Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

Introduction

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is widely acknowledged as the principal framework for eradicating cluster munitions. Adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008, the convention opened for signature six months later in Oslo, Norway and entered into force on 1 August 2010.

This report shows how the convention is making a significant impact, as a majority of states adhere to its core provisions. However, dedicated efforts are needed to ensure that all States Parties meet their legal obligations under the convention, from providing transparency reports to destroying stockpiled cluster munitions.

There are 106 States Parties to the convention as of 31 July 2019. The last accession was Sri Lanka in March 2018, making it the first country from South Asia to join the convention.

Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva, Ambassador Aliyar Lebbe Abdul Azeez, has prioritized universalization since taking over the presidency of the convention in September 2018. Three signatories have ratified the convention since then, most recently the Philippines on 3 January 2019. However, progress towards ratification has been slow among the 14 signatories that still need to ratify before they are fully bound by the convention.

According to the Monitor’s review of available evidence, there have never been any instances, or even allegations, of any State Party using cluster munitions. None of the 17 States Parties that produced cluster munitions in the past have violated this core obligation.

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties must declare and destroy their stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years. A total of 35 States Parties have completed destruction of their stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 178 million submunitions under the convention. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Botswana and Switzerland completed destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions in September 2018 and March 2019, respectively. They and three other States Parties destroyed a total of 1,079 cluster munitions and more than 46,000 submunitions in 2018.

Yet, that clean record of compliance has now been tarnished as Guinea-Bissau did not meet its 1 May 2019 deadline to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions and has been in violation of the convention since then. Moreover, Bulgaria submitted a request in April 2019 to States Parties to extend its stockpile destruction deadline by another 18 months, until 1 April 2021. Bulgaria is the first State Party to make such a request under the convention.

More than half of the 75 non-signatories to the convention stockpile cluster munitions, but almost all of them are complying with the convention’s prohibitions on use, production, and transfer. The glaring exception is still Syria, where Syrian government forces are using ground-fired and air-delivered cluster munitions with Russia’s active support. This is contributing to an already deadly legacy of explosive remnants of war, including unexploded submunitions from cluster munition attacks that began in mid-2012.

There were allegations of new cluster munition use in Libya in the reporting period. Neither Syria nor Libya are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in December 2018, 144 states—including nearly two-dozen non-signatories—voted in favor of a resolution promoting implementation and universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. This is the highest support recorded for the resolution since it was first introduced in 2015. The 38 states that abstained were all non-signatories to the convention, except for signatories Cyprus and Uganda. Russia changed from voting against the annual resolution in 2015–2017 to abstain in 2018, which has left Zimbabwe as the only state to vote no to the resolution.

The convention’s small implementation unit continues its close cooperation with States Parties, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to encourage implementation and universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The lack of a specific action in the 2018 “Agenda for Disarmament” issued by UN Secretary-General António Guterres means this innovative platform is not promoting, let alone tracking, efforts to eradicate cluster munitions.[1]

Some 89% of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports detailing the actions they are taking to implement and promote the convention, while compliance with the annual reporting obligation is less impressive. At least 30 States Parties have enacted specific legislation to enforce their implementation of the convention’s provisions, but there were no notable legislative developments in the reporting period.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2018 and the first half of 2019, with some updates through to the end of July where possible. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available on the Monitor website.[2]

Universalization

Under Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties must encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[3]

Accessions

A dozen countries have acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions since August 2010.[4] The last state to accede was Sri Lanka on 1 March 2018.

Accessions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

There were a couple of positive developments regarding possible accessions to the convention in the reporting period. South Sudan reported in September 2018 that its parliament is considering draft legislation approving accession to the convention and the process was expected to be completed soon.[5] Vanuatu said in July 2019 that it is starting a consultative process to prepare a Cabinet paper on the question of Vanuatu’s accession to the convention.[6]

During the reporting period, several non-signatories provided their largely negative views:

• Argentina reiterated in September 2018 that the convention is “not sufficiently ambitious” and the articles on definitions and interoperability are “contrary to the objective of the total prohibition and the principle of non-discrimination.”[7]
• Brazil again criticized the way the convention was negotiated outside UN auspices in a November 2018 statement at the UNGA.[8]
• China told States Parties in September 2018 that it “cannot join the convention at the moment…due to our national defence needs,” but expressed appreciation for its “humanitarian spirit.”[9]
• The United States (US) said during the UNGA in November 2018 that it does not accept that the convention represents an emerging norm and views cluster munitions as an effective military capability.[10]

Ratifications

A total of 55 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2010, of which three did so during the reporting period: Namibia on 31 August 2018, Gambia on 11 December 2018, and the Philippines on 3 January 2019.

