States and other areas with cluster munition contamination as of August 2017

* Contamination exists or is suspected to exist in areas outside of government control.
** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, where any cluster munition contamination is likely within mined areas.
Note: States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics. 

Summary[2]

As of 1 August 2017, a total of 26 states and three other areas are contaminated by cluster munition remnants.[3] This includes 12 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, one signatory, and 13 non-signatories. It is unclear whether one State Party and one signatory are contaminated.[4]

State Party Mozambique reported completion of clearance in December 2016.[5]

In 2016, unexploded submunitions were found in signatory Angola, and in non-signatories Georgia and Tajikistan. All three countries were suspected to have a residual threat but, prior to these new discoveries, had no specific locations of suspected or confirmed contamination.

Little changed in the global understanding of the extent of the problem during 2016. The size of contaminated areas is not known in approximately half of the cluster munition-affected states. In 2016, clearance operators in several states and other areas continued to identify previously unknown areas of contamination.

New use increased contamination in Syria and Yemen in both 2016 and 2017, and in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016. Alleged new use in Iraq (2017), Libya (2016–2017) and Somalia (early 2016) may have also resulted in increased contamination.

In 2016, at least 88km² of contaminated land was cleared, with a total of at least 140,000 submunitions destroyed during land release (survey and clearance) operations.[6] However, this estimate is based on incomplete data. It represents a 25% increase on the land cleared and 16% increase on the number of submunitions destroyed in 2015. Between 2010 and 2016, a total of more than 535,000 submunitions were destroyed and at least 425km² of land was cleared worldwide. In 2016, a decrease in recorded cluster munition-contaminated areas was reported in only one State Party, Croatia, and in two non-signatories, Serbia and South Sudan, as well as two other areas, Kosovo and Western Sahara.[7]

Only one State Party, Croatia, appears on track to meet its Article 4 clearance deadline, four States Parties are not on track, and it is unclear whether the remaining States Parties will meet their deadlines.

Conflict and insecurity in 2016 and 2017 impeded land release efforts in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia) and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen).

The convention entered into force for Colombia and Somalia in 2016. Colombia has reported that it is in the process of establishing the location and extent of any cluster munition contamination.[8] The extent of contamination in Somalia is not known. As of 1 August 2017, Somalia had not submitted its initial transparency report, which was due in August 2016. 

Contamination and Land Release

Contamination statistics

The extent of contamination remains unknown in the most heavily contaminated countries in the world: Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Survey efforts are being made to improve understanding of the problem. In Syria, the extent of cluster munition use and the high number of casualties mean that contamination has significantly increased. However, the ongoing conflict prevents survey. (See the cluster munition ban and casualties sections of the Syria country profile for further details.)

In only three countries and two other areas did the total reported size of cluster munition-contaminated areas decrease during 2016 as a result of land release (survey and clearance) efforts: Croatia, Serbia, and South Sudan, along with other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara. However, in South Sudan and Western Sahara is it thought that undiscovered areas of contamination exist, so the reported size of contamination may increase in the future. The reported size of contamination in the remaining countries did not decrease because either the extent of contamination is unknown, no clearance took place, or previously unknown areas were identified.

Previously unknown or unreported contaminated areas were identified in 2016 in Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. Prior to this, there were no suspected or confirmed contaminated areas in Angola, Georgia, or Tajikistan.

New contamination was reported in 2016 and 2017 in Syria and Yemen. New use was also alleged in Iraq in 2017, Libya in both years and in Somalia in early 2016.[9] In 2016, the use of cluster munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in additional contamination of approximately 2km².[10] In Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the extent of any new contamination is not known as insecurity prevents or hampers survey and clearance.

The data contained in the following table is drawn from various sources. Those that appear to be most accurate and complete have been used.[11]

Notes: * Mid-2016 data; ** See Democratic Republic of the Congo above; States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; convention signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics.

Land release statistics

The information provided in the table below draws on data provided in Article 7 transparency reports, by national programs, and by mine action operators. There are sometimes discrepancies between these sources. Where this is the case, the data that appears to be most reliable is used and a note has been made. For an explanation of land release terminology, see “Improving clearance efficiency: land release,” in Cluster Munition Monitor 2015.

