Myanmar_Burma
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Summary
Non-signatory Myanmar has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but has not taken any steps to join it. Myanmar last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2013. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.
Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.
Policy
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1]
After Myanmar’s armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, took control of the country in a military coup on 1 February 2021, it formed a provisional government headed by the State Administration Council, chaired by Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing. Parliamentarians elected prior to the coup in November 2020 formed a National Unity Government (NUG) in exile in April 2021, which holds Myanmar’s seat at the UN.[2]
Myanmar has expressed interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps to accede to it. Previously, in November 2019, Myanmar reiterated that it cannot join the convention until there is a nationwide peace agreement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs).[3] According to Myanmar, the convention aims to “prevent the indiscriminate use” of cluster munitions, which can lead to “vulnerability and serious humanitarian impact.”[4]
Myanmar participated in a regional meeting of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in October 2008. It also attended a regional conference on the convention held in Bali, Indonesia in November 2009.
Myanmar has participated as an observer at several meetings of the convention, most recently the Second Review Conference held in November 2020 and September 2021. This was its first participation in a meeting of the convention since 2013.[5] Myanmar has also attended regional workshops on the convention, including a virtual meeting for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) military officials convened by the Philippines in July 2020.[6]
In December 2021, Myanmar abstained from voting on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[7] Myanmar has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.
Myanmar is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling
Myanmar told a regional meeting in 2009 that, “we do not use cluster munitions, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, nor assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Convention.”[8]
Myanmar has denied using cluster munitions. In 2015, it said “cluster munitions were never used in…operations” by the Tatmadaw.[9]
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an NSAG operating in northeast Myanmar, alleged that the Tatmadaw used an old weapon that is similar in design to a modern cluster munition near the town of Laiza, in Kachin state, on 26 January 2013.[10] The “adapter” and 20-pound fragmentation bombs shown in photographs reviewed by Human Rights Watch (HRW) may meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11]
Myanmar possesses 122mm Type-81, Type-90B, and M1985 240mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known whether these include versions with submunition payloads.[12]
[1] The military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many ethnic groups in Myanmar’s border areas and a number of countries still prefer to use the name Burma.
[2] The Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was formed on 1 August 2021 by the State Administration Council (SAC), with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as its chair.
[3] Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution A/C.1/L.46, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2019. Myanmar has previously indicated that it is considering joining the convention.
[4] Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.41, 72nd Session, UNGA First Committee, New York, 31 October 2017. UNGA, Official Records, A/C.1/72/PV26, pp. 18–19 and 29. Myanmar has made similar statements on previous occasions. See, statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015; statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 30 October 2013; and statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 24 October 2012.
[5] Myanmar participated as an observer at the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2012, and at intersessional meetings held in 2013. Myanmar did not attend the First Review Conference in September 2015.
[6] Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the UN in Geneva press release, “Philippines hosts webinar to promote Convention on Cluster Munitions among ASEAN Member States,” 29 July 2020.
[7] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021.
[8] Statement of Ye Minn Thein, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Bali 16 November 2009.
[9] Statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015.
[10] “Burma army allegedly uses cluster bombs to take KIO position,” BNI, 28 January 2013. On 19 April 2013, the deputy secretary of the Kachin National Council (KNC) provided photographs to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) showing an unknown type of air-dropped bomb that it said, “confirmed that the World War-Two era 20-pound fragmentation bombs were used during the airstrikes in the KIA’s strategic outposts between 14 December 2012 and 8 January 2013 by the Myanmar Air Force.” According to the KNC, “this type has never been used in Burma’s civil war before.” The photographs were contained in an email sent to the CMC by Hkun Htoi, Deputy Secretary, KNC, 19 April 2013.
[11] There is evidence that Myanmar government forces mounted six fragmentation bombs to the adaptor, which then separated from the rack when dropped from the air. Photographs show a metal tubular rack that appears to be similar in design to the United States (US)-produced M1 cluster adapter. The small fragmentation bombs are of a more modern design and marking than World War II-era munitions. A military officer who requested anonymity confirmed that the weapon was manufactured in Myanmar. Additionally, a former military ordnance officer confirmed that the markings on the weapons were those used by Myanmar’s armed forces.
[12] “Myanmar Defense Weapons,” 20 March 2014. English translation from Hla Oo’s Blog, “Burma Army’s MRLS or Multi Rocket Launcher Systems,” 23 March 2014.
Impact
Jump to a specific section of the chapter:
Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)
Country Summary
Myanmar/Burma[1] is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Tatmadaw (national armed forces) and numerous non-state armed groups (NSAGs) affiliated with ethnic minorities. Armed conflict in border regions has persisted since Myanmar’s independence in 1948.
A provisional government was established in Myanmar after the Tatmadaw took control of the country in a military coup on 1 February 2021. Parliamentarians elected in November 2020 formed a counter government, the National Unity Government, which currently holds Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations (UN). This impacted the implementation of mine action coordination and operations in Myanmar in 2021.
Mined areas are located adjacent to the borders with Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand. New mines continue to be laid by both the Tatmadaw and NSAGs. The full extent of contamination in Myanmar is unknown, but it includes improvised landmines and mines produced in state-owned factories. Contamination impedes the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). A trend of increasing mine casualties in recent years has been reported by national stakeholders.
In February 2020, a national level meeting was held in Naypyidaw to discuss the formation of a national mine action authority and a national mine action center, which would be established under the oversight of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MoSWRR). The military has undertaken some mine clearance, but operations are not systematic or recorded. Humanitarian mine action operators began arriving in Myanmar from 2012, but are not permitted to clear mines. In January 2020, the mine action sector gained permission to deploy technical teams to commence marking and fencing operations in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),[2] but due to the COVID-19 pandemic little progress was made.
In 2020, Myanmar saw a decrease in the number of organizations undertaking humanitarian mine action projects. In August 2019, 16 organizations reported 21 mine action projects taking place across 85 townships. By February 2020, this had decreased to 13 organizations reporting 13 mine action projects across 77 townships.[3] In May 2021, a total of only seven organizations reported mine action projects taking place in Myanmar.[4]
In 2020, risk education was coordinated by the Mine Risk Working Group (MRWG), led by the Department of Rehabilitation and co-chaired with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). State level coordination was also organized in conflict areas including Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and northern Shan State. Risk education focused on conflict-affected communities in ethnic territories, and particularly targeted IDPs and refugees.
For a decade, from 1999–2009, assistance to mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and persons with disabilities in Myanmar was marginal, due to the neglect of healthcare services by governing authorities. Myanmar’s authorities did not have a national victim assistance program or strategy. Awareness of the need for victim assistance increased significantly from around 2012, initially as a result of activities by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established a permanent presence in Myanmar in 1986, and since the early 1990s has provided financial and technical support to physical rehabilitation programs.[5]
Between 2014 and 2020, the number of victim assistance service providers in Myanmar increased significantly. More than a dozen organizations—including government departments, the United Nations (UN), international and local NGOs, and community-based organizations—were involved in efforts. Victim assistance centers were built, while provision of prosthetics services improved, including via enhanced mobile services. Local availability of community-based rehabilitation and vocational training also increased. Victim assistance coordination improved after the introduction of the National Victim Assistance Technical Group (NVATG) as a sub-working group under the MRWG. Yet essential services remain scarce, particularly for people living in remote rural areas.
Treaty status overview
Mine Ban Treaty |
Non-signatory |
Convention on Cluster Munitions |
Non-signatory |
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) |
State Party (Ratification: 7 December 2011) |
Mine action management and coordination
Mine action management and coordination overview
National mine action management actors |
The Tatmadaw are responsible for mine clearance activities |
UN Agencies |
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) |
Mine action legislation |
None |
Mine action strategic and operational plans |
None |
Mine action standards |
National Mine Action Standard for clearance was being developed as of October 2019 |
Coordination and management
Myanmar’s former military government created a Mine Action Center under the former Myanmar Peace Center in 2013, but it was never fully staffed. Concluding a national ceasefire agreement with NSAGs was a government precondition for proceeding to survey and clearance.[6] With the change of government after the November 2015 election, the Mine Action Center was dissolved. The new NLD-led government made peace negotiations a priority, and several participants in the peace process emphasized the threat of mines and the need for clearance.[7]
In October 2019, Myanmar hosted an international workshop attended by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Norwegian Presidency to the Mine Ban Treaty, to discuss the establishment of a national mine action authority to lead and manage a mine action program in Myanmar.[8]
In February 2020, a national level meeting was held in Naypyidaw to discuss the formation of a national mine action authority and a mine action center under the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MoSWRR). Participants at the meeting also discussed the Ministry of Defense establishing state and regional level mine clearing groups.[9]
It is unclear what progress, if any, has been made following the military coup in February 2021. Coordination mechanisms with the Department of Rehabilitation were reported to be suspended.
Strategic planning
As of August 2020, the pre-coup government had not announced a clear strategy on mine action.
In January 2018, the secretary of the Union Joint Monitoring Committee (JMU-C), Colonel Wunna Aung, had stated that mine clearance could not begin prior to the building of mutual trust between the government and NSAGs.[10] In May 2017, Colonel Aung stated that the Tatmadaw would take the lead on landmine clearance, but that international technological and material support would be accepted.[11]
In August 2017, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, General Min Aung Hlaing, held talks with New Zealand’s ambassador regarding assistance between the two states’ militaries and mine clearance operations.[12] The Embassy of New Zealand in Myanmar has since funded a mine action coordinator, whose primary role is to improve the effectiveness of the sector until a national mine action authority is established. The initiative was reported to be successful in providing a focus for developing procedures.[13]
Legislation and standards
In October 2019, Myanmar stated that it was in the process of finalizing its National Mine Action Standard for the conduct of systematic mine clearance. Myanmar was working with countries in the region via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action, under the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC).[14]
Previously, in 2013, a technical working group comprised of government representatives from the former Myanmar Peace Center, and humanitarian actors, completed work on a draft national mine action strategy and national mine action standards, which were never approved by the government.
International demining organizations in Myanmar have followed IMAS, in addition to their own standard operating procedures.
Information management
Mine action actors in Myanmar retain their own survey results in the absence of a neutral national entity to store data on hazardous areas, which remains sensitive in view of continuing conflict.
Risk education management and coordination
Risk education management and coordination overview
Government focal points |
Department of Rehabilitation, within the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MoSWRR) |
UN focal point |
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) |
Coordination mechanisms |
Mine Risk Working Group (MRWG): comprised of ministries, international and national organizations, and four state-level coordination agencies; it leads on risk education and victim assistance |
Risk education strategy |
MRWG Strategic Workplan 2020–2021 |
Risk education standards |
In development in 2019, but progress halted in 2021 |
Coordination
The Department of Rehabilitation, under MoSWRR, leads the MRWG as co-chair with UNICEF.[15] Formed in April 2012, the MRWG was comprised of 10 ministries, 41 international and national organizations, and four decentralized working groups in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and northern Shan states.. In 2019, MoSWRR endorsed a decision to open a new state-level MRWG in Rakhine State, but at the end of 2020 this was still pending.[16]
The MRWG normally meets three times each year but met only once during 2020, in December, amid restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.[17] However, a virtual meeting was held with the four state-level MRWGs, while a national online meeting was held in October 2020.[18] The MRWG also conducted training workshops on risk education in Myanmar’s states and regions in collaboration with UN agencies, and with international and national NGOs.[19]
In 2021, humanitarian mine action operators in Myanmar continued to coordinate risk education activities online, via monthly and quarterly virtual meetings.
Strategies
A MRWG Strategic Workplan for risk education in 2020–2021 was in place, which also included objectives for victim assistance.[20]
Information management
There is no comprehensive mine/ERW victim surveillance system in Myanmar. The MRWG provides mine/ERW incident data every quarter, with data collected through UNICEF, MoSWRR networks, the databases of mine action operators, the General Administration Department, and the police.[21] However, data is far from complete and many mine/ERW incidents in Myanmar remain unreported, due to the lack of a national accident surveillance system and limited healthcare facilities in remote areas.[22] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as the lead for mine action, also keeps a database which all mine action organizations in Myanmar contribute to.[23]
A workshop in Naypyidaw in 2019 initiated a discussion on the collection of victim data, advocacy efforts, and developing a national standardized system.[24] In 2021, the Department of Rehabilitation reported that there had been improvements to the system in 2020, but no details were provided.[25]
National standards and guidelines
In 2019, operators in the mine action sector in Myanmar were invited to help the government draft national risk education standards.[26] As of August 2021, these had not been finalized.
