.⁶⁸

Bofors has developed the Mine-Guzzler demining vehicle for humanitarian civil operations.⁶⁹ It is operational and ready for serial production as soon as there are buyers. The vehicle has been tested in Croatia, Germany, Egypt, and Sweden.⁷⁰

The PICE Multi-Sensor (PMS) was designed to be used like a metal detector, but to disregard non-dangerous objects such as nails or cans. The program was terminated in April 2001 due to lack of external financing.⁷¹ At the time of termination of the program, various functional units had been developed and tested.

Countermine Technologies is the parent company for three subsidiary companies, whose activities include development and production of demining equipment and the conduct of demining operations. During 2001, Countermine Technologies completed two demining projects in Croatia, which were ordered by the ITF. The projects cleared 360,000 square meters of land. New projects started in October 2001, but were stopped in December 2001 because of bad weather conditions. The projects should be concluded during 2002. Ten to 12 persons (mine clearance personnel and a medical team) are active in the projects. During 2001, a serious incident occurred with the Oracle machine, which exploded three antitank mines when it was about to park during a break in a demining operation. No one was injured.⁷² The Oracle machine received only small damage and was after recovery able to be driven and operated.⁷³ The incident occurred at a bus stop for school buses in a "Safe Area" (marked by CROMAC) where there are not supposed to be any mines.⁷⁴

The mechanical demining machine Scanjack, developed by the Scandinavian Demining Group, has been in full operation in Croatia since April 2001, clearing 2.5 million square meters of land by the end of the year.⁷⁵ A second machine was tested by the Swedish Defence Material Administration during the month of September 2001. This machine is now in use in Croatia by the subsidiary Scanjack d.o.o. Total revenue from the commercial humanitarian demining operations in Croatia during 2001 was \$1.5 million.⁷⁶

SWITZERLAND

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, Switzerland provided mine action funding totaling US\$8.4 million. In September 2001, Switzerland was chosen as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty will be held in Geneva in September 2002.

⁶⁶ Email from Henrik Westander, Consultant for the Biosensor project, 23 January 2002.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 26 February 2002.

⁶⁹ www.boforsdefence.se, accessed on 15 March 2001.

⁷⁰ Email from Allan Carlsson, Sales Director, Bofors Defence, 22 January 2002.

⁷¹ Email from Lena Eng, Project Manager (SBD), SAAB Dynamics, 20 February 2002.

⁷² "Report for January-September 2001," Countermine Technologies, and email from Carl-Erik Ohlsson, Marketing Director and member of the board, Countermine Technologies, 20 March 2002.

⁷³ Telephone interview with Carl-Erik Ohlsson, Marketing Director and member of the board, Countermine Technologies, 18 March 2002.

⁷⁴ "Report for January-September 2001," Countermine Technologies.

⁷⁵ Information document dated 31 December 2001 from Scandinavian Demining group AB, and email with corrections to the document from Lennart Berglund, Chief Executive Officer, Scandinavian Demining Group AB, 21 January 2002.

⁷⁶ Email from Lennart Berglund, Chief Executive Officer, Scandinavian Demining Group AB, 21 January 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Switzerland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 March 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Legal implementation of the Treaty was achieved by modification of prior, more general legislation on military equipment, which entered into force on 1 April 1998.

The Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines drafted an amendment to the national law modeled on Article 2.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which defines an antihandling device as “a device...which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.” The amendment was tabled in the National Council on 4 December 2000, referred to parliamentary commission and returned to Parliament on 11 October 2001, where it received a large majority in favor. In Switzerland’s bicameral parliamentary system, the proposed amendment is next passed to the State Council for consideration, probably in October or November 2002.

Switzerland attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua.¹ In his general statement, Ambassador Christian Faessler declared that too many States remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, and said Switzerland would increase its efforts to encourage them to join the treaty. He urged non-States Parties to respect the treaty’s provisions, and placed great importance on States Parties participating in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional process, which is also open to non-State Parties. He described Switzerland’s “strategic concept” which integrates assistance to mine victims in the larger context of other victims of war, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development.²

At the Third Meeting, it was decided that the Fourth Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva in September 2002, and Switzerland became co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction.

Switzerland has participated actively in all the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including the meetings in January and May 2002. On 31 January 2002, at the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Switzerland announced that a second training course on the management of stockpile destruction programs would take place in June 2002, in Martigny. On 1 February 2002, at the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Switzerland was designated as the Secretary-General of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.

Switzerland’s annual Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2001 was submitted on 30 April 2002. Three previous Article 7 Reports have been submitted: on 4 August 1999, 11 April 2000, and 28 March 2001.³ The reports are brief, since the country is not mine-affected, has destroyed its mine stockpiles, and has retained no mines for training purposes.

Switzerland is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted the annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol on 24 October 2001. It reports new information on international cooperation on mine clearance, mine action funding and assistance.⁴

Switzerland acted as president of the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001. The Swiss delegation presented an analysis of the Article 13 reports received, but expressed concern that many States Parties had not presented Article 13 reports. It

¹ Its delegation included Amb. Christian Faessler, Head of the Multilateral Division and Permanent Mission of International Organizations in Geneva, Rodolphe Imhoof, Ambassador to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama and San Jose, René Haug, Permanent Mission of International Organizations in Geneva, Roman Hunger, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Defense, Urs Beer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Flavio del Ponte, Humanitarian Aid Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

² Statement of Switzerland to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

³ Article 7 Reports, submitted on 4 August 1999 for the period 1 March-20 August 1999; submitted on 11 April 2000 for calendar year 1999; submitted on 28 March 2001 for calendar year 2000; and submitted on 30 April 2002 for calendar year 2001.

⁴ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Forms D, E, 24 October 2001.

stressed the importance of compliance, and recommended that the content of the reports should be discussed at future annual conferences.

Switzerland acted as a vice-president of the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. It supported the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union,⁵ and welcomed extension of the CCW to non-international conflicts. It supported proposals for a strongly mandated expert group on “explosive remnants of war,” and said the Swiss proposal on improvement and regulation of submunition fuzes in order to limit explosive remnants would help to address the problem. The delegation also supported increased regulation of antivehicle mines, and additional compliance measures. The Swiss initiative on small-caliber bullets led to creation of a non-official group of experts, for which Switzerland will cover the costs.

In March 2002, the Swiss voted by a small majority in a national referendum to join the United Nations, which will take place on 10 September 2002. Regarding the Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland has repeated for several years that it is ready to discuss ways toward solving the problems caused by antipersonnel mines in any appropriate forum, but “would oppose the creation of new international norms short of or contradicting the prohibitions and obligations imposed by the [Mine Ban Treaty].”⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1969 and export of antipersonnel mines was banned in December 1996. Swiss law prohibits transit of antipersonnel mines through Switzerland for any purpose, including peacekeeping operations.⁷ Destruction of 3.85 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines was completed by 15 March 1999, with none retained for permitted training and development purposes.⁸

Switzerland possesses two types of directional fragmentation devices (known commonly as Claymore mines), the Richtladung Leicht 96 and the Richtladung Schwer 96 (previously called Horizontalsplittermine 90). These have not been included in Article 7 Reports on the grounds that “the element of indiscriminate effect has been eliminated.”⁹ However, it is has not been made clear what steps have been taken to prevent tripwire/victim activation and ensure command-detonation only.

According to a letter from the Defense General Staff in June 2001, the Swiss Army possesses two types of antivehicle mines: the Panzermine 60 (the Belgian PRB M3, procured in the 1960s) and Panzerabwehrmine 88 (which is the HPD F2 produced by former Thompson-Dasa, procured in 1988).¹⁰

According to a press release from the General Staff in December 2001, it was decided to withdraw the Panzermine 60 from its stockpiles from 1 January 2002 due to the age and condition of the mines, which will be destroyed in the coming two years. Part of the stockpile was destroyed between 1996 and 1998.¹¹ The mine is equipped with a integral magnetic influence sensor and an integral antihandling feature.¹² The Swiss Campaign criticized the mine as possibly violating international humanitarian law because the magnetic influence fuze cannot discriminate between intentional and unintentional disturbance and, because sweeping with a mine detector could cause

⁵ See the report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

⁶ Report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 12 December 2001, p. 2.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 670.

⁸ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 668-669, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 801-802.

⁹ Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 7 March 2001. Ministry of Defense is shorthand for the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS).

¹⁰ Letter from the Defense General Staff, 12 June 2001.

¹¹ “Die Panzermine 60 wird endgültig ausgemustert” (“The Panzermine 60 Will Be Definitively Withdrawn”), Press Release, Ministry of Defense, 18 December 2001, available at: www.admin.ch/cp/d.

¹² Canadian Forces Mine Awareness Database 99, *Jane's Mine And Mine Clearance 2000-2001*.

the mine to activate.¹³ The General Staff replied as follows: “The electronics of the fuze of the Panzerabwehrmine 88 are programmed that an actuation under only certain categories of vehicle is possible... The mine is optimized to military, heavy vehicles.”¹⁴

At the Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002, the Swiss delegation stated that Switzerland has never owned the FFV-028 antivehicle mine, as noted in a Human Rights Watch fact sheet.¹⁵

Mine Action Funding and Assistance¹⁶

In 2001, Switzerland provided mine action funding of US\$8.43 million. This compares to \$8.53 million in 2000, and \$5.8 million in 1999. The 2001 total included some \$4 million for humanitarian mine clearance and \$3.3 million for the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Because programs for mine survivors are integrated into the larger context of other victims of war, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development, no separate funding element for mine survivors can be identified.

Countries receiving Swiss mine action funding in 2001 were Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo).

The annual donor report for mine action funding in 2001 recorded by the UN Mine Action Service mine action investments database is summarized in the table below. It includes financial donations and in-kind assistance.¹⁷

¹³ Tobias Gasser, “Die Minenleger und der Ernstfall” (“The Minelayer and the Worst Case”), *Die Wochenzeitung* (daily newspaper), 26 July 2001, p. 6.

¹⁴ Letter from the Defense General Staff, 12 July 2001; Landmine Monitor researcher’s translation.

¹⁵ Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 1 February 2002.

¹⁶ For mine action funding policy, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 805. The policy is repeated in Switzerland’s Report to the OSCE, 12 December 2001.

¹⁷ “Annual Donor Report,” UN Mine Action Service Mine Action Investments database, accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 14 May 2002.

Mine Action Funding in 2001:

Countries/Areas	US\$ total	US\$ Program/Activity	Program/Activity	Implementing Agency
Albania	853,000	605,000	Demining in north Albania	SFMA
		105,000	Stockpile destruction	NAMSA/NATO PpP
		90,000 in-kind	Mine clearance supervisor	SFMA
		35,000 in-kind	EOD in north Albania	SFMA
		18,000	Support	AMAE
Azerbaijan	60,000	50,000 in-kind	Mine awareness adviser for ANAMA	UNOPS
		10,000 in-kind	Mine clearance equipment	ANAMA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	345,000	150,000	Support to regional NGO	HI
		175,000	Demining	NPA
		20,000	Mine awareness in Posova	HI
Chad	120,000	60,000	Demining	UNDP
		60,000 in-kind	Information advisor for HCND	UNOPS
Croatia	365,000	365,000	Demining-CROMAC/NGO	CROMAC
Eritrea	75,000	75,000	Demining	HALO Trust
Mozambique	950,000	315,000	Demining - north Mozambique	HALO Trust
		135,000	Demining - central Mozambique	ADP
		500,000	Demining – Matalane/Afrovita	IND
Somalia	80,000	80,000 in-kind	Information advisor for MAC	UNOPS
Sudan	340,000	305,000	International integrated project	OSIL
		35,000	Demining – southern Sudan	Basler Mission
Yemen	120,000	120,000 in-kind	Admin/Logistics advisor for UN MAP in Yemen	UNOPS
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1,625,000	60,000	Integrated mine action in southern Kosovo	HI
		225,000	Demining in Kosovo	HALO Trust
		230,000	Integrated mine action in support of ICRC	SFMA
		910,000	Demining in eastern Kosovo	Emercom
		200,000 in-kind	2 liaison officers for UNMACC	UNOPS
Subtotal :	4,933,000			

Regional/ Multilateral/ Thematic Programs	US\$ total	US\$ Program/ Activity	Program/Activity	Implementing Agency
International Advocacy/Outreach	115,000	20,000	Side events at 3MSP, September 2001	Government of Nicaragua
		50,000	Landmine Monitor 2001	ICBL
		30,000	Handbook/ workshop on Non-State Actors	Geneva Call
		15,000	Participation in 3MSP	ICBL
Mine Awareness	20,000	20,000	Film on Swiss mine action in Mozambique	Dipro AG
Mine Clearance Training	30,000	30,000	Stockpile destruction workshop	Ministry of Defense
Research & Development	3,330,000	3,330,000	General	GICHD
Subtotal		3,495,000		
TOTAL		8,428,000		

Abbreviations : SFMA – Swiss Federation for Mine Action, NAMSA – NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, PIP – Partnership for Peace, AMAE – Albanian Mine Action Executive, UNOPS – UN Office for Project Services, ANAMA – Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action, NPA – Norwegian People’s Aid, CROMAC – Croatian Mine Action Center, ADP – Accelerated Demining Program, IND – National Demining Institute, OSIL – Operation Save Innocent Lives, ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines, GICHD - Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

Additionally, intensive training in mine action is given to staff of the Ministry of Defense each year. By the end of 2002, it is expected that there will be a pool of 40 qualified experts ready to respond to the needs of mine action programs internationally.¹⁸ The Ministry also provides technical information and demonstrations on EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) systems. Assistance, mainly EOD systems, are provided to mine action programs in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.¹⁹

Switzerland conducted a second training course on the management of stockpile destruction programs in June 2002 in Martigny. Switzerland was on the Support Committee of the Regional Workshop on Victim Assistance in Southeast Asia, held on 6-8 November 2001 in Thailand.

In 2002, Switzerland has budgeted mine action totaling \$6,275,000. Six countries will receive a total of \$1,485,000: Albania (\$305,000 for demining by the SFMA); Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$185,000 for Handicap International and NPA); Croatia (\$180,000 for CROMAC); Eritrea (\$225,000 for NGO support); Mozambique (\$425,000 for demining by HALO Trust and ADP); and Sudan (\$165,000 for OSIL). Other projects receive \$4,790,000: Fourth Meeting of States Parties (\$120,000); sponsoring southern delegates to the Fourth Meeting (\$60,000); and GICHD (\$4,610,000).

Non-governmental organizations:

Various Swiss-based nongovernmental organizations were engaged in mine action through wider projects of development.

In 2001, Handicap International Switzerland supported mine action programs in 12 countries, to the value of approximately \$1,663,000:

- mine clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$354,063) and Kosovo (\$33,117)
- mine awareness in Angola (\$46,947); Ethiopia (\$42,840); and Mozambique (\$160,311)
- survivor assistance in Albania (\$66,667); Algeria (\$68,133); Cambodia (\$215,782); Nicaragua (\$33,893); Rwanda (\$ 98,555); Senegal (\$67,227); Somaliland (\$33,333); and Yemen (\$28,133)

¹⁸ Report to the OSCE, 12 December 2001, p. 2.

¹⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 24 October 2001.

- World Report on Landmine Victim Assistance 2001 (\$20,000); Regional Conference in Southeast Asia on Victim Assistance (\$87,980).²⁰

Handicap International coordinated the Regional Conference on Victim Assistance in the Framework of the Mine Ban Treaty in South-East Asia, in Thailand, on 6-8 November 2001, with the support of the governments of Switzerland, Norway and Germany.

The Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid provided \$100,000 from donors to support a program in the tribal area in Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan, involving minefield mapping, mine awareness, victim assistance and rehabilitation. World Without Mines is a new NGO in Switzerland which collects funds to support NGOs specializing in demining.²¹

Pro-Victimis provided the support for the following programs in 2001: Albania (\$24,200 for the Swiss Federation for Mine Action for demining); Laos (\$62,000 for power supplies for an orthopedic center); Mozambique (\$28,245 for power supplies for a job training center for disabled); Bangladesh (\$47,000 for BRAC for material for an orthopedic center).²²

The Swiss Federation for Mine Action (SFMA) was involved in these projects in 2001: Kosovo (\$312,000 donated by the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs for demining); Albania (\$1,219,400 donated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Pro-Victimis and the International Trust Fund for demining); Afghanistan (\$270,000 donated by the World Food Program for coordination of humanitarian demining operations, training of local demining NGOs, security of WFP infrastructure, and minefield mapping).

NGO Activities

In October 2001, the Swiss Campaign, as a member of the ICBL which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, organized an event to celebrate the centenary of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Henri Dunant, the Swiss founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross. For two weeks children brought flowers to decorate a wall in Geneva, illustrating the messages that “the small actions of each person achieve something visible” and “peace is built through the participation of civil society.”

The Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines organized a conference on responsibility and reparation, which took place in February 2002 in Geneva. The conference discussed the issue of the responsibility of mine users and manufacturers for demining and helping survivors.²³ The Swiss Campaign launched the Turkey Without Mines campaign in 2000, and continued to support this in 2001, including funding of US\$27,000. The Swiss Campaign continued to work on the issue of how to engage non-state actors in the mine ban. The Swiss Campaign is co-chair of the working group on this subject within the ICBL, and works closely with Geneva Call.

Geneva Call is an NGO based in Geneva, which advocates for the adherence of non-state actors to humanitarian norms and provides a mechanism for them to be held accountable. In September 2001 in Strasbourg, the European Parliament voted unanimously for a resolution proposed by Geneva Call, calling on the international community to support efforts to obtain commitments from non-state actors to stop using antipersonnel mines. In October 2001, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) committed itself under Geneva Call to prohibit antipersonnel mines and to cooperate with mine action in areas under its control.²⁴

²⁰ Email from Paul Vermuelen, Handicap International, 3 May 2002.

²¹ Email from Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, 19 May 2001.

²² Ibid.

²³ For the report of the conference, see www.stopmines.ch.

²⁴ Further information available from info@genevacall.org.

TAJIKISTAN

Key developments since May 2001: Although the United Nations records that Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999, it is not clear that Tajikistan considers itself a State Party formally bound by the treaty. Russia has reconfirmed that it has laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, reportedly with the consent of the Tajik government. Following the completion in July 2001 of a needs assessment, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan has initiated a mine risk education program with the help of the ICRC. Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines continued to kill and injure civilians and livestock in Tajikistan in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999.¹ The treaty entered into force for Tajikistan on 1 April 2000. However, there seems to be some question about whether Tajikistan considers itself to be formally bound by the Mine Ban Treaty.

In a January 2002 response to a questionnaire on landmines from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tajikistan said that President Rakhmanov “signed a decree on Tajikistan’s accession to the Ottawa Convention” on 22 September 1999. But Tajikistan seemed to suggest that its parliament had not yet ratified the convention. The questionnaire asks: “If the Convention was signed, but not ratified, what phase is the process of formal ratification in?” Tajikistan answered that “the given act must be ratified by the country’s parliament, about which the depository of the Convention—the Secretary-General of the United Nations—was informed at the time. Consultations in Parliament are now occurring regarding this issue.”²

The Head of the Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan claimed in June 2001 that Tajikistan had merely given notification of its intention to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and had not deposited its instrument of ratification.³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed to have informed the United Nations Treaty Section in New York of the alleged error.⁴ Subsequently, at a July 2001 roundtable of government ministries organized by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Dushanbe, the Head of the Treaty Law Department informed participants that the Tajik parliament was concerned about the impact of the Mine Ban Treaty on mine use along the border with Afghanistan.⁵

A neighboring government has expressed its belief that Tajikistan has *withdrawn* from the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated, “Tajikistan withdrew its participation from the Ottawa Convention because it couldn’t fulfill its conditions and also because of the presence of threats to national security.”⁶

Previously, at the January 2000 summit of the CIS states, the Tajik government reportedly indicated a possible review of its decision to join the treaty, based on an evaluation of the consequences of clearing minefields from the Tajik-Afghan border.⁷ At the April 2000 CIS summit in Moscow, the Tajik Minister of Defense and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov apparently again expressed doubts about the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2000, a Russian official said that

¹ According to the treaty section of the United Nations, Tajikistan notified the depository of its consent to be bound on 12 October 1999. <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf>.

² Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the OSCE, Vienna, 23 January 2002. In Russian, translated by Landmine Monitor.

³ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶ “Position of the Kyrgyz Republic on the question of joining the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” letter to the ICBL from the Division of UN Affairs, Department of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, undated, received 29 June 2001. Unofficial translation by Landmine Monitor.

⁷ Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

Tajikistan had communicated these same views regarding the Mine Ban Treaty in correspondence with the Russian Foreign Ministry.⁸

Tajikistan is not known to have enacted any domestic legislative implementation measures for the Mine Ban Treaty, as required by Article 9. Tajikistan has not submitted its transparency reports to the United Nations, as required by Article 7. Its initial Article 7 Report was due by 28 September 2000, and annual updated reports were due 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002. Tajikistan has not participated in any of the three annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not attended any of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, nor any of the other international and regional diplomatic landmine meetings in 2000 and 2001.

Tajikistan was absent during the November 2001 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but had previously co-sponsored the draft resolution.

On the same day it acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, 12 October 1999, Tajikistan acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original and Amended Protocol II on landmines. In June 2001, the Head of the Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Tajikistan had adhered to both protocols after a law on ratification had been duly passed by the Tajik Parliament in accordance with internal procedures.⁹

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Tajikistan is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that Tajikistan has stockpiles of antipersonnel mines that the former Soviet Union stored in the republic. It is not known to be taking any steps toward destruction of those stocks. The Mine Ban Treaty mandated deadline for Tajikistan to complete its stockpile destruction is 1 April 2004.

Based on the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian border guards and peacekeeping forces, it would appear that Russia maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan.

Use

Landmine Monitor has not received reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Tajik forces in recent years. However, as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, as have Uzbek forces.

Russia

In August 2001, Russia again acknowledged that its troops stationed along the Tajik border with Afghanistan have emplaced antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan.¹⁰ A Foreign Ministry letter to Landmine Monitor indicated that mines had been laid during the Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000. In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajik government, and in accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF," Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 26. However, in its OSCE response, indicated it had not signed or ratified CCW Protocol II. Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the OSCE, Vienna, 23 January 2002.

¹⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington, DC. It states, "From May 2000 to date the Russian Federation has employed anti-personnel mines (hereinafter 'APMs') in the Chechen Republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border but APMs have not been emplaced in Abkhazia (Georgia)." The response arrived after *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* went to print, and thus could not be included in the report.

by Tajikistan, he said that the mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹¹

It was first reported in October 2000 that Russian border guards were deploying antipersonnel landmines on the Tajik side of the Pyandge River to protect the Tajik-Afghan border from invasion by the Taliban.¹² When asked about this, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan, in order to stop real and potential “terrorist attacks” and to block illegal drug trafficking.¹³

In addition to use by Russian border guards on the Afghan border, Russian peacekeeping forces have also used antipersonnel mines to protect their posts and for other purposes. A November 2000 report stated that “the peacekeeping forces of Russia in Tajikistan employ mine weaponry in accordance with the provisions of international law, and primarily for the protection of border outposts.”¹⁴

In August 2001, Russia described its mine use in Tajikistan and Chechnya to Landmine Monitor: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”¹⁵

As a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Tajikistan is obliged under Article 9 to “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.” In addition, Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that a State Party may not “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”

Despite requests for clarification of its position from Landmine Monitor, Tajikistan has made no public statements about Russian mine use. It would appear, at the least, that Tajikistan has acquiesced to use of antipersonnel mines by the Russian Federation inside Tajikistan. In contrast, Tajikistan has protested the use of antipersonnel mines by Uzbekistan, allegedly inside Tajik territory.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan began to mine border areas with Tajikistan in 2000 and continued mining until at least June 2001.¹⁶ While there have been no confirmed instances of landmine use by Uzbekistan since June 2001, a media report in March 2002 included a claim “by a government source” that

¹¹ Meeting with Col. Mikhail Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 13 December 2001. Notes by Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch.

¹² Yuri Golotyuk, “Russia is just a river-far from new war,” *Vremya Novostey online* (News-Time online), № 137, 2 October 2000; Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia Hardens Its Positions along a Tajikistan Border,” *New York Times*, 3 October 2000.

¹³ Andrei Malov, Counselor of the Department for Security Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001.

¹⁴ Georgiy Mekhov, “How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspiration of the World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,” *Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, November 2000.

¹⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington, DC.

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 809. See also the report on Uzbekistan in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

Uzbekistan would “continue mining its borders.”¹⁷ Uzbekistan has previously justified the use of antipersonnel mines along its borders as a defense against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and to prevent drug traffickers and weapons traders from entering Uzbek territory.¹⁸

Uzbekistan’s borders with Tajikistan remain in dispute; consequently, the location of the landmines is also contested. Tajikistan claims that Uzbek antipersonnel mines have been laid up to 500 meters inside Tajik territory.¹⁹

Landmine/UXO Problem

Tajikistan’s landmine problem stems primarily from Uzbek-laid minefields along border areas, and mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from the Tajik civil war. There have also been past allegations of limited use of mines by criminals and other armed elements.²⁰

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the more recently laid minefields around the Uzbek-Tajik border are of greater concern as they pose a direct threat to people living in the area, where land is used for grazing livestock, hunting, and collecting wood, and to people traveling through on their way to visit relatives on the other side of the border.²¹ Minefields laid during the civil war are located in less populated areas, primarily in mountain passes.

Border Areas With Uzbekistan

A local media report claimed in May 2001 that 70 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border was mined, with mines laid along, and possibly within, the following Tajik districts: Isfarinskii, Kanibadamskii, Zafarabadski, Ashtski, Pendzhikentski, Shakhristanski, and Nauski.²² A mission carried out by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) found that the more mountainous regions in southern areas of the border in the Tursanzade district are particularly contaminated; this includes the villages of Shulum, Noabad, Chuzhaley, and Samarkhand.²³ The US State Department and the GICHD report that some Uzbek mines were laid on Tajik territory.²⁴

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense claims that all minefields are marked clearly and that it has informed the Tajik government of their location.²⁵ However, the GICHD mission concluded that Uzbekistan has so far only sporadically marked minefields laid by its armed forces.²⁶ The US State

¹⁷ Malik Mansur, “Uzbekistan: Calls for End to Mine Policy Rejected,” *Institute For War and Peace Reporting*, Tashkent, 22 March 2002, accessed at: www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200203_109_5_eng.txt on 1 July 2002.

¹⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 816.

¹⁹ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 17.

