



# Landmine Monitor 2015



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**Monitoring and Research  
Committee, ICBL-CMC  
Governance Board**

DanChurchAid  
Handicap International  
Human Rights Watch  
Mines Action Canada  
Research team leaders  
ICBL-CMC staff experts

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ISBN: 978-2-8399-1707-0

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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). For more information visit [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org) or email [monitor2@icblcmc.org](mailto:monitor2@icblcmc.org).

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all our research reports online. This report is available online at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

## International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

**The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:**

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.



# Preface

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## Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

**P**ease agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers' fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another

route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don't bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

▲  
*Mine risk education for children at Daw Hsaw Phya School in Myanmar.*

## International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children's rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL's membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations within a decade, a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign

also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong campaigns. In the few years prior to the merger, the ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor had increasingly been sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the world of landmines and cluster munitions. The merger has strengthened the work toward these goals while still ensuring that the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their distinct areas of work. The ICBL-CMC is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

## Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the *de facto* monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements the transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of more than 30 researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL's campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

## About this report

This is the 17th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. *Landmine Monitor 2015* provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at [www.the-monitor.org/cp](http://www.the-monitor.org/cp).

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the world, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2014, with information included up to November 2015 when possible.

## Acknowledgements

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org). The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL and CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of four NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee's members include: DanChurchAid (Richard MacCormac), Handicap International (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). Megan Burke (ICBL-CMC director) is an *ex-officio* member. From January to November 2015, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for *Landmine Monitor 2015*. The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay (ban policy lead), Stephen Goose, Andrew Haag, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham with assistance from Robert Pattilo and Marion Loddó;
- Contamination and clearance: Jennifer Reeves and Marion Loddó; and
- Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Erin Hunt, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Marie-Josée Hamel, Michael Moore, and Marianne Schulze.

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), which conducted the majority of mine action research performed in 2015 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented here.

Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in November 2015 with assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant).

Report formatting was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Imprimerie Minute printed the report in Switzerland. Rafael Jiménez provided the cover design. This report was also published digitally at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors\*.

- Government of Australia
- Government of Denmark
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Norway
- Government of Sweden
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See
- UNICEF
- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

\* List accurate as of November 2015.



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## 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

### Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of November 2015

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of November 2015

States not Party: Not yet acceded as of November 2015

### The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Argentina
Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Bolivia
Brazil	Canada
Chile	Colombia
Costa Rica	Dominica
Dominican Rep.	Ecuador
El Salvador	Grenada
Guatemala	Guyana
Haiti	Honduras
Jamaica	Mexico
Nicaragua	Panama
Paraguay	Peru
St. Kitts & Nevis	St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Saint Lucia	
Suriname	Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay	Venezuela
Cuba	United States

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Australia
Bangladesh	Bhutan
Brunei	Cambodia
Cook Islands	Fiji
Indonesia	Japan
Kiribati	Malaysia
Maldives	Nauru
New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea
Philippines	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Thailand
Timor-Leste	Tuvalu
Vanuatu	Marshall Islands
China	India
Korea, North	Korea, South
Lao PDR	Micronesia
Mongolia	Myanmar
Nepal	Pakistan
Singapore	Sri Lanka
Tonga	Vietnam

### Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Albania	Andorra	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia
Finland	France	Germany
Greece	Holy See	Hungary
Iceland	Ireland	Italy
Latvia	Liechtenstein	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Macedonia, FYR	Malta
Moldova	Monaco	Montenegro
Netherlands	Norway	Poland
Portugal	Romania	San Marino
Serbia	Slovakia	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
Tajikistan	Turkey	Turkmenistan
Ukraine	United Kingdom	Armenia
Azerbaijan	Georgia	Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Uzbekistan

### Middle East and North Africa

Algeria	Iraq	Jordan
Kuwait	Oman	Qatar
Tunisia	Yemen	Bahrain
Egypt	Iran	Israel
Lebanon	Libya	Morocco
Palestine	Saudi Arabia	Syria
United Arab Emirates		

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Benin	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Central African Rep.	Chad
Comoros	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire	Djibouti	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Kenya	Lesotho
Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
Mali	Mauritania	Mauritius
Mozambique	Namibia	Niger
Nigeria	Rwanda	São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone
Somalia	South Africa	South Sudan
Sudan	Swaziland	Tanzania
Togo	Uganda	Zambia
Zimbabwe		



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# Major Findings

**L**andmine Monitor 2015 details continued progress toward the goal of a mine-free world, but also finds challenges with non-state armed groups using landmines in more countries and a one-year rise in global casualties. While the Monitor reports an increase in clearing mine-affected areas in 2014, many states remain behind on their clearance plans and global funding for mine action declined for a second year in a row.

## Treaty Status

There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—that has yet to ratify.

## Use

From October 2014 through October 2015, the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria—all states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty—used antipersonnel landmines.

- North Korea denied emplacing new landmines along a South Korean patrol route in the demilitarized zone between the two countries, but a UN Command Military Armistice Commission investigation concluded otherwise in an August 2015 report.
- Recent Syrian government use was first documented in 2011, whereas use by the government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has been documented annually by the Monitor since 1999. However, available information indicates that new mine use in Myanmar has been at a significantly lower level over the past several years.

Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices acting as antipersonnel mines in 10 countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen, a significant increase.

- The last time the Monitor reported 10 or more countries in which non-state armed groups

used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices was 2006.

There was no confirmed new use of antipersonnel landmines by a State Party during the reporting period. The Treaty's new Committee on Cooperative Compliance met with representatives of States Parties Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of past use of antipersonnel mines, in some cases dating back to 2008.

## Casualties

In 2014, recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices that act as antipersonnel mines, cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) rose compared to 2013, but was the second lowest annual total since the Monitor started recording casualties in 1999.

- In 2014, a global total of 3,678 casualties were recorded, a 12% increase compared with the total of 3,308 in 2013.
- The incidence rate of 10 casualties per day for 2014 is about 40% of that reported in 1999, when there were approximately 25 casualties each day.
- In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded, especially in conflict settings; therefore, the true casualty figure is anticipated to be much higher. Nevertheless, the decrease in casualties recorded since the entry of the Mine Ban Treaty is even more significant because of improvements in recording over time.

Casualties were identified in 54 states and four other areas in 2014, of which 37 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (80%) where their status was known, which is nearly identical to 2013.
- In 2014, children accounted for 39% of all civilian casualties where the age was known.

▲ *This Valmara bounding fragmentation landmine will be destroyed in-situ in Iraq.*

- Women and girls made up 12% of all casualties where the sex was known, the same as in 2012 and 2013.
- Seventy percent of recorded global casualties occurred in States Parties.
- Afghanistan experienced the greatest single rise in casualties, with 1,296 recorded in 2014 compared to 1,050 in 2013. The bulk of the increase was due to victim-activated improvised explosive devices, with 809 recorded in 2014 compared to 567 in 2013.
- In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices acting as antipersonnel mines caused the majority of all casualties (49% combined).
- The proportion of casualties caused by victim-activated improvised explosive devices increased significantly (to 31%, up from 22% in 2013), with the casualties in Afghanistan accounting for the majority of the increase.

## Contamination and Land Release

Fifty-seven states and four other areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination as of October 2015, including 33 States Parties and 24 states not party. A further five States Parties have either suspected or residual mine contamination. At least 200km<sup>2</sup> of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2014, an increase from an estimated 185km<sup>2</sup> in 2013—destroying more than 230,000 antipersonnel and 11,500 antivehicle mines

- As in 2013, the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2014 was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for 75% of recorded clearance.
- Over the past five years, approximately 976km<sup>2</sup> of mined areas have been cleared and nearly 1.48 million antipersonnel mines and more than 82,000 antivehicle mines have been destroyed.

In 2014, Burundi completed clearance of its suspected mined areas and Mozambique declared itself free of landmines in September 2015.

- As of November 2015, 29 states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999.
- Oman declared for the first time that it has areas suspected of being contaminated with antipersonnel mines in its initial Article 7 transparency report, and therefore has been added to the list of contaminated States Parties. New antipersonnel contamination arising in Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of contaminated States Parties.
- Of the 33 States Parties that have confirmed outstanding mine clearance obligations, 27 have been granted at least one extension period, but only three States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 clearance deadlines.
- In 2014, four States Parties submitted extension requests, all of which were approved at the Third

Review Conference: Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In 2015, four States Parties submitted extension requests: Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal. These are awaiting approval at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to be held 30 November to 4 December 2015.

- Massive antipersonnel mine contamination, defined by the Monitor as more than 100km<sup>2</sup>, is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, and Turkey, as well as Western Sahara. Increased use of land release methodologies—technical and non-technical surveys—have improved the understanding of the remaining mine contamination in many countries.

## Support for Mine Action

Donors and affected states together contributed approximately US\$610 million in international and national support for mine action in 2014, a decrease of \$30 million (5%) from 2013 and the second year in a row of declining support.

International assistance in 2014 was \$417 million, a decrease of \$23 million from 2013.

- A total of 42 states and three other areas received support from 33 donors.
- Contributions from the top five mine action donors—the United States, the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted for 72% of all donor funding.
- This is the ninth consecutive year that international contributions for mine action have totaled more than \$400 million.
- Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan dropped considerably, from \$68 million in 2013 to \$49 million in 2014, although it was still 30% higher than funding received by the second largest recipient (Lao PDR: \$37 million).
- The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45% of all international contributions.
- International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining 16% was not disaggregated by the donors.

Thirteen affected states provided \$194 million in national support for their own mine action programs, \$7 million less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected countries reported contributing \$201 million.

In addition to those contributions, appropriations from the UN General Assembly for mine action within peacekeeping operations provided \$166 million in 2014, an increase of 10% compared with 2013.

## Victim Assistance

Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims made considerable progress in victim assistance under the Cartagena Action Plan (2009–2014) and continued to do so under the Maputo Action Plan Action (2014–2019), but still face many challenges. Findings detailed below relate to the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.

- Through survey, understanding of the needs of mine victims continued to improve in more than half of the States Parties.
- Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms or relevant national plans in place to advance efforts to assist mine victims and uphold their rights. However, expired action plans for assistance in Afghanistan and Sudan had not yet been updated, while several States Parties plans remained inactive or in draft: Algeria, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen.
- In most of the States Parties, assistance efforts have been integrated into other disability rights and development efforts, through collaborative coordination, combined planning, and survivor participation. However, victim assistance coordination efforts stalled in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
- In nearly all of the States Parties, survivors were joining in coordination processes that affect their lives, although in many countries their participation must be better supported, especially in decision-making roles.
- More than half of the States Parties had included some information on victim assistance activities and progress in their formal reports covering calendar year 2014.

- At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States.

Down from a total of more than 50 producing states before the Mine Ban Treaty's existence, currently only 11 states are identified as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

- Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

Non-state armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated improvised explosive devices.

## Stockpile Destruction

Collectively, the States Parties have destroyed more than 49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014.

- Finland completed destruction of its stockpile of one million mines during the reporting period.
- More than nine million antipersonnel mines await destruction by six States Parties.
- Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.

## Transfer and Production

For the past decade, the global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, but the appearance of mines in Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen indicates that some form of market for, and trade in, antipersonnel mines exists.





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# Ban Policy

## Banning Antipersonnel Mines

In these uncertain times, universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian and disarmament provisions matters more than ever. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in 10 countries have used landmines in the past year (October 2014–October 2015), usually victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) rather than manufactured mines. The new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen and the continuing large-scale use of victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq are particularly disturbing.

Yet new use of antipersonnel mines by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria in the past year.

States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and the same can be said of the vast majority of the 35 countries that remain outside it, as they also appear to abide by the Treaty’s key provisions despite not acceding.

Several States Parties continue to face serious compliance concerns, particularly with respect to missed stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine clearance deadline extensions.<sup>1</sup> However, governments and international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continue to work together to support those facing challenges. The Mine Ban Treaty’s newly formed Committee on Cooperative Compliance has been diligently following-up on past allegations of landmine use by States Parties.

This shows the enduring and popular support for the Mine Ban Treaty, which was adopted on 18 September 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999. There are now a total of 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; most recently Oman acceded in August 2014.

<sup>1</sup> For details on extension requests, please see the Mine Action chapter of this publication.

## Use of antipersonnel landmines

In this reporting period—October 2014 through October 2015—the Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria and by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.

This is a significant increase of use by NSAGs from recent years, especially in States Parties.<sup>2</sup>

## Locations of antipersonnel mine and victim-activated IED use, October 2014–October 2015

Use by government forces	Use by non-state armed groups	
Korea, North	<b>Afghanistan</b>	Pakistan
Myanmar	<b>Colombia</b>	Syria
Syria	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>
	Libya	<b>Ukraine</b>
	Myanmar	<b>Yemen</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are in bold.

## Use in States Parties

### Yemen

Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah, emplaced antipersonnel landmines in the Yemeni port of Aden before withdrawing from the city in July 2015. Yemen had declared the completion of mine clearance in Aden in 2009.<sup>3</sup>

According to the information from Yemeni mine action officials, the emergency clearance of landmines

<sup>2</sup> NSAGs used mines in at least seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Management System Officer, Operations Department, Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 20 May 2010.

▲ Visitors examine global landmine use and other maps as part of a photo gallery and treasure hunt to raise awareness of the global landmine issue in Taiwan.

and explosive remnants of war (ERW) began on 11 July 2015 in several residential districts of Aden previously controlled by Houthi forces, including Khormaksar, Jaulaa, and Green City in the Dar Saad neighborhood, as well as Bir Ahmad and Amran in al-Buraika, also near Aden. By 12 August 2015, the teams had removed 91 antipersonnel mines of two types from Aden as well as 316 IEDs, 666 antivehicle mines, and various ERW.<sup>4</sup>

The two types of antipersonnel mines cleared from Aden were the PPM-2 (manufactured in the former East Germany) and a GYATA-64 (previously manufactured in Hungary).<sup>5</sup> In its transparency reports since 2000, Yemen has never reported either of these mine types as stockpiled or retained. It was first reported that these antipersonnel mines had been seen in Yemen in April 2013.<sup>6</sup> Also present in Aden were TM-62 and TM-57 antivehicle mines manufactured in the former Soviet Union.

The NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which provides emergency medical care in Aden, reported more than 35 people injured, mostly children, between early August and mid-September.<sup>7</sup>

### Ukraine

In June 2015, Ukrainian representatives estimated that 8% of eastern Ukraine is either affected or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines and IEDs as well as ERW from the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed rebels that erupted in early 2014—initially in Crimea in the south, then in Ukraine's eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.<sup>8</sup> There is not believed to have been any significant landmine use since the February 2015 ceasefire.

Multiple broadcast media reports by Russian television outlets clearly show that antipersonnel mines

and multipurpose munitions equipped with victim-activated fuzes were used by Russian-backed rebels. In June 2015, the Russian television network Russia 1 aired a report showing members of the rebel “Spartak Battalion” emplacing MON-50 mines with MUV fuzes and tripwires near Marinka in Donetsk province.<sup>9</sup> On 17 November 2014, a Ukrainian media report highlighted that Ukrainian security forces seized equipment purportedly in possession of a rebel sabotage group operating in government-controlled territory in the Kharkov region.<sup>10</sup> Their equipment included MON-50 and OZM-72 mines along with mechanical pull MUV fuzes, tripwire assemblies, and electrical initiation devices.

This equipment includes factory-produced antipersonnel mines never stockpiled or previously destroyed by the Ukrainian government. A video produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014, shows combatants associated with the rebel Zarya Battalion emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine.<sup>11</sup> This type of mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993.<sup>12</sup>

Victim-activated booby-traps have also been used, however, it is unclear who is responsible. The “Raising Red Flags” report by Armament Research Services presents on page 61 a photograph, provided by *Vice News* reporter Harriet Salem, of an RGD-5 hand grenade taped to a tree and fitted with an UZRGM-type fuze affixed to a trip wire.<sup>13</sup> Victim-activated booby-traps and victim-activated IEDs are banned by the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

Additionally, both sides have used several types of hand-emplaced antivehicle mines and Ukrainian government forces have used remotely-delivered PTM-1G antivehicle mines. Ukraine admitted in June 2015 that its forces emplaced antivehicle mines but noted that the locations are fixed with reference to at least two indestructible landmarks, fenced off, and marked with special signs, and that records of mined areas are distributed in no less than three copies.<sup>14</sup>

In June 2014 and June 2015, the government of Ukraine declared in statements to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that it had not used antipersonnel

<sup>4</sup> Human Rights Watch (HRW) Press Release, “Yemen: Houthis Used Landmines in Aden,” 5 September 2015, [www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden](http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden). Unless otherwise noted all information in this section is from this release.

