© Safa Sabah Sabri, August 2014
Members of the Iraqi Alliance of Disability Organizations celebrate the fourth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions outside their headquarters in Baghdad.

Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency | National Implementation Legislation | Interpretive Issues | Timeline of Use

Introduction 

The past six years since the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by 107 states in Dublin on 30 May 2008 have seen remarkable progress in the eradication of these weapons.[1] A total of 113 states have signed, ratified, or acceded to the convention, of which 84 are States Parties legally bound by its provisions.[2]

These countries are adhering to the convention’s comprehensive prohibition on the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. There have been no reports or allegations of any States Parties engaging in banned activities since the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, therefore becoming binding international law. More than half of all States Parties have enacted legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions or have declared that existing laws will be adequate to ensure their adherence.

As of July 2014, a total of 22 States Parties have destroyed more than 1.16 million stockpiled cluster munitions containing nearly 140 million submunitions, which represents the destruction of 80% of all cluster munitions and 78% of all submunitions declared stockpiled. At the end of 2013, the United Kingdom (UK) announced the completion of destruction of its once massive stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions, while Denmark completed its stockpile destruction in March 2014. In 2013 alone, more than 130,000 cluster munitions and 24 million submunitions were destroyed by these and eight other States Parties, including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYR) Macedonia, and Sweden.

Approximately three-quarters of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports as required under Article 7 of the convention detailing these and other actions taken to implement and promote the convention. The community of States Parties and signatories continues to collaborate closely with representatives from the United Nations (UN), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to promote universalization and ensure that the convention’s provisions are respected and implemented by all.

Yet, major challenges remain if the convention’s objective of putting an end to the human suffering caused by cluster munitions is to be realized. In Syria, the government’s use of cluster munitions continued into its third year as Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 went to print, with no end in sight. Worrying reports emerged of new cluster munition use in South Sudan and Ukraine in the first half of 2014, but it is not yet clear which armed forces are responsible.  

These states remain outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Syria is by no means representative of the vast majority of non-signatories that largely adhere to the convention’s provisions, despite not joining. More than 50 states not party to the convention are among the 140-plus countries that have condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions since 2012 in statements and resolutions, including major past users such as Israel and the United States (US). While it has not criticized cluster munition use in Syria, non-signatory Russia was swift to criticize the use of cluster munitions against civilian populations in eastern Ukraine on several occasions in July 2014. The use of cluster bombs in South Sudan was met with protest by a UN Security Council resolution in May 2014.[3]

Such actions contribute to the strong stigma against any use of cluster munitions. They show how most non-signatories acknowledge the civilian harm caused by cluster munitions, while many profess to accept the humanitarian rationale for a ban as provided by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, yet few have made measurable progress toward accession. Despite participating as observers in meetings of the convention, several countries where cluster munitions were once used such as Cambodia, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Vietnam continue to disappoint survivors of the weapons by failing to heed calls to join the ban convention.

One example of progress is seen in Slovakia, where the government concluded an extensive review of the convention in January 2014 with the adoption of an action plan that should result in Slovakia’s accession to the convention by July 2015. This former producer and exporter of cluster munitions was one of a group of countries that deferred the ban on cluster munitions as they pursued another legal instrument on cluster munitions in the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[4]

The 2011 failure of the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference to conclude a new protocol on cluster munitions effectively ended its years-long deliberations on cluster munitions, which has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole multilateral instrument to provide a comprehensive framework to specifically address the weapons.[5] It was also an affirmation that the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its sister instrument, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, represent the alternative humanitarian disarmament path, where humanitarian considerations and the protection of civilians are put ahead of narrow, perceived national security interests.[6]

But, if further progress is to be made under the Convention on Cluster Munitions by its First Review Conference in 2015, all of its supporters must redouble their efforts to promote its universalization, contribute to its implementation, and not hesitate to defend the norm that it is establishing against any use of cluster munitions by anyone under any circumstance.

This overview covers activities during the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, where data is available. All findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available from the Monitor website.[7]

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Universalization

“Universalization” refers to the process of non-signatory countries acceding or otherwise joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as ratifications by countries that signed the convention prior to its entry into force on 1 August 2010. Both processes usually require some form of parliamentary approval, often in the form of legislation. 

One hundred and thirteen states from all corners of the world have signed, ratified, or acceded to the convention since it was opened for signature in Oslo on 3 December 2008.[8] However, only one country acceded and no signatories ratified the convention in the second half of 2013 and first half of 2014. 

As the following regional summaries show, many of the 29 remaining signatories are in the process of either consulting on ratification or engaging in parliamentary approval of ratification. Some states must complete national implementation legislation before they can ratify. 

In the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, several key meetings and activities related to the Convention on Cluster Munitions took place that provided opportunities for promoting universalization of the convention. These are also detailed below.[9]

Signature 

A total of 108 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the period from when it was opened for signature in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008 until its entry into force on 1 August 2010.[10]

As of 31 July 2014, 79 signatories have ratified, becoming States Parties to the convention, and 29 signatories still need to ratify.[11] Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. Thus, signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have committed to never use, produce, or transfer cluster munitions, even if they have not yet ratified.[12]

Since the convention took effect, states can no longer sign, but must instead accede (essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step).[13]

Accession

Five countries have acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions since it entered into force four years ago on 1 August 2010: three in 2011 (Grenada, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago) and two in 2013 (Andorra and Saint Kitts and Nevis). 

There was one accession globally during the reporting period by Saint Kitts and Nevis on 13 September 2013, which is the third Caribbean nation to accede to the convention.[14]

Non-signatory Slovakia—a past producer and exporter of cluster munitions—adopted an action plan on 15 January 2014 to prepare for its accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions by 30 June 2015.[15] Slovakia gave its commitment to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions after concluding that it is now “the only valid international instrument” to address cluster munitions following the 2011 failure by the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to conclude a new protocol on the weapon.

Aside from Slovakia, there was little if any progress toward accession in 2013 or the first half of 2014 by states that previously supported the creation of another legal instrument on cluster munitions in the CCW.[16]

Ratification

A total of 79 signatories had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 31 July 2014. More than half of the 29 signatories still to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions are from Sub-Saharan Africa, while five are from the Americas, three are from Asia-Pacific, and two are from Europe. 

There were no ratifications by the remaining signatories in the second half of 2013 or first half of 2014. The last ratification was Iraq on 14 May 2013 during the reporting period of the previous report, Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.

The lack of ratifications reflects the fact that there are fewer signatories left to ratify than in the years that immediately followed the December 2008 signing conference. But the slow progress on ratification coupled with the low level of accessions is disappointing given the efforts made by States Parties, international organizations, and the CMC. 

Regional universalization developments

Africa

A total of 21 of the 49 states of sub-Saharan Africa have ratified and one (Swaziland) has acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, making a total of 22 States Parties from the region. A total of 19 states from the region have signed but not yet ratified the convention.[17] Eight states from Sub-Saharan Africa remain outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[18]

From Africa, signatories the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo appear closest to ratifying, having completed their respective legislative processes approving ratification.

Legislative processes to ratify the convention are underway in other signatories from Africa, including South Africa, where the cabinet announced its decision on 4 September 2013 to send the convention to parliament for ratification.[19] In Benin, Djibouti, and Rwanda, draft ratification laws are believed to have been introduced for parliamentary approval, but as of 31 July 2014 the exact legislative status was not clear. 

As the updated Monitor country profiles show, more than five years after signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 13 African states still have not introduced ratification measures to their national parliaments for consideration and adoption: Angola, Central African Republic, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.

There were few signs in 2013 and the first half of 2014 that accession is being actively considered by any of the African non-signatories. At the convention’s Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013, Gabon again pledged that its accession to the convention “is not far away.”[20]

Americas

Of the 35 states from the Americas, 15 past signatories have ratified and Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago have acceded to the convention, making a total of 18 States Parties.[21] Of the five signatories from the region, Colombia appears closest to completing its ratification after adopting ratification legislation in 2012 that was reviewed by the constitutional court in 2013.[22]

Legislative processes to approve ratification are underway in the other signatory countries from the Americas. Canada’s Senate adopted legislation to implement and ratify the convention on 4 December 2012, which was then adopted by the House of Commons with an amendment on 19 June 2014.[23] The amended draft legislation was referred back to the Senate, where it will be reviewed when parliament resumes in September 2014.[24] An official from Paraguay told a regional meeting in December 2013 that a Senate committee still has to approve the ratification legislation, before it can be sent to the lower house of for approval.[25]

The 12 non-signatories from the region are a mix of those with long-standing objections to the convention (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, US, and Venezuela) and smaller states favorable to the convention, but with limited capacity or interest to join (Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Suriname). Only two of these countries participated as observers at the convention’s Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013: Argentina and Saint Kitts and Nevis. On the final day of the meeting, Saint Kitts and Nevis deposited its instrument of accession.