²⁰ For example, on 18 June 2000, two “anti-infantry” mines were discovered and neutralized on a railway bridge near the Dushanbe textile factory. The Tajik interior ministry said criminal elements were responsible. The next day, a mine blew up near the entrance of an apartment building. There were no casualties. A mine was also reportedly discovered in the doorway of the neighboring building. “Two anti-infantry mines have been discovered on the railway bridge in Dushanbe” and “A mine has been blown up in a block of flats doorway,” *AP Blitz*, News In Brief #114, Dushanbe, 19 June 2000, accessed at: www.internews.ru/ASIA-PLUS/blitz/527.html on 1 July 2002.

²¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002, available at: www.icrc.org.

²² Viktoriya Panfilova, “Mine War Continues,” *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, No. 186, 5 October 2001.

²³ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 19.

²⁴ US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8353.htm; “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 18.

²⁵ US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.

²⁶ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 20.

Department has reported that Uzbek mine-laying along the border with Tajikistan “included some populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most places.”²⁷ The mother of an Uzbek mine casualty told a journalist in July 2001: “The small boards with the word ‘mines’ cannot be seen—they are hidden with grass.”²⁸

Tajikistan, too, has not systematically marked mine-affected border areas with Uzbekistan. The GICHD writes that “there is a generalized reluctance on the part of all actors in Tajikistan to mark affected areas, on the basis that it is the responsibility of Uzbekistan to mark the minefields it lays.”²⁹

Shepherds and people engaged in hunting, collecting wood, and traveling to visit relatives on the Uzbek side of the border are most at risk.³⁰ Adult males usually carry out these activities, although women collect firewood as well.

Cross-border travel is a particularly complex problem. Uzbek restrictions on travel between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan create an incentive for crossing the border illegally, increasing the danger from antipersonnel mines. In addition, Uzbekistan has closed some major border checkpoints. A senior Tajik border official said that the closure of the Panjakent-Samarkand highway in 2001 was a reason for an increase in the number of mine casualties.³¹ The GICHD stressed the need for better mine risk education efforts, especially in border communities, to avoid this risky behavior.³²

The GICHD reports that Uzbekistan has laid OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines along its border with Tajikistan, and that there are reports of Uzbek-laid POMZ fragmentation mines and PMN blast mines as well.³³ Italian mines produced in 1948 were reportedly found in a minefield in the Shakristan district.³⁴

Civil War

Tajikistan is still affected by mines and UXO resulting from the 1992-1997 civil war. The major areas affected by landmines are the central Tavildara region, the Garm Valley, Khalaikhum, and the border with Afghanistan.³⁵

The minefields laid during the civil war are situated in less populated areas in central Tajikistan, predominantly mountain passes, and do not pose as significant a threat to the civilian population as those on the border with Uzbekistan.³⁶ However, the US State Department reports that landmine explosions in some unmarked minefields in the Karetegin Valley killed civilians during 2001.³⁷ The ICRC has initiated data collection in this area, using a form from Azerbaijan.³⁸

Mine Action Coordination

There is as yet no national mine action center in Tajikistan, and no clear division among ministries of mine action tasks. The GICHD reported in mid-2001, “There is a general need to

²⁷ US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.

²⁸ Bukharbaeva, Galima, “Uzbek Mines Killing Their Own,” *Institute For War And Peace Reporting*, Tashkent, 19 July 2001, accessed at: www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200107_61_1_eng.txt on 1 July 2002.

²⁹ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 20.

³⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002, available at: www.icrc.org.

³¹ “Closure of major checkpoint on Tajik-Uzbek border creates new problems,” *Asia Plus*, Dushanbe, 30 October 2001, accessed at: www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200110/0060.html.

³² “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 19, 28.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

³⁴ ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.

³⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 810.

³⁶ ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.

³⁷ US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.

³⁸ ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.

consolidate all mine action data in Tajikistan in an electronic database that will be open to all concerned ministries and organizations.”³⁹ The GIHCD suggested that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of such a database.⁴⁰

UNDP subsequently reported in July 2002 that it has been working closely with Tajikistan to establish a “mine action cell” and “develop a framework for a comprehensive program that will include setting up information management systems and supporting mine awareness activities as priority tasks.”⁴¹

Mine Clearance

Limited mine clearance has taken place on both the Uzbek and Afghan borders. Tajik border guards have conducted demining in Uzbek border areas near or in the Nauski region of Tajikistan; they reportedly have some mine clearance expertise, but are not equipped with metal detectors.⁴² The head of the border guard committee, Anoyatbek Sulaimonbekov, believes that landmines are no longer necessary. He said, “The threat of infiltration by Afghan terrorists into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has almost been eliminated.”⁴³

There have been occasional reports of *ad hoc* mine clearance on the Afghan border of mines laid by elements hostile to the Russian presence on the border. For example, on 28 February and 1 March 2002, Russian border guards reportedly defused two mines. One was an antipersonnel fragmentation mine, discovered two meters away from a Russian border guard facility. The next day, an officer found a PFM-1 antipersonnel mine by the entrance to the headquarters of a Russian border guard educational center.⁴⁴

There is no indication that demining of Russian-laid mines on the Tajik-Afghan border has occurred.

Mine Risk Education

The ICRC/Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (ICRC/RCST) has initiated mine risk education in Tajikistan. Following a July 2001 needs assessment by the ICRC, RCST, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (MESCD), a mine/UXO risk education strategy was developed. It will be implemented by the RCST volunteer network with help from the MESCD and border guards. The program was developed with a “community-based approach” in mind. During initial stages of the program, ideas were collected from the community to determine how activities should be carried out and how materials should be used.

The ICRC and the RCST identified the following target groups for mine risk education: affected communities living with the danger of mines (group at greatest risk); people traveling through mined areas; the border guards (group at risk and channel of information); the MESCD (responsible for mine action and channel of information); local administrations, or *hukhomats* (channel of information); and, the local media (channel of information).⁴⁵

The ICRC/RCST then developed, field-tested, produced, and distributed teaching aids. Two posters (one version for adults, another for children) were developed for the program with community input, then the RCST printed and distributed 1,000 copies of each poster. Jamoat

³⁹ “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 22.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ UNDP, “Mine Action For Resettlement and Reintegration. Post-Crisis Recovery and the Obstacle of Landmines,” accessed at: www.undp.org/erd/archives/brochures/mine_action/reintegration.htm on 2 July 2002.

⁴² *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, No. 186, 5 October 2001.

⁴³ “Dushanbe advocates neutralization of landmines on Tajik-Uzbek border,” *Interfax* (Tashkent), 8 January 2002.

⁴⁴ “2 Mines Defused on Tajik-Afghan Border,” *RIA Novosti*, 1 March 2002.

⁴⁵ ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.

village authorities, schools, border guards, and local MESCD representatives served as the main distributors.⁴⁶

The MESCD appointed a coordination officer to serve as the focal point for data collection and mine/UXO risk education.⁴⁷ Border guards, who carry out mine awareness activities where accidents occur, have reportedly requested the provision of materials and activities to continue informing people of the mine threat. According to the ICRC, border guards “are aware that they have a key role to play in marking mined areas.”⁴⁸

Following the assessment mission conducted on its behalf by the GICHD in the summer of 2001, UNICEF was expected to start mine risk education activities in Central Asia in January 2002. But as of July 2002, there were no reports of UNICEF mine risk education activity in the region.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines continued to kill and injure civilians and livestock in Tajikistan in 2001. However, there is no reliable information on the precise number of casualties as there is no national mechanism for collecting data on landmine incidents. Information on mine incidents is collected by various ministries, and by the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan; however, overall responsibility for data collection lies with the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.⁴⁹

In 2001, at least 15 people were killed and another 14 injured in reported landmine incidents in Tajikistan near the Tajik-Uzbek border.⁵⁰ The majority of landmine casualties are believed to be civilians who were killed or injured while tending livestock, farming, hunting, collecting firewood, or trying to cross the border to trade. The ICRC collected information on around 40 mine-related incidents in 2001; no details were available on the number of people killed or injured.⁵¹ Other media reports suggest that as many as 50 Tajik citizens have been killed as a result of Uzbek-laid mines.⁵²

Between January and April 2002, at least two people were killed and three injured in reported landmine incidents.⁵³ However, the ICRC reports at least 15 incidents from January to July 2002. In the last six months of 2000, it was reported that 19 people had been killed in 26 mine incidents involving civilians; the number of people injured in these incidents was not reported.⁵⁴

There have been no reported mine casualties along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.

Survivor Assistance

Tajikistan has historically been one of the poorest republics in Central Asia. The health care system has few resources, with run-down facilities, equipment in poor condition, and medicine and materials in short supply. The ICRC provided five health-care facilities with medicines and supplies. In 2001, these hospitals treated 35 mine survivors.⁵⁵

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Landmine Monitor analysis of 10 media reports between January and December 2001.

⁵¹ “Tajikistan: Mine awareness still needed,” IRIN UNOCHA, 15 July 2002, accessed at www.irinnews.org.

⁵² In October 2001, RIA Novosti reported that according to the Tajik government press center, Uzbek mines have killed more than 50 people and injured about 50 other since September 2000. NG, a Russian journal, reported in October 2001 that 48 people had been killed and 14 injured by Uzbek mines in 2001. In March 2002, IWPR reported that Dushanbe estimates the number of Tajik fatalities at 40 and the number of injured at 42. In April 2002, the Varoud news agency reported that 53 Tajik civilians have been killed and dozens injured by Uzbek mines. It is not clear, however, whether that figure refers to just Tajik casualties or both Tajik and Uzbek casualties.

⁵³ Landmine Monitor analysis of 3 media reports between January and 10 April 2002.

⁵⁴ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 811-812.

⁵⁵ “ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001,” ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 26.

The Ministry of Health in the northern province of Sughd Oblast has trained local communities in first aid management for mine injuries, and has provided first aid kits to rural medical facilities. Transport to medical facilities is reportedly available to mine casualties if they lack the appropriate transport. The facilities and skills to treat mine casualties in Tajikistan, including in surgical amputation, are also reported to be adequate. Health care is free of charge, but patients are sometimes asked to pay for drugs and medicine, as there is a chronic shortage of such products.⁵⁶

The Dushanbe Orthopedic Center, run jointly by the ICRC and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP), under the management of the Canadian Red Cross, is the only center producing prostheses for an estimated 3,000 amputees in Tajikistan. In 2001, the center provided physical rehabilitation services and fitted 444 lower limb prostheses, 53 of which were for mine survivors. The RCST and MLSP organized four regional orthopedic seminars and two technicians completed a one-year training course in the repair of polypropylene prostheses. There are also orthopedic satellite centers in Khojent (in the north), Kuliab (in the center), and Khorog (in the south) run by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.⁵⁷ The ICRC plans to assess the capacity of these centers to perform minor repairs to prostheses. The RCST communicates with those who need prostheses, informs patients of the availability of artificial limb-fitting, and pays for round-trip travel to the Center. As of May 2002, all landmine survivors registered with the Center needing prostheses have either been fitted or soon will be.⁵⁸

Mine survivors are eligible for a disability pension, as are other people with disabilities who are unable to work. There are three different levels of pensions, depending on the extent and nature of the disability.⁵⁹

TANZANIA

Key developments since May 2001: Landmine victims continued to arrive in Tanzania refugee camps from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tanzania has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 28 October 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Tanzania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 November 2000. The treaty entered into force for Tanzania on 1 May 2001. Tanzania has apparently not adopted any national implementation measures, as required by Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Tanzania has not, as required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty, submitted its initial transparency report due on 28 October 2001.¹

While the government participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999, it did not attend the two subsequent Meetings of States Parties in Geneva, Switzerland, in September 2000 and in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001. Tanzania

⁵⁶ "Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF," Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁷ Canadian Red Cross, "Dushanbe Orthopaedic Centre, Annual Report 2001," provided in email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Michael Rudiak, Canadian Red Cross, 24 July 2002.

⁵⁸ ICRC, "Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan," May 2002; and "Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF," Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁹ "Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF," Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.

¹ Efforts by Landmine Monitor to obtain information on the status of the Article 7 report and implementation measures were unsuccessful; there were no responses to a telephone inquiry to the High Commission in the UK and an email to the Acting High Commissioner and copied to the Defense Attaché, 1 April 2002.

has never participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including those in January and May 2002. In November 2001, Tanzania cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Tanzania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol 11 of the CCW or the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Tanzania is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines, although it has not made any public declarations to that effect. Tanzania remains one of the only State Parties that has not publicly revealed whether it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Based on reports of past use of antipersonnel mines,² Landmine Monitor regards it as likely that Tanzania has a stockpile, but in the absence of its required Article 7 transparency report, the number and types of antipersonnel landmines in its stockpile remain unknown. Tanzania is one of the few State Parties that has not begun stockpile destruction. The treaty requires Tanzania to complete destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 1 May 2005.

Landmine Monitor field research along the Tanzania-Burundi border in January 2002 did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines on the Tanzanian side of the border.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Tanzania's main link to the landmine problem is the refugee population entering from neighboring countries. Although there is no evidence that mines are planted inside Tanzania, mine victims from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are found in Tanzania. There are no known mine risk education programs for the refugees who enter Tanzania from these mine-affected countries.

Because Tanzania is not mine-affected, there are no mine clearance programs. However, research funded by the Belgian government is being conducted on the use of biosensors (rats) in humanitarian mine clearance operations. The Belgian government has dedicated US\$441,073 for this project.³

Landmine Casualties

In 2001 and 2002, there were no reported landmine incidents on Tanzanian territory. While data on landmine survivors entering Tanzania is not collected in a systematic or comprehensive manner, the available information gives an indication of the problem. Landmine Monitor field surveys showed that civilians suffering landmine casualties continued to enter Tanzania in 2001, while escalation of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo saw new mine victims arriving from there.⁴

Survivors arriving from the DRC

Information on landmine casualties from the DRC was not previously available to Landmine Monitor. According to Dr. Niels Oster, a surgeon at Heri Mission Hospital in Tanzania, most of the patients admitted with landmine injuries are from the DRC; this observation was confirmed by Dr. Jonathan Newkrik, Director of the Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital, where he is also a surgeon.⁵

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 155, regarding use in 1979 and 1986-88.

³ Ellen van Krunkelsven, a research biologist working on the project, told the BBC, 7 June 2001; see http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_318674.html?menu=news.quirkies. See also, Mine Action Investment Page, UN Mine Action, at <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/frameset.asp/>.

⁴ The first field survey was carried out in February 2001 and the second field survey was carried out from 7-14 January 2002.

⁵ Interview with Dr. Niels Oster, Heri Mission Hospital, and Dr. Jonathan Newkrik, Director and Surgeon at Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital, 9 January 2002. Landmine Monitor was unable to visit the government-funded Kigoma Regional Hospital because a special permit was unexpectedly required.

In 2001, Tanzania received a stream of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁶ Upon arrival, the refugees are held at the NMC reception center awaiting transfer into the refugee camps. Landmine Monitor was shown the records of three Congolese landmine survivors, two men and one woman, injured in the DRC in September 2001.⁷

Landmine Monitor interviewed some new arrivals who said mines are laid on the roads from Baraka and Muyega Hills in the DRC to keep away the Mayi Mayi rebels. One of the new arrivals reported seeing two people being brought in for medical assistance after stepping on a landmine at Bwali. They said that other mined areas included Sebele, Kazimiya and the road to Fizi.

Information was also provided by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on landmine casualties from the DRC who had been referred to the Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital. Seven landmine casualties were recorded between August and October 2001, including five men, one woman, and a three-year-old boy.⁸

Survivors arriving from Burundi

At the Heri Mission Hospital, Landmine Monitor talked to a person who had stepped on a landmine in Rumonge commune, Burundi on 7 September 2001. Rumonge commune is on the border with Tanzania and many of the landmine survivors in Tanzania come from here.⁹ Most of the refugees have farms across the border and occasionally leave Tanzania to tend their crops. It was on one such trip that the survivor interviewed was injured.

The Heri Mission Hospital showed Landmine Monitor records on thirteen male landmine survivors from Burundi. Most of the incidents occurred between January and September 2001, while two incidents occurred in 1999 or 2000.

At Manyovu Way Station an official said a number of refugees arrive with injuries due to hand grenades and landmines.¹⁰ The officials admitted that when recording information they do not differentiate whether the injuries are from landmines or from hand grenades and refugees will mostly say that the injuries are from “*mabomb*,” which is a rough translation of the Swahili word for “landmine.” Of the 174 cases that came through the station between October 2000 and 9 January 2002 (date of interview), the official estimated that about 48 cases were classified as “bomb” cases. According to the doctor at Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital, most of these “bomb” cases were actually landmine incidents.¹¹

Landmine survivors were also interviewed at Kasangenzi Reception Center. A survivor from Kayogoro in Makamba, an area very close to the border, was injured in August 2001 and taken to the Heri Mission Hospital. Government soldiers control that area. In another incident, a civilian from Butanganzo in Ruyigi was injured on 16 September 2001 while fleeing to Tanzania. He sustained his injuries at Rutana, another commune bordering Tanzania. He stepped on the mine and survived, but a male companion died on the spot. Tanzanian traders took him to the Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital.

⁶ According to UNHCR statistics, there are more refugees crossing the border from the DRC than from Burundi.

⁷ The three entries were recorded at the NMC reception center for refugees arriving from the DRC. The International Rescue Committee is in charge of this center. After the arrival of refugees at the border point IRC informs UNHCR, who send a boat and transports refugees to transit center or to the hospital if they are injured or unwell.

⁸ The information came from Kibirizi 1, where arriving refugees have their details taken and are then moved on to various holding centers, or to hospitals if medical assistance is needed. The agency in charge is the IRC, which keeps records of all medical cases, including where injuries occurred and whether caused by bullets, landmines or hand grenades.

⁹ Interview with mine survivor, Heri Mission Hospital, Tanzania, 9 January 2002.

¹⁰ Interview with Caritas Muduga, a clerk with Caritas on 9 January 2002. Caritas is the implementing agency for the UNHCR at Manyovu.

¹¹ Interview with Dr. Jonathan Newkrik, Director and Surgeon at Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospital on 9 January 2002.

Survivor Assistance

Public health facilities and services available for landmine survivors along the Tanzania-Burundi border are sparse and under-funded. Tanzania has no specific funding for landmine survivor assistance. Survivors are treated in local hospitals, mostly mission hospitals in the border area. The Heri Mission and Kigoma Baptist Mission Hospitals are not specifically equipped to handle landmine cases.

The only assistance given at Heri Mission Hospital is immediate medical attention: medication, surgery, and dressing of wounds. The hospital operates on donations and is unable to provide prostheses. Dr. Oster has been the only surgeon at this hospital for the last nine years. He said that the length of time it takes for survivors to get medical help complicates their situation as they arrive with serious wounds. Some patients stay at the hospital for as long as a year, depending on injuries sustained and the length of time before medical attention becomes available.¹²

In March 2001, the ICRC provided first aid training for Red Cross volunteers, rural health workers, local leaders, and other medical teams in Kigoma.¹³ The ICRC provides material and financial support to three hospitals, in Kigoma and along the border with Burundi, for war-wounded refugees in Tanzania.¹⁴ The ICRC provides material and financial support to hospitals in Kigoma, Heri, and Kibonda and nine dispensaries, and assists with the transfer of war-wounded refugees, including mine/UXO casualties, from reception centers to the hospitals.¹⁵

Dr. Muhammed Qassim of UNHCR explained that the ICRC has always provided medical assistance at no cost for the treatment of any injured refugee.¹⁶ All patients are treated equally. Those who require specialized treatment are taken to Dar es Salaam, with the logistical support of UNHCR. However, no landmine cases were transferred to Dar es Salaam during the reporting period.

THAILAND

Key developments since May 2001: The Thailand Mine Action Center is revising its master plan for the period 2002-2006 based on the results of the Landmine Impact Survey completed in May 2001. As of June 2002, TMAC had cleared 4.4 million square meters of land. As of July 2002, Thailand had destroyed 266,245 antipersonnel mines from stockpiles, including 186,899 since June 2001. Thailand became co-chair of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention in September 2001. Thailand has offered to host the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in 2003. A Regional Conference on Victim Assistance was held in Bangkok on 6-8 November 2001. On 13-15 May 2002, Thailand hosted the Regional Seminar on Landmines in Southeast Asia.

Mine Ban Policy

Thailand signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 November 1998. The treaty entered into force for Thailand on 1 May 1999. Thailand has not enacted any new domestic legislation or other measures to implement the ban treaty. The Royal Thai Government claims that domestic legislation prior to the ban treaty is adequate, most notably in that domestic laws prohibit the possession of landmines by civilians.¹

¹² Interview with Dr. Niels Oster, Heri Mission Hospital, 9 January 2002.

¹³ Interview with senior ICRC official on 15 February 2001; email from Landmine Monitor researcher, 24 July 2001.

¹⁴ ICRC Annual Report 2000, p. 95.

¹⁵ ICRC (Geneva), *Special Report, Mine Action 2001*, July 2002, p. 22.

¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Qassim, Senior Health Coordinator for UNHCR, 11 January 2002. Dr. Qassim gave his personal views and not those of the UNHCR.

¹ Thailand's first three Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports (10 November 1999, 2 May 2000, and 10 November 2001) all cite three relevant laws: Act on the Export Control of Armaments and Materials of B.E. 2495 (1952); Act on Firearms, ammunition, explosive articles and fireworks of B.E. 2490 (1947); Decree on the

Additional specific legislation regarding landmines has been considered, but no action has been taken. Thailand submitted its annual Article 7 Report, covering the calendar year 2001, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 April 2002.²

At the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua in September 2001, Ambassador Virasakdi Futrakul highlighted the importance of the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.³ At a side meeting on 20 September 2001, Thailand participated in an ASEAN informal group meeting. Participants, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, agreed that the best approach to engaging ASEAN countries in landmine issues would be to focus on humanitarian aspects such as victim assistance, mine awareness, and socio-economic development for mine-affected areas.⁴

Following the Meeting of States Parties, Thailand and Norway assumed their role as co-chairs of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention. On 29 November 2001, Thailand cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002, Ambassador Futrakul led the Thai delegation. Ambassador Futrakul served as co-chair of the General Status Standing Committee and during its meeting on 1 February 2002, Thailand offered to host the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in 2003.⁵ On the margins of the Standing Committee meetings, Thailand participated in an informal meeting of ASEAN states to discuss landmine issues.

From 13-15 May 2002, the Royal Thai Government hosted a meeting entitled "Landmines in Southeast Asia," aimed at engaging ASEAN countries in solving the landmine problem in the region. The seminar was cosponsored by Australia, Canada and Japan. Eight out of ten ASEAN governments attended the meeting, the exceptions being Burma and Singapore. Participants included representatives of national campaigns to ban landmines, the ICBL, and concerned UN agencies.⁶

Thailand also attended the regional seminar on stockpile destruction hosted by Malaysia in August 2001.

Thailand is in the process of studying the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II.⁷ Thailand sent observers to attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to the CCW Amended Protocol II held in December 2001 in Geneva.⁸

The Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) presented *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* and "Landmine Monitor Thailand Country Report 2001," also translated into Thai language, to General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, on 17

Export Control of Armaments and Materials of B.E. 2535 (1992). They also cite the publication in the Government Gazette, on 6 July 1999, on the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for Thailand.

² The report updated information for Forms B-G, but did not include any information for Forms A (national implementation measures), H (technical characteristics of mines), I (measures to provide warning to the population), or voluntary Form J (other relevant matters, such as victim assistance programs).

³ Ambassador Virasakdi Futrakul, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the UN Office in Geneva, "Statement by the Acting Head of the Thai Delegation to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention," Managua, Nicaragua, 18 September 2001.

⁴ The Philippines, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 5 April 2002.

⁵ H.E. Mr. Virasakdi Futrakul, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office in Geneva, "Statement by the Head of Thai delegation to the SC meeting on the General Status and Operation of the Convention," Geneva, 28 January 2002. The Thai Cabinet approved the proposal to serve as host of the 5MSP in 2003 on 20 November 2001, http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/cc_main21.htm, Cabinet's Resolution on 20 November 2001 (in Thai language), accessed on 18 December 2001.

⁶ Press Release by the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines, Bangkok, 15 May 2002.

⁷ Telephone interview with a Department of International Organizations official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 6 February 2002.

⁸ Email from Hathaikhan Yamali, Second Secretary, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 14 February 2002.

December 2001.⁹ TCBL received favorable comments on the report especially from TMAC. Nonviolence International Southeast Asia produced a report on “ASEAN and Anti-personnel Mines” based on the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* with the addition of landmine victim stories from each ASEAN country. The publication was partially financed by TMAC and UNDP.¹⁰

Use, Production, and Transfer

There are no allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines in Thailand during this reporting period (since May 2001).¹¹ Thailand states that it has never produced antipersonnel mines,¹² including Claymore mines.¹³ Thailand has not exported antipersonnel mines.

In April 2001, there was a case of an apparent attempted illegal export of antipersonnel mines. A consignment of nine different types of arms and explosives, including 23 M-14 mines, 23 fuses for M-14 mines, and 25 M18A1 Claymore mines, was seized on 10 May 2001 in Songkhla province. The arms were allegedly smuggled from a military arsenal by two army officials. The apprehended smugglers reportedly said that the arms were to be sold to rebels in Aceh, Indonesia.¹⁴ The case is being prosecuted in a military court.¹⁵

Former combatants from the Burmese armed ethnic group Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) have alleged that they purchased mines and components from Thai businessmen who operate logging concessions in DKBA-controlled areas close to Myawaddy.¹⁶ Another armed group leader claimed to have been approached in late 2001 by a local Thai military commander offering antipersonnel mines for sale.¹⁷ Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm these allegations, which would constitute violations of the Mine Ban Treaty and require action by the Thai government as a State Party.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Thailand initially held 342,695 antipersonnel mines in stockpiles. From 1999 through July 2002, Thailand destroyed 217,557 antipersonnel mines through its Stockpile Destruction Plan.¹⁸ An additional 48,688 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in an accidental explosion at the Army Arsenal on 25 October 2001.¹⁹ Therefore, the total number destroyed as of July 2002 was 266,245, including 186,899 after June 2001.

⁹ Siriphen Limsirikul, “Chavalit assures Thai Government’s readiness to help ban landmines” (in Thai language), *Udomsarn Weekly* (Catholic Church Weekly Newspaper), 1-5 January 2002.

¹⁰ Telephone interview with Maj. Gen. Thammasak Senivongse, Deputy Director, Bangkok, 17 December 2001.

¹¹ In the previous reporting period, Thai officials had accused Myanmar forces of laying mines inside of Thailand, particularly in early 2001. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 482.

¹² A number of sources have identified Thailand as a past producer. For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 376.

¹³ Telephone Interview with Col. Surapon Suwanawong, Assistant Director of TMAC (Operations), Bangkok, 26 March 2002.

