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Use | Universalization | Production | Transfers | Stockpiles | Transparency

The year 2022 marks 25 years since the international treaty prohibiting antipersonnel landmines was adopted on 18 September 1997. The Mine Ban Treaty has succeeded in establishing a robust and inclusive international framework to eliminate these weapons. Although challenges remain, the treaty’s States Parties and its supporters are charting a clear course for achieving its ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

During the reporting period, from mid-2021 to mid-October 2022, there was no evidence to indicate that any of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had violated its core obligations banning any use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines.

The greatest challenge to the emerging norm against these weapons can be seen in new use. Russia has used antipersonnel mines numerous times in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation, in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, Landmine Monitor 2022 documents new, and now greatly expanded, use of antipersonnel landmines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least five countries during the reporting period, including in States Parties the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as in states not party India and Myanmar. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines; in other words, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made from locally-available materials.[1]

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka completed the destruction of its last stockpiled antipersonnel mines in October 2021.[2]  Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, having missed their respective deadlines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by either Greece or Ukraine during 2021.

Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty remains stalled. The last accessions were five years ago.

The spirit of partnership and inclusion that characterized the negotiation of the treaty remains strong, as shown by its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, while NSAGs in five countries also used antipersonnel mines.

Locations of antipersonnel mine use (mid-2021–October 2022)[3]

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

New landmine use during the reporting period, confirmed by the Monitor, is detailed below. 

Landmine use by government forces

Russia

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion began on 24 February 2022.[4] There were also numerous allegations from Russian officials, and Russian-oriented media outlets, that Ukrainian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least seven types of antipersonnel mines have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is also confirmed evidence that Russian forces have emplaced victim-activated booby-traps and IEDs in Ukraine since February 2022 at numerous locations prior to retreating and abandoning their positions.[5]

Antipersonnel mine types used by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Additionally, PFM-type “scatterable mines” appear to have been used in several regions, many of which were under the control of Russian forces for an extended period of time.[6] Since there is no independent confirmation of these allegations as of yet, a final assessment and attribution of the use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine by either party is not possible at this time.

All antipersonnel mine types listed in the table above were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor state, the Soviet Union (or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR). Some landmines used in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from a range of 5–15km away.[7] The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine developed and produced by Russia in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved independence.

Other types of landmines used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines. The POM-2 landmine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means such as vehicles, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be hand-emplaced.If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze or other means then such munitions are considered antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[8]

Belarus has provided various forms of military support to Russia related to its invasion of Ukraine, which has seen Russian forces use antipersonnel landmines.[9] This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party.

The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing such assistance, either directly or indirectly, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated transparency report.

As a State Party to the treaty, Belarus must ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty. This means that it is prohibited for Belarus to:

• Provide security, storage, transportation, or transit for antipersonnel mines;
• Participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines;
• Commit to rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines;
• Accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines; and
• Knowingly derive military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines by others.

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United States (US). This new use has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, as well as by US congressional representatives including Senator Patrick Leahy.[10]

Use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets.[11] The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.[12] Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.[13]

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[14] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[15] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.[16] Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[17]

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.[18] Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.[19] The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[20]

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.[21] This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center. These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;[22] of individual PFM mines in isolation;[23] of civilians handling presumably live mines;[24] and claims of civilian casualties.[25] Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.[26]

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.[27] Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.[28]

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.[29] Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.[30] There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s armed forces have extensively used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Monitor has previously documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of its first annual report in 1999. Yet 2021–2022 marked a significant increase in new use, including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the military every month during January–September 2022, from virtually every part of the country.[31] In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of Myanmar, indicating extensive mine use by the military.[32]

Myanmar military officials have acknowledged ongoing mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Previously, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence told the Monitor that landmines were still used by Myanmar’s armed forces in border areas and around infrastructure.[33] Earlier, in September 2016, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Myint Nwe, told the Myanmar parliament that the armed forces continued to use mines in internal armed conflicts.[34]

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel landmine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Bago, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions, and in Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states. Examples of such reports and allegations are detailed below.