<sup>5</sup> PPM-2 and GYATA-64 mines have been used elsewhere in Yemen in recent years. *Foreign Policy* reported that in late 2011, Republican Guard forces laid approximately 8,000 landmines, including GYATA-64 and PPM-2 mines, at Bani Jarmooz. Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring,” *Foreign Policy*, 25 May 2013, [foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/](http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/). Human Rights Watch also recorded the use of PPM-2 mines in Sanaa, one of which maimed a 10-year-old boy on 4 March 2012. ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Yemen: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 December 2013, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2013/yemen/mine-ban-policy.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2013/yemen/mine-ban-policy.aspx).

<sup>6</sup> During a visit to Bani Jarmooz in April 2013, an international journalist said “residents produced bags of mines recovered from the ground using rudimentary methods. They included four different types of anti-personnel mines, including large numbers of Hungarian manufactured GYATA-64 type mines, known to be among the most powerful anti-personnel devices ever manufactured. Locals also produced plastic East German PPM2 mines and two variations of Soviet wooden PMD-5 [sic] landmines—all were manufactured before the end of the Cold War.” Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring,” *Foreign Policy*, 25 May 2013, [foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/](http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/).

<sup>7</sup> Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Houthis Used Landmines in Aden,” 5 September 2015, [www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden](http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden).

<sup>8</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e\\_COOPERATIVE\\_COMPLIANCE\\_COMMITTEE\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> “Репортаж с линии соприкосновения в ДНР : Боестолкновения с украинцами и установка растяжек,” YouTube, 14 June 2015, [youtu.be/HoKmJq9cww0](https://youtu.be/HoKmJq9cww0).

<sup>10</sup> “Особо опасная группа из 12 диверсантов, причастная ко взрыву в харьковском пабе, задержана, - СБУ. ФОТОрепортаж,” *Censor*, 17 November 2014, [censor.net.ua/photo\\_news/312355/osobo\\_opasnaya\\_gruppa\\_iz\\_12\\_diversantov\\_prichastnaya\\_ko\\_vzryvu\\_v\\_harkovskom\\_pabe\\_zaderjana\\_sbu\\_fotoreportaj](http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/312355/osobo_opasnaya_gruppa_iz_12_diversantov_prichastnaya_ko_vzryvu_v_harkovskom_pabe_zaderjana_sbu_fotoreportaj).

<sup>11</sup> “Жизнь батальона Заря Часть 7 Минирование Life of Zarya battalion,” YouTube, 31 July 2014, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqSgLNajuo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqSgLNajuo).

<sup>12</sup> “Противопехотная мина ПМН-4,” Saper, n.d., undated, [www.saper.etel.ru/mines-2/pmn-4.html](http://www.saper.etel.ru/mines-2/pmn-4.html).

<sup>13</sup> Armament Research Services, “Raising Red Flags: An Examination of Arms and Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine, 2014,” November 2014, p. 61.

<sup>14</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e\\_COOPERATIVE\\_COMPLIANCE\\_COMMITTEE\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf).



## Landmines reported in Ukraine since 2014

Category	Designation	Origin	Type	Initiation
Antipersonnel	MON-50	Russia/USSR	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command
	MON-90	Russia/USSR	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command
	MON-100	Russia/USSR	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command
	OZM-72	Russia/USSR	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command
	PMN-4	Russia	Blast	Pressure
	POM-2/POM-2R	Russia/USSR	Fragmentation	Tripwire/self-destruct
Antivehicle	TM-62M	Russia/USSR	Blast	Pressure
	PTM-1G	Russia/USSR	Blast	Pressure/self-destruct
Antilandmine	PDM-1M	Russia/USSR	Blast	Tilt rod

Note: Use of a tripwire to initiate any explosive device is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.<sup>15</sup> Information provided in December 2014 by Ukrainian government officials states, “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.<sup>16</sup>

Representatives of Ukraine stated in June 2015 that retained or stockpiled antipersonnel mines under their control are not available for issue to troops and remain strictly controlled by the high command.<sup>17</sup> They did admit however, that some mines were stored in the Crimea and are no longer under Ukrainian government control.

The ICBL has expressed concern at reports of use and seizures of landmines in Ukraine.<sup>18</sup> It urges parties to the conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor and to destroy any antipersonnel mines they have seized or otherwise acquired.

### Afghanistan

Afghanistan has experienced extensive use of victim-activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which oppose the government. In September 2015, Afghan officials said that the Taliban had recently laid landmines and booby-traps around Kunduz after seizing the city.<sup>19</sup> The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported

that anti-government forces were using victim-activated IEDs in increasing numbers during early 2015. It documented new use of victim-activated IEDs in Kunduz in April, May, and June 2015, resulting in new civilian casualties. UNAMA has stated that victim-activated IEDs are the most common form of IED currently being used in Afghanistan. Victim-activated (pressure plate) IEDs were responsible for almost half of the casualties from explosive weapons recorded during the first half of 2015.<sup>20</sup>

### Colombia

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) continues to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis near their campsites or bases, on main transit routes, and around caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.<sup>21</sup>

### Iraq

Islamic State and possibly other forces fighting the government of Iraq have used IEDs and explosive booby-traps extensively since 2014.<sup>22</sup> The extent to which the IEDs are command-detonated or victim-activated is not clear.

In June 2015, Iraq blamed “terrorist armed groups and Daesh” (Islamic State) for “a dramatic increase in the number of mines, UXOs [unexploded ordinance] and IEDs” in the country.<sup>23</sup> In May 2015, *Reuters* reported that Islamic State fighters laid landmines in Ramadi, the

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.; and submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

<sup>17</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e\\_COOPERATIVE\\_COMPLIANCE\\_COMMITTEE\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> “Troubling Reports of Landmines Seizures and Use in Eastern Ukraine,” ICBL, 8 July 2014, [www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2014/troubling-reports-of-landmine-seizures-and-use-in-eastern-ukraine.aspx](http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2014/troubling-reports-of-landmine-seizures-and-use-in-eastern-ukraine.aspx).

<sup>19</sup> “Afghan forces struggle to retake Kunduz city from Taliban,” *The Express Tribune (AFP)*, 30 September 2015, [tribune.com.pk/story/964837/afghan-forces-struggle-to-retake-kunduz-city-from-taliban/](http://tribune.com.pk/story/964837/afghan-forces-struggle-to-retake-kunduz-city-from-taliban/).

<sup>20</sup> UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2015 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, August 2015, pp. 8, 11, 30, 45, [bit.ly/LM15Banf20](http://bit.ly/LM15Banf20). For additional information, see the Casualties and Victim Assistance chapter of this publication.

<sup>21</sup> June 2014–June 2015 media tracking of landmine use in Colombia by Camilo Serna, Operational Coordinator and Monitor Researcher, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), emailed to the Monitor on 11 July 2015. Media database of new use, unknown use, and seizures with 200 entries from the following Colombian media sources: *El Tiempo*, *Ejército Nacional*, *RCN Radio*, *El País*, *La Opinión*, *La Voz del Cinaruco*, *El Líder*, *El Espectador*, *UARIV*, *HSB Noticias*, *PAICMA*, *Diario del Huila*, *El Colombiano*, *Crónica del Quindío*, *La Nación*, *El Nuevo Día*, and *Vanguardia*.

<sup>22</sup> See for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” *IRIN*, 6 November 2014, [www.irinnews.org/report/100797/isis-s-latest-threat-laying-landmines](http://www.irinnews.org/report/100797/isis-s-latest-threat-laying-landmines); and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,” *Buzzfeed*, 19 March 2015, <http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-hidden-enemy-in-iraq#.wu97dG1X>.

<sup>23</sup> Statement of Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, 25 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2c\\_ARTICLE\\_5\\_COMMITTEE\\_-\\_Iraq.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2c_ARTICLE_5_COMMITTEE_-_Iraq.pdf).

capital of Iraq's western desert province of Anbar.<sup>24</sup> The NGO Conflict Armament Research stated in April 2015 that Islamic State forces are producing and deploying IEDs on an industrial scale.<sup>25</sup>

### Tunisia

New casualties, due to victim-activated explosives among the Tunisian military engaged in operations against militants in Jebel Al-Cha'anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate near the Algerian border, continued to occur. In December 2014, one government soldier was killed and one injured by a landmine explosion on Mount Samama in Kasserine governorate.<sup>26</sup> In August 2015, two soldiers were killed by landmines during an army operation on Mount Mghila in the Kasserine region.<sup>27</sup> Due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely many of these devices were recently emplaced.

## Use in states not party

### North Korea

On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were injured by newly laid antipersonnel mines. One soldier had both legs amputated while the other lost his foot. The South Korean military accused North Korea of laying the mines, which were identified as PMD-6 wooden box mines made in North Korea.<sup>28</sup>

North Korea issued a denial of use, stating it only used mines in self-defense.<sup>29</sup> At a press conference in New York on 21 August, the North Korean ambassador asserted that the South Korean military had identified the mine as an M-14 on 4 August and then changed it to a North Korean box mine on 10 August for political purposes.<sup>30</sup>

An investigation by the United States (US)-led UN Command's Military Armistice Commission examined the area after the incident and issued a report that concluded that "the North Korean People's Army violated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement by

emplacing wooden box land mines along a known Republic of Korea patrol route." According to the report, the investigation determined that "the devices were recently emplaced" and not "legacy landmines which had drifted from their original placements due to rain or shifting soil."<sup>31</sup>

### Syria

In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government mine use in the country's border areas.<sup>32</sup> A Syrian official acknowledged the government had "undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines."<sup>33</sup>

The Islamic State, rebel groups, and the regime in Syria continue to use IEDs and landmines, which has led to many civilian and non-civilian deaths. These are frequently reported as "roadside bombs," but also include victim-activated devices. According to the Violations Documentation Center for Syria, there were 24 non-civilian deaths and 67 civilian deaths from landmines between October 2014 and October 2015.<sup>34</sup> The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also reported 67 civilian deaths from this time period from landmines, but noted that there were 53 non-civilian deaths, and nine unspecified individual deaths.<sup>35</sup>

Human Rights Watch reported that at least 70 mine explosions occurred in the Tel Shair corridor along the Syrian-Turkish border near Kobani between 15 September and 15 November 2014, killing at least three civilians, including two children, and injuring nine others. Photographs taken by humanitarian workers show what appear to be US-made M2 bounding antipersonnel mines that were allegedly found in the minefields north of Kobani, which lie in Turkish territory and fall under Turkey's obligations as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.<sup>36</sup>

Photographs and a video posted online by the Syrian Center for Demining Rehabilitation on 28 September 2015, allegedly filmed west of Daraa in southern Syria, show up to 20 PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being

<sup>24</sup> "Iraqi forces say thwart Islamist attack near Ramadi," *Reuters*, 20 May 2015, [www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0O5oLP20150520](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0O5oLP20150520).

<sup>25</sup> Forum on the Arms Trade and Stimson Center, "Tracking arms in conflict: Lessons from Syria and Iraq," 7 April 2015, [www.forumarmstrade.org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7\\_findings\\_final.pdf](http://www.forumarmstrade.org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7_findings_final.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> "One Tunisian soldier killed in landmine explosion near Algerian borders," *Shanghai Daily*, 2 December 2014, [www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article\\_xinhua.aspx?id=255987](http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=255987).

<sup>27</sup> "Two soldiers killed by landmine in west Tunisia," *The Guardian*, 18 August 2015, [www.nguardiannews.com/2015/08/two-soldiers-killed-by-landmine-in-west-tunisia/](http://www.nguardiannews.com/2015/08/two-soldiers-killed-by-landmine-in-west-tunisia/).

<sup>28</sup> This particular type of mine has been found frequently in South Korea and on its coastal islands. In 2010, a South Korean man was killed by the same type of mine in the neighboring county in Gyeonggi Province. See *Landmine Monitor 2011*.

<sup>29</sup> "North Korea Rejects Landmine Blasts Blame," *Sky News*, 14 August 2015, [news.sky.com/story/1535725/north-korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame](http://news.sky.com/story/1535725/north-korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame).

<sup>30</sup> "North Korea Ambassador's August 21, 2015 Opening Statement at UN Press Conference," Scribd.com, [www.scribd.com/doc/275521285/North-Korea-Ambassador-s-August-21-2015-Opening-Statement-at-UN-Press-Conference](http://www.scribd.com/doc/275521285/North-Korea-Ambassador-s-August-21-2015-Opening-Statement-at-UN-Press-Conference).

<sup>31</sup> US Forces Korea Press Release, "United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission Investigates land mine detonation in demilitarized zone," 13 August 2015, [www.usfk.mil/Media/PressReleases/tabid/12661/Article/613531/united-nations-command-military-armistice-commission-investigates-land-mine-det.aspx](http://www.usfk.mil/Media/PressReleases/tabid/12661/Article/613531/united-nations-command-military-armistice-commission-investigates-land-mine-det.aspx).

<sup>32</sup> ICBL Press Release, "ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines," 2 November 2011, [www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.aspx](http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.aspx).

<sup>33</sup> "Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border," *Haaretz*, (*The Associated Press*), 1 November 2011, [www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200](http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200).

<sup>34</sup> Violations Documentation Center in Syria, "Martyrs," undated, [www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs](http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs).

<sup>35</sup> Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, "Reports," undated, [www.syriahr.com/en/category/coverages-of-observatory/reports/](http://www.syriahr.com/en/category/coverages-of-observatory/reports/).

<sup>36</sup> Human Rights Watch Press Release, "Syria/Turkey: Landmines Kill Civilians Fleeing Kobani," 2 December 2014, [www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/02/syria/turkey-landmines-kill-civilians-fleeing-kobani](http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/02/syria/turkey-landmines-kill-civilians-fleeing-kobani).

removed from the ground.<sup>37</sup> This was the first evidence of use of the PMN-4 in the Syria conflict, but it is unclear who laid them or when. Markings on the mines indicate they were manufactured in Russia in 1995.

A video posted to YouTube on 12 October 2015 by “the First Brigade,” which specializes in demining, shows bounding antipersonnel mines as well as antivehicle mines reportedly cleared in Daraa.<sup>38</sup>

A video released by PYD in February 2015 following the cessation of fighting in Kobani shows victim-activated IEDs in buildings, allegedly in Kobani.<sup>39</sup>

### Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period, information available to the Monitor indicates a continuation of the trend of a significantly lower level of new mine use.

In March 2015, the inhabitants of Pyin Soe village in the eastern Paletwa township of Chin State, near the border with Bangladesh, fled after they were warned by soldiers from Light Infantry Brigade 289 not to go beyond a stream near their village because the government soldiers had laid mines on the other bank.<sup>40</sup> In September 2015, Myanmar Army soldiers asked villagers to take them to a frontline location in Momauk township at which point the soldiers laid mines and warned them not to return to the area.<sup>41</sup>

Antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs has apparently decreased significantly since 2012 when many armed groups began to engage in negotiations on a nationwide ceasefire, which some, but not all, signed in October 2015.<sup>42</sup> In March 2015, villagers from Pyin Soe village reported that they saw the Arakan Army (AA) lay mines near the edges of their village during conflict between the AA and the Myanmar Army.<sup>43</sup> In May 2015, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) sent a letter to several villages in Mogaung township notifying them that new mines were being laid there. In December 2014, the government published allegations of landmine use by the KIA, and

stated that 10 people had died and 37 were injured due to KIA-laid mines between October 2013 and November 2014.<sup>44</sup>

### Libya

Reports emerged in September 2014 alleging new use of antipersonnel mines at Tripoli International Airport, which saw fighting in July–August between the Zintan alliance of militia groups and forces of the Libya Dawn Alliance.<sup>45</sup> Antipersonnel mines were likely laid in 2014 and not earlier, but the party responsible for the use could not be determined.<sup>46</sup> On 29 October, Human Rights Watch spoke by telephone with the commander of the Misrata Revolutionaries engineering unit within the Libya Dawn Alliance that had been responsible for clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance in Tripoli since August. The commander said that on 24 August 2014, the day of the airport takeover, his unit had discovered a mined area of the airport.<sup>47</sup> He said a pickup truck mounted with anti-aircraft weapons entered the “old airport area” and detonated a mine, killing one fighter from the Misrata Umm al-Maarek brigade and wounding several others.

### Pakistan

The government reported in March 2015 that antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the country and attributed responsibility for the use to “terrorists.”<sup>48</sup> Media reports have registered a large number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents.

<sup>37</sup> “Locals speak of KIA’s acts,” *Global New Light of Myanmar*, 8 December 2014, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Video footage reportedly filmed in September at Tripoli International Airport by *Alnabaa*—a private Libyan satellite TV network—and by *Al Jazeera* shows the clearance of at least 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines and at least one PRB M3 antivehicle mine. Reports by both TV networks alleged that the mines were laid by the Zintani-led forces. “MOHAMMEDNAJEM MINES IN TRIPOLI AIRPORT,” YouTube, 31 August 2014, [youtu.be/iuDv4vwwHk?t=1m3s](https://youtu.be/iuDv4vwwHk?t=1m3s); and “عزنب اندبت اي بيلى ريف تناوق,” YouTube, 31 August 2014, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1yZ1rW\\_vrl&feature=youtu.be&t=1m32s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1yZ1rW_vrl&feature=youtu.be&t=1m32s).

