The Mine Ban Treaty is one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation and the widespread adherence to the norm it is establishing against antipersonnel landmines.

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty was signed on 3 December 1997 by 122 countries and entered into force more than 13 years ago on 1 March 1999. One country, signatory Poland, has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the last Landmine Monitor report, making a total of 161 States Parties, or more than 80% of the world's nations. Most of those still outside the treaty nevertheless abide by its key provisions, indicating near-universal acceptance of the landmine ban.

Yet challenges remain. Several major states are not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including the United States (US), where an ongoing landmine ban policy review is not expected to be decided until late 2013. Syria and Myanmar were both confirmed to be using antipersonnel mines in 2012 and 2013. Moreover, while overall implementation has been impressive, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties related to destruction of stockpiles by the treaty-mandated deadlines and use of the weapon.

Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL.

This overview chapter has two parts. The first examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by its States Parties. The second section provides a global overview of banning antipersonnel mines, as well as the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by the 36 states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from September 2012 to October 2013.

Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

In general, States Parties' implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of other States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.

The treaty's compliance provision – contained in Article 8 – have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question. However, the ICBL has on numerous occasions called for States Parties to operationalize Article 8's formal mechanisms in order to be prepared for any eventual need. The ICBL believes it may become necessary for States Parties to consider this process if the apparent use of antipersonnel mines by forces loyal to the government of Yemen in 2011 and other serious allegations of use by States Parties are not adequately addressed by the concerned states.

Prohibition on use (Article 1)

All previous editions of Landmine Monitor have stated that there has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. This achievement appears to be in jeopardy given the weight of evidence that has emerged that government forces in Yemen used antipersonnel mines at two locations in 2011. The ICBL believes that States Parties should put a high priority on ascertaining the facts, and should consider the initiation of the formal compliance clarification mechanism provided for by the Mine Ban Treaty if the government of Yemen cannot adequately explain the circumstances at Bani Jarmooz and at the Ministry of Trade and Industry compound in the capital, Sana'a. In addition, a Turkish military court convicted a Turkish general under the charge of negligence in an incident where his troops used antipersonnel mines in 2009 – this initial verdict is likely to be appealed.

In this reporting period, commencing in September 2012, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in States Parties. However, there was an unconfirmed allegation of use in South Sudan. In July 2013, after a visit to Jonglei state, the NGO Refugees International issued a report that stated that government forces have been laying antipersonnel mines in the town of Pibor in the southeast of Jonglei state, adding to previous allegations of use in South Sudan.

Additionally, a number of previous allegations of mine use by the armed forces of Sudan (in 2011), Turkey in (another case from 2009), and Cambodia (2008 and 2009) remain unresolved and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

Yemen

Credible new information emerged this year from three independent sources indicating that the government's Republican Guard planted thousands of antipersonnel mines in late 2011 at Bani Jarmooz, north of Yemenâ's capital city.^[1] From their descriptions and drawings by local residents, Human Rights Watch (HRW) identified PMN antipersonnel mines that were found in the area, while photographs taken by a journalist indicate that other types of mines may have been used, including the PMD-6 antipersonnel mine.^[2]

In total, HRW estimates that at least 15 civilian casualties, including nine children, have resulted from landmines in the area from September 2011 to May

2013.^[3] The most recent victim was Fawaz Mohsin Saleh Husn, a 9-year-old boy from al-Khabsha village, who was injured by a mine at Bani Jarmooz on 12 April 2013.^[4] The casualties all occurred in the vicinity of military camps that the 63rd and 81st Brigades of the Republican Guard established in July 2011 and which remain in place as of September 2013. There has been no other military activity in the area that could explain the presence of the mines. HRW did not observe any fencing or warning signs when it visited the site in April 2013.

Yemen's Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Ali Mohamed Saeed Majawar, responded to the allegations late May 2013, stating, "we have contacted the relevant government bodies and Yemen Mission in Geneva. It was agreed that an official investigation will be conducted on the use of AP [antipersonnel] mines in the mentioned area, by whom and the guilty will be punished. YEMAC will implement a level one survey to locate the mines and clear them to stop any further casualties"^[5]

Sometime after May 2011, antipersonnel mines were laid inside a building compound of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in the capital city, Sana'a.^[6] Deminers from the Army Engineering Corps were seen in a video recording obtained by HRW removing at least 25 antipersonnel mines from the compound on 7 March 2012, including one mine type not encountered before in Yemen, either in stock or emplaced.^[7] The forces that used the mines at the compound could not be conclusively determined.^[8]

South Sudan

During 2011 and 2013, there were several incidents in which landmines were apparently laid in South Sudan, including in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile; however, the Monitor could not determine who was responsible for the mine use. The ICBL expressed concern at "alarming reports" of new landmine use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).^[9] In May 2012, the ICBL again drew States Parties' attention to apparent new mine-laying in 2011, but noted it was not possible to determine who was responsible or whether antipersonnel mines in addition to antivehicle mines had been laid.^[10]

