Summary

Non-signatory Jordan has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but has not taken any steps to join. Jordan last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It voted in favor of a key United Nations (UN) resolution on the convention in December 2021.

Jordan is not known to have used or produced cluster munitions, but it has imported them and is believed to possess a stockpile.

Policy

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Jordan has expressed interest in the convention but has not taken any steps to accede to it. In 2012, Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid al-Hussein told States Parties that “We realize and appreciate the importance of the Convention on Cluster Munitions … Hopefully circumstances will change some time in the not too distant future and we will be able to join.”[1] Prince Mired, who has served as special envoy for the Mine Ban Treaty, had previously told States Parties in 2010 that Jordan supported the Convention on Cluster Munitions “from the sidelines” but had not decided “if and when we can join.”[2]

Jordan participated in two meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions but did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[3] Jordan attended an international conference on cluster munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

Jordan participated as an observer at the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2012, but not since then. Jordan was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Review Conference held in November 2020 and September 2021.

In December 2021, Jordan voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Jordan has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Jordan expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, describing the use of “such internationally prohibited weapons” as “a violation of the provisions of international law and a dangerous development that imperils the lives of citizens.”[5] It also voted in favor of a 2015 Security Council resolution expressing concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[6] Jordan has also voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at use of cluster munitions in Syria.[7]

Jordan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Jordan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but has imported them and possesses a stockpile.

Jordan has not disclosed information on the types and quantities of its stockpiled cluster munitions.

According to United States (US) export records, Jordan imported 200 CBU-71 and 150 Rockeye cluster bombs at some point between 1970 and 1995.[8] The US also transferred 31,704 artillery projectiles (M509A1 and M483 projectiles) containing more than three million dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions to Jordan in 1995.[9] Jordan reportedly possesses the Hydra-70 air-to-surface unguided rocket system, but it is not known whether the ammunition types available to it include the M261 multi-purpose submunition rocket.[10]

Jordan received four NORINCO WM-80 multi-barrel rocket launchers from China in 2009–2010, but it is not known if this sale included 272mm cluster munition rockets, which contain 380 high-explosive antitank submunitions.[11]

Use

Jordan is not known to have used cluster munitions.

Jordan has participated in the Saudi Arabian-led joint military operation in Yemen against Houthi forces, which used cluster munitions in 2015–2016.

Policy

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 August 1998, ratified on 13 November 1998, and became a State Party on 1 May 1999. On 1 April 2008, Jordan enacted the National Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Law, which incorporated the treaty into Jordan’s domestic law.[1]

Jordan has attended most meetings of the treaty, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014. More recently Jordan attended the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it provided statements on victim assistance and Article 7 reporting.[2] Jordan did not attend the intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2019.

Jordan’s Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein has played an important leadership role in promoting the treaty. He served as chair of the board of the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) and president of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007. He was also appointed in 2010 to serve as Special Envoy on Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Jordan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war, nor is it party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Jordan never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It imported mines in the past. The United States (US) supplied 35,972 antipersonnel mines from 1973 to 1975, including 29,970 non-detectable M14 blast mines and 6,002 M18A1 Claymore mines.[3] Jordan also imported mines from Belgium (PRB M35) and the UK (No. 3 and No. 5 antipersonnel mines).[4]

Jordan last used landmines in 1978. It completed the destruction of its stockpile of 92,342 antipersonnel mines in April 2003. It included Claymore mines in its stockpile destruction.