<sup>39</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli,” 5 November 2014, [www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-new-landmine-use-tripoli](http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-new-landmine-use-tripoli). The Zintan alliance of militia groups, a coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan, controlled Tripoli Airport from the end of the 2011 until 24 August 2014, when Libya Dawn Alliance of militias from the coastal city of Misrata seized control, after five weeks of intense fighting. At the time of fighting, a Zintani force known as the Airport Security Katiba was controlling Tripoli Airport and its vicinity.

<sup>40</sup> The commander informed Human Rights Watch that his unit has found and cleared approximately 600 landmines since 24 August, mostly T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines, from the Tripoli International airport compound.

<sup>41</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/EAD-1587D68214C2AC1257E1A004707D7/\\$file/2015\\_Pakistan\\_NAR\\_API.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/EAD-1587D68214C2AC1257E1A004707D7/$file/2015_Pakistan_NAR_API.pdf).

<sup>37</sup> “تندب يقوشلما ي حل ا يف ماظنلا تناوق استعزز يتلا ماغلآلا طلازا 28 و 2015 و 28 اعد فخيرب,” YouTube, 28 September 2015, [youtu.be/gXJly3Etok](https://youtu.be/gXJly3Etok). See also, Armament Research Services, “Russian PMN-4 anti-personnel landmines in Syria,” 1 October 2015, [armamentresearch.com/russian-pmn-4-anti-personnel-landmines-in-syria/](http://armamentresearch.com/russian-pmn-4-anti-personnel-landmines-in-syria/).

<sup>38</sup> “لماعتلا و ماغلآلا عزنب مصتخم هبتيك لؤا || قنسلما دوسأ ققرف || زيهمم,” YouTube, 12 October 2015, [youtu.be/mncW58ni8N4](https://youtu.be/mncW58ni8N4).

<sup>39</sup> “شعاعاد يباها تناوخفهمو ماغلآلا نيب ينابوك يلاا قايح,” YouTube, 14 February 2015, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgzXaRfRkKw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgzXaRfRkKw).

<sup>40</sup> Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, [www.chro.ca/images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict\\_Paletwa\\_eng.pdf](http://www.chro.ca/images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf).

<sup>41</sup> Monitor interview with humanitarian organizations working with conflict-displaced communities in Kachin state, Yangon, 9 and 13 October 2015. Informants requested anonymity.

<sup>42</sup> For more details, see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Myanmar: Mine Ban Policy,” 27 October 2015, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/myanmar\\_burma/mine-ban-policy.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/myanmar_burma/mine-ban-policy.aspx).

<sup>43</sup> Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, [www.chro.ca/images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict\\_Paletwa\\_eng.pdf](http://www.chro.ca/images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf).

### Other reports

Additionally, reports of “landmine” use by Boko Haram militants in the Sambisa Forest of Nigeria have been published in the media since May 2014. For example, two soldiers were killed and two others were injured when troops of 5th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Brigade encountered “landmines” buried by Boko Haram while advancing towards Dikwa, Borno State, according to a Nigerian Army spokesperson.<sup>49</sup> He also said the militants converted chemistry laboratories at the Dikwa School of Agriculture into bomb-making factories when they seized the town.<sup>50</sup> The Nigerian Army has released a series of photos showing its engineers removing IEDs planted along the Gwoza-Yamteke highway.<sup>51</sup> The limited amount of photographs published of the devices used by Boko Haram indicate that they are IEDs, not factory produced landmines.

Military authorities stated to an Egyptian newspaper that they had begun to lay landmines around military outposts in the Sinai in May 2015.<sup>52</sup> By October 2015, Egypt did not respond to a letter sent by the ICBL in June requesting clarification on the report.

In the reporting period, there were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.

## Global stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. In the past, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines. However, in 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million<sup>53</sup> and the US confirmed that its stockpile is three million.<sup>54</sup> Previously, China was estimated to have stockpiled 110 million antipersonnel mines, and the US 10.4 million. Therefore, the global total held by states not party may now be less than 50 million. (*See Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty, further below, for details on stockpiles remaining to be destroyed by States Parties.*)

<sup>49</sup> “Boko Haram Landmines Kill 2 Soldiers As Army Liberate Borno Town,” *gjoinformant.net*, 21 August 2015, [www.gjoinformant.net/2015/08/21/boko-haram-landmines-kill-2-soldiers-as-army-liberate-borno-town/](http://www.gjoinformant.net/2015/08/21/boko-haram-landmines-kill-2-soldiers-as-army-liberate-borno-town/).

<sup>50</sup> “Nigerian Army Disables Boko Haram Explosives,” *Voice of America*, 5 August 2015, [www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-army-disables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html](http://www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-army-disables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html).

<sup>51</sup> “Bombs, IEDS & Land Mines: Nigeria Army Clear Gwoza -Yamteke Road in Borno (Photos),” *Tori.ng*, 5 August 2015, [www.tori.ng/news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.html](http://www.tori.ng/news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.html).

<sup>52</sup> “New security plans to ‘entrap’ Sinai militants by landmines,” *The Cairo Post*, 20 May 2015, [thecairopost.youm7.com/news/151695/news/new-security-plans-to-entrap-sinai-militants-by-landmines](http://thecairopost.youm7.com/news/151695/news/new-security-plans-to-entrap-sinai-militants-by-landmines).

<sup>53</sup> There is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines.

<sup>54</sup> For China: ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Col. Wu Gang, Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. For the US: US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” 27 June 2014, [www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455](http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455).

## Largest stocks of antipersonnel mines

Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	estimated 6 million
India	estimated 4–5 million
China	“less than” 5 million
US	3 million
<b>Total</b>	<b>45 million</b>

## States not party that may stockpile antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Korea, North	Russia
Azerbaijan	Korea, South	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Kyrgyzstan	Singapore
China	Lao PDR	Sri Lanka
Cuba	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	UAE
Georgia	Mongolia	US
India	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Iran	Myanmar	Vietnam
Israel	Nepal	
Kazakhstan	Pakistan	

It is not clear if all 31 states currently stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles, used solely for training purposes. Three states not party, all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine possesses stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

## Non-state armed groups

During this reporting period, the Polisario Front in Western Sahara reported the destruction of 3,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, as required by its signature of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for adherence to a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.<sup>55</sup>

Fewer NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production and due to the destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty.

<sup>55</sup> Geneva Call, “Western Sahara: the Polisario Front destroys stockpiles of anti-personnel mines,” 31 March 2015, [www.genevacall.org/polisario-front-destroys-stockpiles-anti-personnel-mines/](http://www.genevacall.org/polisario-front-destroys-stockpiles-anti-personnel-mines/). Also email from Geneva Call in response to request for information from Carolin Nehme, Thematic Legal Advisor, Geneva Call, 18 June 2015.

Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks from former regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria) or removed them from minefields, but most appear to make their own improvised mines from locally available materials. In states not party, NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

## Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.<sup>56</sup> A total of 40 of which have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and most recently, the US.<sup>57</sup> A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. Between June 2014 and June 2015, Pakistan's armed forces state that they recovered 253 tons of explosives and thousands of weapons during operations against insurgents in the country.<sup>58</sup> In 2015, the Colombian Army continued to locate and destroy landmine assembly facilities belonging to FARC.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.

<sup>57</sup> Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.

<sup>58</sup> Khan, H. "2,763 terrorists killed, 347 army jawans embraced martyrdom," *The International News*, 14 June 2015, [www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-38028-2763-terrorists-killed-347-army-jawans-embraced-martyrdom](http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-38028-2763-terrorists-killed-347-army-jawans-embraced-martyrdom).

<sup>59</sup> For example, in June 2015 an Army unit located and destroyed a cache of 40 FARC mines in Planadas (Tolima). June 2014–June 2015 media tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, CCCM, emailed to the Monitor on 11 July 2015.

## Trade in antipersonnel mines

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has reported for the past decade that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen in recent years raises the specter that some form of market for antipersonnel mines exists.<sup>60</sup>

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they now have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.<sup>61</sup>

## Universalizing the ban on antipersonnel mines

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 30 acceded.<sup>62</sup>

The last to accede was Oman on 20 August 2014. No country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since *Landmine Monitor 2014* was published.

The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Pacific state of the Marshall Islands, which is the only signatory yet to ratify.

The US government announced policy measures in June and September 2014 to ban future production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerate stockpile destruction, and ban their use, except on

<sup>60</sup> In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel mines suggests that a new supply channel is in place as Yemen did not declare the type as part of its stockpile or as part of existing mine contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden. In Sudan, the appearance in the past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.

<sup>61</sup> Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

<sup>62</sup> The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of "succession." These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

the Korean Peninsula.<sup>63</sup> The White House said the new landmine policy means the US is “signaling our clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention.”<sup>64</sup>

### Annual UN General Assembly resolution

An annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization. A dozen of the countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.<sup>65</sup>

On 2 December 2014, UNGA Resolution 69/34 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 164 states in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.<sup>66</sup> The number of affirmative votes and abstentions was slightly lower than in 2013.<sup>67</sup>

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).<sup>68</sup>

### Non-state armed groups

Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. At least 64 NSAGs have committed to halt the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.<sup>69</sup> The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, and frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

### Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3

<sup>63</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White House, 23 September 2014, [www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy).

<sup>64</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 6/27/2014,” The White House, 27 June 2014, [www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-joint-base-andrews-62](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-joint-base-andrews-62).

<sup>65</sup> This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.

<sup>66</sup> The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

<sup>67</sup> The resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor in 2013 and 2010, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001.

<sup>68</sup> Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

<sup>69</sup> As of October 2014, 44 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, [www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/](http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/). Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The weaknesses of the original protocol and inadequate measures to improve it through Amended Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2015, a total of 102 states were party to Amended Protocol II. One state ratified the protocol since the publication of *Landmine Monitor 2014*; Grenada on 10 December 2014.

Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 11 states that are party to the original protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol, including Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Togo, and Uganda.

A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also landmine producers.

### States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to the CCW

Armenia	Libya
Azerbaijan	Myanmar
Bahrain	Nepal
Egypt	Saudi Arabia
Iran	Singapore
Kazakhstan	Syria
Korea, North	UAE
Kyrgyzstan	Vietnam
Lebanon	

*Note: Italics indicate states that also reserve the right to produce antipersonnel mines*

## Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.

## Compliance

At the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties to the convention created a new Committee on Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern about compliance with the convention's prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any follow-up that might be appropriate for States Parties.<sup>70</sup>

The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty's Committee on Cooperative Compliance delivered a three-page report to the June 2015 intersessional meetings detailing its work and preliminary observations concerning allegations or reports of landmine use in States Parties.<sup>71</sup> According to the report, between September 2014 and May 2015 the Committee met several times to consider past instances of alleged use of antipersonnel mines and assess the credibility of these allegations and the value of follow-up on them. In that period it met with the representatives of concerned States Parties Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.

The Committee did not recommend specific actions be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to further follow-up on these and other allegations of use. Following the presentation of the report, Ukraine and Turkey addressed the allegations and Austria, Norway, Switzerland, UNMAS, the ICRC, and the ICBL welcomed the Committee's work and the report's observations. Austria condemned any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor and called on all States Parties concerned to clarify outstanding allegations of use at the earliest possible opportunity, take any necessary steps for full compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, and immediately take all measures necessary to protect the civilian population from any more harm.<sup>72</sup>

### Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties

In this reporting period, commencing in October 2014, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine Monitor 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. That

is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred in 2011.

Additionally, a number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Turkey (from 2009), and Cambodia/Thailand (2008 and 2009) warrant resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

### Stockpile destruction

A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, of which 90 have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.<sup>73</sup>

**Finland** completed the destruction of its stockpile of one million mines on 18 August 2015 and was the only state to conclude destruction in the reporting period.<sup>74</sup>

Six States Parties stockpile antipersonnel landmines, including three that failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline:

- **Oman** declared a stockpile of 17,260 antipersonnel mines of Belgian, British, and German manufacture in its initial Article 7 transparency report provided in August 2015.<sup>75</sup> It has committed to destroy the stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
- **Poland** signed a contract in March 2015 to destroy its remaining stockpile of 16,597 landmines in coordination with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency by June 2016.<sup>76</sup> Poland's stockpile destruction deadline is 1 June 2017.
- **Somalia** acknowledged that "large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals," and that it is "putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile."<sup>77</sup> Somalia has not reported the destruction of any stockpiled mines since the convention came into force for it. Somalia's stockpile destruction deadline is 1 October 2016.
- **Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine** remain in violation of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>70</sup> The committee will also, "When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences." "Decisions on the Convention's Machinery and Meetings," Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>71</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Activity Report and Preliminary Observations," June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Cooperative-compliance-activity-report.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Cooperative-compliance-activity-report.pdf).

<sup>72</sup> Statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 26 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e\\_COOPERATIVE\\_COMPLIANCE\\_COMMITTEE\\_-\\_Austria.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_-_Austria.pdf).

<sup>73</sup> Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005 deadline had passed.

<sup>74</sup> Juho Korpela, "The last anti-personnel mines destroyed," Finnish Defense Force, 18 August 2015, [bit.ly/LM15Banf74](http://bit.ly/LM15Banf74).

<sup>75</sup> Oman listed a stockpile of 1,556 No. 7 (UK); 12,560 PRB M409 (Belgium); and 3,144 DM31 (German) antipersonnel mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, August 2015 (in Arabic, translation by the Monitor), [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/957868F552AB98BAC1257E9E0054ABAC/\\$file/Oman+Initial+2015.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/957868F552AB98BAC1257E9E0054ABAC/$file/Oman+Initial+2015.pdf).

<sup>76</sup> Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2f\\_STOCKPILE\\_DESTRUCTION\\_-\\_Poland.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2f_STOCKPILE_DESTRUCTION_-_Poland.pdf).

<sup>77</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/0421E458A87D2CA5C1257B-4A004C41CE/\\$file/Somalia+2012.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0421E458A87D2CA5C1257B-4A004C41CE/$file/Somalia+2012.pdf).

<sup>78</sup> Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014.

Five States Parties collectively possess more than nine million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (5,767,600), Belarus (2,861,636), Greece (452,695), Oman (17,260), and Poland (16,957).

The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.

- At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, **Belarus** reported that all of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines other than those considered to be in an “unsafe condition” will be destroyed by 1 November 2016.<sup>79</sup>
- In a statement released 31 December 2014, **Greece** stated that “it was reviewing all possible options in an effort to adhere to its initial intention to complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by the end of 2015.”<sup>80</sup>
- At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, **Ukraine** stated that PFM mines are ready to be destroyed at the incinerator located at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant but budgetary priority has been focused on national defense. Ukraine expressed its willingness for further negotiations for international funding for the destruction of its remaining stockpile.<sup>81</sup> It destroyed 576 PFM mines in 2014, which had become unstable in storage and dangerous.<sup>82</sup>

### Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 72 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 38 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey)

a deadline of 1 June 2010.

<sup>79</sup> Preliminary Observations of the President of the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Stockpile-Destruction-2f-corrected.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Stockpile-Destruction-2f-corrected.pdf).

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e\\_COOPERATIVE\\_COMPLIANCE\\_COMMITTEE\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf).

<sup>82</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2015, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/6EFB9D23D790FA91C1257E-62005235CE/\\$file/Ukraine+2014.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6EFB9D23D790FA91C1257E-62005235CE/$file/Ukraine+2014.pdf).

have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-five States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 33 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.<sup>83</sup> A total of 43% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual transparency report for calendar year 2014, which was due by 30 April 2015.

Due to this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2014 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for previous years.

In addition to those listed above, an additional 33 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 14,288 retained mines.<sup>84</sup>

Key updates from calendar year 2014 were:

- **Oman** submitted its initial Article 7 report, retaining 2,000 mines.
- **Australia** only retains mines without detonators, which are not defined as antipersonnel mines, meaning it no longer retains mines.
- The number of retained mines in Denmark, Ireland, and the **United Kingdom** (UK) increased.

The ICBL has expressed concern regarding the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Eight States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but only a few have explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2014 were Brazil (2,037 fewer), Greece (345), Cambodia (80), Czech Republic (37), Slovakia (35), Spain (31), Belarus (24), and Thailand (19).

Three States Parties increased the number of their retained mines in the reporting period. The United Kingdom retained an additional 353 mines, Ireland increased by 59, and Denmark increased by 12.

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or

<sup>83</sup> No Article 7 reports for four of the remaining five States Parties could be found: Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The fifth, Tuvalu, has yet to submit their initial Article 7 report.

