Summary

Non-signatory Israel has acknowledged the humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as it sees military utility in these weapons. Israel has never attended a meeting of the convention. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.

Israel has developed, produced, exported, and acquired cluster munitions, but it has not used them since 2006. The country’s last manufacturer of cluster munitions, IMI Systems, ended its production in 2018 after being acquired by Elbit Systems Ltd., but the government of Israel must pledge not to produce cluster munitions in the future. Israel possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions and hosts United States (US) stocks of cluster munition.

Policy

The State of Israel has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Israel has not taken any steps to join the convention as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Israel rarely comments on the convention, but criticized it in 2011 for being too “expansive” and for lacking the support of “relevant states.”[1]

Israel did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2] The convention, adopted in Dublin in May 2008, came into being less than two years after Israel extensively used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 2006.

Israel has never participated in a meeting of the convention, even as an observer. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Review Conference in November 2020 and September 2021.

Israel abstained from voting on the key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2021 that urged states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[3] It has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Israel has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[4]

Israel is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Israel is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), where it opposed any discussion about regulating cluster munitions until 2008.[5] Israel expressed regret that states failed in 2011 to adopt a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions, but has not proposed further CCW deliberations on the matter.[6]

Use

There is no evidence to indicate that Israel has used cluster munitions since July–August 2006 in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah forces.[7]

The Israeli government’s Winograd Commission of Inquiry into the 2006 conflict in Lebanon found a lack of clarity concerning the acceptable or appropriate use of cluster munitions.[8] In 2006, Israel defended its use of cluster munitions as conforming with “accepted practice” and international humanitarian law.[9]

Israel also used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 1978, and again in 1982 against Syrian forces and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). In 1973, Israel used cluster munitions in Syria against the training camps of NSAGs near Damascus.[10] The Israeli Air Force also used cluster bombs to target Egyptian air defense positions in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[11]

Production and transfer

Israel has developed, acquired, produced, and exported cluster munitions. At the end of 2018, Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI), was acquired by Elbit Systems Ltd., which announced that it was discontinuing the production of cluster munitions. The government of Israel has not committed to never produce cluster munitions in the future.

In the past, IMI developed, produced, licensed the production, and exported numerous types of cluster munitions including artillery projectiles (105mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, 155mm, 175mm, and 203mm), mortar projectiles (120mm), and rockets (EXTRA, GRADLAR, and LAR-160).[12] Most of the cluster munitions delivered M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[13] More recently, IMI developed the 155mm M999 “Advanced AntiPersonnel Munition” that delivers M99 DPICM submunitions.[14]

In the past, Israel concluded licensing agreements for the production or assembly of M85 DPICM submunitions with Germany, India, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US.[15] Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the UK have declared stockpiling 155mm artillery projectiles containing M85 submunitions in their transparency reports for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Azerbaijan received a total of 50 EXTRA missiles and LAR-160 rockets from Israel for its Lynx-type launchers in 2008–2009.[16] Georgia received four GRADLAR rocket launchers from Israel in 2007.[17] Chile has reported that it possessed 249 LAR-160 cluster munition rockets.[18] Israel reportedly also exported the LAR-160 rocket system to Venezuela.[19]

Israeli company Elbit Systems Ltd. acquired IMI in November 2018, and renamed it IMI Systems. In January 2019, the vice president of Elbit Systems Ltd., David Vaknin, told media that “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.”[20]

In October 2020, a company representative confirmed that “Elbit Systems has discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[21]

Other Israeli companies developed and produced several types of air-dropped cluster munitions in the past. The Rafael Corporation produced ATAP-300, ATAP-500, ATAP-1000 RAM, TAL-1, and TAL-2 cluster bombs, as well as the BARAD Helicopter Submunition Dispenser.[22] In 2011, Venezuela destroyed TAL-1 cluster bombs belonging to its air force.[23] An air-dropped cluster bomb of Israeli origin called ARC-32 was stockpiled by Colombia.[24]

In the past, Israel has imported cluster munitions from the US, including M26 rockets (each with 644 M77 DPICM submunitions) for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers and 155mm M483A1 projectiles (each with 88 M42/M46 submunitions). Israel used both in southern Lebanon in 2006. Israel has also received and used US-made and supplied Rockeye cluster bombs (each with 247 submunitions) and CBU-58B cluster bombs (each with 650 submunitions).[25]

In 2017, a government upgrade of artillery systems for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly rejected a system made in Germany, because of the German government’s insistence that Israel must not use it to deliver cluster munitions.[26]