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had laid antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe, in Pekon township, Shan state.[35] While, in August 2022, a local militia group discovered MM6 antipersonnel mines laid around the perimeter of Letpadaung Copper Mine in Salingyi township, Sagaing region. The copper mine is a joint venture by the Myanmar military’s Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. and China’s state-owned Norinco Industries.[36]

In July 2022, there were multiple incidents of people being injured by landmines near the perimeter of Myanmar Armed Forces camps in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state.[37] Other incidents reported that month included:

• Two villagers returning to Kawlin township, Sagaing region, after fleeing the previous day were injured by a mine allegedly emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[38]
• Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers accompanied a villager to recover the body of his son, who had stepped on a mine in Zu Kaing village, in Ann township, Rakhine state. They removed two mines on the way which they said had been laid by a unit of the Myanmar Armed Forces.[39]
• Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly closed a ferry service in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, and emplaced mines to prevent Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) from using it.[40]

In June 2022, a humanitarian group found three mines in a church compound in Daw Nye Ku, in Demoso township, Kayah state, that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left earlier that day, while a fourth mine injured a boy.[41] Still in Kayah state, landmine use attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces the previous month caused casualties among attacking anti-military militias.[42]

In May 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid mines at a Buddhist monastery that they had occupied in Puandge township, Bago region.[43]

A police officer who defected to the anti-military resistance stated in April 2022 that the Myanmar Army was laying directional and other antipersonnel mines at police posts.[44] That same month, two more incidents, which resulted in civilian casualties, were recorded. The first incident occurred in Mahlaing township, Mandalay region, where a landmine allegedly laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces at the base of a mobile phone tower injured a 15-year-old girl.[45] During the second, civilians were injured by landmines as they were returning to their village in Loikaw township, Kayah state after the departure of the Myanmar Armed Forces.[46]

In March 2022, villagers in Mhan Taw, in Khin U township, Sagaing region, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left mines around bodies of people killed during a raid.[47] Also that month, locals alleged that Myanmar Armed Forces troops had emplaced mines at a checkpoint near the entrance to a bridge in Dawei township, Tanintharyi region.[48]

In February 2022, a civilian returning to Kinsanpya, in Kani township, Sagaing region, was killed by a mine which locals said was laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces during a raid.[49] While, a youth was injured by a mine laid by Myanmar Armed Forces Infantry Brigade 284 in Kyat Ka Chaung village tract, in Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state.[50]

In January 2022, a man was injured after stepping on a landmine near Nang Khing village, in Demoso township, Kayah state. The Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF) said that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid mines in the area.[51]

Previously, in December 2021, two villagers were injured by a landmine after their village in Mingin township, Sagaing region, was occupied by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[52]

In November 2021, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid antipersonnel mines near the base of mobile phone towers in 48 townships, causing casualties among engineers.[53] That same month, residents in Hsipaw township, Shan state, were warned of mines being laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces around a pumping station for an energy pipeline.[54]

During 2021 and 2022, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel mines along the border with Bangladesh.[55] In October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on that border.[56] Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar on its border, and said “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”[57^] 

Landmine use by non-state armed groups

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in the CAR, Colombia, the DRC, India, and Myanmar. The Monitor also received reports of sporadic mine use by NSAGs in Egypt,[58] the Philippines,[59] Thailand,[60] Tunisia,[61] and Venezuela.[62] A lack of available information or means of independent verification meant that it was not possible to determine if the reported incidents were the result of new use of antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period, or due to legacy contamination from mines laid previously. 

The Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during the reporting period, any new use of antipersonnel mines in several countries which previously had significant use. No use was reported in Afghanistan for the first time since 2007. No use was reported in Pakistan for the first time since 1999, though the Pakistan Army recovered antipersonnel mines from an NSAG in 2022, and many groups which previously used them remain active.