Victim assistance management and coordination
Victim assistance management and coordination overview[27]
Government focal points |
Department of Social Welfare and Persons with Disabilities, within MoSWRR |
Coordination mechanisms |
Victim Assistance Sub-Technical Group (VATG), coordinated by Humanity & Inclusion (HI), gathers national and international victim assistance actors under the umbrella of the MRWG |
Coordination regularity and outcomes |
Six VATG meetings were organized at national and state level in 2020 |
Plans/strategies |
Victim assistance objectives included in the MRWG Strategic Workplan 2020–2021 |
Disability sector integration
|
A representative of MoSWRR reported that Myanmar was taking an integrated approach towards victim assistance, based on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), in its national disability law and national social protection strategy |
Survivor inclusion and participation |
No direct representation, but survivors belong to broader disabled persons’ organizations that participate in coordination activities |
Coordination
Humanity & Inclusion (HI) facilitated Victim Assistance Sub-Technical Group (VATG) meetings, which in 2020 were held three times at the national level: in person in March, and virtually in May and November. At the state level, meetings were held in northern Shan (7 July), Kayin (12 August), and Kachin (10 September).[28]
Organizations representing persons with disabilities, including the Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association (MPHA) and the Myanmar Federation of Persons with Disabilities (MFPD), took part in VATG meetings in 2020.
Laws and policies
In June 2015, Myanmar enacted the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Law.[29] In July 2018, MoSWRR published the rules and regulations that applied under the 2015 law.[30]
In July 2019, Myanmar passed a Child Rights Law, to align national policies and regulatory frameworks with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Myanmar ratified in 1991.[31] The law includes sections on victim assistance and protection against landmine incidents.
In 2014, Myanmar launched a National Social Protection Strategic Plan, through MoSWRR, to provide an allowance to all persons certified with a disability.[32] In 2017, and again in 2019, the government announced to the media that it would be disbursing a monthly allowance to persons with disabilities in nine townships across four states, as a pilot program with a view to eventual nationwide coverage.[33] At a national level meeting in Naypyidaw in February 2020 to discuss the formation of a national mine action authority, it was reported that MoSWRR would provide MMK200,000 (US$110) and prosthetic limbs, if needed, for each victim of landmine explosions.[34] Between September 2019 and August 2020, the fund was budgeted for 600 victims.[35] In 2020, the Department of Rehabilitation reported that since the 2017–2018 financial year, 648 mine victims had received payments, amounting to a total of MMK129,600,000 (US$70,000).[36]
However, while the victim assistance fund was easy for people to access in government-controlled areas, it was less clear how accessible it was to people living in areas controlled by NSAGs.
A disability certification and registration process was being rolled out by MoSWRR in 2020, and was piloted in two states under the Department of Rehabilitation. Persons with disabilities were to be registered through a nationwide system to receive a disability card, which includes classification based on the severity of their disability. This will likely enable better identification of persons with disabilities, greater advocacy for their rights, and future provision of social protection funds.[37]
Strategies
Under Myanmar’s pre-coup government, a national strategic plan on the rights of persons with disabilities was being developed by a working committee, with the support of eight subcommittees which included representatives from organizations of persons with disabilities and other NGOs.
In April 2019, MoSWRR held a planning meeting and drafted a national strategy in relation to Myanmar’s obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
In 2019, the ICRC, together with the World Health Organization (WHO), worked with the Ministry of Health to develop a draft strategic plan on strengthening the national rehabilitation sector.[38] The work of a steering committee set up to implement this plan and develop a national referral system was delayed in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[39] The steering committee convened virtual meetings towards the end of 2020 to discuss expanding local access to assistive technology and producing online training materials for the referral system personnel, who were set to come from the Ministry of Health, local NGOs, and the Red Cross Society.[40]
National standards and guidelines
In 2020, the Victim Assistance IMAS was introduced in a national level VATG meeting by HI and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and the standard was translated into Burmese.[41] HI also introduced the VA Standard at national level at the MRWG.[42]
Contamination
Myanmar is contaminated with landmines—including improvised mines—and ERW, as a legacy of decades of internal armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and NSAGs in ethnic minority areas. Myanmar is not known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants.
Landmine contamination
Some 97 of Myanmar’s 325 townships—across 12 states and regions—are believed to suffer from some degree of landmine contamination, primarily in the form of antipersonnel mines.[43]
No formal estimate exists of the extent of mine contamination in Myanmar, though credible reports of mine contamination, casualties, and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) or suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), have been reported in the states of Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan; and in the administrative regions of Bago, Magway, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi.[44]
Shan and Kachin states are considered heavily contaminated. Previously, Kayin state and the Bago region were among those with the heaviest mine contamination and highest number of victims.[45]
Some contamination is from mines produced by state-owned factories. Ka Pa Sa (Defense Products Industries) produced at least five types of antipersonnel landmines, including domestic versions of PMN, POMZ, and M-14 type mines. NSAGs in Myanmar are also known to construct improvised mines (see Myanmar Mine Ban Policy profile).
ERW contamination
Myanmar is also affected by ERW, including mortars, grenades, artillery, and air-dropped bombs. Periodic reports in Myanmar suggest the presence of ordnance dating from World War II.[46] ERW contamination has also been reported in relation to armed conflict during late 2018 and early 2019 in Kachin state,[47] and due to conflict in 2020 in Rakhine state.
Casualties
Casualties overview
Casualties |
|
All known mine/ERW casualties (as of the end of 2020) |
5,261 (900 killed, 4,243 injured, 118 unknown) |
Casualties in 2020 |
|
Annual total |
280 (decrease from 358 in 2019) |
Survival outcome |
195 killed, 85 injured |
Device type causing casualties |
175 antipersonnel mines; 4 improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs); 16 antivehicle mines; 43 ERW; 42 unspecified mines/ERW |
Civilian status |
259 civilians, 16 military, 5 unknown |
Age |
200 adults, 76 children, 4 unknown |
Gender |
170 men, 47 women, 63 unknown |
Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; IED=improvised explosive device.
Casualties in 2020
In 2020, there were at least 280 mine/ERW casualties in Myanmar, based on information provided by NGOs, UN agencies, and other organizations, as well as by state and independent media reports. Although this marked a decrease from the annual casualty total for 2019, the number of fatalities increased significantly to 195 in 2020 from 89 in 2019 the previous year. The majority of casualties (175) were caused by antipersonnel mines.
Most casualties in 2020 (147) were recorded in Rakhine state, followed by Shan state (72). Kachin state had 21 recorded casualties, while Kayin state had 15 recorded casualties. The total number of casualties in Rakhine state represented an increase from 2019, when the state had 119 casualties. In Shan and Kachin states, casualties decreased in 2020, from 149 and 51 respectively in 2019.
Despite the presence of a number of mine action actors, and though coverage of victim assistance increased, no national systematic casualty data collection occurred. Due to the lack of an official data collection mechanism, the absence of a basic reporting format or means of sharing data, and the varying sources of annual data available to the Monitor, reporting is believed not to reflect the full extent of mine/ERW incidents and casualties in Myanmar.
Media reporting indicates a trend of increasing annual casualties in recent years. In August 2019, the Department of Rehabilitation, within MoSWRR, stated that the number of landmine casualties in Myanmar was increasing each year.[48] On 4 April 2019, the MRWG reported that although many incidents still go unreported, annual casualties increased from 176 in 2017, to 276 in 2018.[49] The Department of Rehabilitation reported 200 casualties from 112 incidents from January–September 2020, with women and children accounting for 48% of the casualties.[50] Differences in the casualty figures provided by the MRWG and the Monitor are attributable to the fact that the MRWG seeks to have a figure available in a shorter timeframe, to inform its activities. The Monitor compiles its data over a longer period and its estimates can be considered an amended figure when released at the end of the following calendar year. Neither tally is comprehensive, but provide the best-known estimates from public sources in light of the lack of official data.
A 2018 study found that many IDPs with disabilities living in NSAG-controlled areas appeared to have impairments due to mines and conflict-related violence. However, in government-controlled areas, “most” of the persons with disabilities reported that their disabilities were congenital, or due to accidents. The study proposed that this may be due to “perceptions that stepping on a landmine can incur charges for ‘destruction of government property’, adding further problems for [persons with disabilities]. This acts as an incentive for landmine victims to blame traffic or other accidents for their disabilities, potentially distorting numbers.”[51]
The number of Tatmadaw and NSAG casualties due to mines/ERW remains unknown, but is likely substantial. A Ministry of Defense official told the Monitor that landmines were the chief cause of death and injury for Tatmadaw troops, yet added that if he revealed the figure “it would give a psychological weapon to our enemies.”[52] Past Monitor reporting indicates that there have been a significant number of military casualties, but military records remain unavailable to the public.[53]
The total number of casualties in Myanmar, for all time, is unknown. The Monitor recorded a total of 5,261 mine/ERW casualties (900 killed, 4,243 injured, 118 unknown survival outcome) between 2000 and the end of 2020.
Mine action
Clearance operators
National |
Tatmadaw Field Engineering Corps |
International |
DanChurchAid (DCA) Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Mines Advisory Group (MAG) The HALO Trust Humanity & Inclusion (HI) Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) |
International demining organizations started arriving in Myanmar in 2012, but were not authorized to conduct non-technical survey operations until around 2015. In 2020, six international demining operators had offices in Yangon and some in regional locations: DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the HALO Trust, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
In November 2019, Bangladesh offered mine action assistance to Myanmar, at the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty.[54]
Land release
Survey
In July 2020, the Monitor and the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) produced a country map showing townships with SHAs, and an infographic on the impact of landmine use in Myanmar.[55]
From 2016, several international mine action operators were authorized to conduct non-technical survey in specific locations in Myanmar. Non-technical survey by DCA, DRC, the HALO Trust, and MAG took place in 2018 and 2019, although operators were unable to carry out survey across an entire state, leaving them unable to determine a baseline level of contamination.
In January 2020, mine action operators gained permission to deploy technical teams to commence marking and fencing operations, in accordance with IMAS.[56] The Department of Rehabilitation asked the mine action sector to prioritize technical survey, marking, and fencing of areas identified for returns and resettlement of IDPs in Kachin state.[57] However, in 2020, restrictions on travel and gatherings amid COVID-19 led to delays, and prevented non-technical survey from taking place.[58]
In 2020, DRC planned to commence non-technical survey in Kachin state and northern Shan state, but was unable to conduct training for staff. Training is now planned for late 2021, with operations to commence in early 2022. Community mapping exercises were conducted in 31 villages in 2020 and early 2021, to identify non-technical survey tasks in potentially contaminated villages.[59]
The HALO Trust undertook non-technical survey in early 2020, but suspended activities in March 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions. Before the suspension, the HALO Trust identified five CHAs in northern Shan state (totaling 419,009m²) and four SHAs in Kayin state (totaling 6,058m²). One CHA in northern Shan state and six CHAs in Kayin state were marked. The HALO Trust resumed operations in March 2021 with four teams across Kayin and Shan states, though as of August 2021 operations were suspended again due to further COVID-19 restrictions.[60]
In 2020, MAG conducted non-technical survey in the Tanintharyi region, in three areas (Nyaung Pin Kwin village, Pyigyimandaing village tract, and Rar Hpu village), and in Loikaw township in Kayah state. The surveys were conducted in January–March and September 2020, identifying four SHAs totaling 9,321m². No marking was conducted in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions. As of the end of August 2021, MAG had been unable to conduct further non-technical survey.[61]
HI did not conduct non-technical survey in 2019 or in early 2020, but planned to start survey from September 2020.[62] NPA was unable to undertake non-technical survey in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[63] DCA did not conduct non-technical survey in 2020, and focused on risk education and victim assistance.[64]
Some farmers in the Bago region have marked mine contaminated areas discovered while farming, in an attempt to warn people from entering those areas.[65]
Clearance
Humanitarian mine action operators have not been permitted to conduct clearance by either the government or authorities in ethnic minority areas, and this remained the case in 2020. The Tatmadaw have conducted some mine clearance, but the operations are to unknown standards. The amount of land cleared, and the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed, has not been reported.
In January 2019, the Tatmadaw announced localized mine clearance in advance of the resettlement of families in Nam San Yang village, in Kachin State’s Wiangmaw township.[66] In November 2019, an assessment by a Kachin-based NGO found that households with registration certificates had their household compounds cleared with a bulldozer.[67] In March 2020, villagers in Nam San Yang complained that mines remained a threat in the area.[68] In July 2020, the Tatmadaw returned, and removed mines from 100 acres of farmland.[69] In August 2020, Tatmadaw spokesperson Brigadier-General Zaw Min Tun told a journalist that the Nam San Yang return had been a success and that the military planned to expand its IDP return activities, and would assist with transportation and mine clearance.[70] In December 2020, it was reported that clearance in Ta Pyae Yan and Kyauk Sa Khan villages, in Waingmaw township, was undertaken ahead of the return of 2,000 villagers.[71]
In March and August 2020, limited clearance was also reported in Lajaryan and Dotphoneyan, in Kachin state, in coordination with the Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee (KHCC).