Almost one-third of global cluster munition clearance in 2016 took place in Lao PDR, where 30.17km² of contaminated land was cleared and 106,636 submunitions destroyed.

Note: NTS = non-technical survey; TS = technical survey; SHA = suspected hazardous area; CHA = confirmed hazardous area.

 

Note: TS = technical survey; CHA = confirmed hazardous area; BAC = battle area clearance.

Note: N/R = not reported; NTS = non-technical survey; TS = technical survey; SHA = suspected hazardous area; CHA = confirmed hazardous area.

Note: TS = technical survey; CHA = confirmed hazardous area.

Clearance obligations under Article 4

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention. If unable to complete clearance in time, the State Party may request deadline extensions for periods of up to five years. No such requests have yet been made as the first clearance deadlines are 1 August 2020.

In seeking to fulfill their clearance and destruction obligations, affected States Parties are required to:

• Survey, assess, and record the threat, making every effort to identify all contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control;
• Assess and prioritize needs for marking, protection of civilians, clearance, and destruction;
• Take “all feasible steps” to perimeter-mark, monitor, and fence affected areas;
• Conduct risk education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around areas contaminated by cluster munitions;
• Take steps to mobilize the necessary resources at national and international levels; and
• Develop a national plan, building upon existing structures, experiences, and methodologies.[12]

The following table provides an assessment of progress of States Parties against clearance deadlines based on size of contamination, the existence of a resourced plan, progress to date, and obstacles to land release operations such as conflict and insecurity. 

Clearance completed

Eight States Parties have completed the clearance of their cluster munition-contaminated areas under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

State Party Mozambique reported the completion of clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in December 2016.[13] Seven States Parties have in previous years completed the clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants: Albania, the Republic of the Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Norway, and Zambia. One signatory, Uganda, and one non-signatory, Thailand, also completed clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in previous years.

In signatory DRC, verifications are required before a formal declaration of completion is made.

Progress by States Parties under the Dubrovnik Action Plan

The Dubrovnik Action Plan was adopted by States Parties at the Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in September 2015. It seeks to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the convention until the Second Review Conference in 2020. Section III (Actions 3.1–3.8) is related to clearance and risk reduction education.

This section examines the progress of States Parties against their Dubrovnik Action Plan commitments on the clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants.[14]

Action 3.1—Assess the extent of the problem of cluster munition contamination

States Parties are required to provide an assessment of the extent of the problem of cluster munition contamination within two years of the First Review Conference or two years after entry into force of the convention for each State Party (refer to the table “Estimated cluster munition contamination” above for existing knowledge of extent of the problem). By the end of 2016:

• Two states had a very good understanding of the extent of the problem.
• Six states had a fairly good understanding of the extent of the problem.
• Four states—including the most heavily contaminated states—had a poor understanding of the problem.
• One state may be able to declare it has no contaminated areas, once assessment and survey have been conducted. 

The two States Parties that have a very good understanding of the problem are Croatia and Germany. In Croatia, all known contamination is contained within confirmed hazardous areas.[15] In Germany, survey of the military training area was completed in 2015,[16] although the results were not made available to the public.

The six States Parties that have a fairly good understanding of the extent of the problem are Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, Montenegro, and the UK. In two states, Afghanistan and Lebanon, many of the cluster munition-contaminated areas are known, but there may be other contamination that is as yet undiscovered.[17] Most of BiH’s cluster munition-contaminated areas are suspected hazardous areas that require survey to either confirm or release.[18] Montenegro has two suspected areas that have yet to be surveyed.[19] Two states, Chile and the UK, know the locations of all contaminated areas, but the extent of contamination within those areas is not known. The UK has affirmed that, on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, no areas known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants exist outside areas already suspected of being contaminated with landmines or ERW.[20] However, it does not know the extent of cluster munition contamination within these areas. Chile has not reported conducting any survey of the four military training areas that it suspects are contaminated.