<sup>84</sup> States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Jordan (850), Argentina (841), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom (724), Portugal (694), Italy (624), South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Nicaragua (448), Togo (436), Slovenia (361), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d'Ivoire (290), Lithuania (269), Uruguay (260), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), Fiji (93), Rwanda (65), Ireland (59), Senegal (50), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).



## States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

State	Last total declared (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2014	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Finland	16,500 (2014)	16,500	0	None ever	—
Turkey	14,902 (2014)	16,000	42	2014	—
Bangladesh	12,050 (2013)	15,000	450	2013	—
Sweden	6,183 (2014)	13,948	52	2014	—
Belarus	5,998 (2014)	7,530	24	2014	—
Algeria	5,970 (2014)	15,030	0	2009	—
Greece	5,797 (2014)	7,224	345	2014	—
Croatia	5,685 (2014)	17,500	29	2014	—
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	N/R	2010	—
Tunisia	4,670 (2014)	5,000	100	2014	—
France	3,956 (2014)	4,539	2	2014	—
Yemen	3,760 (2013)	4,000	0	2008	—
Bulgaria	3,669 (2014)	10,466	3	2014	6,446
Nigeria	3,364 (2011)	3,364	N/R	None ever	—
Brazil	3,214 (2014)	17,000	2,037	2014	—
Thailand	3,208 (2014)	15,604	19	2014	4,517
Serbia	3,149 (2014)	5,000	0	2011	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	N/R	None ever	—
Chile	2,824 (2014)	28,647	101	2014	23,694
Cambodia	2,747 (2014)	701	80	2014	—
Belgium	2,564 (2014)	5,980	0	2013	—
Indonesia	2,454 (2013)	4,978	0	2009	2,524
Romania	2,395 (2013)	4,000	0	2013	1,500
Czech Rep.	2,264 (2014)	4,859	37	2014	—
Peru	2,015 (2014)	9,526	0	2012	7,487
Sudan	1,938 (2015)	10,000	N/R	2008	—
Oman	2,000 (2015)	2,000	N/R	None ever	—
Canada	1,909 (2014)	1,781	0	2013	—
Denmark	1,832 (2014)	4,991	0	2013	2,900
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	N/R	2007	—
Uganda	1,764 (2011)	2,400	N/R	2003	—
Japan	1,663 (2014)	15,000	267	2014	—
Spain	1,660 (2013)	10,000	31	2014	6,000
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	N/R	2009	—
Netherlands	1,557 (2013)	4,076	0	2013	—
Slovakia	1,185 (2014)	7,000	35	2014	5,500
Germany	1,143 (2014)	3,006	737	2014	—
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	N/R	2007	—
Botswana	1,019 (2011)	1,019	N/R	Unclear	—
<b>Partial Total</b>	<b>149,312</b>	<b>325,770</b>	<b>4,391</b>		<b>69,571</b>

Note: N/R = not reported.

otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

- **Afghanistan** keeps no live landmines for its entire stock of 2,360 retained mines.
- **Australia** keeps no serviceable detonators for its

entire stock of 459 retained mines.

- **Canada** reported it has transferred 84 mines from Afghanistan without fuzes.
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina** maintains a stockpile of 983 fuzeeless mines.
- **Gambia** reported that all of its 100 retained mines were fuzeeless.

- **Serbia** reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless.
- **Lithuania** reported it has 269 mines with command-controlled fuzes, which are not covered under the treaty.
- **Eritrea, France, Germany, Mozambique, and Senegal** also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 25 States Parties have over time used expanded Form D of their annual transparency reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines.<sup>85</sup>

## Transparency reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

During the reporting period, October 2014 to October 2015, an initial report was submitted by Oman in August 2015. Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012) has never submitted an initial report. As of 27 October 2015, only 41% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2014.

Of the 94 States Parties<sup>86</sup> that have failed to meet their most recent annual reporting obligation, 74 have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2014 are five States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (Ethiopia, Niger, Palau, Somalia, and Yemen).

No state submitted a voluntary report in 2015. In previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia (2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

<sup>85</sup> Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Romania, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Zambia. Some States Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D.

<sup>86</sup> Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroun, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.



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# Mine Action

Progress continues to be made in removing the threat of antipersonnel mines. The amount of land reported to be cleared of landmines globally in 2014 increased to 201km<sup>2</sup>, compared to 185km<sup>2</sup> in 2013. Twenty-eight States Parties have completed clearance since 1999. However, progress is slow. As few as three of the 33 States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations are on track to meet their deadlines, even though in many cases this should be achievable. Improvements are needed in defining the size of the remaining antipersonnel mine contamination, reporting on survey and clearance results, and the timeliness and quality of extension requests.

## Status and Key Developments 2014–2015<sup>1</sup>

- Sixty-one states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination: 33 States Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas. A further five States Parties have either suspected or residual mine contamination.
- In its initial Article 7 transparency report, Oman declared for the first time that it has areas suspected of being contaminated with antipersonnel mines, and therefore has been added to the list of contaminated States Parties. New antipersonnel mine contamination arising in Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of contaminated States Parties.
- A total of 201km<sup>2</sup> was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2014, an increase from an estimated 185km<sup>2</sup> in 2013. The total number of antipersonnel mines reported to be destroyed was 232,000, a decrease from 275,000 in 2013. Last year, the ICBL

stated that it believed that more than 200km<sup>2</sup> of mined area could be cleared annually, and in 2014 this was achieved.<sup>2</sup>

- Twenty-eight States Parties have completed implementation of Article 5 since 1999.<sup>3</sup> Burundi announced in April 2014 that it had completed survey and clearance of its remaining suspected mined areas and reiterated this announcement in June 2014. In September 2015, Mozambique declared itself clear of antipersonnel mines.<sup>4</sup>
- Twenty-seven States Parties have requested and received extended deadlines for clearance. In 2014, four States Parties submitted extension requests, all of which were approved at the third review conference: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In 2015, four states submitted extension requests for consideration by the 14th Meeting of States Parties, 30 November to 4 December 2015: Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal.
- Only three States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 clearance deadline.

▲ Curious children look over an armored tractor with rotary mine comb safely parked in the Gulan refugee camp, Khost province, Afghanistan.

<sup>2</sup> *Landmine Monitor 2014*, Mine Action chapter, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> In addition, El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created. Jordan declared completion of clearance in April 2012 but has found hundreds of antipersonnel mines during subsequent verification and clearance operations; it therefore still has an obligation under Article 5.

<sup>4</sup> In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Oldemiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines. UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated, [www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique\\_Declared\\_Mine\\_free/](http://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/). An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that following its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Committee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015. Burundi had declared completion in November 2011 but subsequently discovered additional areas requiring clearance, and cleared those prior to its deadline. Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 26 June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/thursday13\\_HIGH\\_LEVEL\\_SEGMENT\\_-\\_Burundi.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/thursday13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf).

<sup>1</sup> The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), which conducted the majority of mine action research performed in 2015 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented here.

### Estimated extent of mine contamination

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia, and Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
<b>More than 100 km<sup>2</sup></b>				
<b>Angola</b> <b>Chad</b>		<b>Afghanistan</b> <b>Cambodia</b> <b>Thailand</b>	<b>Azerbaijan</b> <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</b> <b>Croatia</b> <b>Turkey</b>	<b>Iraq</b> <i>Western Sahara</i>
<b>20–99 km<sup>2</sup></b>				
<b>Eritrea</b> <b>South Sudan</b> <b>Zimbabwe</b>		South Korea Sri Lanka		<b>Algeria</b> Lebanon <b>Yemen</b>
<b>5–19 km<sup>2</sup></b>				
<b>Sudan</b> <i>Somaliland</i>	<b>Argentina*</b> <b>Chile</b>		<b>Armenia</b> <b>Tajikistan</b> <b>United Kingdom*</b>	
<b>Less than 5 km<sup>2</sup></b>				
<b>DR Congo</b> <b>Niger</b> <b>Senegal</b>	<b>Ecuador</b> <b>Peru</b>		<b>Serbia</b> <i>Kosovo</i>	<b>Jordan</b> Palestine
<b>No estimate provided</b>				
<b>Ethiopia</b> <b>Mauritania</b> <b>Somalia</b>	<b>Colombia</b> <i>Cuba</i>	China India Lao PDR Myanmar North Korea Pakistan Vietnam	<b>Cyprus**</b> <b>Georgia***</b> Kyrgyzstan Russia <b>Ukraine</b> Uzbekistan <i>Nagorno-Karabakh****</i>	Egypt Iran Israel Libya Morocco <b>Oman</b> Syria

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.

\*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

\*\*Cyprus states that no minefields remain under Cypriot control.

\*\*\*The known area in Georgia is small, but there may be mined areas in South Ossetia.

\*\*\*\*The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories.

## Mine Contamination in 2014

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines due to a lack of data. Estimates of the size of contaminated areas have tended to be exaggerated as a result of poor surveys. However, global understanding of the scale of the problem is gradually improving each year, particularly among States Parties, as they make increased use of land release methodologies to cancel suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) by non-technical survey, and reduce confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) through technical survey. No estimate of the size of contamination exists for seven States Parties, 18 states not party, and one other area, which are known to be contaminated (for further details of the estimated extent of antipersonnel mine contamination, please see the Mine Action country profiles at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org)).

Prior to 2014, Ukraine did not report any mine contamination under Article 5, as the scope of any residual mine problem it had was not known. In 2014, new contamination was reported in Ukraine and in a number of other states that were already contaminated (for details please see the Ban Policy chapter of this publication).

Five States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Djibouti,<sup>5</sup> Moldova,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

<sup>6</sup> Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC\\_june08/Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2june08-Moldova-en.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_june08/Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2june08-Moldova-en.pdf).

## Programs clearing the largest amount of mined area in 2014

State	Mined area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Notes
<b>Afghanistan</b>	62.87	12,517	Major discrepancies between the Article 7 report and data from the mine action center
<b>Cambodia</b>	54.38	20,479	Substantial inconsistencies in data, and discrepancies between the Article 7 report and data from the mine action center
<b>Croatia</b>	37.75	1,842	
<b>Algeria</b>	6.4	42,428	
<b>Iraq</b>	5.58	16,734	Major discrepancies between data provided by mine action centers and operators
Azerbaijan	4.76	42	
Sri Lanka	3.75	32,223	
<b>Mozambique</b>	3.07	45,681	
<b>South Sudan</b>	2.62	880	
<b>Angola</b>	2.6	2,676	
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>183.78</b>	<b>175,502</b>	
Other programs combined	17.19	56,307	
<b>Total global clearance</b>	<b>200.97</b>	<b>231,809</b>	

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Namibia,<sup>7</sup> Palau,<sup>8</sup> and the Philippines.<sup>9</sup> These States Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. In cases where they are unable to complete this work within their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

## Mine Clearance in 2014

Total global clearance of landmines in 2014 was estimated to be 201km<sup>2</sup>, with 232,000 antipersonnel mines and 11,500 antivehicle mines destroyed. This represents an increase from 185km<sup>2</sup> of total area cleared in 2013, although a decrease from the destruction of approximately 275,000 antipersonnel mines.

<sup>7</sup> Despite a statement by Namibia given at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

<sup>8</sup> Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge). In May 2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working in Palau to clear unexploded ordnance, including land and sea mines, but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowledge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”

<sup>9</sup> The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

Ten countries comprised three-quarters of all reported clearance efforts in 2014. However, in three of these countries, there were substantial inconsistencies between data sources in reported areas cleared. Many states do not report on clearance, therefore this total figure is intentionally conservative and understates the extent of clearance.

## Mine clearance in 2010–2014 (km<sup>2</sup>)

Year	Mined area cleared	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed
2014	201	231,708	11,500
2013	185	275,000	4,500
2012	200	240,000	9,300
2011	190	325,000	29,900
2010	200	388,000	27,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>976</b>	<b>1,479,708</b>	<b>82,200</b>

Five of the 10 most contaminated States Parties do not appear in the table above. Four of these states—BiH, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe—had low rates of clearance in 2014, ranging from 0.15km<sup>2</sup> to 1.85km<sup>2</sup>, while Chad did not report on the amount of land cleared.

No clearance figures were reported in 2014 for the following States Parties: Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Ukraine. Clearance was not reported in the following states not party: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,

South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Egypt and Morocco reported very high clearance figures, but provided no further details, therefore those figures have not been included in the total global clearance figure.

## Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.

### Completion of Article 5 implementation

Twenty-eight States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance since the treaty entered into force in 1999. Burundi, which had reported additional suspected mined areas after declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2011, announced that its subsequent survey and clearance efforts in 2014 had been completed.<sup>10</sup> Mozambique declared completion of its Article 5 obligations in September 2015.<sup>11</sup> However, because Mozambique had not requested an additional extension to its deadline of 1 January 2015, for eight months Mozambique was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Montenegro has still formally to report completion of its Article 5 obligations.

### State Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

Albania	Germany	Nigeria
Bhutan	Greece	Rwanda
Bulgaria	Guatemala	Suriname
Burundi	Guinea-Bissau	Swaziland
Congo	Honduras	Tunisia
Costa Rica	Hungary	Uganda
Denmark	Malawi	Venezuela
France	Montenegro	Zâmbia
FYR Macedonia	Mozambique	
Gambia	Nicaragua	

In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.

<sup>10</sup> Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 26 June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/thursday13\\_HIGH\\_LEVEL\\_SEGMENT\\_-\\_Burundi.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/thursday13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Oldemiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines. UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated, [www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique\\_Declared\\_Mine\\_free/](http://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/). An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that following its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Committee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015.

### Progress on meeting deadlines

As of November 2015, only three States Parties are on track to meet their clearance deadlines, while 20 are not on track, and the status of three is unclear. Four States Parties are awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2015. Two States Parties have missed their deadlines.

The assessments of the status of each States Party regarding the fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations are made through consideration of several factors including the deadline date, the remaining challenge and the extent to which it is known, clearance rates, mine action capacity and assets, funding prospects, and the existence of any conflict and insecurity problems.<sup>12</sup>

Four States Parties submitted extension requests that were approved at the Third Review Conference in June 2014:<sup>13</sup>

- **DR Congo** requested a six-year extension period to conduct non-technical and technical surveys and clearance in order to complete its obligations.<sup>14</sup> In granting DR Congo’s second extension request, States Parties called on DR Congo to present a detailed workplan by 30 April 2015. However, in June 2015 DR Congo informed States Parties that due to funding difficulties it was unable to submit a workplan until the next meeting of States Parties in December 2015.<sup>15</sup>
- **Eritrea**’s extension request sought a further five years to continue clearance and complete resurvey of SHAs, but not to fulfil its clearance obligations under the treaty. In granting the extension request, States Parties noted that five additional years beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a long period of time to meet this objective.”<sup>16</sup>
- **Yemen**’s second extension request acknowledged that it was largely “based on speculation,”<sup>17</sup> and operations in 2014 in fact fell well short of the extension request target of clearing 1.6km<sup>2</sup> a year, hampered by insecurity and by an acute shortage of funds.
- **Zimbabwe**’s three-year extension request was to enable further survey and clearance, but not to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period. Zimbabwe undertook “to

<sup>12</sup> The status assessments were made by NPA, and the Monitor concurs with these conclusions.

<sup>13</sup> APLC/CONF/2014/CRP.1, Final Draft Document, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 27 June 2014, pp. 6–10, [www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> Analysis of DR Congo’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Statement of DR Congo, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation Matters, Geneva, 25 June 2015.

<sup>16</sup> Decision on the Eritrea Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 15.

## States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of any deadline extensions

States Parties	Original deadline	Extension period	Deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years	1 March 2023	Not on track
Algeria	1 April 2012	5 years	1 April 2017	On track
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years	1 January 2018	Not on track
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years	1 March 2020	No change since extension requested
BiH	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chad	1 November 2009	14 months (1st extn.) 3 years (2nd extn.) 6 years (3rd extn.)	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chile	1 March 2012	8 years	1 March 2020	On track
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years	1 March 2021	Not on track
Croatia	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years Second extension request submitted in 2015	1 July 2016	Extension requested to 1 July 2019
DR Congo	1 November 2012	26 months (1st extn.) 6 years (2nd extn.)	1 January 2021	On track
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years	1 October 2017	Not on track
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)	1 February 2020	Not on track
Ethiopia	1 June 2015	5 year request submitted in 2015 after missing deadline		In violation of Mine Ban Treaty. Extension requested to 31 May 2020
Iraq	1 February 2018	N/A		Not on track
Jordan	1 May 2009	3 years	1 May 2012	Should submit extension request*
Mauritania	1 January 2011	5 years Second extension request for five years submitted in 2015	1 January 2016	Extension requested to 1 January 2021
Niger	1 September 2009	N/A**	31 December 2015	Not on track. Intends to submit a second extension request in 2015
Oman	1 February 2025			No assessment at this point
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years	1 March 2017	Not on track
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years Second extension request for five years submitted in 2015	1 March 2016	Extension requested to 1 March 2021
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years	1 March 2019	Unclear
Somalia	1 October 2022	N/A		Not on track
South Sudan	9 July 2021	N/A		Not on track
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years	1 April 2019	Not on track
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years	1 April 2020	Unclear
Thailand	1 May 2009	9.5 years	1 November 2018	Not on track
Turkey	1 March 2014	8 years	1 March 2022	Not on track
Ukraine	1 June 2016	N/A		Unclear
United Kingdom	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track

States Parties	Original deadline	Extension period	Deadline	Status
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)	1 March 2020	Not on track
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	22 months (1st extn.) 2 years (2nd extn.) 2 years (3rd extn.) 3 years (4th extn.)	1 January 2018	Not on track

\*Jordan formally declared completion of clearance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2012. However, given Jordan's recognition that it still has suspected hazardous areas, it has outstanding Article 5 obligations to fulfil, and should submit an extension request.

