Summary: State Party Mali ratified the convention on 30 June 2010. It has participated several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. Mali voted in favor of a key UN resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Mali provided an initial transparency report for the convention in May 2016, which confirms it never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research or training. Mali states that it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Malisigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 June 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 December 2010.

Mali has not enacted specific national implementation legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. [1]

Mali provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 May 2016, covering calendar year 2015. It has not submitted annual updated reports, which are due by 30 April.

Mali actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and advocated for a total ban on cluster munitions without exception and with immediate effect. [2]

Mali attended several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. [3]

In December 2018, Mali voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [4] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

During the treaty negotiations, Mali argued against including Article 21 on interoperability (relations with states not party). [5] It has not elaborated its views on other important issues regarding interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibition on foreign stockpiling and transit of cluster munitions, and the prohibition on investment in cluster munition production.

Mali is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2016, Mali confirmed that it has never produced cluster munitions and does not possess any stocks, including for research and training. [6] Mali has stated on several occasions that it has never transferred or used cluster munitions. [7]

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Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

The Republic of Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017 has experience a significant increase in incidents caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, in the center of the country.[1]

In 2001, Mali stated that there had been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[2] Mali has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 2005. In 2009 and 2010 Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Kidal and Tombouctou, particularly along the roads between Abubaza and Tinza.[3] The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mine laying around the northern town of Gao by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and an offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.[4]

The situation deteriorated in 2019, particularly in northern and central Mali. The extent of contamination is not known, and no land was released in 2019. In 2020, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) noted that because of the conflict “no clear mapping of the contamination is possible, and no proactive elimination is deemed possible at this time.”[5]

International mine action operators were focusing on risk education to reduce the number of new casualties and were working with local implementing partners. Risk education activities in Mali were often combined with non-technical surveys (NTS), referral of survivors to appropriate services, and victim assistance activities. However, the number of new casualties remained high, with civilians making up two-thirds of all mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in 2019.

Access to basic victim assistance services was disrupted by the intensification of the conflict in 2019. Although UNMAS reported improved geographical coverage of medical care and referral in the central and northern regions due to the increased number of victim assistance service providers and international financial support for such services. Access to physical rehabilitation and psychological support services was also strengthened.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Despite many reports of improvised mine incidents in recent years, Mali did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[6]

Mali does not have a national mine action authority. The government however committed to create a mine action authority within the Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, with support from UNMAS.[7] As co-chair of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire, GT-LHAM), UNMAS leads, coordinates, and implements mine action activities, and ensures that international partners comply with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[8]

Strategies and policies

The Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons has a 2019–2023 action plan, however as of October 2020 this plan did not include mine action activities.[9]

Legislation and standards

There are no national mine action standards. In 2013, UNMAS developed interim standards, the National Technical Guidelines for Mine Action (NTSG). These guidelines cover accreditation, risk education, NTS, victim assistance, monitoring and quality management.[10]

Information management

Information is managed through the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) since 2019.[11]

Gender and diversity

In 2019, UNMAS organized internal trainings on gender and diversity in mine action, established gender focal points, and developed an action plan for gender equality and diversity. Priority was given to project proposals mainstreaming gender.[12]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[13]

Coordination

The Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group, under the UN Protection Cluster, coordinates humanitarian mine action activities in Mali, including risk education. The working group is co-chaired by UNMAS and another member of the group. The working group meets once a month in Bamako.[14] Topics include development of messaging and tools, coordination of risk education activities, and data reporting and coordination with other humanitarian sectors.[15]

Risk education operators are accredited by UNMAS, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the NTSG.[16]

National Standards and guidelines

There are no national risk education standards. In 2013, UNMAS developed interim standards, the NTSG 22–Risk Education.[17]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[18]

Laws and policies

In June 2018, Mali adopted the Law 2018–027 on the rights of persons with disabilities.[19] There was no specific legislation mandating physical accessibility to public buildings. Persons with disabilities had access to basic health care. The Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action is responsible for persons with disabilities. However, the government did not prioritize the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities and many relied on begging.[20] Persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment.[21]

Impact

Contamination

Landmine

The extent of contamination with improvised mines is not known. In 2009 and 2010 Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Kidal and Tombouctou, particularly along the roads between Abubaza and Tinza.[22] The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mines laying in the north of the country. The central regions were the most affected by the threat of improvised mines.[23] UNMAS said in March 2013 that it had received reports of antivehicle mines in the Kidal region being cleared towards Tin and Zaotene.[24] In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines.[25]

While armed groups often used command-detonated explosive devices between 2017 and 2018, they have increasingly been using pressure-plate devices since.[26] UNMAS found that victim-operated devices represented at least half of all IED incidents in Mali in 2019, and over 60% between January and October 2020.[27] UNMAS indicated that trigger mechanisms of these improvised mines included pressure plates and tripwires, but had no evidence of any improvised mines activated by the contact or weight of a person. UNMAS confirmed that some of these improvised mines had been newly emplaced.[28]

Regions most affected by improvised mines are Gao, Kidal, and Mopti. Improvised mine incidents were also reported in Koulikoro, Segou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu.[29] The presence of improvised mines impedes the use of roads in the central and northern regions.[30] The mine contamination also obstructed access to education, health, land, housing, food, and basic services. It also hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as economic recovery and development. Civilians were increasingly among the casualties of improvised mines in Mali.[31] The threat was particularly significant for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees.[32]

ERW

Mali has ERW contamination obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement, and efforts to stabilize and rebuild the economy in the aftermath of its civil war. Aerial attacks, artillery bombardments, and ground fighting in central and northern Mali left extensive unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance ranging from grenades, mortars, and rockets to artillery shells and aircraft bombs. The towns of Diabaly, Douentza, Konna, and Gao were reportedly among the worst affected.[33] The extent of contamination with ERW is not known.

