Cluster Munition Monitor 2010
Mine Action
© Alison Locke, 2006
Clearance in Southern Lebanon.
Global Contamination and Impact
As of 1 September 2010, at least 23 states and three other areas are believed to have cluster munition remnants on their territory.[1]
Cluster munition remnants are defined in the Convention on Cluster Munitions as covering four types of hazard: unexploded submunitions, unexploded bomblets, failed cluster munitions, and abandoned cluster munitions.[2] The greatest threat to the civilian population typically comes from unexploded submunitions, primarily as a result of their sensitive fuzing, but also because of their shape, color, and metal content, which often attracts tampering, playing, or collection by boys and young men.
States and other areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants
Africa |
Americas |
Asia-Pacific |
Europe-CIS |
Middle East-North Africa |
Angola |
Argentina* |
Afghanistan |
Azerbaijan |
Iraq |
Chad |
Cambodia |
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) |
Lebanon |
|
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) |
Lao PDR |
Croatia |
Syria |
|
Republic of the Congo |
Vietnam |
Georgia (South Ossetia) |
Western Sahara |
|
Guinea-Bissau |
Montenegro |
|||
Mauritania |
Russia |
|||
Sudan |
Serbia |
|||
Tajikistan |
||||
United Kingdom* |
||||
Kosovo |
||||
Nagorno-Karabakh |
Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain areas with unexploded submunitions.
Two of these states, the Republic of the Congo and Guinea-Bissau, are believed to be contaminated from explosions at ammunition storage areas and not from use of cluster munitions during armed conflict.
In addition, at least 13 other states may also be contaminated or contain a small residual threat from unexploded submunitions including Colombia, Eritrea, Grenada, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Malta, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, as well as Chile and Jordan, which may have contamination from firing ranges.
Albania and Zambia, both States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, declared that they had cleared all unexploded submunitions from their territory by November 2009 and May 2010, respectively.
Three other states where cluster munitions were used in the past—Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda—are no longer believed to be contaminated, but the possibility is not excluded. Sierra Leone is a State Party and Uganda a signatory to the convention.
The region most affected by cluster munitions, by far, is Southeast Asia, followed by Europe. The extent of contamination across affected states varies significantly. The table below highlights those states and other areas with the greatest contamination from unexploded submunitions, based on the best available information as of mid-2010.
Extent of contamination from unexploded submunitions in most heavily affected states and other areas
State/area |
Estimated extent of |
No. of confirmed and suspected hazardous |
Convention status |
Lao PDR |
No credible estimate, but massive |
Not known |
State Party |
Vietnam |
No credible estimate, but massive |
Not known |
Non-signatory |
Iraq |
No credible estimate, but very large |
Not known |
Signatory |
Cambodia |
No credible estimate, but very large |
Not known |
Non-signatory |
Nagorno-Karabakh |
94 |
255* |
Not applicable |
Western Sahara |
28 |
178 |
Not applicable |
Lebanon |
23 |
Not reported |
Signatory |
Serbia |
22.7 |
404 |
Non-signatory |
Kosovo |
Not quantified |
60 |
Not applicable |
Sudan |
Not quantified |
34 |
Non-signatory |
Mauritania |
6 |
1 |
Signatory |
Croatia |
4.3 |
19 |
State Party |
BiH |
2 |
18 |
State Party |
Montenegro |
0.25 |
Not reported |
State Party |
Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.
* HALO Trust’s database does not distinguish between cluster munition remnants and other contamination, but almost all of the 255 sites contain unexploded submunitions.[3]
Mine Action Programs Addressing Unexploded Submunitions
Of the affected states and other areas, almost all had active mine action programs in 2009–2010.[4] During the same period, however, there was actual clearance of unexploded submunitions or some form of survey (not necessarily nationwide) of cluster munition remnants known to take place in just 14 states and three other areas, as set out in the table below. Moreover, in many of these, clearance and survey activities related to unexploded submunitions were very limited.
Mine action programs addressing unexploded submunitions in 2009 to June 2010
State/area |
Survey |
Clearance |
Afghanistan |
No |
Yes |
Albania |
Yes |
Yes |
Angola |
No |
Yes |
Azerbaijan |
No |
No |
BiH |
Yes |
Yes |
Cambodia |
No |
Yes |
Chad |
No |
No |
Croatia |
No |
Not known |
DRC |
No |
Yes |
Republic of the Congo |
No |
No |
Georgia |
Yes |
Yes |
Guinea-Bissau |
No |
Yes |
Iraq |
No |
Not known |
Lao PDR |
Yes |
Yes |
Lebanon |
Yes |
Yes |
Mauritania |
No |
No |
Montenegro |
No |
No |
Russia |
Not known |
Not known |
Serbia |
Yes |
Yes |
Sudan |
No |
Yes |
Syria |
No |
Spot clearance only |
Tajikistan |
No |
No |
UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas) |
Yes |
Yes |
Vietnam |
Yes |
Yes |
Zambia |
Yes |
Yes |
Kosovo |
Yes |
Yes |
Nagorno-Karabakh |
Yes |
Yes |
Western Sahara |
Yes |
Yes |
Clearance Obligations Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Each state is obliged to clear and destroy all unexploded submunitions located in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] If unable to complete clearance in time, a state may request an extension of the deadline for periods of up to five years.