¹⁴ “Two army personnel captured in stealing weapons to sell to Aceh Non-state Actors in Indonesia” (in Thai language), *Mattichon Weekly* (local magazine), 14-20 May 2001.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with Police Maj. Charoen Thammakhan, Chief Investigator in charge of the case, Songkhla District Police Station, Songkhla Province, 12 March 2002.

¹⁶ Landmine Monitor Burma researcher interview with former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November 2001.

¹⁷ Landmine Monitor Burma researcher interview with ethnic group leader, Chaing Mai, Thailand, November 2001.

¹⁸ “Thailand’s Lessons Learned to Pursue the Ottawa Convention,” Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Director General of TMAC, to the Second Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 27-31 May 2002. Information on the destructions from April-July 2002 was provided in a telephone interview with Col. Surapon Suwanawong, Assistant Director of TMAC (Operations), Bangkok, 23 July 2002.

¹⁹ “Thailand’s Lessons Learned to Pursue the Ottawa Convention,” Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 27-31 May 2002, and “APL Stockpiling and Destruction in Thailand,” Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

Of the remaining 76,450 antipersonnel mines, plans call for destruction of 20,000 in August 2002. The final 51,480 will be destroyed before the 1 May 2003 deadline set by the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁰

A total of 4,970 antipersonnel mines will be kept for training and research purposes, as permitted under Article 3 of the treaty. Initially, Thailand had proposed to keep 9,487 mines.²¹ According to Thailand's Article 7 Reports, none of the mines retained for training have yet been consumed (destroyed).

Funding for destruction has come from the Royal Thai Government and a small grant from Norway.²²

Antipersonnel Mines Destroyed Since *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*²³

Location of Destruction	Date of Destruction	Number of APMs Destroyed	APMs Remaining in Stock*
Ratchaburi (RTA)	27 Aug-13 Sep 2001	13,982	249,367
Nakorn Sawan (RTA)	27 Aug-24 Sep 2001	20,000	229,367
Lopburi (RTAF)	7 Aug 2001	2,618	226,749
Border Patrol Police Sites in Chanthaburi, Nong Bua Lamphu, Chiang Mai, and Song Khla (National Police Bureau)	18 Jul-9 Aug 2001	1,611	225,138
Accidental Blasts: Pak Chong RTA Arsenal, Nakorn Ratchasima	25 Oct 2001	48,688	176,450
Lopburi (RTA)	2-26 Apr 2002	20,000	156,450
Nakorn Sawan (RTA)	1-25 May 2002	20,000	136,450
Ratchaburi (RTA)	3-27 Jun 2002	20,000	116,450
Ratchaburi (RTA)	2-26 Jul 2002	20,000	96,450
Nakorn Sawan (RTA)	2-26 Jul 2002	20,000	76,450
Total		186,899	76,450*

* Includes 4,970 antipersonnel mines retained for training

TMAC reported that approximately 48,688 mines were destroyed in the accidental explosion at the RTA's Third Division Ordnance department's depot at Nong Sarai, Pak Chong district in Nakorn Ratchasima province (200 kilometers northeast of Bangkok) on 25 October 2001. In the accident 19 soldiers and civilians died and many civilians were injured. The explosion destroyed major warehouses and a large amount of artillery, and damaged warehouses, offices, barracks and surrounding civilian area. The explosion was caused by heat and chemical reaction in expired munitions during transportation to a disposal site.²⁴

²⁰ "Thailand's Lessons Learned to Pursue the Ottawa Convention," Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 27-31 May 2002.

²¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 480. The decision to reduce the number was made in November 2000.

²² Landmine Monitor Mine Action questionnaire completed by Operations and Evaluation Office, Thailand Mine Action Center, Bangkok, 5 February 2002.

²³ Faxes (in Thai language) from Col. Surapon Suwanawong, Assistant Director of TMAC (Operations), 18 and 19 January 2002; telephone interview with Col. Surapon Suwanawong, 23 July 2002.

²⁴ "Army Arsenal Explosion-Town in fear of more blasts," *The Nation*, 26 October 2001; "Munitions Explosions-Old explosives self-ignited, army concludes," *Bangkok Post*, 29 October 2001; TMAC, "Details of TMAC's Efforts Assisting at Nong Sarai, Pak Chong district, Nakorn Ratchasima province" (in Thai language), *TMAC Newsletter*, November 2001; "APL Stockpiling and Destruction in Thailand," Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

Two other incidents occurred. One, on 29 January 2002, was at the same arsenal during a disposal delivery.²⁵ The other one occurred on 17 March 2002 when a bomb (37mm) exploded at the RTA's Nong Ta Ku demolition site in Pak Chong. One soldier suffered serious injuries and lost four fingers.²⁶ Apparently, no antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the last two accidents.²⁷

All Claymore mines in stockpiles are reportedly in command-detonated mode,²⁸ but Landmine Monitor is not aware what steps have been taken to ensure this.

Landmine Problem

The Landmine Impact Survey completed in May 2001 identified 934 mine-contaminated areas for a total of 2,556,700,000 square meters located within 27 provinces, along the borders with Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and Malaysia. A total of 530 villages were reported as seriously affected, including 295 villages along the Thai-Cambodian border in a mined area of 1,943,600,000 square meters; 90 villages along the Thai-Laotian border in a mined area of 211,500,000 square meters; 135 villages along the Thai-Burmese border in a mined area of 400,400,000 square meters; and four mine-affected communities in two southern provinces close to the border with Malaysia in a mined area of 1,200,000 square meters.²⁹

Most of the areas are no longer marked; the military possesses maps of only some mined areas. One expert has commented, "The actual number of mines in Thailand is unknown. The former conflict participants are no longer available to provide information on the actual numbers of mines laid or locations. All categories of anti-personnel (AP), anti-tank (AT) mines and booby-traps are present. Numerous abandoned munition caches are found in jungle areas. These caches are especially common on the Thai-Cambodian border near the Pailin area."³⁰

Deminers have to confront numerous environmental challenges including three canopy jungles in mountainous areas, laterite soils (high ferrous content), severe weather conditions including monsoons and tropical diseases.³¹ Most areas contaminated by mines and UXO are located near the borders, in forests and on mountainous terrain.

Many civilians take high risks in their daily lives as they enter mined areas to gather subsistence food, to collect firewood, and to farm. Alternative job opportunities are few, consequently the pressure to use the land is high.

²⁵ Bangkok Post reporters, "Munitions Explosions - Pak Chong blows up again," *Bangkok Post*, 30 January 2002; "Army Munitions Blasts - Pak Chong erupts again," *The Nation*, 30 January 2002; "40,000 explosives waiting to be blasted again! In shock, Defense Minister ordered urgent destruction" (in Thai language), *Matichon Daily Newspaper*, 30 January 2002; Anan Paengnoy, "Arsenal Blasts - Villagers prepare for 'the next time'," *Bangkok Post*, 31 January 2002; Wassana Nanuam and Yuwadee Tunyasiri, "Surayud willing to take blame - Chavalit says he is likely to be spared," *Bangkok Post*, 2 February 2002; Wassana Nanuam, "Military Arsenal - Army set to boost security," *Bangkok Post*, 3 February 2002.

²⁶ "Munitions Explosion - Pak Chong clean-up ends," *Bangkok Post*, 28 February 2002; "Munitions Dump - Explosion at clearing site, soldier hurt," *Bangkok Post*, 18 March 2002.

²⁷ However, in one of his two statements to the Standing Committees in May 2002, MG Suksomstarn said that the 48,688 mines were destroyed on both 25 October 2001 and 29 January 2002. "Thailand's Lessons Learned to Pursue the Ottawa Convention," Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 27-31 May 2002. His other statement mentioned only the 25 October 2001 incident. "APL Stockpiling and Destruction in Thailand," Statement by MG Gitti Suksomstarn, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

²⁸ Telephone Interview with Col. Surapon Suwanawong, Assistant Director of TMAC (Operations), TMAC, Bangkok, 26 March 2002.

²⁹ Dr. Guy Rhodes, Norwegian People's Aid, Presentation of Results of Landmine Impact Survey for Thailand, Bangkok, 31 May 2001.

³⁰ Dave McCracken (ed.), *Humanitarian Demining Operations in Thailand*, TMAC/USHDP Thailand, Bangkok, March 2002, p. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*

Surveys and Assessments

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and TMAC presented the findings of their Landmine/UXO Impact Survey in Bangkok on 31 May 2001.³² The official report due to be released in September 2001 had not been publicly distributed as of June 2002. On the basis of the Landmine Impact Survey results, and at the request of potential donors, TMAC is revising its initial 2000-2004 master plan for the period 2002-2006.³³ TMAC plans to establish two additional Humanitarian Mine Action Units for a total of five HMAUs.³⁴

Following the survey, on 22 June 2001, TMAC met with governors of the 27 mine-affected provinces to discuss provincial humanitarian mine action. In January 2002, the Ministry of Interior asked the 27 provinces to coordinate necessary actions with TMAC, including the prioritization of mined areas, the mobilization of the existing territorial volunteer units as civilian demining units, and the establishment of sub-committees and operation centers on mine clearance at the district and provincial levels.³⁵ According to one government official, the results of the survey did not receive adequate attention because NPA distributed copies of provincial survey reports in English to governors of mine-affected provinces and TMAC did not follow-up.³⁶

Mine Clearance

From July 2000 when clearance operations began, until June 2002, TMAC cleared 4,415,387 square meters of land. A total of 195,277 square meters of land has been handed over to civil authorities. In this time period, TMAC cleared 1,723 antipersonnel mines, 529 antivehicle mines, and 22,085 UXO.³⁷

As of 15 February 2002, TMAC had conducted 934 rapid response operations for mine clearance and 1,269 operations for UXO clearance.³⁸ Other military and police patrol units have done some demining after requests made by villagers, but there is no official record of the amount of land cleared by these spot operations.

From 26 October to 20 December 2001, following the explosions at Nong Sarai Army Arsenal in Pak Chong, two teams of deminers worked on clearance of UXO and mines in a radius of over five kilometers from the explosion.³⁹ Emergency ordnance clearance operations in Pak Chong cleared 4,125,350 square meters of land.⁴⁰

In Sa Kaeo province, 44,800 square meters, or 28 rai, of cleared land was handed over to local authorities on 6 March 2002.⁴¹ The ceremony was presided over by the Deputy Supreme Commander and attended by the US Ambassador to Thailand and NGO representatives. Prior to

³² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 483-484, for background on the survey.

³³ Interviews with two senior TMAC personnel, Bangkok, 1 February 2002.

³⁴ Interview with Maj. Gen. Gitti Suksomstarn, TMAC Director General, TMAC, Bangkok, 22 March 2002; Thailand Mine Action Center, "Memorandum requesting permission from Supreme Command on adjusting plan on establishment of HMAUs" (in Thai language), 30 August 2001; and TMAC, "First Interim Corrected and Revised edition of the National Mine Action Master Plan 2002-2006," (in Thai language) February 2002. Initial plans had called for a total of eight HMAUs. The reduction in number of HMAUs reflects a lack of international funding.

³⁵ Letter to Director General of TMAC from Secretary General of Ministry of Interior, on targeting of the mine-affected areas, 29 January 2002.

³⁶ Interview with a government official from Buriram province, Seminar on Civilian Demining and Victim Assistance Projects in Thai-Cambodian border provinces, Bangkok, 14 March 2002.

³⁷ Email from David McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, 29 July 2002. This contained a chart on HMAU#1 and #2 Demining Progress until June 2002.

³⁸ Email from David McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, 12 March 2002.

³⁹ Major Surin Priyanuphap, HMAU1 personnel, Presentation on HMAU1, at the Hand-over Ceremony of PROMAC (BDM-48) and Explosives, Ban Nong Ya Kaeo, Sa Kaeo Province, 23 January 2002.

⁴⁰ Email from David McCracken, USHDP Advisor TMAC, 12 March 2002.

⁴¹ Maj. Gen. Gitti Suksomstarn, TMAC Director General, Speech in the Hand-over Ceremony, Ban Nong Ya Kaeo, Sa Kaeo Province, 6 March 2002.

the ceremony, TMAC invited TCBL and the General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation to witness the quality assurance operations of the humanitarian demining.

TMAC cannot directly employ civilians. However, due to the great need for many more people properly trained in humanitarian demining,⁴² TMAC sought and received the support of other ministries to have civilian demining teams working in coordination with military teams.⁴³

TMAC held the first demining training for civilians from 23 July to 28 September 2001. The eighteen newly trained civilian deminers joined in clearance operations at Pak Chong. The General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation financially supported the civilian demining team.⁴⁴ In mid-March 2002 the civilian demining team was involved in a survey in Khok Soong district of Sa Kaeo province to prepare demining operations.⁴⁵ The civilian deminers have also been employed by the Minister of Fine Arts to clear a small area at the Sadok Khok Thom, Sa Kaeo Province, aiding the restoration of an ancient Khmer sanctuary.⁴⁶

TMAC is seeking donor support for further training of civilian deminers, equipment, and field operations for one to two years, after which provincial budgets will support demining by civilians. TMAC intends to train two civilian demining teams in Sa Kaeo and Chanthaburi provinces by the end of 2002 and requested an additional 1 million Baht (US\$23,288) for this initial operation.⁴⁷

Coordination and Planning

TMAC, under the Supreme Command of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, is responsible for mine action coordination. It receives and manages domestic and international mine action funding. TMAC is revising its first master plan for 2000-2004.⁴⁸ In February 2002, TMAC issued the "First Interim - Corrected and Revised - edition of the National Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action 2002-2006." The priorities are civilian needs, including access to schools, agricultural land, and water sources. Priorities are also to be established on the basis of the data collected by the Landmine Impact Survey, as well as in consultation with provincial and district officers, and concerned villagers.⁴⁹

The new Master Plan includes the establishment of two new HMAUs in addition to the three HMAUs already active. Each HMAU is assigned to a geographical area: HMAU#1 in Sa Kaeo province; HMAU#2 in Chanthaburi and Trat; HMAU#3 in Buriram, Surin, Sisaket and Ubon Ratchathani; HMAU#4 in Petchabun, Phitsanulok, Uttaradit, Nan, Phayao, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and Tak and HMAU#5 in Ratchaburi, Petchaburi, Kanchanaburi, Prachuab Kirikhan, Loei, Udonthani, Nong Bua Lamphu, Nong Khai, Cumporn, Yala, and Nakorn Sithammarat.⁵⁰

On 25-27 July 2001, TMAC organized a workshop on the National Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2002-2006 at the Office of the Secretary General of the Defense Ministry, in Muang Thong Thani. Eighty participants included representatives from the Supreme Command,

⁴² This issue was discussed in presentations and working groups at the Southeast Asia Mine Action Cooperation and Technical Conference organized by USHDP and TMAC from 4-8 March 2002, Bangkok.

⁴³ Interview with Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, Bangkok, 18 March 2002. He also said that potential donors expressed support for civilian participation in humanitarian mine action.

⁴⁴ Interview with Suthikiat Sopanik, Director of General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation, Bangkok, 29 November 2001; and at Sa Kaeo Province, 23 January 2002.

⁴⁵ Suthikiat Sopanik, Director of General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation, Presentation at the SE Asia Mine Action Cooperation and Technology Workshop, Bangkok, 7 March 2002; telephone interview with Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, Bangkok, 20 March 2002.

⁴⁶ Email from Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, Bangkok, 29 July 2002.

⁴⁷ Interview with Maj. Gen. Gitti Suksomstarn, TMAC Director General, Bangkok, 22 March 2002.

⁴⁸ Thailand Mine Action Center, "Corporate Plan - Establishing A Strong Mine Action Institutional Framework for Thailand," Second Draft, 26 December 2001.

⁴⁹ Interview with Maj. Gen. Gitti Suksomstarn, TMAC Director General, Bangkok, 22 March 2002.

⁵⁰ Thailand Mine Action Center, "First Interim Corrected and Revised edition of the National Mine Action Master Plan 2002-2006," Addendum on Adjusted Establishment Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action Units, Chapters 8.1-8.2, and 9.1, (in Thai language), February 2002.

militaries, police, NGOs, related ministries, governors and provincial administrative organizations from 27 mine-affected provinces.⁵¹

TMAC organized another seminar on Civilian Demining and Victim Assistance Projects on 14-15 March 2002 in Bangkok. Local government officials from the seven mine-affected Thai-Cambodian border provinces, as well as concerned central ministerial offices and NGOs, were invited to brainstorm in order to concretize the two projects. The seminar concluded with recommendations that each province should support humanitarian mine action by using existing service providers and budget, and establishing local committees to implement the projects. TMAC will be responsible for proposing the projects on civilian demining and victim assistance to the government for financial support.

From 4-8 March 2002, USHDP and TMAC sponsored the Southeast Asia Mine Action Coordination & Technical Workshop focused on demining, challenges, mistakes and better practices.⁵² The Mine Action Information Center at James Madison University facilitated the meeting. Representatives from Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, China, and South Korea attended.

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

The Royal Thai Government (RTG) provided 40 million Baht (approximately US\$929,152), to TMAC for mine action in FY 2001 (October 2000 - September 2001).⁵³ In fiscal year 2002, TMAC expects to receive a total of 32 million Baht (US\$743,321) from the RTG national budget for humanitarian mine action.⁵⁴

In 2001, the United States provided US\$1.42 million, including US\$1.07 million for demining equipment and US\$350,000 for the mine detection dog program.⁵⁵ In addition, US Special Forces conducted two humanitarian demining training sessions at a cost of US\$350,000.⁵⁶

The United States Humanitarian Demining Program (USHDP) provided a Special Advisor to TMAC from RONCO, a private, commercial demining company. The adviser is also responsible for coordination with the US Embassy and the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). The USHDP has been involved in training and deployment of Mine Detection Dog (MDD) teams, train the trainers programs at the Mine Dog Center, advanced training for manual deminers at Ratchaburi Demining Center, and research and development support for mechanical systems to be used in demining, such as the TEMPEST and SDTT systems.⁵⁷

The government of Canada officially donated a Canadian-manufactured PROMAC (BDM 48) Brusher Deminer system and FIXOR explosives to HMAU1 on 23 January 2002, for an estimated value of US\$340,000.⁵⁸ Previously, in May 2001, Canada had provided the BDM 48 machine for HMAU1 testing and trial use system in Sa Kaeo province. Canada reported mine action funding to Thailand in 2001 totaling US\$295,972.⁵⁹

In 2001, the Royal Thai Government received US\$400,000 from Japan, originally provided in 2000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action. On 20 August 2001, UNDP and the RTG

⁵¹ Thailand Mine Action Center, *Monthly Report on Activities* (in Thai language), July 2001.

⁵² Email from Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, 29 January 2002 and 18 March 2002.

⁵³ Information from TMAC, prepared by George Focsaneanu, UNDP Senior Advisor to TMAC, 8 January 2002.

⁵⁴ Interview with a senior TMAC personnel, TMAC, Bangkok, 1 February 2002.

⁵⁵ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 20.

⁵⁶ Email from George P. Kent, Political Section, US Embassy, Bangkok, 25 March 2002; emails from Maj. Scott Elder, JUSMAG, 27 and 28 March 2002.

⁵⁷ Email from Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, 18 March 2002.

⁵⁸ Telephone interview with James Trottier, Political Economic Counselor, Canadian Embassy, Bangkok, 22 March 2002; Pattanapong Hirunard, "Dealing with the mine threat," *Bangkok Post*, 24 January 2002.

⁵⁹ UNMAS Mine Action Investment Database.

signed an agreement utilizing the earmarked Japanese funds for mine clearance to be completed by 31 July 2002.⁶⁰

Norway has reported US\$80,111 in mine action funding for Thailand in 2001, and Germany has reported US\$22,832.⁶¹

The non-governmental Japan Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS) provided TMAC with an advisor on logistical support for equipment and technology development.⁶²

The General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation supported humanitarian demining training and clearance activities for Baht 1,000,000 (US\$23,228).⁶³ Handicap International (Thailand) received Baht 280,000 (US\$6,504) from Handicap International (HI) for mine risk education activities in Chanthaburi province. HI Thailand received also Baht 300,000 (US\$6,968) from Canada through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives for mine awareness programs; and Baht 4,000,000 (US\$92,915) from UNHCR for a Mine Risk Education project in the Thai-Burma border from July 2000-August 2001. HI Thailand survivor assistance projects were financed by the European Union for Baht 7,000,000 (US\$162,601) and Australia for Baht 120,000.⁶⁴ COERR received Baht 120,000 (US\$2,787) from the World Bank for mine awareness activities in 16 schools in Sa Kaeo and for network strengthening of survivor groups.⁶⁵ ADPC's mine awareness activities in Sa Kaeo received local funding of Baht 1,000,000 (US\$23,228).⁶⁶ In 2002, The Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines is conducting a one-year survivor assistance program in Surin and Buriram provinces with the support of Baht 340,000 (US\$7,897) from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. The Prosthetic Foundation of Thailand under Royal Patronage received local donations of Baht 12,000,000 (US\$27,874) for survivor assistance.⁶⁷

Mine Risk Education

In 2001, TMAC's HMAUs and three NGOs conducted mine risk education activities in mine-affected areas. However, there have been no need assessments for mine risk education following the Landmine Impact Survey.

HMAUs conducted mine awareness programs in 146 communities in Sa Kaeo, Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, Chanthaburi and Trat provinces.⁶⁸ TMAC's HMAU#1 reached about 46,000 persons in 61 villages, HMAU#2 reached 23,306 persons located in 29 villages, and HMAU#3 reached 22,940 people in 35 villages.⁶⁹

From July 2000 to August 2001, the Asia Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) provided mine awareness training to 1,000 participants, mainly provincial government officials and teachers

⁶⁰ Press Release from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 20 August 2001; interview with George Focsaneanu, UNDP Senior Advisor to TMAC, Bangkok, 22 March 2002.

⁶¹ UNMAS Mine Action Database.

⁶² Interview with Yamada Shinichi, JAHDS Thailand representative, Bangkok, 22 March 2002, and telephone follow-up, 26 March 2002.

⁶³ Interviews with Suthikiat Sopanik, Director of General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation, Bangkok, 22 and 25 March 2002.

⁶⁴ Interview with Duangkamol Ponchamni, Director of Programs in Thailand, Handicap International, 22 March 2002; Email to Duangkamol Ponchamni, Director of HI Thailand, from Siriphen Limsirikul, Landmine Monitor 2002 researcher, with request for clarification of funding periods, 26 March 2002.

⁶⁵ Sukpranee Deerada, Project Officer of COERR Aranyaprathet Field Office, Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo Province, "Landmine Monitor 2002 Thailand questionnaires on Mine Awareness/Risk Education, and on Survivor Assistance 2001," 28 December 2001.

⁶⁶ Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, "Summary Project Report on Results of Training Program on Mine Risk along the Border" (in Thai language), November 2001; Sirikhahn Khahattha, Government Relations Officer, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Reply to Landmine Monitor 2002 questionnaire on Mine Awareness/Risk Education 2001, 8 January 2002.

⁶⁷ Assoc. Prof. Therdchai Jivacate, MD, Director General, Prosthetic Foundation, Chiang Mai Province, in response to the questionnaire on Survivor Assistance, 7 January 2002.

⁶⁸ Landmine Monitor 2002 Questionnaire on Mine Action, completed by TMAC, 4 February 2002.

⁶⁹ Emails from Dave McCracken, USHDP Advisor to TMAC, 12 March 2002 and 29 July 2002.

in Sa Kaeo province. The evaluation of the project suggested improvements in teaching aids, a need for the curriculum to include pictures, and information on laws prohibiting possession of weapons.⁷⁰ As a result of the evaluation, ADPC was requested to expand the project to border schools. However, ADPC has not been able to continue this project for lack of funding.

As part of the ADPC mine awareness education program, over 200 schoolchildren in Sa Kaeo province joined in the children's art contest titled "Danger of Landmines." Winners, selected by a committee chaired by TCBL coordinator, received certificates and scholarships at the award presentation in Sa Kaeo on 20 July 2001.⁷¹

In April 2000, HI began a three-year Community-Based Rehabilitation (CBR) and Mine Risk Education (MRE) project in Chanthaburi province. In 2001, the program covered 5,941 people, including 4,091 community members, 1,300 school children of primary and secondary levels, 50 government officials (teachers and public health stations), as well as 500 people outside mine-risk areas.⁷² In the western part on the Thai-Burma border area, HI ran a second MRE project which included a survey on mine casualties in three refugee camps for refugees from Burma. Some 70% of the casualties interviewed reported they had not received mine awareness training.⁷³

On 7 December 2001, Handicap International, together with District Administration Organizations of Khlong Yai and Thep Nimitr in Chanthaburi province and the Chanthaburi-Trat Royal Navy Base/HMAU2, organized a 15-kilometer mine ban walkathon/marathon rally in mine-affected areas of Chanthaburi province. About 1,500 local residents participated.⁷⁴

COERR Aranyaprathet field office in Sa Kaeo province promoted mine awareness education for students in Grades 3-6 in 23 primary schools in two districts and one sub district of Sa Kaeo province. The World Bank funded the project with 44,000 Baht (US\$1,022). From April 2001 to March 2002 a total of 1,500 students participated to the program and landmine survivors assisted as resource persons.⁷⁵

Landmine Casualties

According to the results of the Landmine Impact Survey, between June 1998 and May 2001, 346 new landmine casualties were recorded, more than 100 people a year.⁷⁶ Between January and May 2001, the Landmine Impact Survey recorded 30 new casualties in the provinces of Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son, Phetchaburi, Prachuap Khirikhan, Ratchaburi, Surin, and Tak. It is acknowledged that these figures do not reflect the picture for the whole country. Of the 30 casualties, 17 were identified as Karen or Burmese.⁷⁷ According to Major General Suksomstarn of TMAC, landmines cause only two casualties a month in Thailand, or about 24 persons per year.⁷⁸

⁷⁰ Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, "Summary Project Report on Results of Training Program on Mine Risk along the Border" (in Thai language), November 2001.

⁷¹ Photograph with caption "The Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre Foundation (ADPC) held a children's art contest titled 'Danger of Landmines' with judging taking place at the Government House on 20 June 2001," Society- Outlook section, *Bangkok Post*, 4 July 2001.

⁷² Fax from Supotch Boontem, Cambodian Border Programme Manager, Handicap International, "Landmine Monitor 2002 Thailand questionnaire on Mine Awareness/Risk Education 2001," 18 March 2002.

⁷³ Handicap International (Thailand), *Mine Casualties Survey Report, Tak Province, Thailand - Mine Risk Education Project Thai-Myanmar Border*, (Bangkok, August 2001), p. E14.