Casualties

Casualties overview[34]

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Casualties in 2019: details

The Monitor identified at least 345 new mine/ERW casualties in Mali in 2019. The majority of incidents occurred in the region of Mopti. Other mine/ERW incidents were reported in Gao, Kidal, Ségou and Timbuktu. Of the total casualties for 2019, 236 were recorded by UNMAS, 104 identified in data analysis of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project and five were reported by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[35]

The Monitor recorded 931 mine/ERW survivors (people injured) in Mali by the end of 2019. UNMAS reported a total of 234 mine survivors and 218 survivors of ERW incidents by the end of 2019.[36]

Although 2019 had the highest number of annual casualties recorded by the Monitor for Mali, as there is no centralized mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism or database this may not be indicative of a trend. Conflict-related casualty data is collected by the Regional Directorates for Social Development and Solidarity Economy of Mali, without any specific focus on mine/ERW casualties. UNMAS collects casualty data in accordance with the IMAS. Other organizations and medical institutions collect mine casualty data such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the National Center for Orthopedic Appliances of Mali (Centre National d'Appareillage Orthopédique, CNAOM).[37] UNMAS considered casualty data collected in Mali to be reliable and reflective of the reality.[38]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

Clearance

Land release overview[39]

Note: EOD=explosive ordnance disposal; ERW=explosive remnants of war; and IED=improvised explosive device.

Land release: landmines

No clearance operations took place in Mali in 2019, and operations were limited to EOD spot tasks.[40]

The Malian Armed Forces received EOD training in Benin.[41] UNMAS also provided them with training, equipment, and technical support, and trained MINUSMA personnel to mitigate the threat from explosive ordnance.[42] In September 2019, the United States (US) donated equipment to the Malian Armed Forces to address the IED threats, including extraction robots, mine detectors, and medical kits.[43]

NTS were conducted in 170 areas in 2019, combined with risk education activities.

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Several national civil society organizations provided risk education in Mali in 2019. These included: Support Association for Rural Populations (AAPPOR); the Youth and Development Association of Mali (AJDM); the Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel (AMSS); Action Research for the Development of Local Initiatives (ARDIL); the Platform of Initiatives, Expertise, Education, and Support to local decentralized bodies (PIEAPCD); and TASSAGHT.[44]

Risk education international operators[45]

Note: IDP=internally displaced people; IED=improvised explosive device; and NTS=non-technical survey.

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiaries of risk education in 2019[46]

* UNMAS beneficiary numbers include figures of MAG and other operators.

Implementation

Target groups

Risk education planning was informed by casualty information, which guided the preparation of tailored messages.[47] Risk education was provided in central and northern Mali in 2019, as part of the humanitarian protection strategy.[48] Risk education messaging included the threat from antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, improvised mines, and ERW. Risk education sessions did not include messages on command-detonated IEDs.[49]

Main target groups included children, internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees, local and host communities. Local and host communities are exposed to the risk of explosive ordnance in areas affected by conflict, while IDPs flee to areas they are not familiar with. Nomads and seasonal farmers were also a target group due to their movements in search for grazing land and water. IDPs and nomads are particularly difficult to reach due to the unpredictability of their movements, including to areas which cannot be easily accessed for security reasons. Scrap metal collectors and dealers were also targeted with risk education sessions due to the nature of their activity which exposed them to the risk of explosive ordnance.[50]

In 2019, risk awareness and mitigation was also provided to aid workers and drivers from humanitarian organizations and private companies operating in the affected regions of central and northern Mali.[51] For drivers, sessions reinforced the need for visual checking during travel, communicating regarding potential risks with local community members, and decision making in the case of a mine incident on the road.[52] Community leaders also received risk education to support the sustainability of messaging in the community.[53]

Risk education is integrated into the school curriculum at primary and secondary school.[54]

UNMAS and its implementing partners worked to fully include persons with disabilities in risk education sessions. Mine/ERW survivors identified during these sessions were referred to UNMAS-funded victim assistance projects in central and northern Mali.[55]

Depending on the context and the needs, risk education was sometimes delivered separately to women and men of the same community.[56] The inclusion of risk education into armed violence reduction activities facilitated access to and acceptance of risk education teams by the communities.[57]

Delivery methods

Risk education activities of the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) were conducted in partnership with two Malian NGOs and included community sessions and school sessions. MAG trained community focal points to identify and report explosive ordnance contamination and incidents, and to refer victims to appropriate services. In addition to face-to-face sessions, MAG and its partners used leaflets and posters, radio messages and interactive radio talks to disseminate risk education messages.