In January 2020, the Tatmadaw closed an IDP camp in Myebon township, Rakhine state, to clear landmines in the area. A statement, reportedly issued by the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, said the military had asked camp residents to leave to prevent them from being injured by mines, and that troops had deactivated a mine 20 meters from the camp. Camp officials stated that the military then torched temporary shelters at the camp, causing about 400 of the 500 people living there to flee in fear.[72] It is not known if further mine clearance occurred at the site.
Armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and an NSAG, the Arakan Army, in Rakhine state has led to thousands of IDPs since 2018. Since November 2020, an informal ceasefire has been observed. Mine clearance work was reported in February 2021 in the townships of Rakhine state where IDPs were expected to return home. Mine clearance has taken place along the Ann-Sittwe highway and in some villages in Rathedaung township. As of 19 February 2021, there were 13,445 IDPs seeking to return to their homes from IDP camps in Ann, Buthidaung, and Sittwe townships.[73]
On 31 March 2021, the Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Dr Thet Thet Khine, at a Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development meeting in Naypyidaw, said emphasis was being placed on clearing landmines to resettle IDPs to their native villages in Rakhine state.[74] However, clearance was not systematic and not all townships were included in the plans.[75] In March 2021, it was reported that the military and the Arakan Army were negotiating to clear mines from mountains and forests where conflict had previously occurred.[76]
A national humanitarian group, the Free Burma Rangers (FBR), run a course on mine identification and emergency clearance procedures, in annual training programs for relief teams.[77] Landmines encountered on their missions are either removed by FBR personnel, who then turn them over to NSAGs from ethnic minority communities, or are removed directly by the local NSAGs.
Deminer safety
In January 2020, the battalion commander of Tatmadaw Light Infantry Battalion 708 was killed while attempting to remove an antivehicle mine laid by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[78]
Mine action was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and by the changing political situation and civil unrest in Myanmar following the February 2021 coup. Mine action activities were impacted by restricted communications, a shutdown of essential services such as banks, travel restrictions, and local lockdowns. Increased safety and security measures were put in place by operators.
Risk education
Risk education operators[79]
Type of organization |
Name of organization |
Type of activity |
Governmental |
Department of Rehabilitation |
Coordination and chair of the MRWG |
Department of Education
|
Risk education in Kayin state |
|
National |
Committee of Internally Displaced Karen People and the Karen Teachers Working Group
|
Provides risk education alongside other forms of humanitarian assistance and advocacy |
Karen Development Network |
Community-based risk education |
|
Karenni Social Welfare and Development Center |
Established a Karenni Mine Risk Education Group in 2006 to provide risk education and collect victim data |
|
Local Development Network |
Community-based risk education |
|
Ta'ang Students and Youth Union
|
DCA partner and provides risk education in Shan state |
|
Nyein (Shalom) Foundation |
Active in the peace-building process and peace education, including risk education |
|
Wunpawng Ninghtoi |
Implements activities and projects to assist IDPs, including on risk education and livelihood support |
|
Myanmar Heart Development Organization (MHDO) |
Community-based risk education and livelihood activities |
|
Myanmar Red Cross Society |
Community-based risk education |
|
Kachin Baptist Convention |
Delivers risk education training to teachers in IDP camps in partnership with Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
|
|
Kachin Development Group |
HI risk education partner |
|
South Shan Youth Capacity Building Centre |
Community implementers trained by the HALO Trust to provide risk education and first-aid in Shan state |
|
Never End Tomorrow |
Community implementers trained by the HALO Trust to provide risk education and first-aid in Kachin state |
|
International |
DanChurchAid (DCA)-Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) |
Risk education as part of a program to address natural disasters and the impacts of conflict. Works in the Bago region, and also in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, and Shan states |
Danish Refugee Council (DRC) |
Operates mine risk education team and plans to provide risk education alongside non-technical survey in Kayah and Shan states |
|
The HALO Trust
|
Training for 750 community implementers in mine risk education and first-aid. Works in Kachin, Kayin and northern Shan states with partners Never End Tomorrow and the South Shan Youth Capacity Building Centre |
|
Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
|
Training of protection and education implementing partners in Kachin state and also works in eastern parts of the Bago region, and Kayin state |
|
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
|
Emergency risk education, community-based risk education through Myanmar Red Cross Society volunteers, risk education in schools, training in risk education for community volunteers, and risk awareness sessions for other humanitarian organizations |
|
Johanniter International Assistance (JOIN) |
Risk education through partners as part of broader humanitarian assistance focused on water, sanitation, hygiene, nutrition, health, and disaster preparedness |
|
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
|
Risk education alongside community liaison activities in villages and IDP camps. MAG had three implementing partners in 2019–2020, and is contracted by the Durable Peace Programme to provide capacity-building support on risk education to 14 local organizations. MAG works in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states, and also in the Tanintharyi region |
|
Relief International |
Risk education in northern Shan state |
|
People in Need |
Training in risk education delivery for teachers in IDP camps, in partnership with HI |
Note: IDP=internally displaced person; NGO=non-governmental organization.
Beneficiary numbers
Risk education beneficiaries in 2020[80]
Operator |
Men |
Boys |
Women |
Girls |
HALO Trust |
7,137 |
4,265 |
9,383 |
5,088 |
HI |
10 |
211 |
42 |
211 |
NPA |
236 |
411 |
468 |
441 |
UNICEF |
N/A |
11,768 |
N/A |
10,259 |
Note: N/A=not applicable.
The Department of Rehabilitation recorded a total of 109,180 risk education beneficiaries in 2020 (21,082 boys; 24,891 girls; 26,705 men; and 36,502 women), although the data was not collected according to Standard Beneficiary Definitions.[81] The total represents a decrease from the reported 280,000 people reached in Myanmar in 2019.[82] The beneficiary totals in the table above represent only some of the operators providing risk education in Myanmar.
More than 11,600 people received training in risk education through training of trainers programs in Myanmar in 2020. HI trained 52 people, the HALO Trust trained 10,646 people, while UNICEF trained 988 professionals (teachers, social workers, and NGO staff) to provide risk education.[83]
ICRC reported reaching 160 direct beneficiaries with risk education in 2020, of which 112 were persons with disabilities.[84] HI reported reaching five persons with disabilities, while UNICEF reached 656 children with disabilities.[85]
As of August 2020, at least seven organizations reported implementing risk education across 82 townships, 293 village tracts/towns, 945 villages/wards, and in 23 IDP camps. Operators providing risk education were mostly concentrated in Kachin state, Shan state, Kayin state, Mon state, the Bago region, Kayah state, Rakhine state, and the Tanintharyi region.[86]
Implementation
Target groups
IDPs, returnees, and conflict-affected populations were a significant target group for risk education in Myanmar. While displaced in camps or host communities, they also returned to their villages of origin to check on livestock, property, and farmland. HI reported that IDPs sought income and livelihood activities outside of IDP camps in areas controlled by NSAGs in Kachin state.[87] People often relied on livelihood activities in forested and mountainous areas which remained contaminated.[88] In many cases, there was a lack of information on safe and unsafe areas due to an absence of warning signs and limited local knowledge of newly contaminated areas.[89]
Children were at risk from mines/ERW, particularly in return and resettlement areas and in conflict affected areas. In some IDP camps, there were not enough schoolteachers to support the provision of risk education, particularly in remote areas, and most risk education for children took place outside of school.[90] Children with disabilities were hard to reach, as they were often not visible in communities or had difficulty understanding materials.[91]
Men were at risk from mines/ERW due to livelihood activities, such as hunting and foraging for food in remote areas far from their homes. These activities were often conducted out of economic necessity. Reaching men for risk education was reported to be challenging, as they were often out of their villages during scheduled working hours of risk education teams.[92] MAG provided risk education at night and at weekends in an effort to better reach men.[93]
Reaching remote areas and some ethnic minority groups in Myanmar remained difficult due to access restrictions, particularly in NSAG-controlled areas. International NGOs worked with local partners to better reach remote communities. Risk education staff were required to be fluent in a number of local languages, while dialects and materials also had to reflect linguistic and cultural differences.[94] HI developed radio messages in the Kachin language to reach communities there.[95]
Delivery methods
Risk education is delivered as a standalone activity in Myanmar due to the lack of permission for operators to conduct clearance, although it is sometimes integrated with non-technical survey. In areas impacted by ongoing conflict, risk education is delivered through local partner organizations.
In 2016, a common Mine Risk Education Toolkit was field-tested, before being approved by the government in 2017. DCA and UNICEF also developed an app in 2017 as part of the toolkit, which was jointly developed by DCA, UNICEF, and the MRWG, with support from MoSWRR.[96] The Mine Risk Education Toolkit was reviewed and revised by UNICEF in 2019–2020.[97]
Face-to-face sessions remained the primary means of delivering risk education in Myanmar, along with the distribution of printed materials.[98] Risk education materials were being developed by HI to be inclusive of persons with disabilities, including children, through the use of plain and simple language, accessible fonts and colors, and the dissemination of messages via radio broadcasts.[99]
In 2020, MAG was contracted by the Durable Peace Programme—funded by the European Union (EU)—to deliver training of trainers programs and capacity support in Kachin and northern Shan states, to help 14 NGOs integrate risk education into their humanitarian work. The partner agencies co-designed risk education activities based on their capacities, with MAG staff providing training, support with planning and materials, and quality assurance.[100]
While schoolteachers received risk education training in some areas of Myanmar, risk education was not integrated into the national curriculum. However, ICRC reported in 2021 that a process was underway to integrate risk education into the school curriculum.[101]
HI began implementing a risk education project in IDP camps, in both government-controlled and NSAG-controlled areas of Kachin state in 2020. This included a training of trainers program for schoolteachers, in partnership with the Kachin Baptist Convention and People in Need.[102] ICRC and the Myanmar Red Cross Society provided risk education training to schoolteachers and other government staff.[103]
HI trained community risk education volunteers and partner organizations in disability awareness and inclusive livelihoods.[104] ICRC trained risk education volunteers from communities in NSAG-controlled areas to provide risk education in IDP camps and conflict-affected villages.[105]
Villagers were encouraged by operators to report mines/ERW to local authorities.[106]
Major developments in 2020
In January 2020, the HALO Trust provided training to staff of the Rakhine Ethnic Congress in risk education and first-aid, enabling them to pass on their knowledge to conflict-affected communities in Rakhine state.[107]
In 2020, amid restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, operators used television and social media sites, such as Facebook, to provide risk education messages.[108] NPA provided some remote and digital risk education, but planned to resume face-to-face sessions in 2021.[109] HI delivered risk education through three radio stations (Bhamo Diocese, Lashio Diocese, and Myitkyina Diocese) and three social media platforms (Facebook, WeChat, and Viber).[110] DRC developed online risk education sessions, available on platforms including Facebook, Messenger, Skype, and Viber.[111] ICRC provided risk education messages through radio stations, television, and a news agency.[112]
In August 2020, the HALO Trust began to provide modified risk education sessions in households receiving delivery of hygiene materials.[113]
HI was unable to fully deliver on one of its risk education projects in communities due to the access restrictions imposed amid the COVID-19 pandemic.[114]
Several emergency risk education sessions were held in northern Shan state in 2020, in response to displacement amid armed conflict.[115]
Marking
The Tatmadaw has produced warning signs and fenced some known mined areas in Myanmar, but it is not known to what extent this marking is systematic.[116]
Victim assistance
Victim assistance operators[117]
Type of organization |
Name of organization |
Type of activity |
Governmental |
Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MoSWRR) |
Socio-economic support; rehabilitation services; vocational training school for adults with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors |
Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS) |
Prosthetic centers and two orthopedic hospitals |
|
Ministry of Defense (MoD) |
Provision of prosthetic devices through three centers
|
|
National |
Nu Daw Mya Yi Foundation |
Prosthetics work camps in Yangon, in conjunction with Jaipur Foot of India |
Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People |
Production of prosthetics at the Kho Kay Prosthetic Clinic in Hpapun, Kayin state |
|
Karen Health and Welfare Department |
Medical first-aid assistance and amputation surgeries |
|
Karenni Health Workers Organization |
Prosthetics in Loikaw, Kayah state |
|
Karuna Mission Social Solidarity |
First-aid and immediate assistance to survivors |
|
Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association |
Advocacy on disability rights, production of assistive devices, and encouragement of economic inclusion via employment |
|
International |
Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR-Japan) |
Vocational training, referrals, advocacy on survivors’ rights |
Exceed Worldwide |
Operates the prosthetics workshop at the National Rehabilitation Hospital in Yangon; and financially supports the Myanmar School of Prosthetics and Orthotics, and a prosthetics workshop in Mandalay |
|
Leprosy Mission–Myanmar |
Rehabilitation and prosthetics |
|
Humanity & Inclusion (HI) |
Community-level data collection on victims; mapping of services and barriers to access; assessment and referrals; psychosocial support; socio-economic inclusion; repair of mobility devices; advocacy on survivors’ and victims’ needs; and capacity-building of the Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association |
|
World Education |
Physical rehabilitation; economic inclusion; access to medical and vocational funds; and advocacy on survivors’ and victims’ needs |
|
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/Myanmar Red Cross Society |
Support to five rehabilitation centers: one under the Myanmar Red Cross Society in Hpa-An; three under the MoHS in Kyaing Tong (eastern Shan), Mandalay, and Myitkyina (Kachin); and a prosthetics and orthotics workshop in Buthidaung township, Rakhine state |
|
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) |
Financial assistance covering medical costs and rehabilitation, including transport, for war victims and mine survivors; and economic inclusion through livelihood programs |
Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.