⁷⁴ Interview with Duangkamol Ponchamni, Director of Programs in Thailand, Handicap International, Civilian Demining and Victim Assistance Projects in Thai-Cambodian border provinces, Bangkok, 14 March 2002.

⁷⁵ Telephone interview with Sukpranee Deerada, Project Officer of COERR Aranyaprathet Field Office, Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo Province, 27 March 2002; Sukpranee Deerada, Project Officer of COERR Aranyaprathet Field Office, Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo Province, "Landmine Monitor 2002 Thailand questionnaire on Mine Awareness/Risk Education 2001," 28 December 2001.

⁷⁶ For more details *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 489.

⁷⁷ Email from Ruangdech Pongprom, Database Office, TMAC, 8 July 2002.

⁷⁸ Maj. Gen. Gitti Suksomstarn, TMAC Director General, Opening Remarks at the Southeast Asia Landmines Cooperation and Technical Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, 4 March 2002.

As there is no comprehensive data on landmine casualties for 2001, the discrepancy between these figures cannot be explained.

Reports on casualties can be found in the media. For example, in January 2001, a truck driver was killed by a landmine on the side of the road after he stepped out of his truck.⁷⁹ In May 2001, in two separate incidents, one farmer was killed and another injured after stepping on landmines.⁸⁰ And on 16 December 2001, two boys, aged 7 and 8 years, were killed by a mine at the Ranger base in Aranyaprathet district, Sa Kaeo province.⁸¹ A local resident reported that mines were hidden under the tree where the children were playing.

The *Mine Casualties Survey Report, Tak Province, Thailand* released by Handicap International indicated that there has been a steady increase in the number of casualties along the Thai/Burma border. According to the report, "Since 1996, the number of mine casualties had a tendency to increase every year. By 1999, it reduced a little and in 2000 rose to the highest level of 22 cases. In the year 2001, for the two months of data collection (January and February) there were 10 casualties already."⁸² Mine survivors, most of who were from Burma but now residing in refugee camps along the border in Tak province, were surveyed. The goal of the project is to establish a reporting system where casualty data is collected and transmitted to the Ministry of Public Health or its equivalent for analysis and distribution.⁸³

HI has now established a reporting system with Thai border hospitals in order to improve data collection on landmine casualties in Tak province. HI receives information from three Thai hospitals and sub-district health stations in the refugee camps. The casualties, or their family, are traced and interviewed by HI staff. In the period January to April 2002, nineteen new casualties were reported, including two people killed and seventeen injured. Three of the casualties were female, and sixteen were males. The youngest casualty was a seven-year-old child. Fourteen of the casualties were the result of incidents on the Burma side of the border.⁸⁴

As of June 2002, TMAC's HMAU reporting system was still not operational. It is intended that the HMA units will collect reports on incidents and casualties and transmit the information to the IMSMA database at TMAC. Although no reports were collected on the western border, on the eastern border two incidents were reported on one day. On 4 February 2002, two new casualties were reported: one in Taphraya district of Sa Kaeo province and the other in None Din Daeng, Buriram province.⁸⁵ In another reported incident, on 3 March 2002, in the Thai/Burma border district of Tha Song Yang in Tak province, four schoolgirls triggered a landmine while gathering vegetables. One girl was killed and the other three were injured and taken to Mae Sot Hospital.⁸⁶

Survivor Assistance

Medical and rehabilitation services in Thailand are available in both state and privately owned hospitals and health care units, functioning at the provincial, district, and community levels.⁸⁷ Generally, assistance available to landmine survivors is adequate; however, most come from very poor farming families who can experience difficulties coping with the costs of care and rehabilitation.

⁷⁹ "Army to blast 20,000 mines," *Bangkok Post*, 17 January 2001.

⁸⁰ James East, "Meet the new air-con mine buster," *The Straits Times*, 9 June 2001.

⁸¹ "2 boys killed while playing with explosive at Army base," (in Thai language), *Matichon Daily Newspaper*, 17 December 2001.

⁸² Handicap International, *Mine Casualties Survey Report, Tak Province, Thailand - Mine Risk Education Project Thai-Myanmar Border*, Bangkok, August 2001, p. E6.

⁸³ HI, *Mine Casualties Survey Report, Tak Province, Thailand - Mine Risk Education Project Thai-Myanmar Border*, Bangkok, August 2001, p. E14.

⁸⁴ Fax from Saowaluk Sae-Tang, Mine Risk Education Project Manager, Handicap International, Mae Sot, 15 May 2002.

⁸⁵ Interview with Ruangdech Pongprom, Database Manager, TMAC (civilian official in-charge of IMSMA database), at the SE Asia Mine Action Workshop, Bangkok, 8 March 2002.

⁸⁶ "Mae Sot - Schoolgirls trigger landmine," *The Nation*, 5 March 2002.

⁸⁷ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 443.

Landmine Monitor received 24 responses to a questionnaire on survivor assistance sent to sixty-nine district and regional hospitals, and concerned organizations in mine-affected areas. In general, most organizations were able to provide figures on mine survivors assisted, while few hospitals were able to, due to the lack of a built-in data collection system on landmine casualties. Public hospitals and rehabilitation centers identified 61 landmine survivors assisted with medical care and walking aids in 2001.⁸⁸

TMAC is considered the focal point for victim assistance in Thailand. In 2001, TMAC assisted 335 landmine survivors by facilitating transfers to hospitals, mobile prosthetic units, and vocational training centers.⁸⁹

In 2001, the Prosthetic Foundation provided mobile prosthetic services in remote provinces: 1,746 free-of-charge prostheses were fitted for 1,140 beneficiaries, including 211 landmine survivors. In 2002, the program will establish five mobile units in four different provinces and one of the largest state hospitals in Bangkok.⁹⁰ Over the last ten years, almost 10,500 prostheses have been produced. By using local materials, the foundation is able to make prostheses, designed for local weather conditions and practices, for 1,000 Baht (US\$23.22), six times cheaper than imported versions.⁹¹

Handicap International has opened fifteen orthopedic workshops in Thai provincial hospitals since 1982. Since 1998, HI has operated community-based rehabilitation, and orthopedic workshops, in four refugee camps along the Thai/Burma border to assist all persons with disabilities including landmine survivors. Refugee technicians are trained in the production of prostheses, and produce around forty devices a month. HI's program also includes the distribution of wheelchairs and vocational training. In 2001, 119 landmine survivors benefited from the program.⁹²

COERR continued to assist the Network of Landmine Survivors in Sa Kaeo province to run income-generating projects with revolving funds. In 2001, 179 families of landmine survivors benefited from the program.⁹³

On 2 January 2002, the TCBL started a one-year project in Surin and Buriram provinces, which includes community-based survivor assistance, empowerment, mine awareness, and the setting up of a small revolving loan fund. In addition, the project intends to establish a database of survivors to complement the TMAC national incident database.

Landmine survivors from Burma seeking assistance in Thailand receive medical care from hospitals in the refugee camps and public district hospitals in the Thai/Burma border provinces, including Tak, Mae Hong Son, Kanchanaburi, and Chumphon. Most of the landmine casualties are amputees.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Responses from twenty hospitals and the Sirindhorn National Center for Medical Rehabilitation to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire.

⁸⁹ Statistics collated from various information provided to Landmine Monitor by TMAC.

⁹⁰ Associate Professor Therdchai Jivacate, MD, Director General, Prosthetic Foundation, Chiang Mai Province, in response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 7 January 2002.

⁹¹ Saritdet Marukatat and Woranuj Maneerungsee, "Ready for a leap - Innovative, inexpensive, locally-produced artificial legs may be set to step into the global marketplace," *Bangkok Post Outlook*, 20 March 2002.

⁹² *Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs*, ICBL, September 2001, p. 112; and response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire by Supotch Boontem, Handicap International, Chanthaburi, 18 March 2002.

⁹³ *Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs*, ICBL, September 2001, p. 111; and response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire by Sukpranee Deerada, COERR, Aranyaprathet District, 28 December 2001.

⁹⁴ HI (Thailand), *Mine Casualties Survey Report, Tak Province, Thailand - Mine Risk Education Project Thai-Myanmar Border*, Bangkok, August 2001, pp. E12-14.

Disability Policy and Practice

A national disability law has been in place since 1991.⁹⁵ At the request of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Cabinet announced that the year 2002 is dedicated to the promotion of professions for persons with disabilities (PWDs).⁹⁶ The budget for 2002 is seven million Baht (US\$162,601). PWDs and PWD associations can apply for support from the National Office for Rehabilitation of PWDs, or from provincial public welfare offices.⁹⁷ On 28 November 2001, the Council of Disabled People of Thailand and its network organizations, led about 1,000 persons with disabilities to Government House, the Parliament, and the National Ombudsman's office, to protest discrimination in employment opportunities for PWDs, and urged the government to amend over 50 laws that discriminate against PWDs, and to speed up the issuing of delayed ministerial regulations on the provision of facilities for PWDs.⁹⁸

At the South East Asia Regional Conference on Victim Assistance held in Bangkok on 6-8 November 2001, HRH Princess Galyani Vadhana Krom Luang Naradhiwas Rajanagarindra, elder sister to His Majesty the King, addressed the official Opening Ceremony. The Conference was an initiative of Handicap International aimed to raise awareness of the needs of mine survivors and to assist countries in the region in the development of national plans of actions. Participants from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, and observers from Myanmar attended the Conference. Preparations in Thailand for the regional conference included five pre-workshop planning sessions, and a national workshop held on 26 September 2001. HI and other NGOs continue to network on survivor assistance policies.

TOGO

Togo signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified it on 9 March 2000 and became a State Party on 1 September 2000. No domestic implementation measures have been taken, as required by Article 9. Togo's initial transparency report required by Article 7 was due on 28 February 2001 but has not been submitted. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that these delays were probably due to administrative reasons, particularly a lack of personnel.¹ The official added that, as the country is not affected by antipersonnel mines, the mine issue is not a priority.²

Togo did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001, due to flight disruptions after the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.³ Togo did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002, due to financial resources.⁴ Togo participated in the regional "Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention" in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001.

On 29 November 2001, Togo voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, which calls for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁹⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 491.

⁹⁶ Cabinet Resolution, 9 October 2001 (in Thai language), at http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/cc_main21.htm accessed on 18 March 2002.

⁹⁷ Interview with an official from the Association of the Physically Handicapped of Thailand, Bangkok, 18 March 2002.

⁹⁸ Council of Disabled People of Thailand, *Newsletter*, November 2001 (in Thai language), pp. 1-2; Association of the Physically Handicapped of Thailand, *Newsletter*, January-February 2002 (in Thai language), p. 4.

¹ Interview with Abra Afetse-Tay, in charge of Judicial, Agreements, and Treaty Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abidjan, 29 January 2002.

² *Ibid.*

³ Interview with Lt. Col. Yao Ametsipe, Cabinet of the Ministry of National Defense and War Veterans, Lomé, 14 February 2002.

⁴ Interview with Abra Afetse-Tay, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé, 5 April 2002.

Togo is not affected by landmines and there are no mine victims. It reportedly has never produced, transferred or used antipersonnel mines, but possesses a small stock of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.⁵ In April 2001, during military training for peacekeepers of ten West African countries, held at Kara in the north of Togo, a simulation of mine clearance operations in combat areas was carried out.⁶

The Togolese Campaign to Ban Landmines, established in 2000, broadcast programs on the Mine Ban Treaty on the national "Radio Togo" in May and June 2001.⁷

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Trinidad and Tobago signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 27 April 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. On 28 September 2000, it became the first Caribbean state to adopt domestic implementing legislation, the "Anti-Personnel Mines Act, 2000."¹ Trinidad and Tobago cosponsored and voted in support of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. It has not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 August 1999. Trinidad and Tobago has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected.²

TUNISIA

Key developments since May 2001: In January 2002, the government hosted a regional seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty in North Africa. The Army destroyed 1,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of the event. Tunisia has not submitted Article 7 Reports in 2001 or 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Tunisia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1999, ratified on 9 July 1999, and the treaty entered into force for it on 1 January 2000. Tunisia has not passed any domestic legislation implementing the treaty. In January 2002, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that existing penal laws are sufficient to respond to any violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ Last year, several Tunisian officials had indicated that national implementation legislation was being prepared.²

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 159.

⁶ Bernadin Adjosse and Assimbodom Batassi, "Manœuvres militaires Cohésion Kozah 2001," *Togo-Presse*, 23 April 2001, p. 7; interview with Lt. Col. Yao Ametsipe, Cabinet of Ministry of Defense and War Veterans, Lomé, 14 February 2002.

⁷ Three 20-minute programs, "The Discovery of the Ottawa Treaty," were broadcast on 31 May, 7 June and 14 June 2001.

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 386.

² Landmine Monitor telephone interview with C.S. Arunachalam, Assistant Chief Parliamentary Counsel, 17 July 2000.

¹ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Chef of Department, General Direction of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002. The laws cited by Tunisia are: law number 33/1969 issued in 12 June 1969, and order number 60/1970 issued on 21 January 1970, both regarding the production, transfer, stockpiling, and possession of weapons; and law number 63/1996 issued on 15 July 1996 on the conditions of manufacture, export, transfer, stockpile, use, and trade of explosive elements for civilian purposes. See Tunisia, Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 9 July 2001, covering the period from 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000.

² Interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Social Affairs, Tunis, 25 April 2001. These included four representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two from Ministry of Defense, and two from Ministry of Social Affairs.

Tunisia did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001 due to travel problems after the events of 11 September.³ Tunisia cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. Representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs participated in meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002.

From 15-16 January 2002, Tunisia hosted, with the support of Canada, the Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa. Representatives from Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, nine donor countries, UNMAS, UNDP, ICRC, ICBL and others attended the seminar. At the opening of the seminar, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Mohamed Chokri Ayachi, noted the effects of mines and UXO on development in the region and the importance of socio-economic integration for mine victims by developing the areas where they live.⁴

Tunisia submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report on 9 July 2000, but has not yet submitted the required annual updated reports due 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002. Tunisian officials noted that the Tunisian Mission to the UN in New York had received guidance for submitting a report in 2001, but for unknown reasons did not do so. The same officials stated that the annual report would be submitted in 2002.⁵

Tunisia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but has not ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines. It attended the convention's second review conference in December 2001. Tunisian officials state that adoption of Amended Protocol II and Protocol IV (Blinding Lasers) is under active consideration and there are no military objections to these agreements.⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Tunisia has never produced antipersonnel landmines and has not exported or imported antipersonnel mines since joining the Mine Ban Treaty. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Tunisia does not produce or conduct research on any munitions that may function like an antipersonnel mines and pose dangers to civilians.⁷

Tunisia declared a stockpile of 17,575 antipersonnel mines in its July 2000 Article 7 Report and indicated that it plans to retain 5,000 mines for research and training activities permitted by Article 3 of the treaty.⁸ The 5,000 mines retained are additional to the 17,575 mines that will be destroyed.⁹

On 12 January 2002, Tunisia destroyed 1,000 antipersonnel mines as part of its national stockpile destruction plan. This was the first destruction since 30 June 1999. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the storage and security of the stockpile and for implementation of the national stockpile destruction program, which is scheduled for completion by 1 January 2004, the treaty mandated deadline.

³ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002, and follow-up telephone interview, 29 April 2002.

⁴ Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention in North Africa, Tunis, January 15-16, 2002: Final Report on Proceedings," p. 2.

⁵ Statements by Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to Landmine Monitor researcher, Tunis, 16 January 2002.

⁶ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 9 July 2000. For the types of stockpiled and retained mines see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 984-984.

⁹ For example, Tunisia declared a stockpile of 3,550 PMA-3 mines to be destroyed, and a total of 4,000 PMA-3 mines to be retained. Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 9 July 2000. This was also confirmed in an interview with Lt. Col. Moustafa Moussa, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 29 May 2002.

Tunisia informed States Parties in May 2002 that it does not envision any problems, technical or other, in meeting the deadline.¹⁰ Two Tunisian officers were slated to participate in the stockpile destruction training course in Switzerland in June 2002.¹¹

Landmine Problem

Tunisian territory was mined during World War Two, but officials state that the impact of the mined areas is “low” and mine incidents are rare.¹² Tunisian officials claim that mined areas are marked and mapped, and civilians do not use these areas because they are remote.¹³ No in-depth assessment or survey of the landmine problem in Tunisia has been undertaken.¹⁴

Tunisia’s Article 7 Report indicates that mines were also laid in 1976 and 1980 in five areas, containing a total of 3,526 antipersonnel mines and 1,530 antivehicle mines.¹⁵ Three areas are located in the desert regions in the far south near the Libyan border at Borj El Khadra, M’Chiguig, and Ras Jedir (the border post between Tunisia, Algeria and Libya). A fourth area is Bir Zar on the Libyan border. The fifth mined area identified as M’Guisem is located in the southeast on the Libyan border.¹⁶ In addition to these mined areas, local residents often find mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from World War Two in various locations.¹⁷

Mine Action

There is no national agency responsible for coordinating mine action in Tunisia and the Tunisian Army is the only institution authorized to engage in mine clearance. Funding for mine action comes from the budget for the Ministry of Defense.¹⁸ The Tunisian Military Academy is responsible for training military personnel in mine clearance.¹⁹

Mine clearance operations take place systematically before the beginning of any civil project in a suspected mined area. A Ministry of Defense official described several difficulties encountered in mine clearance operations in a presentation to the regional seminar held in January 2002, including the absence of minefield maps, various kinds of soils, difficulties of mine detection, mines laid a long time ago, and high costs.²⁰

There is not a coordinated national plan for educating the public about the risks of mines. Military schools (*lycee militaires*) have responsibility for mine risk education training in cities. The National Guard has a similar responsibility in rural areas.

Landmines Casualties and Survivor Assistance

No new landmine casualties were reported in 2001 or in the first quarter of 2002.²¹ However, in May 2001, a child lost his hand in a UXO incident while he was grazing sheep. In another reported incident in March 2002, two children were injured while they were grazing sheep in an area outside of Qiuroan City, in north Tunisia; one child lost a hand and received serious facial

¹⁰ Intervention de la Tunisie sur Le point relatif a la destruction du stock, to the Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

¹¹ Interview with Lt. Col. Moustafa Moussa, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹² Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Interview with Colonel Nouri Ben Taous, Ministry of Defense, Tunis, 16 January 2002; Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Form C, 9 July 2000.

¹⁶ Interview with Lt. Col. Moustafa Moussa, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 29 May 2002.

¹⁷ Interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Social Affairs, Tunis, 25 April 2001.

¹⁸ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Colonel Nouri Ben Taous, Ministry of Defense, Tunis, 16 January 2002; Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

²⁰ Intervention by Colonel Nouri Ben Taous, Ministry of Defense, Tunis, 16 January 2002 (notes taken by researcher).

²¹ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

injuries and the other child received serious chest and stomach injuries.²² In April 2001, Tunisian officials provided Landmine Monitor with a document indicating that no new mine casualties had been registered since 1996.²³ Tunisian authorities registered three mine and UXO casualties from 1991-1996.

The Ministry of Disabled Affairs is responsible for the care of all disabled people in Tunisia, including landmine/UXO survivors. Assistance includes finding employment, pensions and compensation, and also credit facilities to establish small businesses. The Center for Professional Rehabilitation (Centre de Réadaptation Professionnelle des Handicapés Moteurs et des Accidentés de la Vie) offers physical rehabilitation for all disabled people.²⁴

TURKMENISTAN

Key developments since May 2001: Turkmenistan submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report in November 2001. It reported the destruction of more than 400,000 antipersonnel mines since 1997, and a remaining stockpile of 761,782 mines. It requested a seven-year extension of its deadline for stockpile destruction, but such an extension is not permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Turkmenistan subsequently indicated it intended to meet the deadline of 1 March 2003.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkmenistan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 January 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Turkmenistan has not yet passed national legislation or other measures implementing the treaty, as required by Article 9.

Turkmenistan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, dated 1 October 2001, to the United Nations on 14 November 2001.¹ The report was due by 27 August 1999. Turkmenistan chose not to use the standard reporting forms, but instead submitted one page of text and two detailed tables on its stockpile. Much of the information required by Article 7 is not included in the report.

The government has not participated in any of the meetings of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. Turkmenistan has also not attended any of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, nor any of the regional meetings on landmines held over the past few years.

In November 2001, Turkmenistan cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in previous years. Turkmenistan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Landmine Problem, Casualties, Production, Transfer, and Use

According to Turkmenistan, "There are no mined areas on the territory of Turkmenistan."² There are no reports of landmine casualties. Turkmenistan has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel landmines.³ It is not believed to have produced or exported landmines in the past. There have been no reports of use by Turkmenistan in the reporting period.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Turkmenistan has reported that of an initial stockpile of 1.17 million antipersonnel mines in December 1997, a total of 761,782 antipersonnel mines remained as of 1 October 2001 (see table

²² Interview with Lt. Colonel Moustafa Moussa, Ministry of Defense, Geneva 29 May 2002.

²³ Document provided to Landmine Monitor by Tunisian authorities on 25 April 2001.

²⁴ Interview with Zied Bouzouita, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunis, 21 January 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, dated 1 October 2001, submitted on 14 November 2001. The report was submitted in Russian. Landmine Monitor utilized a translation provided by the Government of Canada.

² Article 7 Report, dated 1 October 2001, submitted on 14 November 2001.

³ Ibid.

below).⁴ The landmines were likely inherited from the Soviet Union after its collapse in 1991. All mines are stored in the arsenals of the armed forces.⁵

In the Article 7 Report, Turkmenistan reported the destruction of 412,601 landmines from 1997-2001.⁶ Turkmenistan destroys all mines by explosion.⁷ The country has already successfully eliminated its stocks of the following mines: POMZ-2M, POMZ-2, PDM-6M, KPOM-2, and PMN-3.⁸ Turkmenistan has destroyed more OZM-72 mines than any other of its antipersonnel mines (130,754), but still possesses more of this type (490,091) than any other.⁹

It is noteworthy that Turkmenistan reports destroying more than 66,000 PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines, which are contained in KFS-1 and KFS-1S carriers. There has been much discussion in the international community about the difficulties of destroying PFM mines, particularly the safety risks posed by their specific construction and toxic gases resulting from their explosion.

Details of AP mine stockpile and destruction, 1997-2001¹⁰

Mine Type	No. of mines stockpiled as of 24 December 1997	No. of mines destroyed (1997-2001)	Quantity scheduled for destruction
KFS-1S	65,305	57,849	7,456
KFS-1	10,423	8,320	2,103
KPOM-2S	9,100	7,000	2,100
KPOM-2	17,800	17,800	N/A
PMN	31,454	96	31,358
PMN-2	182,657	80,173	102,484
PMN-3	29,993	29,993	N/A
OZM-72	620,845	130,754	490,091
MON-50	83,422	20,283	63,139
MON-90	5,842	103	5,739
MON-100	42,960	2	42,958
MON-200	14,410	56	14,354
POMZ-2M	52,072	52,072	N/A
POMZ-2	4,200	4,200	N/A
PDM-6M	3,900	3,900	N/A
Totals	1,174,383	412,601	761,782

Turkmenistan's deadline for stockpile destruction under Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 is 1 March 2003. In its Article 7 Report, however, Turkmenistan requested that its deadline be extended for seven years: "[I]t will take approximately eight years to destroy all of the stocks of antipersonnel mines. Therefore, Turkmenistan is requesting an extension of the time allowed for the destruction of the whole arsenal of antipersonnel mines to the year 2010."¹¹

While the Mine Ban Treaty has a provision allowing for an extension of the deadline for destruction of antipersonnel mines in the ground, there is no possibility for an extension of the deadline for destruction of antipersonnel mines held in stockpiles. The co-chairs of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Australia and Croatia, have communicated

⁴ Ibid. This figure contradicts a statement made by a Turkmen government official in 1999, who claimed that Turkmenistan had "a small stockpile of landmines." *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 744.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

with Turkmenistan regarding this matter.¹² In a letter to the co-chairs, Turkmenistan stated that it now plans to meet its deadline, and that it only has about 250,000 antipersonnel mines left to destroy.¹³ This would mean Turkmenistan destroyed some 500,000 mines from October 2001 to May 2002.

The shelf life of all of Turkmenistan's antipersonnel mines appears to have expired. Turkmenistan's Article 7 Report includes a table with the production date and shelf life for each mine type in stock. The time elapsed since expiration ranges from 1-25 years, the oldest being the MON-100 and MON-200 type mines. Turkmenistan has destroyed fewer MON-100 and MON-200s than any other type of mine.¹⁴ It would appear that Turkmenistan does not intend to retain any mines for training or development purposes.

UGANDA

Key developments since May 2001: Uganda has denied allegations of use of mines in the DR Congo in 2000, and has reportedly been conducting an investigation, in a spirit of cooperation. Uganda invited foreign military attaches to inspect an alleged mine production facility, and they concluded no production existed. Uganda submitted its initial Article 7 Report in May 2002, which provided the first public details on a stockpile of 6,782 antipersonnel mines. Uganda will retain 2,400 of the mines for training purposes. Mine Risk Education is underway in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, and in Kasese district in western Uganda. There continue to be new mine casualties.

Mine Ban Treaty

Uganda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 February 1999. The treaty entered into force for Uganda on 1 August 1999. Uganda reported in May 2002 that the "1997 Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Bill 2002" was before parliament.¹ In July 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that the bill was referred to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for more input.²

Uganda participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 where it denied allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by its forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2000 and stated that it was going to investigate the allegations. It repeated its denials at the intersectoral Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in January and May 2002. (See Use section below for more details).

Uganda's first Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 28 January 2000, was submitted to the United Nations on 24 May 2002, covering the period 28 January 2000 to 24 May 2002. Uganda cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.

Uganda is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not to its Amended Protocol II on landmines.³ Uganda did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, reportedly because of lack of funds.⁴

¹² The co-chairs informed Landmine Monitor of this during the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002.

¹³ Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, "Update on Implementation of Article 4," 30 May 2002, endnote 46; available at: http://www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may02/speeches_sd/Co_Chairs_Article_4_update.pdf.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Table 1, dated 1 October, submitted on 14 November 2001.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 24 May 2002, covering the period 28 January 2000-24 May 2002.

² Interview with Dorah Kuteesa, Senior Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2002.

³ Interview with Eunice Kigenyi, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 January 2002.