In July 2013, after a visit to Jonglei state, the NGO Refugees International issued a report that stated that "multiple UN and NGO sources have …reported that members of the [Sudan People's Liberation Army, SPLA] have been laying anti-personnel mines in civilian areas. However the UN Mine Action Service has been unable to conduct an investigation that would confirm this."^[11] The report also cited recent civilian injuries from antipersonnel mines. Refugees International informed the ICBL that the mine use was in the town of Pibor in the southeast of Jonglei state.^[12]

Sudan

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that antipersonnel mines are available for use in the southern part of the country, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and

statements, the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations.^[13]

During early 2012, discoveries of stockpiles or allegations of mine use were reported in South Kordofan in the towns of Taroji,^[14] Heglig,^[15] Heiban,^[16] and at the Jebel Kwo military base located near the village of Tess.^[17] In August 2013, the South Kordofan state secretary for the rebel Justice & Equality Movement (JEM), Engineer al-Rehema Ismail Fedail, accused the government of Sudan of planting landmines in North and South Kordofan states, identifying several newly-mined locations including Um 'Djamena, southern al-Dabekr, southern Abu Zabad and al-Tamjoyah, in addition to al-Dashol and Abu Janok areas.^[18]

The ICBL has expressed "œgrave concern" at allegations of antipersonnel mine use by armed forces of the Republic of Sudan in South Kordofan and urged the government to clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines.^[19] It has called on Sudan to clarify if it has new contamination resulting from antipersonnel mine use and urged the government to allow international NGOs to continue mine action operations across the country.^[20]

In May 2012, a representative of the government of Sudan stated that regarding use allegations reported in February 2012, it would "carry out an investigation" and "declare the findings" in its next annual Article 7 report.^[21] At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Sudan publicly committed to investigate the allegation.^[22]

Yet the Article 7 report provided in April 2013 contains no new information with respect to the use allegation in South Kordofan. In December 2012, Sudan said the mine use allegations were "not accurate" because they come from "rebel groups" and urged that information concerning new mine use be shared with the government's national mine action center.^[23]

Turkey

In 2009, there were serious allegations of at least two instances of use of antipersonnel mines by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23rd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province on 9 April 2009.^[24] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties, "A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones."^[25]

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Çukurca on 27 May 2009.^[26] The Turkish Army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before its detonation.^[27] An investigation by the Chief Prosecutor's Office in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish Commander.^[28] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff Military Prosecutor's Office in 2010.^[29]

According to media accounts, in September 2010 a report on the incident to the military's prosecutor's office found that the device used was an "anti-personnel landmine." Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the emplacement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish Martial Court.^[30] General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.^[31] In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning.^[32] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties, "The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months of imprisonment due to 'causing death and injury by negligence.'" Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict and not a final decision.^[33]

Cambodia

Previous allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodian forces on the Cambodian-Thai border, made by Thailand in 2008 and 2009, have not been resolved.^[34] In May 2011, in response to a request by the Monitor for an update regarding a promised fact-finding mission report into the allegations, a government official stated that the report could not be completed due to a lack of response by Thailand to a request for further details.^[35]

Cambodia, according to a request for information made by the ICBL, conducted a fact-finding mission from 10 – 12 May 2013 to investigate an incident in March 2013 in which three Thai soldiers were injured by what the Thai military alleged were newly planted mines near the Ta Kwai Temple in Phanom Dong Rak district.^[36] Cambodia informed States Parties that its fact-finding mission determined that the Thai solders were injured by mines laid in the past during the Cambodian civil war. Cambodia's investigation stated that its soldiers found indications of the incident on the same day, and provided a GPS reference that was different than the reference where the Thai military stated the incident took place. The Cambodian fact-finding mission stated that the incident took place to the side of, and not on, a specially cleared path used for military-to-military meetings between the Thai and Cambodian military in that particular area. The Cambodian delegation informed States Parties that it had discussed its investigations with the ICBL. Cambodia provided a copy of its investigation report to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit and the ICBL at the May 2013 intersessional meeting and to the government of Thailand through diplomatic channels.^[37]

Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)

A total of at least 150 of the 161 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, including 87 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 63 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes).

Of the remaining 11 States Parties:

• Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu have not made an official declaration, but are not thought to possess stockpiles;^[38]
• Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010;
• Finland and Poland are in the process of destroying their stockpiles;
• Somalia, while initially declaring not to possess any antipersonnel mines, is in the process of assessing whether any are currently possessed;
• Côte d'Ivoire reported in November 2012 that it discovered 1,526 antipersonnel mines of four types during an inventory;
• Both Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan need to formally confirm to States Parties that they no longer possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines; and
• Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005 deadline had passed.

