Nagorno-Karabakh

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 30 October 2020

[UPDATE October 2020: On 23 October, a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report documented incidents of use of cluster munitions by Azerbaijan following the outbreak of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in late September 2020. A second HRW report on 30 October found cluster munition use by Armenia during the conflict, but could not confirm whether it was direct use by Armenian forces or if Armenian forces supplied cluster munitions to forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.]

Summary: Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any United Nations (UN) member state and thus is not eligible to accede to, or attend meetings of, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In May 2017, a representative told the Monitor that Nagorno-Karabakh does not possess cluster munitions and claimed there has been no use, production, or transfer of cluster munitions on its territory. Cluster munition rockets were fired into Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016.

Policy

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

In May 2012, Nagorno-Karabakh’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasiliy Atajanyan expressed support for the ban on cluster munitions: “Realizing what a deadly [sic] to civilians are cluster munitions, and assuming that the suffering of civilians caused by cluster munitions outweigh the potential military benefits of using this weapon, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully support the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” However, he said, “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not in a position to join the Convention, in view of the fact the conflict with Azerbaijan is not yet resolved.”[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Karen Mirzoyanprovided a statement in response to the Monitor’s request for an update on cluster munitions that states the “Republic Artsakh [the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] does not possess cluster munitions and there has been no use, production or transfer of cluster munitions on the territory of the Republic.”[2]

Previously, in May 2012, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Atajanyan stated that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic does not produce, export, stockpile or use cluster munitions and does not intend to do so.”

Previous use

In May 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh provided to the Monitor with evidence of cluster munition use on its territory in April 2016, stating: “During the 4-day aggression against Republic of Artsakh in April 2016, Azerbaijan has employed two types of ground-launched cluster munition rockets (LAR 160 and Smerch) in the north of the Republic (Martakert region) and in the southeast (Hadrut region).” The information, including photographs of cluster submunition remnants and rockets, was sourced by the Artsakh Ministry of Defense, the State Service for Emergency Situations, the Prosecutor General’s office, and HALO Trust. Subsequently, the Artsakh State Service for Emergency Situations and HALO cleared more than 200 unexploded cluster submunitions from the two locations.[3]

Cluster Munition Monitor was not able to conduct an independent investigation to make a conclusive determination about responsibility for this cluster munition use. During fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces, Azerbaijan launched artillery and rockets more than 10 kilometers into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 April until 5 April 2016, when a ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 local time.[4]

Within 10 days, emergency clearance operations by HALO destroyed approximately 200 unexploded M095 DPICM-type submunitions near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[5] HALO also cleared remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-160 surface-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions.[6] The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.[7]

Azerbaijan and Armenia have both denied using cluster munitions in the brief conflict and accused the other side of using the weapon against civilians. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on 28 April 2016 that “cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact…do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians.”[8] Armenia’s Ministry of Defense issued photographs on 6 April 2016 showing the remnants of Smerch rockets that it claimed Azerbaijan fired into Nagorno-Karabakh.[9]

Unknown quantities of air-dropped RBK-series cluster bombs were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory. In June 2016, HALO destroyed an unexploded PTAB-1M submunition found by a farmer on agricultural land near the village of Mugalny.[10]



[1] Letter from Vasiliy Atajanyan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, in response to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor inquiry, 12 May 2012.

[2] Letter from Karen Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 29 May 2017.

[3] Ibid.

[4] HALO Trust, “HALO Begins Emergency Clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “NK’s Emergency Situations Service & HALO have destroyed 200+ ‪#clustermunitionssince clearance resumed in ‪#Karabakh,” 9:14am, 20 April 2016, Tweet.

[5] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO's assessment of new ‪#clustermunitioncontamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:39am, 14 April 2016, Tweet; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new ‪#clustermunitionstrikes in ‪#Karabakhhas allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 8:19am, 6 May 2016, Tweet.

[6] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of ‪#clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:19am, 12 April 2016, Tweet.

[7] Roberto Travan, “Nagorno-Karabakh, A 25-Year Border War Reignites With Religion,” La Stampa, republished in English by World Crunch, 11 June 2016.

[9] The article stated that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “do not possess weaponry of this kind.“Armenian MOD provides factual proof of prohibited cluster missile use by Azerbaijani army,” ArmenPress, 6 April 2016.

[10] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Thanks to Aleksey Saradjanov for reporting this PTAB cluster munition found on his farm near Mugalny vil. ‪#Karabakh,” 5:40am, 1 June 2016, Tweet.