Major developments
Needs assessment
In May 2020, HI conducted a survey—mainly by telephone interview—of persons with disabilities and the impacts of COVID-19. Priorities identified by the survey included COVID-19 prevention awareness, distribution of food and non-food items (including hygiene materials), distribution of items to enable communication (such as phone cards), and access to safe rehabilitation services. The Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association is to lead on implementing these priorities.[118]
Medical care and rehabilitation
Traumatic injuries are the main cause of ill health and the third-highest cause of death in Myanmar. Myanmar has few physicians trained in emergency medicine and they are generally not located in rural areas, which lack ambulance services to care for mine/ERW survivors on the way to hospital. Health centers in Myanmar’s three major cities lack adequate emergency response capacity—with Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon having only one emergency room each.[119]
Rehabilitation services are often not available to persons with disabilities in Myanmar, especially those living in rural areas. Existing physical rehabilitation centers cover only 10% of needs. Most centers are in larger cities, and travel expenses are prohibitive.[120]
The provision of and access to medical care and rehabilitation was further limited by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Mine victims found it difficult to get treatment in hospital due to the increase in COVID-19 patients. Often only outpatients were accepted, with appointments having to be made in advance.[121]
Following the coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s healthcare system was reported to have largely collapsed as health workers and teachers joined the country’s civil disobedience movement and/or were persecuted by the military regime. More than 250 attacks on healthcare workers or facilities in Myanmar were documented in the six months after the military coup.[122] Movement restrictions and fear of violence prevented people from seeking help in emergency clinics and hospitals.
In 2020, physical rehabilitation centers in Myanmar were supported by ICRC and HI, while one victim assistance center was supported by the Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association.[123]
ICRC supported nine physical rehabilitation projects, with five centers receiving ICRC support on a regular basis. A total of 298 mine/ERW survivors in Myanmar received physical rehabilitation services in 2020.[124] In February 2020, the government approved the opening of a prosthetics and orthotics workshop in Buthidaung township, Rakhine state, which also ran a mobile workshop to repair assistive devices and had a network of roving technicians to assist people in remote areas. Two rehabilitation centers were provided with raw materials for producing prosthetic feet, though access constraints prevented ICRC from providing similar assistance to a third center.[125]
The COVID-19 pandemic affected rehabilitation services, and all of the ICRC-supported facilities in Myanmar had to suspend their services for several months in 2020.[126]
Since 2017, HI has partnered the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)—a body within the Karen National Union (KNU)—to provide support in both government-controlled and NSAG-controlled areas of Kachin state.[127] In 2019, HI increased its support for medical care, using a social fund.[128] In 2020, HI continued to support the delivery of rehabilitation services in Kachin and Kayin states, and in the Bago region.[129]
As of May 2020, the Prosthetics Department of the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot—a Thai town on the border with Myanmar—which had previously provided prosthetics to people from Myanmar, ceased operations. A handover was planned to KDHW, and the clinic moved its equipment to a KDHW-run clinic in Klo Yaw Lay village, in Hpapun township, Kayin state. Mae Tao Clinic prosthetic technicians provided six months of training to six health workers from KDHW, the Pa-Oh Health Working Committee, and the Committee for Health and Development Network. Handover plans were postponed in 2020 due to travel restrictions and the closure of the Myanmar-Thailand border amid the COVID-19 pandemic, although the plan was to be reviewed in 2021.[130]
The World Education Community-Focused Rehabilitation Services project aimed to improve access and opportunities for victims of conflict and people with disabilities in Kachin state. The project intends to pilot the Community-Based Inclusive Development Demonstration Model in Myanmar. The model was developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded Okard Project, and implemented by World Education Laos. In November 2020, World Education Myanmar supported its partner, the Kachin Baptist Convention, to conduct a needs assessment in participating communities.[131]
Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion
Most mine/ERW survivors in Myanmar have had to abandon their traditional professions, making vocational training and alternative livelihood support necessary.[132]
The Association for Aid and Relief-Japan (AAR-Japan) continued to provide vocational training for persons with disabilities at its center in Yangon.[133]
Since 2018, HI ran a project in partnership with the Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association to improve socio-economic conditions for mine/ERW victims, via livelihood services in the Bago region and Kayin state, funded by the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[134] In 2020, HI supported two beneficiaries to attend skills training; while in 2021, three beneficiaries attended a vocational training center. Cash grants were provided to 78 people for income-generation activities in 2020. HI trained mine/ERW survivors in peer-to-peer counselling in the Bago region, and also in Kachin and Kayin states.[135]
In 2020, ICRC funding enabled one rehabilitation center to hire and train a new staff member, and to provide training to two physiotherapists in mental health and psychosocial support.[136]
ICRC also organized an online workshop in 2020 for players, coaches, and other members of the wheelchair basketball program of the National Paralympic Committee.[137]
World Education Myanmar supported self-help groups in Kayah state for persons with disabilities and their family members, enabling activities such as income-generation, saving, and lending.[138]
[1] Myanmar is divided into states and regions. States are the designated home areas to some of Myanmar’s larger ethnic minority groups. Other areas, which are not identified with a specific group, are referred to as administrative regions. The former military junta changed the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 and also changed the names of some states. Kayin state was previously known as Karen state, while the Bago region was previously known as the Pegu region. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma and the former state names. In this country profile, internal state and administrative region names are given in their current form.
[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) Myanmar, 25 May 2020; and by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[3] Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), ‘‘The MIMU 3W: Who is doing What, Where,’’ undated.
[4] One border-based organization, the Myanmar Red Cross, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and four international NGOs. See, MIMU, “Countrywide Overview - MIMU 3W,” May 2021.
[5] ICRC, “Where We Work: The ICRC in Myanmar,” 30 June 2014.
[6] Roger Fasth and Pascal Simon, “Mine Action in Myanmar,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Vol. 19, Issue 2, July 2015.
[7] See, for example, “Union Peace Conference—21st Century Panglong continues,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 2 September 2016. At the Union Peace Conference (UPC) in September 2016, Daw Wint Wah Tun of the NLD said of her Shardaw township, in Kayah state, that “local people do not feel secure as landmine fields pose a threat to their way of life.”
[8] Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 25–29 November 2019.
[9] Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Myanmar begins talk on landmine clearing program,” Myanmar Times, 3 February 2020.
[10] “Standard operating procedures for commanders drafted at JMC-U,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 20 January 2018. Col. Wunna Aung said: “Both sides are still discussing conducting workshops on mines. The NCA includes mine clearance work. But mutual trust needs to be created first so it is still under discussion and mine clearance cannot be implemented yet.”
[11] Ye Khaung Nyunt, “Second day of 10th Union Joint Monitoring Committee meeting in Yangon,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 5 May 2017.
[12] “Senior General meets New Zealand Ambassador,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 27 August 2017.
[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 27 April 2020.
[14] Statement of Myanmar, UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons, New York, 25 October 2019.
[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, NPA Myanmar, 18 March 2021.
[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021; and by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 15 May 2020.
[22] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG Myanmar, 25 May 2020.
[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 27 April 2020.
[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG Myanmar, 25 May 2020; and by Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Myanmar, 18 March 2021.
[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sith Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021; by Michelle Yesudas, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Adviser, and Nyo Nyo Thaw and Aye Thoung, Project Managers, HI, 18 May 2021; and by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020. See also, “Myanmar drafts national strategy for disabled,” Xinhua, 4 April 2019; GICHD, ‘‘Myanmar: Victim Assistance & Mine Risk Education,’’ presentation by Dr. San San Aye, Deputy Director General of the Department of Social Welfare, at Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors, in Geneva, 17 February 2015; and International Alert Myanmar and Kachinland Research Centre, “Conflict impacts on gender and masculinities expectations on people with disabilities in Kachin state: A rapid assessment,” December 2018.
[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sith Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021; and by Michelle Yesudas, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Adviser, and Nyo Nyo Thaw and Aye Thoung, Project Managers, HI, 18 May 2021.
[29] Myanmar Law Library, ‘‘Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 30/2015 - Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,’’ June 2015.
[30] Pyae Thet Phyo, “After delay, Disability Rights rules and regulations published,” Myanmar Times, 13 July 2018.
[31] UNICEF Myanmar press release, “The enactment of the new Child Rights Law by the Government of Myanmar a Landmark step,” 24 July 2019.
[32] The allowance will not be available until the 2015 disability rights law is enacted and a certification process is established by the government. Government of Myanmar, “Myanmar National Social Protection Strategic Plan,” December 2014, p. 53.
[33] Monthly assistance payments of MMK16,000 to MMK30,000 (approximately $8 to $16), depending on circumstances. A disabled child will get MMK16,000 per month and a disabled adult up to 64 years old will get MMK30,000. The project pilot areas are the East Dagon township of Yangon region, Pathein and Kangyi Taung townships of the Ayeyarwaddy region, Monywa, Ayardaw and Chaung Oo townships of Sagaing region, and Thaton and Paung townships of Mon state. See, Htoo Thant, “Pilot project to register disabled people for welfare,” Myanmar Times, 1 February 2019; and Htoo Thant, “Government to start disability payments,” Myanmar Times, 16 November 2017. Exchange rate from 2 October 2021: MMK1,852.99=US$1. Oanda.com.
[34] Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Myanmar begins talk on landmine-clearing program,” Myanmar Times, 3 February 2020.
[35] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021. Exchange rate from 2 October 2021: MMK1,852.99=US$1. Oanda.com.
[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[38] ICRC, ‘‘Annual Report 2019,’’ 29 June 2020, p. 350.
[39] ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 363.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michelle Yesudas, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Adviser, and Nyo Nyo Thaw and Aye Thoung, Project Managers, HI, 18 May 2021.
[42] Ibid.
[43] The Department of Rehabilitation reported that nine states and regions out of 15 were contaminated. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sith Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[44] Across Kayah and Kayin states, all 14 townships are contaminated. In Myanmar’s five other affected states, contaminated townships are as follows: Chin state (Hakka, Mindat, and Paletwa); Kachin state (Bhamo, Chipwi, Hpakant, Injangyang, Mansi, Mogaung, Mohnyin, Momauk, Myitkyina, Shwegu, Sumprabum, Tanai, Tsawlaw, and Waingmaw); Mon state (Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye); Rakhine state (Ann, Buthidaung, Kyaukphyu, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Myebon, Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, and Toungup); and Shan state (Hopong, Hsenwi, Hsihseng, Hsipaw, Kengtung, Konkyan, Kutkai, Kyaukme, Kyethi, Langkho, Lashio, Laukkaing, Lawksawk, Loilen, Manton, Mawkmai, Monghpyak, Mongkhet, Mongmit, Mongpan, Mongshu, Mongton, Mongyai, Muse, Namhsan, Namtu, Nanhkan, Nawnghkio, Pangsang, Pekon, Tachileik, Tangyan, and Ywangan). In the five affected regions, contaminated townships are as follows: Bago region (Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin, and Taungoo); Magway region (Minhla and Pauk); Mandalay region (Thabeikkyin); Sagaing region (Indaw, Kalewa, and Lay Shi); Tanintharyi region (Bokpyin, Dawei, Myiek, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu).