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 47 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 250,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2012. Eight States Parties possess nearly 11 million antipersonnel mines awaiting destruction: Belarus (3,356,636), Côte d'Ivoire (1,526), Finland (809,308), Greece (953,285), Guinea-Bissau (at least seven), Poland (13,585), South Sudan (at least four), and Ukraine (5,767,600).

Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

South Sudan	9 July 2015
Finland	1 July 2016
Somalia	1 October 2016
Poland	1 June 2017

Finland has commenced the destruction of its stockpile that once totaled more than one million mines, destroying 220,455 mines in 2012, and has reported it will complete the destruction of the remainder of its stockpile before the end of 2015, prior to its July 2016 deadline.^[39] Poland destroyed more than one million mines during the decade while it was a signatory and has 13,585 antipersonnel mines left to destroy by its June 2017 stockpile destruction deadline. South Sudan declared the completion of stockpile destruction before independence from Sudan, but it has also reported discovering small quantities of antipersonnel mines since entry into force. In a statement to States Parties in May 2013, South Sudan indicated this stockpile has not yet been destroyed and it has given no indication of when this task will be accomplished.^[40]

Somalia has declared possessing no stocks, but also cautions that "large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals" and that it "is currently putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds anti-personnel mines in its stockpiles."^[41]

During a national inventory of its ammunition stockpiles, Côte d'Ivoire discovered 1,526 antipersonnel mines and it apparently intends to retain 290 of these mines for training purposes.^[42] It previously declared not possessing stockpiles, including for training purposes, and its stockpile destruction deadline was 1 December 2004.^[43] During its statement on stockpile destruction at the April 2013 Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Côte d'Ivoire reported having destroyed all of its mines under the Mine Ban Treaty.^[44] Guinea-Bissau, which reported completion of stockpile destruction in 2005, stated in December 2011 it had discovered a small number of mines in storage and intended to destroy them by the end of March 2012, but destruction had not taken place as of May 2013.

The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010 – 2014 calls on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date.

Belarus has repeatedly stated that it requires international assistance in order to destroy its remaining antipersonnel mines. An attempt to provide assistance through a project financed through the European Commission collapsed in 2006.^[45] A new program was “re-launched” by the European Union (EU) on 30 June 2010 with a period of performance stipulated at 28 months.^[46] On 30 December 2010, the EU officially announced that the contract was awarded to the Spanish company Explosivos Alaveses SA (EXPAL), for a total value of €3,900,000 (US$5,171,790).^[47] In December 2012, Belarus informed States Parties that there had been delays in the construction of the facility, including a change in subcontractors in mid-2012, but it said the destruction should begin in the first half of 2013.^[48] In May 2013, Belarus stated that EXPAL was completing installation of the destruction facility, which it said was "90 percent operational." Belarus said it could not give an exact deadline for when the mines will be destroyed and committed to "continue to keep States Parties updated"on its progress towards stockpile destruction.^[49]

Greece started its stockpile destruction almost eight months after its deadline under a contract with Hellenic Defense Systems S.A. (EAS), but then halted stockpile destruction operations in early 2010 after an explosion at the subcontractor's destruction facility located in Bulgaria and other problems led Greece to cancel the contract with EAS.^[50] In May 2012, Greece stated that stockpile destruction was suspended pending the conclusion of a contractual dispute between the government and the contractor and subsequent appeal.^[51] In December 2012, Greece announced that it would resume work with EAS rather than prolong a delayed legal process.^[52] On 29 April 2013, Greece signed a modified contract for the destruction of the remaining 60% of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, following "extensive negotiations" between the Ministry of National Defence and EAS.^[53] In July 2013, a Greek official confirmed to the ICBL that Greece would "continue their cooperation for the stockpile destruction of the remaining 60% of the anti-personnel mines based on a modified contract" with EAS but gave no indication that destruction had recommenced.^[54]

On 21 September 2011, Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency (NSPA)^[55] signed an agreement to implement a project to destroy 2.7 million PFM mines in cassettes and blocks using €2.35 million ($3.27 million) in funding coming from the EU through a NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund over a period of three years.^[56] In December 2012, Ukraine stated that the "large-scale" destruction of the landmine stockpile would begin in January 2013 and said that one million mines will be destroyed each year.^[57] In May 2013, however, Ukraine said it was only able to undertake a lower level of destruction with small funds from Germany, noting that "since 2010" it has been waiting for the EU funds to be dispersed.^[58] Additionally, Ukraine has not provided clear information on plans to destroy the PFM mines contained in 220mm rocket warheads not covered by its agreement with NPSA. Nor has Ukraine publicly announced plans to destroy its stockpile of 149,096 POM-2 mines.^[59] It did report that the US was providing funding for a kiln for other weapon destruction that could then be used to destroy further mines, noting that it was taking steps to complete the construction of the facilities where the mines will be dismantled. Ukraine said the "capabilities we are putting in place demonstrate we are doing everything in our power to get there"^[60] but noted that the deadline for destroying the stockpile will depend on funding from the EU.

