Landmine Monitor 2021

The Impact

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Assessing the Impact: Contamination | Casualties

Coordination: Clearance | Risk Education | Victim Assistance

Addressing the Impact: Clearance | Risk Education | Victim Assistance

 

This chapter highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of antipersonnel mines. The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while the second part focuses on addressing the impact through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

This overview documents progress under the Oslo Action Plan—the five-year action plan of the Mine Ban Treaty, adopted in November 2019. The plan is consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby States Parties declare that they are:

“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”

As of October 2021, there were 33 States Parties that had declared obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to clear contaminated land. In 2020, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, most States Parties reported undertaking clearance in areas under their jurisdiction and control. A total of 146km² of contaminated land was cleared, while approximately 135,583 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed. In 2020, Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) both declared completion of their Article 5 clearance obligations.

However, States Parties Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria were added back on to the list of States Parties with clearance obligations due to having either newly discovered or, in the case of Nigeria, new mine contamination. Progress towards the aspirational goal “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025,” as agreed by States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014 and reaffirmed at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in 2019, has stalled, with few States Parties on target to meet their deadlines.

Exceptionally high numbers of casualties resulting from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to be recorded during 2020, following a sharp rise in casualties caused by increased conflict and contamination since 2015. The total of 7,073 mine/ERW casualties in 2020 represents more than double the number of casualties in 2013, which saw the fewest annual casualties on record. Casualties were recorded in 51 countries and three other areas in 2020. For the first time, Syria recorded the highest number of annual causalities, followed by Afghanistan. The majority of casualties in 2020 were reported in countries experiencing armed conflict and which suffered contamination with mines of an improvised nature.

Mine/ERW risk education was conducted in at least 26 States Parties during 2020, albeit under unprecedented and challenging conditions. Delivery was adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic as physical distancing, movement restrictions, and school closures prevented many of the usual risk education activities from being conducted. However, in line with Action #31 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties and operators responded and adapted to these changing circumstances by devising new ways to deliver the life-saving messages through mass media, mobile phone apps, social media platforms, and local networks of community volunteers.

At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims—these states have “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.”[1] The Oslo Action Plan includes commitments to enhance the core victim assistance components of emergency medical response, ongoing healthcare, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socio-economic inclusion. It also includes a commitment on protection of victims in situations of risk, including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters. This action has become particularly important in the context of states meeting victim assistance objectives during the COVID-19 pandemic, while at the same time addressing the changes and challenges brought about by pandemic-related restrictions.

Assessing The Impact

Antipersonnel mine contamination

Antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

States Parties with Article 5 obligations

As of October 2021, a total of 33 States Parties had declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control, and therefore have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties that have declared Article 5 obligations as of October 2021

Afghanistan

Eritrea

Serbia

Angola

Ethiopia

Somalia

Argentina*

Guinea-Bissau

South Sudan

BiH

Iraq

Sri Lanka

Cambodia

Mauritania

Sudan

Chad

Niger

Tajikistan

Colombia

Nigeria

Thailand

Croatia

Oman

Turkey

Cyprus**

Palestine

Ukraine

Dem. Rep. Congo

Peru

Yemen

Ecuador

Senegal

Zimbabwe

*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, and completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty.

At the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020, Chile formally announced having completed clearance of all known mined areas within its territory on 27 February 2020.[2] The United Kingdom (UK) also announced completion of its Article 5 obligations in November 2020, following the clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas ahead of its deadline of 1 March 2024.[3]

Since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999, 33 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory. State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

States Parties that have declared fulfilment of clearance obligations since 1999

1999

Bulgaria

2010

Nicaragua*

2003

Costa Rica

2011

Nigeria**

2004

Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname

2012

Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,* Uganda

2005

Guatemala

2013

Bhutan, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Venezuela***

2006

North Macedonia

2014

Burundi

2007

Eswatini (formerly Swaziland)

2017

Algeria,* Mozambique*

2008

France, Malawi

2018

Jordan, Mauritania**

2009

Albania, Rwanda, Tunisia,*** Zambia

2020

Chile, UK

*Algeria, Nicaragua, and Mozambique have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination.

**Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria have reported finding new contamination.

***Tunisia and Venezuela are suspected to have improvised mine contamination.

Several States Parties to have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards.[4] Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Jordan each declared the fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations several years after their initial declarations.

States Parties that have reported new contamination

If a State Party discovers a mined area under its jurisdiction or control after its original or extended Article 5 deadline has expired, it has an obligation to inform all States Parties of the discovery and to undertake to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in the area as soon as possible, and before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference.[5]

Three States Parties that previously declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines have since reported further contamination, and submitted extension requests in 2020 and 2021.

Guinea-Bissau declared fulfilment of its clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 2012. Yet in June 2021, Guinea-Bissau reported residual contamination from mines/ERW and submitted an extension request until 31 December 2022.[6]

Mauritania, which declared itself free of mines in 2018, reported finding new contamination in 2019 and was granted a one-year extension in 2020 to conduct survey to gain a more accurate estimate of contamination.[7] Following this initial one-year extension, Mauritania submitted a fourth request to extend its clearance deadline in June 2021.[8]

Nigeria announced that it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligations in 2011, but indicated newly-mined areas in 2019.[9] Nigeria submitted an extension request in November 2020, and received an interim extension until 31 December 2021 “to present [a] detailed report on contamination, progress made and work plan for implementation.”[10] Nigeria submitted a second request in May 2021, to be considered at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021.[11]

States Parties with residual contamination

Four States Parties were known or suspected to have residual contamination in 2020.

Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines on its southwestern borders. In 2020, Algeria reported that 8,813 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed, an increase from the 4,499 found in 2019.[12] Algeria reported that the mined areas are under its jurisdiction and control, and that the mines are immediately reported and destroyed, in accordance with the treaty.[13]

There have been several mine/ERW casualties reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.[14] The mines are believed to be present mainly on its borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia; in areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

In Mozambique, four small suspected mined areas totaling 1,881m² were reported to be submerged underwater in Inhambane province.[15] At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2018, Mozambique reiterated its commitment to address these areas once the water level had receded and access could be gained, and said the National Demining Institute conducted regular monitoring. Mozambique noted that it believed there was little probability that mines would be detected in the submerged areas.[16] Mozambique has provided no further updates since 2018 on the status of these mined areas.

Nicaragua declared completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010, but has since found residual mine/ERW contamination. In 2018, Nicaragua reported that its contingency operations answered 13 reports made by the public, resulting in the clearance of 2,849m² and removal and destruction of 29 items of ERW. Nicaragua confirmed these operations would continue through 2019.[17] In May 2020, two mines exploded in El Bayuncun, San Fernando, near the border with Honduras. The first mine injured one person and the second injured four people from a rescue party.[18]

Extent of contamination in States Parties

States Parties Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen have all reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km²). However, the extent of contamination in at least two of these countries— Ethiopia and Ukraine—is likely to be considerably less once survey is conducted.

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km²) is reported in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

Medium contamination (5–19km²) is reported in seven States Parties: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.

Ten States Parties reported less than 5km² of contamination: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, and Serbia.

Nigeria, which submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request in 2021, reported that due to insecurity, the extent of contamination had not been determined. Nigeria is impacted by improvised mines, other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ERW, mainly in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the northeast.[19]

Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties[20]

Region

Massive

(more than 100km²)

Large

(20–99km²)

Medium

(5–19km²)

Small

(less than 5km²)

Americas

   

Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

East and South Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan

Cambodia

Thailand

Sri Lanka

 

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

BiH

Croatia

Turkey

Ukraine*

 

Tajikistan

Cyprus**

Serbia

 

Middle East and North Africa

Iraq

Yemen

   

Oman

Palestine

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ethiopia*

Angola

Chad

Eritrea

Zimbabwe

Mauritania

Somalia

South Sudan

Sudan

DRC

Guinea-Bissau

Niger

Senegal

*Both Ethiopia and Ukraine have reported massive contamination, although this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted. It is expected that the estimates will be significantly reduced after survey. In Ukraine the estimate includes all contamination, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other ERW.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

  • Americas

In December 2020, Colombia reported a total of 260 municipalities suspected or known to be contaminated, including 138 municipalities that were inaccessible or only partly accessible.[21] Contamination in accessible areas comprised 7.73km², with 1.85km² classified as confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and 5.88km² as suspected hazardous areas (SHA).[22] Colombia also reported in December 2020 that 253 municipalities were free of contamination.[23]

Ecuador and Peru each have a very small amount of remaining contaminated area, of 0.04km² and 0.37km² respectively.[24]

  • East and South Asia and the Pacific

As of the end of December 2020, Cambodia reported contamination of 801.64km², following the completion of a national baseline survey in 73 districts.[25] Thailand has a total of 62.95km² of contamination, of which 23.27km² are CHA (183 areas), and 39.68km² are SHA (43 areas). Much of the remaining contamination in Cambodia and Thailand is along their shared border, where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation.[26]

Afghanistan reported contamination of 187.31km² as of the end of 2020, of which 148.46km² is classified as CHA, and 38.85km² is classified as SHA.[27] Prior to the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan in August 2021, new contamination resulting from fighting between the government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continued to add to the extent of contamination in the country.[28]

Mine contamination in Sri Lanka is mainly in Northern province, the scene of intense fighting during the civil war; and to a lesser extent in Eastern and North Central provinces. As of March 2021, Sri Lanka reported a total of 12.79km² contamination, with 304 CHA (11.44km²) and nine SHA (1.35km²).[29]

  • Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

BiH reported extensive contamination of 956.36km² as of the end of 2020.[30] The majority of hazardous areas in BiH are suspected rather than confirmed (95km² CHA and 861.36km2 SHA), meaning actual contamination may be less than reported.

As of March 2021, Croatia reported contamination of 279.55km² (196.89km² CHA, including 30.14km² under military control, and 82.66km² SHA) across eight of its 21 counties.[31] The majority of contaminated land in Croatia is reported to be in forested areas.[32] Newly discovered contamination was identified in four counties in 2020–2021.[33]

Turkey reported contamination of 145km² across 3,834 areas. The majority of contaminated areas are found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, while 920 areas are not in border regions.[34] Turkey plans to conduct non-technical survey during 2021–2023 of all of the contaminated areas, to provide a more accurate picture of contamination.[35]

Ukraine reported 7,000km² of contamination (undifferentiated, including antipersonnel mines) in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as of the end of 2020.[36] Ukraine has provided the same estimate of contamination since 2018, and survey to provide a more accurate baseline has not yet been conducted.[37] In addition, an estimated 14,000km2 of undifferentiated contamination was reported in areas not controlled by the government.[38]

Cyprus, Serbia, and Tajikistan all have much smaller amounts of contamination.

Cyprus is believed to have 1.24km² of antipersonnel and antivehicle landmine contamination. However, the contamination is reported to be only in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone, and not in territory under the effective control of Cyprus.[39] Serbia reported 1.15km² of contamination across five areas, in Bujanovac municipality.[40] Tajikistan reported a total of 8.55km² of antipersonnel mine contamination (7.02km² CHA and 1.53km² SHA).[41]

  • Middle East and North Africa

Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised landmines in areas liberated from the Islamic State. As of the end of 2020, Iraq reported 1,199.95km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, and an additional 596.27km² of IED contamination, including improvised mines. The majority of contamination was in Federal Iraq.[42]

Yemen does not currently have a clear understanding of the level of contamination, as ongoing armed conflict continues to add to the extent and complexity of contamination, which includes improvised mines.[43] The scale of the conflict and its extensive impact has continued to prevent implementation of effective nationwide survey.[44] The most recent estimate of contamination, from March 2017, was 323km².[45]

Oman reported that all of its hazardous areas had been cleared before the signature of the Mine Ban Treaty, but were in the process of being “re-inspected” to deal with residual risk.[46]

Palestine reported 0.18km² of landmine contamination, of which 85,000m² was antipersonnel mines and 99,000m² was antivehicle mines.[47]

  • Sub-Saharan Africa

Ethiopia reported in April 2020 that remaining contamination totaled 726.06km2, across 152 areas in six provinces.[48] Of this, 29 areas (3.52km²) were CHA, while 123 areas (722.54km²) were SHA.[49] Most SHAs are located in the Somali region. It believed that the baseline figure is an overestimate and that only 2% of these areas are actually likely to contain mines.[50]

As of December 2020, Angola reported total landmine contamination of 85.42km² across 17 provinces, of which 84.41km² was antipersonnel mines and 1.01km² was antivehicle mines. Of the antipersonnel mine contamination, 81.58km² was classified as CHA and 2.83km² as SHA.[51]

Chad has identified 147 hazardous areas across three provinces,[52] covering an estimated total of 80.33km² of mixed contamination (57.59km² CHAand 22.74km² SHA).[53] Over half of the mine contamination is located in Tibesti.[54] Lake province is contaminated with improvised mines.[55]

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2014, when it was estimated at 33.5km².[56]

As of 31 December 2020, remaining mine contamination in Zimbabwe was 34.12km2. All of this contamination is classified as CHA, and is located in five provinces along the border with Mozambique and an inland minefield in Matabeleland North province.[57]

Mauritania declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018, but later identified further contamination.[58] A survey conducted in February and March 2021 identified 19 mined areas, covering 16.18km².[59] Local authorities have reported an additional mined area in Ouadane, in the Adrar region, the size of which is still to be determined.[60]

Somalia reported 6.1km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, out of a total of 161.8km² of mixed contamination which includes antivehicle mines.[61] Somalia also reported an increase in the use of improvised mines.[62] Since 2017, the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) reported it was in the process of synchronizing and verifying data in the national database, which may lead to adjustments to the figures.[63] This process was ongoing in 2021.

South Sudan reported 7.28km² of contamination as of 31 December 2020, with 63 areas classified as CHA (2.83km²) and 55 as SHA (4.45km²).[64] The largest SHA, in Jonglei, totaled 1.98km², but it is thought its size would be reduced through survey.

As of the end of 2020, Sudan reported 13.09km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination, with 56 CHA (up from 43 in 2019) and 41 SHA (down from 52 in 2019) across the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan.[65] New contamination totaling 6.22km² was found in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in 2020, with 11 new hazardous areas registered.[66]

Contamination in the DRC totals 0.13km², but is partly located in the provinces of Ituri and North-Kivu, which are difficult to access due to the presence of NSAGs and the Ebola epidemic.[67]

In 2021, Guinea-Bissau reported that residual contamination covers 1.09km² and is classified as CHA, with antipersonnel mines accounting for 0.49km² and antivehicle mines accounting for 0.6km². In addition, 43 areas were suspected to contain both mines and ERW.[68]

Niger and Senegal both have small amounts of contamination. Senegal reported that following non-technical survey in 2020, 37 hazardous areas had been identified, covering 0.49km².[69] In 2020, Niger reported 0.18km² of CHA, adjacent to a military post in Madama, in the Agadez region.[70]

Suspected improvised antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties with reported improvised mine hazards and casualties

Improvised devices designed to detonate—or which due to their design, can be detonated—by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.[71] Available information indicates that the fusing of most improvised landmines allows them to be activated by a person, but there may be exceptions.

Improvised mines are noted as a concern in the Oslo Action Plan, which says “the States Parties are also facing new challenges including increased use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature and rising number of victims.”

Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan lays out the commitments of States Parties affected by improvised mines whereby all provisions and obligations of the treaty apply to such contamination. This includes the obligations to clear these devices in accordance with Article 5 and to provide regular information on the extent of contamination, disaggregated by type of mines, in their annual transparency reporting under Article 7.

Several States Parties suspected to be contaminated with improvised mines, which may be antipersonnel mines by their nature, have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 or have not provided regular Article 7 transparency reports.

Improvised landmines causing casualties in Burkina Faso and Cameroon were believed to have primarily acted as de facto “antivehicle mines.” According to Monitor data for 2019, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents in both countries, and no casualties occurred while individuals were on foot. However, in 2020, a few incidents in Burkina Faso and Cameroon appear to have involved people walking.

In the following States Parties, casualties from improvised mines have been documented. These States Parties must clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 obligations and may need to request new clearance deadlines.