Impact

Last updated: 02 December 2020

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Treaty Status Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in an armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan which lasted from 1988 until 1994. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, but this has not been internationally recognized.

All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and submunitions as a result of the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and new mine contamination was added in 2013 by Nagorno-Karabakh’s military. The then-chief of Nagorno-Karabakh’s military, General Movses Hakobian, stated in July 2013 that “his forces have placed more antipersonnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[1]

In May 2017, Nagorno-Karabakh’s Minister of Foreign Affairs provided the Monitor with evidence of cluster munition use on its territory in April of that year.[2]

Azerbaijan and Armenia both deny using cluster munitions during the brief escalation of conflict that took place in April 2016, with both states blaming each other for use of cluster munitions in such a way as to endanger civilians.[3]

On 3–4 October 2020, the de facto authorities of the area shared footage consistent with attacks with Israeli-made M095 cluster munitions, in the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert. In November 2020, The HALO Trust was reported as stating that clearance was being undertaken: “The cluster bombs are particularly dangerous as they can maim and kill indiscriminately and remain dangerous for a long time…so far, we have managed to clear the visible ones on the streets, but there are still many in people’s gardens, balconies, and submerged beneath rubble, which poses a risk for when the displaced people return.’’[4]

In March 2019, United States (US) officials announced their intention to stop funding The HALO Trust’s demining program in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in July 2020, the US State Department announced its budget for 2021, which included US$1.4 million allocated to humanitarian demining assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh.[5]

Treaty ratification status

Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any United Nations (UN) member state and thus is not eligible to accede to theMine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities(CRPD).

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Humanitarian mine action commenced in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2000. Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a national mine action authority in place to oversee mine action activities.[6]

Risk education management and coordination

The HALO Trust is the primary provider of risk education in Nagorno-Karabakh. As there is no national mine action authority or other national coordinating body, The HALO Trust implements its risk education activities under the oversight of the Ministry of Education.[7] The HALO Trust reports that the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities are supportive and welcoming of its risk education activities.[8]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview[9]

Landmine contamination

9km(CHA: 5.9km2 and SHA 3.1km2)

Extent of contamination: Small

Cluster munition remnants contamination

70.48km2

Extent of contamination: Medium

Surveyed (cluster munition remnants and landmines)

4.4km2 (contaminated area surveyed in 2019)

This resulted in cancellation of 1.1km2

Note: CHA=Confirmed Hazardous Area; SHA=Suspected Hazardous Area.

Mine Contamination

Nagorno-Karabakh has been affected by landmines since the 1988–1994 conflict. Mines were laid by both the Azerbaijani and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of antivehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as antipersonnel mines. The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict, certain areas were mined several times.[10]

New mine contamination was reported in 2013, when Nagorno-Karabakh’s then-military chief, General Movses Hakobian, stated that “his forces have placed more antipersonnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[11]

The HALO Trust is currently undertaking a new baseline survey, The National Survey Project, of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to establish the true extent of mine contamination. The HALO Trust is unsure of when the survey will be completed due to varying levels of contamination across different regions. However, the surveys in Askeran and Martakert have been completed.[12]

There have been more landmine accidents per capita in Nagorno-Karabakh than anywhere else in the world, with children comprising a quarter of the victims.[13]

Cluster munition contamination

The extent of cluster munition remnant contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh is unknown, although it is recognized that a large number of cluster munitions were dropped on the territory during the 1988–1994 war.

Cluster munitions were also used in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 during a brief resurgence of conflict. Within 10 days of the 2016 escalation ceasing, emergency clearance operations by The HALO Trust resulted in the destruction of approximately 200 unexploded M095 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM)-type submunitions near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert.The HALO Trust also cleared remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-160 surface-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions.The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.[14]

ERW Contamination

The extent of explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh is unknown. However, in 2019, The HALO Trust cleared 15 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), 33 small arms-related items of explosive ordnance, and 214 items of small arms ammunition.[15]

Casualties

Casualties overview[16]

Casualties

All known casualties (2000–2019)

Casualties: 388 (81 killed, 307 injured)

 

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

6

Survival outcome

1 killed; 5 injured

Device types to have caused casualties in 2019

Antipersonnel mine, antivehicle mine, shOAB submunition

Civilian status

4 civilians, 1 Azerbaijani soldier, 1 Armenian soldier

Age and gender

All 6 casualties were men

 