Mines Retained for Training and Research (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer "a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques… The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes."

A total of 75 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 44 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-one States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 29 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. A total of 28% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual Article 7 report for calendar year 2012, which was due by 30 April 2013.

Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines. Because of this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2012 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for previous years.

Key updates from calendar year 2012 were:

• Sudan destroyed its entire remaining stock of retained mines, a total of 1,938 mines;
• Zambia eliminated more than half of its retained mines, a total of 1,213 mines;
• Australia eliminated more than half of its retained mines, a total of 3,654 mines;
• Brazil used nearly 20% of its retained mines, a total of 1,326 mines; and
• Côte d'Ivoire has acquired 290 retained mines from a stockpile of 1,526 antipersonnel mines it discovered in November 2012.

In addition to those listed below, an additional 31 States Parties each retain less than 1,000 mines for a total of 11,979 retained mines.^[61]

A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Eleven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Angola, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

State	Last known declaration (for year)	Initial declaration	Reported consumed in 2012	Year of last declared consumption	Reduced as excess to needs
Finland	16,500 (2012)	16,500	0	None ever	–
Turkey	15,041 (2012)	16,000	59	2012	–
Bangladesh	12,500 (2012)	15,000	0	None ever	–
Sweden	6,930 (2012)	13,948	164	2012	–
Brazil	6,587 (2012)	17,000	1,326	2012	–
Greece	6,158 (2012)	7,224	0	2009	–
Belarus	6,022 (2012)	7,530	8	2012	–
Algeria	5,970 (2012)	15,030	0	2009
Croatia	5,717 (2012)	17,500	58	2012
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	Not reported	2010	–
Tunisia	4,840 (2012)	5,000	50	2012	–
Bhutan	4,491 (2006)	4,491	Not reported	None ever	–
South Africa	4,367 (2012)	4,830	0	2010	–
France	3,956 (2012)	4,539	35	2012	–
Yemen	3,760 (2012)	4,000	0	Unclear	–
Bulgaria	3,672 (2012)	10,466	0	2007	6,446
Nigeria	3,364 (2011)	3,364	Not reported	None ever	–
Thailand	3,350 (2012)	15,604	24	2012	4,517
Serbia	3,149 (2012)	5,000	0	2011	1,970
Australia	3,134 (2012)	10,000	3,654	2011	5,769
Chile	3,012 (2012)	28,647	216	2012	23,694
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	Not reported	None ever	–
Slovenia	2,980 (2012)	7,000	2	2012	4,000
Belgium	2,569 (2012)	5,980	472	2012	–
Romania	2,500 (2012)	4,000	0	2003	1,500
Indonesia	2,454 (2012)	4,978	0	2009	2,524
Czech Rep.	2,360 (2012)	4,859	83	2012	–
Japan	2,161 (2012)	15,000	258	2012	–
Germany	2,111 (2012)	3,006	19	2011	–
Peru	2,015 (2012)	9,526	25	2012	7,487
Canada	1,921 (2012)	1,781	0	2010	–
Denmark	1,832 (2012)	4,991	47	2012	2,900
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	Not reported	2007	–
Uganda	1,764 (2011)	2,400	Not reported	2003	–
Netherlands	1,750 (2012)	4,076	80	2012	–
Spain	1,710 (2012)	10,000	8	2012	6,000
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	Not reported	2009	–
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	1,624 (2011)	2,405	Not reported	Unclear	–
Mozambique	1,363 (2012)	1,427	320	2012	260
Angola	1,304 (2012)	1,460	135	2012	–
Slovakia	1,272 (2012)	7,000	0	2011	5,500
Cambodia	1,190 (2012)	701	0	Unclear	–
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	Not reported	2007	–
Botswana	1,019 (2012)	1,019	Not reported	Unclear	–
Partial Total	170,723	335,383	7,043		72,567

Note: The category "Reduced as excess to needs" represents circumstances, since entry into force, when a State Party reduces the quantity retained for reasons not related to permitted purposes.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but only a few have explained the reductions in their Article 7 reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2012 were Brazil (1,326 fewer mines), Czech Republic (83 fewer mines), Denmark (47 fewer mines), Eritrea (71 fewer mines), Iraq (706 fewer mines), Ireland (1 fewer mine), Lithuania (26 fewer mines), the Netherlands (80 fewer mines), Peru (25 fewer mines), Slovenia (2 fewer mines), Spain (8 fewer mines), Sudan (1,938 fewer mines), Turkey (59 fewer mines), Zambia (1,213 fewer mines), and Zimbabwe (50 fewer mines).