In Burkina Faso, IED use by NSAGs has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-plate improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018, due to the introduction of measures which block signals to command-detonated IEDs. In 2020, 107 casualties of improvised mines were recorded—although most incidents involved vehicles, including cars, carts, and bicycles. Yet in August 2020, eight children were killed by an improvised mine in Bembela. One report said the children were watching over animal herds when they stepped on an IED, while another said that the device exploded as some of the children were walking and some were on a cart.[72]

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, and its Article 5 deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, improvised mines have caused casualties, particularly in the north on the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s activities have escalated.[73] The extent of contamination is unknown but is thought to be small. Most casualties in past years were traveling by vehicle; yet in 2020, of 12 improvised mine casualties, two were incidents that were reported to have occurred while the casualty was walking.[74]

Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination, and since 2017 has experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country.[75] All casualties to date were traveling by vehicle. The Monitor recorded 242 improvised mine casualties in Mali in 2020. UNMAS reported to the Monitor that improvised mines in Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap.[76]

Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of both civilian and military casualties from mines—including improvised mines—in the last five years.[77] The improvised mines causing casualties—particularly shepherds walking with their herds—often result in lower limb amputation, consistent with antipersonnel mine explosions.

Venezuela reported clearing all of its remaining mined areas under Article 5 in 2013.[78] Yet in August 2018, media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel suffered an antipersonnel mine incident in Catatumbo municipality, Zulia state, along the border with Colombia,[79] where Colombian NSAGs were believed to be using improvised mines to protect strategic positions.[80] In March 2021, the Venezuelan military engaged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, in Apure state,[81] and a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines “similar to those used in Colombia” were found in the area.[82] This indicates they were improvised antipersonnel mines. Contamination was later confirmed by a member of parliament and the Ministry of Defense.[83] Venezuela requested UN support to clear mines from the border in April 2021, and announced that the military would be using a mine sweeper prototype to clear the area.[84]

Antipersonnel mine contamination in states not party and other areas

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territories.

States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination

Abkhazia

Israel

Myanmar

Armenia

Korea (North)

Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijan

Korea (South)

Pakistan

China

Kosovo

Russia

Cuba

Kyrgyzstan

Somaliland

Egypt

Lao PDR

Syria

Georgia

Lebanon

Uzbekistan

India

Libya

Vietnam

Iran

Morocco

Western Sahara

Note: other areas are indicated in italics.

State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

States not party

The extent of contamination is unknown in most states not party: Armenia, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Libya, Morocco, Mynamar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Landmines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzebkistan.

Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

The level of contamination is known to some extent in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, and Lebanon.

In Azerbaijan, contamination comprised 5km² of antipersonnel mine contamination (1.5km² CHA and 3.5km² SHA) and 8.71km² of antivehicle mine contamination (1.79km² CHA and 6.92km² SHA). Survey is needed to assess the extent of contamination, due to changes in control of parts of Nagorno-Karabakh after the conflict in 2020.[85]

In Georgia, contamination totaled 2.79km² across four mined areas, including 0.05km² contaminated with antipersonnel mines, and 2.74km² contaminated with antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines. The size of two additional areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines, in the villages of Osiauri and Khojali, was unknown.[86]

Just over 90km² of contamination was reported in Israel in 2017, comprising 41.58km² CHA and 48.51km² SHA (including areas in the West Bank).[87] This did not include mined areas “deemed essential to Israel’s security.” No updates on contamination have been provided since 2017, although Israel reported progress in re-surveying mine affected areas and the clearance of 0.18km² in 2020.[88]

At the end of 2020, Lebanon reported 18.23km² of landmine contamination, all CHA. There was also 0.41km² of IED contamination, which included improvised mines.[89]

Other areas

Five other areas unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status are known to have mine contamination: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

The extent of contamination in Abkhazia and Kosovo is small, at 0.01km² in Abkhazia and 1.2km² in Kosovo.[90]

Nagorno-Karabakh was reported to have 6.75km² of contaminated land including 5.62km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 0.23km² of antivehicle mine contamination, and 0.9km² of mixed antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination.[91] The total extent of contamination may be subject to adjustment, due to changes in territorial control during the 2020 conflict and the possibility that new mines may have been laid.

Somaliland was reported to have 3.86km² of contaminated land in total, including 0.52km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 2km² of antivehicle mine contamination, 0.17km² of ERW contamination, and 1.17km² of mixed contamination.[92]

Western Sahara has minefields east of the Berm,[93] covering an area of 215.96km² (90km² CHA and 125.96km² SHA).[94] According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines, although small numbers of antipersonnel mines have been found in these areas.[95]

Mine/ERW casualties

Landmines of all types—including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised mines—as well as cluster munition remnants[96] and ERW remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm globally.

Following a sharp rise in casualties amid increased conflict and contamination since 2015, high numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2020, when at least 7,073 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW. Of that total, at least 2,492 were killed while 4,561 were injured. In the case of 20 casualties, it was not known if the person survived.[97]

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 51 countries and three other areas in 2020. The annual total represents an increase from 5,853 casualties in 2019, and an upward turn from three years of declining casualties (2017–2019) since the annual total reached a peak of 9,440 in 2016, due to increased conflict and the resulting contamination.[98]

States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2020

Region

States and other areas

Americas

 

Colombia

   

East and South Asia and the Pacific

 

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Cambodia

India

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Pakistan

Philippines

Solomon Islands

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

 

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Croatia

Nagorno-Karabakh

Tajikistan

Turkey

Ukraine

Middle East and North Africa

 

Algeria

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Palestine

Syria

Tunisia

Yemen

Sub-Saharan Africa

 

Angola

Burkina Faso

Cameroon

Cent. African Rep.

Chad

Dem. Rep. Congo

Ethiopia

Kenya

Mali

Mauritania

Mozambique

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Somalia

Somaliland

South Sudan

Sudan

Uganda

Western Sahara

Zimbabwe

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated in italics.

The casualty total for 2020 represents more than twice the number of casualties in 2013 (3,456), the year with the fewest mine/ERW casualties on record. The significant rise in casualties since that time is primarily due to intensive armed conflicts involving the use of improvised mines.

Mine/ERW casualties: 2001–2020[99]

Mine :ERW Casualties 2001-2020

Between 1999 and 2019, Afghanistan and Colombia alternated in having the highest number of annual recorded casualties. In 2020, Syria, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, recorded the most casualties (2,729), followed by State Party Afghanistan (1,474). This marked the first year that Syria had the highest recorded number of annual casualties since Monitor reporting began in 1999. Afghanistan had recorded the most annual casualties each year from 2008–2019, while casualty rates in Colombia spiked from 2005–2007.

Mine/ERW casualties over 20 years in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Syria

Mine :ERW Casualties Afghanistan -Colombia -Syria

The Monitor notes that since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, casualty totals for Syria have fluctuated, due to inconsistent availability of data and sources and a lack of access to affected areas. Annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties in Syria are thought to be a considerable undercount, while ambiguity in the way that casualties and explosive incidents are reported in the media often leaves it unclear if mines involved in incidents were of an improvised nature. Casualty data for Syria is routinely adjusted in light of new surveys and historical data.

It is certain that many casualties go unrecorded each year globally, meaning not all casualties are captured in the Monitor’s data. Some countries do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place, while other forms of reporting are often inadequate. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic posed an additional challenge to data collection efforts in mine/ERW affected countries.

InAfghanistan, data collection was limited amid ongoing conflict. The existing system records only civilian casualties. Reporting on military casualties is rare, with no data available for 2019 or 2020. Since May 2017, the Afghan military has stopped releasing conflict casualty figures.

The number of casualties in Azerbaijan in 2020 has not yet been adequately determined, in part due to the complexity of data collection following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also due to changes in territorial control of affected areas. This risks duplication or under-reporting.[100]

Yemen reported that there was no nationwide casualty surveillance system, and that casualties were recorded in an ad hoc manner by local authorities, medical institutions, and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC). The issue is compounded by the scale of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen and the COVID-19 pandemic.[101] The Monitor recorded 350 casualties for Yemen in 2020. In its Article 7 report for 2020, Yemen reported 532 victims surveyed in 2020.[102] The UN Humanitarian Needs Overview for Yemen reported 1,300 civilians “affected in landmine or ERW related incidents” in 2020, with no reference to persons killed or injured.[103]

Casualty demographics[104]

Civilians accounted for the vast majority of mine/ERW casualties in 2020 compared to military and security forces.[105] In 2020, 80% of casualties were civilians, where their status was known, evidencing the long-recognized trend of civilian harm that motivated the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor identified 27 casualties among deminers in nine countries during 2020 while the remaining 20% of casualties were military or combatants. The country with the most military casualties was Syria (390), followed by Mali (165), Ukraine (120), and Nigeria (113).

Civilian status of casualties in 2020

Civilian

4,437

Deminer

27

Military

1,105

Unknown

1,504

There were at least 1,872 child casualties in 2020. Children made up half of civilian casualties where the age group was known (3,733), and accounted for 30% of all casualties for whom the age group was known (6,272).[106] Children were killed (645) or injured (1,218) by mines/ERW in 34 states and one other area in 2020.[107]

In 2020, as in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties—where the sex was known—were boys (81%).[108] ERW was the device type that caused most child casualties (870, or 46%), followed by improvised mines (434, or 23%).

In 2020, as in past years, men and boys made up the majority of casualties, accounting for 85% of all casualties where the sex was known (4,583 of 5,388). Women and girls made up 15% of all casualties where the sex was known (807).

Casualties by device type

Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised mine casualties. In 2020, improvised mines accounted for the highest number of casualties (2,119) for the fifth year in a row. Although the number of casualties attributed to improvised mines declined from 2019, this is attributable to variants in casualty recording terminology. Most casualties attributed to unspecified mine types in 2020 were reported in countries with improvised mine casualties (1,550 of 1,632 unspecified mine casualties in 2020, or 95%).[109]

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2020

 Casualties Per Device _2020

In 2020, landmines caused at least 4,352 casualties, including those reported as factory-made antipersonnel mines, improvised mines, antivehicle mines, and unspecified mines.[110]

Cluster munition remnants caused 218 casualties,[111] while other ERW caused 1,760 casualties.[112]

A total of 743 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were not disaggregated in data or reporting.[113]

Casualties and Mine Ban Treaty status in 2020

Mine/ERW casualties occurred in 38 States Parties in 2020.[114] States Parties accounted for half (52%, or 3,642) of annual casualties. Eight States Parties recorded more than 100 casualties in 2020: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

States Parties with over 100 casualties in 2020

State Party

Casualties

Afghanistan

1,474

Mali

368

Yemen

350

Ukraine

277

Nigeria

226

Colombia

167

Iraq

167

Burkina Faso

111

There is a clear trend of declining annual casualties in most States Parties since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence more than 20 years ago, with the exception of those experiencing conflict and substantial improvised mine use.

In 2020, the Monitor identified 3,391 mine/ERW casualties in 12 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.[115] More than 80% of those casualties were recorded in Syria (2,729).[116] Myanmar accounted for the next highest total among countries yet to join the treaty, with 280 casualties.

In three other areas—Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara—a combined total of 37 casualties were reported in 2020.[117]

Coordination

The Oslo Action Plan, agreed in November 2019 at the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, highlights best practices that contribute to the effective implementation of mine action programs. These include high levels of national ownership; developing evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and workplans; and keeping national mine action standards up to date with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Click here to see a summary table of mine action management and coordination

Clearance coordination

In 2020, clearance in most States Parties with contamination was managed and coordinated through national mine action centers. This was the case in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Guinea-Bissau’s National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI), formed in 2001, and under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense since 2009, had been inactive since 2012.[118] Having submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request in 2021, CAAMI reported that a new director had been appointed and that it had resumed activities.[119]

Nigeria formed an Inter-Ministerial Committee in 2019 to develop a mine action strategy and a workplan for survey and clearance.[120] In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Nigeria reported that it hoped to establish a national mine action center during the extension period.[121]

In Ukraine, a new structure comprising a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) chaired by the Minister of Defense, and two mine action centers—one under the Ministry of Defense and one under the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU)—were approved in September 2020 via an amendment to the 2018 Mine Action law.[122] The two mine action centers were established and undergoing accreditation and staffing as of August 2021.[123]

National mine action strategies

National mine action strategies and workplans are crucial for strengthening national ownership of mine action programs, and to enable greater transparency and accountability via monitoring and reporting of progress on clearance under Article 5. Developing a national strategy and workplans can also help states align their mine action activities with broader humanitarian and development aims, and boost their ability to secure international funding.

In 2020, 23 States Parties reported having national mine action strategies and/or workplans in place. Afghanistan, Croatia, Iraq, Sudan, and Tajikistan were in the process of updating their national strategies in 2020, with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supporting the process in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.[124]

Sri Lanka planned to update its national strategy in 2021, based on the results of ongoing re-survey in Northern, Eastern, and North Central provinces.[125] The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) planned to assist Yemen in updating its outdated national strategy in 2021, to better reflect mine action needs and priorities amid the ongoing conflict.[126]

In 2020, States Parties Cyprus, the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Ukraine did not have national mine action strategies in place. The DRC’s strategy expired in 2019, though it reported in August 2020 and again in February 2021 that it was in the process of developing a new strategy.[127] The GICHD planned to work with Ukraine to develop a national mine action strategy, with a workshop due to be held in 2022.[128]

Information management

States Parties that did not use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2020 included BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Niger, Oman, Thailand, and Serbia. Serbia was in contact with GICHD to discuss the possibility of installing IMSMA.[129]

As part of the UNDP Mine Action Governance and Management Project, which began in 2017 and is funded by the European Union (EU), the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) planned to create a new online database to increase the availability and transparency of its mine action data.[130] Colombia also enhanced its reporting and monitoring via interactive digital dashboards on demining, risk education, and victim assistance. These dashboards and mine action datasets have been made publicly accessible through the Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, AICMA) online “geoportal”.[131]

Ukraine had two functioning IMSMA databases in 2020, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defense. Consolidation of both databases into a central national IMSMA database is planned once the NMAA has been established.[132]

Transparency reporting

As of 1 October 2021, seven States Parties with clearance obligations had not yet submitted Article 7 transparency reports for calendar year 2020: the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, and Somalia.

Four of them have not submitted their report for many years: Niger since 2018, Eritrea since 2014, Nigeria since 2012, and Guinea-Bissau since 2011.[133] In line with Action #49 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties that have provided no update on implementation of their clearance obligations under Article 5 for two consecutive years should be assisted by the president of the Mine Ban Treaty, in close cooperation with the Article 5 Committee.

National mine action standards

Several States Parties reported updating national mine action standards in 2020:

  • Afghanistan updated standards on improvised mines, planning and prioritization, and quality management;[134]
  • Angola updated standards on land release, accreditation, training, technical and non-technical survey, post-clearance documentation, and quality and information management;[135]
  • Cambodia updated standards on land release, accreditation, and quality and information management;[136] and
  • Colombia updated standards on land release and information management.[137]

In 2020, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported that their national standards were in the process of being reviewed and updated.[138] A national standards workshop in Yemen, set to take place in April 2020, was postponed amid the COVID-19 pandemic, but work began in September 2020 to update survey standards. Yemen reported that the Arabic version was 95% complete as of the end of 2020.[139]

Ukraine’s national mine action standards, first published in April 2019, were being revised in 2021 and will become binding after the establishment of the NMAA.[140]

Some States Parties need to update their national standards, or are still waiting for standards to be approved. Mauritania is required to update its national mine action standards, which date to 2007, and is planning to review them during its fourth extension period.[141] Somalia completed revision of its national standards in 2019, and prepared them for approval by the Ministry of Internal Security in 2020 after receiving feedback from stakeholders.[142] As of September 2021, the National Technical Standards and Guidelines in Somalia were still pending approval.[143]

In 2020, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) and the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in Iraq reported developing guidelines for the conduct of mine action operations in the context of COVID-19 prevention measures.[144]

Risk education coordination

In 2020, 15 States Parties had mechanisms for coordinating risk education, either through specific risk education technical working group meetings, or through inclusion in meetings of the United Nations (UN) Mine Action Sub-Cluster. Seventeen States Parties reported no specific mechanisms for risk education coordination.