Asia-Pacific

Only 12 of the 40 states that comprise the Asia-Pacific region have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[26] There have been no accessions from the Asia-Pacific region; the nine States Parties all signed and ratified the convention.[27]

Asia-Pacific signatories Indonesia, Palau, and the Philippines have all said that they are pursuing ratification, but none have introduced ratification legislation into their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. Indonesia and the Philippines still do not appear to have concluded stakeholder consultations on ratification of the convention that began after it was signed in 2008.

Non-signatories Cambodia, China, Mongolia, Thailand, and Vietnam have continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, making statements at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013. Yet none of these states have adopted plans to accede or provided timeframes for when they might do so. Half of the non-signatories from the Asia-Pacific region still have not made a public statement articulating their position on joining the convention.[28]

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

Thirty-three of the 54 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia have signed the convention, of which 31 have ratified. Andorra has acceded, making a total of 32 States Parties.[29] All except eight of the 28 European Union (EU) member states are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[30] Russia and all eight states from the Caucasus and Central Asia remain outside the ban convention and have made little, if any, progress toward joining it in the reporting period.[31]

As the last signatories from Europe left to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Cyprus and Iceland unfortunately made little progress toward that objective in 2013 and the first half of 2014. In Cyprus, there has been no effort to adopt ratification legislation that was introduced to parliament in 2011 and officials see no prospect for immediate action.[32] Despite promises by Icelandic officials since 2010, the ratification package for the convention still had not been introduced to parliament for approval as of 1 July 2014.[33]

The government of Slovakia approved an action plan on 15 January 2014, which instructs relevant ministries to begin the process of its accession to the convention in 2014 so that the instrument can be deposited by 30 June 2015.[34] Slovakia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, has informed the CMC that the plan represents “a serious political commitment and significant step towards…accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in a realistic timeframe.”[35]

Middle East and North Africa

There are just three States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions from the Middle East and North Africa: Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia.[36] A total of 16 countries from the region have not signed the convention.[37]

Several non-signatories from the Middle East and North Africa have continued to participate in the convention’s meetings, but few made any statements in 2013 or the first half of 2014. 

According to the CMC, in June 2014 a government representative confirmed that Palestine intends to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[38] Previously, officials had indicated that Palestine would like to join the convention once it achieved legal status with the UN.  

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

Zambia hosted the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka from 9–13 September 2013. Approximately 800 delegates attended from 106 states (58 States Parties, 18 signatories, and 30 observers/non-signatories), as well as from UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.[39] The CMC delegation was comprised of 150 campaigners including cluster munition survivors and youth campaigners. The meeting was opened by the President of Zambia, Michael Chilufya Sata, who stated that cluster munitions “have no place in the modern era.”[40]

The meeting adopted the “Lusaka Progress Report” detailing progress made on the convention’s implementation and universalization since 2010 and especially since the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2012.[41] It also agreed to establish an “implementation support unit” in Geneva to replace the ad hoc assistance that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has provided since 2010 to support successive presidents of the Meetings of States Parties, as well as all States Parties.

Chile hosted a regional workshop on cluster munitions in Santiago on 12–13 December 2013, attended by representatives from 24 Latin American and Caribbean states, including non-signatories Argentina, Belize, Cuba, and Saint Lucia.[42] The participating states adopted the “Santiago Declaration” calling for “joint action to ensure the protection of civilians through the prohibition and total eradication of cluster munitions.”[43]

Representatives from 11 African signatory states attended workshops on the universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Geneva on 20 and 24 February 2014.[44] Representatives of non-signatory states from the Middle East and North Africa attended a similar workshop on the convention’s universalization in Geneva on 27 May 2014.

The fourth round of intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions took place in Geneva on 7–9 April 2014, with participation from representatives of 101 countries in addition to a CMC delegation.

The Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) at the Centre for Security Cooperation held its sixth annual workshop on the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions during a wider symposium on mine action in Zadar, Croatia from 22–26 April 2014. The workshop was attended by six governments from the region.[45]

As President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Zambia has placed special emphasis on promoting universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In June 2014, its Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Kalaba promoted the convention in his capacity as President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, discussing accession with his counterpart in Mauritius during a visit and also raising it with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of Zimbabwe during a visit.[46]

Since 2012, several Pacific workshops on the clearance of explosive remnants of war dating from World War II have featured the need for universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including a workshop convened by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in Palau in November 2013 and a workshop hosted by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and ICBL-CMC member organisation SafeGround (formerly the Australian Network to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions) in Brisbane, Australia in June 2013. 

Costa Rica will host the convention’s Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San Jose on 2–5 September 2014.[47]

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Use of Cluster Munitions

Overview of cluster munitions use

Cluster munitions have been used during armed conflict in 38 countries and four disputed territories by at least 22 governments since the end of World War II (as detailed in the following table and the Timeline of cluster munition use found at the end of this chapter). Almost every part of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. 

Summary of states using cluster munitions and locations used[48]

The United States, Israel, and Syria—all non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—have been among the most prolific users of cluster munitions, but the vast majority of states outside the convention have never used the weapon.[49] Only three non-signatories are considered major users and producers of cluster munitions: Israel, Russia, and the US.[50]

Many countries that used cluster munitions in the past are now either States Parties (France, Iraq, the Netherlands, and the UK) or signatories (Colombia, Nigeria, and South Africa) to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and have relinquished use of cluster munitions. Article 4 of the convention is not retroactive, but affirms that a State Party that previously used cluster munitions that became remnants on the territory of another State Party before the convention’s entry into force for both parties is “strongly encouraged” to provide assistance to the other State Party. 

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems from cluster munitions, most crucially the absolute ban on use of cluster munitions. There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any of the State Parties to the ban convention since it entered into force on 1 August 2010.[51]

New use

Since 1 July 2013, cluster munitions have continued to be used in Syria, while evidence of cluster munition attacks was recorded in South Sudan and Ukraine in the first half of 2014. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The three conflicts are entirely separate, but it is notable that the same kind of cluster munitions have been used in more than one of these countries.[52] The Monitor has also recorded the first use of self-destruct cluster munitions in Syria as well as Ukraine.[53]

Use in Syria

At least 249 cluster munitions were used by government forces in 10 of Syria’s 14 governorates in the two-year period from July 2012 to July 2014, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).[54] The true extent of use in Syria is likely more widespread as the data is incomplete and not all remnants have been recorded. At least seven types of cluster munitions have been used in Syria, including air-dropped bombs, dispensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets, and at least nine types of explosive submunitions.[55]

Initial reports of cluster munition use emerged in mid-2012, then increased sharply in October 2012 as the government intensified its air campaign on rebel-held areas with the use of RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets.[56] The Syrian government continued to use air-dropped cluster bombs in 2013 and 2014, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. Use of AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions was also recorded, but the delivery system was not clear.[57]

At the end of 2012, the first use of ground-launched cluster munitions was recorded when Syrian government forces used multi-barrel rocket launchers to deliver Egyptian-made 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM-like submunitions with distinctive white ribbons.[58] In early 2014, the use of 9M55K and 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms was first documented.[59] HRW attributed the use to the Syrian government.[60]

Video footage of another DPICM-like submunition with a red ribbon was reportedly filmed in the village of Maliha in rural Damascus in early April 2014 and again in the town of al-Waziyeh southeast of Homs on 22 July 2014.[61]From its markings, arms experts have identified the weapon as a “ZP-39” submunition, but it is of unknown origin and the delivery system is not known. Markings on the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993, making them more recently produced than the RBK-series cluster bombs, but still old stock at more than 20 years of age.[62]

The Syrian military initially denied possessing or using cluster munitions and the government has continued to deny its use of the weapons.[63] As of July 2014, it does not appear that cluster munitions have been used by opposition rebel groups, but there is some evidence of unexploded submunitions being used as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by some rebel groups.[64]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage and public outcry. By 1 July 2014, a total of 142 states had condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions through national statements, UN resolutions, and communiques including 51 non-signatories.[65] During 2013, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted two resolutions on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic that included specific references criticizing the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[66]

Use in South Sudan

In early 2014, evidence emerged showing that cluster munitions had been used recently during the conflict between the opposition forces loyal to South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, with air-support for the SPLA provided by Uganda, a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In the week of 7 February 2014, UN mine action experts found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and an unknown quantity of intact AO-1SCh submunitions by a stretch of road 16 kilometers south of Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, in an area not known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants prior to mid-December 2013.[67]

Both South Sudanese and the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) forces are believed to possess the types of aircraft capable of delivering this type of cluster munition, which can be dropped by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters. The opposition forces are not believed to possess these means of delivery.