Four States Parties have increased the number of their retained mines in the reporting period. Cambodia retained an additional 72 mines cleared in its demining operations. South Africa's total increased by 11 mines. France consumed 98 mines in training, but also obtained 113 mines from an unknown source. As a result, France's net total of retained mines went up by 15. Ukraine transferred 605 antipersonnel mines from its stockpiles, after previously declaring the destruction of all its retained mines.

While laudable for their transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

• Australia keeps no serviceable detonators for more than 3,100 retained mines in stock;
• Canada reported it has transferred 86 mines from Afghanistan without fuzes;
• Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless; and
• Mozambique, Eritrea, Germany, and Senegal also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 21 States Parties have over time used expanded Form D of annual Article 7 reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines.^[62]

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

During the reporting period, since September 2012, initial reports were submitted by Finland, Somalia, and South Sudan. Poland's initial Article 7 report is due by 28 November 2013. Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu have never submitted initial reports.

As of 16 October 2013, only 53% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2012. Encouragingly, six States Parties (Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Iceland, Somalia, and Swaziland) submitted an annual Article 7 report in 2012 after not turning in a report for two or more years.

Of the 74 States Parties^[63] which have failed to meet this legal obligation, 59 have failed to submit an annual Article 7 report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2012 are eleven States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (BiH, Republic of Congo (Congo), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Palau, Uganda, and Venezuela).

Morocco was the only state not party to submit an Article 7 report for 2012, its sixth voluntary report. In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2011), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

Twelfth Meeting of States Parties

The Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty was held at the UN in Geneva on 3 – 7 December 2012. A total of 123 states attended: 107 States Parties and observer delegations from 16 states not party to the treaty.^[64] An ICBL delegation of more than 185 campaigners from 47 countries, including landmine and cluster munition survivors, participated in the meeting.

The meeting's opening ceremony featured addresses by the foreign ministers of Slovenia and Switzerland, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, as well as the head of the ICRC, Peter Maurer, and the head of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Barbara Haering. Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams and landmine survivor Tun Channereth of Cambodia spoke on behalf of the ICBL.

The Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Matjaž Kovačič, was appointed president of the meeting, taking over from Cambodia’s Prak Sokhon who served as president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties.

Poland announced that it was about to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, an action that it completed on 27 December 2012. Palestine declared its strong desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

Five States Parties – Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, and Uganda – announced the completion of their mine clearance programs, fulfilling their Article 5 mine clearance obligations. The decision was made at the meeting to grant mine clearance deadline extension requests to four states: Afghanistan (until 2013), Angola (2017), Cyprus (2016), and Zimbabwe (2015). The ICBL expressed concern at the high number of states needing deadline extensions since 2009 and said that while some requests are justified, many of these states should have been able to finish within the treaty's 10-year deadline.

Finland announced that its stockpile destruction has begun and should be completed by the end of 2015. The three States Parties that remain in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for missing their deadlines for destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines – Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine – all reported on their stockpile destruction efforts.

The main outcome of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties was the Geneva Progress Report, a mid-term assessment of efforts by States Parties to apply the 2010 – 2014 Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in November 2009.

States Parties also agreed to hold the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland on 2 – 6 December 2013.

Global Overview: States Not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Universalizing the ban

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 161 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 29 acceded.^[65]

One country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine Monitor 2012 went to print in September 2012; Poland ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 December 2012.

With the addition of Poland, all 28 EU member states are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, thus completing universalization in the EU. In May 2013, the president of the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties, Ambassador Matjaž Kovačič of Slovenia, urged other regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, African Union, and Pacific Islands Forum to follow the EU's example by working to achieve universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty by their member states.^[66]

The 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty includes the Marshall Islands, which is now the last signatory remaining to ratify.

In March – April 2013, ICBL campaigners in 50 countries promoted the Mine Ban Treaty's universalization as part of the "Lend Your Leg" global action, including in non-signatories Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the US, and Vietnam.

Representatives from 17 states not party attended the Mine Ban Treaty's Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012, including from China, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Oman, Palestine, Singapore, United Arab Emirates (UAE), the US, and Vietnam.