[45] Research by Landmine Monitor. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports by NGOs and other organizations of use, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel. The survey included casualty data from January 2007 through December 2018, and data from other informants from January 2008 through October 2019.
[46] See, for example, “Unexploded WWII bombs discovered at central Myanmar sports ground,” Coconuts Yangon, 30 September 2015; and Nay Thwin, “World War II ordnance kills three,” Democratic Voice of Burma, 20 March 2012.
[47] See, for example, this report on an unexploded aerial bomb allegedly from armed conflict in Kachin state in May 2018. Free Burma Rangers, “Rangers Help Vulnerable Civilians in Kachin State,” 8 December 2018.
[48] Myat Thura, “Official warns of rising landmine casualties,” Myanmar Times, 14 August 2019.
[49] UNICEF press release, “One out of four casualties of landmine incidents in Myanmar are children,” 4 April 2019.
[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sith Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[51] International Alert, “Conflict Impacts on Gender and Masculinities Expectations on People with Disabilities in Kachin State: A Rapid Assessment,” December 2018, pp. 14–15.
[52] Monitor meeting with Col. Min Htike Hein, Deputy Permanent Secretary for the Minister of Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyidaw, 29 June 2018.
[53] See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World, (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009). Unprecedented levels of information on Tatmadaw casualties were received in 2008 from the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military-led government, when 508 Tatmadaw casualties were identified. Information from this source has not been made available for any other year.
[54] Statement of Bangladesh, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
[55] MIMU, “Townships with Suspected Landmine Contamination (1999–2000) and Casualties in Myanmar (2019),” 2020. The infographic provides an 11-year overview of data from the Monitor (2007–2017), and is also available in Burmese. MIMU reported to the Monitor that the infographic was one of their most requested products.
[56] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG Myanmar, 25 May 2020.
[57] Durable Peace Programme, ‘‘Mine Risks in IDP Return and Resettlement Sites in Kachin State: Baseline Survey Results from DPP-MAG Joint Deployments,’’ briefing paper, June 2020.
[58] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Liam Harvey, Head of Programme, DRC Myanmar, 26 August 2021; and by Stephen Hall, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[59] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Liam Harvey, Head of Programme, DRC Myanmar, 26 August 2021.
[60] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Stephen Hall, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[61] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sofia Raineri, Programme Officer, MAG Myanmar, 3 September 2021.
[62] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, NPA, 18 March 2021.
[64] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DCA- Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) Myanmar joint office, 13 September 2021.
[65] “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. In August 2020, in Htatabin township in Bago region, farmers informed Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) researchers that they sometimes discovered landmines when clearing land for new plantations, after which they placed a warning or danger sign indicating that there should be no entry due to landmine contamination.
[66] “Seventeen Kachin IDP Families Return Home,” Kachin News Group/Burma News International, 4 February 2019.
[67] Dan Seng Lawn, “Safe and Dignified Returns? A Rapid Assessment of the Experiences of Returned Internally Displaced Persons in Nam San Yang Village, Kachin State, Myanmar,” United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Kachinland Research Centre, 12 December 2019.
[68] “Returned IDPs Demand Landmines Be Removed From Nam San Yang,” Kachin News Group/Burma News International, 25 March 2020.
[69] Ibid.; and “More Than One Year After IDPs Return to Nam San Yang, Burma Army Removes Landmines From Their Farmland,” Kachin News Group, 3 August 2020.
[70] Ye Mon, “An unhappy return for IDPs in Kachin State,” Frontier Myanmar, 22 August 2019.
[71] Myat Thura, “Myanmar Military clears mines to help villagers return home,” Myanmar Times, 16 December 2020.
[72] Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Myebon camp in Rakhine closed for landmine clearance, Tatmadaw says,” The Myanmar Times, 29 January 2020.
[73] “Since mid-January, over 13,000 IDPs in Arakan State register to return home,” Development Media Group, 19 February 2021; and “Landmine clearance said to make way for IDPs in some Arakan townships,” Development Media Group, 25 February 2021.
[74] “Quick win projects intended to narrow development gap between Rakhine State and other states,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 March 2021, p. 12.
[75] “Mine clearance ineffective in Arakan state,” Burma News International, 25 May 2021.
[76] “Military, AA negotiate to clear landmines from Arakan’s forests,” Development Media Group, 10 March 2021.
[77] FBR, ‘‘New Rangers Graduate Relief Team Training and Go Now to Help People Under Attack,’’ 1 January 2021.
[78] KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020.
[79] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Diector, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021; MIMU, “The MIMU 3W: Who is doing What, Where,” 23 August 2020; Land Portal, ‘‘Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People,’’ undated; Durable Peace Programme, ‘‘Ta-ang Student Youth Union (TSYU),’’ undated and UNOCHA, “Mine Risk Education in Myanmar: When Knowledge is Power,” 6 March 2019; Durable Peace Programme, ‘‘Nyein (Shalom Foundation),’’ undated; Durable Peace Programme, ‘‘Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WPN),’’ undated; DCA, ‘‘DCA and NCA in Myanmar,’’ undated; DDG, ‘‘Where We Work: Myanmar,’’ no longer available online; JOIN, ‘‘International Assistance in Myanmar,’’ undated; response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020; by Bishu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021; by Geoff Moyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 4 March 2021; by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021; and by Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DCA-NCA, Myanmar, 13 September 2021.
[80] HALO Trust data from Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 4 March 2021; HI data from Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021; NPA data from Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, NPA Myanmar, 18 March 2021; and UNICEF data from UNICEF presentation, “Mine action 2020: Summary of Results,” May 2021.
[81] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 19 March 2021.
[82] Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 25–29 November 2019.
[83] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021; by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 4 March 2021; and UNICEF presentation, “Mine Action 2020: Summary of Results,” May 2021.
[84] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[85] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021; and UNICEF presentation, “Mine Action 2020: Summary of Results,” May 2021.
[86] MIMU, “Countrywide Overview – MIMU 3W,” May 2021; and UNICEF, ‘‘Mine Action in Myanmar Fact Sheet (as of 31st March 2020),’’ April 2020.
[87] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[88] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[89] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 15 May 2020 and 31 August 2021.
[90] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[91] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[92] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, NPA Myanmar, 18 March 2021.
[93] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG Myanmar, 25 May 2020.
[94] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 27 April 2020.
[95] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[96] GICHD, ‘‘Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in challenging contexts,’’ August 2020.
[97] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[98] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 27 April 2020; by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 25 May 2020; by Michael Hortia, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021; and by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[99] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[100] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bekim Shala, Country Programme Manager, MAG Myanmar, 25 May 2020.
[101] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[102] Minutes of VATG meeting, 13 March 2020.
[103] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[104] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[105] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahat, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[106] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Liam Harvey, Head of Programme, DRC Myanmar, 26 August 2021.
[107] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 27 April 2020.
[108] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[109] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kyaw Kyaw Oo, Operations Coordinator, NPA Myanmar, 18 March 2021.
[110] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Hortia, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[111] DDG, ‘‘Virtual Mine Risk Education in Myanmar,’’ 10 June 2020.
[112] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bishnu Mahar, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[113] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Myanmar, 4 March 2021.
[114] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Horita, Field Coordinator, HI Myanmar, 16 March 2021.
[115] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 4 March 2021; and HALO Trust, “Latest: Keeping families safe in Myanmar,” undated.
[116] Monitor interview with photojournalist accompanying Tatmadaw clearance engineers in Kayin state in August 2015. Signs were placed near a site of armed conflict between a Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) splinter group and the Tatmadaw in Hlaing-Bwe township during reported clearance. The photographer provided an image of the signs to the Monitor on 3 August 2018, and said the truck in which he traveled with the Tatmadaw had many mine warning signs. In November 2018, in eastern Bago region, after a mine incident near a school in Tha Pyay Nyunt village, Tatmadaw soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 8/53 fenced the area to make it inaccessible. KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2019.
[117] AAR-Japan, “Where we work: Myanmar,” undated; Exceed Worldwide, “The Myanmar School of Prosthetics and Orthotics: MSPO,” undated; The Leprosy Mission International, “Myanmar,” undated; HI, “Country Card: Myanmar,” updated September 2020; World Education Myanmar Facebook page; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 363.
[118] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Michelle Yesudas, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Adviser, and Nyo Nyo Thaw and Sye Thoung, Project Managers, HI, 18 May 2021.
[119] Susan Becker, “Progress towards health systems strengthening in Myanmar,” Journal of Global Health Reports, Vol. 2, 30 March 2018.
[120] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2018 Annual Report,” 2019, p. 45.
[121] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Michelle Yesudas, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Adviser, and Nyo Nyo Thaw and Aye Thoung, Project Managers, HI, 18 May 2021.
[122] Physicians for Human Rights, “At Least 252 Reported Attacks and Threats to Health Care in Myanmar During Six Months of Military’s Crackdown,” 10 August 2021.
[123] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sithu Win, Deputy Director, Department of Rehabilitation, 11 March 2021.
[124] ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 365.
[125] Ibid., p. 363.
[126] Ibid., p. 363.
[127] HI, “Myanmar 2018,” September 2018.
[128] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fabrice Vandeputte, Regional Programme Director, HI, 14 May 2020.
[129] HI, “Country Card: Myanmar,” updated September 2020.
[130] Monitor interview with Naw Annie Po Moo, Director of Operations, Mae Tao Clinic, 28 January 2020. The Prosthetics Department, and the new operations in Klo Yaw Lay clinic, receive financial support from Together Against Landmines (Gemeinsam gegen Landminen, GGL), an NGO based in Austria. See, Mae Tao Clinic, “Biennial Report 2019–2020,” 2021, p. 24.
[131] See, World Education Myanmar Facebook page.
[132] DDG, “DDG Study Aims to Counter Rise in Victims from Mines in Myanmar,” 16 January 2018.
[133] AAR-Japan, “Annual Report 2018: April 2018–March 2019,” 2019, p. 17; AAR-Japan, “Where We Work: Myanmar,” undated.
[134] HI, “Country Card: Myanmar,” updated September 2020.
[135] Ibid.
[136] ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 363.
[137] Ibid.
[138] See, World Education Myanmar Facebook page.
Mine Ban Policy
Policy
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]
Following the military coup on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar Armed Forces created a provisional government, which has since struggled for recognition.[2] In April 2021, parliamentarians who had been elected in November 2020 formed an oppositional National Unity Government (NUG) from exile.[3] Myanmar did not take any steps during 2021 or the first half of 2022 to accede to the treaty.
Prior to the coup, Myanmar officials had expressed interest in the Mine Ban Treaty and welcomed its humanitarian provisions.[4] Myanmar often stated that it was studying the treaty with a view to joining in the future.[5] In November 2020, Myanmar stated that it “attentively” follows the work of the treaty, which it said plays “an important role in ending the human suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel land mines.”[6]
Myanmar did not participate in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty.
Since then, it has participated as an observer at several meetings of the treaty, including the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.[7] Most recently, representatives from Myanmar’s army-led government, the State Administration Council (SAC), attended the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties held virtually in November 2021, and the intersessional meetings held in Geneva in June 2022.
The NUG continues to hold Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations (UN) in New York. In December 2021, Myanmar abstained from voting on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 76/26, which promoted the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Myanmar has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution supporting the treaty since 1997.[8]
In December 2021, Mine-Free Myanmar held a press conference in Bangkok to launch Landmine Monitor 2021.[9] For the first time since 2010, a military censorship decree prevented the campaign from publishing within the country the Monitor’s annual country report on Myanmar.[10] During 2021, the UN’s Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) produced an updated map of the country’s mine-affected areas and infographics showing the impact of landmines.[11]
Production, transfer, and stockpiling
State-owned enterprise Myanmar Defense Products Industries, known as Ka Pa Sa, produces at least five types of antipersonnel landmine: MM1, MM2, MM3, MM5, and MM6.[12]
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar often publish photographs showing antipersonnel landmines produced by the state and held by frontline Myanmar Armed Forces units for use. For example, in May 2021, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Arakan National Council (ANC) displayed MM2 antipersonnel mines obtained after their forces seized a Myanmar Armed Forces military base in Kayin state.[13] In August 2021, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) displayed MM5 and MM6 antipersonnel mines captured after fighting with the Myanmar Armed Forces in eastern Muse township.[14] In November 2019, a NSAG in northern Shan state published photographs showing MM2 antipersonnel mines made by Myanmar Defense Products Industries with markings indicating that the mines were manufactured in 2018.[15]
Myanmar is not known to have exported antipersonnel landmines.[16] Myanmar previously imported or otherwise acquired and used antipersonnel mines manufactured in China, India, Italy, Russia or the former Soviet Union, and the United States (US).[17]
There is no publicly available information on the types or quantities of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled by the Myanmar Armed Forces.