Casualties in 2019: details

All casualties in 2019 were adult males who encountered explosive ordnance during the course of their work. The HALO Trust reported three incidents resulting from ERW: a shepherd suffered leg injuries from an antipersonnel mine, one person had a near miss concerning an antivehicle mine during land cultivation, while a third person suffered abdominal and leg injuries due to cultivating land contaminated with cluster munitions.[17] In addition to The HALO Trust’s casualty data, three other mine-related incidents were recorded during 2019. Two involved soldiers (one Azerbaijani soldier killed, and one Armenian soldier wounded), while one civilian was wounded by a landmine near Martakert, where he was conducting waterline works.[18]

Addressing the impact

Mine Action

Operators and service providers

Throughout 2019, there was no national mine action center or other mine action coordinating body in Nagorno-Karabakh. The HALO Trust is the only international clearance operator in the territory, and in its clearance operations it coordinated with, and reported to, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nagorno-Karabakh rescue services.[19] The HALO Trust acted as the primary coordinating body in terms of collecting casualty data, mapping and survey, and clearance.

Clearance

Landmine and cluster munition remnants clearance[20]

Clearance in 2019

Landmines: 0.20km2

Cluster munition remnants: 0.05km2

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

38 antipersonnel mines

6 antivehicle mines

3 cluster munitions

Landmine clearance in 2015–2019

2015: 0.21km2

2016: 0.12km2

2017: 0.29km2

2018: 0.25km2

2019: 0.20km2

Total land cleared: 1.07 km2

Cluster munition remnants clearance in 2015–2019

 

2015: 2.91km2

2016: 3.28km2

2017: 1.06km2

2018: 0km2

2019: 0.05km2

Total land cleared: 7.3 km2

Progress

The HALO Trust is undertaking a new survey of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to establish the true extent of mine contamination. Survey has been completed in two regions as of August 2020

The HALO Trust is the only humanitarian demining NGO operating in Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 2000, The HALO Trust has cleared almost 500 minefields, which had affected the lives of 130,000 people

Note: NGO=Non-Governmental Organization.

Major developments in 2019

In March 2019, the US State Department announced that it would no longer fund mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh.The US Agency for International Development (USAID)—which had previously funded the program in the area of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—and the US State Department cited lack of civilian mine-related injuries since 2017 in conjunction with the program nearing completion as the reasoning behind the decision.[21] However, The HALO Trust casualty data reveals that in 2018 there were at least three incidents involving mines/ERW in Nagorno-Karabakh: two children were injured by a landmine fuze whilst playing, while an adult male who encountered a cluster munition during land cultivation had a near miss.[22] Furthermore, casualties were also recorded in 2019: mine incidents killed an Azerbaijani soldier and injured an Armenian soldier, while three civilians encountered landmines (two were injured, while another escaped without injury) and one civilian was injured by a cluster munition.[23]

On 24 July 2020, the US House of Representatives passed the State and Foreign Operations Bill concerning the US State Department budget for 2021. In the budget, $1.4 million was allocated to the continuance of demining operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.[24] It is understood that The HALO Trust will be the recipient of this funding as the sole mine action actor in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Risk Education

Operators and service providers

Risk education international operator

Name of organization

Type of activity

The HALO Trust

Emergency risk education (in mine-affected communities where residents are known to be engaging in unsafe behavior)

Community risk education (conducted in community venues and door-to-door to reach adults, especially at-risk adult groups)

Risk education in schools

Risk education for NGO workers and service providers when requested

Note: NGO=Non-Governmental Organization.

Beneficiary numbers

In 2019, The HALO Trust provided mine risk education to 228 men, 2,665 boys, 416 women and 2,428 girls.

Implementation

The HALO Trust conducts risk education largely through face-to-face means, supplementing these sessions with printed materials such as leaflets, posters and flyers. The HALO Trust conducts risk education in Nagorno-Karabakh in accordance with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 12.10, and along with best practice recommendations disseminated by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the multi-agency Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE-AG).

Target groups

Children, farmers and shepherds are at highest risk of coming into contact with landmines, cluster munition remnants and ERW in Nagorno-Karabakh. Children are at high risk due to their curiosity and lack of understanding of potential danger, while shepherds and farmers are at high risk due to their close relationship with the land. Incidents involving farmers and shepherds represent nearly 40% of all mine/ERW incidents resulting in casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been many instances of farmers ploughing over antivehicle mines whilst cultivating land, while shepherds often wander into unknown minefields following their livestock.[25]



[1] Lusine Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez, 26 July 2013.