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions[11]

In Haiti and Liberia, parliamentary processes are underway to complete ratification of the convention, while the DRC has made no progress to ratify since 2013, when its Senate adopted a legislative measure approving ratification.[12]

The 12 other signatories took few steps toward ratifying during the reporting period. Angola, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, São Tomé e Príncipe, Tanzania, and Uganda still have not referred the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval, while the status of ratification by Djibouti and Jamaica is unclear.

Cyprus is the last European Union (EU) state to have signed but not ratified the convention. In November 2018, it again told the UNGA that “the abnormal security situation on the island” prevents it from completing ratification.[13]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Conference on Disarmament, Carlos Morales Dávila, served as president of the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 3–5 September 2018. A total of 79 countries attended the meeting—60 States Parties, six signatories, and 13 non-signatories—as well as UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC coalition of NGOs.States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the convention and condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[14]

This was the only international meeting of the convention during the reporting period, but States Parties convened regional workshops and other meetings. Chile convened a hearing on the Convention on Cluster Munitions at the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, DC on 6 December 2018. Together with Panama, Chile hosted a meeting on universalization of the convention in Geneva on 6 February 2019.[15] Representatives from 12 states in the Asia-Pacific region attended a workshop on the convention hosted by the Philippines in Manila on 18–19 June 2019.[16]

At the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of High Contracting Parties in Geneva in November 2018, no state made a formal proposal to add cluster munitions back on to the CCW’s program of work.[17] The failure of the CCW’s 2011 Review Conference to adopt a draft protocol on cluster munitions has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by the weapons.

Sri Lanka is serving as president of the convention’s Ninth Meeting of States Parties to be held at the UN in Geneva on 2–4 September 2019.[18] The UN has received sufficient funds to convene the meeting, but states owe the convention $91,846, as of 31 May 2019.[19] As a result, the meeting has been scaled back to two days—2 and 4 September—while states will meet informally without translation on 3 September.

The CMC continues its advocacy in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation.

UN General Assembly Resolution 73/54

Since it was first introduced in 2015, the UNGA resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions has become an annual barometer for gauging support of non-signatories for the convention’s goals. The four UNGA resolutions have promoted implementation of the convention and urged states outside it to join as soon as possible:

• In 2018, 144 states voted in favor of Resolution 73/54, one voted against, and 38 abstained;[20]
• In 2017, 142 states voted in favor of Resolution 72/54, two voted against, and 36 abstained;[21]
• In 2016, 141 states voted in favor of Resolution 71/45, two voted against, and 39 abstained;[22]
• In 2015, 139 states voted in favor of Resolution 70/54, two voted against, and 40 abstained.[23]

A total of 33 non-signatories to the convention voted in favor of the 2018 resolution.[24]

Russia changed its vote to abstain from the resolution after voting against the previous resolution in 2015–2017. This left non-signatory Zimbabwe as the only state to vote against the 2018 UNGA resolution. All 38 states that abstained from the vote were non-signatories to the convention with the exceptions of signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

Various states and groups of states explained their vote on the 2018 resolution and their positions on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[25]

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

Since the end of World War II, at least 21 governments have used cluster munitions in 40 countries and four other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

States that have used cluster munitions and locations of use[26]

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics.

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[27]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Several past users of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have relinquished any use of these weapons under any circumstances.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.

Cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011 and 2015), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–2017).[28]

New use

Cluster munitions continued to be used in Syria during the period covered by this report (July 2018–July 2019), and there were allegations of new use in Libya. Neither is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In Yemen, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition conducting a military operation against Ansar Allah forces known as the Houthi armed group used air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions in 2015–2017.[29] However, Cluster Munition Monitor could not find any evidence or credible allegations of new cluster munition use in Yemen in 2018 or during the first half of 2019.[30] Additional cluster munition attacks may have gone unrecorded, as first-hand evidence is challenging to collect.

Use in Syria

The Monitor documented at least 38 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2018 and June 2019. It found evidence of at least a dozen more cluster munition attacks, but could not conclusively verify this use. Evidence shows that Syrian government forces are still primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in attacks on opposition-held areas.

The number of reported cluster munition attacks and identified new casualties have decreased since mid-2017 as Syrian government forces have regained areas previously held by non-state armed groups. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 reported at least 636 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and July 2018, including 36 attacks between July 2017 and July 2018.

The number of cluster munition attacks in Syria is certainly higher than this, as many attacks likely went unrecorded. Local residents, journalists, activists, and first responders continue to record and share evidence of cluster munition use in Syria, but such first-hand information has become increasingly scarce. Additionally, videos and photographs showing cluster munition remnants often do not provide information on the date or circumstances of use.