Of the 40 states that had signed and ratified the convention as of 7 September 2010, BiH, Croatia, Lao PDR, Montenegro, and the UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas) were believed to be affected by unexploded submunitions. Malta may have a small residual threat from unexploded submunitions left from World War II. The legal deadline for completing clearance for these states is 1 August 2020, except for the UK, which has a deadline of 1 November 2020, and BiH with a deadline of 1 March 2021.
In seeking to fulfill their clearance and destruction obligation, affected States Parties are required to:
- survey, assess, and record the threat, making every effort to identify all contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control;
- assess and prioritize needs for marking, protection of civilians, clearance, and destruction;
- take “all feasible steps” to perimeter-mark, monitor, and fence affected areas;
- conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas;
- take steps to mobilize the necessary resources (at the national and international levels); and
- develop a national plan, building upon existing structures, experiences, and methodologies.
In doing so, affected States Parties are required to “take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).”[6] Applicable IMAS are, in particular, the following:
- 08.10: General Mine Action Assessment;
- 08.20: Land Release;
- 08.21: Non-technical Survey;
- 08.22: Technical Survey; and
- 09.11: Battle Area Clearance.[7]
Reporting obligations under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions are more extensive than those contained in the Mine Ban Treaty. Thus, it is not just necessary to report on the location of areas contaminated and cleared and the number of explosive items cleared, but also the following:
- estimated size of affected areas;
- size of areas cleared; and
- disaggregated clearance statistics for each type of unexploded submunition cleared and destroyed, with clarity as to the type and precise number of dispensers and explosive submunitions or explosive bomblets destroyed.
As a good practice, cancellation of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) by non-technical survey or release of part of confirmed hazardous areas by technical survey should also be carefully recorded and reported by states and demining operators. This includes situations where clearance and destruction of unexploded submunitions has been conducted only on the surface of the ground, making it clear whether and why sub-surface clearance will or will not subsequently be required. Care must be taken not to “double-report” land that is first cleared only on the surface and then sub-surface.
Release of Areas Affected by Unexploded Submunitions
Land release concept
If unexploded submunition contamination is to be addressed efficiently, national authorities will have to develop transparent systems to reduce SHAs to confirmed hazardous areas containing such remnants. As the IMAS on land release states, “On some occasions, land has been subjected to full clearance unnecessarily.”[8] Any land that is not contaminated with unexploded submunitions or other explosive remnants of war (ERW), but is physically cleared represents inefficiency and a potentially huge waste of resources for a national clearance program.
In part, land release is a recognition that some surveys have led to excessive estimates of the size and number of SHAs. There is now a better understanding that an array of techniques other than full clearance can enable SHAs to be addressed efficiently and with a high degree of safety for both program personnel and the intended beneficiaries. These techniques include better information gathering and verification, and greater use of high-quality non-technical and technical survey.[9]
Care must be taken, however, when applying land release to ensure that certain basic principles are followed. In particular, any land confirmed to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions must be cleared to the standards of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the process of cancellation of SHAs by non-technical survey, and land release by technical survey (see Technical survey section below), must be accountable and follow applicable mine action standards.