In Croatia, risk education is coordinated at the regional level, through five large area offices and 15 smaller branch offices of the National Education Center for Civil Protection.[145] The Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) coordinates risk education in Somalia via consortiums of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in each state.[146]

In Sri Lanka, there is no official coordination mechanism, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) works with the national mine action center to support risk education activities conducted in schools through the Ministry of Education, and at community level through local NGOs.[147]

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic limited risk education coordination meetings in some States Parties. In Cambodia, the Risk Education Technical Reference Group, which usually meets on a quarterly basis, met once in 2020.[148] In Iraq, the risk education working group held only one face-to-face meeting.[149] In South Sudan, risk education meetings were conducted online, but due to limited internet connection some agencies were unable to attend.[150]

Risk education delivery amid COVID-19 restrictions was a key topic of meetings in 2020.

Strategies and national standards

In 2020, risk education was included within the national mine action strategies of States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Thailand. In addition, Ethiopia and Turkey reported including risk education in their national mine action workplans.

Cambodia and Somalia updated their national standards on risk education in line with IMAS 12.10 on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), revised in November 2020.[151] Risk education standards in Somalia were still pending approval as of September 2021. Colombia updated Standard Operating Procedures for risk education to align with the updated IMAS.[152]

Iraq and Thailand were also in the process of updating national risk education standards in line with the revised IMAS 12.10.[153]

Several States Parties had no risk education standards, or had standards that required updating. Angola had no risk education standards, but Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) planned to support the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) to develop these as part of its capacity development support.[154] Chad had reported that it would review its risk education standards at the end of 2020,[155] but in 2021 said this would take place in 2022.[156] In Yemen, national standards were reported to be in the early stages of development.[157]

Transparency reporting

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to report on risk education and other risk reduction programs in their Article 7 reports, including on methodologies used, challenges faced, and the results achieved; with information disaggregated by gender, age, and disability.

As of 1 October 2021, 20 of the 26 mine-affected States Parties that had submitted their Article 7 reports for calendar year 2020 reported on risk education. However, the level of detail varied. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, and Thailand all provided risk education beneficiary data disaggregated by age and sex, and also provided details of their risk education programs, including on activities, methodologies, and challenges amid COVID-19.

Eleven States Parties provided a description of risk education activities but no beneficiary data: BiH, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. In some cases—such as Peru, Senegal, and Turkey—no activities were conducted, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

States parties Angola and Yemen provided only beneficiary data, although it was disaggregated by age and sex. States Parties Chad, Cyprus, Oman, Tajikistan, and Ukraine did not report on risk education activities in their Article 7 reports.

No States Parties reported reaching persons with disabilities through risk education in 2020.

Risk education in Article 5 deadline extension requests

Action #24 of the Oslo Action Plan states that extension requests under Article 5 should include detailed, costed, and multiyear plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities. This will help ensure that risk education programs are planned, budgeted, and integrated within the overall obligations of States Parties.

In 2020, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, and Senegal described risk education activities within their Article 5 extension requests, though did not provide costed and detailed multiyear plans. Only South Sudan provided a clear explanation of risk education plans and a budget in its extension request. Niger and Ukraine did not include risk education in their requests.

In 2021, the DRC, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey all included some mention of risk education within their extension requests, though none provided costed and detailed multiyear plans. Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria did not include risk education in their requests.

Victim assistance coordination

States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs[158]

Afghanistan

El Salvador

Serbia

Albania

Eritrea

Somalia

Algeria

Ethiopia

South Sudan

Angola

Guinea-Bissau

Sri Lanka

BiH

Iraq

Sudan

Burundi

Jordan

Tajikistan

Cambodia

Mozambique

Thailand

Chad

Nicaragua

Turkey

Colombia

Palestine

Uganda

Croatia

Peru

Ukraine

Dem. Rep. Congo

Senegal

Yemen

States Parties which have a responsibility for victims

The Oslo Action Plan reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to “ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.”

At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Nairobi in 2004, States Parties “indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors,” and that states with victims had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest need and expectations for assistance. The Monitor’s reporting on victim assistance focuses primarily on the States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims and needs for assistance.

A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference, as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.”[159] Landmine victim, according to this widely accepted understanding of the term, includes survivors, as well as affected families and communities. [160]

Participation of victims and their representative organizations

Participation of victims is an overarching principle in the Oslo Action Plan.[161] In 2020, victims were reported to be represented in coordination in Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Victim participation in coordination activities was lower than in past years, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions.

There were few indications that input from victims was acted upon in 2020. Reporting by states lacked detail on processes for including inputs from victims in decision-making. However, in February 2021, Colombia hosted a three-day meeting in Bogota, aimed at ensuring inclusion of victims from different backgrounds and regions.[162]

Victim assistance standards

The process to adopt a first specific IMAS on victim assistance began in 2018. Following a review of an initial draft that was made available in 2020, the new standard was fully adopted in October 2021.[163] According to the IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance, national mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating the ongoing, multi-sector efforts to address the needs of survivors, and help in ensuring the inclusion of survivors and indirect victims, and their views in the development of relevant national legislation and policy decisions. The standard notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.[164]

Afghanistan and Cambodia reported on their participation in the development of the IMAS on victim assistance. In 2020, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) held meetings with DMA in Iraq, on preparing a national standard for victim assistance and developing a mechanism for the collection of standardized victim data.[165]

A relevant government agency to coordinate victim assistance[166]

Twenty-one States Parties were reported to have victim assistance coordination linked to disability coordination mechanisms that considered issues related to the needs of mine/ERW victims.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, no victim assistance coordination meetings were held in BiH, Chad, or the DRC in 2020.

Multi-sectoral efforts in line with the CRPD[167]

Adopting, and implementing, a comprehensive plan of action that identifies gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims—and, or among, persons with disabilities—is a key step toward ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of mine victims in each State Party.

The Oslo Action plan confirms that States Parties “recognize the need to integrate assistance to victims and survivors into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction.”[168]

In Afghanistan, the National Disability Strategy 2030 had been deposited with the president in 2020 for adoption, and some 15 action plans for its implementation were developed. The draft strategy was last discussed at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled in June 2021.[169]

Centralized database with needs and challenges[170]

The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties to use a centralized database including information on persons killed and injured, and the needs and challenges of mine survivors—disaggregated by gender, age, and disability to ensure a comprehensive response. Progress in the development of centralized databases since the adoption of the Oslo Action Plan in 2019 has been unsteady.

Afghanistan’s National Disability Database was under development in 2020, in which 370,000 martyrs and persons with disabilities will be registered through a biometric system.[171] People with a disability acquired due to conflict are prioritized and will make up most beneficiaries.[172] Initial registration took place in Kabul and four other provinces in 2019.[173] In September 2021, concerns were raised that biometric data collected by the deposed Afghan government, and inherited by the Taliban, could be used to identify people linked to previous regimes or international forces, or members of persecuted groups who have received aid.[174]

In Iraq, DMA worked with the Ministry of Health and Environment and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2020, to develop a database for persons with disabilities and mine/ERW victims.[175] Discussions were held between DMA, ICRC, and HI regarding the mechanism for collecting victim data.[176]

Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims in Cambodia, Colombia, and Thailand was ongoing in 2020.

Croatia’s development of a unified database on mine/ERW victim needs has stalled since 2017. In 2020, data on mine victims and their family members was collected for inclusion in a central mine/ERW victim database, as part of a mine action project funded by Switzerland.[177]

Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen needed to significantly improve the collection of victim data and each establish a unified and coordinated system.

National referral mechanisms[178]

States Parties can improve accessibility for victims by ensuring that service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Some victims may need to be referred to specialized services,from one health facility to another, or for travel and treatment abroad. Referral mechanisms can involve national systems as well as local networks, including referral via community-based rehabilitation systems.

National mine action centers that reported referring survivors to access services included those in BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen.

National government ministries and bodies provided referrals as victim assistance focal points in Algeria, Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Peru.

Many NGOs provided referrals at the national or local level in the States Parties with victims. These groups included survivor networks, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs, also referred to as organizations of persons with disabilities, OPDs), national NGOs, and international NGOs such as HI, ICRC, and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.

The list of States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs does not encompass all States Parties with responsibility for mine survivors. The actions contained in the Oslo Action Plan are specifically aimed at States Parties with a significant number of victims, yet the victim assistance section also notes more broadly that “States Parties with victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control will endeavour to do their utmost to provide appropriate, affordable and accessible services to mine victims, on an equal basis with others.”

States Parties where the number of survivors reported or estimated is more than 100 (including those recognized as having a significant number of victims) can be found in the table below.

States Parties with more than 100 mine/ERW survivors

More than 20,000 survivors

Between 5,000 and 20,000 survivors

Between 1,000 and 4,999 survivors

Between 100–999 survivors

Afghanistan

Cambodia

Iraq

Angola

BiH

Colombia

Ethiopia

Mozambique

Sri Lanka

Turkey

 

Algeria

Belarus

Burundi

Chad

Croatia

Dem. Rep. Congo

El Salvador

Eritrea

Guinea-Bissau

Kenya

Kuwait

Nicaragua

Palestine

Serbia

Somalia

South Sudan

Sudan

Thailand

Uganda

Ukraine

Yemen

Zimbabwe

Albania

Bangladesh

Chile

Honduras

Jordan

Mali

Montenegro

Namibia

Niger

Nigeria

Peru

Philippines

Rwanda

Senegal

Tajikistan

Zambia

Addressing The Impact

Antipersonnel mine clearance

Mine clearance in 2020

The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel landmines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

Among States Parties, total reported clearance in 2020 was at least 146km².[179] This represents a decrease from the reported 156km² cleared in 2019. At least 135,583 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2020.

Monitor data on mine clearance in States Parties is based on analysis of information provided by multiple sources, including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 reports, and Article 5 extension requests. In cases where varying annual figures are reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2019–2020[180]

State Party

2019

2020

Clearance (km²)

APM destroyed

Clearance (km²)

APM destroyed

Afghanistan

28.01

7,801

24.24

5,379

Angola

1.92

1,943

1.77

452

Argentina*

See clearance figures under UK

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

0.53

963

0.29

1,357

Cambodia

20.93

15,425

46.42

10,085

Chad

0.47

0

0.21

39

Chile

0.55

4,093

0.60

12,526

Colombia

0.79

311

1.08

166

Croatia

39.16

2,530

49.66

4,953

Cyprus**

0

0

0

0

Dem. Rep. Congo

0.21

26

0.02

23

Ecuador

0.002

62

0

0

Eritrea

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Ethiopia

1.75

128

0

0

Guinea-Bissau

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Iraq

46.56

12,378

7.66

4,043

Mali

N/R

8

N/R

5

Mauritania

0

0

0

0

Niger

0.01

208

0.01

115

Nigeria

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Oman

0.13

0

0.23

0

Palestine

0.01

106

0.01

16

Peru

0.08

1,113

0

0

Senegal

0

0

0

0

Serbia

0.60

22

0.27

0

Somalia

0.12

6

0.77***

1

South Sudan

1

405

0.71

246

Sri Lanka

N/R

N/R

4.59

43,157

Sudan

0.87

1

0.35

42

Tajikistan

0.53

5,219

0.65

5,106

Thailand

0.09

2,677

0.92

9,355

Turkey

0.67

25,959

0.14

9,781

Ukraine

1.70

N/R

N/R

5

United Kingdom (UK)*

3.61

319

0.23

432

Yemen

3.10

1,536

2.80***

1,388

Zimbabwe

2.75

39,031

2.41

26,911

Total

156.15

122,270

146.04

135,583

Note: N/R=not reported; APM=antipersonnel mines.

*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

***Clearance of mixed, undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.

Several States Parties reported that the COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges to demining operations in 2020. Angola, Chad, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all suspended demining operations for a period to comply with national measures to counter the pandemic.[181] Angola reported that movement restrictions impacted the supply chain, and Tajikistan reported that border closures delayed the delivery of demining equipment and supplies.[182] In other states, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sudan, and Thailand, clearance operations continued, albeit with precautionary measures in place.[183] However, in States Parties Ecuador, Ethiopia, Peru, and Senegal, demining operations were largely suspended during 2020.

Despite the restrictions and challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic, some States Parties maintained a steady clearance output in 2020. Based on reported data, Croatia cleared the most land during 2020 (49.66km²), closely followed by Cambodia (46.42km²). Cambodia cleared and destroyed 10,085 antipersonnel mines, compared to 4,953 in Croatia. Sri Lanka cleared and destroyed the most landmines in 2020, reporting 43,157 mines cleared from 4.59km².

Afghanistan cleared 24.24km², down from 28.01km² cleared in 2019. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) in Afghanistan told the Monitor that while it had met its original baseline land release target—set in its 2013 extension request—annual land release targets had increased each year, due to both legacy and new contamination being added to the database. In 2020, Afghanistan reported that it had reached only about 34% of the annual target.[184]

Mine action in Yemen continued to operate under emergency response conditions in 2020, with a fire brigade approach to clearance focused on small, high-threat areas, with significant impact for communities.[185] In 2020, non-technical survey was being planned and is expected to start in 2021. It aims to establish a baseline to enable the planning of future clearance.[186]

Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, and Yemen reported clearing improvised mines as well as antipersonnel mines in 2020. In its Article 7 transparency report, Iraq provided better disaggregated data for land cleared of improvised mines as opposed to all improvised explosive devices (IED), hence reducing the amount of land reported cleared in 2020 compared to 2019. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported the clearance of improvised mines in Mali.[187]

Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) met their Article 5 clearance obligations in 2020. Chile completed clearance on 27 February 2020 after releasing 2.69km² in the first two months of the year, of which 0.6km² was cleared. Chile reported that 12,526 antipersonnel mines and 10,170 antivehicle mines were cleared during this two-month period.[188] The UK reported completing clearance of antipersonnel landmines in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in November 2020, having cleared four remaining contaminated areas in the Yorke Bay area, totaling 0.23km².[189] The UK reported clearing and destroying 432 mines in 2020.[190]

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, the DRC, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey all cleared under 1km² in 2020.[191] Five of these States Parties—the DRC, Niger, Oman, Palestine, and Serbia—have small amounts of contamination while four—Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan—have contamination classified as medium, and therefore should be able to complete clearance within the next few years if clearance and land release outputs are increased. Niger also reported no clearance since the beginning of March 2020. Oman reported “re-clearance” of 0.23km² in 2020 and 0.13km² in 2019, but no landmines were found and destroyed.[192] Serbia cleared no antipersonnel mines during 2020, but reported clearing one antivehicle mine and 1,586 ERW.[193]

Ukraine did not report mine clearance in its Article 7 report for 2020. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) reported clearing 49.39km² and destroying 73,375 ERW, although it did not specify clearance of antipersonnel mines.[194] International operators cleared just over 2km² of undifferentiated contaminated land in Ukraine, destroying five antipersonnel mines.[195]

Five States Parties reported no clearance during 2020: Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Peru, and Senegal. Cyprus did not undertake clearance, as no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remained under its control.[196] Ecuador and Peru both reported that clearance operations were suspended amid the COVID-19 pandemic.[197] Mauritania reported conducting survey to confirm newly identified contaminated areas.[198] Senegal reported that an action plan for resource mobilization had been developed and that non-technical survey had begun, but no suspicious areas had been identified. Implementation in Senegal was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[199] Senegal has not reported any clearance since 2017.

Ethiopia reported in its Article 7 report for 2020 that it had cleared 1.75km² of land, and cleared and destroyed 128 mines.[200] These were the same figures provided in its Article 7 report for 2019 which covered the period January 2019–April 2020.[201] It is likely that Ethiopia did not conduct further clearance after April 2020.

Article 5 deadlines and extension requests

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel landmines contaminating its territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for the country, it is able to request an extension for a period of up to 10 years.

Progress to 2025

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of 30 September 2021, 24 States Parties had deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before and no later than 2025.

Seven States Parties have Article 5 deadlines later than 2025: BiH (2027), Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), Senegal (2026), South Sudan (2026), and Sri Lanka (2028).

Of the seven Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2021, five States Parties have requested extensions up to 2025, while two States Parties have requested extensions beyond 2025.

Despite the majority of States Parties having deadlines in 2025 or earlier, it appears that few of these States Parties will meet their deadlines.

In several States Parties, land release projections are behind target, which they reported was due to a lack of funding and demining capacity.