No incidents of antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Nigeria were reported, for the first time since 2014, although groups previously involved in mine use remain active.

NSAGs in these countries may still use improvised mines, as in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control makes it difficult to confirm new use.

Central African Republic

Since early 2021, there have been reports of new antipersonnel landmine use in the CAR. In April 2022, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) destroyed antipersonnel mines found in the country.[63] In 2021–2022, reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the CAR referred to incidents of antipersonnel mine use, documenting that in 2020 and 2021, “in several locations visited by the Panel including Grimari, Ippy, Boali and Nana-Bakassa, the Panel gathered testimonies from local communities regarding incidents where civilians were injured by small explosive devices often triggered by a trip wire in areas where the CPC [Coalition of Patriots for Change], FACA [Central African Armed Forces] soldiers and Russian instructors had been or were present.”[64]

Previously, several types of landmines, including NR442 antipersonnel landmines, were photographed by researchers from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a journalist from France 24 in February 2014, among weapons seized from armed groups by French forces near Mpoko.[65]

Colombia

Colombia reported that improvised antipersonnel mines were used by NSAGs in 2021, as well as by criminal enterprises involved in the manufacture of narcotics and illegal mineral extraction.[66] Colombia attributed responsibility for 216 antipersonnel mine events in January–December 2021 to residual or dissident forces of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), and for 77 events to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).[67] Twenty events were attributed to other NSAGs, while for 54 events the group responsible was unknown. In total, 367 new events were reported in Colombia in 2021. From 1 January to 31 July 2022, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace registered 232 events (58 attributed to the ELN, 139 to residual FARC elements, 14 to other actors, and 21 unknown).[68] Landmine seizure incidents were reported in late 2021 and early 2022.^[69]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

NSAGs are active in the DRC.[70] Sporadic use of antipersonnel landmines has been reported by the Monitor in the past.[71] In December 2021, a woman escaping an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) camp was injured by an antipersonnel mine laid on the camp’s perimeter. Other incidents of mine use attributed to the ADF occurred from August to November 2021, when at least four farmers were killed in North Kivu province by mines. In July 2021, two children in Ituri province were killed by an explosive device allegedly laid by the ADF.[72] The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in November 2005.[73]

India

An increasing number of incidents involving pressure-plate mines, attributed to recent use by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) or its People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) have been reported in the past few years. In February 2022, in Kalanhandi district, Odisha state, a journalist was killed by a pressure-plate mine placed under a banner that had just been raised by the CPI-M.[74] Five days later, a herder in the same area was killed by a pressure-plate mine and CPI-M banners were found nearby.[75] In June and December 2021, in Lohardaga district, Jharkhand state, villagers died after stepping on pressure-plate mines, which police said were laid by the CPI-M or PLGA. Further landmine casualties in this area were reported in 2022.[76]

Myanmar

NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2021 and early 2022, there were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the KNLA, and other groups.[77]

Since the military coup in February 2021, several local militia groups have been established, some of which identify as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Local media often report use of landmines by such groups. Most devices are actually command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated mines.[78] PDF groups often declare allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG). Pro-military militias, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.[79]

Between August and May 2022, mine-laying by PDFs resulted in several casualties among the Myanmar Armed Forces in Bago, Magway, and Sagaing regions, as well as Kachin state.[80]

Civilian casualties were also reported in 2021 and 2022. For example, in January 2022, a villager was killed by a landmine emplaced by the KNLA in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.[81] While armed conflict between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and members of the Northern Alliance including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Kyaukme township, Shan state, reportedly resulted in mine-laying that caused civilian injuries in February and March 2022.[82] Also in March, mines laid by the KNLA caused casualties in Meh Klaw village tract, in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[83] In December 2021, locals blamed the Border Guard Force for a mine that caused civilian casualties near Kyaw Kayt Kee village, in Hpaan township, Kayin state.[84]