South Sudan has denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and also denied Ugandan use of the weapons.[68]The commander of the Ugandan forces in South Sudan, Brig. Muhanga Kayanja, acknowledged that UPDF forces used helicopters to provide close support to ground troops, but denied the use of cluster bombs.[69] A UPDF spokesman reportedly said that the Ugandan army would not take part in any investigation into the incident as that responsibility rests with the South Sudanese government and international experts.[70] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon drew attention to the UN’s discovery of the cluster munition remnants near Bor and condemned the use of cluster bombs in the South Sudan conflict, but did not indicate who the UN believed was responsible or if an investigation would be undertaken.[71]

The CMC condemned the cluster munition use in South Sudan and called for an immediate investigation.[72] By 31 July 2014, twenty countries had expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan, including Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Wylbur C. Simuusa—in its capacity as the President of the Convention on Cluster Munitions—and Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende.[73] During the April 2014 intersessional meetings of the convention, Cambodia, the Netherlands and New Zealand made interventions expressing concern at the reported cluster bomb use in South Sudan, while 15 other states unanimously endorsed a UN Security Council on 27 May 2014 that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei state and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[74]

Use in Ukraine

In early July 2014, evidence emerged that strongly indicates ground-launched cluster munitions were used in recent weeks in two separate locations in eastern Ukraine during fighting between Ukrainian government forces and armed insurgents.[75]

On 3 July, the remnants of a 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rocket and a 9N235 fragmentation submunition were identified from photographs reportedly taken at Kramatorsk in eastern Ukraine.[76] A total of 72 individual 9N235 submunitions are contained in each 9M55K rocket, which is fired from the 9K58 Smerch multiple-barrel rocket launcher over a maximum range of 90 kilometers.

On 11 July, photographs taken by the Associated Press at an insurgent base at Slavyansk, which was abandoned during the Ukrainian government’s early July take-back of the town, show the remnants of at least eight 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets and at least three fragmentation submunitions that are all either 9N210 or 9N235.[77] These rockets are fired from the 9K57 Uragan multi-barrel rocket launcher, which has a maximum range of 35 kilometers. According to the Associated Press, the remnants at Slavyansk were collected and destroyed by Ukrainian government explosive ordnance disposal teams. 

Both Ukraine and Russia have large stockpiles of cluster munitions, including the types used in eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied using cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine.[78] On 4 July 2014, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions against civilians.[79] On 25 July 2014, a senior commander of the Russian General Staff expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[80]

The CMC has expressed concern at the “worrying” evidence of cluster munition use in eastern Ukraine and urged the government of Ukraine to confirm or deny the use allegations.[81]

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions. 

In an April 2014 letter, the Deputy Prime Minister of Slovakia stated “the Ministry of Defence of Slovakia has already banned the use of cluster munitions by the Slovak army.”[82] Previously, in 2009 and 2010, Slovakia stated, “The Armed Forces have not used and will not use cluster munitions ever in the military operations outside of the territory of the Slovak Republic.”[83]

The US confirmed in November 2011 that its policy on cluster munitions is still guided by a June 2008 US Department of Defense directive requiring that any US use of cluster munitions before 2018 that results in a 1% or higher unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate—which includes all but a tiny fraction of the US arsenal—must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a very high-ranking military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO. 

Romania has said it restricts the use of cluster munitions to use exclusively on its own territory. Poland has said it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia and Finland have made similar declarations.

During the CCW negotiations on cluster munitions, several states that have not signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions publicly stated that they were prepared to accept a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as part of the proposed CCW protocol, including Russia, China, India, and South Korea. The CMC urges that as an interim measure toward joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, these states should institute the commitments they made at the CCW as national policy.  

Non-State Armed Groups 

Due to the relative sophistication of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used these weapons and none have done so since 2006. In the past, cluster munitions use by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), Bosnia and Herzegovina (by a Serb militia), Croatia (by a Serb militia), and Israel (by Hezbollah). Cluster munitions have also been employed in conflicts against NSAGs, including in Libya, South Sudan, and Syria, as well as in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.[84]

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Production of Cluster Munitions

A total of 34 states have developed or produced[85] more than 200 types of cluster munitions.[86] Half of these producers ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or as a result of joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 

Producers

Sixteen countries are believed to produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so.[87] None of these states have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Asia and Europe account for the majority of producer states, with six and five producers respectively, while the Middle East and North Africa has three producer states and two producers are from the Americas.

Cluster munition producers

The Monitor has removed Slovakia from its list of cluster munition producers after its Deputy Prime Minister declared in April 2014 that “Slovakia has already stopped producing cluster munitions” and the government adopted an action plan committing Slovakia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions by 30 June 2015.[88]

It is not known if cluster munitions were produced in all 16 producer countries during 2013 and/or the first half of 2014 due to lack of transparency and available data. Previously, Greece informed the Monitor that its last production of cluster munitions was in 2001.[89] India stated that it did not produce any cluster munitions in 2011.[90]

At least three of the countries still producing cluster munitions have established reliability standards for submunitions: 

• The US in 2001 instituted a policy that all submunitions reaching a production decision in fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a UXO rate of less than 1%.[91]
• Poland stated in 2005, “The Ministry of Defense requires during acceptance tests less than 2.5% failure rate for the purchased submunitions.”[92]
• South Korea in 2008 issued a directive requiring that in the future it would only acquire cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms and a 1% or lower failure rate.[93] 

Former producers

Under Article 1(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop or produce cluster munitions. Since the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any of the convention’s States Parties or signatories.

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown by the following table. All are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except signatory South Africa, and non-signatories Argentina and Slovakia, which have both indicated they do not intend to produce cluster munitions in future.

Former producers of cluster munitions 

A number of States Parties have provided information in their Article 7 transparency reports on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, including France, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.[94]

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Transfer of Cluster Munitions

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[95]

Exporters and recent transfers

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in public information available, the US has probably been the world leader in exports, having transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[96] Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of 36 states, including many that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the USSR.[97] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions prior to their adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Non-signatories Georgia, India, Pakistan, Slovakia, Turkey, and the UAE are among the recipients of cluster munitions exports since 2005.

At least three states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have enacted an export moratorium: Singapore, Slovakia, and the US. 

New transfer information arising from recent use 

It is not known who supplied or transferred the Soviet-era cluster munitions used in South Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine in 2014. All three states are known stockpilers of cluster munitions and the munitions appear to have been manufactured more than two decades ago. Cluster munition rockets used by the Syrian armed forces were likely produced by two Egyptian companies. 

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 91 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[98] At least 23 of these states have destroyed their stockpiled cluster munitions, while 13 States Parties are in the process of destruction. 

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions

Note: Countries in italics report no longer possessing stockpiles. 

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to make a valid global estimate of quantities in stockpiles as most non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions have not disclosed detailed information on the types and quantities they hold. 

One exception in the reporting period was Slovakia, which publicly disclosed a stockpile totaling 899 cluster munitions of various types in its January 2014 action plan for accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[99] Georgia once possessed a significant stockpile of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions according to information released on the destruction of obsolete weapons in 2013.[100]

Previously, only the US had disclosed the size of its stockpile, when it said it had “more than 6 million cluster munitions” in 2011.[101] Greece and the Ukraine have disclosed partial figures.[102]

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

A total of 33 States Parties have stockpiled cluster munitions at some point in time, of which 19 have already destroyed their stockpiles. Fourteen States Parties are preparing to begin, or are in the process of, stockpile destruction: BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Japan, Mozambique, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

According to available information, at one point 29 States Parties stockpiled more than 1.4 million cluster munitions containing 177 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions and explosive submunitions declared by States Parties[103] 

Note: Italics indicate states that no longer possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

Three signatories have completed destruction or have stated they no longer stockpile cluster munitions:

• Colombia destroyed its stockpile of 72 cluster munitions containing 10,832 submunitions during 2009.[104]
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had voluntarily destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and now has no stockpiles on its territory.[105]
• The Republic of Congo declared in September 2011 that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory.[106]

In 2012, Canada reported a stockpile of 12,597 cluster munitions containing 1.1 million explosive submunitions.[107] In April 2014, it said that stockpile destruction was due to commence the following week and be completed by September 2014.[108]

Five signatories have acknowledged stockpiling cluster munitions but have not provided information on their stocks or plans for their destruction:

• Angola has yet to make an official declaration that all stocks of cluster munitions have been identified and destroyed, but in 2010 stated that its entire stockpile had been destroyed and its armed forces no longer possessed cluster munitions.[109]
• Guinea’s stockpile status and plans for its destruction were not known as of 31 July 2014. 
• Indonesia has acknowledged having a stockpile of cluster munitions, but the size and precise content is not known. 
• A Nigerian official confirmed in April 2012 that Nigeria has a stockpile of BL-755 cluster bombs.[110]
• South Africa has stated that its “relatively small stockpile of obsolete cluster munitions” has been earmarked for destruction.[111]

No stockpiles

Confirmation by States Parties and signatories in transparency reports that they do not possess stockpiles is as important as a declaration of stockpiles. A total of 35 States Parties have confirmed never stockpiling the weapon, most critically through a direct statement included in its transparency report.[112] Since August 2013, Andorra, Australia, Iraq, Liechtenstein, and Swaziland have made such a declaration in the reporting period. 

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party. 

A total of 22 States Parties have declared the destruction of more than 1.16 million cluster munitions containing nearly 140 million submunitions as of July 2014, as shown in the following table.[113] This represents the destruction of 80% of the total stockpiles of cluster munitions and 78% of the total number of explosive submunitions declared by States Parties. 