The four States Parties that have a poor understanding of the extent or location of the cluster munition problem are Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Somalia. Lao PDR is the world’s most contaminated country, and the extent of affected areas is not known. It has now taken steps to improve its understanding, as in 2016 it committed to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021.[21] Although Iraq has confirmed more than 207km² of cluster munition contamination, the true extent is not known, and conflict and insecurity continued to prevent efforts to better define the problem in 2016.[22] Although Chad and Somalia are contaminated by cluster munitions, they have not recorded any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas.

Colombia may be able to declare it has no contaminated areas, once assessment and survey have been conducted.

Action 3.2—Protect people from harm

In accordance with their Article 4 obligations, through their Article 7 transparency reports, six States Parties reported on measures to provide risk education and/or to prevent civilian access to areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants through marking and fencing in 2016: BiH, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.[23]

In Germany and the UK, all cluster munition contamination is fenced and marked. In Germany, the areas are completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to the area.[24] The UK has conducted comprehensive perimeter-marking of mined areas potentially containing cluster munition remnants.[25]

In most affected States Parties, a humanitarian and/or socio-economic impact of contamination is reported to varying degrees, indicating the need for greater efforts to fulfill this action.[26] In several states, cluster munition remnants continue to cause casualties (see the casualties chapter for further details).

Action 3.3—Develop a resourced plan

Despite the requirement to have a plan in place within one year of the First Review Conference or by entry into force of the convention for that State Party, no State Party has presented a strategic plan that is resourced and on track.

The only State Party that appears to be on track towards its Article 4 clearance deadline is Croatia, although its mine action plan does not specifically address cluster munition remnants.

Three States Parties have specific plans for survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants, but it is not clear that they are on track to complete clearance by their Article 4 deadlines: Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Montenegro. Afghanistan has prepared a number of plans for clearing cluster munition remnants, but implementation has been taken over by other priorities and hampered by insecurity.[27] At the end of 2016, Afghanistan circulated a proposal to donors to complete clearance of all known cluster munition contamination.[28] Lebanon’s 2011–2020 mine action strategic plan originally aimed to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants by 2016, but its first mid-term review concluded that it would not be possible to complete clearance before 2020.[29] Lebanon is in the process of conducting a second mid-term review to reflect more accurately its expected cluster munition clearance completion date. This review is due to be completed in 2017.[30] Montenegro’s plan to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants is not funded.[31]

Two States Parties are working toward developing specific cluster munition clearance plans: BiH and Lao PDR. BiH is in the process of developing a new strategy for 2018–2025 that should contain a plan and timeframe for the completion of cluster munition clearance. The process is due for completion by the end of 2017.[32] Lao PDR plans to complete a survey by the end of 2021, which should provide the basis upon which a clearance plan can be developed.[33] However, this will not be achieved within the Article 4 clearance deadline, and an extension request will need to be submitted.

Germany reports that it plans to complete clearance operations in early 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline. However, it has not presented a detailed plan, and meteorological conditions and environmental protection laws limiting burning periods could lead to delays.[34]

Four States Parties do not have a cluster munition clearance strategy in place. They have not indicated an intention to develop such a plan, nor whether they expect to meet their Article 4 deadlines: Chad, Chile, Iraq, and the UK. Chad’s mine action plan notes that it adhered to the Convention on Cluster Munitions but does not detail plans to survey and clear cluster munition contamination.[35] Chile has not presented a plan for how it will achieve its Article 4 clearance deadline, and as of mid-2017, survey and clearance had not commenced. Iraq does not have a strategic plan for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, and in the context of ongoing conflict and other security and humanitarian imperatives, cluster munition clearance does not rank as a priority. As any cluster munition contamination in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is contained within existing minefields, the UK needs to present detailed plans and timelines for completing demining operations in order to demonstrate how it intends to meet its Article 4 deadline.

The convention entered into force on 1 March 2016 for Colombia and Somalia. As of mid-2017, they had not developed a clearance plan. Colombia reported in May 2017 that it is in the process of establishing the location and extent of any contamination, but it did not provide details of any plan or activities.[36] Once the necessary assessment and survey have been conducted, Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations. In 2015, Somalia developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” which aims to support the government in fulfilling its Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munition obligations. However, a specific strategy to address cluster munition remnants has not been presented.[37]

Action 3.5—Manage information for analysis, decision-making, and reporting

Each State Party is required to “record and provide information to the extent possible on the scope, extent and nature of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.” (For details of the extent to which states have a knowledge of the contaminated areas under their jurisdiction, see Action 3.1 above.)