Production, transfer, and stockpiling by non-state armed groups
Various NSAGs in Myanmar have produced improvised blast and fragmentation antipersonnel mines, including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the KNLA, and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). Victim-activated explosive devices are comprehensively prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, regardless of whether they were manufactured in a factory or improvised from locally available materials. Some NSAGs in Myanmar have also produced Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines and antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices.
NSAGs in Myanmar continued to produce improvised antipersonnel mines in 2021–2022.[18] These groups have also acquired landmines by removing them from mined areas and obtaining them on the clandestine arms market.[19]
In 2022, NSAGs also seized or captured antipersonnel mines from the Myanmar Armed Forces. The Monitor has seen photographs of mines captured in 2022 by the Arakan Army, the KIA, the Karenni Army, the KNLA, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and several People’s Defense Force (PDF) groups in Shan, Kayin, and Kayah states, and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions.[20]
Use
The Monitor has documented extensive use of antipersonnel landmines by the Myanmar Armed Forces, and by various NSAGs operating in Myanmar, since the first annual Landmine Monitor report was published in 1999.
New use by Myanmar Armed Forces
Myanmar’s Armed Forces have extensively used antipersonnel mines since the military coup in February 2021. This activity marks a significant increase in new use, including use around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.
Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by NSAGs every month from January to September 2022, in virtually every part of the country. In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by and in the possession of the Myanmar Army were captured in both the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the armed forces.[21]
An investigation by Amnesty International documented civilian casualties from MM2 and MM6 antipersonnel landmines laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces in the townships of Demoso, Hpruso, and Loikaw, in Kayah state, between February and June 2022.[22]
Examples of specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel landmine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces since February 2021 are detailed below.
In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe, in Pekon township, Shan state.[23]
In August 2022, a local militia discovered MM6 antipersonnel landmines laid around the perimeter of Letpadaung Copper Mine in Salingyi township, Sagaing region. The copper mine is a joint venture by the Myanmar military’s Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. and China’s state-owned Norinco Industries.[24]
In July 2022:
- Two civilians returning after fleeing their village in Kawlin township, Sagaing region, were injured by a landmine allegedly emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[25]
- There were multiple incidents of people being injured by landmines near the perimeter of Myanmar Armed Forces camps in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state.[26]
- Two Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers accompanied a villager to recover the body of his son, who had stepped on a mine in Zu Kaing village, in Ann township, Rakhine state. They removed two mines on the way which they said had been laid by a unit of the Myanmar Armed Forces.[27]
- The Myanmar Armed Forces allegedly closed a ferry service in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, and laid mines around it to prevent KNLA fighters from using it.[28]
In June 2022, three mines were found in a church compound in Daw Nye Ku, in Demoso township, Kayah state that Myanmar Armed Forces had left earlier that day, while a fourth mine injured a boy.[29] Landmine use attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces the previous month in Kayah state caused casualties among KNDF fighters.[30]
In May 2022, in Puangde township, Bago Region, the Myanmar Armed Forces allegedly laid mines at a Buddhist monastery that they had occupied.[31]
In April 2022:
- A police officer who had defected to PDF resistance groups stated that the Myanmar Army had ordered the laying directional and other antipersonnel mines at police posts.[32]
- A mine allegedly laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces at the base of a mobile phone tower in Mahlaing township, Mandalay region, injured a civilian.[33]
- Civilians were injured by landmines upon returning to their village in Loikaw township, Kayah state after the departure of Myanmar Armed Forces troops.[34]
In March 2022:
- Civilians in Mhan Taw village, Khin U township, Sagaing region, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left mines around the bodies of people killed during a raid.[35]
- Locals alleged that the Myanmar Armed Forces had emplaced landmines at a checkpoint at the entrance to a bridge in Dawei township, Tanintharyi region.[36]
In February 2022:
- A civilian returning to Kinsanpya village, Kani township, Sagaing region was killed by a mine allegedly laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces during a raid.[37]
- A youth was injured by a mine laid by Myanmar Armed Forces Infantry Brigade 284 in Kyat Ka Chaung village tract, in Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state.[38]
In January 2022, a man was severely injured after stepping on a landmine near Nang Khing village, in Demoso township, Kayah State. KNDF alleged that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid the mine, as well as other mines in the area which had claimed ten victims.[39]
In December 2021, two villagers were injured by a mine when they returned home after their village in Mingin township, Sagaing region was occupied by the military.[40]
In November 2021:
- Local media reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid antipersonnel mines near the base of mobile phone towers in at least 48 townships across the country, causing casualties among mobile phone company engineers.[41]
- Residents of Hsipaw township, Shan state, were warned of mines being laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces around a pumping station for an energy pipeline.[42]
In September 2021:
- A civilian was killed and two were injured in Kayah state after they returned to a village following a raid by the Myanmar Armed Forces. A local militia group said it had found 30 landmines left by the military.[43]
- An employee from a military-owned telecommunications company was seriously injured after stepping on a mine placed outside a cell phone tower near Nant Hwe village, Muse township. It was alleged that the Myanmar Armed Forces had mined the bases of mobile phone towers in response to attacks by local militia groups.[44]
In August 2021:
- A farmer was injured by a landmine outside a Myanmar Armed Forces base in Usoungtaung village, Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state. According to locals, the area was commonly used by farmers and there had been no previous mine incidents.[45]
- A child tending cows was killed by a mine laid near the perimeter of a Myanmar Armed Forces base in Myi Tung Mare village, Bhamo township, Kachin state.[46]
During 2021, residents of Ruktha village, in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state were given warnings by the Myanmar Armed Forces not to come near their base as it was mined.[47]
It is often difficult to assign responsibility for specific incidents in Myanmar to either the Myanmar Armed Forces, or a particular NSAG. Yet villagers often report landmine casualties in areas where armed conflict had recently occurred.
On 29–30 April 2022, armed conflict between a Border Guard Force and the KNLA left at least one landmine, which injured a person the following week.[48]
In March 2022, three children were killed after playing with a landmine they found in Hko Kham village, in Lashio township, Shan state. It was allegedly left during conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces and NSAGs affiliated to the Northern Alliance.[49]
In February 2022, in Minbya township, Rakhine state, a man was killed by a landmine at the site of recent clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the Arakan Army.[50]
In January 2022:
- A villager was killed by a mine in Li Hseng village, Mongkaing township, Shan state, which was blamed on recent fighting between two local NSAGs, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).[51]
- A villager was killed by a mine that had been recently laid near a mobile phone tower in Pauk Pin village, in Monywa township, Sagaing region.[52]
Prior to January 2022, the KNLA and the Myanmar Armed Forces had warned villagers in Meh Klaw village tract, Hpapun township, Kayin state, of landmines in the area which had caused the death of one villager.[53]
In August 2021, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) under the RCSS, and the Myanmar Armed Forces engaged in armed conflict in Shan state with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army, MNDAA, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). New civilian landmine casualties were reported near the conflict areas after this fighting.[54]
In July 2021, a child was injured by a landmine in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, in an area where the Myanmar Armed Forces and the Arakan Army had recently clashed.[55]
Atrocity/forced labor mine clearance
The Monitor has found evidence that the Myanmar Armed Forces has continued the practice of using civilians as ‘guides’ to walk in front of its units in mine-affected areas, effectively to detonate landmines. This is a grave violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.[56] There were several examples of this heinous practice during the second half of 2021.
In November 2021, Myanmar Army soldiers reportedly arrested a 16-year-old Chin boy and two adults, and forced them to walk in front of soldiers to detect landmines.[57]
In September 2021:
- Two farmers were reportedly forced to walk in front of a Myanmar Army column in Pekon, Shan state, in an area is known to be contaminated by mines.[58]
- Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers seized a woman in Paing Kalan Done village tract, in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, and forced her to walk in front of them as they entered KNLA territory.[59]
In August 2021, Myanmar Armed Forces Light Infantry Battalions 341 and 410, from Ler Toh camp in Hkaw Poo village tract, in Hpapun township, Kayin State, seized three women and forced them to carry materials and equipment, using them as human shields.[60]
In May 2021, the Mindat People’s Administrative Council told the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar that “The military…arrested ten Mindat youth and they forced them to walk in front of them as a human shield…the ten were walking ahead with the soldiers behind them.”[61] The area, in Mindat township, Chin state, was previously documented by the Monitor as being contaminated by landmines.
Bangladesh border
New mine casualties continued to occur on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh in 2022.[62] In 2017, the Monitor published evidence of Myanmar government forces using antipersonnel mines along the border.[63] A 2018 report by the Human Rights Council said there was “reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Myanmar Armed Forces, both in the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the ‘clearance operations’ with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh.”[64]
Bangladesh condemned this landmine use and urged Myanmar to “impose [a] moratorium on the use, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.”[65] In February 2021, two workers hired to repair the border fence between Bangladesh and Myanmar were injured by landmines.[66]
The Myanmar government denied using mines on the border with Bangladesh in a November 2018 statement, describing the evidence as “without merit.”[67] Myanmar again denied its involvement in mine use on the Bangladesh border in October 2020.[68]
Use by non-state armed groups
With at least 20 NSAGs fighting in Myanmar, it can be difficult to assign responsibility for use to a specific NSAG, but many have used landmines since the Monitor started reporting in 1999.
Since the military coup in February 2021, several local militia groups have been established, some of which identify as PDFs. PDF groups often declare allegiance to the NUG. Local media often report the use of “landmines” by such groups. Most of these are command-detonated roadside bombs, yet some are victim-activated landmines.[69] Pro-military militias, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in parts of the country.
The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs since July 2021.
In August 2022:
- The PDF in Tabayin township, Sagaing region, stated that landmines laid around its camp had caused several Myanmar Armed Forces casualties.[70]
- In Hpakant township, Kachin State, the KIA allegedly laid mines which caused two Myanmar Armed Forces casualties.[71]
In June 2022:
- The Phaung Pyin PDF stated that it had laid landmines which caused several Myanmar Armed Forces casualties in Paungbyin township, Sagaing region.[72]
- An anti-military militia said that a Myanmar Armed Forces soldier they had captured was killed by mines laid around the group’s camp in Bago region as he attempted to escape.[73]
- The Jahtu Zup People’s Militia Force in Hpakant township, Kachin State, allegedly laid mines to block access to a gold mine.[74]
- Landmines laid around a Yaw PDF camp in Gangaw township, in Magway region, reportedly caused several Myanmar Armed Forces casualties during a raid.[75]
In May 2022, landmines laid on a path by a PDF reportedly caused casualties to a Myanmar Armed Forces patrol in Mingin township, Sagaing region.[76]
In March 2022, mines laid by the KNLA killed one person and injured another in Meh Klaw village tract, in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[77]
In January 2022:
- A villager was killed by a mine planted by the KNLA in Kyaukkyi, Bago region.[78]
- Armed conflict between the RCSS, SSPP, and members of the Northern Alliance in Kyaukme township, Shan state, allegedly involved the laying of mines which caused civilian injuries in February–March 2022.[79]
In December 2021, locals blamed the Border Guard Force for laying a mine which caused civilian injuries near Kyaw Kayt Kee village, in Hpaan township, Kayin state.[80]
In August 2021, a PDF group claimed that its use of landmines in Pekon township, Shan state had caused several Myanmar Armed Forces casualties.[81]
In July 2021:
- Villagers claimed the TNLA was responsible for laying mines in Lwe Kwe village tract, in Namhsan township, Shan state which denied access to agricultural lands.[82]
- A mine reportedly laid by KNLA Battalion 102 killed one person in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[83]
- A combined Katha PDF and KIA force claimed that its use of landmines had caused Myanmar Armed Forces casualties.[84]
The use of antivehicle landmines by groups opposed to the military also caused civilian casualties in 2021.[85]
The SAC claims to have recovered a variety of improvised mines during operations against armed groups opposed to the military coup.[86]
There were several incidents between May and December 2021 involved the use of bombs or booby-traps in urban areas. In most cases, the victims were engaged in the removal of rubbish, and the explosive device was contained in a black plastic bag.[87]
Previously, in 2011, Myanmar’s government announced its intent to conclude peace agreements with NSAGs. On 15 October 2015, eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government, committing to “end planting of mines” and “cooperate on the process of clearing all landmines.” Since the February 2021 military coup, this commitment no longer appears to be operational.