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties

Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction.

Prior to the convention’s entry into force for States Parties, a total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing just more than 78 million submunitions were destroyed by Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK.[114]

Destruction completed

Nineteen States Parties have declared that they no longer stockpile cluster munitions, of which 16 have provided information on the number and/or types of munitions destroyed, as detailed in the previous table. Three States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction are not listed in the table due to lack of information:

• Honduras stated in December 2007 that it does not possess cluster munitions and officials said that a stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munitions were destroyed in previous years.[115] It has yet to provide its Article 7 report formally declaring no stocks.
• Afghanistan again stated in April 2014 that all its stockpiles of cluster munitions were destroyed before the convention entered into force for Afghanistan.[116] But it has declared numbers of munitions under the stockpile destruction section of its Article 7 reports, indicating that significant destruction occurred in 2005–2011 and in 2012 and 2013.[117] The destroyed munitions do not appear to be stockpiled weapons under the jurisdiction and control of the Afghan government, but rather a combination of cluster munitions that had been abandoned by other combatants in the past and recently discovered, failed cluster munitions, and unexploded submunitions. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions. 
• Iraq has similarly declared that it does not stockpile any cluster munitions, but at the same time it has used the stockpiling section of its Article 7 reports to list 92,092 munitions destroyed from 2003–2013 (prior to the convention’s entry into force) and 6,489 munitions destroyed in 2013, but these are likely weapons or remnants destroyed in the course of clearance.[118] 

Four States Parties completed stockpile destruction in the reporting period, all years in advance of their treaty-mandated deadlines:  

• On 12 July 2013, Chile completed its stockpile destruction six years in advance of its 1 June 2019 deadline;
• On 25 October 2013, FYR Macedonia completed its stockpile destruction five years in advance of its 1 August 2018 deadline;
• On 17 December 2013, the UK completed its stockpile destruction five years in advance of its 1 November 2018 deadline; and
• On 20 March 2014, Denmark completed its stockpile destruction more than four years in advance of its 1 August 2018 deadline.

Destruction underway

In 2013, 10 States Parties destroyed more than 130,000 cluster munitions and 24 million submunitions, as detailed in the following table. 

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2013

Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction. 

Germany and the UK again accounted for the majority of cluster munitions destroyed in 2013, as they did in 2012 and 2011. France placed in a close third as its destruction program reached a greater capacity. Japan and Switzerland began physical destruction of their stocks in 2013.

At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013, several States Parties reaffirmed that they will complete destruction well in advance of their treaty mandated deadlines. Germany confirmed it is on track to complete the destruction of its remaining stocks in 2015.[119] Italy stated that the destruction processes would be completed “as soon as possible” and “well in advance” of the treaty’s deadline, but did not indicate if the objective would be met before 2015.[120] Japan said that its stockpile should be destroyed by the end of 2015.[121] France said it is working to complete stockpile destruction by 2018, if not in advance of the deadline.[122]

Sweden has said previously that it intends to complete destruction of the stockpile by the end of 2014.[123]

All other States Parties with cluster munitions stockpiles have committed to complete destruction within the eight-year deadline required by the convention and several provided updates on their destruction efforts in the reporting period. 

Destruction costs

More than US$15 million has been spent on stockpile destruction by States Parties BiH, Croatia, Denmark, Moldova, Norway, and Spain. 

Historically, at least $216 million has been allocated or estimated as necessary for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions by States Parties France (€20.2 or $26.8 million), Germany (€41.4 million or $55.0 million), Japan (JPY ¥2.8 billion or $28.7 million), Switzerland (CHF40 million or $43.2 million), and the UK (£40 million or $62.6 million).[124]

In April 2014, Peru requested international cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions by the deadline provided by the convention.[125] Guinea-Bissau has also requested technical and financial assistance for its stockpile destruction.

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Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of and training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons. 

The CMC and at least three dozen States Parties believe that no compelling reason exists to retain live cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for these purposes.   

Retention by States Parties

As of July 2014, 10 States Parties—all from Europe—retained cluster munitions for training and research purposes. It is not clear if their holdings constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes. The initial quantity of cluster munitions (and submunitions) retained, the quantity retained at the end of calendar year 2013, the quantity used or “consumed” for permitted purposes, and types are listed in the following table. 

Cluster munitions retained for training[126]

Note: The quantity totals may include individual submunitions retained, which are not contained in a delivery container. 

Germany still retains the largest number of submunitions of any State Party. The CMC has expressed concern at the retention of such high numbers of cluster munitions and submunitions and asked if Germany’s training program is large enough to require the consumption of so many submunitions. In April 2014, Germany reported that “a review on consumption of retained [cluster munitions] with the aim of reduction is ongoing.”[127]

Use of retained cluster munitions

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties maintain detailed annual reporting on past use of retained cluster munitions to ensure they are being kept only for permitted purposes. In the reporting period, five States Parties reduced the number of cluster munitions in the course of training Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and other research:

• Belgium consumed seven M483A1 artillery projectiles and 616 submunitions in explosive ordnance disposal training and research in 2013.[128]
• The Czech Republic reported using 193 submunitions for the training of its armed forces in cluster munitions detection and clearance techniques in 2013.[129] In April 2014, it declared the retention of 100 submunitions, which is a small fraction of the 796 submunitions initially retained in 2010.
• France destroyed 288 KB-1 and KB-2 submunitions, 568 submunitions from SAKR rockets, and two individual 74mm 9N22 submunitions were consumed over the course of 2013.[130]
• Germany consumed a total of 28 cluster munitions and 3,125 submunitions during EOD training in 2013.[131]
• Spain consumed 302 ESPIN-21 cluster munitions and 6,342 submunitions in the course of EOD training and research in 2013.[132] It has decreased the initial amount of cluster munitions retained by more than half since 2011.

Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland did not consume any cluster munitions in training or research during 2013.

Denmark, Czech Republic, and Sweden have indicated that they are retaining individual submunitions only.

No retention

Two States Parties that initially retained cluster munitions have since destroyed those retained stocks and not replaced them as of July 2014: 

• Australia declared the retention of two cluster munitions and 276 explosive submunitions from the former Soviet Union in its initial Article 7 report provided in September 2013.[133] In the updated annual report provided in April 2014, Australia declared the destruction of both cluster munitions and the 276 explosive submunitions in September 2013.[134]
• The UK destroyed its retained submunitions by demolition in 2012 due to “concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[135] In April 2014, the UK affirmed that in the future it may retain “a small number” of submunitions for permitted purposes.[136] Its 2013 and 2014 Article 7 reports state that the “UK has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[137]

Three States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions—Chile, Croatia, and Moldova—have declared the retention of inert items that have been rendered free from explosives and no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention. 

In their transparency reports, in statements and letters, and in their national implementation legislation, most States Parties have expressed the view that there is no need to retain any live cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for training in detection, clearance and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. This includes 17 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions in the past.[138]

Most signatories have indicated they are not retaining any cluster munitions for training or research purposes, including Canada and Colombia. 

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Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency measures report no later than 180 days after the convention’s entry into force for that State Party and an updated report by 30 April each year thereafter. The CMC encourages states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[139]

Initial reports

According to the UN website as of 28 July 2014, a total of 65 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of the convention, representing three-quarters (77%) of States Parties for which the obligation applied at that time.[140] This compliance rate is largely unchanged from previous years.[141]

Eighteen States Parties are late in submitting their initial Article 7 transparency reports, as listed in the table below. Of these states, nine had submission deadlines in 2011, three were due in 2012, three were due in 2013, and one was due in 2014. 

State Parties with overdue initial Article 7 reports (as of 28 July 2014) 

One State Party has a pending deadline for its original reporting obligation: Saint Kitts and Nevis on 28 August 2014. 

Annual updated reports

After submitting their initial Article 7 report, States Parties are required to provide an updated report by 30 April of each year covering the previous calendar year. States Parties with no changes since their previous report can complete a simple cover page indicating no change, while others can provide updated information using only the cover page and relevant forms.

As of 28 July 2014, 10 States Parties that have provided initial reports had not delivered an annual update since the initial report: Antigua and Barbuda, Burundi, Hungary, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, and Sierra Leone.

As of 28 July 2014, 21 States Parties that have provided initial reports had not provided the most recent annual update due by 30 April 2014.[142]

Voluntary reports

States not party to the convention may submit voluntary reports as an interim step toward ratification or accession, or at least as an indication of support for the convention. Three signatories and one other area have provided voluntary initial Article 7 transparency reports: Canada (in 2011, 2012, and 2013), DRC (in 2011, 2012 and 2014), Palau (in 2011), and Western Sahara (in 2014).

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National Implementation Legislation

Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires States Parties to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.”[143]The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

As of 31 July 2014, 22 States Parties are known to have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 26 States Parties have indicated that their existing national laws are sufficient to implement the convention. Another 19 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention. The status of national implementation measures was unknown or unclear in another 13 States Parties, most of which have not submitted an initial transparency report as required by the convention.[144]

National implementation legislation by States Parties

National implementation laws

The 22 States Parties that have enacted legislation to implement the convention are listed in the table below. Most enacted legislation prior to ratifying, often by combining the legislative process for approval of implementation and ratification.