In April 2019, Jordan reported that it retained 100 antipersonnel mines for training purposes.[5]

Notes: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Contamination

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is contaminated by mines and ERW. Contamination is primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

Jordan declared that it had fulfilled its Article 5 clearance obligations on 24 April 2012, having determined that no areas under its jurisdiction or control remained in which antipersonnel mines were known or suspected.[1]

However, in formally declaring completion of its Article
5 obligations at the Twelfth Meeting of States Partiesin December 2012, Jordan noted that: “While all mined areas that Jordan had made every effort to identify
were cleared by 24 April 2012, Jordan, as a responsible State Party, has proceeded with verification efforts in
two parts of the country, with these verification efforts having resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas.”[2] This pertains first to the need for verification in the Jordan Valley, as earlier clearance by the Jordanian Armed Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) did not comply with national and international standards and was not subject to quality control;[3] and second to verification that is needed along Jordan’s northern border with Syria, due to a considerable discrepancy (estimated to be more than 10,000 mines[4]) between the recorded number of emplaced mines and the number actually cleared. Most of the difference in the figures is thought to be due to the migration of mines outside identified areas due to flooding and terrain fluctuations, detonations,[5] and unrecorded clearance operations by the army or by smugglers.[6]

As of the end of 2017, the total area in need of verification for missing mines was just under 4.25km², across a total of 56 areas. This comprised 1.4km² across 36 areas in the Jordan Valley and 2.8km² across 18 areas in the norther borders.[7] In September 2018, the NCDR reported that the sampling and verification project in the Jordan Valley had been completed in June 2018. Furthermore, the Jordanian military had reportedly “checked” the areas in the northern borders for military use and further quality control (QC) by the NCDR may not be required in this region. Once security conditions on the Syrian border allow, the NCDR plans to check the work of the Jordanian military and determine if any further action is required. The NCDR’s operations in the north remained suspended as of October 2018, due to the ongoing Syrian crisis.[8]

Program Management

TheNCDR’s board of directors includes representatives of the Jordanian armed forces, the government, NGOs, landmine survivors, and the media.[9] The NCDR is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality-assuring all mine action organizations, as well as for fundraising.[10] It is also responsible for ensuring mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies.[11]

Strategic planning

The NCDR’s current 2015–2020 National Plan aimed to verify, sample, and release the remaining 5.4km² in the Jordan Valley within 36 months (by the end of 2017), by deploying six manual clearance teams and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of US$2 million.[12] In April 2017, the NCDR reported that it was not on target to complete verification of the Jordan Valley by the end of the year, and that it would update its work plan in 2018.[13] As mentioned above, verification was reported to have been completed in June 2018. In addition, the Jordanian military had reportedly “checked” the areas in the northern borders for military use and the NCDR planned to check this work once security conditions allowed.[14]

The plan also aimed to eliminate all ERW contamination by 2017.[15] As of September 2018, ERW clearance had not yet started, due to a lack of funding.[16] The NCDR prioritizes areas in need of development for verification.[17]

In addition, Jordan’s national plan reports that the NCDR will transition from a national institution focusing largely on its own mine clearance, to one that will concentrate on assisting other conflict-affected countries to overcome the challenges of mine action and ERW removal.[18]

Operators

The verification and demining operations in Jordan are conducted by the NCDR and REC. Since October 2015, Jordan has deployed four operational teams, totaling 35 deminers.[19] From January 2018, capacity was reduced to three operational teams.[20] According to the NCDR, a shortage of funds prevents it from deploying mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) in its Jordan Valley operations.[21]

Land Release

Survey and clearance in 2017

In 2017, Jordan verified and released just under 1.44km² of land, across 38 areas in the Jordan Valley, during which 75 antipersonnel mines (72 M14 mines and 3 M35 mines) and two antivehicle mines were destroyed.[22] This represents a slight increase on the 1.36km² verified and released in 2016.[23]

Article 5 Compliance

Jordan still has outstanding Article 5 survey and clearance obligations.

Jordan declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012 convention deadline, in accordance with the three-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2008. It submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012.[24] On announcing completion, however, Prince Mired acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced,”[25] and noted that verification efforts had resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas.[26]

With verification of the Jordan Valley completed, as of October 2018, the NCDR needs to confirm whether any quality control of earlier clearance is needed on the northern borders, once security conditions allow, in order to determine whether Jordan has fulfilled its obligations under Article 5.

In the last five years Jordan has verified and released just over 5km² of mined area (see table below).