In 2019 and 2020, Angola failed to meet its projection for land release of 17km² per year, and has not provided an updated workplan or adjusted milestones.[202] Cambodia reported requiring additional financial support and demining capacity to meet its 2025 deadline.[203] Tajikistan also reported that its current capacity would need to be increased to meet its extension deadline.[204] Chad indicated to the Monitor that it is uncertain whether it will meet its deadline, due to funding uncertainties beyond September 2021.[205] Serbia also reported a lack of funding for field operations, which prevented survey of suspected contaminated areas in 2020.[206] Serbia’s annual clearance figure of 0.27km² was just below its projected clearance target of 0.3km².

Several States Parties reported that the COVID-19 pandemic had compromised progress.

Demining operations in Ecuador were suspended in 2020. The pandemic was reported to have delayed planning and affected Ecuador’s ability to complete clearance by 2022.[207] Ecuador has cleared 0.55km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land since demining operations began in 2000.[208] Ethiopia reported that most field activities in 2020 were suspended amid the pandemic, affecting land release in the Somali region. Ethiopia did not meet its annual clearance target.[209] Peru’s land release output had increased significantly in 2019. However, in 2020, the pandemic prevented clearance operations.[210] Sudan reported that it was not on target to meet its deadline of April 2023, claiming that two years of progress were lost due to political instability and the pandemic.[211]

Thailand—which was on target in terms of its survey and clearance plan—reported that it was uncertain whether its deadline would be met, as COVID-19 restrictions had prevented face-to-face meetings with Cambodia to negotiate border clearance. The Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) was concerned that the national mine clearance budget may also be reduced as a result of the pandemic.[212] Zimbabwe, also on target to meet its deadline, noted that the pandemic and the national economic situation could impact its ability to meet its 2025 deadline.[213]

Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Yemen are each unlikely to meet their deadlines before 2025 due to insecurity, conflict, and the extent of contamination.

Afghanistan reported that it will not meet its 2023 deadline due to decreased funding, the need for survey of legacy contamination, and new contamination by improvised mines. Afghanistan anticipated submitting an extension request for at least five additional years until 2028.[214] The Taliban takeover in August 2021 has created uncertainty about the continued progress of mine clearance in Afghanistan.

In Ukraine, ongoing conflict means it is unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline.[215] In June 2020, Ukraine stated that it did not have control over territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories, and that the hostilities were causing further contamination along the contact line.[216]

Yemen also faced challenges due to continued fighting in parts of the country, restricting access to locations near the frontline, including newly contaminated areas.[217] The pandemic slowed deployment of international staff and created access restrictions, while the declining economic situation in Yemen resulted in rising fuel prices and exchange rates.[218] Yemen will submit a further Article 5 extension request in March 2022.

Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of October 2021)

State Party

Original deadline

Extension period

(No. of request)

Current deadline

Status

Afghanistan

1 March 2013

10 years (1st)

1 March 2023

Behind target

Angola

1 January 2013

5 years (1st)

8 years (2nd)

31 December 2025

Behind target

 

Argentina*

1 March 2010

10 years (1st)

3 years (2nd)

1 March 2023

See note

BiH

1 March 2009

10 years (1st)

2 years (2nd)

6 years (3rd)

1 March 2027

Progress unclear

Cambodia

1 January 2010

10 years (1st)

6 years (2nd)

31 December 2025

Behind target

Chad

1 November 2009

14 months (1st)

3 years (2nd)

6 years (3rd)

5 years (4th)

1 January 2025

Behind target

 

Colombia

1 March 2011

10 years (1st)

22 months (2nd)

31 December 2025

Behind target

Croatia

1 March 2009

10 years (1st)

7 years (2nd)

1 March 2026

On target

Cyprus

1 July 2013

3 years (1st)

3 years (2nd)

3 years (3rd)

1 July 2022

Requested 4-year extension until 1 July 2025

Dem. Rep. Congo

1 November 2012

26 months (1st)

6 years (2nd)

18 months (3rd)

1 July 2022

Requested 3.5-year extension until 31 December 2025

Ecuador

1 October 2009

8 years (1st)

3 months (2nd)

5 years (3rd)

31 December 2022

Behind target

Eritrea

1 February 2012

3 years (1st)

5 years (2nd)

11 months (3rd)

31 December 2020

In violation of the treaty by not requesting a new extension to its clearance deadline

Ethiopia

1 June 2015

5 years (1st)

5.5 years (2nd)

31 December 2025

Behind target

Guinea-Bissau

1 November 2011

2 months (1st)

1 January 2012

Requested extension until 31 December 2022

Iraq

1 February 2018

10 years (1st)

1 February 2028

Behind target

Mauritania

1 January 2011

5 years (1st)

5 years (2nd)

1 year (3rd)

 

31 January 2022

Requested 5-year extension until 31 December 2026

Niger

1 September 2009

2 years (1st)

1 year (2nd)

5 years (3rd)

4 years (4th)

31 December 2024

Progress unclear

Nigeria

1 March 2012

1 year (1st)

31 December 2021

Requested 4-year extension until 31 December 2025

Oman

1 February 2025

N/A

1 February 2025

On target

Palestine

1 June 2028

N/A

1 June 2028

On target (in Palestinian-controlled areas)

Peru

1 March 2009

8 years (1st)

7 years (2nd)

31 December 2024

Behind target

Senegal

1 March 2009

7 years (1st)

5 years (2nd)

5 years (3rd)

1 March 2026

Behind target

Serbia

1 March 2014

5 years (1st)

4 years (2nd)

1 March 2023

Behind target

Somalia

1 October 2022

N/A

1 October 2022

Requested 5-year extension until 1 October 2027

South Sudan

9 July 2021

5 years (1st)

9 July 2026

On target

Sri Lanka

1 June 2028

N/A

1 June 2028

On target

Sudan

1 April 2014

5 years (1st)

4 years (2nd)

1 April 2023

Behind target

Tajikistan

1 April 2010

10 years (1st)

6 years (2nd)

31 December 2025

On target

Thailand

1 May 2009

9 years (1st)

5 years (2nd)

31 October 2023

On target

Turkey

1 March 2014

8 years (1st)

1 March 2022

Requested 45-month extension until 31 December 2025

Ukraine

1 June 2016

5 years (1st)

2 years (2nd)

1 December 2023

Progress unclear

Yemen

1 March 2009

6 years (1st)

5 years (2nd)

3 years (3rd)

1 March 2023

Behind target

Zimbabwe

1 March 2009

22 months (1st)

2 years (2nd)

2 years (3rd)

3 years (4th)

8 years (5th)

31 December 2025

On target

Note: N/A=not applicable.

*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

Extension requests in 2020 and 2021

In 2020, nine countries submitted extension requests: BiH (until March 2027); Colombia (until December 2025); DRC (until July 2022); Mauritania (until January 2022); Niger (until 31 December 2024); Nigeria (until December 2021); Senegal (until March 2026); South Sudan (until July 2026); and Ukraine (until December 2023).[219] These requests were approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.

As of 1 October 2021, seven countries had submitted requests during 2021 to extend their Article 5 deadlines: Cyprus, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey. The decision on approval of these extension requests will take place at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021.

Cyprus has been granted three extensions to its Article 5 deadline, each for a period of three years. Cyprus submitted a fourth request in 2021, for another three years, until 1 July 2025.[220] Cyprus has cited antipersonnel mines remaining in territory occupied by Turkish forces, which it has been unable to clear, as the reason for its multiple extension requests.[221]

In 2020, the DRC submitted a third extension request, which was approved, setting a new deadline of 1 July 2022.[222] In 2021, the DRC requested a fourth extension, for a period of three years and six months, until 31 December 2025, to clear 33 remaining contaminated areas totaling 0.12km².[223] The extension request indicates that little progress has been made.

Guinea-Bissau completed clearance of all known mined areas in December 2012.[224] However, at the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, in November 2019, it reported residual mine/ERW contamination and submitted an extension request until 31 December 2022.[225]

Mauritania declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2018, but in June 2020 submitted an extension request—which was approved—to extend its clearance deadline by one year, in order to survey previously unknown mined areas.[226] Following this initial one-year extension, Mauritania submitted a fourth request in June 2021 to extend its deadline to 31 December 2026.[227]

Nigeria reported having improvised mine contamination at the Fourth Review Conference, in November 2019, and submitted a request in November 2020 for an interim extension until 31 December 2021, to enable it to present a detailed report on contamination, progress made, and a workplan for implementation.[228] In 2021, Nigeria submitted a request for four years, until 31 December 2025, but did not include a plan for survey or clearance for this extension period.[229]

Somalia submitted an extension request in April 2021 for five years, until 1 October 2027. A revised request was submitted in September 2021, which included a workplan.[230] However, the plan fails to provide detailed annual projections for survey and clearance, which will make any progress towards the achievement of Somalia’s Article 5 obligations difficult to assess.

Turkey submitted an extension request in March 2021, for three years and nine months, until 31 December 2025. Turkey noted that the extension period would allow for the collection of relevant information, with a view to submitting a second request.[231] The request did not include planning or resources for the clearance of mines in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus.

In addition, Eritrea was expected to submit an extension request in 2021, but as of 1 October, had yet to do so. Eritrea, which in 2019 was granted a new Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2020, has failed to report on progress or submit another extension request, and has been in a state of non-compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty since its deadline expired.[232]

Risk education

The Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The Oslo Action Plan further recognizes the importance of risk education in helping to prevent mine incidents and save lives, providing five actions for States Parties related to risk education. These are to integrate risk education within wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with other mine action activities; provide context-specific risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups; prioritize people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data, and through an understanding of people’s behavior and movements; build national capacity to deliver risk education, which can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and report on risk education in annual Article 7 transparency reports.[233]

Provision of risk education in 2020

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific mine risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups. In 2020, 26 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations at risk due to antipersonnel mine contamination: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Risk education activities were disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. For example, the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reached 7,722 people through risk education in 2020, marking a massive decrease from 36,295 reached in 2019.[234] Afghanistan, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, among other States Parties, also saw a reduction in risk education beneficiaries in 2020.[235] Beneficiary data collected by the Monitor in 2019 and 2020 indicates that in many states, the number of risk education recipients dropped, particularly where the majority of beneficiaries were reached through interpersonal delivery methods.

In Ecuador and Peru, no mine risk education beneficiaries were reached in 2020, as the Seventh Binational Mine Risk Education Campaign—carried out jointly by both states in contaminated border areas—was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[236] Risk education activities in Turkey were suspended, and in Sri Lanka cancelled, due to the pandemic in 2020.[237]

Chad, Cyprus, Tajikistan, and Ukraine did not report on risk education in their Article 7 reports, though it is known that risk education took place in these states. In Chad, risk education was undertaken by Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND).[238] In Cyprus, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided online risk education to United Nations (UN) peacekeepers during the pandemic.[239] In Tajikistan, risk education was carried out by the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) and the national Red Crescent Society.[240] In Ukraine, risk education was carried out by international organizations, Ukrainian security and emergency sector actors, and the Ukrainian Red Cross.[241]

As of 1 October 2021, the DRC, Eritrea, Niger, and Nigeria had not submitted Article 7 reports for 2020, though risk education was conducted in each of these states. In the DRC, risk education was carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community volunteers, while in Eritrea the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided risk education to 30,000 children.[242] The European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in the Sahel conducted risk education sessions in Niger in 2020.[243] Niger has not provided any updates on risk education since 2012. In Nigeria, risk education was conducted by a national NGO, the Youth Awakens Foundation, as well as by international and UN operators.[244]

Argentina, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and the United Kingdom (UK) are not known to have conducted any risk education in 2020.

Risk education prioritization

Action #30 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to prioritize people most at risk by linking the provision of risk education to available casualty and contamination data. In 2020, as in 2019, it was reported that national level Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data was used to inform the prioritization and planning of risk education in all States Parties where IMSMA data was available.

Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Sudan, and Turkey reported that a prioritization mechanism was in place for targeting people most at risk.

Afghanistan maintained a priority scoring matrix to prioritize affected populations by their proximity to hazards, recent casualties, and incidences of armed conflict.[245] In Cambodia, the Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)—operated by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)—was used by operators to plan and target activities.[246] Croatia reported prioritizing risk education according to casualty and contamination data, with the system reported to be age-sensitive and tailored according to population movements, jobs, coping mechanisms, and risk behaviors.[247] Sudan ranked contaminated communities as either high, medium, or low impact areas to prioritize risk education, while Turkey reported risk education prioritization was based on analysis of impacted villages in its database.[248]

In 2020, studies in Cambodia, Colombia, and Ukraine aimed to enhance understanding of at-risk populations, and of prioritization and monitoring processes. In Cambodia, a review of risk education in 2013–2019 was conducted by CMAA. Its recommendations included developing a theory of change to inform the design and monitoring of risk education.[249] In Colombia, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) published a study that analyzed risk education and victim assistance IMSMA data from 2012–2019. It concluded that while data was being used to prioritize risk education, the development of a baseline and standardized indicators would help identify trends and changes in community vulnerability.[250] In eastern Ukraine, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) survey of risk education in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, to provide a project baseline.[251]

In several States Parties, there was a need to improve the availability of data and the processes for targeting risk education. In BiH and Iraq, victim databases were incomplete or not publicly available.[252] In Ukraine, there was no standardized approach to data collection and analysis to inform risk education, and operators used different datasets, including open-source data, media reports, and reports by the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) to inform targeting and prioritization.[253] In Yemen, the lack of a functioning IMSMA database made it difficult to identify risk groups, highly contaminated areas, and risk taking behaviors.[254]

Target areas and risk groups

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific risk education, tailored to the threat encountered by the population. It must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. Consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that put people at risk, is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

Target areas

In 2020, many of the target areas for risk education remained the same as in 2019. States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine conducted risk education in both rural and urban areas. In States Parties Cambodia, Chad, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, risk education was conducted only in rural areas.

In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and along the Thailand-Myanmar border, risk education was conducted in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In Afghanistan, returnees and IDPs were targeted for risk education via a collaboration between United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) zero points, transit centers, and encashment centers, using a blend of video and direct presentation approaches.[255]

In 2020, risk education in Iraq was prioritized in areas liberated from Islamic State, to ensure that returnees had an awareness of the risk and knowledge of how to stay safe.[256] As a result of this prioritization, central and southern Iraq saw fewer risk education activities.[257]

Risk education targeted at border areas was conducted in Thailand and Zimbabwe in 2020. In Thailand, the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) provided risk education in areas bordering Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.[258] Humanity & Inclusion (HI) delivered risk education for refugees and IDPs from Myanmar in nine refugee camps in Thailand.[259] In Zimbabwe, risk education was conducted on the border with Mozambique.[260]

In Colombia, risk education was provided in indigenous reserves in mountainous areas in 2020. Indigenous communities were affected by ongoing conflict and extreme poverty, and were often hard to reach due to frequent displacement from their communities.[261]

In Yemen, UNDP reported that risk education will need to focus on hard-to-reach areas and locations near frontlines when they become accessible.[262]

Risk groups

Children, often growing up in contaminated areas but lacking knowledge of the risks, continued to be seen as a key risk group in many States Parties in 2020. Children are also prone to picking up and playing with explosive remnants of war (ERW). Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe reported children as key target groups for risk education. However, Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine all reported that children were more affected by ERW than landmines, while boys and adolescent males were considered to be particularly prone to picking up and playing with items.

Adult men were also cited by the majority of States Parties and operators to be a primary risk group in relation to antipersonnel mines. Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe all targeted men for risk education. Men were often seen to be at high risk due to their work in rural areas, including cultivation, collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending animals. Men were also reported to be more likely than other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity.

Poverty and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives continued to be cited as the primary reasons for intentional risk-taking by populations in both rural and urban areas.

Fewer reported mine incidents involved women and girls in 2020, and risk education operators noted that they were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors, or to travel as far from home as men. However, in the DRC, women were reported to travel to contaminated areas for food and household materials.[263] Women and girls remain an important group to target in risk education as they can help promote safer behavior among men, and among children and peers.[264] In Sri Lanka, women and schoolgirls worked with national risk education organizations to reach out to families and act as peer group influencers.[265] In states such as Somalia, where female social and economic roles are limited, women and girls are often harder to reach for risk education.[266]

In 2020, risk education in some states was conducted for specific at-risk groups.