The quality of reporting on survey and clearance is variable, and has not improved significantly overall in 2016. Of those States Parties that conducted survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2016, only Croatia, Mozambique, and the UK had clear, consistent land-release data across the different sources.

Discrepancies between survey and clearance data provided by mine action centers, operators, and Article 7 reports were found in Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon. In BiH’s reporting, land release by technical survey was not disaggregated from land released through clearance.

Germany’s efforts to tackle its cluster munition problem are unclear, because it has not published the results of its survey.

As of 1 August 2017, Chad, Chile, Mozambique, and Somalia had not provided Article 7 transparency reports covering calendar year 2016. Chile has not reported since 2013.

Action 3.7—Apply practice development[38]

States Parties continue to implement land release methodologies to improve the efficiency of clearance of cluster munition remnants. (For further information about land release, see “Improving clearance efficiency: land release” in Cluster Munition Monitor 2015.)

In 2016, the following States Parties reported using technical and/or non-technical survey to confirm, reduce, or cancel hazardous areas: BiH, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mozambique. These are the same States Parties as in 2015. In Iraq, however, although survey was used to confirm contamination, there were no reports of land being canceled or reduced through survey. In Lao PDR, the introduction of cluster munition-specific survey continued to greatly improve the efficiency of clearance. While the total area cleared in Lao PDR decreased significantly in 2016 compared with 2015, the number of submunitions destroyed increased significantly.[39]

Action 3.8—Promote and expand cooperation

International cooperation and assistance to support national capacity-building in program management is provided to almost all States Parties. It covers strategic planning and standards development, as well as the implementation of land release operations.

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides support to mine action programs in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Somalia.[40] In Lebanon, it supports the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2016, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) provided an advisor in Lao PDR; provided personnel to the mine action center in Lebanon to support capacity-building; and in collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided support to strategic planning in BiH. In Mozambique, UNDP’s budget ended in mid-2016, causing concern for the country’s ability to maintain a capacity to address residual contamination.[41] In Colombia, the Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS planned to transfer its responsibilities to the mine action center by the end of 2017.[42]

International NGOs provided support to mine action programs, by providing capacity-building support on standards (particularly on land release) and information management, as well as directly conducting clearance operations and mine risk education in 2016. International NGOs were active in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Somalia.

Croatia, which is on track toward its Article 4 clearance obligations, did not receive international capacity-building or operational support in 2016, nor did Germany and the UK. In Chile, where no cluster munition survey or clearance has yet taken place, there was no international support in 2016.

Since 2015, Lebanon has been collaborating with the GICHD to manage and coordinate the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme for Mine Action.[43]

(For information about funding for cluster munition survey and clearance, please see the Support for Mine Action sections of the online country profiles.)[44]

Progress in signatories, non-signatories, and other areas

In general, there is much better knowledge of cluster munition contamination and more thorough reporting of land release activities in States Parties and signatories than in non-signatories. This underlines the importance of striving for universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in order to improve global efforts to address the threat posed by cluster munition remnants.

In general, non-signatories have a poor understanding of the extent of their contamination. In 11 of 13 non-signatories (84%), as well as in one signatory, the extent of contamination is not known.[45] This compares to five of the 12 States Parties (42%).[46]

In 2016, no data on survey or clearance was available for two non-signatories (Iran and Syria) and land release results were not comprehensive in four non-signatories (Cambodia, Libya, Ukraine, and Vietnam).

All States Parties and signatories have a mine action program, authority, center, or other institution responsible for mine action. Non-signatory Syria does not have a national mine action program, authority, or center. Ukraine, also a non-signatory, has several bodies responsible for mine action, but as of mid-2017 was still in the process of establishing an appropriate national mine action institutional structure.[47]

All three other areas (Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara) have a good understanding of the extent of contamination, available land release results, and established mine action programs or authorities. 