[2] ICBL-CMC, ‘‘Country Profile: Nagorno-Karabakh: Cluster Munition Ban Policy’’ last updated 30 October 2020.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Andrew Connelly, “The humanitarian fallout of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” The New Humanitarian, 5 November 2020.

[5] Siranush Ghazanchyan, ‘‘Armenian Assembly Welcomes Passage of Amendment in Support of Demining in Nagorno Karabakh’’, Public Radio of Armenia, 24 July 2020.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 1 May 2020.

[7] Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 31 July 2020.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 1 May 2020.

[9] Contamination data provided in emails from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 30 July 2020 and 7 August 2020.

[10] ICBL-CMC, ‘‘Country Profile: Nagorno-Karabakh: Mine Action,’’ last updated 15 November 2018.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 7 August 2020; and HALO Trust, ‘‘Annual Report and Financial Statements,’’ 31March 2019, p. 11.

[13] HALO Trust, ‘‘Nagorno Karabakh,’’ (program webpage) undated.

[14] ICBL-CMC, ‘‘Country Profile: Nagorno-Karabakh: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,’’ last updated 30 October 2020.

[15] Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 30 July 2020.

[16] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), curated data files for Central Asia and the Caucuses, accessed 20 July 2020, combined with multi-year casualty data provided via email by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 July 2020.

[17] Casualty data provided via email by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 July 2020.

[18] Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2019. See also, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, Issue 5, 28 September 2010, pp. 651–660.

[19] Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 31 July 2020.

[20] Data on clearance and ordnance destroyed in 2019 provided by email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 30 July 2020. For more information on the HALO Trust survey, see, HALO Trust, ‘‘Annual Report and Financial Statements,’’ 31March 2019, p. 11; and email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 7 August 2020. For data on HALO trust clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh since 2000, see, HALO Trust, ‘‘Nagorno Karabakh,’’ (program webpage) undated.

[21] Joshua Kucera, ‘‘U.S. Ends Funding for Karabakh Demining,’’ eurasianet, 19 March 2020.

[22] Casualty data provided via email by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 July 2020.

[23] HALO Trust casualty data for 2019 provided via email by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 July 2020; and Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2019. See also, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47, Vol. 5, 28 September 2010, pp. 651–660.

[24] Siranush Ghazanchyan, ‘‘Armenian Assembly Welcomes Passage of Amendment in Support of Demining in Nagorno Karabakh,’’ Public Radio of Armenia, 24 July 2020.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 1 May 2020.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 28 November 2013

Policy

Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any UN member state. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Nagorno-Karabakh’s political and military leaders have stated their support for an eventual ban on antipersonnel mines but have indicated that, even if eligible to do so, Nagorno-Karabakh would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until the conflict with Azerbaijan is resolved and all states in the region support a ban on antipersonnel mines.[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Nagorno-Karabakh has stated that it has never produced or exported mines, and has not purchased new mines since 1995. Its antipersonnel mine stockpile consists of mines left over from the Soviet Union (OZM-72, PMN-2, and POMZ-2 mines).

In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, was reported by the media to state that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[2] General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the ICBL to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and confirmed that “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan…today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He also wrote, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”[3]

 



[1] Meetings between Naira Melkoumian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masis Mailian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ICBL, Stepanakert, 1–2 February 2002; and interview with Irina Beglaryan, Head of Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 3 February 2006.

[2]  Lusine Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013, asbarez.com/112014/karabakh-enhances-defense-capabilities/.

[3] “ICBL gravely concerned about use of antipersonnel mines by Nagorno-Karabakh,” ICBL (Geneva), 20 September 2013, www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News/Nagorno-Karabakh.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 07 October 2013

In 2012, the Armenia office of the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) provided US$940,000 to HALO Trust for mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh.[1]

Despite HALO’s report that there were 143 confirmed mined areas covering 7km2 and 241 cluster strike locations covering 88km2 remaining to be cleared as of 31 December 2012, funding has declined 65% since 2008 and 38% from 2011.[2]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[3]

Year

Donor

Amount ($)

2012

United States (US)

940,000

2011

US, private

1,523,000

2010

US, United Kingdom (UK), private

2,036,694

2009

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,169,944

2008

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,697,526

Total

 

9,367,164

 

 



[1] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 31 August 2012.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO, 15 April 2013.