\*\*Niger's first extension request was granted in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state's Article 5 deadline. N/A = not applicable.

clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.”<sup>18</sup> In granting the request, States Parties stated that Zimbabwe had not complied with the principal commitment it made under previous extension requests “to garner an understanding of the true remaining extent of the challenge and to develop plans.” They noted the progress made toward building capacity and increasing efficiency by engaging support from international organizations.<sup>19</sup>

Four States Parties submitted extension requests in 2015 for approval at the 14th meeting of States Parties, to be held 30 November–4 December 2015:

- **Cyprus** submitted a second request on 27 March 2015, for a further three-year extension, until 1 July 2019. The reason cited for the second extension request was the same as the first request, namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas.<sup>20</sup>
- **Ethiopia** is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for missing its 1 June 2015 clearance deadline, a situation that could have been avoided by accelerating progress in previous years or by requesting an extended deadline in 2014, as per the process agreed at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties. Ethiopia submitted a request on 15 June 2015 for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas.<sup>21</sup> Ethiopia's extension request contains a number of inconsistencies and errors. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation therefore asked for clarification of several points, and a response was provided on 26 October 2015.
- **Mauritania** submitted an extension request in April 2015 because of suspected contamination on the border with the area of Western Sahara, in locations where border demarcation needs to be

clarified. In its request for a second extension, up to 1 January 2021, the Mauritanian government said it would enter into a dialogue with “all of the stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict so as to be in a position to clarify the status of the suspected areas.”<sup>22</sup>

- **Senegal's** latest Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in June 2015 included plans for survey and clearance in 2016–2020, but did not specify how developments in peace discussions were expected to impact clearance, how the armed forces would be involved in the clearance process, or how resources would be mobilized.<sup>23</sup>

**Niger** announced in June 2015 that it would submit a second extension request which, as of 8 November 2015, has yet to be submitted.

Funding shortages have been cited as an impediment to fulfilling Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations by or for approximately one-third of States Parties with outstanding obligations. Several of these states are also experiencing conflict or security problems that contribute to the lack of donor support. Conflict and security problems are reported to severely affect implementation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. In the following countries, insecurity is reported to hamper land release efforts in specific geographical areas: Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan, Thailand, and Turkey.

However, many of the States Parties that have requested extensions, or are not on track to meet their deadlines, are not facing such constraints. The Cartagena Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2009 stated that extensions should only be needed “due to exceptional circumstances.”<sup>24</sup> Despite this, by November 2015, of the 33 States Parties with outstanding clearance obligations, 28 have requested deadline extensions, eight of which have requested extensions at least twice. The ICBL has called on States Parties to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance obligations.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Decision on Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015.

<sup>21</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 28.

<sup>24</sup> “Cartagena Action Plan 200-2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” 11 December 2009, p. 4, [www.cartagena-summit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf](http://www.cartagena-summit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> See for example ICBL, Statement on Clearance, Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 June 2014, [icbl.org/media/1466485/](http://icbl.org/media/1466485/)



Many of those States Parties with extended deadlines in place are making only limited progress, as the table above indicates. Moreover, many have not provided clear plans on how they intend to meet their clearance obligations within their deadlines. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation observed that of the “States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5, few have reported that they have a plan to complete implementation of Article 5, some have plans that extend beyond their deadlines and many have not indicated that they have plans leading up to their deadlines.”<sup>26</sup>

### **Monitoring the progress of States Parties against their Article 5 obligations and the Maputo Action Plan**

The Maputo Action Plan was adopted at the Third Review Conference on 27 June 2014. Actions 8, 9, and 11 relate to clearance, and States Parties agreed to “commit to intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.”<sup>27</sup>

The Committee on Article 5 Implementation was established by the Third Review Conference, replacing the Standing Committee on Mine Action.<sup>28</sup> Its purpose is to “intensify efforts, particularly those outlined in the Maputo Action Plan, to ensure that Article 5 is fully implemented as soon as possible, while acknowledging local, national and regional circumstances in its practical implementation.” It also analyzes each request for an Article 5 extended deadline. It presented its preliminary observations on Article 5 implementation on 23 June 2015, reporting on 16 of the 18 States Parties that had submitted information by that date.<sup>29</sup>

With regard to Maputo Action Plan Action #8 (quantification and qualification of remaining contamination challenge), the Committee assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that only four of the 16 States Parties had provided a high degree of clarity: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Sudan, and Thailand.

In assessing Maputo Action Plan Action #9 (application of land release methodologies), the Committee called on States Parties to align their national mine action standards with the revised International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) if they have not already done so.

Maputo Action Plan Action #11 calls for on-time submission of high-quality requests. In 2015, two states submitted on-time requests (Cyprus and Mauritania),

while Ethiopia and Senegal missed the submission deadline by more than 15 months and 2.5 months respectively. One state announced its intention to submit a request that has still not been made public as of 8 November 2015 (Niger). The requests prepared by Ethiopia and Senegal lacked the consistency, accuracy, and comprehensiveness that would characterize high-quality requests.

As of 1 November 2015, Article 7 transparency reports for 2014 were still outstanding for eight states with contamination: Angola, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen. Maputo Action Plan Action #25 calls for the annual submission of high-quality and updated information.

icbl-3rc-statement-on-clearance.pdf.

<sup>26</sup> Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, p. 4, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary\\_observations-Art5.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> Draft Final Document, 27 June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>29</sup> Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary\\_observations-Art5.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.pdf).



# FIRST AID



## Casualties and Victim Assistance

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### Casualties

Landmines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants,<sup>1</sup> and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant indiscriminate threat.


For 2014, the Monitor recorded 3,678 mine/ERW casualties marking a 12% increase from 2013. The percentage of civilian casualties, as compared to military and security forces,<sup>2</sup> was 80% in 2014 (where the civil status was known), almost identical to 2013.<sup>3</sup>

Despite ongoing casualties and the significant increase compared to 2013, 2014 still had the second lowest annual total of mine/ERW casualties recorded since 1999. There has been an overall trend of progressively fewer casualties since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force 1999.


There were an average of 10 casualties per day in 2014, whereas in 1999 there was more than one mine/ERW casualty occurring each hour on average.<sup>4</sup> Yet the total global number of casualties continues to grow each year. Over 96,000 mine/ERW casualties have been recorded by the Monitor since its global tracking began in 1999.

▲ Albania's victim assistance focal point Veri Dogjani (right), a qualified medical doctor, discusses emergency response with NPA medical team in the field.

Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2014)



Cumulative total of mine/ERW casualties recorded 1999–2014<sup>5</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2015*, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx).

<sup>2</sup> Security forces include police and representatives of non-state armed groups.

<sup>3</sup> The percentage of civilian casualties was 79% in 2013, 81% in 2012, and 70% in 2011. Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known. From 1999–2003, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% per year.

<sup>4</sup> In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties. Given significant improvements in data collection since 1999, with a higher proportion of casualties now being recorded, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant.

<sup>5</sup> Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collectively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are also disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW where possible. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given, incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remotely-detonated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-activated), and people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing devices. For more details on casualty figures or sources of casualty data by country or area, see country profiles on the Monitor website, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx).


## Casualties in 2014

Of the total of 3,678 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2014, at least 1,243 people were killed and another 2,386 people were injured; for 49 casualties it was not known if the person survived.<sup>6</sup> The Monitor recorded 3,308 casualties in 2013. In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher.

The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely used annual dataset of casualties caused by mines/ERW.<sup>7</sup> Casualties were identified in a total of 58 states and other areas in 2014.<sup>8</sup> Of the total casualties in 2014, 70% (2,593) occurred among States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>9</sup>

In 2014, there were far more victim-activated IED casualties in Afghanistan (809, compared to 567 in 2013), as well as a smaller increase in casualties caused by ERW (430, compared to 399 in 2013). In Mali, there was a jump in the number of mine casualties, thought to be due to antivehicle mines (92 in 2014, compared with 31 in 2013). In addition, victim-activated IED casualties were recorded in Mali for the first time (16).<sup>10</sup> In both Chad and Cambodia, the numbers of casualties from landmines, antivehicle mines, and ERW all increased

### Greatest annual change in total mine/ERW casualties 2013–2014



<sup>6</sup> This is among the lowest number of unknowns since Monitor recording began in 1999.

<sup>7</sup> For the year 2014, the Monitor collected casualty data from 25 different national or UN mine action centers. The Monitor also collected data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim assistance service providers, as well as from a range of national and international media sources. Mine action centers registered 835 of the 3,678 casualties identified in 2014. The Monitor identified 591 mine/ERW casualties in 2014 through the media that had not been collected via official data-collection mechanisms. The majority of these casualties occurred in countries without any data-collection mechanism.

<sup>8</sup> The Monitor first recorded 72 states in which mine/ERW casualties were identified in 1999.

<sup>9</sup> Casualties were identified in the following 37 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2014: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>10</sup> The remainder of the increase for Mali was casualties caused by ERW: 33 in 2014, up from 21 in 2013. The number of casualties from unknown devices declined: 3 in 2014, down from 16 in 2013.

compared to 2013.<sup>11</sup> One factor influencing the increased number of casualties reported in Myanmar appeared to have been more extensive data collection, with a larger number of organizations engaged and reporting on the landmine issue.

### States with 100 or more recorded casualties in 2014

States	No. of casualties
Afghanistan	1,296
Colombia	286
Myanmar	251
Pakistan	233
Syria	174
Cambodia	154
Mali	144

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold

However, it must be stressed that, as in previous years, the 3,678 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2014 only include *recorded* casualties. Due to incomplete data collection at the national level, the true casualty total is certainly higher. Based on the updated Monitor research methodology in place since 2009, it is estimated that there are up to approximately 1,000 additional casualties (25–30%) each year that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. The level of underreporting has declined over time as many countries have initiated and improved casualty data-collection mechanisms and the sharing of this data. In 2014, however, the number of casualties missed in national annual reporting is expected to be higher than average with more than 1,000 casualties (1,200–1,500), including many casualties from recently emplaced IEDs and booby traps in Iraq and Syria, yet to be accurately recorded. Some media reports quoted sources that said there had been hundreds of such casualties.<sup>12</sup>

Yet the 2014 estimate is a significant drop from the estimated total in 1999, when the monitor identified some 9,000 casualties, with another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties estimated as unrecorded.

Some significant country-level decreases in casualty totals in 2014 were likely due in part to conflict and insecurity reducing the possibility of data collection. In Yemen, reported casualties decreased from 55 in 2013 to 24 in 2014, significantly reduced from a peak of 263 in 2012. In Syria, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty that had seen a significant increase in mine/ERW casualties in 2013, casualty recording was reported

<sup>11</sup> For Chad the following casualties were reported: 46 via unspecified mine types in 2014, and 20 in 2013; 20 antipersonnel mine in 2014, and none (differentiated) in 2013; and 13 ERW in 2014, and none (differentiated) in 2013. Cambodia reported the following casualties: 37 via antipersonnel mine in 2014, and 25 in 2013; 35 antivehicle mine in 2014, and 24 in 2013; 81 ERW in 2014, and 60 in 2013. The remaining casualties in Cambodia were from unexploded submunitions, one in 2014, and three in 2013.

<sup>12</sup> However, it was often not clearly reported whether devices were victim-activated.

to have been seriously hindered by the deteriorating security situation in 2014. Syria had 174 recorded casualties in 2014, compared to 201 in 2013. Just 19 casualties were recorded for Ukraine in 2014, although other reporting implied that there were hundreds of mine/ERW casualties through 2014 and into 2015, but the reports lacked sufficient detail to be included in the Monitor data set.

Fluctuations in annual casualties recorded in Angola (11 in 2014, 71 in 2013, and 34 in 2012) and in Iraq (64 in 2014, 124 in 2013, and 84 in 2012) are attributable to a lack of a reliable collection mechanism for casualty data in those countries. This causes variability in casualty totals and makes trends difficult to discern, as noted in the previous Landmine Monitor report. In addition, while data collection within Iran is thought to be quite complete, it has not been made available to the Monitor consistently. Consequently, the casualty data was often compiled from various sources, as was the case for 2014.


### Casualty demographics<sup>13</sup>

There were 1,038 child casualties in 2014, continuing minor annual decreases from 1,112 in 2013 and 1,272 in 2012. Child casualties in 2014 accounted for 39% of all civilian casualties for whom the age was known.<sup>14</sup> Since the Monitor began recording casualties in 1999, there has been an average of 31% child casualties among all casualties from mines/ERW.<sup>15</sup>

As in previous years, in 2014 the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (81%).<sup>16</sup> There were 561 child casualties in Afghanistan in 2014, representing nearly half (46%) of all civilian casualties in that country where the age was known. It also constitutes over half (54%) of all child casualties recorded globally in 2014.

For more information on child casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor fact sheet on Landmines/ERW and Children.

### Mine/ERW casualties by age in 2014<sup>17</sup>



<sup>13</sup> The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

<sup>14</sup> Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of the incident.

<sup>15</sup> The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999, and more than 1,600 in 2001.


<sup>16</sup> The sex of 33 child casualties was not recorded.

<sup>17</sup> This includes only the civilian casualties for which the age was known.

Mine/ERW incidents impact not only the direct casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who were killed, as well as the survivors<sup>18</sup>—but also members of their families struggling under new physical, psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of those people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties.

In 2014, the percentage of female casualties among all casualties for which the sex was known was 12% (378 of 3,234). This was the same percentage as in 2012 and in 2013.<sup>19</sup>

### Mine/ERW casualties by sex in 2014<sup>20</sup>



Between 1999 and 2014, the Monitor identified more than 1,600 deminers who were killed or injured while undertaking clearance operations to ensure the safety of civilian populations.<sup>21</sup> In 2014, there were 53 casualties identified among deminers (five deminers were killed and 48 injured) in 10 states,<sup>22</sup> a significant decrease in the number of demining casualties in the preceding two years: 85 in 2013, and 132 in 2012. It was also about half of the average of 105 casualties among deminers per year since 1999.

In 2014, the highest numbers of casualties among deminers were in Iran (17), Afghanistan (16), and Lebanon (six). Together, these three countries represented almost 75% of all deminer casualties globally in 2014. The 17 deminer casualties in Iran continued the trend of declining casualties among deminers since 2012; 687 deminer casualties have been identified in Iran since 2006.<sup>23</sup> Demining casualties in Afghanistan have been

<sup>18</sup> A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

<sup>19</sup> For 444 casualties the sex was not known.

<sup>20</sup> This includes only the casualties for which the sex was known.


<sup>21</sup> There were 1,623 casualties among deminers from 1999 through 2014. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identified has fluctuated widely, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in operating procedures, in international demining standards, or demining equipment.

<sup>22</sup> Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Lebanon, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Thailand, Zimbabwe, and Somaliland.

<sup>23</sup> No data on deminer casualties in Iran prior to 2006 was available to the Monitor for inclusion in this report. Even based on partial data, Iran exceeded all countries in the total number of demining casualties since 1999. Afghanistan, with the second highest number of deminer casualties, has recorded 491 since 1999.

moderately consistent, with 18 casualties identified in 2013 and 16 in 2012.

### Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military status in 2014<sup>24</sup>




Civilian casualties represented 80% of casualties where the civilian/military status was known (2,833 of 3,528).

The country with the most annual military casualties continued to be Colombia, with 187 in 2014. Mali, with 84 military casualties (including peacekeeping forces), was the next highest. The third highest number in 2014 was in Pakistan, with 75 military casualties, followed by Algeria (54) and Syria (52).