In Afghanistan, drivers were targeted for risk education at bus stations, to sensitize them to the dangers of overtaking and using shortcut roads.[267]

In Cambodia, risk education was provided to laborers and construction workers at their place of work, and to agricultural workers in the fields.[268] In Iraq, municipality workers and street cleaners were targeted in cities such as Mosul. Cash-for-work employees hired by UNDP and the IOM were also provided risk education.[269] In Ukraine, railway workers, power company staff, and other employees received risk education if their work took them to contaminated areas.[270] In Yemen, frontline workers involved in construction or rubble removal were provided with safety messages.[271]

In Somalia, pastoralists and nomadic groups were considered at risk due to frequently moving to new pastures and areas. They were also reported to be a challenging group to reach for risk education operators because of this mobility.[272]

In Sri Lanka, risk education was provided to forest officers in Northern Province, who were at risk while working in forested and potentially mined areas. Sri Lanka reported that several new hazardous areas were identified during risk education sessions with forest officers in 2020.[273]

In response to accidents in border areas of Thailand, TMAC revised its risk education approach to better reach those most at risk, including labor migrants crossing Thailand’s borders.[274]

In Zimbabwe, risk education was provided to men and women working in tea and timber estates along the border with Mozambique, who traversed hazardous areas to get to work.[275] Border traders were also targeted for risk education due to their use of unofficial border crossing points to evade the payment of taxes.[276]

In Ukraine, elderly people were targeted for risk education as insufficient pensions forced them to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms, and collect firewood in contaminated areas.[277] Many people had to regularly cross the line of contact to collect pensions or access other public goods and services.[278]

Refugees and IDPs remained an important target group for risk education during 2020 in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that 7,474 IDPs were reached in 2020.[279]

No new projects to reach persons with disabilities were reported in 2020, though HI continued to integrate victim assistance and risk education across their programs. For example, a program run by HI in Colombia combined physical rehabilitation and exercise with the promotion of safe behaviors.[280] A number of international mine action organizations provided training to community focal points and risk education teams in inclusion awareness training and referral.

In Colombia, risk education was delivered to indigenous populations living in remote areas. In 2020, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP) reported that 40 different types of risk education materials had been developed in six different indigenous languages, following a project implemented by HI.[281]

Risk education delivery methods

Action #28 of the Oslo Action Plan recommends integrating risk education activities with wider humanitarian, development, and protection efforts; and as part of survey, clearance, and victim assistance activities within the mine action sector. Action #31 refers to a need to build national capacity to deliver risk education, in order to respond to changing needs and contexts.

Adapting interpersonal risk education

The vast majority of risk education reported in States Parties is delivered through face-to-face sessions, often with specialized risk education and community liaison staff and the distribution of printed materials, such as leaflets and posters. Many risk education operators reported using mixed gender teams to ensure that all age and gender groups in the population were adequately reached. Often risk education is carried out as an integrated part of survey and clearance, such as in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

However, in 2020, risk education activities, particularly interpersonal means of delivery, were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both national and international operators responded by adapting their approaches and developing new and innovative delivery methods.

Several States Parties developed specific guidelines to safely implement risk education during the pandemic. In Cambodia, protocols ensured that small numbers of people attended sessions and respected physical distancing.[282] In Iraq, the guidelines in Federal Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq were different, with the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) allowing restricted face-to-face sessions, while the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) allowed only the use of digital media.[283] In line with DMA protocols, operators adopted remote delivery methods including the use of radio, video, loudspeakers, phone calls, mobile apps, and social media.[284]

Colombia implemented a public information campaign via community radio, social media, and video and audio messages, to reach populations despite movement restrictions.[285]

Amid COVID-19 movement restrictions in Somalia, UNMAS distributed 1,000 solar-powered Risk Education Talking Devices, with pre-recorded risk education and COVID-19 hygiene messages in Somali languages. UNMAS estimated that a total of 5,000 households—with an estimated 40,000 beneficiaries—were reached via the devices. UNMAS planned to distribute an additional 4,000 units across Somalia by April 2021.[286]

In 2020, the Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC) created a Facebook page for risk education and mine awareness-raising, and reported distributing materials containing a hotline number for the public to report suspected contamination.[287]

In Zimbabwe, operators conducted door-to-door risk education sessions instead of community sessions, and distributed fliers with risk education and COVID-19 prevention messages.[288]

Reaching IDPs and returnees was also complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In Iraq, MAG developed a short script that could be delivered by phone to families in Sinjar district, Ninewa governate, in response to a significant increase in returnee movement from May–September, which coincided with COVID-19 restrictions and a lack of humanitarian actors on the ground.[289]

Risk education in schools

Delivery of risk education to children in school settings is an important part of risk education programs in many States Parties. In 2020, five States Parties had risk education integrated into the school curriculum: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan; while it was reported that risk education was also being incorporated into the primary school curriculum in Nigeria and Iraq.[290] Risk education was also provided in schools, outside of the curriculum, in many States Parties.

However, risk education in schools was disrupted in 2020 due to school closures or inadequate COVID-19 protection measures within schools. In BiH, the Red Cross Society conducted risk education in schools in previous years through annual competitions, under the “Think Mines” project.[291] Unable to organize these competitions in 2020 due to school closures, the Red Cross Society set up a risk education project online through “Viber,” an instant messaging app, which enabled risk messages to continue to reach primary school children during the pandemic.[292]

Ukraine closed all schools and education facilities on both sides of the line of contact to contain the spread of COVID-19 from mid-March 2020, and schools were only gradually opened again from September.[293] UNICEF reached over 100,000 children in both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas via its online education course, “Super Team against Mines,” and worked with the HALO Trust to provide online and offline sessions in remote schools and small education facilities.[294]

Risk education through focal points and police

In some States Parties, community focal points were able to continue to deliver risk education messages in their communities when risk education teams were unable to visit.

In Colombia, in response to restricted access to remote communities amid the pandemic, OACP sub-contracted six indigenous peoples’ organizations, four afro-descendent organizations, and six survivors’ organizations to implement community risk education.[295] HI also implemented a training of trainers program for 110 beneficiaries in rural and indigenous communities, and supported community educators to acquire risk education certification from the OACP.[296]

In Thailand, TMAC has long supported local risk education networks to disseminate messages in their communities, and to inform local authorities if mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) are found. In 2020, TMAC utilized social media platforms such as local group chats on “Line,” an instant messaging app, to coordinate with local networks and officials to continue delivering risk education, and to enable local level reporting on mines/ERW found in the area.[297]

Some States Parties worked with local police or security services to deliver risk education and enable the reporting of mines/ERW in 2020. The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) worked with commune police posts to implement risk education sessions in line with the village and commune safety policy.[298] In Sri Lanka, following a number of accidents resulting from the illegal harvesting of explosives for sand mining, the Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) cooperated with the police and security forces to regulate the activity as a complement to risk education programs.[299] In Somalia, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) provided risk education training to the Puntland State Police in stations situated close to contaminated land.[300]

Victim assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties have committed to provide assistance to people harmed by a specific type of weapon.[301] The preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties “to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.”

Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party “in a position to do so” should provide such assistance. It also affirms the right of States Parties to seek and receive assistance to the extent required for victims. Since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with limited resources.

At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in 2014, States Parties recognized their “enduring obligations to mine victims” even after completion of mine clearance, which was then seen to be “within reach.”[302] Victim assistance is an ongoing responsibility in all states with victims, including countries that are mine-affected and those that have been declared mine-free.

In 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference, in Oslo, States Parties also recognized that victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans, and legal frameworks on the rights of persons with disabilities, and support the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development intends to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. Therefore, the SDGs are complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer opportunities to bridge relevant frameworks.

The CRPD is legally binding, providing an overarching mechanism for amending national laws and policies related to persons with disabilities. It also pertains to the victims of indiscriminate weapons.Although not all injuries result in the victim suffering long-term physical impairment, survivors of landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) often become persons with disabilities, and therefore are protected by the CRPD.

Over time, it has become more widely recognized that just as efforts to respond to the needs of mine/ERW victims should benefit all persons with similar needs—including other persons with disabilities, without discrimination—the rights of mine/ERW victims should be considered by disability rights actors more broadly.Interconnectivity allows for solution-oriented approaches to implementing the international legal commitments and obligations that arise from the CRPD, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Victim assistance and the Oslo Action Plan

Actions to address the impact of mines and ERW through to victim assistance in the Oslo Action Plan include the implementation of:

  • Effective and efficient emergency medical response, and ongoing medical care;[303]
  • Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation, and psychological and psychosocial support services;[304]
  • Social and economic inclusion;[305] and
  • Protection in situations of risk, including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters.[306]

Emergency medical response and ongoing medical care[307]

A timely initial medical response to mine/ERW casualties should include first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care. The provision of such services, involving assessment and the communication of critical information ahead of transfer of a patient to hospital, can considerably affect survival outcomes and the speed of recovery of victims, as well as mitigate consequences of injuries and reduce the severity of impairments.

In Afghanistan, several health facilities were forced to close in 2020 due to insecurity. In early 2021, services at six health centers in Arghandab, Kandahar, were suspended due to improvised explosive device (IED) contamination blocking access routes for staff and patients.[308] Overall, healthcare in Afghanistan is supported through two tiers of services, with the support of donors through the Sehatmandi project, while the Ministry of Public Health contracts international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver health services.[309] The Sehatmandi project supports primary health centers where services are utilized by marginalized populations in rural areas, with high poverty rates. From August 2021, a pause in funding to the Sehatmandi project left 90% (more than 2,000) of the supported health facilities at risk of closure.[310]

In Ethiopia, humanitarian and rehabilitation needs increased as access to essential services was limited amid the crisis in the Tigray region. As of December 2020, 90% of hospital staff in the regional capital, Mekelle, had returned to work, but most healthcare centers outside of Mekelle were closed due to damage or the effects of the conflict.[311]

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) lacks healthcare infrastructure and basic social services.[312] In South Sudan, mine/ERW incidents often occurred in remote areas far from health facilities. However, in eastern Ukraine, primary healthcare centers and satellite services along the line of contact received equipment and medicines in 2020, while Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) transferred patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. As of the end of 2019, all patients were provided with care through the public health system.[313]

International NGOs continued to provide much-needed assistance in conflict-affected areas in 2020. In Iraq, healthcare services for all persons with disabilities have decreased over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, many medical facilities were damaged, and ongoing conflict has further undermined its weak health system.[314] In 2021, Yemen’s health system was reported to have “collapsed” amid the impacts of armed conflict and the added challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic.[315]

Healthcare, rehabilitation, and psychological and psychosocial support services[316]

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help victims regain or improve mobility, and to engage in everyday activities. Rehabilitation requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach, involving doctors, physiotherapists, prosthetists, social workers, and other specialists as needed. Such comprehensive services remain scarce in countries with mine/ERW survivors. Psychosocial support, an integral aspect of rehabilitation, can be standalone or combined with other activities, for example through peer-to-peer support carried out by survivors’ networks.

States Parties can make rehabilitation services more sustainable by allocating a specific budget for the physical and functional rehabilitation needs of persons with disabilities, including mine and ERW victims. Once the most operative and supported sector of victim assistance, health and rehabilitation services faced increasing and numerous challenges in many countries in 2020, including over coordination, supply of materials, and access issues.

A World Health Assembly resolution, on the highest attainable standard of health for persons with disabilities, has called for their equitable treatment and access to health services, including rehabilitation, without discrimination. The resolution followed the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Disability Action Plan 2014–2021.[317] The plan was developed and revised with broad input, including a joint contribution from ICBL-CMC members and survivors’ networks. It reflected many concerns raised by survivors, such as ensuring access to rehabilitation in rural and remote areas, as well as participation and inclusion. Its outcomes had not been reported as of the end of September 2021.

Access to rehabilitation centers remained extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda in 2020.

In Afghanistan, authorities acknowledged that the government was not capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces, yet at least seven more are needed. Afghanistan reported that 90% of its population lives more than 100km from such centers, while 20 of its 34 provinces have no prostheses provider.[318]

After the Afghan government was deposed by the Taliban in 2021, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) began steadily resuming activities in four provinces: Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Nimroz.[319] An orthopedic program run by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to operate seven centers. The largest, in Kabul, remained open but operated at reduced capacity, with fewer patients admitted and reduced staffing. Around 25% of patients in the center in 2020 were amputees, with most being survivors of mines/ERW.[320]

In Burundi, mine/ERW survivors are eligible for free healthcare via social programs targeting vulnerable groups, yet knowledge of this scheme and access to its benefits was limited.[321] The three physical rehabilitation centers in Burundi were nearly nonfunctional and users had to pay for services, while just one center received government support in 2020.[322]

In El Salvador, persons with disabilities—including mine/ERW survivors—protested delays in the procurement of materials to manufacture prostheses, which affected the quality of services for 20,000 beneficiaries, including ex-combatants and civilians. This was reported to be due to a lag in decision-making as new management staff lacked experience in disability services.[323]

Nicaragua reported that in 2020, the “Everyone with a Voice” program assisted survivors and other persons with disabilities, providing medical care, food packages, and mobility devices.[324]

Survivors in northern Uganda have to travel long distances to access prosthetic services at the only functioning rehabilitation center, in Gulu. In 2020, a study found that it was not feasible for the Ministry of Health to open more centers. It was reported that the Ministry of Health had to take over responsibility for managing the only functioning center in the mine-affected region due to “the warnings development partners are giving their clients to keep their limbs well if funding stops.”[325]

Senegal has not provided support for victim assistance since 2015. Since then, Senegalese mine survivors have obtained prosthetic devices and repairs from an ICRC-supported rehabilitation center in Guinea-Bissau.[326] Survivors’ networks reported that the ICRC’s support to the center was scheduled to end in December 2022.

Rehabilitation services are not widely available at community and primary healthcare levels. Services that do exist lack qualified personnel, while procedures for obtaining assistive technology are often lengthy and complicated.[327] A project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), was launched in 2019 in Tajikistan and Ukraine. It aimed to improve rehabilitation services, and increase access in the two countries.[328] A new international project, Rehabilitation Health Systems Integration Coordinator for Learning, Acting and Building for Rehabilitation Systems (ReLAB-HS) was launched in Ukraine in September 2021 with support from USAID.[329]

In 2020, ICRC and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) held discussions on opportunities to collaborate, including on the provision of medical equipment and training.[330] The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour was unable to oversee a social development fund previously administered by the World Bank, which had provided limited basic services and supported more than 60 NGOs assisting persons with disabilities in Yemen.[331]

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based support groups, survivor networks, associations of persons with disabilities, and sports and recreational activities.

In Afghanistan, peer-to-peer support activities lacked funding in 2020. The Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO) provided psychosocial support through a limited peer-to-peer support program, which reached 20–30 people.[332]

In the DRC, psychological support for mine/ERW victims was lacking. Psychological support and socio-economic inclusion activities were only available in North-Kivu province.[333]

In El Salvador, a mental health program included psychological support and empowerment in all aspects of life, including support in maintaining family and social roles.[334]

In Iraq, a psychological support unit is reported to exist in every rehabilitation center, to support people with psychological trauma as a result of their injuries. A mental health advisor also sits at the Ministry of Health headquarters.[335]

Sri Lanka reported that mental health services, provided by a consultant psychiatrist, a mental health officer, and a community support officer, were available across Northern Province.[336] A National Mental Health Strategy, which drew on the experiences of mine survivors, was in the process of being finalized by the Ministry of Health in 2020.[337]

Sudan’s National Mine Action Center (NMAC) reported an increase in the provision of social and psychological support to mine/ERW survivors and their families in 2020, including peer-to-peer support, both within and outside of hospitals. However, NMAC also recognized that provision of such support to victims in remote and unsafe areas was scarce, and highlighted a need to train staff to provide appropriate psychological support to victims in those areas.[338]

Social and economic inclusion

Ensuring the socio-economic inclusion of mine/ERW victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit schemes, income-generation activities, and employment programs, was a reported priority need in all affected states.

There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities, and to develop appropriate education, training, and livelihood support. Little reporting on programs that specifically involved mine survivors was available in 2020. Several states reported on employment quota systems or social security benefits, without indicating if these reached mine/ERW survivors.