⁴ Interview with Dorah Kutesa, Senior Secretary, Ministry of Affairs, 21 January 2002.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Uganda has firmly denied previously reported allegations of ongoing landmine production at its government-owned facility in Nakasongora.⁵ At the January 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Uganda said, "In July 2001, the Uganda Government invited all Resident Military Attaches to make an inspection tour of the industrial facility where landmines are alleged to be made. The representatives of the US, UK, South Africa, Libya, and Tanzania were among the foreign military personnel who carried out the inspection and made a signed statement in which they expressed their unanimous conviction that there was no landmine production at Nakasongora."⁶ In its May 2002 Article 7 Report, it reported that the decommissioning of its landmine production facilities was completed.⁷

At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Uganda reported on a "national drive" to collect all existing landmines in Uganda for future destruction. In January 2002, it reported the military was compiling details of its stockpiles in Soroti and Masindi for transportation to Magamaga ordnance depot near Jinja for eventual destruction "in public before the deadline for Uganda as per Article 4 of the Convention."⁸ The deadline for Uganda to complete stockpile destruction is 1 August 2003.

In its Article 7 Report, Uganda for the first time publicly revealed information about its mine stockpile. It reported having a total of 6,782 antipersonnel mines, including the following: 493 PMN; 273 POMZ-2; 4,564 T-72; 240 SRB 6721; 470 TM 200; 54 TM 500; 12 M-35; 286 NR 413; 15 LOT-11-68 (US); 60 OZM 413; 81 PMD7, 232 PM4-A1; 2 "scatterable mines" (type unspecified).⁹ It will retain 2,000 T-72 and 400 TM 200 mines for training as permitted by the treaty.¹⁰ The list of stockpiled mines would appear to indicate that Uganda has obtained mines in the past from Belgium, China, former Soviet Union, United States, and former Yugoslavia.

Use

There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces, either in Uganda or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, during this reporting period (since May 2001).

Both *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* cited serious allegations that Ugandan forces had used antipersonnel mines during fighting around Kisangani in the DRC in June 2000. The allegations came from United Nations field officials, humanitarian aid workers, medical professionals caring for mine victims, World Food Program staff, demobilized Ugandan soldiers, RCD rebel officers, and people in local communities. Last year, *Landmine Monitor* concluded, "While *Landmine Monitor* has not received any eyewitness accounts or direct admissions by those who actually used the mines, the testimony of a significant number and range of knowledgeable sources, coupled with practical evidence such as the location of the mines around defensive Ugandan positions, indicates a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces, or their allies."¹¹

The government has repeatedly denied such use. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Uganda responded to the *Landmine Monitor Report* by saying that it had "respected and observed all of [its] obligations" under the Mine Ban Treaty. It said Ugandan forces had not used mines in Kisangani in the DRC, but that others who occupied Uganda's defensive positions after Uganda withdrew could have planted mines. Uganda went on to say that it

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 161-162.

⁶ Statement by Captain Kagoro A. Asingura of the Uganda Delegation, to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form E, 24 May 2002.

⁸ Interview with the Uganda delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form B, 24 May 2002. The SRB 6721 is also known as the Yugoslav PMA-3. It is unusual that Uganda would hold two scatterable mines.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, 24 May 2002.

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 165.

supported the suggestion of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that a full investigation should be carried out.¹²

At the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting in Geneva on 1 February 2002, Uganda informed States Parties of a joint Uganda-Rwanda investigative commission looking into the conduct of the fighting in the DRC, and indicated that the commission would be adding the landmine issue to its mandate. Uganda said it would report back the results to the May Standing Committee meeting. At the same time, Uganda said again it was certain that its forces had not used antipersonnel mines in the DRC.¹³ States Parties and the ICBL expressed their appreciation for Uganda's spirit of cooperation in attempting to resolve the matter.

At the May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, the Ugandan delegation stressed the country's commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty, but reported that the joint commission had not yet responded on the landmine issue. Uganda again said it did not use mines in the DRC, and stated that the reports of use came after Ugandan forces had withdrawn from Kisangani, noting that Ugandan defensive positions were occupied after the withdrawal, making it likely that the mines were laid by others.¹⁴

Use by Non-State Actors

Landmine Monitor did not receive any reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the Lord's Resistance Army in this reporting period (May 2001-May 2002). It is the first time since Landmine Monitor began collecting data in 1998 that LRA antipersonnel mine use has not been reported. However, in late March 2002, following an agreement allowing Ugandan army units to pursue LRA units within Sudanese territory, the Ugandan Defense Minister claimed that the Ugandan army had overrun four LRA bases inside Sudan and seized weapons including "55 assault rifles, grenades, bombs, land mines and ammunition."¹⁵ Also, on 25 March 2002, a vehicle on the Gulu-Juba road, about 20 miles from Gulu town, hit an antivehicle mine suspected to have been planted by the LRA, killing the driver and seriously injuring his brother.¹⁶

Landmine Problem, Survey and Assessment

As detailed in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) carried out a mine assessment mission in May 2001, finding some mined areas in northern and western Uganda, and noting that the "problem is not acute, but is causing deaths and injuries in these areas."¹⁷ The assessment has not led to any major changes, but has spurred more funding for NGO mine risk education and support programs, which had stopped due to lack of funding. In its Article 7 Report, Uganda reported that no survey had been carried out to map the exact locations of mines, which can be found in the northern and western parts of the country.¹⁸

The Uganda People's Defense Forces is reported to have acquired new mine clearance and detection equipment, including "chubbies or mine breachers for detecting landmines," a probable reference to the South African "Chubby" mine clearance and detection machine. The military

¹² Statement by Uganda Head of Delegation, Lt. Col. Ramandhan Kyamulesire, Ministry of Defense, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor/HRW.

¹³ Statement by Captain Kagoro A. Asingura of the Uganda Delegation, to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

¹⁴ Statement by Captain Kagoro of the Uganda Delegation to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

¹⁵ "Ugandan army finds large rebel arms cache in Southern Sudan," *Agence France Presse* (Kampala), 17 April 2002; Report by Osike Felix, *New Vision*, 30 March 2002, p. 1, referred to antipersonnel mines.

¹⁶ Dennis Ojwele, "LRA kills one in Gulu district," *New Vision*, 29 March 2002, p. 9; Oketch Bitek, "One killed as Gulu truck hits landmine," *Monitor* (newspaper), 26 March 2002, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 166-167; Mines Advisory Group, "Uganda: Assessment Report," June 2001.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, Form C, 24 May 2002.

displayed these during the 16th Anniversary of National Resistance Movement celebrations on 26 January 2002.¹⁹

Mine Action Funding

In 2001, Uganda received CDN\$360,000 (US\$217,800 or Ug.Shs.360 million) from the government of Canada's development agency CIDA for an integrated mine risk education and victim support program for mainly northern Uganda. Funds were provided through Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR) to CPAR-Uganda, IPPNW-Uganda, and UNACOH for a period of 18 months, starting September 2001.²⁰ In February 2002, the Canadian government announced a donation of \$365,000 for ongoing landmine work in northern Uganda.²¹

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance are the only mine action activities coordinated in Uganda. Central coordination and monitoring is provided by the Ministry of Health (Disability and Rehabilitation Department), which works with relevant NGOs, international agencies, and government departments. All partners decide the planning of activities and priorities collectively, which are then carried out by the implementing NGOs or government departments.

MRE is underway in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, and in Kasese district, in western Uganda.²² MRE handbooks were officially launched in Gulu District on 8 June 2001 before of an audience of 120 people, and in Kitgum on 11 June 2001 to an audience of 50. A total of 720 primary school teachers from Gulu, Kitgum and Pader have been trained in mine risk education with funding from the Italian NGO Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (International Service Volunteers Association, AVSI) in collaboration with the office of the District Rehabilitation Officer, Gulu.²³

In Kasese district, western Uganda, the Anti-mines Network Rwenzori (AMNET-R) carried out MRE workshops in February 2002 for 68 community leaders and for 22 primary school teachers.²⁴ In addition, a number of drama groups in Kasese district have started participating in mine risk education.²⁵ Two mine sensitizations were carried out in Kasese district for 50 first-level health workers, NGO and District leaders, and Internally Displaced camp and community leaders. Communities have been asking for more training and expansion of the program, including more posters and handbooks.²⁶

During the first quarter of 2002, a needs assessment baseline survey was carried out in which people expressed interest in the expansion of the program to involve more people at the grass root level. Refresher mine risk education training sessions were conducted for a total of 40 district trainers in March and April 2002 in Gulu and Kasese. Further MRE refresher training sessions for 20 trainers were carried out for Kitgum and Pader districts. In June 2002, training for mine risk educators at sub-county level was carried out, including 80 from Gulu district, 40 from Kasese district, and 38 from Kitgum and Pader districts.

¹⁹ Jabweli Okecho reporting in *Sunday Vision*, 27 January 2002, p. 3; *Sunday Vision*, 3 February 2002, p. 5.

²⁰ Information provided by IPPNW-Uganda.

²¹ "Canada to Maintain Landmine Project," *New Vision*, 28 February 2002.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 167-168; *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 118; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 94.

²³ Interview with and report by Bernard Ocen, District Rehabilitation Officer, 7 Gulu district, Gulu Town, March 2002.

²⁴ Interview with Wilson Bwambale (AMNET-R), Kasese, 15 March 2002.

²⁵ Wilson Bwambale, "Anti-mine Network Rwenzori (AMNET-R) Report," 26 February 2002.

²⁶ Interviews with District, Community and Camp leaders, Gulu, January -February 2002.

Landmine Casualties

The total number of landmine casualties in Uganda is not known, as there is no comprehensive data collection system. Some information on landmine/UXO casualties is available as part of general hospital records maintained according to the Health Information Management System (HIMS).²⁷ Between 1991 and March 2001, 602 mine casualties were reported in Uganda.²⁸

In 2001, the International Service Volunteers Association reported twelve new landmine casualties in the Gulu, Kitgum and Adjumani districts.²⁹ It was not reported if the casualties were killed or injured. Other sources reported that landmines had killed at least seven people and injured three others in the mine-contaminated areas of north and western Uganda in 2001. One man was reported killed in Kasese, western Uganda.³⁰ In Gulu district, five people were treated as a result of mine incidents at St. Mary's Lacor Hospital, including four males, aged 20-28 years, and one female aged 22 years. No new casualties were reported by the Gulu regional hospital. In Kitgum, two males were injured, including one adult and one child. The driver of a truck was killed after his vehicle hit an antivehicle mine suspected to have been planted by LRA on the Gulu-Juba road in Gulu district. His passenger was admitted to St. Mary's Hospital with severe injuries.³¹

Most of those injured were traveling on foot or in fields and were aged between 20 and 40 years.³² Most of the casualties who reached the hospitals required an amputation except for one victim, a soldier, who was injured in Pajule, Kitgum district and sustained facial injuries and lost his sight. He was treated in St. Joseph Hospital, Kitgum District.³³

No mine/UXO casualties were reported by any of the hospitals in the first three months of 2002.

Survivor Assistance

The public health system in the mine-affected areas of northern and western Uganda is ill-equipped to handle landmine casualties although basic health facilities are found in hospitals throughout the country. In the mine-affected districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, which have experienced about 15 years of war, most of the health facilities have broken down and some of the existing facilities are under-staffed and lack equipment and supplies. However, in Kasese district in western Uganda, most of the health facilities are operating reasonably well. Casualties often have to travel long distances before reaching health facilities where they can get adequate medical attention. Landmine casualties use whatever transport is available to reach the nearest health facility as there is no specific emergency transport.

The health care system and other facilities available in the country include the provision of psychological and social support services, and physical rehabilitation including prosthetic facilities for landmines survivors.³⁴

The ICRC provided medical and surgical supplies to 13 hospitals in the conflict areas, and four referral hospitals in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts. Sufficient surgical supplies for 100

²⁷ Interview with Dr. Olut Charles, Medical Superintendent, Kitgum Hospital and Dr. Theresia Pello, Medical Superintendent, St. Joseph Hospital, 24 January 2002; interview with Dr. Martin Ogwang, Lacor Hospital and Dr. Kaducu, Gulu Hospital, 25 January 2002.

²⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 168.

²⁹ Davide Naggi, Coordinator, AVSI, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 7 March 2002.

³⁰ Hospital records for Bwera, Kagando and Kilembe hospitals, Kasese; and interviews with District leaders and health workers, Kasese, 20-22 December 2001.

³¹ Oketch Bitek, "One killed as Gulu truck hits landmine," *Monitor Newspaper*, 26 March 2002, p. 1; and Dennis Ojwele, "LRA landmine kills one in Gulu District," *New Vision Newspaper*, 29 March 2002, p. 9.

³² Gulu orthopedic workshop records.

³³ Hospital records for 2001, Kitgum and St. Joseph hospitals; and interview with Dr. Olut Charles, Medical Superintendent, Kitgum Hospital and Dr. Theresia Pello, Medical Superintendent, St. Joseph Hospital, 24 January 2002.

³⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 169.

patients were also made available to support the six main hospitals in the Kasese region. In 2001, the hospitals treated 189 war-wounded patients, of which 22 were mine/UXO victims.³⁵

Since December 2001, in Kasese district, the training of first level health care providers in Emergency First Aid has been funded by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR). IPPNW provided US\$3,000 (Ug.Shs5.1 Million) and CIDA provided CDN\$1,230 (US\$700 or Ug.Shs1.23 million) as part of the CPAR program.

The Italian NGO, AVSI, continues to provide medical rehabilitation for war victims in 13 districts of northern Uganda.³⁶ In 2001, the program of medical rehabilitation, prosthetics, physiotherapy, psycho-social assistance and community reintegration assisted 180 patients, including 56 landmine survivors. AVSI cooperates with the Ministry of Health and local authorities with funding support from the European Union, the Italian and Australian governments, and private donors.³⁷

The Gulu Regional orthopedic workshop reported that between 1999 and 2001, 286 landmine survivors were treated at the center; war-related injuries constituted 80 percent of all the injuries treated.³⁸ The ICRC has supported the Ministry of Health prosthetic/orthotic centers in western and northern Uganda, providing training to local staff and materials and equipment. In 2001, physical rehabilitation services were provided for patients, who received 235 prostheses, of which 31 percent were for mine survivors. The assistance program concluded at the end of 2001, however, sufficient raw materials were left to continue the fitting of patients for at least another year.³⁹

In Kasese district, the Kitende Hostels Project has assisted landmine survivors since 1998. Up to 2001, 50 survivors had been taken to Buluba Hospital in Mayuge district Eastern Uganda for the fitting of artificial limbs. Since 2001, survivors have been taken to the nearby Fort Portal Regional Workshop, about 60 kilometers from Kasese district, for the fitting of prostheses. By June 2002, 74 people had benefited from the program, which covers all the expenses of transport, food, fitting and hospital charges.⁴⁰

In Kitgum district, the local council has allocated funding to a local NGO, GUU Foundation, to provide orthopedic devices, wheelchairs, and crutches, for landmine survivors.⁴¹

In September 2001, CPAR started an 18-month integrated mine awareness and survivor assistance program in northern Uganda. The Integrated Landmine Awareness and Victim Support Program includes capacity building, capital for income generation activities, vocational skills training, and farming tools and equipment, in Gulu district.

Other government ministries, NGOs, and international agencies that assist persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, include the Ministries of Labor and Social Development, the Prime Minister's Office (Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees), Internal Affairs and Defense, WHO, UNICEF, Save the Children Denmark, Save the Children U.K, World Vision, NORAD, World Rehabilitation Fund, UNACOH, ICC-Uganda, URCS, St. John's Ambulance, AMNET-R, and GUSCO.

³⁵ ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 22.

³⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 169.

³⁷ Davide Naggi, Coordinator, AVSI, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 7 March 2002. AVSI reported to have spent 100 million Uganda Shillings (approximately US \$58,800) to train teachers in mine awareness education and physical rehabilitation of landmine victims in northern Uganda (the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader) between June 2000 and December 2001. Interview with Amodoi Raphael, Orthopedic Technologist with AVSI, Gulu, 25 January 2002.

³⁸ Gulu Orthopedic workshop records, 2002.

³⁹ ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, Annual Report 2001, at <http://www.icrc.org>.

⁴⁰ Interview with Aaron Mukababebwa Muhindo, Coordinator, Kitende Hostels Project Landmine Victim Program, Kasese town, 15 June 2002.

⁴¹ Interview with District Community Development Officer, Kitgum, 23 January 2002.

Disability Policy and Practice

Uganda has comprehensive legislation on disability issues.⁴² In addition to previously reported legislation, the *Local Government Amendment Act 2001* provides for the appointment of a secretary for disability affairs on the Executive Committee at the district and sub county levels. It also provides for representation of disabled persons on boards such as the Tender Board and the District Service Committee. The *Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions Act 2001* also has provisions for the admission of disabled persons. At the policy level there is a national action plan on disability,⁴³ which was further elaborated in a policy paper by the Ministry of Labor, Gender and Social Development. During the Presidential elections of 2001, the president made pledges on special needs education and on the National Disability Council; these became policy papers after his re-election.⁴⁴

UNITED KINGDOM

Key developments since May 2001: Mine action funding for 2001/2002 totaled GB£12 million, a decrease from GB£16 million in 2000/2001. In April 2002, the UK company PW Defence Ltd is alleged to have offered to supply 500 antipersonnel mines in contravention of national law and the Mine Ban Treaty. The same month, the State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories is alleged to have offered two types of antipersonnel mines for sale in the UK. In January 2002, the UK Ministry of Defence simulated a Mine Ban Treaty Article 8 investigation into hypothetical breaches of the treaty in the UK.

Mine Ban Policy

The United Kingdom signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 31 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999.¹

The UK participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua. The UK reported in detail on its exercises in preparation for fact-finding missions under Article 8 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and recommended that States Parties either engage in such preparations or provide a single point of contact.²

On 29 November 2001, the UK cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The UK attended the interessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

The UK submitted its annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report on 21 March 2002, covering calendar year 2001.

In February 2002, Parliament was told that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) takes the lead in promoting the Mine Ban Treaty, "including taking suitable opportunities to lobby States non-party to the convention about the desirability of ratification or accession."³ It has conducted one global and one targeted lobbying campaign by its overseas posts since UK ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty in July 1998.⁴ However, the issues of ratification and accession were not raised during intensive British diplomacy focused on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey in

⁴² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 170.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Interview with Benon Ndeziboneye, Senior Program Officer Action on Disability and Development, 1 February 2002.

¹ For national legislation, especially regarding interpretations of "assistance," see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 813-814.

² *Landmine Monitor* notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

³ *Hansard* (parliamentary record), 1 February 2002, col. 583W.

⁴ Fax from United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 March 2002.

2001-2002.⁵ Asked why, the FCO responded that it intends to increase lobbying of other countries in the build-up to the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.⁶

In addition to FCO activities, “DFID [Department for International Development] helps developing countries implement their obligations under the Ottawa Convention...and works to strengthen the international community’s capacity...to provide a more coherent, timely and cost-effective response.”⁷

The UK is a party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted the annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol in October 2001.⁸ The UK attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001, and also attended the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. At a preparatory meeting in September 2001, the UK co-sponsored a proposal to increase the technical regulation of antivehicle mines. Regarding proposals within the CCW to deal with “explosive remnants of war,” the UK position as announced in Parliament in January 2002, is to “continue to seek to minimize the post-conflict risk to civilians at the same time as maintaining essential capability for our forces. To this end, we will play an active and positive role in the discussions of the GGE [Group of Governmental Experts] and any subsequent negotiations.”⁹

Parliamentary Early Day Motion (EDM) No. 424, signed by 50 Members of Parliament (MPs) in November 2001, called for a moratorium on the use of cluster bombs until an international agreement on their use and clearance has been achieved. In January 2001, 51 MPs signed EDM No. 251 calling for the “government to improve both the level and the consistency of long-term funding” for British charities working with communities affected by unexploded ordnance.¹⁰ EDM No. 1078 on explosive remnants of war was tabled in March 2002, and had received 110 signatures by late June. This called for comprehensive international law requiring, among other things, users of explosive munitions to be responsible for the clearance of unexploded ordnance.

In May 2002, EDM No. 1330 was tabled, relating to the alleged offer for sale of antipersonnel mines by a UK company (see next section). The EDM calls for better implementation of national legislation banning antipersonnel mines. By late June, the EDM had received 89 signatures.

Production and Transfer

Previously a major producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, the UK reported on 26 August 1999 that it had completed conversion or decommissioning of production facilities.¹¹ British companies continue to cooperate internationally in the development and production of antivehicle mines. Some of these mines may have fuzes enabling them to be activated by a person, and thus have the effect of an antipersonnel mine.¹²

In April 2002, a senior representative of the UK company PW Defence Ltd was recorded offering to supply 500 landmines to a BBC journalist, in contravention of national legislation (the Landmines Act 1998) and the Mine Ban Treaty.¹³ Researchers from the UK NGO Landmine Action found PW Defence Ltd (formerly Paines Wessex) promoting the mines at arms fairs in Greece and South Africa. The company is a subsidiary of UK-based Chemring Group plc. Local police launched an investigation and David Howell, PW Defence’s Overseas Sales Manager, was

⁵ Email from United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 May 2002.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ *Hansard*, 1 February 2002, col. 583W.

⁸ Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, October 2001 (day not given).

⁹ *Hansard*, 30 January 2002, col. WA39.

¹⁰ Early Day Motions are not binding on government; they are used as an expression of parliamentary opinion. EDMs can be accessed at: dem.ais.co.uk/weblink/html/printable.html/EDM.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form E, submitted on 26 August 1999 for the period 1 March-1 August 1999.

¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 746-749, and *2001*, pp. 815-818.

¹³ BBC Radio 4, “Today Programme,” 10 May 2002.

“withdrawn from duties” and has since been arrested.¹⁴ The police, Customs and Excise, and the Health and Safety Executive, which are responsible for investigating alleged breaches of the legislation, were continuing their enquiries and by the end of June 2002 had not announced any decision to instigate a prosecution.¹⁵

The UK delegation and Landmine Action made interventions in reference to the PW Defence allegations at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002. The UK stated that it was barred from commenting directly on the case because criminal charges had not yet been brought, but the actions taken in response to this incident “clearly demonstrates how seriously the UK takes its Article 9 obligations.” It also urged States Parties “to ensure Article 9 national implementation measures are in place and promptly brought to bear if necessary.”¹⁶ Landmine Action praised the positive efforts to implement the UK Landmines Act and suggested a number of improvements, in particular by making a single authority responsible for investigating allegations. It also suggested that it is advisable for national legislation to clearly define an antipersonnel mine, and for there to be proactive dissemination of the legal prohibition, and some form of monitoring.¹⁷

A second similar incident occurred in April 2002, when the State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) allegedly offered two types of antipersonnel mines for sale to a journalist from Channel 4 TV, who posed as a representative of a private company seeking to purchase a variety of weapons. The mines appeared in a brochure, which the POF Director of Exports later claimed was out of date. He stated that “all our current brochures do not at all have any data/reference to mines of any sort.”[sic].¹⁸

A similar incident involving POF occurred in 1999, and in the same year the Romanian arms company Romtecnica offered for sale several types of antipersonnel mines at an arms fair in the UK.¹⁹ Government and police forces have not made public the progress of investigations into these two incidents.

In January 2002, the UK Ministry of Defence simulated an investigation, based on Mine Ban Treaty Article 8 compliance processes, into hypothetical breaches of the treaty in the UK, such as alleged stockpiling or use of antipersonnel mines. The three-day exercise, Operation Partlett, was intended to present an opportunity for different parties to learn about the processes of both conducting and hosting an investigation. The main parties involved were a Fact Finding Mission, National Authority representatives, the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, staff at the Defence Munitions depot in Plymouth, and a number of observers, including NGOs. The hypothetical breach being investigated was a claim that the UK had allowed transshipment by the United States of antipersonnel mines through UK bases during mobilization for the conflict in Afghanistan.²⁰ This was the third such exercise to be undertaken at different military premises in the UK.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Destruction of the UK’s stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines was completed in October 1999.²¹ In April 1998 the UK announced that it would “retain about 4,000

¹⁴ Simon Goodley, “Landmine group chief lost for words,” *Daily Telegraph* (daily newspaper), 14 May 2002.

¹⁵ *Hansard*, 24 May 2002, col. 709W.

¹⁶ Statement by the UK on Article 9 (dated 30 May 2002), SC on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

¹⁷ Statement by Landmine Action on Article 9, SC on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

¹⁸ Letter from Pakistan Ordnance Factory to Channel 4 (television company), 1 May 2002.

¹⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 746-749.

²⁰ An observer from Landmine Action was present for Day 2 of the exercise. Richard Moyes, “Operation Partlett: UK Ottawa Treaty Verification Exercise,” p. 1.

²¹ As noted in the previous *Landmine Monitor Report*, the UK’s Article 7 Reports have provided no information on the technical characteristics of several types of British antipersonnel mine (most of which are found in minefields in Africa), nor other antipersonnel mines still possessed by the UK that were manufactured overseas. No information is provided on the Projector Area Defense (PJRAD) fragmentation mine (not

anti-personnel landmines, less than half of one per cent of current stocks, in order to be able to carry out training in demining.”²² At the end of 2001, the number of antipersonnel mines retained for purposes permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty Article 3 had increased to 4,949, with new mines obtained and apparently all of the mines originally retained still remaining in stock.²³ The number of Ranger (2,088)²⁴ and C3 Elsie (1,056) mines retained has remained the same, but the number of unidentified “foreign” mines has increased from 859 (as of 1 August 1999), to 1,375 (as of 1 April 2000), to 1,775 (as of 31 December 2000), to 1,805 (as of December 2001).²⁵

The Article 7 Report submitted in March 2002 describes these mines as being retained “for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.”²⁶ Asked why the numbers of mines retained were not gradually being reduced as a result of permitted training and development, the Ministry of Defence replied that “it is important when conducting work related to mine clearance, detection and destruction to be as familiar as possible with a wide range of mines.”²⁷

The Ministry of Defence stated on 8 March 2002 that it retained 4,775 live mines,²⁸ which may indicate that 174 were expended since 31 December 2001. However, the Ministry declined to give a breakdown of the foreign mines retained, nor to explain the planned purposes and rates of usage of the mines retained.²⁹

The UK also possesses inert antipersonnel mines, which are used for training in mine detection and clearance.³⁰ In its 1999 Article 7 Report, the UK noted 434 “inert training shapes” were kept.³¹ In its subsequent Article 7 Report, the UK noted that that Mine Ban Treaty did not require reporting on inert munitions.³²

Antivehicle Mines

During discussion of antivehicle mines with personnel-sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices at the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, the UK delegation intervened to state that, in their view, antivehicle mines are not covered by the treaty and that Amended Protocol II of the CCW is the appropriate forum for discussion of antivehicle mines. The UK has previously made known its view that mines designated as antivehicle or antitank, but which may be detonated by the unintentional act of a person, are not to be considered to be antipersonnel and hence are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.³³

considered an antipersonnel mine by the Ministry of Defense), or on Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines (prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty when activated by tripwire). The Ministry stated in May 2001 that the tripwires had been destroyed and that changes to drill, resulting from the Mine Ban Treaty and national legislation, make physical modification of these mines unnecessary. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 815-816. In February 2002, the Ministry of Defence told Parliament that Claymore-type mines “are used only in the command detonated mode of operation, which requires a soldier to initiate the munition.” *Hansard*, 25 February 2002, col. 693W.

²² Letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to UK Working Group on Landmines, 27 April 1998.

²³ Article 7 Report, submitted on 21 March 2002 for calendar year 2001, Form D.

²⁴ According to the Article 7 Report submitted on 21 March 2002, the Ranger mines retained have a “Shelf Life expiry date” of 1 August 2002.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 August 1999; 17 April 2000; 25 April 2001; and 21 March 2002.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D.

²⁷ Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 8 March 2002.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2002, in reply to researcher’s faxed enquiry on 11 April 2002.

³⁰ Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 8 March 2002.

³¹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 August 1999.

³² Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 April 2000.

³³ Landmine Monitor notes, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. For details of the UK position on AV mines and AV mines in UK stockpiles, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 751, and *2001*, pp. 816-818.

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the UK intervened to state its agreement that the intersessional work should re-focus on the “broad humanitarian aims” of the treaty, and “in this spirit” the delegation reiterated the UK position “that antivehicle mines and antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, do not fall within the Ottawa Convention.” The UK view is that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices do not become antipersonnel mines “if unintentionally, they are detonated by the presence of a person. For us, it is the design of the mine that is the key.... The definition of what constitutes an antipersonnel mine in the Ottawa Convention does not turn on any unintended effects the mine might have when deployed.” Finally, the UK delegation urged States Parties to “move beyond the definitional stand-off.”³⁴ With regard to antivehicle mines, the UK is “engaged in the [CCW] process...[and is] taking action with our EU partners and others to reach...a satisfactory outcome at the end of this year.”³⁵

Last year Landmine Monitor reported that two types of antivehicle mine, the Mk.7 and L3A1, were due to be withdrawn from stocks in October 2001. The Ministry of Defence stated in March 2002 that this has not yet happened: “At present there is still a continuing requirement to retain the Mk.7 variants and L3A1 mines.” A decision on disposal is “expected.”³⁶

Foreign Stockpiles on UK territory

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that U.S. antipersonnel mines have been stored on ships offshore the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia. The UK government has stated that “US stocks do not fall under our national jurisdiction or control,” and therefore the UK has no obligation to have them removed or destroyed.³⁷

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated in March 2002 that U.S. antipersonnel mines were not transited, stockpiled or maintained on British Indian Ocean Territory during the conduct of operations in Afghanistan.³⁸ Secondary legislation under the Landmines Act extended its provisions in 2001 to British Overseas Territories.³⁹

Regarding transit across UK territory of antipersonnel mines by States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported to Parliament in March 2002 that it had received legal advice that such transit would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under the Treaty.⁴⁰

Mine Action Funding

The government announced in October 2001 that future funding for demining will be channeled through United Nations bodies, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).⁴¹ The report for 2002 of the Department for International Development states that “a coordinated international framework for effective humanitarian mines action is crucial, and the UN is the central player here. We have agreed our mine action strategy, including multi-year funding, with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Mine Action Service. The channeling of funds through UN agencies is leading to a more systematic

³⁴ Statement by the UK on Article 2 (dated 30 May 2002), SC on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 22 March 2002.

³⁷ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 818.

³⁸ *Hansard*, 15 March 2002, col. 1298W.

³⁹ *Hansard*, 26 February 2002, col. 1155W. British Overseas Territories were listed in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 818.

⁴⁰ *Hansard*, 26 March 2002, col. 812W.

⁴¹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, October 2001, Form E, which referred specifically to “demining,” and correspondence between the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, and Frank Cook MP, 29 March 2001.

approach to the prioritization and coordination of mine action programs, as well as the adoption of common standards and practices.”⁴²

DFID contributed GB£12 million (US\$17.28 million) to humanitarian mine clearance, mine awareness education, and research and development in the financial year 2001-2002.⁴³ This included an “allocated 3 million [US\$4.32 million] through UNMAS for future humanitarian action interventions in Afghanistan” to cover mine clearance operations focusing on “clearance of communication routes, airports and high priority areas near to civilian populations.”⁴⁴

The GB£12 million in mine action funding for 2001/2002 represents a decrease from GB£16 million (US\$22.88 million) in 2000/2001. Funding budgeted for 2002/2003 represents a further decrease, to GB£10 million (US\$14.4 million). The following tables summarize mine action spending by activity and country or program.

Mine Action Spending by Activity for Financial Years 1997-2002 in GB£ (US\$)⁴⁵

	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001	2001-2002
Mine clearance	4,349,642 (\$6,219,988)	4,570,468 (\$6,535,770)	12,335,000 (\$17,639,050)	14,500,000 (\$20,735,000)	10,200,000 (\$14,688,000)
Mine awareness	250,000 (\$357,500)	Nil	1,292,339 (\$1,848,045)	500,000 (\$715,000)	500,000 (\$720,000)
Research and development	376,673 (\$538,642)	548,343 (\$784,131)	500,000 (\$715,000)	1,000,000 (\$1,430,000)	1,300,000 (\$1,872,000)
TOTALS:	4,976,315 (\$7,116,130)	5,118,811 (\$7,371,088)	14,127,339 (\$20,202,095)	16,000,000 (\$22,880,000)	12,000,000 (\$17,280,000)

⁴² “Departmental Report 2002,” Department for International Development, Chapter 2, para 36, pp. 28-29, available at: www.dfid.gov.uk, accessed on 30 June 2002.

⁴³ *Hansard*, 21 March 2002, col. 471W. Exchange rate at 5 April 2002: GBP1 = \$1.44, used throughout.

⁴⁴ *Hansard*, 23 January 2002, col. 893W.

⁴⁵ *Hansard*, 29 March 2001, col. 721W and *Hansard*, 21 March 2002, col. 471W.

Funding for Mine Action by Country for Financial Years 1996-2002 in GB£ (US\$)⁴⁶

	1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001	2001-2002
Afghanistan	1,050,000 (\$1,514,100)	2,106,500 (\$3,037,573)	920,000 (\$1,326,640)	1,900,000 (\$2,739,800)	Nil	3,150,000 (\$4,536,000)
Albania	Nil	Nil	Nil	50,070 (\$72,201)	369,648 (\$532,293)	694,540 (\$1,000,138)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nil	Nil	Nil	500,000 (\$721,000)	Nil	500,000 (\$720,000)
Cambodia	1,058,700 (\$1,526,645)	689,686 (\$994,527)	693,000 (\$999,306)	2,274,000 (\$3,279,108)	1,430,571 (\$2,060,022)	1,000,000 (\$1,440,000)
Chad	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	270,000 (\$388,800)	
Croatia	Nil	Nil	Nil	100,000 (\$144,200)	150,000 (\$216,000)	326,529 (\$470,202)
Egypt	500,000 (\$721,000)	87,308 (\$125,898)	Nil	Nil	Nil	
Eritrea/ Ethiopia	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	544,151 (\$783,577)	
Georgia	Nil	Nil	220,781 (\$318,366)	340,000 (\$490,280)	452,259 (\$651,253)	500,000 (\$720,000)
Guinea-Bissau	Nil	Nil	Nil	138,860 (\$200,236)	120,000 (\$172,800)	
Northern Iraq	785,000 (\$1,131,970)	658,972 (\$950,237)	740,000 (\$1,067,080)	451,764 (\$651,444)	616,100 (\$887,184)	206,137 (\$296,837)
Jordan	Nil	Nil	Nil	587,156 (\$846,679)	270,000 (\$388,800)	197,402 (\$284,259)
Laos	148,307 (\$213,859)	101,250 (\$146,003)	500,000 (\$721,000)	833,351 (\$1,201,692)	616,100 (\$887,184)	300,000 (\$432,000)
Lebanon	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	387,297 (\$557,708)	
FYR of Macedonia	Nil	Nil	Nil	52,000 (\$74,984)	Nil	
Mozambique	408,900 (\$589,634)	487,500 (\$702,975)	362,500 (\$522,725)	403,000 (\$581,126)	Nil	
Nicaragua	Nil	Nil	Nil	283,000 (\$408,086)	283,000 (\$407,520)	189,000 (\$272,160)
Sierra Leone	Nil	Nil	Nil	4,500 (\$6,489)	Nil	
Thailand	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	300,000 (\$432,000)	
Yemen	47,772 (\$68,887)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	
FRY (Kosovo)	275,000 (\$396,550)	Nil	Nil	5,664,339 (\$8,167,977)	7,899,020 (\$11,374,588)	2,000,000 (\$2,880,000)

⁴⁶ Table compiled from several sources: *Hansard*, 29 March 2001, col. 723W, and 21 March 2002, col. 471W; Department for International Development, *Humanitarian mine action, second progress report* (London: DFID, September 2000); and fax from DFID to the Mines Advisory Group, undated but received in May 2002. The data leaves a small discrepancy in the total funding for 2001-2002 (GB£12 million or GB£11,663,608) and other years, and a larger discrepancy in the total funding for 2000-2001 (GB£16 million or GB£13,708,146).

Mine Action Expenditure in Financial Years 2000-2002 by Implementing Organization, in GB£ (US\$)⁴⁷

Implementing Organization	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003 (budgeted)
HALO Trust	1,863,304 (\$2,683,158)	1,150,000 (\$1,656,000)	
Mines Advisory Group (for Northern Iraq)	1,164,015 (\$1,676,181)	1,000,000 (\$1,440,000)	500,000 (\$720,000)
Cambodian Mine Action Center via UNDP	214,285 (\$308,570)		500,000 (\$720,000)
Croatian Mine Action Center	150,000 (\$216,000)		
Government of Jordan	270,000 (\$388,800)		
Organization of American States	283,000 (\$407,520)	189,000 (\$272,160)	
UNMAS (for Kosovo)	390,364 (\$562,124)		
Battle Area Clearance Training Equipment Consultants (BACTEC)	1,100,616 (\$1,584,887)	15,000 (\$21,600)	
Defense Systems Ltd.	3,118,404 (\$4,490,501)	750,000 (\$1,080,000)	
European Landmine Solutions	2,550,632 (\$3,672,910)	22,000 (\$31,680)	
QinetiQ	Nil	100,000 (\$144,000)	
UN Mine Action Service	600,000 (\$864,000)	5,000,000 (\$7,200,000)	
UNDP	600,000 (\$864,000)	2,100,000 (\$3,024,000)	
Global contribution to UNMAS and UNDP			4.6 million (\$6.6 million)*
UNICEF	500,000 (\$720,000)	500,000 (\$720,000)	300,000 (\$432,000)
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining	790,000 (\$1,137,600)	1,000,000 (\$1,440,000)	1 million (\$1.44 million)
UNMAS (for Afghanistan)			1.85 million (\$2,664,000)
Cranfield Mine Action	162,182 (\$233,542)	221,000 (\$318,240)	
Landmine Monitor	157,000 (\$226,080)	30,000 (\$43,200)	
Defense Evaluation and Research Establishment (DERA)	306,060 (\$440,726)		
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	23,105 (\$33,271)		
Aardvark	52,613 (\$75,763)		

⁴⁷ *Hansard*, 11 July 2001, col. 531W and 21 March 2002, col. 471W, and fax from DFID to the Mines Advisory Group, undated but received in May 2002.

Implementing Organization	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003 (budgeted)
MineLifta	45,952 (\$66,171)		
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance	Nil	500,000 (\$720,000)	
DISARMCO (Research and Development)	Nil	61,000 (\$87,840)	
ERA (Research and Development)	Nil	117,000 (\$168,480)	
International Test & Evaluation Program		400,000 (\$576,000)	200,000 (\$288,000)
Mine Action Research program			200,000 (\$288,000)
“Mines Advice and programme monitoring”			150,000 (\$216,000)
To be allocated later			700,000 (1,008,000)
TOTAL	14,341,532 (\$20,651,806)	12,605,000 (\$18,151,200)	10,000,000 (\$14,400,000)

*This total is composed of GB£1 million described as for UNMAS central capacity, GB£600,000 for UNDP central capacity, GB£1 million for other UNMAS field programs, GB£2 million for UNDP field programs.

In addition to the above spending, the Ministry of Defence bears the costs of the Mine Information and Training Center (MITC). It was established in November 1997 at a reported annual cost of GB£125,000 (US\$203,750). The Center had provided mine awareness training to over 50,000 people by March 2002.⁴⁸ The Ministry of Defence is “currently reviewing the terms of reference for the MITC, with a view to possibly enhancing their mines awareness training role, for humanitarian mine action.”⁴⁹

Research and Development

The UK is part of the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP), under which the Defense Evaluation and Research Agency evaluates new equipment including mine detection technology for humanitarian demining. ITEP received GB£400,000 (US\$576,000) from the UK government during the financial year 2001-2002.⁵⁰ In 2002-2003 the UK donation to ITEP is budgeted as GB£200,000 (US\$288,000).⁵¹

The Ministry of Defence mine detection research program is currently assessing the following technologies for military use: ground-penetrating radar, metal detection, polarized thermal imaging, ultra wide-band radar, and quadrupole resonance. Research is also under way on a portable humanitarian mine detector. It was intended that 2000 units of a pyrotechnic torch for destroying mines, developed in partnership with QinetiQ, would come into military service by early 2002. The Defence Procurement Agency placed contracts in October 2001 for the competitive assessment phase of the Mine Detection, Neutralization and Route Marking System (MINDER) program, with an initial capability to enter service by 2005. The Ministry spent GB£5.8 million

⁴⁸ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, October 2001, Form E, and Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 8 March 2002.

⁴⁹ Fax from Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 22 March 2002.

⁵⁰ *Hansard*, 18 December 2001, col. 193W.

⁵¹ Fax from DFID to the Mines Advisory Group, undated but received in May 2002.

(US\$8,352,000) in the financial year 2001-2002 on this program. Investigations into individual mine neutralization are also taking place.⁵²

The Ministry of Defence reports expenditure on these programs as: GB£3 million (US\$4,329,000) from the Treasury Capital Development Fund for work on the portable humanitarian mine detector, and GB£1.55 million (US\$2,232,000) from DFID, with the majority of this funding going to GICHD and QinetiQ.⁵³ The period to which these costs refer has not been clarified.⁵⁴

Survivor Assistance

DFID does not specify funding allocated for mine survivors, instead providing support for "health care and community-based rehabilitation assistance."⁵⁵ The Article 7 Report submitted in March 2002 did not include the voluntary Form J, on which other matters of interest such as survivor assistance may be reported.

Several British NGOs support survivor assistance programs in mine-affected countries, some of whom receive funding from DFID. These NGOs include Action on Disability and Development, Africa Educational Trust, The Cambodia Trust, Handicap International UK, Heather Mills Health Trust, Hope for Children, Jaipur Limb Campaign UK, Jesuit Refugee Service, Mercy Corps Scotland, Motivation, POWER, and Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal.

On 7 November 2001, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund announced another round of grants which included assistance for people injured by landmines and other persons with disabilities. Total funding of £547,768 (US\$788,786) over three years will support programs run by British NGOs in Guinea-Bissau (Handicap International UK), Somalia (Africa Educational Trust) and Sudan (Action on Disability and Development). Funds have also been earmarked for mine clearance in Afghanistan.⁵⁶

Previously, on 11 October 2000 the Fund had announced a round of grants for mine clearance, mine risk education, and survivor assistance programs totaling £1,189,593 (US\$1,716,106) over three years. The grants support programs in Afghanistan (Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal), Afghanistan/Pakistan border (Action for Disability and Mercy Corps Scotland), Angola (Mines Advisory Group), Laos (POWER), and Sri Lanka (Hope for Children).⁵⁷ Other beneficiaries of the Fund include the Jaipur Foot Campaign UK programs in Angola and Mozambique.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, one British national was killed and four others injured in landmine or UXO accidents while overseas engaged in military, peacekeeping or demining activities. In April, one soldier was killed and two others injured when their armored vehicle hit a landmine in southwestern Kosovo. The soldiers were part of the KFOR peacekeeping mission.⁵⁸ In August, a British mine clearance technical adviser lost his thumb when a grenade detonator exploded during a training session in the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁵⁹ In December, a British soldier was injured in a landmine explosion at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.⁶⁰

⁵² *Hansard*, 26 November 2001, col. 662W.

⁵³ Fax from the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defense, 22 March 2002.

⁵⁴ Request to Ministry of Defence for clarification sent on 17 June 2002.

⁵⁵ *Hansard*, 25 October 1999, col. 709.

⁵⁶ "Over £2 million earmarked for war-torn communities in latest grants round", The Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund – Press Release 008/2000, 7 November 2001, accessed at www.theworkcontinues.org.

⁵⁷ "The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund announces latest grant awards," Press Release, 11 October 2000, accessed at www.theworkcontinues.org.

⁵⁸ Stefan Racin, "British soldier dies in Kosovo mine blast," *UPI*, 14 April 2001.

⁵⁹ "Mine-clearance: an activity that is always fraught with danger," Handicap International Belgium Press Release, 7 August 2001.

⁶⁰ "Second U.S. Serviceman Loses Foot in Mine Blast," *Reuters*, 19 December 2001.

On 20 July 2002, a British deminer lost his leg in a landmine incident in southern Lebanon.⁶¹

Landmine Problem

See separate entry for the Falkland Islands.

URUGUAY

Key developments since May 2001: Uruguay ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 June 2001 and the treaty entered into force on 1 December 2001. Uruguay submitted its first Article 7 Report on 23 April 2002. Uruguay destroyed 432 antipersonnel mines from May 2000 to June 2002, leaving 1,728 in stock. Uruguayan Army mine clearance experts are serving in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Mine Ban Policy

Uruguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 7 June 2001 and the treaty entered into force on 1 December 2001. It has not yet enacted national legislation, but reported the ratification legislation, Law 17.327, as a national implementation measure.¹ Uruguay submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 23 April 2002, covering the period from April 2001 to April 2002.

In September 2001, Uruguay attended the Third Meeting of State Parties in Nicaragua as an observer, represented by the head of the Engineers Department of the Army of Uruguay. In November 2001, Uruguay cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Uruguay delivered a statement to the UNGA on behalf of the regional group Mercosur (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay), in which the countries called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.² It also voted in support of three resolutions on landmines by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in June 2001.³

From 3-5 December 2001, Uruguay participated in the "Mine Action in Latin America" conference held in Miami.⁴ While Uruguay is party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), it did not participate in CCW meetings held in Geneva in December 2001. Uruguay also did not attend the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

With regard to the issue of possible joint military operations with a non-State Party who may use antipersonnel mines, the government told Landmine Monitor in April 2002 that Uruguay "does not participate, nor does it plan to participate, in military exercises in which antipersonnel mines are used."⁵

Uruguay states that it has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel landmines.⁶

⁶¹ Rodeina Kenaan, "British sapper loses leg in southern Lebanon land mine explosion," *AP*, 20 July 2002.

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 23 April 2002, covering the period April 2001 to April 2002.

² Statement by Ambassador Felipe Paolillo, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States, UNGA 56th session, 26 October 2001.

³ On 5 June 2001, Uruguay voted in favor of Resolutions AG/1792, AG/1793 and AG/1794 of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), supporting mine action in Peru and Ecuador, the mine clearance program in Central America, and the goal of the western hemisphere as an antipersonnel landmine-free zone, respectively.

⁴ The Conference was sponsored by: the US Department of Defense; the Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University; the Organization of American States (OAS); the US Southern Command; and the US Department of State. See <http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/>.

⁵ National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire 2002, undated, received in April 2002.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 23 April 2002; National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, February 1999; National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, May 2001.

Stockpiling and Destruction

In May 2000, Uruguay had a stockpile of 2,160 antipersonnel mines, including 1,575 M-35 and 585 NR-409 mines, both types manufactured by Belgium. A total of 82 antipersonnel mines were destroyed between May 2000 and May 2001, including three M-35 and 79 NR-409 mines.⁷

On 27 June 2001, Uruguay destroyed 160 antipersonnel mines. Ten NR-409 mines were destroyed in a symbolic destruction event at the Material and Armament Service of the Army's Second Engineer's Battalion (Polígono de Destrucción de Munición en Abras de Castellano) in the department of Florida, 100 kilometers north of the capital, Montevideo.⁸ Over the course of that day and the next, the Army destroyed 50 M-35 and another 100 NR-409 antipersonnel mines.⁹ The stockpile destruction was done by open detonation.¹⁰

In its Article 7 Report, Uruguay reported a stockpile of 1,928 antipersonnel mines, including 1,522 M-35 and 406 NR-409 mines. This would seemingly indicate that the ten mines destroyed symbolically were not counted.¹¹

On 26 June 2002, Uruguay destroyed another 200 antipersonnel mines (100 M-35 and 100 NR-409 mines), at the Army base in Florida department, in the presence of Army personnel, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, and the Landmine Monitor researcher.¹²

Thus, according to the government's records, as of July 2002, Uruguay had a stockpile of 1,728 antipersonnel mines, including 1,422 M-35 and 306 NR-409 mines, and had destroyed 432 mines since May 2000, including 153 M-35s and 279 NR-409s.

According to the Article 7 Report, the Army will retain 500 antipersonnel mines for training (400 M-35 and 100 NR-409 mines).¹³

Mine Action and Landmine Casualties

Uruguay declares that it is not mine-affected.¹⁴ While a few Uruguayan nationals have fallen victim to landmines while overseas on military and peacekeeping operations, no new casualties were reported in 2001 or in the first quarter of 2002.

Uruguay has military personnel serving in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). According to the Army, they have cleared approximately 100,000 square meters of land from the area where they are stationed.¹⁵ According to a June 2002 report by the UN Secretary-General, the Uruguayan engineering company, located in Kisangani, is also providing demining specialists to aid an investigation into an incident near Ikela in which a vehicle carrying two UN military observers on patrol detonated an antivehicle mine.¹⁶

⁷ National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, May 2001. A letter dated 19 November 1997 from former Defense Minister Raúl Iturria in response to a question from National Deputy Gabriel Barandiaran revealed that, as of November 1997, the Armed Forces had a total of 2,338 antipersonnel mines (1,604 M-35 mines and 734 NR-409 mines). See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 311.

⁸ The Landmine Monitor researcher was present for the destruction, as were Army personnel and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.

⁹ Letter (Nota No. 014/F/01) from Colonel Wile Purtscher, Chief of the Department of Engineers, Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, to Landmine Monitor, 25 July 2001.

¹⁰ National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, May 2001.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 23 April 2002. According to the report, between April 2001 and April 2002, 228 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (53 M-35 and 175 NR-409 mines).

¹² The destruction was originally scheduled to destroy 278 antipersonnel mines (172 M-35 and 106 NR-409 mines). See Article 7 Report, Form F, 23 April 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 23 April 2002.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form C, 23 April 2002.

¹⁵ National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, April 2002.

¹⁶ Eleventh report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, p. 5.

In the past Uruguay has participated in UN peacekeeping missions in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the soldiers have acquired valuable experience in mine clearance in these missions.¹⁷

The Army provides an annual, month-long course on humanitarian demining for approximately ten officers at a time, using inert mines only.¹⁸ This course would be in its tenth year, but in 2002 was suspended for the first time because of budget shortfalls.¹⁹

VENEZUELA

Key developments since May 2001: Landmine Monitor verified the presence of a small minefield at a Navy base near the Colombian border. Venezuela has not publicly acknowledged having landmines on its territory. As of July 2002, Venezuela had not yet submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 March 2000. Landmine Monitor has been told that Venezuela stockpiles approximately 40,000 antipersonnel mines. In December 2001, a media report indicated that a Colombian guerrilla group, EPLA, had used explosive devices inside Venezuela.

Mine Ban Policy

Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 14 April 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999. Venezuela has not yet enacted any national implementation measures. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that when Venezuela ratifies an international treaty, it immediately becomes national law, and therefore Venezuela considers that there is no need for a domestic implementation law.¹

Venezuela attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. It cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001. Venezuela participated in the "Mine Action in Latin America" conference, held in Miami from 3-5 December 2001. Venezuela did not attend the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in January 2002, but did participate in the meetings in May 2002.

As of June 2002, Venezuela has not yet submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, due by 9 March 2000. In September 2001, Venezuelan Ambassador Miguel Gómez told the plenary at the Third Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, "The Ministry of Defense has submitted the report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it is being reviewed so as to be sent to the appropriate agency as soon as possible."² According to Defense Ministry officials, that information was incorrect.

In January 2002, the officer who prepared the Article 7 Report for the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that the report was completed and submitted to the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of January 2002.³ The Director of Operations told Landmine Monitor that the report was approved by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Bernabe Carrero, on 30 January 2002, and added that it would be submitted to the Ministry of

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, dated 5 April 2002, presented to Landmine Monitor by Dr. Alvaro Moerzinger, Director General, International Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a cover letter dated 10 April 2002.

¹⁸ National Army response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, April 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Lieutenant Alvaro Urse, 26 June 2002.

¹ Telephone interview with Victor Manzanares, First Secretary for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, 4 February 2000.

² Miguel Gómez, Venezuelan Ambassador to Nicaragua, intervention at the Third Meeting of State Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, September 2001.

³ Telephone interview with Frigate Captain Lino Poleo, Ministry of Defense, 28 January 2002.

Foreign Affairs at any moment.⁴ Apparently, following the political crisis in April 2002,⁵ the Ministry of Defense decided to delay its submission of the report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On 17 June 2002 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela) met in Lima and issued the "Lima Commitment."⁶ In the Lima Commitment, six points were outlined related to the Mine Ban Treaty, including complete destruction of stocks, establishing national programs for victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration, and a call for non-state actors to comply with the international norm against antipersonnel mines.

Venezuela is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II in December 2001, but did participate in the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, as an observer.

Production and Transfer

Officials state that Venezuela has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁷ As previously reported by Landmine Monitor, the US Department of Defense has identified Venezuela as the producer in the past of the MV-1 improvised fragmentation antipersonnel mine.⁸ In January 2002, Brigadier General José Esteban Godoy Peña told Landmine Monitor that the Venezuelan state had not produced mines, and explained that the MV-1 was a mine used by guerrillas in the 1960s, known as "trampas caza bobos" (fool-catcher booby-traps).⁹

No reliable information is available on illegal trafficking of weapons, including antipersonnel mines, within Venezuelan territory. While there have been various reports of illegal trafficking of weapons along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, Landmine Monitor has not found any evidence of trafficking in antipersonnel mines.