Several states indicated in 2012 or 2013 that they are actively considering accession, including Lao PDR, Myanmar, Palestine, and the US. Significant developments during the reporting period regarding universalization of the treaty include:

• Lao PDR stated in December 2012 that it will "continue to work hard" to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and has "organized a regular review on where we are in terms of readiness to accede"^[67];
• Myanmar informed States Parties in December 2012: "We are reviewing our current status" with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty;
• Palestine declared its strong desire in December 2012 to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, which it is now eligible to join following its new status at the UN; and
• The US informed States Parties in December 2012 that a decision on the US landmine policy review and on US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty would be announced "soon."^[68]

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

On 3 December 2012, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 165 nations in favor, none opposed, and 19 abstentions.^[69]

This was three more votes in favor and one more abstention than the previous vote in 2011.^[70] Mine Ban Treaty State Party Japan mistakenly abstained from voting on the 2012 resolution. ^[71] After being absent for nearly every vote since 1997, Saudi Arabia has abstained from voting for the resolution since 2011.^[72] Lebanon again abstained from the vote on the 2012 resolution.^[73]

The annual resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization.^[74] Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in support of consecutive UNGA resolutions, including Finland.^[75]

Of the 18 states not party (at the time) that voted in support of Resolution 67/32 on 3 December 2012, eight have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997 (Armenia, Bahrain, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the UAE), while 10 that consistently abstained or were absent previously now vote in favor (Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, and Tonga).

From the resolution's voting record, the states that could be described as most opposed to the Mine Ban Treaty are the 15 states not party that have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya (since 1998), Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).^[76]

Non-state armed groups

A significant number of NSAGs have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence, showing the strength of the growing international norm. At least 63 NSAGs have committed to halt the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.^[77] The exact number is difficult to determine, because NSAGs may split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, most recently the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a Sudanese NSAG, in August 2013.^[78]

Use of antipersonnel mines

Locations of New Use of Antipersonnel Mines: 2012–2013

Use by government forces	Use by NSAGs	Use in Other Area
Myanmar, Syria	Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Yemen	Nagorno-Karabakh

In this reporting period, September 2012 through October 2013, the Monitor has confirmed the new use of antipersonnel mines by forces of the governments of Syria and Myanmar. New use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen is also detailed below. Additionally, it was reported in July 2013 that forces in the internationally unrecognized breakaway area of Nagorno-Karabakh emplaced new antipersonnel mines.

Government Forces

Syria

In late 2011, Syrian government forces began using antipersonnel mines along the borders with Lebanon and Turkey.^[79] New landmine use on the Lebanese border was reported in al-Buni, Tel Kalakh, Kneissi, Heet, and Masharih al-Qaa.^[80] On 1 November 2011, a Syrian official told the media that "Syria has undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.^"[81]

There have been reports of civilian casualties from this mine use. For example, Syrian forces emplaced up to 200 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines before they abandoned a military position in the village of Kharbit al-Jouz, near the Turkish border, which wounded three civilians in October 2012.^[82]

HRW received an allegation that government forces used antipersonnel mines during the May/June 2013 battle for Qusair, a town on the border with Lebanon. In June, a witness who was helping to evacuate civilians from Qusair informed HRW that civilians were warned against attempting to enter Lebanon without using government checkpoints because routes across the border are affected by government-planted landmines.^[83]

The ICBL expressed concern at Syria's "disregard" for the safety of civilians seeking to cross the border to flee the violence in Syria, calling on the Syrian army to stop using mines immediately and clear those already planted.^[84] In early 2012, several states condemned mine use by Syria, as did the President of the Mine Ban Treaty's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Prak Sokhonn of Cambodia.^[85] States that expressed concern at the reported landmine use include Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the US, as well as EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, the Monitor has consistently documented the extensive use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period (since September 2012), information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of new mine use, and use in more limited geographic areas.

The Monitor received an allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by the Tatmadaw (the name of Myanmar's Army) in November 2012 in Pa Yeh village in Kachin State which resulted in at least one casualty.^[86] In February 2013, cross-border traders in Rakhine State informed the Monitor that Nasaka (Myanmar's Border Forces) officers had warned them that an operation to lay landmines along the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh would begin soon. A trader from Kha Maung Seik^[87] told the Monitor, "I cannot return to my village directly from here because the paths we have been using are now mined. When I arrived still there was no mine; army planted landmines within last two day and Nasaka officer, who gives me permission, told me this over phone; so that I don't return by using same path.^"[88] A news report noted that mines had been planted in the areas near border pillars 37 to 40. Later in February, Border Guard of Bangladesh personnel issued a warning to locals to avoid some border areas due to the presence of mines and increased their surveillance to prevent people from getting near the border.^[89]

Border Guard Forces (BGF)^[90] within Myanmar are militias under the control of the regional Tatmadaw commander, but comprised of various former insurgent organizations. BGF maintains the force structures and areas of operation they had previously as an armed group. It is not clear how often BGF units are operating under Tatmadaw instructions or are acting independently. BGF have used antipersonnel mines sporadically since that time, but no specifically attributed instance of use could be identified since mid-2012. However, a member of a BGF unit in Kachin State which was fighting the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) alongside government forces stated to the Monitor that, if necessary, they could engage in mine warfare.^[91]