Stockpiling

The size and composition of Israel’s current stockpile of cluster munitions is not known, but it is likely to be significant and comprised of the cluster munitions listed in the previous section.[27]

Israeli media reported in September 2018 that the Israeli Air Force was preparing to destroy unspecified types of air-dropped cluster munitions.[28]

Israel hosts a stockpile of US ammunition, which could be transferred to Israel for use in an emergency.[29] A 2008 US Department of State cable, released by Wikileaks in 2011, contained the claim that US-manufactured cluster munitions with a more than 1% tested failure rate, “constitute greater than 60 percent of the overall” holdings of cluster munitions in the “pre-positioned War Reserve Stockpiles in Israel (WRSA/I).”[30] Israeli officials reportedly warned the US that “unless the prohibition is lifted, Israel will have to revise its defensive doctrine, find a solution to the one-percent dud rate requirement for cluster munitions, and look to another type of weapon system.”[31]

Policy

The State of Israel has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In November 2010, Israel reiterated its long-standing position that “regional circumstances prevailing in the Middle East prevent Israel from committing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines. Unfortunately, these regional conditions have not improved in recent years.”[1] Israel has said that “it is unable to disregard its specific military and security needs” and that “it cannot commit to a total ban on anti-personnel mines as they are a legitimate means for defending its borders against possible incursions such as terrorist attacks.”[2]

On 28 March 2011, Israel’s parliament (the Knesset) unanimously adopted the Mine Field Clearance Act. The law establishes a national mine action authority to manage the clearance of Israel’s “non-operational” minefields, but it does not refer to the Mine Ban Treaty or address the use, production, transfer, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines.[3]

Israel last attended a formal meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2004, when it participated as an observer in the First Review Conference in Nairobi.

In December 2018, Israel abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 73/61calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done in previous years.[4]

Israel is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Israel is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war, nor is it party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Israel has said it “ceased all production and imports of antipersonnel mines in the early 1980s.”[5] It has dismantled its antipersonnel mine production lines.[6] Israel has in the past been a significant antipersonnel landmine producer and exporter. Israel is known to have produced the M12A1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 6 (a copy of the M18A1 Claymore) antipersonnel mines.[7] Israel has produced and exported antipersonnel mines since at least the 1970s, when it provided some to South Africa.[8] Manufacturers included Israel Military Industries (IMI, based in Ramat Hasharon, and Tel Aviv-based Explosive Industries Ltd. (EIL). Nations listed in the trade press as acquiring IMI mines include Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nigeria, and Zaire.[9] EIL’s No. 4 plastic antipersonnel mine was found by British deminers in the Falklands/Malvinas.[10]

Israel declared a moratorium on the transfer of all antipersonnel mines in 1994 that was extended for three-year periods in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014. The 2014 extension was effective until July 2017.[11] According to Israel, the moratorium was declared in recognition of the “grave humanitarian consequences” associated with antipersonnel mines and “the need, in this respect, for self imposed state restraint.”[12]

On 31 December 2007, the Defense Export Control Act entered into force in Israel. The act “criminalizes, inter alia, any violation of the export without an export license or contrary to its provisions. This Act serves as Israel’s statutory framework for the implementation of its obligations under the CCW regarding restrictions and prohibitions on transfer and the Moratorium on any sales of [antipersonnel mines].”[13]

The size and composition of Israel’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines remains unknown, but it includes both hand-emplaced and remotely-delivered mines.[14]

In the summer of 2017, the Israeli Mine Action Authority (INMAA) began a three-year effort to clear minefields in the Golan Heights under Israel’s control.[15]

Use

The NGO Mine-Free Israel estimates that as of 2011, there were approximately one million operational and non-operational mines laid in minefields covering more than 197,000 dunams (197 km²) in Israel and Palestine.[16]

In August 2011, Bamachaneh, the journal of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), reported that the IDF laid antipersonnel mines in the Golan Heights along the border with Syria.[17] The mines were laid after hundreds of civilians entered Israeli territory on 15 May 2011 during the annual Palestinian commemoration of “Nakba Day,” apparently crossing through minefields uninjured.[18]

The ICBL denounced the mine-laying as “shocking” and “disgraceful.”[19] The president of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties issued a statement expressing concern.[20]

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Contamination

The exact extent of mine contamination in the State of Israel is not known. Israel has reported 41.58km² of confirmed mined area and a further 48.51km² of suspected mined area, as of the end of 2017.[1] The combined 90km² represents only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential to Israel’s security. The size of other mined areas is not made public. It includes 18.38km² of mined area in the Jordan Valley (11.84km² of antipersonnel mined area, 6.19km² of antivehicle mined area, and 0.35km² of mixed antipersonnel and antivehicle mined area) and the West Bank[2] (see Palestine’s profile for further information).

