Summary

Non-signatory Syria has shown little interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has acquired them and possesses stocks. The Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions repeatedly in 2012–2021, with the support of Russia. The use of cluster munitions in Syria has caused widespread harm, and has been met with strong international condemnation.

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria has shown little interest in the convention and has taken no steps to join it. The Syrian government commented publicly on the convention once, in 2011, when it expressed appreciation for it and described cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity.” However, Syria stated that it “cannot sign” the convention “due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]

Syria did not engage in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011. This was its first and, to date, only participation in a meeting of the convention.

In December 2021, Syria abstained from voting on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Syria has not explained why it has abstained from the vote on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced was 2015.

Syria is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but has imported and stockpiled them.

There is no publicly available information on the types and quantities of cluster munitions stockpiled by Syria. Yet based on documented use, Syria possesses at least 13 types of cluster munitions, as listed in the following table, but when and how the Syrian government obtained them is not known.[3]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[4]

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Use

Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, though the Monitor is not aware of any cluster munition attacks in the period from April 2021 to July 2022. Previously, at least a dozen cluster munition attacks were recorded in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

In Syria, the last credible evidence of cluster munition use was near Aleppo on 14 March 2021 by government forces, but subsequent attacks may have gone unreported.[5] In northeastern Syria, the head of the Tal Tamr Military Council reportedly alleged that Turkish-backed armed groups had used cluster munitions while shelling the village of Um Kef, near Tal Tamir in al-Hasakah governorate, on 4 June 2022.[6] The Monitor was not able to independently verify the alleged attack or determine whether cluster munitions were used.

At least 687 individual cluster munition attacks were recorded in Syria from July 2012 until March 2021.

Syrian government forces have been primarily responsible for use in the country, but Russian and Syrian government forces have used many of the same aircraft and weapons, and frequently carry out operations together. There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and has used them in Syria since October 2015.[7] Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[8]

There is no evidence to indicate that the United States (US) or its partners used cluster munitions in Syria.[9] The Islamic State used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014, and may have used them since.[10] It has not been possible to determine with confidence if other non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Syria have used cluster munitions.[11]

All except two types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union or its successor state, Russia.[12] The Syrian Air Force has used an array of RBK-series cluster bombs.[13] More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs, containing SPBE sensor-fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile, were used in Syria after Russia began its joint operation in the country in September 2015.[14]

Syrian government forces have used ground-launched cluster munitions since the end of 2012, deploying multi-barrel rocket launchers to fire 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions.[15] Since 2014, Syrian government forces have used Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets, which contain 9N210 or 9N235 submunitions and are fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[16] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles with 9N123K cluster munition warheads.

Responses to use of cluster munitions

The Syrian military has denied possessing cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on allegations of new use.[17] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria, but in 2016 claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[18]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, global public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[19] In September 2019, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.” [20] During the course of the meeting, at least 10 countries and the European Union (EU) publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[21]

Since May 2013, the UNGA has adopted more than nine resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[22] Since 2014, states have also adopted more than 17 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks.[23]

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by landmines left after successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948, but particularly as a result of the conflict in Syria since 2011. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, have also become increasingly prevalent in Syria in recent years, and have been used by multiple armed actors engaged in the conflict.[1] Non-state armed group (NSAG) the Islamic State planted IEDs in homes, public buildings, and service provision facilities when its fighters retreated from areas previously held by the group.[2]

Cluster munitions have been used extensively in 13 of Syria’s 14 governorates since 2012, with Tartus being the exception.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2021 reported that one in three populated communities in Syria were thought to be contaminated by explosive ordnance, and that one in two people were at risk from explosive ordnance contamination. Areas that experienced intense hostilities, including Aleppo, Idleb, Ar Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, and Dar’a governorates, were particularly affected.[3] In 2020, an average of 76 explosive incidents per day were recorded in Syria, while in some parts of eastern and western Ghouta—in Rural Damascus governorate—nearly 60% of surveyed land has been confirmed as hazardous.[4]

There is no national mine action program in Syria. Ongoing hostilities, shifting frontlines, and reports of continuing use of landmines by both pro- and anti-government forces has prevented systematic large-scale survey to determine the full extent of contamination. In government-controlled areas, some clearance has been undertaken by Russian and Syrian military engineers, civil defense forces, and by Armenian deminers. In northeastern governorates under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (KSDF), clearance has been undertaken by humanitarian demining organizations and commercial companies. Contamination impact surveys have been conducted by international operators, which provided information on hazards, victim needs, and risk behavior.