Allegations of landmine use by states

Landmines in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of laying mines in 2020 and 2021 in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in adjoining areas.[85] It has not been possible to independently verify these claims.[86] At the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2021, Armenia denied using antipersonnel mines in the 2020 conflict and stated that during withdrawal, Armenian forces lacked the time possible to mine areas that subsequently came under Azerbaijan’s control.[87] 

Yet in May 2021, Armenia’s acting prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, told a government meeting that Armenian soldiers had emplaced mines along sections of the border to strengthen security, and had installed warning signs.[88] Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 12 June 2021 that 15 detained Armenians had been handed over to Armenia, in exchange for maps from Armenia showing the location of around 97,000 mines laid in the Aghdam region—one of seven territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan regained control over in 2020.[89] It is unclear if the maps show the location of newly laid minefields, mines emplaced before 2020, or both.

Landmines in Syria

The Monitor has not independently documented or confirmed any new use of antipersonnel landmines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. The last concrete indication of possible new use was an undated photograph circulated on social media in May 2019, where a Syrian Army soldier is shown emplacing stake-mounted POMZ-2 fragmentation mines and tripwires on farmland near Kernaz, in northern Hama.[90] 

Universalizing the Landmine Ban

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; of which 132 signed and ratified it, while 32 acceded.[91]

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be hopeful when it comes to efforts to universalize the treaty.

President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty on 21 June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty.[92] The new policy prohibits US development, production, and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines. It also commits the US to not use antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world except on the Korean Peninsula, and to destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles that are “not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.”

Mongolia told the Monitor in December 2021 that it stockpiles antipersonnel mines, but “does not produce, sell or transfer” them and “does not utilize mines to defend its borders during peace and war.”[93] The statement shows how Mongolia has largely aligned its policies and practice with the Mine Ban Treaty, though it does not address the government’s position on accession to the treaty.

The lack of new accessions over the past five years demonstrates the intransigence of certain states who have ignored repeated calls to revisit and review their policy on not acceding to the treaty. During the reporting period, several states not party acknowledged the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian rationale while reiterating their long-held positions on not joining it.

Cuba decried the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines and said that it is “committed to the application of a strict policy to guarantee responsible use of antipersonnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for the security of the Cuban nation.”[94]

Egypt said that antipersonnel mines are a key means for securing its borders and repeated its criticism that the treaty does not, in its view, assign responsibility for mine clearance to those who laid the mines in the past.[95]

India expressed its commitment to the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, but cautioned that its position on achieving that goal was contingent upon “the availability of militarily effective technologies that can perform cost effectively the legitimate defensive role of antipersonnel landmines.”[96]

Iran repeated its long list of objections to the Mine Ban Treaty, arguing that the treaty “does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for their responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territory.”[97]

Pakistan repeated its long-held position that landmines “play a significant role in meeting military needs,” and stated that its “security concerns and the need to guard long borders” meant that “reliance on landmines is an integral part of Pakistan’s defence.”[98]

South Korea stated that the “unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula” prevents it from acceding.[99] It remains to be seen if South Korea will heed calls to revisit its position on joining now that the US has realigned its policy with most provisions of the treaty.

Annual UNGA resolution

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.[100]

On 6 December 2021, a total of 169 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/26, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[101] No state voted against the resolution, while 19 abstained.

This marked the fourth consecutive year when 169 votes in favor were recorded. There was a slight rise in abstentions, up from 17 in 2020.[102] States Parties Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe abstained from the vote, but did not explain their reason for doing so. Seven states not party made statements explaining their votes.[103]

A core of 14 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[104]

Non-state armed groups

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, reflecting the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of these weapons. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs during late 2021 or 2022.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.[105] The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.[106] As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.[107]

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel landmines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. The Monitor has again removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.[108]

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing, but have yet to disavow ever doing so.[109] The most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia.