States Parties that have enacted national legislation 

Two states adopted legislation before the convention was concluded in May 2008 (Austria and Belgium), two adopted legislation in 2008 prior to signing the convention in December (Ireland and Norway), while four adopted legislation in 2009, four in 2010, three in 2011, five in 2012, one in 2013, and none in 2014. 

No countries started the process of implementing legislation during the reporting period. In November 2013, Spain’s Congress of Deputies approved additional legislative measures to its 2010 penal code amendment, which were awaiting Senate approval as of June 2014.[145]

Existing law deemed sufficient

At least 26 States Parties have indicated that they view their existing laws as sufficient to implement the convention: Albania, Andorra, BiH, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iraq, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovenia, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

Seven States Parties were added to this list in the reporting period: 

• A BiH official said in September 2013 that “all the necessary legislation is in place.”[146] Previously, officials indicated that BiH was considering national legislation to enforce the ban convention.
• Chile cited its ratification legislation under national implementation measures in its Article 7 report.[147]
• Costa Rica declared that “according to Article 7 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, the Convention on Cluster Munitions constitutes supreme law and is made applicable through Law 8921 promulgated 16 December 2010.”[148]
• Iraq cited its 2012 ratification law in its initial Article 7 report provided in June 2014.[149]
• Mauritania cited its ratification legislation, Law 2011-050, in its Article 7 report.[150] In April 2014, a government official said that international treaties ratified by Mauritania are automatically incorporated into the domestic law so there is no need for new or amended legislation specific to cluster munitions.[151]
• Peru cited its ratification law under national implementation measures in its Article 7 report.[152]
• Senegal reported in April 2014 that “it is not necessary to put in place legislation or regulation because Senegal is not a country affected by cluster munitions.”[153] Senegal cited its ratification legislation in its Article 7 report.[154]

Legislation under consideration

At least 19 other States Parties have said that they are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention: Afghanistan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ghana, Grenada, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Togo, and Zambia. 

National implementation legislation by signatories

Signatories including Canada, Chad, Colombia, Iceland, Republic of the Congo, DRC, South Africa, and Uganda are among those that have expressed their intent to enact implementation legislation.

During the reporting period, Canada’s implementation legislation (the “Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions”) was reintroduced to the House of Commons as Bill C-6 on 25 October 2013, approved on 19 June 2014, and was awaiting Senate approval as of 31 July 2014.[155] The draft implementation legislation has been strongly criticized by the CMC, Mines Action Canada (MAC), and others, particularly the section dealing with “interoperability” or relations between States Parties and states that have not joined the convention, including during joint military operations.

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Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on some important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC has urged States Parties and signatories to declare their views on the following special issues of concern so that common understandings can be reached: 

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and 
3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

A significant number of States Parties and signatories to the convention have declared their views on these matters, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and in direct communication with the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws have been enacted that provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet, as of 31 July 2014, 33 of the 84 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions still had not declared their views on even one of these interpretive issues.[156]

In addition, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in late 2010 and 2011 show how the US, despite not itself participating in the Oslo Process, attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, especially with respect to interoperability.[157] The cables also show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of States Parties, including Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. US cluster munition stocks have been removed from Norway and the UK. 

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. Article 21 was strongly criticized by the CMC for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations. 

Article 21 says that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party. 

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[158]

States Parties Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK have indicated support for the contrary view that the Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. 

The CMC has described Australia’s Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 as “extremely problematic” because it allows Australian military personnel to assist with cluster munition attacks by states not party—a provision that runs counter to the convention’s prohibition on assistance—and contravenes Article 9 requiring penal sanctions for activities prohibited by the convention. In a statement issued upon Australia’s ratification in October 2012, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, “With this legislation, it is now an offence to use...and also to encourage others to engage with these dangerous weapons…The Convention and the Act will also apply to Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel during military operations and ADF personnel serving alongside the defence forces of States not party to the Convention.”[159]

Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its views on Article 21, but in a June 2008 State Department cable, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.[160]

Signatory Canada is in the process of considering draft implementation legislation that contains extensive provisions on interoperability. Section 11 of Canada’s draft implementing legislation on “Joint Military Operations” would permit Canadian Armed Forces and public officials to “direct or authorize” an act that “may involve” a state not party while that state is performing activities prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The bill would also permit Canadian forces and public officials to “expressly request” use of cluster munitions by a state not party if the choice of weapons is not within the “exclusive control” of the Canadian Armed Forces.[161] The original text of Section 11(1)(c) would have also allowed Canadians themselves to use, acquire, possess, or transfer cluster munitions if they are temporarily assigned to the armed forces of a state not party, but during a committee hearing on 10 December 2013, the word “using” was deleted from that clause of the bill at the proposal of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[162]

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as a ban on the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. It has also said that the convention should be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[163]

States Parties that have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention, include Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

In addition, signatory Canada’s draft legislation does not explicitly address transit or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions but could be read to implicitly allow these activities.[164] In May 2013, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that “The Canadian Forces would also prohibit, as a matter of policy, the transportation of any cluster munitions aboard Canadian assets.”[165]

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US has removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories. The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[166] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[167]

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in five other States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain), as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:  

• A US cable dated December 2008 states, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[168] Some International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions, but the current status of any possible stockpiles is not known.
• According to a December 2008 cable, Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.[169] Germany has not yet publicly expressed clear views on the convention’s prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions.
• In a November 2008 cable, the US identified Italy, Spain, and Qatar as states of particular concern with respect to interoperability since “they are states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[170] Spain reported in 2011 that it is in the process of informing the states not party with which it cooperates in joint military operations of its international obligations with respect to the prohibition of storage of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.[171]
• A December 2008 cable states that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”[172]Japan maintains that US military bases in Japan are under US jurisdiction and control, so the possession of cluster munitions by US forces does not violate the national law or the convention.
• According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[173]
• According to a May 2007 cable, the US may store clusters munitions in Kuwait.[174]

Disinvestment

A number of States Parties and the CMC believe that the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts constitutes a prohibition on investment, both direct and indirect, in the production of cluster munitions.

A total of nine States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the following table.[175]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

Belgium was first to enact disinvestment legislation in 2007, followed by Ireland in 2008, Luxembourg and New Zealand in 2009, Italy in 2011, Samoa in 2012, and Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 2013.

In addition, at least 26 States Parties and signatories to the convention have provided their view that investment in cluster munitions production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, France, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, the UK, and Zambia.

There were a few developments concerning disinvestment in the second half of 2013 and first half of 2014:

• Denmark announced at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013 that the government “is currently investigating the possibilities nationally for further engaging private investors in pursuing the objectives of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions].” It also informed States Parties of the former Minister of Business and Growth’s request to the Council on Social Responsibility to provide “recommendations on requirements and possibilities to effectively strengthen efforts for responsible investment in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[176] Despite several years of campaigning by Danish NGOs that have also worked to stop Danish financial institutions from investing in companies that produce cluster munitions, the government appears to have reverted to supporting the non-binding recommendations approach contained in its 2010 “Guide on Responsible Investment.”[177]
• Ghana informed States Parties in September 2013 that it “considers investments in the production of cluster munitions a form of assistance that is banned by the Convention.”
• Luxembourg in September 2013 called on other States Parties to follow its example as a country that has gone further than the provisions of the convention to prohibit financing of cluster munitions production in its national legislation.[178]
• Liechtenstein promoted its domestic legislation prohibiting, both directly and indirectly, the financing of cluster munitions production at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013.[179]

A few states have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, and other states have withdrawn and/or banned investments in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition production and promote socially responsible investment in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

CMC member NGOs and national stakeholders have continued to call on governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and to provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors on the issue of investment in cluster munition producers.[180] The CMC’s Stop Explosive Investments campaign initiative, launched in 2009, continued its efforts in the reporting period.[181]

In 2013 and 2014, CMC co-founder and member PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) released two significant reports on disinvestment: a report on examples of positive practice stemming from legal prohibitions on investments in cluster munitions in April 2014 and an update of a report on the status of global investment in cluster munition production in December 2013.[182] The 2013 updated report identifies a number of financial institutions in eight States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) which have guidelines on investment in cluster munitions production not previously listed in the 2012 edition produced in cooperation with FairFin (formerly Netwerk Vlaanderen).[183]

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Timeline of cluster munition use[184]

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[1] The convention text was adopted by consensus by the 107 governments that were full participants in the negotiations. However, adoption does not have any legal obligation attached. Eighteen states adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin on 30 May 2008 but never signed or acceded: Argentina, Bahrain, Belize, Brunei, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Slovakia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Six other states that adopted the convention did not sign during the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008, but joined later at a later date: Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Jamaica, Nigeria, Seychelles, and Swaziland.

[2] Accession and ratification are the most common ways to become a State Party. “States not party” to the convention are those that have signed but not ratified, and those that have not bound themselves as States Parties through accession, ratification, or other mechanisms such as acceptance or approval.