In Cambodia, some patients undergoing rehabilitation received gender training, small business management training, job placements, and small grants to establish businesses.[339]

A project led by HI in Chad trained persons with disabilities and supported mine/ERW victims to restart income-generating activities and to undertake technical and vocational training.[340]

In the DRC, the Polus Center and its partners established a private-public partnership providing vocational training for mine/ERW survivors within the coffee industry, while also supporting rehabilitation and a local mine survivors’ association. In 2020, a coffee tasting lab and training center was under construction in partnership with the University of Buffalo in the US.[341]

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, planned accessible sports events and recreational activities were cancelled or postponed in many countries during 2020.

Protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities in situations of risk[342]

During times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing services. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance with relevant human rights laws.

A Victim Assistance Experts Meeting, organized by the Committee on Victim Assistance and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit in November 2020, focused on Action #40 of the Oslo Action Plan on the protection of mine victims in situations of risk and emergencies.

In the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties with a significant number of victims commit to ensuring that “relevant national humanitarian response and preparedness plans provide for the safety and protection of mine survivors in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters, in line with relevant international humanitarian and human rights law and international guidelines.”[343]

The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016. In November 2019, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released guidelines on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action, consistent with the charter. They indicate how humanitarian actors can identify and respond to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities, and were pilot tested with national organizations of persons with disabilities, including mine survivors’ networks.[344]

The Reference Group on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action—co-chaired by the International Disability Alliance (IDA), CBM Global, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—is a cooperation platform between the United Nations (UN), international agencies, NGOs, and organizations of persons with disabilities. It aims to support the implementation of key guidance materials, including the IASC guidelines.[345]

UN Security Council Resolution 2475, adopted in June 2019, on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict, marked the first resolution on such protections.[346] The resolution recognized the important contributions of persons with disabilities to conflict prevention, and called for their meaningful participation and representation in peacebuilding.

However, further efforts are required to increase the participation of survivors and persons with disabilities in peace processes, conflict resolution, and armed violence reduction programs.

A survey, released in April 2021, indicated that persons with disabilities had little presence in the peace process in Afghanistan and stressed the need for their active role in peace talks.[347]

In Iraq, a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) found that persons with disabilities were disproportionately impacted by armed conflict, and that little consultation with persons with disabilities or their representative groups had been undertaken by the government, or by humanitarian and development agencies.[348]

A disability rights group in Yemen informed the UN Security Council in 2020 that the majority of people who had acquired impairments due to conflict were injured by airstrikes, landmines, and ERW. The speaker stated that “Any peace negotiations must include participation of people with disabilities…but none of us have been engaged in any of those processes.”[349]

In 2020, numerous States Parties with new mine/ERW casualties and victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.[350]

The displacement crisis due to the conflict in Syria has also impacted services in refugee host countries, including in Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, HI, along with other NGOs, provided hygiene kits and information on physical distancing to beneficiaries of victim assistance programs.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), many activities related to healthcare, physical rehabilitation, and economic inclusion were suspended in early 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Most local communities were not sufficiently prepared to provide an adequate response for persons with disabilities.[351] In 2020, the pandemic impacted the provision of physical rehabilitation in Cambodia. The rehabilitation center in Siem Reap was relocated to enable health services to prepare for COVID-19, and only provided minor repairs to assistive devices. The rehabilitation center in Kratie also halted services, as extra hospital space was needed. People were referred to bicycle repair shops for minor repairs. Rehabilitation centers provided advice by phone, and staff coached parents and others to give physical therapy.[352] In Chad, digital rehabilitation was introduced to maintain a link between patients and rehabilitation centers amid the pandemic.[353]

In Colombia, operators reported that the COVID-19 pandemic limited direct victim assistance activities, and that efforts were partly redirected toward capacity-building and advocacy using digital platforms.[354] ICRC supported mine/ERW survivors in Colombia during the pandemic, in some cases providing cash to cover expenses for rent, food, medicine, and utilities.[355]

Crisis response measures often result in the consideration of cash and voucher approaches. This may indicate a change from the long-standing distinction between rights-based support and social forms of disability support, shifting away from medical and charity models of assistance.

In Thailand, volunteers of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security collected data from persons with disabilities affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.[356] Registered persons with disabilities each received a cash transfer as initial financial assistance, while the state Fund for Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities offered a one-year debt moratorium for persons with disabilities or caregivers, in light of the impact of COVID-19 restrictions.[357]

In the DRC, the five ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centers suspended services due to COVID-19 response measures.[358]

In Ukraine, limited access to trauma care and emergency health services was exacerbated amid the COVID-19 pandemic due to lockdowns, movement restrictions, and the closure of crossing points.[359]

States Parties to the CRPD also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies, aligning with Action #40 of the Oslo Action Plan.


[1] Mine Ban Treaty, “Final Report,” First Review Conference, Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33, bit.ly/FinalReportMBTNairobi2004.

[2] Statement of Chile, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/ChileStatementNov2020. See also, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) press release, “Chile ends mine clearance operations: the Americas a step closer to becoming a mine-free region,” 3 March 2020, bit.ly/ChileAPMBCPressRelease2020.

[3] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/UKStatementNov2020.

[4] Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.

[5] Co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, “Proposed Rational Response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed,” Twelfth Mine Ban Treaty Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, bit.ly/UnknownMinedAreas2012.

[6] Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 23 June 2021, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatementJune2021; response to Monitor questionnaire by Nautan Mancabu, National Director, National Mine Action Coordination Centre (Centro Nacional de Coordenção da Accão Anti-Minas, CAAMI), 24 March 2021; and Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequest2021.

[7] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[8] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[9] Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019, bit.ly/NigeriaStatementNov2019.

[10] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 10 November 2020, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[11] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[12] Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 36–37. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.

[13] Email from Colonel Djelliel, Executive Secretary of the Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 20 April 2021.

[14] Naser Al Wasmi, “Torrential downpour unearths landmines in Kuwait,” The National, 21 November 2018, bit.ly/TheNational21November2018.

[15] Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was “18.888 square meters” in its June statement to the intersessional meetings, and “1.118m2” in four tasks in its latest Article 7 transparency report.

[16] Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Forms C and F. These areas were initially recorded as totaling 5,107m2, which, following clearance of 3,226m2 by Handicap International (HI) in 2015, left 1,881m2 remaining to be addressed. In its April 2017 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Mozambique reiterated that the “total areas suspended due to inaccessibility due to the high-level of water are 1,881m2 with 4 tasks remaining,” and confirmed that the areas were “earmarked for future clearance once access is regained.” The report also erroneously lists the size of remaining contamination in the four areas as 3,226m2.

[17] Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 4.

[18] La Segovias en Noticias, “One deceased and 4 injured in antipersonnel mines incident in the border with Honduras,” Facebook post, 12 May 2020, bit.ly/FacebookNicaraguaMay2020.

[19] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 4, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[20] Data reported by States Parties. Argentina is not included in the table. Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

[21] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Section D, p. 18. In December 2019, Colombia had reported 322 municipalities suspected or known to be contaminated, including 156 municipalities where operators were working and 166 municipalities which were inaccessible due to insecurity. See, Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Clarifications to the Committee, 31 July 2020, pp. 9 and 58, bit.ly/ColombiaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[22] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 18.

[23] Ibid.; and Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Clarifications to the Committee, 31 July 2020, pp. 9 and 58, bit.ly/ColombiaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[24] Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 9; and Lt.-Col. Marcelo Torres Garzon, “Status of Implementation of Humanitarian Demining, Ecuador,” presentation at Regional Dialogue on Humanitarian Demining, held virtually, 10–11 February 2021, bit.ly/EcuadorPresentation2021; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 5.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chim Chan Sideth, Director, Regulations and Monitoring Department, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 28 February 2021; and email from Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA. Data provided by CMAA staff, 3 June 2021.

[26] Improved relationships between Cambodia and Thailand have led to cooperation to survey and clear border areas. See, Khouth Sophak Chakrya, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” The Phnom Penh Post, 24 September 2019, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost24Sept2019.

[27] Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 8. In April 2020, it was reported that antipersonnel mine contamination in Afghanistan totaled 171km² (120km² CHA, 51km² SHA), while contamination from improvised mines totaled 37km² (16km² CHA, 21km² SHA). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 16 April 2020.

[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.

[29] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 11.

[30] BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C; and email from Ljiljana Ilić, Interpreter, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 30 September 2021. This was a reduction from the 966.68km² reported in BiH Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2020, p. 16, bit.ly/BiHArt5ExtRequestRevised2020; BHMAC, “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2020,” undated, p. 11; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Željko Đogo, Officer for Analysis and Reporting, BHMAC, 2 April 2021.

[31] Statement of Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/StatementCroatiaNov2020; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Civil Protection Directorate (CPD), 16 March 2021.

[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021.

[33] The newly identified contamination covers 310,931m2 and is located in the counties of Lika-Senj, Požega-Slavonija, Šibenik-Knin, and Sisak-Moslavina. Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021.

[34] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 9.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 27 August 2020, p. 2, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation.

[37] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, bit.ly/UkraineArt5ExtRequest2018; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Project Coordinator in Ukraine (OSCE-PCU), 4 August 2021.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 10 April 2020.

[39] Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 4 and 21; and emails from Mark Connelly, Chief of Operations, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Cyprus, 11 March 2021, and 18 and 28 May 2021.

[40] Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D.

[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 9 April 2021.

[42] Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 14–17.

[43] Yemen reported that trying to highlight the exact area of contamination would be misleading and possibly damaging to future reports. See, Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 12.

[44] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, pp. 12 and 15; and Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, p. 9, bit.ly/YemenArt5ExtRequest2019.

[45] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Form D, pp. 4 and 9.

[46] Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations Committee on Article 5 Implementation by Oman,” 30 June–2 July 2020, p. 1, bit.ly/Art5CommitteeOman2020; and Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2020), p. 18.

[47] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maj. Wala Jarrar, External and International Relations, Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC), 23 March 2021.

[48] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 6; and Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for April 2019 to April 2020), 13 May 2020, Form D, p. 6.

[49] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for April 2019 to April 2020), 13 May 2020, Form D, p. 6.

[50] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 35, bit.ly/EthiopiaArt5ExtRequest2019.

[51] Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 3–4.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Swiss Foundation for Demining (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) France, “Report on the national workshop on the implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines in Chad,” April 2021, p. 5.

[56] Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8, bit.ly/EritreaExtensionRequest2014.

[57] Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 3.

[58] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019); and Statement of Mauritania, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2 July 2020.

[59] Mauritania stated that this was a rough estimate of its remaining contamination, pending further technical survey of the mined areas.

[60] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[61] Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised) 8 September 2021, p. 9, bit.ly/SomaliaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021.

[62] Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 5.

[63] Ibid., p. 3.

[64] South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 2–3.

[65] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F, p. 13.

[66] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 22 February 2021; and Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Annex 1, p. 40.

[67] Statement of DRC, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 2 July 2020; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 24 February 2021.

[68] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nautan Mancabu, National Director, CAAMI, 24 March 2021; and Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequest2021.

[69] Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, pp. 3–4.

[70] Niger Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 5, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequest2020.

[71] In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines or victim-operated IEDs, or are referred to by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs or crush wire IEDs.

[72] Based on incident notes documented in the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) compilation of media coverage of conflict incidents for Burkina Faso in Calendar Year 2020. See, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47, Vol. 5, 28 September 2010, pp. 651–660, bit.ly/IntroducingACLED2010.

[73] Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram,” Voice of America, 3 March 2015, bit.ly/CameroonVOA3March2015; and Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens with Land Mines,” Voice of America, 24 May 2015, bit.ly/CameroonVOA24May2015.

[74] Based on incident notes documented in the ACLED compilation of media coverage of conflict incidents for Cameroon in Calendar Year 2020.

[75] UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” updated May 2021, unmas.org/en/programmes/mali.

[76] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020.

[77] In 2016, the Monitor reported the highest number of casualties of mines and victim-activated IEDs in Tunisia since monitoring began in 1999. There were 65 casualties in 2016, up from 20 in 2015. Since 2016, there have been between 17–20 casualties in Tunisia each year. ICBL-CMC, ‘‘Country Profile: Tunisia: Casualties,’’ updated 23 January 2018, bit.ly/TunisiaProfileCasualties2018.

[78] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Venezuela: Mine Action,” updated 9 October 2014, bit.ly/VenezuelaMineAction2014.

[79] “Un militar venezolano muerto por mina antipersona en frontera con Colombia” (“Venezuela military killed by anti-personnel mine at the border with Colombia”), France 24, 6 August 2018, bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018.

[80] Jan Philip Klever, UNMAS Director for Colombia Program, “Las minas antipersonal en Colombia, armas silenciosas que impiden el desarrollo” (“Antipersonnel mines in Colombia, silent weapons preventing development”), El Espectador, 4 April 2021, bit.ly/ElEspectador4April2021; and Owen Boed, “Colombia’s Doubtful Progress Against Landmines,” Insight Crime, 20 October 2020, bit.ly/InsightCrime20Oct2020.

[81] “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border,” France 24, 5 April 2021, bit.ly/France24-5April2021; and “Enfrentamiento entre Fuerzas Armadas venezolanas y disidentes de las FARC en Apure: denunciaron que en la zona del enfrentamiento se hallaron minas antipersona” (“Clash between Venezuelan Armed Forces and FARC dissidents in Apure: they denounced that antipersonnel mines were found in the conflict area”), NTN24.COM, 21 March 2021, bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021.

[82] Ibid.

[83] “Diputado chavista confirmó que disidentes de las FARC han ubicado minas antipersona en Apure” (“Chavist member of Parliament confirmed FARC disidents found antipersonel mines in Apure”), El Nacional, 24 March 2021, bit.ly/ElNacional24March2021.

[84] “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border”, France 24, 5 April 2021, bit.ly/France24-5April2021; and “Venezuelan Army to Clear Mines in Border Areas with Colombia”, TeleSur, 16 April 2021, bit.ly/TeleSur16April2021.

[85] Since the end of the conflict in 2020, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported to the Monitor that there were “obvious minefields” and the entire region “will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions.” Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were also under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021.

[86] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Humanitarian Demining Control Division, Legal Entity of Public Law State Military Scientific-Technical Center “DELTA” (SMSTC “DELTA”), 10 September 2021.

[87] Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), 26 May 2018.

[88] Israel, CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, March 2021.

[89] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ltc. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 9 April 2020.

[90] Data for Abkhazia obtained in response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Montafi, Project Officer, HALO Trust, 30 August 2021. Data for Kosovo, see, US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “US Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Europe,” 5 April 2021, bit.ly/USStateDeptEurope5April2021.

[91] Email from Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 20 July 2021.

[92] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 31 August 2021.

[93] A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west, and the Polisario Front in the east.

[94] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Western Sahara Programme Manager, UNMAS, 4 March 2021.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2021 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2021), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2021.

[97] As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor’s casualty database.

[98] The revised 2016 casualty number as reported in Landmine Monitor 2020. See, ICBL-CMC, Landmine Monitor 2020 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020), bit.ly/LandmineMonitor2020.

[99] The number of casualties initially recorded for past years has since been adjusted with newly available data.

[100] The Monitor recorded detailed data on 26 casualties in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh for 2020, with duplicated reporting by area or country removed. ANAMA reported 21 mine/ERW casualties in Azerbaijan due to the conflict (11 killed, 10 injured), among 569 civilian conflict victims (106 killed, 463 injured). ANAMA also reported two casualties in 2020 prior to the conflict. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021. The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AZCBL) counted 179 mine/ERW casualties in 2020 (nine civilians killed, 10 injured; 42 military killed, 118 injured). Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AZCBL, 8 October 2021.

[101] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G; and Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, p. 9, bit.ly/YemenExtensionRequest2019.

[102] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G. Previous data indicated that aggregate annual casualty figures reported by Yemen included casualties for all time surveyed during that year, rather than casualties which occurred in the calendar year itself.

[103] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021,” 21 February 2021, p. 84, bit.ly/YemenNeedsOverview2021.

[104] The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

[105] The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat, as well as members of NSAGs and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipation2009.

[106] Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child.