Clearance in conflict

In 2016 and 2017, conflict has hindered land release activities in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen). These are the same countries that were affected by conflict in 2015, and little has changed in the overall picture since then.

Afghanistan continued to report that some cluster munition-contaminated areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity.[48] In Iraq, cluster munition clearance was not a priority. Dense contamination by improvised mines inflicting casualties and delaying the return of civilian populations was the top imperative, resulting in slower progress on cluster munition survey and clearance.[49] There are unconfirmed reports that Somalia experienced new cluster munition contamination in 2016, in addition to older suspected contamination, which has been reported to pose an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.[50] However, no overview of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants exists in Somalia, and, as of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[51] In September 2016, two mine action staff were killed and one injured in a shooting incident.[52]

In Libya, the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) describes the following challenges to implementation: the high level of contamination; ongoing conflict and the continued presence of the non-state armed group Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas continues to be problematic; limited ERW and improvised explosive device (IED) disposal capacity in Libya; the vast geographical area; and the shortfall in governmental and international support.[53] International mine action operations inside Libya are severely constrained by insecurity. In 2016, international mine action clearance operators continued to focus their efforts on capacity-building and training of national actors, much of it taking place outside the country.[54]

In South Sudan, a resurgence in violence forced mine action operations to close in the second half of 2016.[55] Cluster munition contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During 2016, UNMAS documented numerous examples of cluster munition and explosive items preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.[56] A fear of ERW reportedly prevented internally displaced persons from returning home.[57] The amount of cluster munition-contaminated land that was cleared in 2016 doubled, despite insecurity. This was the result of a decision to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, due to the need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities.[58] In 2016, three mine action staff were killed and three injured by gunshot wounds when their vehicles were ambushed.[59]

Sudan continued to report that some cluster munition-contaminated areas cannot be accessed due insecurity and conflict.[60]

In Ukraine, the heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.[61] The State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), which is responsible for humanitarian demining, suffered severe losses to buildings and vehicles during the conflict.[62] The OSCE Project Coordinator and Danish Deming Group (DDG) therefore provided the SESU with equipment and training in 2016 to support their operational capacity.[63]

Systematic land release is not possible in the two countries—Syria and Yemen—that experienced heavy new cluster munition contamination in 2016 and into 2017. The humanitarian impact in both countries is high (see their respective mine action and casualty country profiles for further details). In Syria, there is no national mine action program and international operators were unable to operate in 2016. Non-state armed groups and volunteers have conducted clearance immediately after fighting has occurred, despite a lack of adequate training, equipment, and resources.[64] In Yemen, a priority was given to reducing the emergency threat of explosive weapons and providing relief to heavily affected communities.[65] However, clearance, which is conducted by the Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), is hampered by a lack of equipment or training specific to cluster munition remnants.[66]

In Azerbaijan and Georgia, there may be cluster munition contamination in areas that are not under government control, where mine action cannot take place.[67]

In 2016, conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in April resulted in a need for emergency clearance of approximately 2km² of contaminated areas.[68] In Western Sahara, the expulsion of civilian staff members of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by Morocco resulted in the suspension of UNMAS-contracted demining activities east of the Berm from 20 March to 15 September 2016.[69] Cluster munition strike areas located inside the buffer strip east of the Berm are inaccessible for clearance.[70]

Country Summaries

Where discrepancies between data sources exist, only one source has been utilized—usually the mine action center. (For complete information on all states, including details of data variations, please refer to the online mine action country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)

States Parties

Afghanistan’s cluster munition contamination dates from use by Soviet and United States (US) forces and blocks access to agricultural and grazing land.[71] Most cluster munitions used by the US in late 2001 and early 2002 were removed during clearance operations in 2002–2003, guided by US airstrike data.[72] As of May 2017, Afghanistan recorded 5.57km² of cluster munition-contaminated areas, and contamination is probably more widespread than reported.[73] During 2016, the level of recorded contamination remained unchanged at 6.86km².[74] The land cleared in 2016 was previously unrecorded.[75] Land release was hampered by insecurity in affected areas and a downturn in funding.[76]