### Victim-activated weapons and other explosive items causing casualties

#### Casualties by type of explosive device in 2014<sup>25</sup>



In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs acting as antipersonnel mines caused the majority of all casualties (49% combined).<sup>26</sup> The percentage of total casualties from factory-made antipersonnel mines decreased (18% in 2014, down from

27% in 2013).<sup>27</sup> The percentage of casualties from victim-activated IEDs that act as antipersonnel mines increased significantly (up to 31%, from 22% in 2013). Afghanistan saw a large increase in the number of annual victim-activated IED casualties: 809 in 2014, from 567 in 2013, but less than the peak of 987 in 2012. This accounted for most of the increase in victim-activated IED casualties in 2014 globally.

In 2014, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in nine states.<sup>28</sup> Starting in 2008, the Monitor began identifying more casualties from these improvised antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their use and also to improved data collection that made it possible to better discern between factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs, and between command-detonated IEDs and victim-activated IEDs.

In 2014, antivehicle mines killed and injured 218 people in 17 states and other areas, or 6% of casualties for which the device was known.<sup>29</sup> The states with the greatest numbers of casualties from antivehicle mines were Pakistan (64) and Cambodia (35). In 2013, antivehicle mines similarly caused 212 casualties, or 7% of casualties for which the device was known.

In 2014, 31% of casualties were caused by ERW in 41 states and areas, similar to the 34% recorded in 2013 and 31% of casualties in 2012.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> In 2014, there were casualties from factory-made antipersonnel mines in 26 states and areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, India, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Zimbabwe and three other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

<sup>28</sup> Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Thailand, and Tunisia.

<sup>29</sup> In 2014, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and two other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

<sup>30</sup> In 2014, casualties from ERW were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, and two other areas: Kosovo and Somaliland. In addition to other types of ERW, casualties of unexploded submunitions were identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2014, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx).

## States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2014

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia, and Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Angola</b> <b>Chad</b> <b>Congo, DR</b> <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b> <b>Guinea-Bissau</b> <b>Kenya</b> <b>Mali</b> <b>Mozambique</b> <b>Namibia</b> <b>Niger</b> <b>Senegal</b> <b>Somalia</b> <b>South Sudan</b> <b>Sudan</b> <b>Tunisia</b> <b>Uganda</b> <b>Zambia</b> <b>Zimbabwe</b> <i>Somaliland</i>	<b>Colombia</b> <b>Peru</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b> <b>Cambodia</b> India Lao PDR Myanmar Nepal Pakistan <b>Philippines</b> Sri Lanka <b>Thailand</b> Vietnam	<b>Albania</b> Armenia Azerbaijan <b>Belarus</b> <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> <b>Croatia</b> <b>Poland</b> Russian Federation <b>Serbia</b> <b>Tajikistan</b> <b>Turkey</b> <b>Ukraine</b> <i>Kosovo</i> <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	<b>Algeria</b> Egypt Iran <b>Iraq</b> <b>Kuwait</b> Lebanon Libya Morocco Palestine Syria <b>Yemen</b> <i>Western Sahara</i>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**, other areas in *italics*

# Victim Assistance

This overview reports on the annual status of coordination and planning efforts designed to improve access to services and programs for survivors of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) for the year 2014, with updates into 2015 when possible. It covers the activities and achievements in 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims in need of assistance. It particularly assesses victim assistance in the context of the treaty's Maputo Action Plan (2014–2019).<sup>31</sup> It also looks at the role of survivors in decision-making and other relevant matters of concern.

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty in which States Parties committed to provide “assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” of those people harmed by a specific type of weapon.<sup>32</sup> Victim assistance, in practice, addresses the overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors<sup>33</sup> of landmines, cluster munitions, ERW, and other weapons, as well as people in their communities with similar requirements for assistance.

In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach family members and other people who have been killed or who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to mines/ERW. All of these people are considered “mine victims” according to the accepted definition of the term, which includes survivors as well as affected families and communities—although victim assistance efforts have mainly been limited to survivors to date.

The Monitor has tracked the progress of programs and activities that benefit mine/ERW survivors, families, and communities under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans since 1999.

In June 2014 at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review

<sup>31</sup> This corresponds with Actions 12-18 of the Maputo Action Plan. The Monitor reports on the following 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which there are significant numbers of survivors: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This list includes 29 States Parties that have indicated that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must provide care as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clearance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. Algeria, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2011, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/other\\_languages/french/MBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5\\_extensions/countries/Algeria-ExtRequest-Revised-17Aug2011-fr.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/other_languages/french/MBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5_extensions/countries/Algeria-ExtRequest-Revised-17Aug2011-fr.pdf); and Turkey, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5\\_extensions/countries/Turkey-ExtRequest-Received-29Mar2013.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5_extensions/countries/Turkey-ExtRequest-Received-29Mar2013.pdf).

<sup>32</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, (Mine Ban Treaty) Article 6.3, [www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/).

<sup>33</sup> A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

Conference in Maputo, all States Parties committed to the Maputo Action Plan, which includes a set of actions that would advance victim assistance through to 2019.<sup>34</sup> In order to replace the previous victim assistance standing committee, in Maputo States Parties also agreed to the formation of a new Committee on Victim Assistance that will “support States Parties in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance.”<sup>35</sup>

Despite years of financial shortages that reduced the availability of actual services, victim assistance efforts have remained vibrant. A wide range of activities demonstrated the continued will of States Parties, the UN, NGOs, and above all survivors’ own networks and representative organizations to “tangibly contribute, to the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society,” even when confronted with limited resources.<sup>36</sup>

As shown by the many successful practices and activities, victim assistance is not inherently complicated. However, many challenges remain to ensure access to sustainable services, to remove the barriers to the full participation of survivors in their societies, and to create actual improvements in their wellbeing. It will require active cooperation and stronger determination to overcome these challenges.

At a symposium on the Maputo Action Plan’s victim assistance commitments, held by Thailand in Bangkok in June 2015, the ICBL highlighted that, in carrying out the plan, States Parties can apply the many years of training and capacity-building already provided during the life of the convention, including on improving planning, monitoring, and evaluation.<sup>37</sup> The ICBL also noted that a minimum level of clear and measurable objectives is needed. This was also highlighted in the evaluation of a multi-million dollar World Bank-funded rehabilitation system from the early days of victim assistance. In response to inadequate reporting on project achievements, the evaluation found that “a simple monitoring system focused upon a few key variables relating project outputs to intended outcomes would have sufficed.”<sup>38</sup>

The Maputo Action Plan provides a framework that allows States Parties to qualitatively assess progress in

<sup>34</sup> “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, [www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Maputo Action Plan, Action #13. Until the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in 2014 there had been a Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, which was originally titled the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration, and Mine Awareness.

<sup>37</sup> “Victim Assistance & the Framework of Maputo Action Plan,” Presentation of ICBL, Bangkok, 15 June 2015.

<sup>38</sup> World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, “Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - War Victims Project,” 12 December 1999, <http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoctb.nsf/InterLandingPagesByUNID/8525682E0068603785256913006EF367>.



## Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia, and Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola	Colombia	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria
Burundi	El Salvador	Cambodia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iraq
Chad	Nicaragua	Thailand	Croatia	Jordan
Congo, DR	Peru		Serbia	Yemen
Eritrea			Tajikistan	
Ethiopia			Turkey	
Guinea-Bissau				
Mozambique				
Senegal				
Somalia				
South Sudan				
Sudan				
Uganda				
Zimbabwe				

victim assistance, which they can attribute to the relevant actions that they take, even in the absence of existing measurable baselines. It calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims while also emphasizing the necessity of simultaneously integrating victim assistance into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions into the appropriate sectors, including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction.<sup>39</sup> States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance objectives “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”<sup>40</sup>

The relevant content of the action points of the Maputo Action Plan, can be summarized as follows:

- Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; support efforts to make referrals to existing services.
- Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
- Ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance capacity.
- Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
- Address the needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
- Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives annually and report on measurable improvements in advance of the next Review Conference.

The Maputo Action Plan also affirms the need for States Parties to continue carrying out the actions of the previous five-year plan, the Cartagena Action Plan. The Cartagena Action Plan stressed the importance of the accessibility of services and information as well as the inclusion and participation of victims, particularly survivors, in all aspects of the treaty and its

implementation. It emphasized that with regards to the assistance provided, there should be no discrimination against mine/ERW victims, among mine/ERW victims, nor between survivors with disabilities and other persons with disabilities.<sup>41</sup>

### Assessing the needs

States Parties should assess needs for victim assistance—including through sex- and age-disaggregated data—and gauge the availability of services required. They should also use this opportunity to offer referrals to existing services.<sup>42 43</sup>

Needs assessment methods were improving and were increasingly linked to the provision of services in States Parties in Southeast Asia. However, much more needed to be done in Afghanistan to improve data collection.

- In **Afghanistan**, no specific needs assessment surveys of mine/ERW survivors were conducted in 2014, but the relevant ministry registered persons with war-related disabilities and the dependents of persons killed in conflict in order for them to receive a monthly social security allowance. An independent assessment by the national corruption watch body reported that the registration practices were seriously flawed and that the social security registration system required a massive overhaul.
- In **Cambodia**, the national survivors’ network in partnership with the national mine action authority continued to conduct a large-scale survey on the quality of life for mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. Data gathered was used to provide referrals, to enable follow-up, to address specific health, income-generating and educational needs,

<sup>39</sup> Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan.

<sup>40</sup> “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 December 2009 (hereafter referred to as the “Cartagena Action Plan”).

<sup>42</sup> According to Action #12 of the Maputo Action Plan.

<sup>43</sup> Country profiles are available on the Monitor website providing more details on all countries highlighted in this chapter, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx).

as well as to provide emergency food for those people in the most difficult situations.

- In **Thailand**, the relevant government agencies improved interagency coordination for the registration of new mine/ERW casualties, as well as follow-up for assistance and support. The national mine action center made follow-up visits and provided small emergency funds for the urgent needs of some survivors.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, needs assessments were geographically localized and survivor surveys progressively covered affected areas in several countries:

- In **Angola**, the national survey for identifying and registering mine/ERW survivors with disabilities and assessing needs had covered half of all 18 provinces in the country as of the end of 2014.
- In **Burundi**, the national mine action authority (DAHMI)<sup>44</sup> in collaboration with Handicap International (HI) identified survivors and assessed needs in three (Makamba, Rutana, and Ruyigi) of its 17 provinces.
- In **Eritrea**, the relevant government ministry and UNICEF carried out “mini assessments” during field monitoring activities.
- In **Sudan**, the UN continued to work with disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) and social workers to identify the needs of mine/ERW survivors through individual case studies. This information was shared with the relevant ministry and the national mine action center.
- In **Uganda**, the national network of NGOs, called the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA), undertook a mine/ERW survivor needs assessment in the remote Yumbe District.

Surveys that also enhanced survivors’ links with state-provided services were reported in the Americas:

- In **Colombia**, from mid-2014 the national mine action authority (DAICMA)<sup>45</sup> conducted a survey on the demographic, socio-economic, and cultural conditions of mine/ERW survivors, while informing them on how to register for services and benefits through the state process. Survey coverage increased.
- In **El Salvador**, the state-run Protection Fund held roundtable consultations with survivors’ associations on survivors’ needs and made individual visits to provide legal support and links to assistance.
- In **Peru**, the mine action center CONTRAMINAS<sup>46</sup> verified and updated information on mine/ERW survivors and their needs. It also visited the remote regions of Junín and Huancavelica to update information on registered survivors, provide medical assistance, and identify mine survivors who remained unregistered.

<sup>44</sup> Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les Mines et Engins non explosés.

<sup>45</sup> Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal.

<sup>46</sup> Centro Peruano de Acción Contra las Minas Anti-Personal.

Progress in compiling data through assessment, although incomplete, was ongoing and making some progress in several countries in Europe:

- In **Albania**, an assessment of socio-economic and medical needs of marginalized ERW survivors was conducted in eight affected regions in 2013–2014 with the support of local government and branches of the national association of persons with work-related disabilities.
- **Croatia** progressed in the development of a unified database on casualties of mines/ERW and their families, with agreements made between relevant departments and agencies, a specific working group established, a dedicated staff member employed, and a combined database established. However, in 2015, there were insufficient funds to follow up with needs assessment in the field. The working group sought new approaches to implementing the needs survey, which was designed to inform the development of projects that would address the needs of survivors and their communities.
- In **Serbia**, the Ministry responsible for victim assistance announced plans to establish a database of members of disabled persons’ organizations, to be updated regularly on the current needs of individuals.
- **Turkey** continued to monitor and report on survivors receiving care through the military medical system in 2014. In 2015, the national mine ban campaign in cooperation with the national disability association were collecting data on survivors in refugee camps in eastern Turkey.

In the Middle East and North Africa there was notably increased sharing and use of casualty data from recent surveys, in addition to some ongoing data collection:

- In **Algeria**, data from HI’s 2012 survivor identification process was used in the development of the new victim assistance action plan (March 2014) and in the implementation of economic inclusion projects for mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities, funded by the relevant government ministry and the European Union.
- In **Iraq**, the national mine action authority based in Bagdad continued mine/ERW survivor survey efforts in 2014 and into 2015. A Basrah province survey was ongoing in 2015, to be completed in 2016. It provided data and information on needs from the national survey and assessment to the relevant ministries. Mine action authorities also exchanged survivor information with the health ministry’s national injury surveillance system.
- In **Yemen**, a significant number of mine/ERW survivors were registered in Abyan in 2013, while in 2014 some additional survivors were registered during the course of a victim assistance team conducting medical examinations and providing support.

Additionally, questions about disability, which were also relevant to survivors, were included in preparations for upcoming national censuses in El Salvador, Ethiopia,

and Uganda. This was encouraged and supported by survivor's organizations. In Peru, the national disability council (CONADIS),<sup>47</sup> a member of the national Victim Assistance Consultative Committee, was also working on a disability census.

## Enhancing plans, policies, and legal frameworks

### Coordination

States Parties committed to enhancing coordination activities in order to increase the availability and

### Status of victim assistance efforts in 2014/2015

State Party	Coordination (collaborative or combined with disability)	Plan for assistance	Survivor participation (in coordination)
Afghanistan	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	No (expired)
Albania	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Algeria	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Draft victim assistance plan pending endorsement
Angola	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Bosnia and Herzegovina	No (inactive)*	N/A*	Yes
Burundi	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes (inactive)
Cambodia	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes (disability plan)
Chad	No ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	N/A ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	Yes (inactive)
Colombia	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Congo, DR	No	N/A	No (component of mine action strategy)*
Croatia	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes (disability plan)
Eritrea	No	N/A	No
Ethiopia	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes (disability plan)
Guinea-Bissau	No	N/A	Yes
Iraq	No	N/A ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	No
Jordan	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes (disability plan), draft victim assistance plan pending endorsement
Nicaragua	No	N/A	No
Peru	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Senegal	No	N/A ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	Yes
Serbia	No	N/A ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	No
Somalia	No	N/A	No
South Sudan	Yes (combined)	Yes	No (component of mine action strategy)
Sudan	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	No (expired)
Tajikistan	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes
Thailand	Yes (collaborative)	Yes ( <i>ad hoc</i> meetings)	Yes
Turkey	No	N/A	No
Uganda	Yes (combined), but inactive*	N/A	Yes (victim assistance plan expired end 2014)*
Yemen	Yes (no collaboration) Inactive in 2015*	No Inactive in 2015*	Yes (inactive)
Zimbabwe	No	N/A	No

Note: Changes since Landmine Monitor 2014 marked with \*. N/A = There was no active coordination mechanism in which survivors could participate. *Ad hoc* meetings = While there was no active coordination mechanism, survivors and their representative organizations met with relevant government authorities.

<sup>47</sup> Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad.

accessibility of services that are relevant to mine victims.<sup>48</sup> In 2014 and into 2015, 18 of the 31 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms or disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to mine/ERW survivors' needs.<sup>49</sup>

In Iraq, Senegal, Serbia, and Thailand there were no official multi-sectorial coordination meetings, but *ad hoc* meetings continued to take place during 2014. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, coordination was hampered by significant funding capacity constraints. A victim assistance coordination mechanism was established in Serbia in early 2015. *Ad hoc* victim assistance meetings also began in Chad, taking place during 2014. In Somalia, a victim assistance and disability working group met for the first time in May 2014 and was intended to meet quarterly, but no meetings have taken place since.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), victim assistance coordination was put on hold in early 2014. The coordination mechanism for victim assistance in DR Congo was dissolved in 2013, and the closure of the UNMAS office in Kinshasa in 2014 saw coordination moved to the physical rehabilitation-focused cluster on disability (led by the World Health Organization, WHO), where victim assistance issues were not specifically addressed. In South Sudan, the victim assistance and disability working group held only one meeting between September 2014 and June 2015 due to funding difficulties. Previously, it was reported to have held monthly meetings. There were no meetings of the intersectoral disability committee responsible for victim assistance coordination in Uganda in 2014; meetings had becoming increasingly less frequent since 2013, also due to a lack of funding. In Yemen, coordination ceased due to armed conflict in 2015, not long after having been reactivated in 2013.