[107] The survival outcome for nine children was not reported. In 2020, child casualties were recorded in 34 states and one other area (other areas are indicated in italics): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

[108] There were 1,146 boys and 276 girls recorded as casualties in 2020, while the sex of 450 child casualties was not recorded.

[109] These casualties were recorded in Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

[110] In 2020, antipersonnel mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Croatia, India, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Improvised mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Antivehicle mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine. Unspecified mine types caused casualties in Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Other areas are indicated in italics.

[111] In 2020, cluster munition remnants caused casualties in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. For more information on cluster munition casualties, see, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), Cluster Munition Monitor 2021 (ICBL-CMC: September 2021), pp. 45–51, bit.ly/CMMonitor2021.

[112] ERW caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

[113] In 2020, unspecified mines/ERW caused casualties in: Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and one other area, Western Sahara.

[114] Afghanistan (1,474), Algeria (15), Angola (22), Bangladesh (2), Burkina Faso (111), Cambodia (65), Cameroon (32), Central African Republic (3), Chad (34), Colombia (167), Croatia (1), DRC (13), Ethiopia (14), Iraq (167), Jordan (9), Kenya (5), Kuwait (1), Mali (368), Mauritania (2), Mozambique (7), Niger (64), Nigeria (226), Palestine (10), Philippines (3), Senegal (15), Solomon Islands (2), Somalia (36), South Sudan (57), Sri Lanka (2), Sudan (22), Tajikistan (3), Thailand (12), Tunisia (4), Turkey (24), Uganda (7), Ukraine (277), Yemen (350), and Zimbabwe (16).

[115] Armenia (4), Azerbaijan (12), Egypt (46), India (72), Iran (50), Lao PDR (33), Lebanon (9), Libya (87), Morocco (1), Myanmar (280), Pakistan (68), and Syria (2,729).

[116] Not including the occupied Golan Heights.

[117] As noted previously in this report, greater clarity is needed on the number of mine/ERW casualties reported as occurring in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh and in state not party Azerbaijan in 2020. Recorded casualties in the three areas are as follows: Nagorno-Karabakh (14), Somaliland (8), and Western Sahara (15).

[118] Interviews with Filomeno Graça, Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance Program Coordinator, CAAMI, Bissau, 29 April 2019; with Irene Laval, General Secretary, Ministry of Defense of Guinea-Bissau, Bissau, 29 April 2019; and with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 23 June 2010.

[119] Email from Nautan Mancabu, National Director, CAAMI, 4 March 2021.

[120] Membership of the Inter-Ministerial Committee included representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Social Development, the National Emergency Management Agency, the Northeast Development Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs. The membership of the committee was being expanded to include the Nigeria Police Force, the National Security and Civil Defense Corps, and the Ministry of Education. See, Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 13, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[121] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 13, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021; and Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019, bit.ly/StatementNigeriaNov2019.

[122] US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2020,” April 2021, p. 36, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2021; UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine,” 15 February 2021, p. 84, bit.ly/UkraineNeedsOverview2021; and OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Thematic Report: The Impact of Mines, Unexploded Ordnance and Other Explosive Objects on Civilians in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine: November 2019–March 2021,” 28 May 2021, p. 6, bit.ly/OSCEUkraineMay2021.

[123] Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Advisor on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 4 August 2021.

[124] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 April 2021; by CPD, 16 March 2021; by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 9 April 2021; and by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 22 February 2021. See also, Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020) Form C, p. 26. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.

[125] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 18.

[126] UNDP, “Mine Action Capability Maturity Self-Assessment Tool,” 27 December 2020.

[127] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 18 August 2020 and 24 February 2021.

[128] GICHD, “The Importance of NMAS,” presentation at the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA): Innovations and Strategies in HMA, 22 September 2020.

[129] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Center (SMAC), 8 March 2021; and Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 6.

[130] Statement of GICHD, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and BiH Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 7 September 2018, p. 6, bit.ly/BiHArt5ExtRequestSept2018.

[131] Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP), “Geoportal AICMA,” undated, bit.ly/OACPGeoportalAICMA; and OACP, “Estadísticas” (“Statistics”), undated, bit.ly/OACPStatistics.

[132] Email from Miljenko Vahtavic, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 30 April 2018.

[133] Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Somalia submitted Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2021, but also need to submit Article 7 transparency reports every year.

[134] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

[135] Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 11; and OACP, “Estandares” (“Standards”), undated, bit.ly/OACPStandards.

[136] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chim Chan Sideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021.

[137] Colombia, “Operational Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2020–2025,” March 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/ColombiaDeminingPlan2020-2025.

[138] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 27; Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form A, p. 10; Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 26; Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 9; and Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A, p. 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

[139] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, pp. 10–11.

[140] Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 4 August 2021; statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/UkraineStatementNov2020.

[141] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2020; and Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, p. 9, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[142] Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 1.

[143] Response to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 27 August and 21 September 2021.

[144] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; and by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South, 5 March 2021. See also, Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form A, p. 10.

[145] Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 28 April 2020.

[146] Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C.

[147] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 22.

[148] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021; by Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 2 March 2021; by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 March 2021; and by Portia Stratton, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 26 March 2021.

[149] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021; by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021; and by Celine Cheng, Risk Education Specialist, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[150] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 4 March 2021.

[151] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021; by Portia Stratton, Programme Manager, NPA, 26 March 2021; and by Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 March 2021. See also, Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Annex I, p. 16,

[152] OACP, “Estandares” (“Standards”), undated, bit.ly/OACPStandards; and Colombia, “Resolucion 05 del 15 de Junio del 2021” (“Resolution 05 of 15 June, 2021”), 15 June 2021, bit.ly/ColombiaResolution15June2021.

[153] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate EORE Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021; by Ismaeel Ahmed, National Operations Manager, FSD, 28 February 2021; and by Flt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC), 17 May 2021.

[154] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miroslav Pisarevic, Angola Country Director, NPA, 22 March 2021.

[155] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.

[156] Chad Protection Cluster, “Stratégie du Cluster Protection Tchad, 2019” (“Chad Protection Cluster Strategy, 2019),” March 2019, p. 3 bit.ly/ProtectionClusterChad2019; response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021; by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 13 March 2021; by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 8 May 2020; and by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI, 13 March 2021.

[157] UNDP, “Mine Action Capability Maturity Self-Assessment Tool: Lead Assessor Comments,” 27 December 2020.

[158] This list includes States Parties that have indicated to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that they have significant numbers of victims for which they must provide care. It also includes Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of victims in their Article 5 deadline extension requests. See, Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 March 2011, bit.ly/AlgeriaExtensionRequest2011; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2013, bit.ly/TurkeyExtRequest2013. In addition, the list includes Palestine and Ukraine, as both are indicated to have significant numbers of victims and needs, but have not yet comprehensively reported them.

[159] Final Report of the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, 9 February 2005, p. 27 bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport.

[160] A “survivor” is a person who was injured by a mine/ERW and lived.

[161] Oslo Action Plan, Action #4, “Take into consideration the needs of mine survivors and affected communities and ensure their meaningful participation in all Convention related matters,” 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019. See also, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Article 1: Purpose, and Article 29: Participation in Political and Public life, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[162] “The National Stakeholder Dialogue: Strengthening the Participation and Inclusion of Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and Unexploded Ordnance,” was held with the support of EU Council Decision 2017/1428 and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU). See, APMBC, “Colombia National Victim Assistance Dialogue,” 22–24 February 2021, bit.ly/ColombiaVictimAssistanceDialogue.

[163] The February 2020 edition of IMAS 13.10, as reported on in Landmine Monitor 2020, was taken offline in a review process to address concerns raised by international stakeholders.

[164] IMAS 13.10, Victim Assistance in Mine Action, first edition, October 2021, bit.ly/IMAS1310VAOct2021.

[165] Both Iraq, and Convention on Cluster Munitions State Party Lao PDR, demonstrated their interest in the draft IMAS on victim assistance and are positioned to become the first adopters of national standards aligned with IMAS 13.10. See, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2021 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2021), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2021.

[166] Oslo Action Plan, Action #32, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and CRPD, Article 33: National Implementation and Monitoring, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[167] Oslo Action Plan, Action #34, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and CRPD, Article 33: National Implementation and Monitoring, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[168] Oslo Action Plan, Action #12, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

[169] Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J; and Afghanistan Ministry for Martyrs and Disabled Affairs, “The draft of National Disability Strategy was discussed,” 23 June 2021, bit.ly/AfghanistanMMDJune2021.

[170] Oslo Action Plan, Action #35, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and CRPD Article 31: Statistics and Data Collection, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[171] Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J.

[172] Social Protection, “Martyrs and Disabled Pension Programme, MDPP,” updated 13 October 2021, bit.ly/Afghanistan13Oct2021.

[173] Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J.

[174] Irwin Loy, “Biometric data and the Taliban: What are the risks?,” New Humanitarian, 2 September 2021, bit.ly/NewHumanitarian2Sept2021.

[175] Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 44.

[176] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 13 April 2021.

[177] Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021; and statement of Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020.

[178] Oslo Action Plan, Action #37, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and CRPD, Article 4: General Obligations, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[179] This refers to land cleared, and does not include land released or cancelled through survey. The figures should be taken with caution due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated clearance from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual Article 7 transparency reports. Clearance by actors such as state armed forces, the police, and commercial operators may not be systematically reported. For further details on land release figures for 2020, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website: bit.ly/MonitorCountryProfiles.

[180] Figures are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2020) unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT. Afghanistan clearance data includes 23.83km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 0.41km² of land cleared of improvised mines. 5,159 antipersonnel mines and 220 improvised mines were cleared. Angola reported clearance of 426 antipersonnel mines during clearance operations and 26 antipersonnel mines during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts. BiH reported 609 antipersonnel mines and 143 improvised mines destroyed in its response to the Monitor questionnaire on 2 April 2021. In its Article 7 report, which was submitted on 26 August 2021, BiH reported the clearance of 1,357 antipersonnel mines. Cambodia: data provided by Chin Chan Sideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021, gave a clearance figure of 54.13km² cleared and 10,051 antipersonnel mines cleared. The figures in the Article 7 report are provided in the table as they were based on a March 2021 database update. Colombia: for data on ordnance destroyed, see OACP, “Estadisticas: Desminado Humanitario en progreso” (“Statistics: Humanitarian Demining in progress”), undated, bit.ly/OACPDeminingInProgress; and “Estadisticas: Desminado Humanitario” (“Statistics: Humanitarian Demining”), updated 31 July 2021, bit.ly/OACPHumanitarianDemining. Croatia’s clearance figure includes 49.24km² cleared by humanitarian operators and 0.42km² cleared by the military. DRC clearance data from response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 February 2021. DRC reported clearance of 19 antipersonnel mines and 4 improvised mines. Iraq’s clearance figures include 0.62km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 7.04km² of IED contaminated land. 3,817 antipersonnel mines and 226 improvised mines were cleared. Mali: data on ordnance cleared provided in responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020 and 3 May 2021. The mines cleared were all improvised mines. For Niger clearance data, see Niger Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 24, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequest2020. The data for land cleared and mines cleared and destroyed is for the period 30 December 2019–1 March 2020. Niger has reported no further clearance since March 2020. Oman reported “re-clearance” of 0.23km² but no mines were found. Palestine clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Major Wala’ Jarrar, External and International Relations, PMAC, 23 March 2021. Somalia clearance data from responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 27 August and 21 September 2021. The clearance was of mixed, undifferentiated contamination. South Sudan clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 8 March 2021. In its Article 7 report, South Sudan reported 231 antipersonnel mines cleared and destroyed, less than the 246 reported by the NMAA. Tajikistan clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021. There is a difference between the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed provided by TNMAC (5,106) and in Tajikistan’s Article 7 report (5,103). Ukraine did not report clearance data for 2020. Data on mines cleared in Ukraine provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 22 March 2021, and by email on 17 August 2021. Data also provided in emails from Tobias Hewitt, Programme Development Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 13 August 2021; and Tony Connell, Country Director, and Olena Kryvova, Deputy Country Director, FSD Ukraine, 18 August 2021. The UK records the number of antipersonnel mines cleared and the amount of land released annually in its Article 7 reports, but it is not disaggregated into land cleared or released through survey. Clearance figures for the UK are from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “Falklands Demining Programme Workplan Under Article 7,” 30 April 2020, pp. 8–9, annexed to the UK’s Article 7 report (for calendar year 2019). Yemen clearance data for 2020 is from the UNDP dashboard, and via an email from Marie Dahan, Reporting and Coordination Analyst, UNDP Yemen, 4 July 2021. However, this represents clearance by YEMAC only. The US Department of State gives a clearance figure of 2.9km² for 2020. See, US Department of State, PM/WRA, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2020,” April 2021, p. 43, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2021. Figures on ordnance cleared are from Yemen’s Article 7 report, and differ from those reported for 2020 by the UNDP dashboard (923 antipersonnel mines, 5,312 antivehicle mines, 511 IEDs, 54,106 ERW, 403 cluster munition remnants, 98 rockets, 2,483 fuzes, and one air-dropped bomb). The difference could be due to YEMAC including ordnance cleared under the Masam Project in its reporting.

[181] Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 11; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021; by Seck Ibrahima, Head of Operations and Information Management Division, Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d'Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS), 30 March 2021; by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Director, NMAA, 8 March 2021; by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integration, SMAC, 23 March 2021; and by Colonel MB Ncube, Director, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 2 March 2021.

[182] Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 11; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021.

[183] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; by Chim Chansideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021; by Mohamed Abd Elmajeed, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 22 February 2021; and by Flt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, TMAC, 17 May 2021.

[184] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

[185] UNDP, “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Programme: Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 2020, p. 6.

[186] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, pp. 6 and 12; and UNDP, “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Programme: Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 2020, p. 7.

[187] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020 and 3 May 2021.

[188] Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 15–17.

[189] Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “Falklands Demining Programme Workplan Under Article 5,” 30 April 2020, p. 9. Annexed to the UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019).

[190] UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G, pp. 11–12.

[191] This list does not include Chile and the UK, who also both cleared under 1km² in 2020, but in completion of their clearance obligations.

[192] Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019).

[193] Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D and Annex III, p. 9; response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 8 March 2021.

[194] SESU, “Report on the Main Results of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in 2020,” 2021, p. 13, bit.ly/SESUUkraine2020.

[195] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 22 March 2021; email from Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 17 August 2021; email from Tobias Hewitt, Programme Development Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 13 August 2021; and emails from Tony Connell, Country Director, and Olena Kryvova, Deputy Country Director, FSD Ukraine, 18 August 2021.

[196] Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 4 and 21.

[197] Statement of Arturo Cabrera Hidalgo, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Regional Dialogue on Humanitarian Demining, held virtually, 10–11 February 2021, bit.ly/EcuadorStatement2021; and statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 18 November 2020, bit.ly/PeruStatementNov2020.

[198] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2020; and Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[199] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Seck Ibrahima, Head of Operations and Information Management Division, CNAMS, 20 March 2021.

[200] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 6.

[201] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 5.

[202] For annual projections in Angola, see, CNIDAH, “Detailed workplan for the implementation of Article 5 of the Convention (2019–2025),” November 2018, Annex 1, p. 13, bit.ly/CNIDAHWorkplan2019-2025.

[203] Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, pp. 7–9 and 55, bit.ly/CambodiaArt5ExtRequest2019. Cambodia is considering deploying Royal Cambodian Army soldiers to meet this need.

[204] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021.

[205] Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 15.

[206] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 8 March 2021.

[207] Statement of Arturo Cabrera Hidalgo, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Regional Dialogue on Humanitarian Demining, held virtually, 10–11 February 2021, bit.ly/EcuadorStatement2021.

[208] Ibid.; and Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 15.

[209] Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), 28 September 2021, Form C, pp. 6–8, and Form J, p. 12.

[210] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020.

[211] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 22 February 2021.

[212] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Flt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, TMAC, 17 May 2021.

[213] Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Annex A, pp. 20–21; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. MB Ncube, Director, ZIMAC, 2 March 2021.

[214] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Operations Manager, DMAC, 16 April 2020; and by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

[215] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 10 April 2020.

[216] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, bit.ly/UkraineArt5ExtRequestJune2020.

[217] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 13.

[218] Ibid.; and Monitor communication via Skype with Stephen Robinson, Senior Technical Advisor-Mine Action, UNDP Yemen, 7 June 2021.