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) cluster munition contamination results from Yugoslav use in the 1992–1995 conflict after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Cluster munitions were also used by NATO forces in Republika Srpska.[77] Sixty communities across seven cantons are affected by 1.12km² of confirmed hazardous area and 7.3km² of suspected hazardous area.[78] The total amount of confirmed hazardous areas increased slightly in 2016. During 2016, four organizations conducted cluster munition technical survey and/or clearance: the BiH Armed Forces and the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, and NGOs Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Pro Vita.[79]

Chad is believed to be contaminated bycluster munitions used by France and Libya in the 1980s, but the full extent of contamination is not known. No cluster munition survey or clearance was undertaken in 2016. There was evidence of cluster munition contamination in 2015, as three cluster munition remnants were discovered and destroyed, and civilian casualties were reported as a result of an accident with a submunition.[80] The National Demining Center (Centre National de Déminage, CND) operates demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International operated in Chad in 2016.[81]

Chile hasreported military training areas totaling 97km² that are suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. As of mid-2017, Chile had not reported conducting any survey or clearance of the cluster munition-contaminated areas, nor had it reported on any steps taken to elaborate a work plan. Chile has not submitted any Article 7 transparency report since 2013.

The convention entered into force for Colombia on 1 March 2016. In 2009 and 2010, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that cluster munitions had been used in the past.[82] The impact of any cluster munition contamination is believed to be minimal. In August 2016, and again in May 2017, Colombia reported that it was in the process of establishing the location and extent of any contamination.[83] Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations once the requisite assessment and survey has been taken.

Croatia is contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1990s conflict that followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.[84] By the end of 2016, 1.74km² of land across three counties was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, a reduction of 0.19km² from 2015. Clearance was completed in Split-Dalmatia county in 2016.[85] In Croatia, clearance is conducted by the state-owned operator MUNGOS and commercial demining companies.[86]

Germany reportedin June 2011 that it had identified areas suspected of containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Non-technical survey resulted in a suspected area of approximately 11km².[87] The area is completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to it.[88] Survey was completed in 2015, and results formed the basis for subsequent preparatory work in 2016, including the preparation of a fire protection system.[89] Clearance operations commenced in March 2017.[90]

The extent of Iraq’s cluster munition contamination is not known. Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas of central and southern Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraq reports that cluster munition remnants in confirmed hazardous areas cover a total of 207km² across nine central and southern governorates: 95% is in just the three governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.[91] The northern Kurdish region is reported to only have residual, scattered cluster munition contamination.[92] In 2016, survey and clearance were conducted by the civil defense and the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) South, along with humanitarian operators Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), NPA, and MAG.[93] Mine action operations were overshadowed by conflict, and data deficiencies hindered an accurate determination of progress.

Lao PDR is the world’s most heavily contaminated state as a result of cluster bombs used by the US between 1964 and 1973, including more than 270 million submunitions.[94] The scale of contamination is not known. As of April 2017, there was 352km² of confirmed contamination,[95] but actual contamination is much higher. In 2016, Lao PDR committed to a nationwide survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021.[96] In 2016, the total cluster munition-contaminated land cleared represented a significant reduction compared to the previous four years, in part as a result of the increased focus on survey.[97] However, the number of submunitions destroyed was the highest recorded in any year, which might indicate that clearance activities were better targeted to avoid clearance of uncontaminated land.[98] In 2016, operators included five humanitarian operators—one national, UXO Lao, and four international (HALO Trust, Handicap International, MAG, and NPA)—as well as several international and national commercial operators.