Stockpiling

Venezuela has not yet formally and publicly provided information regarding its stockpile of antipersonnel mines. However, a government official told Landmine Monitor that the Army and Navy stockpile approximately 40,000 antipersonnel mines, of more than ten types, mostly US-manufactured.¹⁰

According to Brigadier General Godoy Peña, the Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Armed Forces recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

⁴ Telephone interview with General Velázquez Luque, Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2002.

⁵ The political crisis that led to an attempted coup d'état on 11 April 2002 and subsequent restoration of President Hugo Chávez on 13 April 2002 resulted in serious disruptions in national institutions, including the Armed Forces.

⁶ "Compromiso de Lima" (aka the "Andean Letter for Peace and Security towards Limits and Control of External Defense Spending"), 17 June 2002, at: www.rree.gob.pe; see also Statement by Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, 27 June 2002.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 389; also, on production, interview with Mayor Josman Castillo Benítez, Armaments Service, Air Force of Venezuela, Buenos Aires, 6 November 2000; and interview with General Alberto Müller Rojas, Army of Venezuela, 30 November 2000.

⁸ US Department of Defense, "ORDATA II, Version 1.0," CD-ROM. This contains a photo and schematic drawing of the mine.

⁹ Interview with Brigadier General José Esteban Godoy Peña, Director, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Armed Forces of Venezuela, 30 January 2002. He showed Landmine Monitor a drawing of the MV-1 in which the acronym "FALN" was visible. The Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional) were non-state actors active in Venezuela in the 1960s. The Spanish acronym for Venezuela's Armed Forces is FAN (Fuerza Armada Nacional).

¹⁰ Telephone interview with government official who requested anonymity, 10 June 2002.

a stockpile destruction plan be prepared, with 20 percent of stockpiled mines retained for training.¹¹ Aside from this recommendation, there are no other indications that Venezuela is developing a stockpile destruction plan.

Landmine Use

According to the retired military officer contacted by Landmine Monitor, the Armed Forces have “some small minefields” at Navy bases in Apure and Amazonas states, on the border with Colombia.¹² He said the minefields are inside the military posts, and are properly marked. He said, “There have been no accidents because only military personnel are near the minefields, there are no civilians.” A government official has confirmed this information.

In May 2002, Landmine Monitor traveled to the small community of Guafitas, in Páez municipality, Apure state, and verified the presence of a small minefield inside a Navy post on the Arauca River, on the Colombian border.¹³ The minefield, approximately five meters in width, is around the perimeter of the Navy post and is fenced, with ten warning signs. A local resident told Landmine Monitor that the Navy post was established in 1997 and that he did not know of any incidents involving the landmines.

Venezuela has not publicly acknowledged the existence of minefields on its territory, and has not yet publicly declared any plans to remove the minefields as required by the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not known if the Armed Forces has engaged in maintenance of these minefields since Venezuela became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in October 1999.

According to a December 2001 media report, guerrillas belonging to a little known Colombian group called the Latin American Popular Army (EPLA, Ejército Popular Latinoamericano) are using “explosive mines” to surround and protect their camps in Venezuelan territory.¹⁴ The EPLA and other Colombian non-state actors are active in the border regions between Colombia and Venezuela.

According to the report, Venezuelan military and police forces found two temporary camps where two kidnapped individuals were being held, in the mountains of San Joaquín de Navay, in Fernández Feo municipality, southern Táchira state. When asked by a reporter if security forces had found it difficult to reach the site because of the presence of “minas queiebrapatatas” (leg-breaking mines), the Chief of the First Regional Command, General Irwin Marval Molina, was quoted as saying that this was true, explosive objects had been placed throughout the site, but there had been no casualties among the security forces.¹⁵

If the media report is correct, this would mark the first time since 1997 that Venezuelan security forces have found these types of explosives, and an investigation on their origin is being conducted.¹⁶

Mine Action and Mine Casualties

Since 1996, Venezuela has contributed 23 military mine action supervisors to the MARMINCA mine clearance efforts by the OAS in Central America, including four in 2001 and four in 2002.¹⁷

¹¹ Interview with Brigadier General José Esteban Godoy Peña, Director, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Armed Forces of Venezuela, 30 January 2002.

¹² Interview with retired Venezuelan military officer who requested anonymity, and telephone interview with government official who requested anonymity, 10 June 2002.

¹³ Landmine Monitor field visit to the community of Guafitas, Páez, Apure state, 31 May 2002.

¹⁴ This use was confirmed in the article by General Irwin Marval Molina, Chief of Regional Command No.1 of the National Guard. Eleanora Delgado, “Muertos seis subversives y desmantelado campamento de insurgents. Guerrilleros tiended campo minado para aislar a personas secuestradas,” *El Nacional* (Caracas), 2 December 2001. The EPLA is a splinter group of the former Popular Liberation Army (EPL, Ejército Popular de Liberación) of Colombia.

¹⁵ Eleanora Delgado, “Muertos seis subversives y desmantelado campamento de insurgents. Guerrilleros tiended campo minado para aislar a personas secuestradas,” *El Nacional* (Caracas), 2 December 2001.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

There are no known landmine victims in Venezuela.¹⁸

YEMEN

Key developments since May 2001: On 27 April 2002, Yemen destroyed the last 8,674 of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Between May 2001 to February 2002, 2.2 million square meters of land were cleared of mines and UXO. Yemen has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance since September 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 1 September 1998 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. Draft implementation legislation was discussed at a meeting of the inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), on 7 April 2002.¹ NMAC proposed that the draft legislation be incorporated into the civil or military criminal code.² A committee, including the NMAC chair and a legal consultant, was formed to reformulate the draft law and submit it to the Cabinet for approval. On 27 April 2002, the government reported that the legislation was under “final consideration.”³

Yemen attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001. At the meeting, Yemen and Germany were named co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, and Mine Action Technologies. Yemen served in this role at the January and May 2002 intersessional meetings. Yemen cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

After submitting its initial Article 7 transparency report on 30 November 1999, Yemen submitted annual updates on 14 November 2000, 18 September 2001, and 27 April 2002. The 2002 update covers the period from 8 September 2001 to 27 April 2002 and includes 58 pages detailing the location of mined areas.⁴

While Yemen is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), its Geneva-based representatives attended the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

The Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) translated and published the country report on Yemen from the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* to promote the universalization, implementation, and monitoring of the Mine Ban Treaty in Yemen and throughout the region.

Yemen states that it has never manufactured or exported antipersonnel mines. The last reported use of mines was 1994.⁵

¹⁷ The 23 supervisors constitute 10% of the total contributions to the program from regional countries, and include: three in 1996, three in 1997, four in 1998, three in 1999, and two in 2000. Contributing Countries (International Supervisors) to the OAS Program of Demining in Central America, Table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.

¹⁸ Landmine Monitor consulted with human rights groups in border regions, who confirmed there are no known victims in border communities.

¹ Interview with Rashida Al-Hamadani, Secretary of the National Demining Committee, Sana'a, 13 March 2002. In 2002, a legal committee drafted a law to implement the treaty, with the assistance of the ICRC regional office in Cairo, which was then studied by Ministry of Legal Affairs. The National Mine Action Committee used to be called the National Demining Committee.

² Interview with M. Al-Fasyel, Director of Ministry of Legal Affairs, Sana'a, 12 March 2002. NMAC believed this would be sufficient to fully implement the Mine Ban Treaty.

³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 April 2002.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Form C.

⁵ See previous *Landmine Monitor Reports* for more details on past use and importation of mines.

Stockpile Destruction

On 27 April 2002, Yemen completed destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines, when it destroyed the last 8,674 mines at Alwaht in Lahej governorate.⁶ The Prime Minister, representatives of the Ministry from Defense and other ministries, ambassadors, the UN Development Program, the international media, NGOs, and the in-country Landmine Monitor researcher for Yemen attended the ceremony.⁷

Yemen destroyed about 74,000 antipersonnel mines in total, apparently including 66,674 since September 2001.⁸ Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided financial assistance to destroy the stockpile.⁹

Yemen intends to use the bodies of POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines to build a monument to commemorate the stockpile destruction and "to artfully depict the relationship between the human beings and the mines."¹⁰

Yemen elected to retain 4,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes as permitted under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹¹ Retained mines are housed in two locations: in Sana'a at the Military's central storage facilities, and in Aden, at the Military's Engineering Department training facility.¹² Thus far, Yemen has consumed 120 of these mines for training of mine detection dogs.¹³

The Army does not possess Claymore-type mines.¹⁴

Survey and Assessment

The Survey Action Center (SAC) carried out the world's first comprehensive nationwide Landmine Impact Survey in Yemen between July 1999 and July 2000. It identified 592 mine-affected villages in nineteen out of twenty governorates (Al-Mahweet governorate was the only one declared mine-free).¹⁵ The survey identified 1,078 mined areas covering a total reported surface area of 923 million square meters, mainly in central and southern Yemen. It indicated that approximately 828,000 Yemeni civilians (or one out of every sixteen citizens) are affected by the presence of mines and UXO.

Mine Action Funding

In 2001, the government of Yemen allocated 3 million Yemeni riyals (\$17,212 at official conversion rates) to the mine action program.¹⁶ Previously, the Yemen Mine Action Program spent

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form G, 27 April 2002. This included 8,174 PPMN-SR-2 mines and 500 PMN mines. Also, email from Mansoor Al-Ezzi, Director, Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 30 April 2002.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form G, 27 April 2002. Also, email from Mansoor Al-Ezzi, Director, YEMAC, April 2002.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2002, reports that 66,674 mines were transferred for destruction in the period 8 September 2001 to 27 April 2002. This included 58,000 POMZ-2 mines in addition to those destroyed on 27 April. There is a discrepancy in accounting. In its 2002 and 2001 Article 7 reports, Yemen reports a stockpile of 78,000 mines (58,500 POMZ-2; 16,000 PPMiSR-2; 2,000 PMN; and 1,500 PMD-6). It retained 4,000 of those mines for training purposes, leaving 74,000 to be destroyed. A total of 5,050 were destroyed on 14 February 2000, and 4,286 on 22 February 2001. This would leave 64,664 to be destroyed since September, not 66,674. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 987-988.

⁹ Canada provided CAN\$21,000 for the final stockpile destruction. Yemen's Article 7 Report, Form F, 27 April 2002. The United States funded the February 2001 destruction. Telephone interview with Mansoor Al-Ezzi, Yemen Mine Action Program, 24 February 2001. The UK provided \$12,000. Telephone interview with Scott Pilkington, UN Chief Technical Advisor, Sana'a 8 April 2002.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2002.

¹¹ It is keeping 1,000 each of PMN, POMZ-2, PMD-6 and PPMiSR-2.

¹² The 4,000 mines retained for training were transferred to these locations during the reporting period. Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2002.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2002. This includes 30 of each of the four types retained.

¹⁴ Interview with Mansoor Al-Ezzi, Director, YEMAC, Sana'a, 11 March 2002.

¹⁵ For more detail on the survey methodology and findings, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 988-989.

¹⁶ Telephone interview with Scott Pilkington, UN Chief Technical Advisor, Sana'a 8 April 2002.

approximately \$5.5 million in a two-year period from May 1999 through April 2001. In 2001 international donors to mine action in Yemen allocated the following:

- Saudi Arabia: \$3 million (in installments over three years). This is for demining, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, and victim assistance. On 13 April 2002, in a ceremony attended by the Minister of State and the Saudi ambassador in Sana'a, six hearing aids, three wheelchairs and 19 prostheses were provided for mine survivors. Saudi Arabia also funded surgical operations for 32 mine survivors.¹⁷
- United States: nearly \$1.7 million. This is for the purchase of demining equipment and materials (\$656,000), vehicles (\$148,900), medical supplies (\$5,816), logistic support items (\$25,100) funding to support current mine clearance operations (\$187,000), and training by U.S. military forces (\$672,000).¹⁸
- Germany: \$326,000. This is for mine detecting dogs (\$153,000), secondment of experts (\$148,000), and a mission to study lessons learned (\$25,000).¹⁹
- Italy: \$253,626 (€280,436) for support to the national mine action program.²⁰
- The Netherlands: \$500,000 for mine action program activities.²¹
- Switzerland: \$120,000 for an administration and logistics advisor to support the national mine action program.²²
- Canada: \$62,184. This is for mine clearance support (\$58,777) and stockpile destruction (\$3,414).²³
- United Kingdom: \$12,000 for stockpile destruction.²⁴

Mine Action Planning and Coordination

The National Mine Action Committee, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), is responsible for policy formulation, resource allocation, and the national mine action strategy. The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) is responsible for coordination of mine action activities, the activities of the Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB Aden), and also executes national mine action plans. The Yemen Mine Action Program currently employs 816 personnel in planning, training, logistics, mine survey, mine clearance, mine awareness, and victim assistance. The NMAC has established a Mine Awareness Advisory Committee (MAAC), and a Victim Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC), and working groups to assist with planning and evaluation of mine awareness and victim assistance activities. There are no new developments regarding the plan to open a regional mine unit in Hadramout.²⁵

As part of a twenty-five year strategy, mine action specialists designed the government-approved Five-Year Strategic Mine Action Plan (from 2001 to 2005), which uses the National Mine Action Vision and Landmine Impact Survey, to establish national priorities. These include mined areas that block access to a critical area (such as water or pasture land); mined areas that block access to infrastructure (such as roads, public use facilities, or water resources); and mined areas that impede development (such as water projects, airport/sea/port development, and oil

¹⁷ Interview with Kaid Thabet Mokbel, Director, Medical Survey Team, Victim Assistance Department, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 9 May 2002.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 44.

¹⁹ UN Mine Action Investment Database, 2001 donor report for Germany.

²⁰ Italy, Article 7 Report, Form J, submitted 2 May 2002. Converted to US dollars by Landmine Monitor on 9 May 2002.

²¹ UN Mine Action Investment Database, 2001 donor report for the Netherlands; in the Article 7 Report submitted by the Netherlands on 19 April 2002, the figure is given as €568,000.

²² UN Mine Action Investment Database, 2001 donor report for Switzerland.

²³ UN Mine Action Investment Database, 2001 donor report for Canada.

²⁴ Telephone interview with Scott Pilkington, UN Chief Technical Advisor, Sana'a 8 April 2002.

²⁵ Interview with Mansoor Al-Ezzi, Director, YEMAC, Sana'a 11 March 2002, and email 24 July 2002.

extraction). Another priority is to ensure mine survivors have equal access to educational and economic opportunity.²⁶

Mine Clearance

A unit of the Engineering Department of the Ministry Defense and a separate body, the Mine Clearance Unit of the Regional Technical Executive Unit, undertake mine clearance in Yemen. In 2001, 4,304 antipersonnel mines, 35 antivehicle mines, and 4,352 UXO were cleared and destroyed.²⁷ From May 2001 to February 2002, six Army demining companies cleared 2,198,607 square meters of land in Aden, Lahej, Abyan, al-Dhala, Ebb, and Hadramout and handed over the land to the local authorities and the communities.²⁸ Mine action teams were deployed to four of the fourteen highest priority impact areas based on the results of the Landmine Impact Survey. Three out of four areas close to communities in Aden, Sana'a and Hija governorates were cleared.²⁹ Cleared sites mostly consist of grazing lands, desert, and farms.

Newly formed technical (Level Two) survey teams engaged in area reduction and clearance in eight governorates: Aden, Lahej, Hadramout, Abyan, Al-Dhala, Ebb, Hajah and Sana'a.³⁰ Four demining companies fenced 25 minefields in these governorates.³¹ During these operations 62 antipersonnel mines and 822 UXO were detected, cleared, and destroyed as efforts to limit the boundaries of these minefields.³²

At the beginning of 2001, 432 deminers (including 14 UXO specialists) were working in Yemen. The number had increased to 500 by July 2002, and is expected to reach 600 by 2003. Eight mine detecting dogs were brought from Afghanistan, of which two died, and 13 additional dogs are slated to arrive in 2002 from Germany. Sixteen members of the regional mine action staff are being trained to work with these dogs.³³

In 2002, the national program will continue to expand. The last of the eight mine action units (including clearance, mine awareness, and victims assistance teams) will be trained, equipped, and fielded; two additional technical survey teams will be deployed; the first four mine detecting dog teams (four dogs in each team) will be operational; and a management information system to accredit, license, and ensure quality in accordance with international standards will be put into place.³⁴

Mine Risk Education

In the year 2001 and through April 2002, the YMAA and the Mine Awareness Department at the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden carried out joint activities in Aden, Lahej, and Abyan, reaching 64 villages and schools and an estimated 44,808 people. These organizations also executed 87 field visits and distributed 30,490 posters and games during this period.³⁵

Mine risk education in Yemen is mainly conducted through field visits and workshops in villages close to mined areas. There is ongoing coordination with key people (Shieks, Imama, teachers, students, and journalists) at the governorate and village levels. The content of the participatory workshops include an introduction to the danger of mines and UXO using materials such as plastic models and posters. The participants are also trained in how to transmit basic mine

²⁶ Five Year Strategic Action Plan for Yemen, 2001-2005; also published in UN Mine Action Service, "Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," February 2002, pp. 250-251.

²⁷ Interview with Yehia M. Nasser, Director, Operations Department, Regional Technical Executive Unit, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 19 March 2002.

²⁸ Interview with Fadhle Garama, Director, Regional Technical Executive Unit, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 8 April 2002.

²⁹ Interview with Mansoor Al Ezzi, Director, YEMAC, Sana'a, 11 March 2002.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Interview with Fadhle Garama, Director, Technical Executive Unit, Aden, 8 April 2002.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ UN Mine Action Service, "Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," February 2002, p. 251.

³⁵ Interview with Saleh A. Montsar, Deputy Director, Regional Technical Unit, Aden, 4 April 2002.

risk education messages using a child-to-child approach. Communication skills and safety procedures are also taught in case they encounter mines or UXO. Role-playing and games are also used.

The National Mine Action Program spent \$20,000 for mine risk education in 2001. The Mine Awareness Department in Sana'a established plans for 2002 to target 101 mine-affected villages to work in cooperation with demining companies in villages in Al Dhala and Ebb.³⁶ During 2001, the Mine Awareness Department in Sana'a implemented separate mine risk education workshops and follow-up meetings in different mine-affected villages in Qataba and Al-Nadra. The National Mine Action Program supports these activities.

The Mine Awareness Department implements mine risk education locally and nationally which involves mainly village presentations, which are preceded by meetings with the key people where information is gathered regarding accidents, mine victims, places where mine victims, and locations where mines and UXO have been found. The Mine Awareness Department also produced a documentary film advocating for the Mine Ban Treaty and Mine Action activities in Yemen. This film was shown on Yemeni television in March 2002.³⁷

In April 2001, the Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) received a \$22,440 grant from the embassy of the United States in Sana'a to work jointly with the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden to replicate community-based programs in Qataba and Al-Nadra. Both Qataba in Al-Dhala governorate and Al-Nadra in Ebb Governorate are high-risk areas identified by the Impact Survey. YMAA women members gave mine risk education sessions at one of the houses in the village to reach women and girls who could not attend the workshop. Field visits were conducted in these areas in May and June 2001 and February and April 2002. In March 2002, the YMAA produced a poster and a storybook depicting mine survivors, as well as a quarterly newsletter about mine risk education activities in villages, with support provided by the U.S. embassy and Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden).³⁸

Landmine Casualties

The National Mine Action Center registered five mine survivors in 2001; it does not register those killed in mine incidents. The Regional Mine Action Center in Aden gave different numbers: in September 2001, a mine explosion injured three children (two lost their lower limbs and fingers) in Azal village, Ebb governorate; during the same month, ten people were killed and five injured in an antivehicle mine explosion in Al-Nadra, Ebb governorate.³⁹

Mine/UXO incidents continue to be reported in 2002. On 24 March, two soldiers were injured in a mine explosion during a training exercise at the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden. On 25 March 2002 in the al-Baida Governorate, a ten-year old boy was killed and two other children were injured in a UXO explosion.⁴⁰ On 2 April 2002, a mine incident in Al-Otbat village in Qataba killed a goat, but there were no human casualties.⁴¹

The Landmine Impact Survey, completed in July 2000, recorded a total of 4,904 casualties, of which 2,560 were killed and 2,344 injured.⁴² At the time, it was noted that casualties were markedly higher than any statistics previously collected. Concerns have been expressed that the numbers are not accurate and could be as high as double the real figure. It is possible that the

³⁶ Interview with Nabeel Rassam, Director, Mine Awareness Department, National Mine Action Center, Sana'a, 3 January 2002.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Interview with Aisha Saeed, Chairperson, YMAA, Sana'a, 10 May 2002.

³⁹ Interview with Kaid Thabet Mokbel, Head of Medical Survey Team, Victim Assistance Department, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 9 May 2002.

⁴⁰ Interview with Fadhle Garama, Director, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 8 April 2002.

⁴¹ Telephone interview with a local mine awareness committee member, Qataba, 2 April 2002.

⁴² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 993-994.

survey raised expectations of compensation, which induced people to register even though they were victims of other causes.⁴³

Survivor Assistance

The Victim Assistance Department of the National Mine Action Program provides emergency medical assistance to landmine/UXO casualties in any area of Yemen when incidents are reported. The Victim Assistance Department developed a medical survey plan to follow up the results of Landmine Impact Survey. The plan is divided into three stages: medical survey, diagnosis, and provision of medical support. Implementation of the survey commenced in June 2001. An eight-member medical survey team targeted the Qataba district in the Al-Dhala governorate and identified 64 survivors (16 females and 48 males) and the Al-Nadra district in Ebb governorate where 110 survivors (16 females and 94 males) were identified.⁴⁴ On 21 January 2002 the Victim Assistance Department referred 51 mine and UXO survivors from Al-Dhala governorate to the Aden Hospital for medical treatment and for rehabilitation services at the prosthetic workshops.⁴⁵

The ICRC assisted the Ministry of Health National Artificial Limbs and Physiotherapy Center in Sana'a to adopt ICRC technology.⁴⁶ After the delivery of materials in March 2001, the center produced 284 prostheses and 1,870 orthoses. The Ministry of Health requested the ICRC to extend assistance to a new prosthetic workshop that is being built in Mukalla in the isolated Hadramout governorate.

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) supports two physical rehabilitation centers in Taiz and Aden, in cooperation with the Ministry of Insurance, Social Affairs, and Labor (MOISA) and the Ministry of Public Health.⁴⁷ In 2001, the Taiz Rehabilitation Center provided 3,060 physiotherapy treatments, 768 prostheses were fitted, and 109 prostheses were repaired. As well as providing rehabilitation services, the Aden center facilitated the training of twelve orthopedic technicians and six physiotherapy assistants.⁴⁸ Thirty-five amputees are registered on the center's waiting list of which twenty percent were injured in mine or UXO incidents. Production of below-the-knee prostheses started at the Aden workshop in March 2002 when four prostheses were provided to patients, including two mine survivors.⁴⁹ In 2001, donors to the HIB program included the European Union, the Social Fund for Development, the British Council, French Co-operation, and private donors.⁵⁰

In 2001, the Yemen office of Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) supported the Ministry of Social Affairs in a community-based program to assist children with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in the governorates of Aden, Lahej, Abyan, Taiz, and Ebb. Following an evaluation of the program, a workshop was held on 26-28 January 2002 to discuss the outcomes and implement recommendations and lessons learned. Since then, new plans have been discussed between different parties to improve the effectiveness of the program in the field.⁵¹

Since May 2001, support from the National Mine Action Program to the Italian NGO, Movimondo, ceased due to a lack of coordination with the Victim Assistance Advisory Committee.

⁴³ Opinions from various sources given to Landmine Monitor in confidence.

⁴⁴ Interview with Abobaker Abbas, Director of Medical Department, Sana'a, 3 January 2002.

⁴⁵ Interview with Alkadhër Abdulla, Director of the Victim Assistance Department, Regional Mine Action Center, Aden, 9 May 2002.

⁴⁶ ICRC (Geneva), *Special Report, Mine Action 2001*, July 2002, p. 39.

⁴⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 994-995.

⁴⁸ Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001.

⁴⁹ Interview with Roel Janssen, Handicap International Belgium, Aden, 25 March 2002.

⁵⁰ Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001.

⁵¹ Telephone interview with Soud Al-Hibshi, Community Based Rehabilitation Program Officer, Rädä Barnen, 30 April 2002.

However, Movimondo's assistance program, which includes the training of Yemeni physiotherapists and nurses, continues as planned.⁵²

Disability Policy and Practice

Act 61 on the Care and Rehabilitation of the Disabled was issued in December 1999.⁵³ On 23 January 2002, Presidential Law Number 2 establishing a care and rehabilitation fund for the disabled came into effect. The fund will initially cover the costs of immediate medical care in hospital.⁵⁴

Landmine survivor assistance in Yemen is coordinated through the Victim Assistance Advisory Committee; the membership of which includes the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MOISA), Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, and four international NGOs, ADRA, Handicap International Belgium, Movimondo, and Radda Barnen. There is no representation from local NGOs or mine survivors.

ZAMBIA

Key developments since May 2001: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Zambia on 1 August 2001. Zambia is incorporating the Mine Ban Treaty's provisions into domestic law. Zambia for the first time revealed it has a stockpile of 6,691 mines, all of which will be retained "for training only." The Zambian Mine Action Center was established in August 2001, and training was provided for management, survey, mine risk education, and clearance teams. Mine clearance operations began in May 2002. Zambia submitted its initial Article 7 Report on 31 August 2001, months before it was due.

Mine Ban Policy

Zambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 23 February 2001. The treaty entered into force for Zambia on 1 August 2001. In May 2002, Zambian officials said that at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Legislative Drafting Department of the Attorney General's Chambers has begun the process of incorporating the Mine Ban Treaty's provisions into domestic law.¹

Zambia's first Article 7 transparency report, due on 27 January 2002, was submitted on 31 August 2001.² Zambia has not submitted its annual updated report, due on 30 April 2002.

Zambia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. In his statement to the meeting, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steven Chilombo, called on "our brothers who are still on the periphery of joining the Mine Ban Treaty [to] do so as early as possible."³ Zambia also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. It cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, in November 2001.

⁵² Interview with Roberta Contini, Movimondo, Sana'a 11 March 2002; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 994.

⁵³ For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 869-870.

⁵⁴ Telephone conversation with Ehab Salem, Chairperson of the Aden Disabled Society, 9 May 2002.

¹ Presentation on the "Present Status of Ratification and Implementation of IHL Treaties and Conventions in Zambia," to the Southern African Regional Seminar on International Law, hosted by the ICRC, Pretoria, South Africa, 21-23 May 2002. In January 2002, Zambia said, "The Country is now finalizing the incorporation of the Convention into Zambia legislation." Intervention by Ambassador Bonaventure Bowe, Permanent Representative, Head of the Zambian Delegation at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

² Article 7 Report, 31 August 2001, covering the period 1 April - 31 August 2001.