Mine contamination (at end 2017)[3]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Israel’s mine problem dates back to World War II. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defenses along its de factoborder with Syria in the Golan Heights.[4]

The 2017 estimate of 90km² for mined areas that are not considered essential for Israel’s security is a small reduction on the 2016 estimate of 91km².[5] The 0.66km² of mine clearance in Israel and over 0.52km² of cancellation through survey in Israel in 2017, was offset by the discovery of 1.17km² of new, previously unrecorded, mine contamination.[6]

Mine contamination in Israel impacts progress in regional development, and poses a risk to local communities.[7] In the Golan Heights the mines laid by Syrian forces remain largely unknown and areas have been fenced off by the Israel Defense Force (IDF). However, according to an online media report, fencing is not always properly maintained with warning signs, and civilians occasionally cross into minefields looking for edible plants.[8]

Program Management 

The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) is responsible for undertaking a “comprehensive program of mine clearing projects inside Israel.”[9]

The INMAA, which has 10 staff, was established in the Ministry of Defense, with ministry staff responsible for planning mine action.[10] The INMAA manages a “minefield information bank” that is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programs.[11]

Strategic planning 

The INMAA has a multi-year clearance plan for 2017–2020 that plans to focus on technical survey and clearance in the Golan Heights[12] in the spring/summer/autumn, and in southern Israel (the Jordan Valleyand Arava Plain) in the winter.[13]

In addition, the INMAA continues to oversee HALO Trust clearance projects in Area C of the West Bank, funded by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (via ITF Enhancing Human Security).[14] Furthermore, at the start of 2017, the INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley minefields in the West Bank, using national budget and operating through Israeli companies. The INMAA sees significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies and scientific tools to measure mine drift possibilities.[15] (See the Palestine profile for further information). A number of development projects funded by local electricity, water, and infrastructure companies and authorities also pay for mine clearance.[16] The INMAA, “defines clearance policies, sets the national priorities and implements them in coordination with other relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local authorities.”[17] Clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula laid down by the INMAA, and prioritization is set nationally every three years. The criteria usedfor the formula are largely based on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas.[18] In 2016, it was reported that INMAA had been conducting a study of the social and economic impacts of land released over the last four years, as well as on the potential impact for future clearance sites.[19]

Legislation and standards 

The 2011 law on minefield clearance aims to “to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible.”[20]

The INMAA sets national standards “taking into consideration the procedures of the Israel Defense Forces that will be as compatible as possible with the International Mine Action Standards.”[21]

Quality management

Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) contractor, and a clearance operator. Four QA/QC contractors were formally registered as of May 2018, namely: 4CI, Dexagon, Gaman, and Zeev Levanon. Of these four, 4CI and Gaman were contracted to conduct QA and QC of clearance operations in 2017.[22]

Operators 

Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance as well as QA and QC.In 2017, clearance was contracted to four national companies: 4M, the Israeli Mine Action Group (IMAG), Maavarim, and Safeland. In addition, Ecolog conducted geomorphological and hydrological surveys in 2017, together with the INMAA, to assist with cancellation of previously flooded SHAs that could potentially contain mines.[23]

Israel uses several kinds of machines in its mine clearance operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance. They are said to include, as and where appropriate: screening and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters, and flails/tillers. Some of these operations are conducted by Israel directly, while others are performed by contractors.[24]

Throughout 2016 and 2017, the INMAA was supported by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in developing its animal detection system capacity.[25] A pilot project using mine detection dogs (MDDs) was conducted in 2017,[26] but was not successful.[27] However, after investigating and conducting further research into animal detection and behavior, the INMAA plans to conduct another trial in 2019.[28]

In 2017, 106 demining personnel and 36 machines were deployed for clearance operations.[29] This is a decrease on the 130 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and 50 machines deployed in 2016.[30]

The IDF also conduct mine clearance according to their own mine action plans “that are executed by their military methods and techniques.” They have an annual program that includes demining, monitoring, and maintenance of mined area protection.[31] During wintertime, the IDF give special attention to minefields that are close to farms, residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be carried into these areas by floods.[32]

In addition, the INMAA reported that it had secured the continuation of HALO Trust’s clearance program in Area C of the West Bank until the end of 2019.[33] HALO Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA and the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC), primarily with funding from international donors[34] (see the Palestine profile for further information).