Risk education was the most widespread activity of the Mine Action Area of Responsibility within the Global Protection Cluster in 2019 and 2020. Conducted in government-controlled areas and in northwest and northeast of Syria by the United Nations (UN), international demining organizations and national organizations, risk education is integrated with other humanitarian protection activities related to education, shelter, health, food security, and livelihoods.[5] In total, 1,951,296 beneficiaries in Syria were reached through risk education in 2020, while more than 1,100 humanitarian workers were trained in risk awareness to support safe humanitarian access.[6] However, this represents a significant drop from the 3.3 million beneficiaries reached in 2019, largely due to the impact of COVID-19.[7] In a Joint Mine Action and Child Protection Inter-Sectorial Analysis conducted in December 2020, 70% of respondents reported that they had not received any risk education between May–August 2020.[8]

There is no national assistance program for victims of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Syria, however the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a Victim Assistance Working Group as part of the Damascus-based response under the Mine Action Sub-Sector, to coordinate activities and set technical standards among victim assistance stakeholders in Syria.[9] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide services as and where they can operate in Syria. The total number of mine/ERW casualties and survivors in Syria is unknown. However, estimates place the number of those injured and killed at several thousand, while 14,594 victims were crecorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database as of May 2021.[10]

Mine action operations and capacity in Syria were significantly impacted in all areas in 2020 by COVID-19, which resulted in movement restrictions and limitations on activities.[11] Limited access due to safety and security restrictions continued to impact operational reach in Syria, as did funding shortfalls.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Humanitarian mine action commenced in Syria in 2015.[12] UNMAS operates in the country, but Syria has no national mine action authority.

Governed by the framework of agreements between Syria and UN agencies, funds, and programs, as well as by UN Security Council Resolution 2504, the Mine Action Area of Responsibility response includes all pillars of humanitarian mine action.[13]

Coordination

As the lead agency for mine action and coordinator for the Mine Action Area of Responsibility within the Global Protection Cluster,[14] the UNMAS Syria Response represents the mine action sector at the Whole of Syria level and is responsible for drafting key documents such as the Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan. At operational level, a mine action sub-cluster is active in Gaziantep, Turkey, for humanitarian assistance delivered cross-border from Turkey. The mine action sub-cluster is co-lead by UNMAS and the HALO Trust, and meets monthly.[15]

UNMAS has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government and has maintained a presence in Damascus since 2018.[16] Activities include risk education, victim assistance, and explosive ordnance assessments. A Damascus-based mine action sub-sector, led by UNMAS, was established in Damascus in October 2019.[17]

In northeast Syria, in the absence of a UN mechanism, the NGO Forum has adopted a parallel coordination structure to manage the response and a mine action working group is active under the protection working group. Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) acts as the focal point for coordinating humanitarian mine action activities in northeast Syria.

Information management

An incident database is maintained at the regional level and is made available to partners in the humanitarian response. UNMAS maintains an IMSMA database for victim, accident, and risk education reports.[18] Since September 2017, iMMAP has provided information management services for northeast Syria, coordinating data received from operators on hazard locations and the results of non-technical survey, clearance, and risk education.[19] iMMAP also supports the Information Management Resource Center (IMRC), which was launched to support the Whole of Syria structure with information management, coordination, and capacity-building.[20]

Gender and diversity

Efforts to promote inclusive working conditions by UNMAS in Damascus resulted in a rise in the proportion of women employed in technical positions, from 33% in 2019 to 50% in 2020.[21]

Risk education management and coordination

UNMAS serves as the focal point for mine/ERW risk education in Syria, in its position as lead for the Mine Action Area of Responsibility at the Whole of Syria level.

From the Damascus-based response, a risk education working group was previously established by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) under the child protection sub-sector, and subsequently moved under the mine action sub-sector after its activation. UNMAS and UNICEF collaborate to harmonize and coordinate mine/ERW risk education activities for the Damascus-based response.[22] The Syria Hub technical standards and guidelines for risk education were under review as of June 2021.[23]

The Northwest Syria Mine Action Sub-Cluster established risk education standards for organizations operating within each geographic area.[24]

Coordination

Risk education activities are coordinated in each operational region of Syria by the relevant hub or mine-action sub-cluster group.