UNMAS implementing partners conducted sessions adapted to children in schools and community focal points were trained to deliver risk education messages to their communities and to identify and refer victims to appropriate services. UNMAS also used printed materials, posters, radio messages, locality-wide sessions, and text messages.

Major developments in 2019 and 2020

MAG and its partners implemented emergency risk education in northern Mali in 2019, through distribution of leaflets, posters, radio messages, and briefings with available community representatives.

Security concerns in some areas restricted the access of risk education teams.[58]

In 2020, risk education actors had to adapt their activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including providing risk education to smaller groups.[59] In 2020, UNMAS was also considering the use of billboards, social media, and phone applications.[60]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Providers and activities[61]

Major Developments in 2019

The conflict in Mali intensified in 2019, disrupting access to basic services and impeding the delivery of aid. Activities of the ICRC were at times limited or temporarily suspended due to security constraints, in particular the threat of improvised explosive devices.[62]

Since May 2019, responsibility for the physical rehabilitation sector has been with the Ministry of Health and Social Development. It has been responsible for developing and implementing a national strategy for the development of physical rehabilitation in Mali.[63]

Geographical coverage of medical care was extended, and referral systems improved in the central and northern regions, especially in the Mopti region. The number of medical field teams increased, and health workers were trained to provide psychosocial support.

In April 2019, the ICRC began support to a third hospital to treat conflict wounded people in Mopti.[64]

Needs assessment

Through the CARE project, HI assessed the needs of mine/ERW survivors who are beneficiaries of the project.[65]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Mali’s health care system was poor. Health centers lacked equipment, supplies, medicine, and staff.[66] In 2019, there were reports of attacks on the health system in central and northern regions.[67] Due to the security situation, many healthcare providers, including public health providers, have either reduced activities or left the conflict-affected areas.[68] The conflict has also hindered trips to reach health facilities.[69] As a result, access to and quality of health care services were limited in conflict-affected and remote parts of Mali.[70]

The ICRC and MSF continued to provide health care and psychosocial support to affected populations in Gao, Kidal, and Mopti.[71] The ICRC supported four physical rehabilitation centers with equipment, components, services reimbursements, training, prosthetics and orthotics scholarships, quality control for devices, and physiotherapy. It also supported the construction of a rehabilitation center in Mopti and management of the CNAOM.[72] Referral capacities to physical rehabilitation structures were strengthened.[73]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

There was an increase in the number of providers of psychological support services with DCA and the national NGO Support Association for Rural Populations (Association d’Appui pour les Populations Rurales, AAPPOR), and improvements were reported in terms of referral to psychological support services in central regions of Mali.[74]

The ICRC supported the organization of the International Day of Persons with Disabilities and the month of solidarity and the construction of offices and shed for income-generating activities in Gao.[75]

Cross-cutting issues

Member organizations of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group identified focal points in remote areas to facilitate the identification of mine/ERW survivors and their timely referral to appropriate services. This work has been conducted in partnership with community health centers.[76]

The assistance offered to mine/ERW survivors was adapted to the age and gender of the beneficiaries. Eight of the 22 community focal points were women.[77]

Policy

The Republic of Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 June 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation measures adopted in 2000 include penal sanctions and fines.[1]

Mali occasionally attends meetings of the treaty, most recently the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and, prior to that, the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011. Mali last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2005.

Mali is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It is also party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Mali initially declared that it had possessed stockpiles of antipersonnel mines since 1974, the majority supplied by the former Soviet Union.[2] In 1998, it destroyed a stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.[3] In 2003, Mali reported that it retained 600 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but it has never reported any use of these mines.[4]

Use

Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[5]

In January 2012, an armed conflict began in the north of the country between the Malian government and its allies versus armed opposition groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help to re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, while the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In 2013 and 2014, there were several reports indicating the use of either antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict. Between November 2013 and July 2014, there were several antivehicle mines incidents that caused civilian casualties, including aid workers and UN peacekeepers.[6] According to GICHD-SIPRI data, the number of antivehicle mine incidents that caused civilian casualties has increased significantly in recent years, due to mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Mali.

In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines, at 254. This shows a dramatic increase in casualties from 76 in 2015. GICHD-SIPRI also noted that the locations of the incidents were no longer contained to the northern regions of Mali; in 2018, 44% of antivehicle mine incidents occurred in the central regions.[7] In 2019, there were several antivehicle mine incidents resulting in UN peacekeeper casualties: on 25 January two UN peacekeepers were killed and six injured in Mopti region.[8] On 20 April, one peacekeeper was killed and four were wounded in Timbuktu.[9] On 5 October, one peacekeeper was killed and four wounded in northern Mali.[10]

In July 2012, a NSAGs called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa claimed it had laid antipersonnel mines near the city of Gao. After several apparent landmine casualties near Gao in early 2013, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused AQIM of using antipersonnel mines.[11] The ICBL described the reported landmine use as “disturbing.”[12] However, no antipersonnel mines were ever recovered from the area.