In December 2021, the first of 700,000 of a new design of antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military in India. The Nipun mine is designated as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine.[110] Three further types of mines are under development in India, but it is uncertain if any of these are antipersonnel mines. An August 2020 government procurement announcement called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation mine. Previously, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.[111]

Production of antipersonnel mines appeared to have been ongoing in India from 2016–2022. India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India; it is not known if this included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.[112]

Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during annual military exercises in 2021, including mines delivered by rockets and scattered from truck-mounted launchers.[113] It introduced the POM-3 or “Medallion” antipersonnel mine—a self-destructing bounding fragmentation mine equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability, which had been in development since at least 2015.[114] Russia has also deployed new MOB fragmentation mines in Ukraine with production markings indicating they were manufactured in 2019.[115]

On 17 September 2022, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense released a video and statement claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines,[116] eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antitank mines in territories and supply roads between the positions of Azerbaijani army units.[117] The claim that Armenia is producing antipersonnel mines is a recent development and has not been confirmed by non-Azerbaijani sources. Armenia denied these claims, and stated in a letter to the Security Council on 13 September 2022 that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information…in preparation for launching armed aggression.”[118]

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.[119]

Antipersonnel landmines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled in a factory or improvised from locally-available materials.

Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing its annual report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel landmines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements that declared they have stopped exporting mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.[120]

Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines

States not party

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[121] In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the global collective total may be less than 50 million.[122]

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

It is unclear if all 30 states not party thought to have stockpiled antipersonnel mines are current stockpilers. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Stockpile destruction by States Parties

At least 161 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states which have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 states which declared that they never possessed antipersonnel landmines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. States Parties possess a collective total of 3.6 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million) and Greece (343,413).

Sri Lanka announced in October 2021 that it had completed its obligation to destroy its stockpile.[123] Sri Lanka’s remaining stockpile of 11,841 antipersonnel landmines was destroyed in Kilinochchi district, Northern province, in advance of its 1 June 2022 deadline.[124]

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010. Neither State Party has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.[125]

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020 or 2021. One of the reported barriers to the completion of its Article 4 obligations was a “legal dispute” with Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS), which halted the destruction process due to environmental compliance issues.[126] In a statement in June 2022, Greece shared that they have overcome these contractual and regulatory hurdles and that “the draft contract between HDS and their new subcontractor, has already been submitted to the Court of Auditors for a pre-contractual review and assessment.”[127]

The ICBL has repeatedly expressed concern over Greece’s failure to begin the destruction process early enough to meet its deadline. It has urged Greece to set a firm deadline, to devote the necessary resources for stockpile destruction, and to report progress to States Parties on a monthly basis.[128]

Ukraine remains unable to articulate a timeframe for stockpile destruction. A previous agreement reached by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Support and Procurement Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for destruction of stocks of PFM-series antipersonnel mines was terminated in 2020. The parties were in the process of tendering a new agreement.[129]

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[130]

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines.[131]

Mines retained for training and research

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 69 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes; of which 28 each retain more than 1,000 mines, and three (Finland, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Belgium, Denmark, and Spain collectively used a total of 2,901 retained mines during 2021, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.[132]Another 94 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 41 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past. Chile joined this latter group of States Parties in 2020, decades after initially retaining over 28,000 antipersonnel mines when the treaty entered into force for the country.[133]

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

Note: N/R=not reported.

In addition to those listed in the table, another 41 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines, and collectively possess a combined total of 14,888 retained mines.[134] Ten of these states used a combined total of 3,673 retained mines in 2021.[135] Another 13 did not report any use.[136] Seventeen States Parties that retain under 1,000 antipersonnel mines have not submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2021.[137]

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Seven States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

• Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
• Burundi, Cabo Verde, Senegal, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number.”[138]

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” The Action states that “If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned.”[139]

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.[140]

Transparency Reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2022, 81 States Parties (49%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2021.[141] A total of 83 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2021, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.[142] The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2021 was slightly greater than that of 2020.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.[143] States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) provided voluntary reports prior to acceding to the treaty.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.[144]