[3] UN Security Council press statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf3.

[4] Among the states that said they preferred to wait for an outcome before deciding on the Convention on Cluster Munitions are Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey.

[5] All but 40 of the 117 high contracting parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The CCW states that have yet to ban cluster munitions are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, India, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, South Korea, Latvia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates (UAE), US, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. See the full list of CCW states at bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf5.

[6] All States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have joined the Mine Ban Treaty except Lao PDR and Lebanon, while 49 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have yet to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Guyana, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. As of 31 July 2013, there were 161 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory (Marshall Islands).

[7] See www.the-monitor.org.

[8] Forty-one from Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 from Europe, 23 from the Americas, 12 from Asia-Pacific, and three from the Middle East and North Africa.

[9] Starting in 2013, Cluster Munition Monitor no longer includes section reporting on activities at the Convention on Conventional Weapons as the CCW has done no work on cluster munitions since November 2011 when the Fourth Review Conference failed to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions. See Cluster Munition Monitor 2012, www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2012/.

[10] Ninety-four states signed in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008, 10 signed in 2009, and four signed in the first seven months of 2010 before the convention entered into force as binding international law.

[11] The 29 signatories yet to ratify are: Angola, Benin, Canada, CAR, Colombia, Cyprus, DRC, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Palau, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, São Tomé e Príncipe, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

[12] The Vienna Convention is considered customary international law binding on all countries.

[13] A state must deposit an instrument of accession with the UN in New York. The convention enters into force for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after their deposit of the instrument of accession.

[14] CMC web post, “Saint Kitts and Nevis joins global cluster bomb ban,” 14 September 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Ban14. 

[15] Explanatory note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM2014Banf15. Attached in letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014. 

[16] Among the states that said they preferred to wait for a CCW outcome before deciding on the Convention on Cluster Munitions are Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey.

[17] Angola, Benin, Central African Republic, DRC, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Somalia, and South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

[18] Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritius, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

[19] Republic of South Africa government press release, “Statement on the Cabinet meeting of 4 September,” 5 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf19.

[20] Statement of Gabon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Zambia, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf20.

[21] There are 18 States Parties from the Americas: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

[22] In April 2014, Colombia stated that “inter-ministerial consultations” were taking place on the convention, which is believed to be the final phase of the domestic process before the instrument of accession can be deposited. Statement of Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf22. 

[23] Debates of the Senate (Hansard) Volume 148, Issue 125, 4 December 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf23.

[24] House of Commons of Canada, “Bill C-6: An Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf24. After the draft legislation is passed, it will be given royal assent and enter into force, thus enabling Canada to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[25] Statement of Paraguay, Santiago Regional Workshop on Cluster Munitions, 12 December 2013. Notes by the CMC.

[26] There are 19 non-signatories from Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam) and nine non-signatories from the Pacific (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). Six Asia-Pacific non-signatories adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008: Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu. During the Oslo Process, the Marshall Islands, Nepal, and Niue subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming their intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

[27] The nine States Parties from the Asia-Pacific are Afghanistan, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Japan, Lao PDR, Nauru, New Zealand, and Samoa.

[28] Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, North Korea, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga, and Tuvalu.

[29] There are 32 States Parties from Europe: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[30] Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. EU member state Cyprus has signed but not yet ratified the convention.

[31] The 13 other European and Central Asian non-signatories are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Slovakia joined in the consensus adoption of the convention on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, while Tajikistan subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming its intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

[32] In April 2014, a Cypriot representative informed the CMC that the ratification process has been put on hold for the next three years because of the country’s financial situation and International Monetary Fund (IMF) restrictions that inhibit Cyprus from spending funds to meet its anticipated stockpile destruction obligations. CMC meeting with Georgeos S. Yiangou, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 10 April 2014. 

[33] In May 2014, a government representative informed the CMC that proposed amendments to the country’s existing penal law would be submitted in parliament in the third quarter of 2014 and could be approved by the end of the year, permitting Iceland to ratify. Icelandic officials have made similar promises every year since 2010 concerning the ratification legislation package.

[34] Explanatory note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM2014Banf15. Attached in Letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[35] Letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[36] The 15 non-signatories from the Middle East and North Africa are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. Bahrain, Morocco, and Qatar joined in the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the negotiations in May 2008.

[37] Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

[38] CMC web post, “Palestine announces intention to join cluster bomb ban,” 6 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf38.

[39] See the official website for the Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11–14 September 2012, www.3msp.clusterconvention.org/. The list of participants is available at bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf39.

[40] Statement by Michael Chilufya Sata, President of Zambia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 9 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf40.

[41] Convention on Cluster Munitions Lusaka Progress Report, 13 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMMBan14f41.

[42] Members of the CMC from Chile, Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, and Venezuela also participated in the meeting. See CMC web post, “Santiago conference commits to a cluster munition-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean,”14 December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf42.

[43] Santiago Declaration and Elements of an Action Plan, presentation by M. Christian Guillermet, Deputy Permanent Representative, Mission Costa Rica to UNOG, Santiago, 13 December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMMBanf43. 

[44] Benin, Congo, DRC, Djibouti, Guinea, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

[45] Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia attended. The meeting was supported by Germany, the government of Croatia’s Office for Demining, and the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC). RACVIAC, “Symposium on Mine Action,” 22–26 April 2014, www.racviac.org/downloads/2014/CSE-01_report.pdf. 

[46] Alick Banda, “Kalaba lobbies Mauritius to accede to Convention on Cluster Munitions,” The Independent Observer (Zambia), 6 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf46; and “Sign convention on cluster bombs – Kalaba,” Zambia Daily Mail, 6 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf46a.

[47] See the website of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, www.5msp.clusterconvention.org/. 

[48] This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes in Angola, Azerbaijan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zambia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh.

[49] Four non-signatories that stockpile cluster munitions have stated that they have never used the weapons: Estonia, Finland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; while another 13 non-signatories with stockpiles are not known to have ever used cluster munitions: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

[50] Nine of the 16 non-signatories known to produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, and Turkey), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producer states: India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore. This leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries that both produce and use cluster munitions. 

[51] In addition to the new use documented by Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 in South Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, since the Convention on Cluster Munitions took effect in August 2010 new cluster munition use has been recorded in Cambodia and Libya in 2011, in Sudan in 2012, and in Myanmar in 2013, as shown in the Timeline of cluster munition use. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 

[52] The use of air-dropped RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions has been recorded in both South Sudan and Syria, while the use of 9M55K surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms was documented in both Syria and Ukraine in the first half of 2014.

[53] The 9M55K 330mm cluster munition rocket was designed and initially manufactured by the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and then manufactured and exported by the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise “SPLAV State Research And Production Association” from 1991 onward. The mass (weight) of the fragments contained in the 9N235 submunitions makes them more powerful and deadly than other types of submunitions. While designed to detonate on impact, each submunition has a back-up pyrotechnic self-destruct feature designed to destroy it two minutes after being ejected from the rocket, but the self-destruct feature appears to have failed to function in some cases documented in Syria. HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14MAf23. A photograph of the submunitions founded with the remnants of 9M55K-series cluster munition rockets used in Ukraine shows that some failed to self-destruct. See Armament Research Services blog, “9M55K cargo rockets and 9N235 submunitions in Ukraine,” 3 July 2104, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf53.

[54] Since 2012, HRW has systematically researched, recorded, and documented the use of cluster munitions in Syria. This Monitor report updates information provided in HRW’s April 2014 research product. See HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 4 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf54.

[55] Additionally, ZAB incendiary submunitions delivered by RBK bombs have been used by government forces. However, this type is not accounted for by the Monitor as this type is not considered to be an explosive submunition since the ZAB submunitions ignite after release from its container instead of detonating on, before, or after impact. Therefore they are not covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. For further information on Syria’s use of incendiary weapons, see, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf55. 

[56] Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf56; HRW press release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” New York, 12 July 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf56a. 

[57] AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions are capable of being loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers. The AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by the RBK-500 cluster bomb.

[58] It is not known if the 122mm rockets are SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. The design of the fuze system in this type of submunition makes it very sensitive and submunitions that fail to explode on initial impact are liable to detonate if disturbed. HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” New York, 14 January 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf58.

[59] Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf59. 

[60] HRW stated, “It is highly unlikely that rebel forces could acquire the eight-wheeled, 43,700 kilogram launch vehicle or operate its sophisticated fire control system without significant training or time to conduct practice drills. There is no video evidence or written claims that any rebel group controls any BM-30 launchers, its similarly sized re-supply vehicle, or any 300mm surface-to-surface rockets like the 9M55K rocket.” HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMMMAf18.

[61] Collective Awareness to UXO blog, “AP-39 Syria Unidentified Submunition,” undated, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf61. See also videos posted by Syrian activists at youtu.be/rRGRVM4qaC8 and youtu.be/kdpgLV5FKCE.