During the reporting period, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorate of Idlib, while there was also alleged use of cluster munitions in Hama, al-Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor governorates. All 14 governorates of the country except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions at some point since 2012.

At least 13 types of air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions have been used in Syria as well as an unknown type of rocket-delivered submunition. When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions, and in what quantities, remains unknown, but they were all manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia, with one exception.[31]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[32]

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at the Hmeymim airbase southeast of Latakia city and that it has used cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, in joint operations with Syrian government forces since 30 September 2015.[33] In a December 2016 statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not explicitly deny Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but stated that Russia views cluster munitions as “a legal means of warfare” and claimed the “Russian military unflinchingly adhere[s] to the norms of international humanitarian law.”[34]

There has been no evidence that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[35] In July 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command said, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[36]

Israel has undertaken air strikes as well as artillery and missile attacks in Syria, but there is no evidence that it has used cluster munitions.

The now largely defunct Islamic State used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014 and may have used them since then.[37] It is not possible to determine with confidence if other armed groups have used cluster munitions, but there is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by their victims, such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[38]

In September 2018, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[39] Approximately 11 countries and the EU publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions during the meeting, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[40]

Alleged use in Libya

There have been allegations and some indications that cluster munitions have been used in Libya during the reporting period. In May 2019, Libya National Army (LNA) forces led by General Khalifa Hiftar in the east of Libya were accused of using cluster bombs in airstrikes in and around Tripoli.[41] The Government of National Accord (GNA) media group “Volcano of Wrath” released more than 30 undated photographs—that were not geolocated—showing the remnants of Soviet/Russian RBK-250 cluster bombs and various submunitions reportedly “discovered in greater Tripoli and other areas (Ras al-Lufa, al-Sawani, al-Aziziyah, al-Tugar Mosque, and Bir al-Ghanem).”[42]

Cluster Munition Monitor was not able to independently confirm these allegations or identify who may be responsible. Continued conflict limits access to strike sites and there is a lack of independent media and local reporting from inside the country.

However, investigations by international human rights organizations found evidence of LNA cluster bomb use in late 2014 and early 2015.[43] An aviation-focused blogger has documented cluster munitions loaded on to LNA aircraft that were subsequently used to conduct air attacks on opposition forces in 2016–2017 and through June 2018.[44]

Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provide air support to the forces of Khalifa Hiftar. Both states possess cluster munitions and neither has acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordinance (UXO) after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed its cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups have used them. In the past, non-state armed groups use of cluster munitions has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by Islamic State), and Ukraine (by Russian-backed separatists).[45]

Production of Cluster Munitions

Historically, at least 34 states developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions, of which 18 countries ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[46]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in future, as listed in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

It is unclear if all of these countries produced cluster munitions in 2018 and/or the first half of 2019 because of a lack of transparency and available data. Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the US have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[47]

Production of cluster munitions appears to be ongoing in India. Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government transaction database list at least one company providing components for 130mm “Cargo Shells.” Components were produced under contract and supplied to the Ordnance Factory Chandrapur in Maharashtra state.[48] Orders indicated that production may continue until June 2021.

In addition, several states are undertaking research and development of new types of cluster munitions. Russia tested the “Drel” RBK-500U gliding cluster bomb, a new cluster munition developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise according to the company.[49] The US spent $2.5 million in 2018 to test the 155mm M999 “Advanced Anti-Personnel Munition” containing M99 explosive submunitions produced by Israel Military Industries (IMI). However more information is needed to determine if this weapon would comply with the ban convention.[50]

Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer Singapore Technologies Engineering announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[51]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. There have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any of the convention’s States Parties since the convention took effect in August 2010.

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in the future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[52]

In South Africa, Rheinmetall Denel Munition has not responded to Cluster Munition Monitor’s 2018 request to clarify if it produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012.[53] The Monitor sought comment after South Africa’s initial transparency report stated in regard to decommissioning of production facilities: “None. Production ceased in 2012 at Rheinmetall, denel.”[54]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[55]

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for the purposes of research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[56] At least two non-signatories have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter because it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[57]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the USSR.[58] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UAE have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

An Indian defense company displayed components for cluster munitions at its booth at the Eurosatory defense trade event in Paris in June 2018.[59]

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 93 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[60]

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions[61]

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 38 countries—35 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once posessed cluster munitions stocks have now destroyed them, as detailed in the following section on stockpile destruction.

Six States Parties to the convention still have a collective total of 11,626 stockpiled cluster munitions and 742,200 submunitions to destroy: Bulgaria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, Slovakia, and South Africa.