Lebanon’s four southern regions are affected by contamination resulting from cluster munitions use by Israel during the July-August 2006 conflict, while some parts of the country are also contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1980s.[99] Previously unknown contaminated areas continued to be discovered in 2016, predominantly in southern Lebanon.[100] At the end of March 2017, Lebanon had almost 18.2km² of confirmed cluster munition contamination.[101] Cluster munition remnants continue to affect agriculture.[102] Cluster munition clearance in 2016 was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), MAG, and NPA; national operator Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD); and the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Montenegro’s cluster munition contamination is the result of NATO airstrikes in 1999.[103] A non-technical survey conducted in 2012–2013 identified approximately 1.7km² of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in two municipalities and one urban municipality.[104] The contamination mainly affects infrastructure and utilities, accounting for 63% of the affected land, with agriculture accounting for another 30%. One area remains unsurveyed.[105] No land release operations had taken place as of May 2017.[106]

Mozambique’s remaining 1.2km² of cluster munition contamination was identified and cleared in 2015 and 2016. Mozambique informed the Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit of completion of cluster munition clearance in December 2016. Mozambique stated in 2014 that there was limited use of cluster munitions during its 1977–1992 civil war.[107] During surveys conducted in 2015 with the intention of confirming the absence of cluster munition remnants, six areas with a total size of nearly 0.74km² of confirmed cluster munition contamination were identified.[108] Clearance of these areas began in January 2016. In 2016, additional areas were identified and cleared.[109] NPA was the only operator conducting cluster munition survey and clearance in 2015–2016.[110]

The convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 March 2016. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces reportedly used cluster munitions in clashes with Somali Armed Forces along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War.[111] In 2016, BL-755 submunitions were discovered, the result of alleged use by Kenya that year.[112] Cluster munition contamination is suspected in southcentral Somalia and Puntland, but the extent is not known. As of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[113] No survey or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2016. Somalia had not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report as of 1 August 2017.

United Kingdom (UK).There may be an unknown number of cluster munition remnants on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas as a result of use of cluster munitions by the UK against Argentine positions in 1982. Most cluster munition contamination was cleared in the first year after the conflict.[114] The UK affirmed in 2015 that no areas known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants exist outside areas already suspected of being contaminated with landmines or ERW, which are all marked and fenced.[115] In 2015 and 2016, land release was conducted by BACTEC. No submunitions were found during clearance operations in 2016.[116]

Non-signatories with more than 5km² of contaminated land

The full extent of the Cambodia’s contamination is not known. Cluster munition contamination is the result of the intensive US air campaign during the Vietnam War that concentrated on the country’s northeastern provinces along its border with Lao PDR and Vietnam.[117] In 2011, Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodia’s northern Preah Vihear province, which resulted in additional contamination of approximately 1.5 km².[118] On the basis of a baseline survey of eight eastern provinces, the estimated area affected by cluster munition remnants was 365km² as of May 2017—almost 78% of total ERW contamination amounting to more than 469km². The survey showed that 56% of the cluster munition problem is located in the provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng.[119] Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants in eastern Cambodia are undertaken mainly by the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), NPA, and MAG. The armed forceshave conducted clearance in cluster munition-affected areas but they have not reported the extent and results of their operations. In 2016, Cambodia greatly increased the release of cluster munition-contaminated land, compared to the previous year.

South Sudan. From 1996 to 1999, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan.[120] New use of cluster munitions by an unidentified party resulted in additional contamination in 2014 of Jonglei state.[121] At the end of 2016, contamination was suspected across eight of 10 states.[122] However, ongoing insecurity, particularly in Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), prevents access to confirm or address cluster munition contamination.[123] UNMAS oversees mine action and supports the capacity development of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).[124] Four international NGOs (DCA, DDG, MAG, and NPA) and four commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management, Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited, and the Development Initiative) operated in 2016. The amount of cluster munition-contaminated land cleared doubled in 2016 compared with 2015, despite a resurgence in violence that forced the closure of mine action operations in the second half of 2016.[125] A decision was made to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, in order to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities.[126]

Syria. Cluster munitions have been used extensively since 2012, but the full extent of contamination is not known. During an UNMAS rapid assessment in 2016, communities in Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Rural Damascus governorates reported the presence of cluster munition remnants.[127] Prior to the current conflict, the Golan Heights was contaminated by UXO, including unexploded submunitions. There is no national mine action program in Syria. UNMAS deployed a team to southern Turkey in August 2015, and as of March 2017 its focus was on coordination, impact survey, and risk education.[128] Conflict in many governorates has prevented access by mine action organizations. Non-state armed groups and volunteers have conducted clearance immediately after fighting has occurred, despite a lack of adequate training, equipment, and resources.[129]