[62] See Brown Moses Blog, “The markings on what’s assumed to be a Sakr submunition suggests the designation is ZP39, made in 1993,” 4 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf62; and Wareham, Mary (@marywareham), "Meanwhile cluster munitions still used in #Syria - unexploded submunition filmed near Homs: http://t.co/Q6yhCeW70x http://t.co/U28bYPCHxr" 22 Jul 2014, 21:21 UTC, tweet, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf62a. 

[63] According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf63. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affair ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.

[64] A video uploaded to YouTube on 26 March 2014 reportedly of arms captured by government forces from rebel groups shows submunitions prepared for use as IEDs: youtu.be/UTwbnoRQodc. 

[65] Countries that have expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria are from 91 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia FS, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, US, Vanuatu, and Yemen). The Monitor does not count signatories to the Lome regional meeting declaration of May 2013, which expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in general and was endorsed by 36 African states including Angola, Congo Rep, Eritrea, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 

[66] On 18 December 2013, a total of 127 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 68/182 that expressed “outrage” at the Syrian government’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.” “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf66. On 15 May 2013, a total of 107 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 67/262 that included a strong condemnation of “the use by the Syrian authorities of...cluster munitions.” “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/67/L.63, 15 May 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf66a.

[67] United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, pp. 26–27, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf67. 

[68] “South Sudan has no capacity to use or stockpile cluster bombs; neither do the Ugandan forces who have been assisting with security in South Sudan,” South Sudan government army spokesman Philip Aguer told IBTimes. “The war is not intensive enough to require the use of cluster bombs.” See Jacey Fortin, “The Bad Bomb: Cluster Munitions, Cold Cases And A Case of Blame Game in South Sudan,” International Business Times, 12 March 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf68.

[69] HRW press release, “South Sudan: Investigate New Cluster Bomb Use,” 15 February 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf69. 

[70] “Ugandan army won’t take part in cluster bomb investigation,” Sudan Tribune, 19 February 2014, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50027. 

[71] Statement of UN Secretary-General on South Sudan, New York, 12 February 2014, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7455. In May 2014, the UNMAS director informed the CMC that while cluster munitions had been used in South Sudan, it was not possible to determine who was responsible for the use. Email from UNMAS, 13 May 2014.

[72] CMC web page, “Cluster munition use in South Sudan,” undated, but 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf72. 

[73] Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, “Norway condemns use of cluster bombs in South Sudan,” 22 February 2014. bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf73b; statement by Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wylbur C. Simuusa, President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 14 February 2014. bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf73

[74] Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, and Rwanda. See UN Security Council press statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11414.doc.htm. 

[75] Violence erupted in eastern Ukraine following the February 21, 2014 ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich. By mid-March, armed groups initially calling themselves “self-defense units” seized and occupied administrative buildings in several cities, towns, and villages in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Their demands ranged from making Ukraine a federation, to separation of their regions from the rest of Ukraine, to joining Russia. The Ukrainian government’s counter-insurgency operations in these regions has intensified since the country’s 25 May presidential elections and were continuing as Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 went to print.

[76] Armament Research Services blog, “9M55K cargo rockets and 9N235 submunitions in Ukraine,” 3 July 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf53. 

[77] 9M27K-series rockets have different submunitions payloads depending on the configuration. The 9M27K contains the 9N210 submunitions, while the 9M27K-1 contains the 9N235 submunition. Visually, the 9N210 and 9N235 look the same and weigh almost the same, but internally the size of the fragments is different as is the timing on the self-destruct feature. See Szlanko, Balint (@balintszlanko), "Cargo rockets, 220mm 9M27K or 300mm 9M55K. Abandoned rebel base in #Slavyansk, prob. fired by Ukrainians. #Ukraine. http://t.co/r7xjG4gwgg" 11 Jul 2014, 07:39 UTC, tweet, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf77; and Armament Research Services blog, “9M27K series cargo rockets used in Ukraine,” 11 July 2104, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf77a. 

[78] In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told CMC representatives that Ukraine would not use cluster munitions except to defend itself from outside aggression. CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[79] David McHugh, “Troops in Ukraine strike back at rebels; Putin pushes truce,” Associated Press, 5 July 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf79.

[80] “Ukraine used phosphorous incendiaries, cluster bombs against cities – Russian military,” RT, 25 July 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf80. 

[81] CMC web post, “Worrying evidence of cluster munition use in Ukraine,” 3 July 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf81; and letter from Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC to Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 16 July 2014. 

[82] Letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[83] Letter from Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 1 October 2009; and Slovakia, “Position paper on the Cluster Munitions,” provided to the CMC by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to the UK, London, 25 May 2010.

[84] Use of cluster munitions against rebel forces in Syria has been ongoing since 2012. In 2011, Libyan forces of the Gaddafi regime used cluster munitions against rebel forces in Misrata. In August 2008, the government of the separatist territory of Abkhazia asserted that Georgian forces fired large numbers of cluster munitions into the Kodor Valley. Cluster munitions were used in Nagorno-Karabakh sometime between 1992 and 1994 during conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory, but it is not known which armed forces used cluster munitions. Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario) in Western Sahara during their conflict from 1975 to 1988.

[85] The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

[86] The list of producers has changed over time as new information has become available. In May 2002, HRW identified a total of 33 states that had produced at least 208 different types of cluster munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

[87] In April 2011, Romania’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, “Romania is not a producer of cluster munition[s].” In August 2011, Turkey said it has not produced cluster munitions since 2005. However, the Monitor continues to list both Romania and Turkey as producers since it is unclear if they have adopted a new policy forswearing any future production of cluster munitions.

[88] Letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014; and explanatory note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM2014Banf15. Attached in Letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[89] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011. The Monitor continues to list Greece as a producer as it has not adopted a formal policy renouncing any future production of cluster munitions.

[90] Response to Right to Information request submitted by Control Arms Foundation of India from T.J. Konger, Director and Central Public Information Officer, Ordnance Factory Board, Ministry of Defence, 6 June 2012. 

[91] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. Submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2005 and afterward must meet the new standard. However, a waiver was granted for M30 GMRLS rocket submunitions, allowing a 2–4% dud rate. It appears that since the 2001 Cohen policy, a waiver was granted in an Operational Requirements Document approved by the Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Committee that established a new, higher, hazardous dud requirement for M30 GMLRS rocket DPICM submunitions. This higher dud rate requirement sets a “less that 2% dud rate between ranges of 20-60 kilometers” and “less than 4% dud rate under 20 kilometers and over 60 kilometers.” See Office of the US Army Product Manager, Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems, “Briefing on Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets; Self Destruct Fuze Efforts,” February 2007, Slide 2. 

[92] Communication from the Ministry of National Defence of Poland to Pax Christi Netherlands, 14 February 2005. 

[93] Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008. 

[94] Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited the production capacity of former Yugoslavia, has declared, “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf94.

[95] While there is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, at least 15 countries are known to have exported the weapon, including States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Spain, and UK, and non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Turkey, US, and Yugoslavia.

[96] Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

[97] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

[98] The number of stockpiling states has increased since it was first estimated a decade ago as new information has become available and as governments have clarified current and past possession of cluster munitions. In May 2002, HRW identified a total of 56 states that have stockpiled cluster munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890. 

[99] 602 122mm AGAT rockets, 67 M26 rockets, 95 RBK cluster bombs and 3,303 submunitions, and 135 KMG-U dispensers. Explanatory note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM2014Banf15. Attached in letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[100] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

[101] Statement of the US, Fourth Review Conference, CCW, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf101. Previously, in 2004, the US reported the stockpile consisted of nearly 5.5 million cluster munitions containing nearly 730 million submunitions. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[102] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of the Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, Slide 2.

[103] Other stockpilers Guinea-Bissau and Honduras have not submitted their initial Article 7 reports as of 28 July 2014, although Honduras has indicated it no longer stockpiles cluster munitions. Afghanistan and Iraq have completed destruction, but are not listed in the table due to lack of clarity on their reporting of destroyed cluster munitions. (See Stockpile destruction section.)

[104] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010. The CB-250K bombs were produced by Chile and each contains 240 submunitions. The ARC-32 bomb is apparently a 350kg weapon containing 32 anti-runway submunitions produced by Israel.

[105] Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf105. 

[106] Statement of Republic of Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/cl_congo.pdf. In 2011, clearance personnel destroyed cluster munitions remnants and PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh submunitions from an arms depot that was bombed during the 1997–1998 conflict. Cluster munitions were also apparently part of weapons stockpiles destroyed in 2008–2010 with the assistance of UK-based humanitarian demining organization Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Email from Lt.-Col. André Pampile Serge Oyobe, Head of Information Division, Ministry of Defense, 13 July 2010.

[107] In April 2012, Canada reported a stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles, containing total of 1,108,800 DPICM submunitions (806,208 M42 and 302,328 M46). Canada, voluntary Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012. 

[108] Statement of Canada, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, April 2014. Notes by the CMC.

[109] CMC meetings with Maria Madalena Neto, Victim Assistance Coordinator, Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 7–9 June 2010. Notes by the CMC/HRW. Neto later confirmed this statement, noting that the Air Force led a task force responsible for the program. Email from Maria Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, 13 August 2010.