[219] BiH Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2020, bit.ly/BiHExtensionRequest2020; Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2020, bit.ly/ColombiaExtensionRequest2020; DRC Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2020, p. 10, bit.ly/DRCExtensionRequest2020; Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, p. 3, bit.ly/MauritaniaExtRequest2020; Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/NigerExtensionRequest2020; Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, (revised), August 2021, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5RevisedExtRequest2021; Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, pp. 8 and 53, bit.ly/SenegalExtRequest2020. On p. 53, it states that remaining contamination is 1.59km², including the 0.49km² of CHA; presentation by Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc, Chairperson, NMAA South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7–8 June 2018; and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, p. 5, bit.ly/UkraineExtensionRequest2020.

[220] Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 9 February 2021, bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest2021.

[221] Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 April 2012, bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest2012; Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015, bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest2015; and Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 February 2018, bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest2018.

[222] Statement of the DRC, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 2 July 2020, bit.ly/DRCStatement2020; and DRC Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 September 2020, bit.ly/DRCArt5ExtRequest2020.

[223] DRC Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 9 July 2021, bit.ly/DRCArt5ExtRequest2021.

[224] Guinea-Bissau, “Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction,” 5 December 2012, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5Declaration2012.

[225] Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 22–24 June 2021, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatement2021; and Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, bit.ly/GuineaBissauArt5ExtRequest2021.

[226] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[227] Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[228] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 10 November 2020, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2020.

[229] Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021.

[230] Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 September 2021, p. 56, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5ExtRequestRevised2021.

[231] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2021, p. 5, bit.ly/TurkeyArt5ExtRequest2021.

[232] Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 November 2019, bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2019; and Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Eritrea,” Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/EritreaMBTA5Committee2020.

[233] Oslo Action Plan, 29 November 2019, pp. 8–9, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

[234] BHMAC, “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2020,” undated, p. 22.

[235] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMA, 21 February 2021; by CPD, 16 March 2021 and 28 April 2020; and by Caroline Dauber, Country Director, HI, 30 April 2021; statement of Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/StatementCroatiaNov2020; Protection Cluster Ukraine dashboard, “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Sessions, 1 January 2017 to 30 June 2021,” undated, bit.ly/ProtectionClusterUkraineEORE; UNDP, “Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2020,” February 2021, p. 11; Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 32; and Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Annex A, p. 15. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.

[236] Peru Mine Ban Treaty Update on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2020, p. 1, bit.ly/PeruA5Update17Nov2020.

[237] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G, p. 13; and Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 32.

[238] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.

[239] Email from Mark Connelly, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Cyprus, 11 March 2021; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2020,” 23 March 2021, p. 41, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2020.

[240] Email from Alberto Serra, Advisor, NPA, 23 March 2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021.

[241] OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Thematic Report: The Impact of Mines, Unexploded Ordnance and Other Explosive Objects on Civilians in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine: November 2019–March 2021,” 28 May 2021, pp. 23–24, bit.ly/OSCEUkraineMay2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Srdjan Jovanovic, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 30 April 2020.

[242] UNICEF, “UNICEF Mine Action: Summary of Results: 2020,” May 2021.

[243] EUCAP Sahel Niger (EUCAPSahelNiger), “Formation de sensibilisation pour 100 élèves et 5 directeurs d’école d’Agadez sur les risques et le bon comportement face aux mines terrestres et aux engins explosifs improvisés (EEI)” (“Awareness training for 100 students and 5 school principals in Agadez on the risks and good behavior in the face of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)”). 16 September 2020, 18:30 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/EUCAPSahelTweet16Nov2020.

[244] UNOCHA, “North-East Nigeria: Humanitarian Situation Update,” 14 February 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/UNOCHANigeria14Feb2020; UNOCHA, “Nigeria Sector Status: Mine Action Sub-Sector,” updated 4 January 2021, bit.ly/UNOCHANigeria4Jan2021; and Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019, provided by Hugues Laurenge, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 2 June 2020.

[245] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.

[246] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020; by Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020; and by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 21 April 2020.

[247] Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021; and statement of Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/StatementCroatiaNov2020.

[248] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Omer, Mine Risk Education Officer, NMAC, 22 February 2021.

[249] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021; and Robert Keeley, “Country-Led Review of Mine Risk Education in Cambodia 2013–2019,” CMAA and UNICEF, October 2020, bit.ly/KeeleyOct2020.

[250] Salomé Valencia, Angela Desantis, Matt Wilson, Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo, Angela Patricia Cortés Sánchez, and Ana Jaquelin Jaimes Alfonso, “Explosive Ordnance Victims and Risk Education: Lessons Learned from Colombia 2012–2019,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Issue 2, December 2020, pp. 49 and 53, bit.ly/ColombiaEORE2012-2019.

[251] Email from Oleksandr Lobov, Mine Action Specialist, UNDP Ukraine, 9 March 2021; UNDP Ukraine, “Canada and UN launch new mine awareness project,” 15 April 2020, bit.ly/UNDPUkraine15April2020; and UNDP Ukraine, “Report on Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Survey for EORE in the Government Controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” February 2021, p. 6, bit.ly/UNDPUkraineKAPSurvey2021.

[252] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, Movement Cooperator Coordinator, ICRC, 29 April 2020; by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021; and by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.

[253] UNDP Ukraine, “Report on Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Survey for EORE in the Government Controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” February 2021, p. 15, bit.ly/UNDPUkraineKAPSurvey2021; response to Monitor questionnaire by Oleksander Lobov, Mine Action Specialist, UNDP Ukraine, 6 March 2021; and by Imogen Churchill, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 March 2020.

[254] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, EORE Technical Coordinator, HI Yemen, 22 May 2020.

[255] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

[256] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021.

[257] Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 60.

[258] Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 9.

[259] HI, “Country Card: Thailand,” updated September 2020, bit.ly/HIThailandCountryCard2020.

[260] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.

[261] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sean Tjaden, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020; and by Johana Huertas, Humanitarian Mine Action Technical Advisor, HI, 19 May 2020. See also, Salomé Valencia, Angela Desantis, Matt Wilson, Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo, Angela Patricia Cortés Sánchez, and Ana Jaquelin Jaimes Alfonso, “Explosive Ordnance Victims and Risk Education: Lessons Learned from Colombia 2012–2019,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Issue 2, December 2020, p. 52, bit.ly/ColombiaEORE2012-2019.

[262] UNDP, “Mine Action Capability Maturity Self-Assessment Tool: Lead Assessor Comments,” 27 December 2020.

[263] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 February 2021.

[264] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 June 2020; and by Aurelie Fabry, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS in the DRC, 11 May 2020.

[265] Nillasi Liyanage, “Women In The Context Of Post-War Sri Lanka’s Mine Action,” Colombo Telegraph, 4 April 2019, bit.ly/ColomboTelegraph4April2019.

[266] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Somalia, 4 May 2020.

[267] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

[268] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 March 2021.

[269] Response to Monitor questionnaire by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021.

[270] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 22 March 2021.

[271] Humanity & Inclusion (HI), “Death Sentence to Civilians: The Long-Term Impact of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas in Yemen,” May 2020, p. 20, bit.ly/HIYemenMay2020.

[272] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ihrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 9 May 2020.

[273] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 33.

[274] Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 3 and 6.

[275] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.

[276] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Delia Sandra Maphosa, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG, 10 May 2020; and by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.

[277] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Project Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and by Olena Kryvova, Deputy Country Director, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020. See also, UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine,” 15 February 2021, pp. 11 and 15, bit.ly/UkraineNeedsOverview2021.

[278] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Thematic Report: The Impact of Mines, Unexploded Ordnance and Other Explosive Objects on Civilians in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine: November 2019–March 2021,” 28 May 2021, p. 14, bit.ly/OSCEUkraineMay2021.

[279] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 7.

[280] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 21 May 2021.

[281] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 38; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, Humanitarian Mine Action Technical Advisor, HI, 19 May 2020.

[282] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021.

[283] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.

[284] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021; by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Coordinator, HI Iraq, 2 March 2021; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021; and by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate EORE Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021. See also, Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G, p. 31. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

[285] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 29.

[286] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudip Thapa, Operations Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021.

[287] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form I, p. 29.

[288] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nokutenda Masiyanise, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 27 February 2021; by Delia Maphosa, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG Zimbabwe, 10 March 2021; and by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.

[289] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.

[290] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentina Crini, EORE Specialist, UNMAS Nigeria, 8 March 2021; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 51.

[291] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, Movement Cooperator Coordinator, ICRC, 29 April 2020.

[292] ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual report 2020,” April 2021, p. 30, bit.ly/ITFEnhancingAnnualReport2020.

[293] OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Thematic Report: The Impact of Mines, Unexploded Ordnance and Other Explosive Objects on Civilians in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine: November 2019–March 2021,” 28 May 2021, p. 26, bit.ly/OSCEUkraineMay2021; and UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine,” 15 February 2021, p. 16, bit.ly/UkraineNeedsOverview2021.

[294] UNICEF, “Ukraine Country Office: Humanitarian Situation Report: 1 January–31 December 2020,” 31 December 2020, bit.ly/UNICEFUkraineDec2020; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Imogen Churchill, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 March 2021.

[295] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 36–37.

[296] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 21 May 2021.

[297] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Flt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, TMAC, 2 June 2020; and Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 11.

[298] CMAA and NPA, “Field Monitoring Report: Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Thbong Khmum and Prey Veng,” 10–14 August 2020.

[299] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 33.

[300] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 March 2021.

[301] Mine Ban Treaty, Article 6.3, bit.ly/MineBanTreaty1997.

[302] “MAPUTO +15 Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, https://bit.ly/MaputoDeclaration2014.

[303] Oslo Action Plan, Action #36, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

[304] Ibid., Action #38.

[305] Ibid., Action #39.

[306] Ibid., Action #40.

[307] Ibid.; CRPD Article 25: Health; CRPD Article 20: Personal Mobility; and CRPD Article 26: Habilitation and Rehabilitation, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[308] UNMAS, “Afghanistan,” presentation at Mine Action Support Group (MASG) meeting, May 2021, bit.ly/UNMASAfghanistanMay2021.

[309] The Sehatmandi project is supported by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the World Bank (on behalf of 34 donors), and the International Development Association (IDA), supported by the Global Financing Facility. See, World Bank, “Ensuring Accessible Health Care for Rural Afghans,” 9 April 2020, bit.ly/WorldBankRuralAfghansApril2020.

[310] World Health Organization, Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (WHO-EMRO), “Funding pause results in imminent closure of more than 2000 health facilities in Afghanistan,” 6 September 2021, bit.ly/WHO-EMRO6Sept2021.

[311] UNOCHA, “Joint Rapid Needs Assessment Mission (Alamata, Mehoni, Mekelle, and Enderta),” 20–28 December 2020, pp. 4–6, bit.ly/UNOCHAMissionDec2020.

[312] European Commission (EC), “European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 18 May 2021, bit.ly/ECinDRC18May2021.

[313] MSF, “International Activity Report 2019,” August 2020, p. 86, bit.ly/MSFInternationalActivity2019.

[314] Julie Lorenzen, “Yemen’s Healthcare System on the Brink of Collapse,” International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) press release, 15 October 2019, bit.ly/IFRCYemen15Oct2019; and WHO, “Health system in Yemen close to collapse,” October 2015, bit.ly/WHOYemenHealthSystem2015.

[315] Sharmila Devi, “Yemen’s health system has ‘collapsed,’ warns UN,’’ The Lancet, Vol. 397, Issue 10,289, 29 May 2021, bit.ly/SharmilaDeviYemenMay2021.

[316] Oslo Action Plan, Action #39, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; CRPD Article 25: Health; CRPD Article 20: Personal Mobility; and CRPD Article 26: Habilitation and Rehabilitation, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[317] WHO, “A new landmark resolution on disability adopted at the 74th World Health Assembly,” 27 May 2021, bit.ly/WHO27May2021.

[318] Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar Year 2019), Form J.

[319] HI press release, “Humanity & Inclusion committed to assisting Afghanistan,” 30 August 2021, bit.ly/HIAfghanistan30Aug2021.

[320] ICRC, “Amid transition in Afghanistan, ICRC’s orthopedic centres continue to assist,” 31 August 2021, bit.ly/ICRCAfghanistan31Aug2021.

[321] US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi,” 11 March 2020, bit.ly/USStateDeptBurundi2020.

[322] Ibid.; interview with Méthode Niyungeko, Advisor, Humanitarian Department for Mine/Unexploded Ordnance Action in Burundi (Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les Mines et Engins non explosés, DAHMI), in Amman, 13 September 2019; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Méthode Niyungeko, DAHMI, 1 August 2016.

[323] Rina Ventura, “Lisiados de guerra ahora luchan por prestaciones de FOPROLYD” (“War Disabled Now Fight for FOPROLYD Benefits”), La Prensa Grafica, 2 January 2021, bit.ly/LaPrensaGrafica2Jan2020.

[324] Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J.

[325] “Opige’s left leg was buried at his home,” Daily Monitor, 10 March 2020, bit.ly/DailyMonitor10March2020.

[326] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2019 Annual Report,” 3 July 2020, p. 20, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2019; and interview with Hervé Wandfluh, Physical Rehabilitation Project Manager, ICRC, in Bissau, 30 April 2019.

[327] “ReLAB-HS is Launching in Ukraine,” Physio Spot, 8 September 2021, bit.ly/ReLAB-HSUkraineSept2021.

[328] Momentum Wheels for Humanity, “Our Projects,” undated, bit.ly/WheelsForHumanityProjects.

[329] “ReLAB-HS is Launching in Ukraine,” Physio Spot, 8 September 2021, bit.ly/ReLAB-HSUkraineSept2021.

[330] Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 8.

[331] US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen,” March 2020, p. 36, bit.ly/USStateDeptYemen2019.

[332] Monitor online interview with in-country researcher, 28 July 2021.

[333] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 February 2021.

[334] Statement of El Salvador, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 18 November 2020, bit.ly/ElSalvadorStatementNov2020.

[335] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 13 April 2021.

[336] Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 26.

[337] Ibid., p. 23.

[338] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, Victim Assistance Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020 and 22 February 2021.

[339] Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 11.

[340] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.

[341] US Department of State, PM/WRA, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2020,” April 2021, p. 13, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2021; and Polus Center, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Landmine Victim Assistance,” undated, bit.ly/PolusCenterDRCVictimAssistance.

[342] Oslo Action Plan, Action #40, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and CRPD Article 11: Situations of Risk and Humanitarian Emergencies, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.

[343] Oslo Action Plan, Action #40, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

[344] IASC, “IASC Guidelines, Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action, 2019,” 19 November 2019, bit.ly/IASCDisabilityGuidelines2019.

[345] IDA, “Reference Group on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action,” undated, bit.ly/IDAReferenceGroup.

[346] UN press release, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2475 (2019), Ground-Breaking Text on Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict,” 20 June 2019, bit.ly/UNPressRelease20June2019.

[347] Naheed Bashardost, “People with disabilities given little part in peace process: Survey,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 15 April 2021, bit.ly/PajhwokAfghanNews15April2021.

[348] IOM, “Persons with Disabilities and their Representative Organizations in Iraq: Barriers, Challenges and Priorities,” 2021, bit.ly/IOMIraqDisabilities2021.

[349] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Statement by Raja Abdullah Almasabi to the UN Security Council, July 28, 2020,” 4 August 2020, bit.ly/HRWYemen28July2020.

[350] See, Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project (RULAC) website, www.rulac.org. RULAC is an initiative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.

[351] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Željko Volaš, President, Organization of Amputees (Organizacija Amputiraca, UDAS), 30 June 2020; and ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual report 2020,” April 2021, p. 28, bit.ly/ITFEnhancingAnnualReport2020.

[352] Email from Denise Coghlan, Director, Jesuit Service Cambodia, 22 June 2021.

[353] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.

[354] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 21 May 2021.

[355] ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 294, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2020.

[356] Woranut On-ubol, Foreign Affairs Division, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, “Good practices from the Government of Thailand,” undated, bit.ly/ThailandESCAPWebinar2020. Follow-up to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) webinar, “Protecting and Empowering Persons with Disabilities in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 15 May 2020, bit.ly/UNESCAPWebinar15May2020.

[357] Ibid.

[358] ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 161, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2020.

[359] UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine,” 15 February 2021, p. 40, bit.ly/UkraineNeedsOverview2021.