Pakistan allegations

There have been a number of reports that may indicate recent use of antipersonnel mines by Pakistani security forces, although the Monitor cannot verify who laid the mines, or the precise dates mines were laid. In 2012, newspaper reports in Pakistan began to identify victims of antipersonnel mines reportedly laid as part of perimeter defenses at Pakistani Army outposts in Pakistan. In October 2012, three Frontier Corps officers were injured after stepping on a landmine that reportedly had been laid by the security forces near a military checkpoint on the border with Afghanistan in Baizai Tehsil of Mohmand Agency.^[92] In November 2012, one civilian was killed and another injured by a mine reportedly laid by the security forces near the Afghan border in the Dattakhel area of North Waziristan.^[93] As recently as April 2013, Pakistan has stated that it has not laid mines since the 2001 – 2002 escalation on the Pakistan-India border.^[94]

Other Areas

Nagorno-Karabakh

In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh's military chief General Movses Hakobian was reported by the media to have stated that "his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani 'line of contact' east and north of the disputed territory."^[95] General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to an ICBL letter seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and said that "due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan… today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact." He also wrote that "these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us."^[96]

Non-state armed groups

Since January 2012, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that fall under the Mine Ban Treaty’s definition of antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries: States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen, and states not party Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria. This is an increase in the number of countries previously cited by the Monitor and is more countries than was reported in the past five years.^[97]

In Afghanistan, there has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which are opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security Assistance Force forces. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a steep rise in incidents caused by pressure-plate IEDs that had been planted on roads routinely used by civilians in 2012. However, in the first six months of 2013 UNAMA recorded a decrease in incidents caused by victim-activated IEDs from the same time period in 2012. UNAMA stated that the majority of IEDs used in Afghanistan now are victim-activated IEDs, most of which utilize pressure plates.^[98] UNAMA has called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their members from using pressure-plate IEDs.^[99]

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their campsites or bases, on paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as to their bases, or to main transit routes), and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing. In 2012, FARC was accused of laying mines near destroyed infrastructure to prevent or delay its reconstruction.^[100] NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts, which caused casualties among coca eradicators. Government forces continued to recover mines from the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A). For the second year in a row, there was a decrease in reports of mine use by NSAGs as the government engaged almost all the groups in the country in a peace dialogue. In March 2013, two Tatmadaw soldiers were killed and four injured when one reportedly stepped on a landmine while patrolling a pipeline in Namtu township in northern Shan State. It is not known which group laid the mine.^[101] In February 2013, four Tatmadaw soldiers were injured reportedly by a mine laid by the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army in Tangyan township in northern Shan State.^[102] In January 2013, a villager reportedly stepped on a landmine in Kaukriek Township that was allegedly laid by the DKBA.^[103] In Mone Township, villagers stated that some incidents in their area were from newly laid mines, but they were unsure who was responsible.^[104] In November 2012, a villager in Mone Township stated that the KNLA was still using landmines and they had to be careful whenever they walked near their bases.^[105]

In Pakistan, the government has reported that antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the country, and attributes the use to "terrorists."^[106] The Monitor has reported a large number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents. In August 2012, one civilian was killed by a mine reported to have been laid by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in Safi Tehsil of Mohmand agency in FATA.^[107] In October 2012, an electrical repairman was injured by a mine laid near the base of a power pylon he was repairing in Miranshah in North Waziristan,^[108] and another electrical repairman was killed by a mine laid near the base of a power pylon he was repairing in July 2013 in the Machh area of Bolan district in Baluchistan.^[109] Several other civilians were killed or injured in what appeared to be incidents of new use by unknown perpetrators in Dera Bukhti and Kohlu district of Baluchistan in August and September 2012; in Saafi Tehsil of Mohmand agency in FATA in November 2012; in the Tirah valley in Khyber Agency in FATA in April and July of 2013; and in the Shalwazan area of Kurram Agency in FATA in August 2013.^[110]

In Syria, anti-regime rebels have apparently used antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. Rebels reportedly used antipersonnel landmines in the fighting at Qusair, which fell to government forces in early June 2013.^[111] According to the Associated Press, in the year prior to the defeat at Qusair "rebels holding the town had heavily fortified it with tunnels, mine fields, and booby traps."^[112] According to one witness from the town, the Syrian military removed mines from around Qusair and cleared roads after the town fell.^[113] In August 2012, a Syrian rebel told the media that they intended to re-use government antipersonnel mines that have been removed from the ground.^[114] The ICBL called on the Free Syrian Army and all forces involved in the conflict in Syria to forbid their combatants from using landmines.^[115] A July 2013 media report featured a rebel engineer who designed a victim-activated explosive device.^[116]

In Thailand, an insurgent group in southern Thailand has continued sporadic use of victim-activated IEDs. On 25 September 2012, a government employee clearing brush from the side of a highway was injured when he stepped on a victim-activated IED containing about one kilogram of explosive.^[117] On 10 September 2012, a man who stopped his vehicle on a road was injured when he stepped on a victim-activated IED on the road berm.^[118] Both were assumed to have been laid by the southern insurgency. This follows a pattern of use observed by the Monitor since 2009.