Cluster munitions to be destroyed by States Parties[62]

There is a serious lack of information from the two other States Parties with stockpiles to destroy:

• Guinea imported cluster munitions in the past and may currently possess a stockpile.[63] It must clarify the status of the stockpile in its transparency report, which was due in September 2015.
• Guinea-Bissau never provided its initial transparency report, due October 2011, or provided details on the quantities and types of its stockpiled cluster munitions or plans to destroy them.

States Parties that never stockpiled

More than 55 States Parties have formally confirmed never stockpiling cluster munitions, most through a direct statement in their transparency report for the convention.[64] Since September 2018, Benin, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia have submitted initial transparency reports confirming they do not possess cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

• Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF projectiles containing 2,559 M20G submunitions for the GRM 20 mortar system to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of destruction.[65] Cyprus has never shared information on its stockpiled cluster munitions or provided a voluntary Article 7 transparency report detailing such information. Instead, the information on Cypriot cluster munitions comes from Bulgaria’s transparency reports.
• Indonesia has acknowledged that it possesses cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types and quantities stockpiled nor if it has a plan to destroy them.
• Nigeria has not disclosed the quantity of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but said in 2012 that its armed forces possess UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[66] Nigeria has made several appeals for “cooperation and assistance” to destroy the stockpile.[67]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

• Angola stated in 2017 that the process of compiling its draft transparency report allowed it to confirm that stockpiled cluster munitions were all destroyed in or by 2012.
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[68]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as few of these states have publicly shared information on the types and quantities possessed.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[69] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since 2008 in removing cluster munitions from its active inventory and placing them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction. According to US budget materials released in March 2019, “there are approximately 93,766 tons of cluster munitions in the demil stockpile,” plus 203,024 tons in the continental US and another 91,362 tons outside the continental US.[70]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[71] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011, including Israeli-made AS TAL-1 cluster bombs.[72] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[73]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

No State Party with the first stockpile destruction deadline of 1 August 2018 failed to destroy their stocks in time. However, Guinea-Bissau missed its stockpile destruction deadline of 1 May 2019 and has been in violation of the convention since then.

In April 2019, Bulgaria submitted a request to States Parties to extend its stockpile destruction deadline of 1 October 2019 by another 18 months, until 1 April 2021. Bulgaria is the first State Party to make such a request under the convention, which the Ninth Meeting of States Parties will consider and decide upon in September 2019.[74]

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 41 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, 35 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Two States Parties completed the destruction of their cluster munition stocks in the reporting period:

• Botswana destroyed its entire stockpile of cluster munitions on 18 September 2018, more than one year in advance of the deadline.
• Switzerland announced the completion of its cluster munition stockpile destruction on 19 March 2019, more than 21 months in advance of the deadline.[75]

Four States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table below due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

• Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.
• The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm it does not possess stocks.[76]
• Honduras provided its transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because it destroyed the stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[77] 

Destruction underway

During 2018, five States Parties destroyed a total of 1,079 cluster munitions and more than 46,000 submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2018

Note: States listed in bold have stockpiled cluster munitions to destroy

Four of the States Parties that still posess cluster munitions to destroy have collectively destroyed more than 1,000 cluster munitions and nearly 125,000 submunitions.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties with stocks left to destroy (as of 31 December 2018)

Three States Parties that still posesses cluster munitions reported progress towards destroying them during 2018:

• Bulgaria reported in May 2019 that 25 RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs and ten RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs were destroyed at a facility in Italy in 2018.
• Peru began physical destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in 2018, after conducting extensive research into how to safely destroy the stockpile. It has pledged to destroy the stockpile before its 1 March 2021 deadline.[79]
• Slovakia had destroyed approximately half of its total declared stocks of cluster munitions and 11% of the submunitions by the end of 2018. Slovakia has committed to destroy the remainder of its stockpile by the 1 January 2024 deadline “using its own capacities.”[80]

Three other States Parties with cluster munitions did not report any stockpile destruction of during the reporting period:

• Guinea must clarify in its transparency report if it stockpiles cluster munitions and, if it does, must destroy them by 1 April 2023.
• Guinea-Bissau missed its stockpile destruction deadline of 1 May 2019 and has been in violation of the convention since then. In the past, Guinea-Bissau told the States Parties that it required financial and technical assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but it never provided the initial transparency report that was due by 1 October 2011.
• South Africa told States Parties in September 2018 that it will destroy its cluster munition stockpile by its 1 November 2023 deadline.[81] South Africa last destroyed a portion of its cluster munition stocks in September 2012.

The total number of cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties each year has been falling steadily since 2012, as those with this obligation complete stockpile destruction.