Among the 18 States Parties with active victim assistance coordination in 2014, all the national coordination mechanisms were reported to have either collaborated with, or been included as part of, an active disability coordination mechanism. In six States Parties, the designated national coordination body for victim assistance continued to also be the coordination mechanism for disability issues into 2015.<sup>50</sup>

### Plans and objectives

Actions #13 and #14 of the Maputo Action Plan call on States Parties to have time-bound and measurable objectives to implement national policies and plans that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim assistance.

In 2014, of the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors, 19 had plans with objectives that address the needs and promote the rights of mines

<sup>48</sup> According to the ongoing Cartagena Action Plan victim assistance commitments and supported by Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan.

<sup>49</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. States with no known or no active coordination mechanism for victim assistance in 2014: BiH, Chad, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>50</sup> Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.

survivors.<sup>51</sup> Plans in Burundi, Chad, and Yemen remained on hold, due to either a lack of resources and/or armed conflict.

Actions to respond to the needs of mine survivors had been incorporated into the national disability plans in Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, although these states did not have a distinct victim assistance plan. Algeria and Mozambique had developed victim assistance plans, which were pending official approval. Colombia, Peru, and Tajikistan had both a national victim assistance plan and disability plans and policies that take into account the needs and rights of mine/ERW survivors.<sup>52</sup>

In June 2014, Serbia announced that it had initiated the development of a national victim assistance plan through the newly forming working group on victim assistance.

### Availability of and accessibility to services

Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to "increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion opportunities and social protection measures...including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups."

Updates on the availability and accessibility of comprehensive rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities are included in a separate report produced by the Monitor.<sup>53</sup> This report, "Equal Basis 2015: Inclusion and Rights in 33 Countries," presents progress in the relevant States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions<sup>54</sup> in the context of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The Monitor website includes detailed country profiles discerning progress in victim assistance in some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. States with no plan: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>52</sup> In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance was also integrated into efforts to address the needs of armed conflict victims more generally.

<sup>53</sup> See also, ICBL-CMC, "Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries," 12 December 2014, [www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2014/equal-basis-2014-access-and-rights-in-33-countries.aspx](http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2014/equal-basis-2014-access-and-rights-in-33-countries.aspx).

<sup>54</sup> The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR and Lebanon (States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), with significant numbers of cluster munition, landmine, and ERW victims. The "Equal Basis 2015" report is scheduled for publication in December 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx). Findings specific to victim assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine Monitor 2015's companion publication; ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2015), [www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015.aspx](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015.aspx).

## Full and active participation

Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to ensure the “full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them.”

Mine/ERW survivors’ representatives were members of most existing victim assistance coordination mechanisms. However, there remains a long way to go for survivors to be effectively included in coordination roles in a way that their input is listened to, understood, and acted upon with tangible measures in the context of the design and implementation of victim assistance objectives. Most States Parties are yet to demonstrate that they are doing their utmost to enhance the capacity of survivors for their effective participation, or to specify the methods that they are using to build that capacity.

Among the 18 States Parties with active victim assistance coordination during 2014, all but one (Yemen) included survivors in these mechanisms. However, in many cases there remained a need to build the capacity of survivors’ representatives and raise awareness in the coordination bodies in order for inclusion to be fuller and participation more active.

Mine/ERW survivors also participated actively in Mine Ban Treaty and other disarmament and disability rights coordination and campaigning, as well as in matters of peacemaking and peace-building in many countries, including in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. In Colombia, members of National Network of Landmine Victims and Survivors’ Organizations, formed in December 2013, represented the perspectives of mine/ERW survivors in the Colombian peace process national committee, as well as at the peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba in 2015.

The strong involvement of female mine/ERW survivors in peace issues was evident in the Director of the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association—who is also an ICBL Ambassador—joining the 2014 Women Peace Makers Program of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego (US). A female survivor leader from Thailand also participated in a seminar at the UN in New York in July 2014, as part of Thailand’s efforts to promote the women, peace, and security agenda associated with Security Council Resolution 1325.

In the majority of the 31 States Parties, survivors continued to be involved in implementing many aspects of victim assistance, including physical rehabilitation, peer support and referral, income-generating projects, and needs assessment data collection.<sup>56</sup>

## Communicating objectives and reporting improvements

After 15 years of Mine Ban Treaty reporting, there was no agreed format for victim assistance reporting. Many

States Parties reported progress similarly to the way they had in past years, by including a mix of casualty data, updates on victim assistance services provided, and occasionally information on laws and policies. While more than half of the most-affected 31 States Parties had included some information on victim assistance activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports covering calendar year 2014,<sup>57</sup> no States Parties had reported directly on their time-bound and measurable objectives by the ambitiously narrow timeframe of 30 April 2015, as specified in Maputo Action Plan Action #13. However, according to the plan, the objectives should be updated, their implementation monitored, and progress reported annually. Each year, “enhancements” to plans, policies, and legal frameworks and budgets for the implementation of those plans, policies, and legal frameworks should also be reported. By the next reporting period, States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs for assistance will have less than four years to adopt and apply an adequate reporting method for indicating that their efforts have improved the well-being and guaranteed rights of survivors, families, and communities before the next Review Conference.

## Gender considerations

The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”<sup>58</sup> While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be disproportionately disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance for women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Implementation of CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of women and girls and protect them from discrimination and exploitation.<sup>59</sup> The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human rights, are also particularly applicable.

Some States Parties have begun to address gender issues, often with assistance from the NGO Gender and Mine Action Programme. For example, in 2014, the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan developed and adopted a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for 2014–2016 (including victim assistance) and established focal points and an implementation working group.

<sup>57</sup> The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Sudan reported that it did not have any victim assistance activities due to a lack of funding, and Thailand reported on a one-time event.

<sup>58</sup> Maputo Action Plan Action #17.

<sup>59</sup> As of 1 June 2015, CEDAW had 189 States Parties. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 18 December 1979, [treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg\\_no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en](http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en).

<sup>56</sup> Participation in service and program implementation was reported in at least the following 26 States Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

### *Age considerations*

Children, and in particular boys, are one of the largest groups of casualties and survivors. Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. Incremental progress in addressing the specific needs of child survivors was reported in some domains of assistance, particularly psychosocial support and education. The annually updated Monitor fact sheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more details on issues pertaining to children, youths, and adolescents.

### **Special issues of concern: displacement, conflict, and humanitarian emergencies**

This Monitor reporting period was marked by growing numbers of refugees and displaced persons resulting from conflict, as well as by the impact of conflict and natural disasters gravely affecting victim assistance efforts in a number of States Parties. During natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, and times of armed conflict or occupation, mine/ERW survivors face heightened challenges to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as increased barriers to accessing adequate and appropriate services<sup>60</sup>.

In October 2015, flash rains and massive floods destroyed houses and infrastructure in the Sahrawi refugee camps where hundreds of survivors live with little outside support. The camps are situated near Tindouf in Algeria, near Western Sahara. Earlier in 2015, the World Food Programme in Algeria had to reduce the number of essential food items distributed to Sahrawi refugees, including mine/ERW survivors, by 20%. UN agencies present in the camps were jointly advocating for the most basic needs of these refugees to be covered and not to be forgotten.<sup>61</sup>

In 2014, catastrophic flooding in BiH and Serbia affected a significant number of landmine survivors and their families, some of whom lost their homes and other resources. About half of all known survivors in BiH were reported to be in flood-affected areas. The flooding disrupted victim assistance activities in both countries.

In Serbia, floods caused both the state and many local NGOs to re-prioritize their programming to focus on relief for flood victims. This caused a general reduction in services and programs for Serbian mine/ERW survivors, as funds were diverted for emergency relief. During relief efforts, media statements by the mine action center of BiH urged special attention to the needs of mine/ERW survivors. In Serbia, survivors also participated in relief efforts, including by distributing food and water, and the survivors' organizations reallocated project funding to

assist those most affected.

The conflict in Syria has caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons who have fled Syria. While all these host countries have victim assistance commitments and obligations, the influx of refugees created additional challenges in providing assistance and access to services for landmine survivors and other refugees with disabilities. In Iraq, healthcare centers and hospitals in the Kurdistan region were overwhelmed by the number of refugees in need entering from Syria during 2014, especially when combined with the increase in internal displacement. In Jordan, wounded Syrians received immediate medical care and humanitarian organizations provided some psychological support and rehabilitation services for war-injured persons. In Turkey, initial emergency medical care is provided locally, but the costs of physical rehabilitation, mobility aids, and plastic surgery were not covered by government services, and the availability of these relied on non-governmental and international organizations.

Conflict, insecurity, and armed violence severely disrupted the availability and delivery of services in South Sudan. This was also reported to be the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen in 2014 and 2015.

<sup>60</sup> Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Landmines/ERW, Refugees, and Displacement," 20 June 2015, [www.the-monitor.org/media/2034850/MonitorBriefingPaper\\_Refugees\\_20June2015\\_final2.pdf](http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2034850/MonitorBriefingPaper_Refugees_20June2015_final2.pdf); and "Victim Assistance and CRPD Article 11: Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies," 25 June 2015, [www.the-monitor.org/media/2034853/MonitorBriefingPaper\\_VAandArticle11\\_25June2015.pdf](http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2034853/MonitorBriefingPaper_VAandArticle11_25June2015.pdf).

<sup>61</sup> World Food Programme, "UN Agencies In Algeria Urge Continued Food Assistance To Refugees From Western Sahara," 25 February 2015, [www.wfp.org/news/news-release/un-agencies-algeria-urge-continued-food-assistance-refugees-western-sahara](http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/un-agencies-algeria-urge-continued-food-assistance-refugees-western-sahara).



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# Support for Mine Action

**A**rticle 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. While this chapter focuses on financial support for mine action by affected countries and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states for calendar year 2014, cooperation and assistance is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.

## Key Figures

- Thirty-three donors and 13 affected states reported contributing approximately US\$610.4 million in international and national support for mine action in 2014;<sup>1</sup> \$30.4 million less than in 2013 (a 5% decrease).<sup>2</sup>
- International contributions accounted for 68% of overall support for mine action in 2014, while states' contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the remaining 32% of global funding.
- Donors contributed \$416.8 million in international support for mine action to 42 affected states and three other areas. This represents a decrease of \$23 million from 2013 (a 5% decrease).
- Contributions from the top five donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted for 72%

<sup>1</sup> This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2014, as of November 2015. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current dollars. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggregated. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year.

<sup>2</sup> Support for mine action in 2013 has been recalculated from that reported in *Landmine Monitor 2014*. The Monitor now reports \$640.8 million in total support in 2013, instead of \$647 million.

of all international funding with \$301.8 million.


- The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45% of all international contributions.
- Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan dropped considerably, from \$67.5 million in 2013 to \$49.3 million in 2014, although it was still 30% higher than funding received by the second largest recipient (Lao PDR: \$37.3 million).
- International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining 16% was not disaggregated by the donors.
- The Monitor identified 13 affected states that provided \$193.6 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, \$7 million less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected countries reported contributing \$201 million.

▲ *Deminer excavates toward an antipersonnel mine in Angola.*

## International Contributions in 2014

In 2014, 33 donors contributed \$416.8 million in international support for mine action. This represents a decrease of \$23 million (5%) from the \$440 million reported

### International support for mine action: 2004–2014



## Contributions by donors: 2010–2014\*

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)					Total
	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	
US	118.1	113.9	134.4	131.4	129.6	627.4
EU	66.8	38.5	60.7	19.3	49.8	235.1
Japan	49.1	64.0	57.6	43.0	46.8	260.5
Norway	41.8	49.6	48.4	53.4	50.3	243.5
Netherlands	25.9	23.4	24.1	21.3	22.8	117.5
Switzerland	18.1	20.6	18.4	17.5	15.7	90.3
Germany	17.5	22.1	23.8	23.6	23.4	110.4
United Kingdom (UK)	13.1	22.8	22.0	18.0	16.3	92.2
Denmark	12.1	9.3	8.7	9.3	10.2	49.6
Finland	8.0	7.7	7.2	7.4	6.7	37.0
Sweden	7.8	12.9	14.1	12.2	13.0	60.0
Canada	7.7	7.9	6.8	17.0	30.1	69.5
New Zealand	7.5	6.7	5.4	4.3	3.3	27.2
Australia	6.6	14.5	24.0	45.7	24.4	115.2
Ireland	4.5	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.5	20.7
Belgium	3.2	3.1	7.2	8.1	11.9	33.5
Italy	2.2	1.5	2.8	3.4	4.0	13.9
Luxembourg	1.5	1.9	1.2	1.2	0.9	6.7
France	1.3	2.1	2.0	1.3	3.6	10.3
Spain	1.1	1.6	1.9	5.3	5.4	15.3
Other donors**	2.9	11.6	23.2	21.0	7.7	66.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>416.8</b>	<b>439.8</b>	<b>497.5</b>	<b>467.7</b>	<b>480.4</b>	<b>2,302.2</b>

\* The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

\*\* Other donors in 2014 included: Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Each contributed less than \$1 million.

in 2013. Support went to 42 affected states and three other areas (down from 47 states and three areas in 2013) with \$58 million not earmarked for any specific country.

While this is the second year in a row that international assistance to mine action has declined, it has totaled more than \$400 million for the ninth consecutive year. It is too early to speak of a continuing downward trend, but the Monitor will continue to closely follow future developments.

Over the past five years (2010–2014), international support totaled \$2.3 billion, an average of \$460 million per year. Three donors—the US, Japan, and Norway—contributed \$1.1 billion, almost 50% of total international support. Four other donors—the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia—contributed more than \$100 million each.

## Donors in 2014

In 2014, 26 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, three states not party, the EU, and three international institutions<sup>3</sup> contributed a total of \$416.8 million to mine action.

The majority of the funding came from just a few donors. The top five donors contributed a total of \$301.8 million, representing almost three-quarters of all international funding for 2014. The US remained the largest mine action donor, followed by the EU, Japan,

Norway, and the Netherlands. Two countries entered the top 10—Denmark and Finland—replacing Australia and Sweden, which reduced their contributions by a combined total of \$13 million. Thirteen donors contributed less than \$1 million each.

Support from States Parties in 2014 accounted for 55% of all donor funding with 26 countries providing approximately \$230 million, down from a total of \$278 million in 2013. The top five State Party contributors—Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany—provided \$152 million (36%).

In 2014, the EU and its member states<sup>4</sup> contributed a total of \$166 million and accounted for 40% of total international support reported, up from the \$153 million provided in 2013 (35% of total international funding in 2013).

Based on available data as of November 2015, funding for mine action in 2014 decreased by \$23 million. Twelve donors decreased their funding, led by Japan (\$15 million down), the UK (\$10 million down), Australia (\$8 million down), Norway (\$8 million down), and Sweden (\$5 million down).

In contrast, 11 donors contributed more in 2014 than they did in 2013, including a \$28 million increase from the EU, notably through the disbursement of approximately

<sup>3</sup> The Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

<sup>4</sup> Seventeen EU member states provided funding in 2014: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).



## Summary of major changes in 2014

Change	Donors	Combined Total
Decrease of more than \$5 million	Australia, Japan, Norway, the UK, and Sweden	\$45.4 million decrease
Decrease of less than \$5 million	Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and Switzerland	\$10.2 million decrease
Increase of more than \$1 million	Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, and the US	\$37.8 million increase
Increase of less than \$1 million	Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Slovenia, and South Korea	\$2.9 million increase
Donors from 2013 that discontinued their support in 2014	Colombia, Oman, and the UAE	\$9.5 million provided in 2013
New donors in 2014	Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian Fund, OPEC Fund for International Development, and the OSCE	\$1.4 million provided in 2014

## Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US\$ terms\*

Donors	Amount of decrease/increase (national currency)	% change from 2013 (national currency)	Amount of decrease/increase (US\$)	% change from 2013 (US\$)
Australia	- A\$7,588,000	-51%	-7,832,774	-54%
Canada	+ C\$281,373	+3%	-279,639	-4%
Japan	- ¥1,056,301,774	-17%	-14,914,242	-23%
New Zealand	+ NZ\$892,460	+11%	+830,399	+12%
Norway	- NOK28,211,631	-10%	-7,785,827	-16%
Sweden	- SEK30,730,000	-37%	-5,129,558	-39%
Switzerland	- CHF347,941	-2%	-137,561	-1%
UK	- £6,605,855	-45%	-9,661,924	-42%

\* Average exchange rates for 2014: A\$1=US\$0.9034; C\$1.1043=US\$1; DKK5.6151=US\$1; €1=US\$1.3297; ¥105.74=US\$1; NZ\$0.8313=US\$1; NOK6.2969=US\$1; £1=US\$1.6484; SEK6.8576=US\$1; and CHF0.9147=US\$1. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 2 January 2015, [www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm](http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm).