In Tunisia, in a new development a number of soldiers and national guardsmen have reportedly been killed or injured by "landmine explosions" since April 2013 during ongoing operations by the Tunisian military against Islamist rebel forces in the region of Jebel Al-Cha'anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate, an area on the Algerian border. The Monitor has received reports of both military casualties and a civilian casualty from April to September 2013. In early May, the Ministry of Defense stated that the mines causing injuries in April were homemade mines laid in a "professional manner" and were constructed from plastic with a chemical initiator, making detection difficult.^[119] On 6 May 2013, two more soldiers were killed in a blast roughly nine kilometers away from where the previous two explosions reported in April had occurred.^[120] A defense ministry spokesperson was quoted as explaining that "the mines that exploded were made of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and flammable materials that can easily explode when exposed to heat."^[121]

In Yemen, there were credible reports of use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Sa'ada governorate and Abyan governorate in 2011 – 2012. It is unclear if antipersonnel mines are still being used as of October 2013. In its 2013 Article 7 Report, Yemen stated that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) could fulfill its mine action plans in Sa'ada and Abyan in 2012 because "the security situation became much better than 2011." But the report also states that "YEMAC face new challenge in Sa'ada governorate after insurgences war. New kinds of mines made manually by insurgences and planted in Sa'ada, some of them demined by the insurgences and they missed others… lot of mine accidents happened and many of people killed and injured."^[122]

Since June 2004, the government of Yemen has been fighting rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in the mountainous northern Sa'ada governorate, which has seen occasional reports and allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs.^[123]

Haijjah governorate, which borders Sa'ada governorate and where Houthi rebels have been fighting local Sunni tribes backed by the government, has also suffered casualties from landmines. In March 2012, a local representative said that Houthi rebels had planted approximately 3,000 landmines in Kushar and Ahim in Hajja governorate.^[124] In September 2013, a representative of the district of Al-Asha bordering Sa'ada governorate told media that Houthi rebels were planting landmines "in the mountainous areas under their control."^[125]

According to media reports in June 2012, the governor's office in Zinjibar (the capital of Abyan governorate) said that engineering teams have removed some landmines from around the city and the nearby city of Jaar. Government forces regained control of both cities in May 2012, a year after they were occupied by Ansar al-Sharia, an armed organization linked to al-Qaeda.^[126] Photographs of weapons recovered by deminers from Ansar al-Sharia positions after the withdrawal, which HRW examined in October 2012, included antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, explosive booby-traps, and IEDs.^[127]

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.^[128] Thirty-nine of these have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including three that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.^[129] A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed the Monitor that most of its mine production has been shut down, but a small number of antipersonnel mines are produced by the military for research purposes.^[130]

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. In 2012, the Colombian Army reported that FARC was producing non-detectable antipersonnel mines.^[131]

Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has reported for the past decade that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan and Yemen raises the specter that some form of market for antipersonnel mines exists.

In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel mines, in connection with two allegations of new use, suggests that a new supply channel is in place given that Yemen did not declare the type to be in stockpile or as part of existing mine contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden.

In Sudan, the appearance in the past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.

At least 10 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including seven landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they now have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that of the 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 32 stockpile a collective total of about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Four states not party have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Palestine, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.

States not party that may stockpile antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Korea, North	Pakistan
Azerbaijan	Korea, South	Russia
Bahrain	Kyrgyzstan	Saudi Arabia
China	Lao PDR	Singapore
Cuba	Lebanon	Sri Lanka
Egypt	Libya	Syria
Georgia	Mongolia	UAE
India	Morocco	US
Iran	Myanmar	Uzbekistan
Israel	Nepal	Vietnam
Kazakhstan	Oman

It is not certain that all of these states stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Prolific mine use during 2011 by forces of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the discovery of hundreds of thousands of stockpiled mines have shown how Libya's previous denial of possessing a mine stockpile was patently untrue. The National Transitional Council pledged in 2011 to destroy all stocks of mines under its control.

Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production and due to destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from former regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party, NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2013, a total of 100 states were party to Amended Protocol II. Two states joined the protocol since the publication of Landmine Monitor 2012: Kuwait (24 May 2013) and Zambia (25 September 2013).

Only 10 of the 100 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 10 states that are party to the original protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.^[132]

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols^[133]

Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	Singapore
Azerbaijan	Lebanon	Somalia
Bahrain	Libya	Syria
Egypt	Myanmar	UAE
Iran	Nepal	Vietnam
Kazakhstan	Oman
Korea, North	Saudi Arabia

Red type indicates states that also produce antipersonnel mines.