Mine clearance in 2013–2017

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2019, international contributions to mine action in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan totaled some US$500,000.[1]

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in April 2012, however later discovered previously unknown contamination.[2] In 2018, Jordan finally declared fulfilment of its clearance obligations.

International government contributions: 2019[3]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

In the five-year period from 2015–2019, Jordan received approximately $3.6 million in cumulative international assistance for mine action. International funding has declined significantly from more than $8 million in calendar year 2010 to a combined total of $3.6 million in 2015­–2019.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[4]

The last known mine/ERW casualties in Jordan were in 2011, when six casualties were recorded.[2]

The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) has recorded 950 mine/ERW casualties (122 killed; 799 injured; 29 unknown) since 1948.[3]

Victim assistance action points

• Improve rehabilitation centers and provide adequate training to staff.
• Ensure the full implementation of the new law on the rights of persons with disabilities.
• Ensure mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors’ full access to medical insurance, quality rehabilitation care, and services as identified in the 2015–2020 Mine Action Plan.
• Ensure regular maintenance and repair of mine/ERW survivors’ assistive devices, especially for refugees.
• Develop national prosthetic and orthotic standards as identified in the 2015–2020 Mine Action Plan.

Victim assistance planning and coordination

International commitments and obligations

Laws and policies

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s national legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability,[7] but such legal protections were not upheld.[8] In 2017, there was a 76% unemployment rate among persons with disabilities.[9] The National Building Law (No. 7 of 1993), which provides for accessibility standards, lacked implementation.[10] A 10-year national plan was being developed in 2018 to facilitate access to buildings and public services.[11]

Major Developments in 2017–2018

The Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities No. 20 for the Year 2017 entered into force on 30 August 2017. Under the new law, Jordanian citizens with disabilities are eligible for an identification card, which includes information about their disability. The identification card gives them access to a number of services, such as a health insurance card covering medical and rehabilitation services. The law also guarantees employment quotas, access to education, and access to public facilities.[12] According to the new law, the Social Development Ministry will be responsible of providing services to persons with disabilities in place of the NCD.[13]

Emergency, continuing, physical medical rehabilitation; prosthetics and mobility devices; psychological

The influx of Syrian refugees strains Jordanian public services and resources.[14] In 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) strengthened the capacity of local medical service providers to respond to emergencies by providing materials, equipment, and training.[15] A joint program of the ICRC, the University of Jordan, and the Ministry of Health was launched in 2017 to improve teaching in physical rehabilitation.[16]

Médecins sans Frontières(MSF) Amman reconstructive surgery hospital, originally set up to treat war-wounded Iraqis, now admits patients from Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Palestine.[17] War-wounded received reconstructive surgery, physiotherapy, and psychosocial support in 2017.[18]

The Paola Biocca Center, which opened in 2015, had treated 100 amputees by the end of 2017, many of whom were refugees.[19] In 2017, Jordan reported providing 20 prostheses free of charge.[20]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation(NCDR) continued its economic reintegration project in collaboration with the Jordan Agricultural Credit Corporation.[21] In an effort to improve the standards of living of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, Jordan provided monthly grants to persons with disabilities.[22]

Cross-cutting

There were more than 670,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan as of September 2018.[23] Since late 2014, access to health services for Syrian refugees is no longer free of charge, and specialized care for persons with disabilities can be very costly, preventing many of them from accessing appropriate care.[24]

The Sir Bobby Charlton Centre for Support and Rehabilitation, which opened in Amman in August 2017, aims to support and coordinate physical and mental rehabilitation for Syrian refugees.[25] Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) also provided physical rehabilitation and psychosocial services to Syrian refugees,[26] as did the ICRC[27] and MSF.[28] The Paola Biocca Center also provided physical rehabilitation services to refugees.[29]

Due to the uneven distribution of services throughout Jordan, persons with disabilities living in remote areas had little access to services.[30]

Victim assistance providers and activities