Non-technical survey
Non-technical survey is defined by the relevant IMAS as survey which involves “collecting and analysing new and/or existing information about a hazardous area. Its purpose is to confirm whether there is evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and extent of hazards within any hazardous area and to define, as far as is possible, the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas without physical intervention. A non-technical survey does not normally involve the use of clearance or verification assets. Exceptions occur when assets are used for the sole purpose of providing access for non-technical survey teams. The results from a non-technical survey can replace any previous data relating to the survey of an area.”[10]
In 2009–2010, non-technical survey of SHAs suspected to contain unexploded submunitions was conducted in Lebanon, Serbia, Zambia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
In Lebanon, the remaining area containing unexploded submunitions to be cleared at the end of 2009 was approximately 23km2,[11] a significant increase from the estimated 16km2 remaining at the end of 2008 and despite clearance of 4.6km2 in 2009. The increase is the result of re-surveying the contaminated areas, and the transmission of Israeli data on cluster munition strikes, which was finally provided in May 2009.[12] This data indicated 282 potential strike locations that had not previously been identified, of which 166 are north of, and the other 116 south of, the Litani river.[13]
In Serbia, two Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) survey teams, each with two surveyors, started a general survey of areas affected by unexploded submunitions in November 2007. The first part of the project, completed in November 2008, covered all areas that had been targeted with cluster munition strikes and found 15 municipalities affected by SHAs totaling 30.7km2.[14] The second part of the survey, started in January 2009, focused on preparing clearance tasks but also identified a 16th municipality affected by unexploded submunitions. Of 6.7km2 surveyed in 2009, 3km2 was cancelled and released.[15]
At the request of the government of Zambia, between August 2008 and June 2009 NPA surveyed seven of its nine provinces—Eastern, Southern, Lusaka, Western, North-Western, Central, and Luapula.[16] The survey confirmed two hazardous areas containing unexploded submunitions.[17] Both areas were subsequently cleared.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, HALO initially conducted emergency surface clearance of unexploded submunitions. By 2008, HALO concluded there was also a significant sub-surface threat and they subsequently began a re-survey of cluster munition strikes. The result of the survey was an increase of area from 85km2 to 94km2 in need of clearance between 2008 and 2009. Sub-surface clearance has consistently resulted in clearing more area than originally estimated to be contaminated, and new surveys of previously unknown cluster munition strikes have added to the total SHA.[18]
Technical survey
IMAS defines technical survey as “a detailed intervention with clearance or verification assets into a CHA [confirmed hazardous area], or part of a CHA. It should confirm the presence of mines/ERW leading to the definition of one or more DHA [defined hazardous area] and may indicate the absence of mines/ERW which could allow land to be released when combined with other evidence.”[19]
In 2009–2010, technical survey of areas suspected or confirmed to contain unexploded submunitions was conducted in Georgia and Lao PDR.
In 2009 in Lao PDR, UXO Lao released 3.87km2 through technical survey, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action released 0.08km2 for a total of 3.95km2, compared with 2.74km2 the previous year.[20] UXO Lao noted technical survey is “gaining widespread acceptance” and hoped to increase the number of teams conducting technical survey, but also observed that this depended on further training and capacity development.[21]
In Georgia, NPA conducted an underwater survey of Poti harbor on 3–24 January 2010. The survey, which covered 10,700m2 of seabed, found a number of unfired projectiles located along the piers, which are believed to have fallen from sunken vessels, but did not find any unexploded submunitions.[22]
Clearance and destruction
Reporting by states and operators on clearance of unexploded submunitions is incomplete and of varying quality. Based on this reporting, as well as information gathered in concerned programs, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has calculated that clearance in 2009 covered at least 38km2 of affected land, with the destruction of 55,156 submunitions in 14 states and three other areas.
There are currently no specific international standards for the clearance of unexploded submunitions. Thus, the decision whether in certain instances to clear only the surface of an affected area (either through visual search or with the assistance of a detector), or whether to seek to clear land to a specific depth, remains the subject of debate at national level. According to the IMAS, “Different depths of clearance may be specified for different areas depending on an assessment of hazard and future land use.”[23]
Clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2009
State/area |
Cluster munition contaminated |
No. of submunitions destroyed |
Types of cluster munition remnant destroyed |
Afghanistan |
0.67 |
2,607* |
Abandoned cluster munitions and unexploded submunitions |
Albania |
0.28 |
327 |
Unexploded submunitions |
BiH |
N/R |
267 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Cambodia |
N/R |
N/R** |
Unexploded submunitions |
DRC |
N/R |
15 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Georgia |
31.8 |
2,132 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Guinea-Bissau |
N/R |
73 |
Abandoned cluster munitions and unexploded submunitions |
Lao PDR |
N/R*** |
40,499 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Lebanon |
3.90 |
3,964 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Serbia |
0.53 |
4 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Sudan |
N/R |
N/R |
Unexploded submunitions |
UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas) |
N/R |
1 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Vietnam |
3.04* |
3,831* |
Unexploded submunitions |
Zambia |
0.10 |
18 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Kosovo |
0.25 |
82 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Nagorno-Karabakh |
N/R*** |
N/R*** |
Unexploded submunitions |
Western Sahara |
0.95 |
1,336 |
Unexploded submunitions |
Total |
41.52 |
55,156 |
Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.
N/R=not reported
* Reporting is known to be incomplete.
** Mines Advisory Group has reported that in northeastern Stueng Traeng province, where they have one battle area clearance (BAC) team operating, submunitions typically account for 80% of the ERW they clear.