\$25 million to mine action projects in Angola. The US provided \$4.2 million more than in 2013, while Denmark and the Netherlands increased their assistance by more than \$2 million each.

Three donors from 2013 did not report any contribution to mine action in 2014: Colombia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the latter of which provided more than \$9 million in 2013. Five new donors—one State Party, one state not party, and three institutions—were identified in 2014: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the OSCE.

However, as shown in the table above, changes in the exchange rates between national currencies and the US dollar significantly affected the US dollar value of some contributions. For instance, whereas Japan has provided ¥5.2 billion in 2014, ¥1 billion less than in 2013 and representing a 17% decrease, the value of its contribution when expressed in US dollars results in a 23% decrease. Similarly, Canada's contribution dropped by 4% in US dollar terms during 2014, despite rising by 3% in national currency terms.

## Funding paths

In addition to bilateral aid, donors provided funding via several trust fund mechanisms, including the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by UNMAS; the ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia); the Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan; and the NATO Partnership for Peace Fund.

In 2014, contributions to the VTF totaled \$45.1 million from 22 donors, compared to \$51 million from 23 donors in 2013.<sup>5</sup> Japan, the EU, and Australia were the largest donors to the VTF, amounting to half of all contributions. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Six donors and two international institutions allocated \$8 million in 2014 through the ITF for mine action programs in nine states and one area, as well as for global activities.<sup>6</sup> Other organizations that received

<sup>5</sup> UNMAS, Annual Report 2014, September 2015, pp. 22–23, [www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNMAS 2014 Annual Report.pdf](http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNMAS%20Annual%20Report.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2014, March 2015, pp.

a significant proportion of contributions in 2014 included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (\$18.2 million) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) (\$10.7 million).

## Recipients

A total of 42 states and three other areas received \$358.8 million from 33 donors in 2014. A further \$58 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Most advocacy funding is contained within this category of funding.

Of the 45 recipients in 2014, 29 states and one other area received more than \$1 million each. Afghanistan received the largest amount of funding (\$49.3 million) from the largest number of donors (14). Twelve states, or 27% of all recipients, had only one donor.<sup>7</sup>

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45% of all international support in 2014.

## International support recipients in 2014

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
Global	58.0	Libya	6.9
<b>Afghanistan</b>	49.3	<b>Ukraine</b>	6.6
Lao PDR	37.3	Egypt	6.3
<b>Iraq</b>	36.3	Lebanon	6.1
<b>Angola</b>	32.6	Myanmar	5.7
<b>Cambodia</b>	30.3	<b>Tajikistan</b>	4.2
<b>Turkey</b>	26.3	<b>Palau</b>	2.3
Vietnam	14.3	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	2.2
<b>Colombia</b>	11.5	<i>Somaliland</i>	1.7
<b>South Sudan</b>	10.8	Syria	1.4
<b>Mozambique</b>	10.3	Georgia	1.3
<b>Congo, DR</b>	10.3	<b>Yemen</b>	1.2
Palestine	10.2	<b>Thailand</b>	1.0
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	8.7	<b>Chad</b>	1.0
Sri Lanka	8.4	<b>Serbia</b>	1.0
<b>Somalia</b>	7.4	Other recipients*	5.9
		<b>Total</b>	<b>416.8</b>

Note: State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.

\* Other recipients in 2014 included: **Albania**, Armenia, Azerbaijan, **Burundi**, **Croatia**, **Guinea**, **Jordan**, **Kosovo**, the Marshall Islands, **Mauritania**, **Peru**, the **Philippines**, the **Solomon Islands**, **Sudan**, and *Western Sahara*. Each received less than \$1 million.

In 2014, 35 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2013, including 24 recipients receiving less support. Turkey was the recipient with the largest upward fluctuation, receiving \$26 million more than in 2013, while Afghanistan was the recipient with the largest downward fluctuation,

<sup>22–23</sup>, [www.itf-fund.si/public/upload/brosure/itf\\_ar\\_2014.pdf](http://www.itf-fund.si/public/upload/brosure/itf_ar_2014.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Albania, Armenia, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Turkey.

receiving \$18 million less than in 2013. Fluctuation may be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities, changes in local situations, as well as the closing of some programs. Uncertain and changing levels of mine action support received could negatively impact the ability of some affected states to comply with their Mine Ban Treaty obligations in a timely manner. Such concerns were for instance raised by Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, and Zimbabwe regarding their clearance obligations, and by Ukraine regarding its stockpile destruction obligation.<sup>8</sup>

## Funding by thematic sector

### Contributions by thematic sector in 2014<sup>9</sup>

Sector	Total contribution (\$ million)	Percentage of total contribution
Clearance and risk education	281.8	68%
Various	68.5	16%
Victim assistance	27.7	7%
Advocacy	20.7	5%
Capacity-building	14.9	4%
Stockpile destruction	3.2	less than 1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>416.8</b>	<b>100%</b>

Almost 70% of mine action funding in 2014 supported clearance and risk education activities. Victim assistance support dropped by \$1.9 million from 2013, and represented 7% of total international support to mine action. Stockpile destruction totaled just more than \$3 million, most of which was provided by the EU and Germany for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1 landmines through the NATO Support Agency (with a total of \$2.5 million).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA), Annual Report 1393, September 2015, p. 40, [www.macca.org.af/macca/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MAPA-Annual-Report-1393.pdf](http://www.macca.org.af/macca/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MAPA-Annual-Report-1393.pdf); “Lack of funding could jeopardize demining operations in Angola” (in Portuguese), *Deutsche Welle* (DW), 9 July 2015, [www.dw.com/pt/falta-de-financiamento-põe-em-risco-a-desminagem-em-angola/a-18574335](http://www.dw.com/pt/falta-de-financiamento-põe-em-risco-a-desminagem-em-angola/a-18574335); “Money a worry for deminers ahead of 2019 clean-up deadline,” *The Phnom Penh Post*, 6 June 2015, [www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/money-worry-deminers-ahead-2019-clean-deadline](http://www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/money-worry-deminers-ahead-2019-clean-deadline); statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c\\_CLEARING\\_MINED\\_AREAS\\_-\\_Chad.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Chad.pdf); Zimbabwe’s Fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013, [www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5\\_extensions/countries/Zimbabwe-ExtensionRequest-Received-31December2013.pdf](http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5_extensions/countries/Zimbabwe-ExtensionRequest-Received-31December2013.pdf); and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Updates by States Parties that have missed their deadlines for Article 4 implementation, April 2014, [www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/7-ARTICLE\\_4\\_STATES\\_PARTIES\\_MISSED\\_DEADLINES\\_-\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/7-ARTICLE_4_STATES_PARTIES_MISSED_DEADLINES_-_Ukraine.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> In 2013, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (\$300.3 million/68% of total international support), victim assistance (\$29.6 million/7%), advocacy (\$16 million/4%), capacity-building (\$9.4 million/2%), stockpile destruction (\$5.2 million/1%), and various activities (\$79.3 million/18%).

<sup>10</sup> Email from Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Space Division (K1), European External Action Service (EEAS), 11 June 2015; and Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 16 March 2015.

### Clearance and risk education

In 2014, \$281.8 million, or 68% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of \$18.5 million from 2013.

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure, although clearance accounts for most of the reported funding with 23 donors contributing \$237.9 million. Nine donors reported contributions totaling \$8 million specifically for risk education projects in nine countries.

### Victim assistance<sup>11</sup>

Direct international support for victim assistance activities reached \$27.7 million in 2014, down from \$29.6 million in 2013. This represents 7% of all reported support for mine action in 2014, about the same share as in 2013.

Seventeen<sup>12</sup> of the 33 donors identified reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 14 States Parties, four states not party, and one area.<sup>13</sup> Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance.

### Advocacy

In 2014, 5% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities (\$20.7 million). Of the 33 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 18 reported supporting advocacy activities.

Advocacy activities included, but were not limited to, support for the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San Jose in September 2014; travel sponsorship through UNDP; and, contributions to the Implementation Support Units. GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor also received donor support for advocacy.

## National Contributions in 2014


While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States Parties such as Algeria and Iraq, as well as states not party India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual expenditures. In March 2014, the media reported that the government's contribution to demining

in Vietnam was around \$30 million per year.<sup>14</sup>

Thirteen affected states reported \$193.6 million in contributions to mine action from their national budget in 2014, approximately \$7 million less than the \$201 million reported in 2013 (a 4% decrease).<sup>15</sup> Angola (\$121 million) accounted for 63% of the total. Additionally, four States Parties reported contributing a large part to their own mine action programs: Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$14.6 million, 63%), Chile (\$4.9 million, 100%), Croatia (\$28 million, 60%), and Ecuador (\$5.5 million, 100%).

Whereas data about national support remains incomplete, it has accounted to about 30% of total mine action funding in 2010–2014.

### Summary of contributions: 2010–2014



## Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (Abyei<sup>16</sup> and Darfur), as well as Western Sahara, had mine action programs that were partially funded by UN General Assembly assessments as part of peacekeeping mission budgets in 2014.

In 2014–2015, an estimated \$166 million was allocated to mine action for peacekeeping missions globally, a 10% increase from the previous year.<sup>17</sup> The breakdown of assessed budget per mission was not available as of November 2015.

<sup>11</sup> Funding for victim assistance activities are especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities.

<sup>12</sup> Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, and the US.

<sup>13</sup> States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Myanmar, Palestine, and Vietnam. Western Sahara was the sole other area that received victim assistance funding.

<sup>14</sup> "VN calls on donors to help with clean up of explosives," *Vietnam News*, 15 March 2014, vietnamnews.vn/society/252370/vn-calls-on-donors-to-help-with-clean-up-of-explosives.html. The information provided, however, was not specific enough and therefore not included Monitor calculations.

<sup>15</sup> Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>16</sup> The Abyei region is located in the Southern Kordofan state in Sudan.

<sup>17</sup> UNMAS, "Overview of UNMAS Funding," undated but last accessed on 20 October 2015, www.mineaction.org/funding/unmas.





# Status of the Convention

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## 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 18 November 2015 there were 162 State Parties

### States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)  
 Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00  
 Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01  
 Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
 Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02  
 Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99  
 Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99  
 Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99  
 Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
 Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98  
 Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00  
 Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99  
 Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)  
 Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
 Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98  
 Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98  
 Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)  
 Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98  
 Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00  
 Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99  
 Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06

Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
 Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98  
 Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03  
 Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99  
 Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02  
 Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01  
 Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)  
 Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99  
 Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01  
 Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00  
 Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)  
 Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)  
 Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)  
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06  
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99  
 Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
 Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98  
 Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03  
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99  
 Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98  
 Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98  
 Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
 Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
 Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99  
 El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
 Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)  
 Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)  
 Estonia 12 May 04 (a)  
 Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04  
 Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98  
 Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)  
 France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
 Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
 Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02  
 Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98

▲  
*International diplomatic work on the Mine Ban Treaty continues at intersessional meetings in Geneva.*

Ghana	4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00	Saint Kitts and Nevis	3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Greece	3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03	Saint Lucia	3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Grenada	3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Guatemala	3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99	Samoa	3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Guinea	4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98	San Marino	3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Guinea-Bissau	3 Dec 97; 22 May 01	São Tomé & Príncipe	30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Guyana	4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03	Senegal	3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Haiti	3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06	Serbia	18 Sep 03 (a)
Holy See	4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98	Seychelles	4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Honduras	3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98	Sierra Leone	29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Hungary	3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98	Slovak Republic	3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Iceland	4 Dec 97; 5 May 99	Slovenia	3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Indonesia	4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07	Solomon Islands	4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Iraq	15 Aug 07 (a)	Somalia	16 Apr 12 (a)
Ireland	3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97	South Africa	3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
Italy	3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99	South Sudan	11 Nov 11 (s)
Jamaica	3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98	Spain	3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Japan	3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98	Sudan	4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Jordan	11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98	Suriname	4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Kenya	5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01	Swaziland	4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Kiribati	7 Sep 00 (a)	Sweden	4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Kuwait	30 Jul 07 (a)	Switzerland	3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Latvia	1 Jul 05 (a)	Tajikistan	12 Oct 99 (a)
Lesotho	4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98	Tanzania	3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Liberia	23 Dec 99 (a)	Thailand	3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Liechtenstein	3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99	Timor-Leste	7 May 03 (a)
Lithuania	26 Feb 99; 12 May 03	Togo	4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Luxembourg	4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99	Trinidad and Tobago	4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Macedonia FYR	9 Sep 98 (a)	Tunisia	4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Madagascar	4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99	Turkey	25 Sep 03 (a)
Malawi	4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98	Turkmenistan	3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Malaysia	3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99	Tuvalu	13 September 2011 (a)
Maldives	1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00	Uganda	3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Mali	3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98	Ukraine	24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
Malta	4 Dec 97; 7 May 01	United Kingdom	3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Mauritania	3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00	Uruguay	3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Mauritius	3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97	Vanuatu	4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Mexico	3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98	Venezuela	3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Moldova	3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00	Yemen	4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Monaco	4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98	Zambia	12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Montenegro	23 Oct 06 (s)	Zimbabwe	3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
Mozambique	3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98		
Namibia	3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98	<b>Signatories</b>	
Nauru	7 Aug 00 (a)	Marshall Islands	4 Dec 97
Netherlands	3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99		
New Zealand	3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99	<b>States not Party</b>	
Nicaragua	4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98	Armenia	Libya
Niger	4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99	Azerbaijan	Micronesia
Nigeria	27 Sep 01 (a)	Bahrain	Mongolia
Niue	3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98	Burma/Myanmar	Morocco
Norway	3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98	China	Nepal
Oman	20 Aug 14 (a)	Cuba	Pakistan
Palau	18 Nov 07 (a)	Egypt	Palestine
Panama	4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98	Georgia	Russian Federation
Papua New Guinea	28 Jun 04 (a)	India	Saudi Arabia
Paraguay	3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98	Iran	Singapore
Peru	3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98	Israel	Sri Lanka
Philippines	3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00	Kazakhstan	Syria
Poland	4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12	Korea, North	Tonga
Portugal	3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99	Korea, South	United Arab Emirates
Qatar	4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98	Kyrgyzstan	United States
Romania	3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00	Lao PDR	Uzbekistan
Rwanda	3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00	Lebanon	Vietnam

# Mine Ban Treaty

18 September 1997

## Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

### Preamble

#### The States Parties

*Determined* to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

*Believing* it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

*Wishing* to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

*Recognizing* that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

*Welcoming* the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

*Welcoming* also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

*Welcoming* furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Stressing* the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

*Recalling* the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

*Basing* themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

### Article 1

#### General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
  - a) To use anti-personnel mines;

- b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
  - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

## Article 2

### Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

## Article 3

### Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

## Article 4

### Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible

but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

## Article 5

### Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
  - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
    - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
    - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
    - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
  - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.



6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

## Article 6

### International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

## Article 7

### Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines

destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

## Article 8

### Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to

the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party

declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days,

and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

## Article 9

### National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

## Article 10

### Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

## Article 11

### Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

- a) The operation and status of this Convention;
- b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
- c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
- d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
- e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
- f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## Article 12

### Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

- a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
- b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
- c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
- d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as

the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## Article 13

### Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

## Article 14

### Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

## Article 15

### Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

## Article 16

### Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

## Article 17

### Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## Article 18

### Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

## Article 19

### Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

## Article 20

### Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

## Article 21

### Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

## Article 22

### Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



# Appendix

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	battle area clearance
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DPO	disabled persons' organization
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Handicap International
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	non-state armed group
OAS	Organization of American States
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VA	victim assistance

## Glossary

**Abandoned explosive ordnance** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

**“All reasonable effort”** – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical dem-

ining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Community-based rehabilitation** – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

**Confirmed hazardous area** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Improvised explosive device** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**International Mine Action Standards** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action

by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**Information Management System for Mine Action** – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

**National mine action authority** – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

**Non-state armed groups** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Reduced land** – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

**Residual risk** – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).



**Survivors** – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

**Suspected hazardous area** – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

**Unexploded cluster submunitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

**Victim** – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.





# Landmine Monitor 2015



*Landmine Monitor 2015* provides a global overview of efforts in 2014 and part of 2015 to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assess the international community's response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.



Cover: Oberney, an advocate for farmers and 2013 landmine accident survivor in Colombia, can no longer farm but with assistance was able to open a store next to his house to help support his two children.

© Bas Bogaerts/Handicap International, March 2015

Left, top: HALO teams demining along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. In September 2015, Mozambique declared itself landmine-free.

© HALO Trust, March 2014

Left, bottom: Deminer Bonifácio using a dog to help with mine detection in Manica province, Mozambique.

© Eva Maria Fischer/Handicap International, June 2014

Cover Design by Rafael Jiménez  
Printed and bound in Switzerland

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is coordinated by the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC. Research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations comprise the committee: DanChurchAid, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Mines Action Canada



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**LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION  
MONITOR**

ISBN 978-2-8399-1707-0



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