In past years, some NSAGs and former NSAGs in Myanmar unilaterally renounced antipersonnel mine use by signing the Deed of Commitment, administered by Geneva Call, a Switzerland-based non-governmental organization (NGO).[88] The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) signed it in 2007 and its armed wing, the TNLA, has previously promised to refrain from mine use.[89] In June 2017, the TNLA denied allegations of new use and affirmed that it had not used landmines since signing the Deed of Commitment.[90] In July 2022, the Arakan Army stated that it used solely command-detonated landmines, but gave no indication as to the status of large numbers of antipersonnel mines that it has captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces.[91]
Responses to new landmine use
Previously, various Myanmar government officials have admitted or denied that government forces use antipersonnel landmines.[92]
In June 2022, an officer of the Myanmar Armed Forces told the Monitor that Myanmar does not lay antipersonnel mines.[93] In October 2020, Myanmar denied reports that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid mines on the border with Bangladesh.[94]
In July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence told the Monitor that landmines were still used by the Myanmar Armed Forces in border areas and around infrastructure.[95] In September 2016, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Major General Myint Nwe, told the Myanmar parliament that the army continued to use landmines in internal armed conflicts.[96]
NSAGs active in Myanmar often blame government forces, or each other, for using antipersonnel mines.[97]
In July 2022, Amnesty International condemned antipersonnel mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces as a war crime, and documented use occurring in early 2022 in Karenni (Kayah) state.[98]
In June 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar documented casualties due to antipersonnel mines, focusing in particular on the impact on children and recommending that a future civilian government accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.[99]
In November 2021, at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL condemned new use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar, and called on all governments to strongly condemn this use.[100]
[1] The military junta that previously ruled the country changed its name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups in Myanmar, and a number of other countries, still refer to the country as Burma. Internal state and region names are given in their various forms as per local usage, for example, Karenni (Kayah) state. Since 2009, the Monitor has used township names according to those used by the United Nations (UN) Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU). For more information, see the MIMU website.
[2] The Myanmar Armed Forces refer to themselves as the Tatmadaw.
[3] The Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was formed on 1 August 2021 by the State Administration Council (SAC), with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as its chair.
[4] In November 2019, Myanmar’s former Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Win Myat Aye, stated, “Myanmar recognizes the importance of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in putting an end to the suffering and human casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, in saving lives and in returning hope and human dignity. We also believe that universalization of the convention is vital in reducing humanitarian harms. Building lasting peace is the most fundamental and important task in the process of stopping future use of anti-personnel mines.” Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.
[5] Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.45, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, New York, 6 November 2019. UNGA, Official Records, A/C.1/74/PV25, p. 1. This is virtually the same as its statement the previous year. Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.53/rev.1, 73rd Session, UNGA First Committee, Audio Record of 31st Meeting (at 19 mins.), New York, 8 November 2018. See also, Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.40, 72nd Session, UNGA First Committee, New York, 31 October 2017. UNGA, Official Records, A/C.1/72/PV26, pp. 18–19 and 29.
[6] Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16 November 2020.
[7] Myanmar previously attended Meetings of States Parties in 2003, 2006, and 2011–2013. It did not participate in the Review Conferences held in 2004, 2009, or 2014. Myanmar participated in intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013–2014, 2016, 2019, and 2021.
[8] “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 76/26, 6 December 2021. In 1996, Myanmar voted in favor of a UNGA resolution calling on governments to pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, but abstained once the Mine Ban Treaty opened for signature in 1997.
[9] The Mine-Free Myanmar initiative was initially known as “Halt Mine Use in Burma/Myanmar.” See, Mine-Free Myanmar website.
[10] From 2010, when previous censorship laws were repealed, until 2020, the Monitor’s annual country profile on Myanmar/Burma was printed and distributed, in the Burmese language, in the country every year. The 2021 profile in Burmese is available online.
[11] MIMU, “Townships with Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination (1999–2021) and Landmine/ERW Casualties in Myanmar (2020),” 3 November 2021. MIMU reports that the infographic is one of their most requested products.
[12] The MM1 is modeled on the Chinese Type-59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine; the MM2 is similar to the Chinese Type-58 blast mine; the MM3 is a bounding mine; the MM5 is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine; and the MM6 is a copy of the United States (US) M14 low metal content antipersonnel mine. Myanmar also produces the MM4 antivehicle mine.
[13] Mine-Free Myanmar, “Antipersonnel landmines found at Tatmadaw frontline military outpost,” 9 May 2021.
[14] “15 Myanmar Junta Soldiers Reported Killed in Shan State,” TheIrrawaddy, 31 August 2021. While these mines were captured before use, they were reportedly stored in a lightly-armed frontline military base. This is the type of situation where the Myanmar Armed Forces has stated to the Monitor that it uses landmines.
[15] The allegation and photographs were published on a Facebook page associated with the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), 3 December 2019. Photographs since that time rarely show production markings, but when they do, they are all prior to 2018 so it is unclear how much production is ongoing.
[16] In 1999, Myanmar’s representative to the UN stated that the country supported banning exports of antipersonnel mines. Yet no formal moratorium or export ban has been proclaimed. See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], August 2000), p. 469.
[17] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: HRW, October 2004), p. 938. The mines include Chinese Types-58, -59, -69, and -72A; Soviet POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMN-1, and PMD-6; US M14, M16A1, and M18; and Indian/British LTM-73 and LTM-76.
[18] Photographs in June 2022 showed improvised antipersonnel landmines, among other weapons, reportedly made by the Launglon People’s Defense Force (LLPDF) in the Tanintharyi region. See, “Junta troops raid Launglon PDF camp,” Burma News International (BNI)/Mizzima, 6 July 2022.
[19] Landmine Monitor 2009 identified the presence of US-made M26 bounding antipersonnel mines in Myanmar but could not identify the source or the user. In 2010, a confidential source indicated that the KNLA had received many M26 mines from the Royal Thai Army in the past, before Thailand joined the Mine Ban Treaty. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 1,013.
[20] The Monitor found from January–September 2022, in a non-exhaustive survey of media photographs, over 25 instances of mines being captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1, MM2, MM5 and MM6, in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. The mines were captured by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or NUG-affiliated PDFs in those areas after overrunning Myanmar Armed Forces outposts, or after capturing or ambushing a military patrol.
[21] On 31 August, the Arakan Army displayed captured MM2 and MM5 antipersonnel landmines, among other weapons, from the remaining arsenal in a camp it overran at Border Post 40 in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state. See, “Arakan Army says it has captured Myanmar military camp near Bangladesh border,” Development Media Group, 31 August 2022. On 16 August, KIA rebels and PDF fighters captured 11 MM6 antipersonnel mines from captured Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Pinlaebu township, Sagaing region, according to the BBC Burmese Facebook post. On 15 August, the Arakan Army captured seven MM6 (M14) antipersonnel landmines, among other weapons from captured Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Paletwa township, Chin state. On 25 August, the Kantbalu PDF captured five MM6 (M14) antipersonnel landmines among other weapons from captured Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Kantbalu township, Sagaing region. See, Lungekhit News Facebook post.
[22] “Myanmar: Military’s use of banned landmines in Kayah State amounts to war crimes,” Amnesty International, 20 July 2022.
[23] The Mobye PDF warned returning local people they should avoid the grounds of the church as it had been mined. “Junta weapons seized from Catholic church in Shan State’s Mobye Township,” Mizzima, 15 September 2022.
[24] North Yamar PDF lifted 78 MM6 antipersonnel landmines which it stated had been planted by the Myanmar Armed Forces around the copper mine. See, The Irrawaddy (Irrawaddy News), “North Yamar People’s Defense Force defused 78 landmines planted by the regime to protect the China-backed Letpadaung copper mine in Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region. Photo- North Yamar PDF.” 19 August 2022, 09:09 UTC. Tweet.
[25] Aung Aung, “Villagers stepped on Junta’s planted landmines in Sagaing,” Tha Din News and Radio, 1 August 2022.
[26] Aung Aung, “Mine exploded near junta’s station in Mrauk U, 4 children injured, 2 in critical condition,” Tha Din News and Radio, 18 July 2022.
[27] The man’s 14-year-old son had been killed the day before and he wished to retrieve the body. After removing two mines, which the soldiers said had been laid by the 66th Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces, they prevented the man from traveling further. See, “Six killed, 11 injured by landmines amid renewed tensions in Myanmar’s Rakhine state,” Radio Free Asia, 12 July 2022.
[28] “Locals worry about junta’s landmines in Kyaukgyi,” Than Lwin Times, 27 July 2022. On different dates, one child was killed, and another person injured by these landmines.
[29] Monitor interview with David Eubank, Founder, Free Burma Rangers, 15 July 2022. According to Eubank, when the Myanmar Armed Forces left an area after armed conflict with the KNDF, the Free Burma Rangers discovered three mines in the compound of a church, and another four mines, including one that a 16-year-old boy had stepped on. He noted that bags or baskets left by departing soldiers each had between one and six landmines in them. These mines were reported to still be in their factory packaging.
[30] David Boi, “Two KNDF comrades had their legs amputated because of the junta’s landmines,” Tha Din News and Radio, 23 May 2022; Aung Aung, “A comrade from KNDF B-10 killed after stepping on a mine,” Tha Din News and Radio, 15 May 2022; and Aung Aung, “One comrade stepped on mine during clearance operation, lost both legs,” Tha Din News and Radio, 24 April 2022.
[31] Allegation made by Paungde PDF who said they had found the mines after the Myanmar Armed Forces departed. Aung Aung, “The junta soldiers stationed at the monastery planted mines after they retreated,” Tha Din News and Radio, 10 May 2022.
[32] The officer stated that the military council ordered the installation of landmines at police station entrances and exits to prevent PDFs from easily raiding them. “Claymore and anti-personal mines planted at police stations,” Than Lwin Times, 23 April 2022.
[33] The Myanmar Armed Forces were reported to be fencing and mining the base of mobile phone towers. See, Aung Aung, “15-year-old girl’s leg amputated due to a mine planted by Junta troops in Mahlaing,” Tha Din News and Radio, 3 May 2022.
[34] Karenni Human Rights Group (KHRG), “Quarterly Briefing,” Vol. 1, Issue 2, 13 July 2022, p. 3. The KHRG alleges that the casualties were the result of antipersonnel mines recently laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces.
[35] Kyaw Thu, “The residents of Mhan Taw village, Khin Oo Township were killed by the junta and mines were planted near the bodies,” Tha Din News and Radio, 8 March 2022.
[36] David Boi, “The Junta’s forces planted landmines in front of Ka Myaw Kin Bridge in Dawei,” Tha Din News and Radio, 2 April 2022.
[37] David Boi, “A junta’s mine exploded in Kani Township, killing one civilian,” Tha Din News and Radio, 6 February 2022.
[38] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. The Myanmar Armed Forces had issued verbal warnings to villagers not to enter the area, but the youth had just come to the area as his school elsewhere had been closed. It is uncertain when this minefield was first laid.
[39] “Near Nang Khing Village citizen loses leg after stepping on a mine,” Kantarawaddy Times, 16 January 2022.
[40] “Myanmar Civilian Forces Claim Dozens of Junta Troops Killed in Mine Attacks, Ambushes,” The Irrawaddy, 15 December 2021.
[41] New antipersonnel mines were laid near mobile phone towers across 48 townships in Chin, Kayin, Mon, and Shan states, and in the Ayawaddy, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions. Some of these areas, such as Ayawaddy and Yangon, had never previously been found to have antipersonnel mine contamination. See, “Telecoms tower sites mined by Myanmar military,” Myanmar Now, 5 November 2021.
[42] “Villagers’ security threatened by Burma Army landmines along Chinese pipelines in Hsipaw, northern Shan State,” Shan Human Rights Foundation, 18 January 2022.
[43] “Myanmar Junta Accused of Targeting Civilians with Landmines,” The Irrawaddy, 29 September 2021.
[44] “A staff who came to fix Mytel phone tower at Muse Township lost his feet after stepping on a landmine,” Eleven Myanmar, 29 September 2021; and “Security forces today laid mines by a Mytel tower in Mogok, Mandalay Region, according to local residents who had been ordered by the military troops involved to evacuate their homes,” Democratic Voice of Burma, 15 September 2021.
[45] “In Kyauktaw, a villager stepped on a landmine and lost one of his legs,” Myanmar Now, 18 August 2021.
[46] “A teenager was killed when he stepped on a landmine planted by the military council,” BNI, 9 August 2021.