*** Clearance is not disaggregated from other BAC/disposal of ERW.
In only a few situations were specially dedicated teams focusing on the clearance of unexploded submunitions in 2009. In Albania, DanChurchAid (DCA) deployed two BAC teams during the year, each team consisting of one team leader, one deputy team leader, two medics, and eight deminers.[24] In Georgia, NPA operated two teams with 10 BAC personnel equipped with detectors; a third team was added in 2010.[25] In Lebanon, several of the major demining operators have BAC teams specifically focused on the clearance of unexploded submunitions, including the Lebanese armed forces, DCA, Mines Advisory Group, and NPA. Funding constraints led to three other clearance operators leaving the country in 2009. In Serbia, three demining organizations with a total of 66 clearance personnel worked on clearance of unexploded submunitions in 2009.
In Kosovo, HALO had one BAC team of 20 clearance personnel who cleared 0.25km2 of cluster munition contaminated areas in Berisha and Vrelo.[26] In Western Sahara, Landmine Action used three BAC teams of six clearance personnel each, including a total of three women.[27]
[1] Argentina and the UK both claim jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are affected by unexploded submunitions, but for the purposes of this accounting, only one state is included in the total.
[2] The term unexploded submunitions refers to submunitions that have been dispersed and have landed, but have failed to explode as intended. Unexploded bomblets are similar to unexploded submunitions but refer to “explosive bomblets” which have been dropped from a fixed-wing aircraft dispenser but have failed to explode as intended. Failed cluster munitions are where cluster munitions are dropped or fired but a dispenser fails to disperse the submunitions as intended. The term abandoned cluster munitions refers to unused cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped, and are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 2, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 15.
[3] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 2 September 2010.
[4] The exceptions were Montenegro, Russia (Chechnya), and Syria (Golan Heights), where there was minimal or no ongoing clearance of any explosive ordnance.
[5] The convention stipulates that where a State Party is subsequently affected by new cluster munition remnants, the deadline is not later than 10 years after the end of the active hostilities during which cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants.
[6] Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 4, paragraph 3.
[7]See www.mineactionstandards.org. A Technical Note for Mine Action based on lessons learned during the clearance of unexploded submunitions in Lebanon was being revised as of mid-2010.
[8]UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “IMAS 08.20: Land release,” First Edition, New York, 10 June 2009, p. v, www.mineactionstandards.org.
[9] In September 2009, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) noted that land release principles are also applicable to battle areas, including areas affected by cluster munition remnants, but procedures tailored to battle areas would be elaborated in a separate IMAS. Telephone interview with Havard Bach, Head, Operational Methods Section, GICHD, 11 September 2009.
[10] UNMAS, “IMAS 08.21: Non-Technical Survey,” First Edition, New York, June 2009, pp. 1–2, www.mineactionstandards.org.
[11] Interview with Maj. Charmen Rahal, Acting Chief, Regional Mine Action Center, Nabatiye, 3 June 2010.
[12] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, Director, Lebanon Mine Action Center, Beirut, 1 June 2010.
[13] UN Security Council, “Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006),” S/2009/566, New York, 2 November 2009, p. 11, www.reliefweb.int.
[14] NPA, “Report on impact of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia,” Belgrade, January 2009, pp. 9, 69.
[15] Interview with Petar Mihajlović, Director, and Sladjana Košutić, International Cooperation Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre, Belgrade, 26 April 2010.
[16] Government of Zambia/UNDP, “Terms of Reference, Landmine and ERW Survey in Zambia,” Lusaka, 16 August 2007, p. 2; Zambia Article 7 Report, Form J, 3 April 2009; and statement of Zambia, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.
[17] NPA, “Landmine and other ERW Survey in Zambia, Final Report,” 30 September 2009, p. 5.
[18] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 28 April 2010.
[19] UNMAS, “IMAS 08.20: Land release,” First Edition, New York, June 2009, p. 2, www.mineactionstandards.org.
[20] National Regulatory Authority, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2009,” Vientiane, undated but 2010, p. 5.
[21] Interview with John Dingley, Senior Technical Advisor, UXO Lao, Vientiane, 6 May 2010; and UXO Lao, “Annual Report 2009,” Vientiane, undated but 2010, p. 4.
[22] NPA, “Poti Harbour Survey Technical Report, 3rd to 24th of January 2009,” p. 5.
[23] UNMAS, “IMAS 09.11: Battle Area Clearance,” First Edition, New York, 1 September 2007, p. 3, www.mineactionstandards.org.
[24] Email from Anthony Connell, Programme Manager, DCA, 25 March 2010.
[25]Interview with Jonathon Guthrie, former Programme Manager, NPA, in Tyre, Lebanon, 12 August 2010.
[26]Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 7 May 2010; and EOD Coordination Team Mine Action Centre, “Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2009,” Kosovo Protection Force Force Advisory Office, Pristina, 5 January 2010, p. 5.
[27] Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and GIS Manager, Landmine Action, 15 February 2010.