[110] Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf110. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigeria Air Force possesses British-made BL-755 cluster bombs. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 843.

[111] Statement of South Africa, UN Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons, New York, 18 October 2010. In December 2008, South Africa also said that a “relatively small stockpile of outdated cluster munitions” had been “earmarked for destruction.” See statement by Charles Nqakula, Minister of Defence, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

[112] Albania, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Grenada, Guatemala, Ireland, Holy See, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Uruguay, and Zambia have made definitive statements, either in transparency reports or in interventions at official meetings. However, some States Parties did not indicate if they possess stockpiles, but simply indicated “not applicable” or “none” in the form or left the form blank. The CMC has urged all states to clearly indicate in their next reports that there are no cluster munitions stockpiled under their jurisdiction and control, including by stating a more unequivocal response such as “zero.” 

[113] This includes the information submitted by States Parties on a voluntary basis for those cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed before entry into force.

[114] These numbers of munitions reported destroyed by these nations prior to entry into force are included in this table and more information is available in the Monitor country profiles. Switzerland is not listed in the table as it has yet to report on munitions destroyed under the ban convention, but it has declared the destruction prior to entry into force—between 1997 and 2000—of 3,999 cluster bombs and 587,853 submunitions. Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 June 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf114; and email from François Garraux, Arms Control and Disarmament Policy, Federal Department of Defense, 23 August 2011.

[115] Statement of Honduras, Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 5 December 2007. Notes by the CMC/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); HRW meetings with Honduran officials, San José, 5 September 2007, and Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

[116] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 April 2014. Notes by the CMC.

[117] The initial Article 7 report details the destruction between 2005 and 2011 of over 271,000 submunitions of various types. Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 August 2012. The May 2013 Article 7 report details the destruction of 724 munitions and submunitions discovered during 2012 and provides a more thorough accounting of the destruction of the various submunitions between 2005 and 2011, listing five types of munitions that were not included in the initial report. The report states that Afghanistan “has not officially announced completion of stockpiled Cluster Munitions programme however the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.” This would appear to indicate that while there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, the government anticipates that it may discover additional stocks abandoned by other combatants in the past. Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B Part II, 19 May 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf117.

[118] Iraq, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf118.

[119] Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf119a. 

[120] Statement of Italy, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14f120. 

[121] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf121. The 2011 announcement by Nammo stated that the stockpile destruction program would conclude by February 2015 at the latest. Nammo press release, “Nammo Awarded Contract to Demilitarize Cluster Munitions for Japan,” August 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14banf121a.

[122] Statement of France, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf122.

[123] Utrikesutskottets bettkesuts 2011/12:UU7, eNedrustning, icke-spridning och konventionell rustningskontroll samt Sveriges tilltrrs till konventionen om klusterammunition”Utrikesutskottets bettkesuts 20ort 2011/12:UU7, “Disarmament, non-proliferation and conventional arms control and Sweden’s accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions”), 23 February 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf123; statement of Sweden, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2011; and FMV document 10FMV1726-7:1, dated 10 February 2011.

[124] Average exchange rate for 2013. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2014, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/current/default.htm.

[125] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/04/Peru.pdf.

[126] Please see the individual 2013 ban policy country profiles online for more information on retention, including specific quantities for each type retained.

[127] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf127.

[128] Belgium, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitoCMM14Banf128.

[129] The 193 submunitions comprised of 94 AO-2.5, 57 AO-10, 40 PTAB-2.5, and 2 ZAB-2.5T. Czech Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf129.

[130] France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, pp. 62–64, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf130. 

[131] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf127. 

[132] Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form C, 5 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf132. 

[133] Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf133.

[134] Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 11 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf134. 

[135] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf135.

[136] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings Geneva, 7 April 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/04/UK.pdf.

[137] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf137b; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf135.

[138] Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and Slovenia.

[139] A small number of states are not providing definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable” in response to particular information requests. States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” in the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and to discourage use of cluster munitions by states not party, cooperation and assistance, or to report on other important matters such as positions on interpretive issues. Austria, Belgium, DRC, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Zambia have utilized Form J in their initial Article 7 transparency reports.

[140] Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia.

[141] The compliance rate is a slight improvement on the 70% compliance rate reported one year ago by Cluster Munition Monitor 2013, but similar to the “three-quarters” compliance rate recorded by Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.

[142] Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Uruguay.

[143] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010; and ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.”

[144] Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Monaco, Nauru, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago.

[145] In November 2013, Spain’s Congress of Deputies adopted an amendment to the country’s 1998 implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty (Law 33/1998) to add the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[146] Statement by Ivica Dronjic, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013. BiH has declared its ratification law under national implementation measures for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 August 2011. The subsequent Article 7 report indicates no change to the national implementation measures declared in 2011.

[147] Chile, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, September 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf147.

[148] Costa Rica, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf148.

[149] Iraq, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf118. 

[150] Mauritania, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, Form A, 18 March 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf150b.

[151] CMC meetings with Lt.-Col. Alioune Ould Mohamed El Hacen, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD), Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, Geneva, 8 and 15 April 2014.

[152] Resolución Legislative que aprueba la Convención sobre Municiones en Racimo (Legislative Resolution approving the Convention on Cluster Munitions), No. 29843, 15 March 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14BanF152a. On 25 April 2012, Decree 021-2012 approving ratification was signed and published in the official journal El Peruanothe next day. Decree No. 021-2012-RE, 26 April 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14BanF152b.“Ref. 464960,” El Peruano, 26 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 August 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf152b. 

[153] Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf153. 

[154] Senegal’s National Assembly unanimously approved Law No. 14/2010 to ratify the convention on 23 June 2010. Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 October 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14f154. 

[155] House of Commons of Canada, “Bill C-6: An Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf24. 

[156] States Parties that have not publicly expressed a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Panama, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[157] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions originating from 100 locations for the period from 2003 to 2010. Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 had reviewed cables released by Wikileaks as of early August 2011, a total of 57 US diplomatic cables from 24 locations. See, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf157a.

[158] At least 35 States Parties and signatories have previously stated their agreement with this view: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2012), pp. 34–35; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010(Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[159] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Defence press release, “Australia ratifies global treaty to ban cluster munitions,” 17 October 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf159.

[160] “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO1748 dated 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf160.

[161] Senate of Canada, “Bill S-10: An Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf161.

[162] Statement by David Anderson, Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf162.

[163] A total of 32 States Parties and signatories have previously said transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[164] In Canada’s bill, the prohibition on transfer (Section 6c) applies only if there is intent to transfer ownership (not mere physical movement), which arguably means that transit of cluster munitions through Canada could be permissible. Section 11(2) of the proposed legislation would allow Canadian forces to transport the cluster munitions of a state not party during joint military operations. According to a senior government official, the bill “does not allow stockpiling of cluster munitions on Canada’s territory, including by a State not party to the Convention, as it prohibits all forms of possession.” Email from John MacBride, Senior Defence Advisor, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 9 July 2012.

[165] House of Commons official report (Hansard), Volume 146, Number 258, 29 May 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf165.

[166] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In November 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf166.

[167] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a US cable dated 17 December 2008, the US stockpile in Norway was believed to consist of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See “Norway raises question concerning U.S. cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf167.

[168] “Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf168.

[169] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” “MFA gives reassurances on stockpiling of US cluster munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf169. See also “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf169a.

[170] The cable states, “Rome should note that cluster munitions are stored at Aviano and Camp Darby.” “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf170.

[171] Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 27 January 2011.

[172] “Consultations with Japan on implementing the Oslo convention on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf172.

[173] “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable dated 18 April 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf173.

[174] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” With respect to the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See “Follow-up on UAE response to Lebanese request for emergency aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCCM14Banf174.

[175] Italy’s Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

[176] Statement of Denmark, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013. The Council’s report, published in March 2014, did not however recommend to the government a mandatory prohibition on investment in cluster munitions producers, despite strong opposition from the Council’s NGO members. Elias C. Lundström, “Nej til forbud mod klyngebomber” (“No to ban on cluster munitions”), Jyllands-Posten, 13 March 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf176.

[177] Email from Rune Saugmann, Chairman of Denmark Against Landmines, 24 July 2014.

[178] Statement of Luxembourg, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[179] Statement by Stefan Barriga, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN in New York, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 68th session, 11 October 2013. 

[180] The CMC launched the Stop Explosive Investments initiative in 2009. See, www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.

[181] In 2013, FairFin and PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) ended their cooperation in producing the report entitled “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a Shared Responsibility.” PAX published the 2013 edition, dated December 2013, which is built on the previous editions published in conjunction with FairFin.

[182] PAX, “Banning Investments in Cluster Munitions Producers; National Legislation,” April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf182; IKV Pax Christi, “December 2013 Update: Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf182b; and CMC, “Over US$24 Billion Invested in Cluster Bomb Producers Worldwide: Financial Institutions and Governments Urged to Stop Explosive Investments,” 12 December 2013, www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=4561.

[183] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf183.

[184] For more detailed information, please see the relevant Cluster Munition Monitor country profile online at: www.the-monitor.org.