Stockpile destruction by year since entry into force

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

Most States Parties see no need or reason to use live cluster munitions for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. That includes more than 25 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[82]

Yet 13 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2018)[83]

Germany still retains the largest number of cluster munitions, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium. During 2018, Germany and Belgium both significantly reduced the number of cluster munitions retained for research and training purposes during 2018. The Netherlands has reported that it will destroy 200 cluster munitions in 2019 that were originally retained for research and training.[84]

The Czech Republic, Denmark, France, and Spain also reduced the number of cluster munitions and/or submunitions retained in 2018.

BiH, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Slovakia, and Sweden have not destroyed any cluster munitions and/or submunitions since reporting they would retain them for research and training purposes.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations, which would indicate that the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is still unclear if current holdings by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

States Parties Australia, Italy, and the UK initially retained cluster munitions that they subsequently destroyed and did not replace. States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, and Moldova have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention and are therefore not listed in the table above.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous calendar year.

Of the 106 States Parties to the convention, 92 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention as of 31 July 2019.[85] That includes the three States Parties that submitted their initial transparency report during the reporting period: Benin, Tunisia, and Sri Lanka.

This represents 89% of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is a similar compliance rate compared to last year.[86]

States Parties with overdue initial Article 7 reports

Another 11 States Parties still have not provided an initial transparency report for the convention, of which three were originally due in 2011. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation, but none have explained why they have not submitted a transparency report as required by the convention.

Three new States Parties have deadlines pending for the submission of their initial transparency report: Namibia (by 31 July 2019), the Gambia (by 29 November 2019), and the Philippines (by 28 December 2019).

After submitting the initial transparency report, the convention requires that States Parties provide an annual upated report by 30 April. More than 55 States Parties have submitted the annual updated transparency report that was due by 30 April 2019, covering activities in 2018.[87] This poor reporting rate is similar to previous years and could be significantly improved upon.

Canada and Palau provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention. The DRC shared voluntary reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014, but still has not ratified.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage use of cluster munitions, to provide details on cooperation and assistance support, or to report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[88]

The CMC continues to encourage states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[89]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.”[90] The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 31 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention’s provisions, as listed in the table below.[91]

States Parties with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party Afganistan has been added to this list after it enacted a new implementing law for both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty in September 2018.[92]No State Party adopted implementing legislation for the convention during the first half of 2019.

States Parties including Bulgaria and Spain reported amendments to their respective implementation laws during the reporting period.[93]

Another 18 States Parties indicate they are planning or in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[94] Zambia reported in April 2019 that draft legislation to domesticate the convention has been cleared by the Ministry of Justice and will soon be introduced into parliament for consideration and approval.[95]

Five recent States Parties are considering if specific implementation legislation is needed for the convention. Palestine and Sri Lanka reported in 2019 that they are conducting review of their respective laws and regulations to determine if additional specific implementing legislation is needed to enforce their adherence to the convention.[96] States Parties the Gambia, Namibia, and the Philippines have not indicated if they intend to enact specific legislation to enforce their implementation of the convention.

At total of 42 States Parties have indicated their existing laws and regulations will suffice to enforce their adherence to the convention.[97] In 2019, Panama reported the relevant sections of its criminal code that enforce its implementation of the convention’s provisions.[98]

The status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear in 10 States Parties, in part because several have not provided an initial transparency report.[99]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 31 July 2019, more than three-dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[100] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports as well as country profiles for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, and US stocks and foreign stockpiling.[101]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[102]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[103]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait.

Disinvestment

Several States Parties as well as the CMC view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[104]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[105]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2018 or the first half of 2019.

At least 36 States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their view that investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[106] Five States Parties have been added to this list since publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2018, including four that provided statements at the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties:[107]

• Chad stated that “investing in or financing of the production of prohibited weapons undermines the international legal framework that governs their prohibition. We therefore consider investments in the production of cluster munitions are in violation with Article 1 of the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions].”[108]
• The Gambia stated that “production, sale and use of cluster munitions should stop and states could do more by stopping the investment in companies either state on non-state, that produce cluster munitions.”[109]
• Mauritania said it joins states “against the financing of or assistance to companies for cluster bombs (companies that produce these bombs). These bombs, that kill hundreds of innocent people every day, are an obstacle to development, peace and security.”[110]
• Montenegro emphasized that “investing in or financing prohibited weapons production undermines the international legal framework that governs their ban. Therefore Montenegro understands that any investment in producers of cluster munitions is a contravention of Article 1 (1) c of the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions].”[111]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

At least three companies in non-signatories have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from numerous investors: Singapore Technologies Engineering and US companies Textron Systems and Orbital ATK.

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[112]