Ukraine. The full extent of contamination from cluster munitions used by both government and pro-Russian armed opposition forces in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk from mid-2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire is not known. Prior to 2014, cluster munitions had never been used in Ukraine. Mine action operators consist of Ukrainian government authorities, three international NGOs (DDG, Fondation Suisse de Deminage, and HALO Trust) and a national NGO, Demining Team of Ukraine. Only HALO reported survey and clearance of cluster munition contamination in 2016.[130] The clearance results of the government operators were not provided. The UN-led humanitarian coordination system has a mine action sub-cluster, which sits under the Global Protection Cluster.[131] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the GICHD are providing support to establish mine action legislation, policies, coordination, and information management.[132] NATO experts are also supporting the development of the armed forces’ demining capacity.[133]

Vietnam is one of the most cluster munition-contaminated countries in the world as a result of the US use of cluster munitions in 1965–1973 in 55 provinces and cities.[134] The US military also abandoned substantial quantities of cluster munitions.[135] There is no accurate assessment of contamination and no clear data on land release. The Army Engineering Corps has conducted most clearance in the country over the past few years, but as in past years they did not provide data for 2016. Three international NGOs (DDG, MAG, and NPA) conducted survey and clearance in 2016, with increased results.

Yemen. Since the start of the latest conflict in March 2015, intensive air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition have resulted in significant contamination that poses a threat to the civilian population.[136] The Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has identified heavy cluster munition contamination in Saada governorate as well as contamination in Amran, Hodaida, Mawit, and Sanaa governorates, including in Sanaa city.[137] Cluster munition contamination has also been reported in Hajjah governorate.[138] Most is in areas of ongoing conflict and the full extent is not known. Contamination also results from use in 2009 and perhaps earlier. There are some 18km² of suspected contamination with submunitions in the northern Saada governorate predating the current conflict.[139] All survey and clearance is conducted by YEMAC. In 2016, YEMAC conducted clearance in nine governorates tackling high-threat, high-impact spot tasks, but it did not conduct systematic clearance.[140]

Other areas with more than 5km² of contaminated land

Kosovo is affected by cluster munitions used by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Armed Forces in 1998–1999 and by a NATO air campaign in 1999.[141] After demining operations finished in 2001, the UN reported the problem as virtually eliminated.[142] However, subsequent surveys since 2008 have identified contaminated areas.[143] At the end of 2015, areas of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Kosovo doubled from the size reported at the end of 2014, due to the identification of previously unrecorded contamination. By the end of 2016, the total size reported had decreased slightly.[144] Land release was conducted by the Kosovo Security Forces, HALO Trust, and NPA. The capacity of the two international NGOs increased in 2016.[145]

Most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s cluster munition contamination dates from use in 1992–1994 during armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Almost 72km² affects all regions with more than 75% of the contamination located in three regions: Askeran, Martuni, and Martakert.[146] Survey and clearance was conducted by HALO Trust. In 2016, 2km² of new contamination was estimated to have resulted from use of cluster munitions in the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April.[147] HALO Trust’s survey teams and the de facto authority conducted rapid survey and clearance close to populated areas.[148] Surface contamination clearance of this new contamination was completed in 2016, and subsurface clearance of agricultural land was completed in February 2017.[149]

Western Sahara. Morocco used cluster munitions against Polisario Front forces during their conflict from 1975 to 1991. Previously undiscovered cluster munition contamination continued to be found in 2016.[150] New strike areas are expected to be found in the future as mine action activities continue and additional information is received from local populations.[151] Some cluster munition contamination is located inside the buffer strip and is inaccessible to clearance operators.[152] A UN Mine Action Coordination Centre is responsible for managing mine action in Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has a local center (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is supported by the UN and is responsible for coordinating mine action activities east of the Berm and for land release activities.[153] Dynasafe MineTech Limited was the only operator tasked with conducting cluster munition survey and clearance during 2016. UNMAS-contracted demining activities were suspended from 20 March to 15 September 2016, following the expulsion of civilian staff members of MINURSO by Morocco.[154]