[47] The date the mines were placed is unclear, yet the villagers lost livestock to the mines in early 2022 and still could not access the adjacent cemetery as of May 2022. See, Myint Zaw, “A 75-year-old woman was killed when she stepped on a landmine in Kyauk Taw Township,” Tha Din News and Radio, 3 June 2022.
[48] David Boi, “A citizen accidentally stepped on a landmine,” Tha Din News and Radio, 6 May 2022.
[49] “Landmine Kills Children In Northern Shan State Village,” Shan Herald Agency for News, 8 March 2022.
[50] “Minbya Twsp man found dead three days after landmine blast,” BNI, 11 February 2022.
[51] “Landmine Victim Left To Rot In Mong Kung Township,” Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2022.
[52] The Myanmar Armed Forces began laying mines around mobile phone towers after November 2021. See, David Boi, “A farmer dies after stepping on a landmine in Monywa,” Tha Din News and Radio, 14 January 2022.
[53] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. Although both parties had issued verbal warnings, it is unclear which actor laid the mines in the area. The villagers stated that there was no marking to make known precisely which areas were dangerous. Other villagers interviewed said the mines were laid by the KNLA.
[54] For example, in August 2021, two internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kyaukme township stepped on a mine after leaving an IDP camp to forage for food. RCSS, TNLA, and SSPP forces had all previously fought in the area. See, “IDPs Wounded By Landmine In Kyaukme Township,” BNI, 18 August 2021.
[55] “Teenage boy steps on landmine, loses leg in Ponnagyun Township,” Myanmar Now, 22 July 2021.
[56] Over the past two decades, the Monitor has reported disturbing evidence that the Myanmar military has forced civilians to clear antipersonnel mines without training or protective equipment, or forced civilians to guide or carry equipment for the Tatmadaw in mined areas. Such activities constitute a threat to the right to life, liberty, and security of person. During Myanmar’s first Universal Periodic Review of its human rights record, in 2011, the ICBL provided a submission detailing the use of human minesweepers. See Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Tenth Session, “Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1,” 18 October 2010.
[57] Human Rights Council, “Losing a generation: how the military junta is devastating Myanmar’s children and undermining Myanmar’s future: Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” A/HRC/50/CRP.1, 14 June 2022, p. 18, para. 63.
[58] “Burma Army Uses Farmers as Human Shields In Pekon Township,” Shan Herald Agency for News, 7 September 2021. “The soldiers used the farming couple as human shields. People try to flee their villages as soon as the soldiers arrive, because this kind of thing is common in our area,” a villager told the news agency.
[59] Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) and KHRG press release, “The Karen Women’s Organization and the Karen Human Rights Group Condemn the Burmese Junta’s Use of Women as Human Shields,” 3 September 2021.
[60] Ibid. The women were forced to march until they reached Kyaw Hta Loh river, where they were released after sustaining injuries.
[61] Human Rights Council, “Losing a generation: how the military junta is devastating Myanmar’s children and undermining Myanmar’s future: Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” A/HRC/50/CRP.1, 14 June 2022, p. 18, para. 63.
[62] “Bangladeshi injured in mine blast along Myanmar border,” New Age, 17 September 2022.
[63] According to the Monitor, local researchers interviewing and assisting displaced Rohingya civilians as they crossed into Bangladesh on 28 August 2017 saw an army truck arrive on the Myanmar side of the border from which they witnessed Myanmar government soldiers unloading three crates. They said the soldiers removed antipersonnel landmines from the crates and placed them in the ground, later returning at night to place more mines. According to the researchers, mines were emplaced in Taung Pyo Let Yar village tract, in Maungdaw township, adjacent to border pillar No. 31 in Bangladesh, an area that demarcates the start of the land border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Monitor email and phone interviews with non-governmental organization (NGO) researchers, who asked to remain anonymous, 17 September 2017.
[64] Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288.
[65] Statement of Bangladesh, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
[66] Kyaw Myo Aung, “Workers at border fence repair site in Maungdaw severely injured in landmine encounter,” Development Media Group (DMG), 23 February 2021.
[67] Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2018. The statement said “...the security forces of Myanmar and Bangladesh have been conducting coordinated patrol along the border in the west of Myanmar. Coordinated patrol has been made for 19 times so far since August of this year. No incidents of landmines casualty have been reported in the area. Such accusation without concrete evidence will not help facilitate countries to join the convention.”
[68] Statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 19 October 2020.
[69] For example, in Monywa township, Sagaing region, three local militias stated that they attacked junta soldiers coming to clear mines. See, Aung Aung, “Revolutionaries attack junta forces with mines in Monywa,” Tha Din News and Radio, 23 August 2022. In Ye-U township, Sagaing region, a coalition of local militias stated that when the Myanmar Armed Forces entered an area, they detonated the mines. See, Aung Aung, “Ten killed and many injured as junta troops mined in Ye-U,” Tha Din News and Radio, 14 August 2022. The Taze People’s Comrades in Taze township, Sagaing region, claimed that military vehicles triggered landmines they had laid near Doukgyi village. See, “More Than 40 Junta Troops Killed Across Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, 16 August 2021. Mines laid by the Southern Pauk Guerrilla Force in Pauk township, Magway region, killed 17 Myanmar Army troops. See, “Armed resistance replaces anti-coup protests in Pauk township,” Frontier Myanmar, 31 August 2021.
[70] Aung Aung, “Ten junta soldiers mined and killed at a PDF camp,” Tha Din News and Radio, 13 August 2022.
[71] “KIA Landmine Injuries Burma Army In Hpakant,” BNI/Kachin News Group, 16 August 2022.
[72] Aung Aung, “At least 10 Junta soldiers killed in Phaungpyin during a landmine attack by the PDF,” Tha Din News and Radio, 24 June 2022.
[73] Aung Aung, “Landmine killed a junta soldier who ran away,” Tha Din News and Radio, 12 June 2022.
[74] “Landmines Injures Civilians Near Hpakant Goldmine,” BNI/Kachin News Group, 29 June 2022. The Jahtu Zup People’s Militia Force are a pro-military militia.
[75] Kyaw Thu, “8 junta troops who invaded Yaw PDF camp killed by mine blasts; 1 Phyu Saw Htee killed by mines in Pauk Township,” Tha Din News and Radio, 8 June 2022.
[76] Myint Zaw, “Mines cut off 4 junta soldiers’ legs near Taegyi Village, MinKin Township,” Tha Din News and Radio, 25 May 2022.
[77] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. It is uncertain when the KNLA laid these landmines.
[78] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. Villagers stated that the mine was laid by Karen National Union (KNU) fighters, but did not indicate when.
[79] “Father Of Six Injured By Landmine In Northern Shan State,” Shan Herald Agency for News, 18 March 2022.
[80] David Boi, “Villager injured in landmine explosion in Hpa An Township,” Tha Din News and Radio, 11 December 2021.
[81] “Myanmar Resistance Landmines Kill Junta Troops After Attack on Power Line,” The Irrawaddy, 18 August 2021.
[82] “Two buffaloes from Lwe Khet village were trampled on by landmine and one died,” Shwe Phee Myay News Agency, 18 July 2021.
[83] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. KHRG researchers were told that no warning by the KNLA was issued. Nearby, another landmine caused minor injuries to two other people on the same day.
[84] “People’s Defence Force in Sagaing says it killed 180 junta troops with help of Kachin Independence Army,” Myanmar Now, 12 July 2021.
[85] “Mines exploded on the Monywa - Naunggyi Ai - Shwebo road and 2 cars were damaged and there were injuries,” Voice of Myanmar News, 30 November 2021; “Rescue vehicle runs over mines, hurting crew member,” BNI/Than Lwin Times, 12 September 2022; and David Boi, “POV overtook junta convoy, blasted by landmine, 6 killed,” Tha Din News and Radio, 10 April 2022.
[86] “Information Team of State Administration Council holds press conference 4/2021,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 10 April 2021, p. 5. From the photographs, it was not possible to determine the technical characteristics of the mines.
[87] The Monitor recorded at least 25 injuries or deaths among rubbish collectors in towns in Kayin and Shan states, and in the Magway, Sagaing, and Yangon regions betweeen May and December 2021.
[88] In the past, a few armed groups and former armed groups operating in Myanmar unilaterally renounced use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment. The Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) renounced use in July 2006. The Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), both now militarily defunct, renounced use in October 2003. The Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA), and the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization/Pa-O People’s Liberation Army (PPLO/PPLA) renounced use in April 2007. In June 2010, Geneva Call noted that the LDF and the PPLA had disbanded.
[89] Since 2014, Geneva Call has been pursuing inquiries about allegations of mine use made against the TNLA. See, Geneva Call, “Burma/Myanmar: Geneva Call urges an end to mine use in northern Shan State,” 14 July 2016.
[90] Amnesty International, “All the Civilians Suffer: Conflict, Displacement and abuse in Northern Myanmar,” 14 June 2017, p. 44.
[91] “Military-planted landmines causing civilian casualties in Arakan State: AA spokesman,” DMG, 11 July 2022.
[92] For example, in 2018, Myanmar stated that “the Myanmar Armed Forces is no longer using the landmines while safeguarding the life and property of its people in internal conflicts.” Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.
[93] The officer requested anonymity as he had no permission to speak on the issue.
[94] Statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 19 October 2020.
[95] The official said: “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.
[96] “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 September 2016. The deputy minister stated that the Tatmadaw used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges and power towers, and its outposts in military operations. The deputy minister also stated that mines were removed when the military abandoned outposts, or warning signs were placed where landmines were planted and soldiers were not present.
[97] For example, see Lawi Weng, “3 Civilians Reportedly Killed by Landmines in Shan State in June,” The Irrawaddy, 4 July 2018.
[98] Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Military’s use of banned landmines in Kayah State amounts to war crimes,” 20 July 2022.
[99] Human Rights Council, “Losing a generation: how the military junta is devastating Myanmar’s children and undermining Myanmar’s future: Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” A/HRC/50/CRP.1, 14 June 2022.
[100] ICBL, Statement on Universalization, Mine Ban Treaty Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 November 2021.
Support for Mine Action
In 2020, eight donors contributed US$4.1 million to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar for mine action; a 35% decrease compared to the annual level of funding received in 2019.[1]
2020 Monitor total does not include Denmark support to Danish Refugee Council (DRC) operations in Myanmar as it was part of a multisectoral humanitarian and resilience assistance programme, for which the specific amount going toward demining was not available, and as such could not be included in the Monitor support database.[2]
All international contributions went to non-technical survey, risk education, or victim assistance activities through non-governmental organizations.
International contributions: 2020[3]
Donor |
Sector |
Amount (national currency) |
Amount (US$) |
US |
Victim assistance |
US$1,000,000 |
1,000,000 |
United Kingdom |
Risk education |
£678,139 |
869,985 |
Switzerland |
Survey and risk education |
CHF590,000 |
628,395 |
European Union |
Survey and risk education |
€500,000 |
570,500 |
Sweden |
Survey and risk education |
SEK4,600,000 |
499,094 |
Norway |
Risk education |
NOK3,650,000 |
387,132 |
Luxembourg |
Victim assistance |
€73,525 |
83,892 |
Ireland |
Survey |
€70,000 |
79,870 |
Total |
N/A |
4,118,868 |
Since 2016, international mine action assistance to Myanmar has totaled more than $26.5 million, representing an average of $5.3 million per year.
Summary of international contributions: 2016–2020[4]
Year |
International contributions (US$) |
2020 |
4,118,868 |
2019 |
6,275,838 |
2018 |
2,872,606 |
2017 |
6,725,763 |
2016 |
6,525,640 |
Total |
26,518,715 |
[1] Emails from Carole Ory, Senior Expert, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service (EEAS), 29 June 2021; from Camilla Dannevig, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 September 2021; and from Erik Pettersson, Senior Programme Manager, Peace and Human Security Unit, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 28 September 2021; ; Response to Monitor questionnaire by Steve Hoscheit, Security Policy Desk, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 21 May 2021; Ireland Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2020, Form J, 30 April 2021; Sweden Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2021; Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, Form I, April 2021; United Kingdom Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2021; and United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "To Walk the Earth in Safety, January–December 2020," April 2021, p. 27.
[2] Denmark total support to DRC humanitarian operations in Myanmar in 2020 totaled DKK2,277,000 ($348,005), and included a demining element. Average exchange rates for 2020: DKK6.543=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kristine Dyregaard Nielsen, Head of Section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, 15 October 2021.
[3] Average exchange rates for 2020: €1=US$1.141; NOK9.4283=US$1; £1=US$1.2829; SEK9.2167=US$1; and CHF0.9389=US$. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2021.
[4] See previous Monitor reports.