³ Statement delivered by Steven Chibwe Chilombo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

Zambia is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Use and Stockpiling

Zambia has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁴ The Zambian government has in the past stated that the Zambian Armed Forces do not use and are not planning to use landmines.⁵ At the Third Meeting of States Parties, its delegation stated that “there is no justification and there should be no justification for the continued use of these inhuman, and evil devices.”⁶

In its Article 7 Report, Zambia for the first time disclosed details on its stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It has 6,691 mines, which, according to its Article 7 Report, include the following: 535 ALPER 120 (China); 571 AUPS 24 (Italy); 220 POMZ-2 (Russia); 676 MAUS 58 (Russia); 860 T69 (China); 1,225 T59 (Russia); 1,804 T58 (China); 226 T VARS 40 (Italy); and 574 VARS 50 (Italy).⁷ The mines are in the custody of the Zambia Army Central Ammunition Depot in Lusaka.⁸

Zambia has declared that it will retain the entire stockpile of mines “for training only.”⁹ Zambia is the first State Party to declare that it is retaining its entire stockpile, and the 6,691 is among the highest number retained by any State Party. At the Second Meeting of States Parties, Zambia’s Deputy Foreign Minister said, “My country believes the surest way of preventing the use of landmines lies in their total destruction. Stockpiling of antipersonnel mines under the guise of training is a loophole that could be capitalized on to justify the retention of large numbers of these weapons.”¹⁰

Landmine Problem and Assessment

In its Article 7 Report, Zambia said it had no conventional minefields, but there were suspected mined areas from the wars of liberation, along the borders with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola and around “former Freedom Fighters’ Camps.”¹¹ The US government had said previously that “Zambia’s best estimate is that landmines affect 2,500 sq. km in five provinces.”¹² After the United Nations Mine Action Service’s assessment mission in 2000, the landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem was characterized as “mainly residual in nature and concentrated in sparsely populated border areas.”¹³ Zambia plans to conduct a landmine impact study, once sufficient funds are available.¹⁴

In July 2002, President Mwanawasa said, “The liberation struggle that was waged by friends in Namibia, South Africa and various other liberation movements in the Southern African Sub-region left landmines deposited in Zambia. We do not mind the fact that landmines were planted

⁴ Article 7 Report, 31 August 2001. Form H states, “Zambia does not produce APMs.” Form E states, “Zambia has no facilities or programmes for conversion or de-commissioning APM production.”

⁵ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report, Zambia,” 29 May-7 June 2000, p. 13.

⁶ Statement delivered by Steven Chibwe Chilombo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form B, 31 August 2001. Landmine Monitor found many elements of this reporting confusing. Standard reference works on mine types do not list Russian MAUS 58 mines, Russian T59 mines or Chinese T58 mines. Many of the specifications cited for Uganda’s mines are also non-standard.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form B, 31 August 2001.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 August 2001.

¹⁰ Statement delivered by Valentine W.C. Kayope, M.P., Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 12 September 2000; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 171.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 August 2001.

¹² U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, p. 14.

¹³ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report, Zambia,” 29 May-7 June 2000, p. 3.

¹⁴ Intervention by Ambassador Bonaventure Bowe, Permanent Representative, Head of the Zambian Delegation at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

because this was done for the protection of the liberation movements. The fact now is that we cannot use these areas of land because of the mines, and hence the need for de-mining....The Swapo-Party, as a liberation movement many years ago, had camps in Zambia's Western Province, which today is believed to be heavily infested with landmines."¹⁵

Mine Action and Funding

In 1999, Zambia established a National Task Force on the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention.¹⁶ On the recommendation of this Task Force, the country established the Zambian Mine Action Center (ZMAC), which began operations in August 2001.¹⁷

No mine clearance activities were carried out in Zambia in 2001. Clearance operations began in May 2002.¹⁸ A Joint Permanent Commission under the Ministry of Defense has been established and is working with the Mozambique government on joint clearance of the border region.¹⁹

In 2001, the US Department of State provided \$750,000 to Zambia to fund RONCO, a US commercial deminer, to assist the government to establish the indigenous mine action center, ZMAC.²⁰ RONCO Technical Advisors started to train Zambian military personnel in October 2001 to train staff personnel in staff management, mine awareness, impact survey, and database management, and to train field personnel in demining for clearance and medical teams.²¹ The training, which was completed in February 2002, trained 60 personnel (20 staff and 40 field personnel).²² In May 2002, field personnel were deployed to work in support of a large socio-economic project, the Gwembe Tonga Development Project. The US is providing \$800,000 for mine action in Zambia in 2002.²³

In July 2002, President Mwanawasa appealed to the Namibian government to assist Zambia in demining. He also called on others to provide personnel, equipment or experience, which Namibia could share in that regard.²⁴

Zambia has questioned the United Nations' policy and strategy of giving priority to countries where landmine contamination is widespread. In November 2001, Zambia's Ambassador to the UN, Professor Musambachime said, "Our experience with the landmine problem is that even the mere suspicion of their presence condemns large tracts of land."²⁵

The Zambia Army has carried out military-oriented mine clearance activities since the 1970s.²⁶ The Army Corps of Engineers has a squadron of about 240 personnel with mine clearance training. The Ministry of Home Affairs Bomb Disposal Unit also responds to reports of landmines and UXO, and to requests for assistance from the Army.

¹⁵ "Zambia Appeals for De-mining Assistance," *GRN News*, 5 July 2002.

¹⁶ For details of the National Task Force's function and mandate, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 174.

¹⁷ Statement by Prof. Mwelwa C. Musambachime, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations, on Agenda Item 38: Assistance in Mine Action, 21 November 2001, New York.

¹⁸ Email from the U.S. State Department Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 11 July 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Zambian delegates to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 28 January-1 February 2002.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 14.

²¹ Email to Landmine Monitor (SACBL) from Joe George, RONCO (Zambia), 31 July 2002.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ US Department of State Fact Sheet, "The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

²⁴ "Zambia Appeals for De-mining Assistance," *GRN News*, 5 July 2002.

²⁵ Statement by Prof. Mwelwa C. Musambachime, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations, on Agenda Item 38: Assistance in Mine Action, 21 November 2001, New York.

²⁶ Interview with Todd Mulyata, Senior EOD Specialist, Ministry of Home Affairs, Geneva, 11 May 2001.

There have not been any sustained or organized mine risk education programs in Zambia. Army and Ministry of Home Affairs officials have given impromptu mine risk education when involved in mine clearance in an area.²⁷

Landmine Casualties/Survivor Assistance

In 2001, no reports of landmine casualties were found. There is no formal mechanism for collecting data on landmine casualties in Zambia, however, the total number is believed to be small. One peasant from Siampondo village said landmines has cost him 12 head of cattle and 37 goats during the last ten years.²⁸

The ZCTBL/UNMAS initiative noted above reportedly also includes a plan to provide artificial limbs and prosthetics to landmine victims, and villagers are to be provided with seed and other things to enable them to effectively cultivate their demined land.²⁹

The public health service does not distinguish between landmine/UXO survivors and other persons with disabilities. The needs of landmine survivors are addressed within the existing public health care infrastructure. However, according to a year 2000 UNMAS assessment mission, the public health sector suffers from a lack of resources and expertise, which is most acute in the rural areas where the majority of the mine/UXO incidents are likely to take place.³⁰ There are physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration programs for persons with disabilities, including the Chipata Community Based Rehabilitation Program, the Livingstone Community Based Rehabilitation Program, and the Solwezi Community Based Rehabilitation Program.³¹

ZIMBABWE

Key developments since May 2001: In December 2001, it was announced that Zimbabwe's army had completed demining 1.8 million square meters of land around the main border crossing with Mozambique. In 2002, a National Authority on Mine Action was formed to coordinate activities of mine victims and other landmine-related activities. In 2001, five new landmine casualties were reported. Zimbabwe clarified its position regarding possible joint military operations involving use of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 June 1998. The treaty entered into force for Zimbabwe on 1 March 1999. Zimbabwe enacted *The Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2000* in January 2001.

Zimbabwe submitted its initial Article 7 report in January 2000 and an update in April 2001.¹ Government officials informed Landmine Monitor that the next annual update was submitted in December 2001, although as of 31 July 2002 it had not been received by the United Nations.²

Zimbabwe attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua and also actively participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Zimbabwe cosponsored and voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. A senior official said the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs both continue to

²⁷ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report, Zambia," 29 May-7 June 2000, p. 12.

²⁸ Gabriel Siachitema, "Villagers Find Hope in Valley of Mines," *The Herald*, 17 May 2002.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report –The Republic of Zambia," 29 May-7 June 2000, p. 14; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 175; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 195.

³¹ See <http://www.landminevap.org>.

¹ Article 7 Report, 11 January 2000, covering the period August 1999 to January 2000; Article 7 Report, 4 April 2001, covering the period January 2000 to December 2000.

² Landmine Monitor has received from Zimbabwe a copy of the latest report. Article 7 Report, covering the period January 2001 to December 2001, dated December 2001 (no day).

encourage countries that have not signed, ratified, and promulgated the Mine Ban Treaty into domestic law to do so.³

Zimbabwe is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second Review Conference of the CCW, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Zimbabwe no longer produces landmines, and as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, destroyed its stockpile of 4,092 antipersonnel mines in November 2000, retaining 700 mines for training purposes.⁴ In 2000 and 2001, Zimbabwe did not expend any of the mines retained for training.⁵

Zimbabwe states that it stopped using antipersonnel mines upon ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1998.⁶ Past allegations of the use of landmines by the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been consistently and strongly denied by the ZDF and the Ministry of Defense.⁷ Landmine Monitor is not aware of any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Zimbabwean forces in this reporting period.⁸

Joint Operations and Mine Use

In its 2001 report, Landmine Monitor expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party could be in violation of the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not “under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” The ICBL raised this concern with respect to Zimbabwe’s military activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (which at that time was not a party to the treaty), as well as Tajikistan’s activities with Russia, and various NATO members’ activities with the United States.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2002, the Zimbabwe delegation responded to the concern, noting it would “only dwell on three terms that we feel tend to create some confusion in some quarters in as far as Zimbabwe is concerned. These are joint operations, assist and active participation.”⁹

The delegate went on to state, “Zimbabwe’s understanding of the term **joint operations** in the context of the Mine Ban Treaty and especially in situations where the other ally or allies are not States Parties to the Convention, is that troops from different countries always operate under command of their own commanders. In Zimbabwe’s case, our troops are always under command

³ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, National Coordinator and Director of Operations, National Demining Office, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 January 2002.

⁴ For details on stocks and retained mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 177; Article 7 Report, 4 April 2001. For information on past production, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 97-99.

⁵ Article 7 Reports, 4 April 2001 and December 2001. The latter states, “The mines will be used during training of our troops and deminers to enable them to identify the mines found in our minefields, learn how to detect, handle, neutralize and destroy them.”

⁶ Statement of the Zimbabwe Delegation to the Second Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 13 September 2000.

⁷ For information on allegations of use, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 177-179.

⁸ Since 1999, there have been allegations of use of landmines by Zimbabwean forces in Ikela. In 2002, local people from Ikela continued to state that Zimbabwean troops laid mines when they learned that RCD-Goma and Rwandan troops were surrounding them. Interviews with local people, landmine victims and their families, and medical staff, Ikela, February and March 2002. Also, interview with an RCD-Goma officer, March 2002, who declared 92 RCD-Goma soldiers had been victims of landmines in Ikela between 1999 and 2002.

⁹ “Zimbabwe’s Intervention on the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operations of the Convention: Article 1,” Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, May 2002. This written statement is undated, but was delivered on 31 May 2002.

of Zimbabwean commanders and have separate spheres and areas of operations. Our troops therefore remain bound by our domestic laws even if they are operating beyond our borders. Our troops will therefore not in any way be directly or otherwise be involved in any activity banned by the Convention wherever they are operating. We therefore in our view, believe that the term **assist** should be interpreted, relating directly to the activity in question and should not be applied liberally or given too wide a definition. This may lead to confusion, accusations and counter-accusations.”¹⁰

Finally, the delegate said, “**Active participation** in Zimbabwe’s context is when reference is made to a prohibited activity and includes providing finances to such activities with full knowledge that such finance is to be used to procure, manufacture, training in the use of, and or distribution of APMs. Active participation also means actively participating in the carrying, laying and training in the use, manufacture, distribution, encouraging or inducing someone in the use of APMs. It is therefore our humble submission that the terms assist and active participation in the context of Article 1 mean **knowingly and intentionally** participating directly or rendering assistance on the use, transfer and/or production of AP mines. Zimbabwe would therefore like to urge all States Parties and other players to be careful about the interpretation and application of these and other terms in the Convention to avoid misunderstandings.”¹¹

Landmine Problem and Assessment

Zimbabwe has in the past identified seven mined areas that it estimates contain about 1.17 million antipersonnel mines.¹² As of January 2002, 27 percent had been cleared.¹³

In April 2001, Zimbabwe reported that MineTech, a commercial company funded by GTZ, was carrying out a Level 2 Survey of the Malvernia (Sango) to Crooks Corner Minefield (50 kilometers).¹⁴ MineTech also undertook Level 1 and Level 2 Surveys of the sector five border minefield for the potential Trans-Frontier Conservation Project.¹⁵ A total of 41,271.6 square meters of land was surveyed. Forty-seven antipersonnel mines were located during this operation, along with 293 Ploughshear directional fragmentation mines. The Level 2 Survey indicated that the mine threat in this area was far greater than had been initially thought and a concept plan for the clearance of the threat areas indicated as a result of the Level 2 Survey has been developed by MineTech.¹⁶

No Level 2 surveys have been conducted in other parts of the country because of financial constraints.¹⁷

Mine Action Funding

Zimbabwe has received funding for mine action in 2001 only from the U.S., in the amount of \$621,000 to fully equip a fourth demining platoon.¹⁸ The U.S. has allocated \$300,000 for mine action in Zimbabwe in U.S. fiscal year 2002.¹⁹

In its report last year, Landmine Monitor reported the end of the European Union grant to demine the 359-mile long Mukumbura-Nyamapanda minefield, effective December 2000.²⁰ The UN Mine Action Database indicates a contribution from the European Union for 2001, in the

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. Emphasis in original.

¹² For details of each mined area, the initial and estimated present density as well as the minefield type, see Article 7 Report, Form C, submitted December 2001.

¹³ Presentation on National Demining Operations by Major Vengesai, 17 January 2002.

¹⁴ *Landmine Monitor 2001*, p. 180.

¹⁵ See <http://www.minetech.co.uk/Africa.html>.

¹⁶ E-mail from Jody Maine, Minetech International, 12 July 2002.

¹⁷ National Demining Office, "Report on the Area Covered by the Mine Awareness Section, 1998 – 2001."

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining," November 2001, p. 15.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, "The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding," 5 April 2002.

²⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 180.

amount of \$4,085,533.²¹ This, however, was apparently money in the pipeline for the Mukumbura-Nyamapanda minefield grant that concluded at the end of 2000, as well as other previous grants.²²

Mine Action

In 1998, the National Demining Office (NDO) was established at Pomona Barracks to coordinate and integrate all demining activities in Zimbabwe. The establishment of the NDO followed several visits by U.S. demining officials to Zimbabwe.²³ These visits included training of Zimbabwe Engineering personnel in staffing a humanitarian demining office, as well as computer training for all NDO staff.²⁴ Training in staff management and organizational structure was completed in 2001, and since December 2001, the officers have been collecting information on mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine victims.²⁵

A National Authority on Mine Action (NAMA), which incorporates interested individuals as well as the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH), was formed in early 2002.²⁶ The NAMA aims to coordinate the activities of landmine victims and other landmine-related activities. Air-Commodore M.T. Karakadzai, Deputy Secretary of Policy and Procurement in the Ministry of Defense, was appointed Chairman of NAMA. The establishment of this Authority allows the NDO to concentrate on its core business of coordinating demining activities.²⁷

Besides the Zimbabwe Defense Force Engineering Squadron, there are a number of other Zimbabwe-based mine clearance operators. These include, the Southern African Demining Services Agency, Southern African Demining Operators, MineTech International and Mine-Clearance International. In 2002, MineTech International has teams operating in Lebanon, Macedonia, Eritrea, and Somaliland. None of these organizations are presently under contract in Zimbabwe itself.

Status of Minefields

Victoria Falls-Mlibizi: The ZDF's Engineering Squadron continues to demine the Victoria Falls-Mlibizi minefield. In total, 105 kilometers have been cleared, including the 18-kilometer stretch around the town of Victoria Falls. About 25 kilometers were cleared since the previous Landmine Monitor report, and a total of 138 kilometers remains to be cleared. The Victoria Falls-Mlibizi project is expected to be completed in 2003. During the demining process in 2000, Lance-Corporal N. Mangena detonated an antipersonnel mine, resulting in his leg being amputated. This is the only causality suffered by the NDO since its establishment.²⁸

Forbes Border Post (in the Stapleford-Leako Hill minefield): In December 2001, it was announced that Zimbabwe's army had completed demining 1.8 million square meters of land

²¹ See: <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>.

²² The EC indicates €2 million was for the Zimbabwe-Mozambique clearance project, and about €2.5 million for disbursements from previous years. Email from Catherine Horeftari, 29 July 2002. Also, interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, National Coordinator and Director of Operations, NDO, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 January 2002.

²³ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, National Coordinator and Director of Operations, NDO, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 January 2002.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Interview with Chief Warrant Officer T. Castle, Operations Coordinator, and Captain T. Cook, Foreign Area Officer, U.S. Embassy, Harare, 5 February 2002.

²⁶ National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH) is made up of 53 member organizations covering all types of disabilities and undertakes programs and projects with and on behalf of its membership.

²⁷ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, National Coordinator and Director of Operations, NDO, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 January 2002.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

around the main border crossing with Mozambique.²⁹ The director of operations of NDO stated that the "team also checked for mines as far as 100 meters across the border into Mozambique."³⁰ The National Railway of Zimbabwe had requested ZDF assistance to clear the area to enable the servicing of the railway line by its maintenance team.³¹

The Forbes Border Post is part of the economically and strategically important Beira Corridor from Harare to the port of Beira in Mozambique. The corridor is the traditional route for Zimbabwe's export and imports.³² It is presently being upgraded and expanded to cover areas within 50 kilometers on either side of the gateway. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Mkhululi Ncube, the exercise, which took seven months, resulted in the removal of 478 antipersonnel mines.³³ About 27 percent of the area has been cleared.³⁴ The clearing of the state land will eventually pave way for the expansion of the border post for the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, the rehabilitation of the Mutare-Beira Railway and increased police patrols along the border.

Mkumbura Rwenya Minefield (in the Mzengezi-Nyamapanda minefield): Koch-Mine Safe, a joint venture company between Koch Munitionsbergungs of Germany and Mine Safe, a company run by retired Zimbabwe army officers, started working in the Mkumbura Rwenya Minefield in 1998. When it ended operations in December 2000 with the termination of EU funding, it had cleared some 6.2 million square meters of land or about 130 kilometer of the 335-kilometer long minefield³⁵ and about 162,000 mines.³⁶ Since, then the NDO has intensified its mine risk education campaigns in the area. Officially, the demined area in Mukumbura has not been handed over to the local population because approximately 22 kilometers remain uncleared.³⁷

Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park: The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park covers an area of over 35,000 square kilometers, extending into South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Some consider it the most significant and ambitious conservation project worldwide. The park will be officially opened in 2003.³⁸ Part of the 50-kilometer-long Sango Border Post-Crooks Corner minefield runs through the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. Another section of the minefield lies in the sparsely populated areas of Chilethela, Magamgeni, and Malipati villages. The area has been accorded priority number two by Zimbabwe and should, depending on the availability of funding, be the next objective for mine action by the NDO after Victoria Falls.

The Malvernia (Sango) Border Post to Crooks Corner Minefield: The south-eastern part of Zimbabwe on the border with Mozambique and South Africa is inhabited by the Dumisa community, which is living in former "protected villages."³⁹ The land is a state-owned game reserve meant to generate income through tourism. An adjacent 50-kilometer minefield has not been cleared since independence. Villagers have removed the protective fences, iron poles, and minefield warning signs to construct animal pens and small vegetable gardens. This has left the local community and wildlife exposed to mine danger. Almost every family among the Dumisa has lost a domestic animal and most know or are related to a landmine victim.⁴⁰ Although the Dumisa

²⁹ "Zim De-mines Border," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, 13 December 2001; "Zimbabwe Army Completes Demining at Mozambique Border Post," *AFP*, Harare, Zimbabwe, 12 December 2001.

³⁰ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, NDO, Harare, 23 January 2002.

³¹ Lieutenant Colonel Mkhululi Ncube, "Demining Completed," *The Herald*, 13 December 2001, p. 14.

³² Charles Mtetwa, "Joint Venture to see Beira Corridor development," *Business Herald*, 15 October 2001, p. 6.

³³ Lieutenant Colonel Mkhululi Ncube, "Demining Completed," *The Herald*, 13 December 2001, p. 14.

³⁴ "Zimbabwe Army Completes Demining at Mozambique Border Post," *AFP*, Harare, Zimbabwe, 12 December 2001, quoting Lt. Col. Mkhululi Ncube.

³⁵ Interview, with Colonel J. Munongwa, NDO, Harare, 23 January 2002.

³⁶ Presentation on National Demining Operations by Major Vengesai, 17 January 2002.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ "Trans-frontier Park to officially open in 2003," *The Herald*, 6 October 2001, p. 6.

³⁹ Protected villages were restriction camps set up by the Rhodesian government to prevent the interaction of freedom fighters and the villagers during the war. The Dumisa were driven from their original areas into the protected villages in 1976.

⁴⁰ Interview with Dr. Gunguwo, Medical Superintendent, Chikomedzi District Hospital, 12 April 2001.

community was promised that the landmines would be cleared, lack of financial resources has made this impossible. Resettlement programs have not been carried out either.

Research and Development

In Zimbabwe, the private company, Security Devices, has been contracted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to design and test new mine action equipment.⁴¹ In addition, investigations into the possible breeding and training of indigenous dogs for mine detection are due to be carried out under a SADC/EU initiative.⁴²

Security Devices of Zimbabwe has been making equipment for humanitarian demining for a number of years and is now designing and manufacturing new types of protective aprons and visors. Preliminary tests on the effectiveness of their visors and aprons were carried out at the NDO in April 2001. In June 2001, secondary tests were carried out in Chimoi, Mozambique. Continued research on the effectiveness of the visor is being carried out in Pretoria, South Africa because of a lack of capacity in Zimbabwe.⁴³

Mine Risk Education

The National Demining Office has a Mine Risk Education Section to carry out mine risk education (MRE) campaigns throughout the country. Activities are conducted in coordination with the Zimbabwe Republic Police and local authorities.⁴⁴ Areas targeted for MRE are mostly those that are adjacent to mined areas, and information is also collected on UXO and mines in the area during this process. Some minefields are well marked, but in other areas, minefield markings have either deteriorated or been stolen by villagers. Villagers must then rely on local knowledge.⁴⁵

The MRE Section has launched MRE campaigns at national and provincial shows, health delivery centers, and business centers since 1998, with a variety of materials. Schools have also been targeted, including 16 primary and five secondary schools in the Victoria Falls Minefield; 14 primary schools, four secondary schools and nine villages in the Mukumbura area; and in the Rushinga area, 13 primary schools and five secondary schools have been reached.⁴⁶ As a result of people resettling into new areas, the army has had to intensify its mine risk education campaigns.⁴⁷

According to officials from the U.S. Embassy who attended an MRE campaign activity in Mukumbura in November 2001, "The landmine awareness team carries out its work professionally and has managed to transcend the hesitancy normally characterizing the civilian-military barrier."⁴⁸ The team works with the civilian population through the local headmen, chiefs, heads of schools and other community leaders, which has greatly facilitated dissemination of MRE information to the targeted populations. In urban areas, campaigns have been conducted at agricultural shows in all provinces and at the International Trade Fair, which is held annually in Bulawayo.

According to U.S. officials, mine risk education in Zimbabwe compares well with that carried out in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the world.⁴⁹ However, the success and effectiveness of MRE is difficult to evaluate because of the different literacy levels and comprehension of the communities and the fact that no follow-up tests are carried out.⁵⁰

⁴¹ Interview with Major Nhidza (Retd), Director, Southern African Demining Operations, Harare, 5 February 2002.

⁴² Interviews with Colonel J. Munongwa, NDO, 23 January 2002.

⁴³ Interview with Major Nhidza (Retd), Southern African Demining Operations, Harare, 5 February 2002.

⁴⁴ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, NDO, Harare, 23 January 2002.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 14 July 2002.

⁴⁶ National Demining Office, "Report on the Area Covered by the Mine Awareness Section, 1998 – 2001."

⁴⁷ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, NDO, Harare, 14 July 2002.

⁴⁸ Interview with Chief Warrant Officer T. Castle, Operations Coordinator, and Captain T. Cook, Foreign Area Officer, U.S. Embassy, Harare, 5 February 2002.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Interview with Michael Laban, former deminer with MineTech, 1 February 2002.

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, five new landmine casualties were reported, of which two were killed and three injured, including three men and one woman. The sex of one of the persons killed is unknown.⁵¹ In 2000, there were four reported landmine casualties.⁵² The most recent reported casualty occurred on 25 March 2002 when one male was injured in a landmine incident.⁵³

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

The Zimbabwe government covers the initial cost of treating landmine victims; however, it was evident from field research that there is little follow-up assistance available to survivors.⁵⁴ A lack of government funds does not allow for a comprehensive survivor assistance program in Zimbabwe and there is no single organization providing for landmine survivors. Assistance for persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, is channeled through the Social Dimension Fund of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.⁵⁵ Disabled persons receive Z\$250 (about US\$5) per month for children and Z\$500 (about US\$10) per month for adults.⁵⁶ A proposal by SADC/EU to set up a database of Zimbabwe landmine casualties and survivors by age, sex and location is pending. The database will help to place disabled people in self-help projects such as piggeries, poultry farms, and market gardening. Collective community projects will also be encouraged.⁵⁷

The 1992 "Disabled Persons Act" makes provision for the welfare and rehabilitation of disabled persons and established the National Disability Board.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Fax communication from Engineers Directorate, Army Headquarters, 8 July 2002.

⁵² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 181-182.

⁵³ Fax communication from Engineers Directorate, Army Headquarters, 8 July 2002.

⁵⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 182.

⁵⁵ Interview with Mr Mukuta, Director, National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH), Harare, 1 February 2002.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Interview with Colonel J. Munongwa, National Demining Office, Harare, 23 January 2002.

⁵⁸ "Disabled Persons Act" 1992; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 182.