Land Release 

In 2017, more than 0.66km² was released through clearance (excluding the West Bank),[35] compared to 0.92km² of cleared in 2016.[36]

In addition, 0.52km² was cancelled by Ecolog through non-technical survey in Zofar, in the Middle Arava area in 2017. No mined area was released by survey in 2016.[37]

(For further information on survey and clearance in the West Bank, see Palestine’s profile.)

Survey in 2017

In 2017, 0.52km² was reported to have been cancelled through secondary non-technical survey by Ecolog, in collaboration with the INMAA, in Zofar in the middle Arava area of Israel.[38]

A further 0.85km² was also cancelled through non-technical survey by Ecolog in 2017, in collaboration with the INMAA, in the Jordan Valley in the West Bank[39] (see Palestine profile for further information).

More than 1.17km² of new, previously unrecorded, mine contamination was discovered in 2017.[40]

Clearance in 2017 

More than 0.66km² of land was cleared in 2017 (excluding the West Bank), with the destruction of 737 antipersonnel mines, 133 antivehicle mines, and 38 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[41]

Mine clearance in 2017 (excluding the West Bank)[42]

The INMAA typically plans for mine clearance at a targeted rate of 1.5km² per year (including in the West Bank), based on its current budget.[43]

IDF demining is implemented independently of the INMAA, using military methods and techniques.[44] The area cleared or otherwise released by the IDF is unknown. According to Israel’s Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for 2017, the IDF has made significant progress in “re-surveying mine affected areas, and in examining the possibility of area cancellation, following a completion of a fully detailed non-technical survey.”[45]

In addition, HALO Trust continued its clearance of minefields in Area C of the West Bank in 2017, working under the auspices of both the INMAA and PMAC, primarily with international funding (see Palestine’s profile for further information).

Progress towards completion

Based on the clearance rates of the last few years and the INMAA’s forecasted clearance rate of 1.5km² per year, it will take many years to clear remaining contamination.[46]

Mine clearance in 2013–2017 (excluding the West Bank)[47]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Casualties Overview

One antivehicle mine casualty was recorded in the State of Israel for 2016. A farmer sustained minor injuries in the Jordan Valley when his tractor hit an antivehicle mine.[1] In addition, several other explosive s incidents were recorded in 2016 that did not have confirmed mine casualties and therefore were not included in the annual casualty total. In January 2016, a landmine exploded due to a fire, however no casualties were reported.[2] Media reports indicated that a roadside bomb detonated in Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms. Because the incident was not clearly victim-activated, as well as contradictory reporting regarding casualties, casualties from this event have not been included in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty total.[3] A similar ambiguously reported incident occurred in September.[4]

One new casualty was reported in Israel in 2015, when a female soldier was injured by a landmine in the occupied Golan Heights.[5]

No new mine/ERW casualties were identified in Israel in 2014. One explosive incident in the Golan Heights was reported in the media as injuring four Israeli soldiers;[6] however, the Monitor was not able to confirm the cause of the explosion.

In 2013, the Monitor identified three mine/ERW casualties. One soldier was killed in an accident during a demining training course in the Golan Heights[7] and one civilian was injured when he stepped on a mine in an abandoned building in the Jordan Valley.[8] In March of the same year, a teenager was badly injured while tampering with an unexploded ordnance at a home in Safed.[9]

From 1999 to the end of 2016, the Monitor recorded 16 mine/ERW casualties in Israel.[10]

Cluster munition casualties

Cluster munition strikes in 2006 caused 13 casualties in Israel.[11] No further casualties from cluster munition remnants have been identified.

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Israel is not known. “Victims of hostile activities,” including mine survivors, are entitled to benefits, rehabilitation, and grants under the Benefits for Victims of Hostilities Law of 1970.[1] The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities.[2]

Numerous government bodies were responsible for providing assistance to persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services was responsible for overseeing most disability services. The Ministry of Health provided mental health and rehabilitation services, and the Ministry of Education provided special education services to persons with disabilities.[3]

In some cases, the law gave priority to persons with disabilities, particularly in regards to access to public facilities. A government decree requires that 3% of the workforce be persons with disabilities by the end of 2017.[4] However, the employment rate among persons with disabilities in Israel was only 51%.[5]

Lack of accessibility and societal discrimination in multiple areas, including employment, transportation, education, and housing (in regards to access to community-based independent living facilities), were persistent challenges for persons with disabilities.[6]

Israel ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 28 September 2012.