Operators conducting risk education in northwest Syria coordinate through the Mine Action Sub-Cluster. Risk education activities are endorsed by the Mine Action Sub-Cluster through the monthly dissemination of forward planning exercises to maximize outreach to at-risk communities and avoid the duplication of activities.[25] These operators also participate in the monthly Syria Protection Cluster meetings and the Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings held in Gaziantep, Turkey. These meetings cover risk education, population movements, security developments, movement restrictions, IMSMA reporting, priorities, training, and materials.[26]

Operators conducting risk education activities from the Damascus-based response coordinate through the Mine Action Sub-Sector. Specific issues, such as the harmonization of messages and materials, are discussed at technical level through the Risk Education Working Group. Operators also participate in monthly Syria Protection and Community Services Sector meetings and the Mine Action Sub-Sector meetings held in Damascus.[27]

UNMAS collects information on the response through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)-led ‘‘4Ws’’ system (who, what, where, when), and shares this information with mine action operators through dashboards.[28]

UNMAS collects monthly data on the activities of risk education operators in Syria, and also collates IMSMA reporting.[29] This information is used to inform risk education priorities for current and future projects.

The Explosive Hazards Risk Education (EHRE) Workstream, under the Regional Durable Solutions Working Group (RDSWG), was coordinated by UNMAS in 2020 to support a coordinated regional level response to risk education messages, materials, and approaches for Syrian refugees.[30]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[31]

Note: N/R=not reported.

Coordination

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour is responsible for providing assistance to persons with disabilities across Syria, but does not operate programs specific to victim assistance nor provide any form of assistance in opposition-held areas.

In October 2020, UNMAS established a Victim Assistance Working Group under the Mine Action Sub-Sector umbrella in Damascus, with the main objective of bringing together mine action actors and other multi-sectoral actors (including those working in protection, health, livelihoods, and education) to enhance access to services and social protection for survivors and indirect victims of explosive ordnance.[32]

A physical rehabilitation sub-group of the Health Sector Working Group in northwest Syria, chaired by the World Health Organization (WHO), meets regularly.[33]

A rehabilitation working group, under the Health Sector, also exists for the Damascus-based response but does not meet regularly due to the absence of a coordinator. A Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Working Group, also under the Health Sector, is in place for the Damascus-based response. There are regular exchanges between this working group and the Damascus-based Victim Assistance Working Group.[34]

The Mine Action Area of Responsibility, headed by UNMAS, has committed to promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities in its response and other relevant services, such as education and socio-economic assistance.[35]

Laws and policies

During a briefing with the UN Security Council in April 2019, Syrian activist Nujeen Mustafa explained that persons with disabilities remained among the most vulnerable and neglected of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, particularly in areas of active conflict.[36]

The Syrian government ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2009 but offers little protection to persons with disabilities and has taken few, if any, measures to ensure accessibility or equality of access to services. Furthermore, government forces and their allies have destroyed many hospitals and healthcare facilities.[37] There was no evidence of serious attempts to enforce applicable laws in 2020.[38]

Impact

Contamination

As of the end of 2020, the full extent of contamination in Syria from landmines, cluster munition remnants, and ERW was unknown. Combined with the destruction of infrastructure and services, interruptions to humanitarian assistance, and the large numbers of people in need and displaced, the contamination poses significant risks to the population.[39]

The Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2021 reported that one in three populated communities were thought to be contaminated by explosive ordnance, while one in two people were at risk from contamination. The areas which experienced intense hostilities, including Aleppo, Idleb, Ar Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, and Dar’a governorates, were particularly affected.[40]

IMSMA data reports that 40% of communities, surveyed since 2011, have witnessed explosive incidents.[41]

From 2018–2020, the HALO Trust implementing partners conducted an assessment of contamination in 41 sub-districts in northwest Syria, covering 971 communities. Confirmed mine/ERW contamination was reported in 41% of these communities. Many inaccessible communities have experienced high levels of conflict and are also thought to be highly contaminated.[42]

Landmine contamination

Landmines, both commercially-manufactured and improvised, affect all regions of Syria, and vary in type according to the armed groups active there.

Contamination is particularly dense in areas that were occupied by the Islamic State. From Raqqa to Hassakeh governorate in the northeast, and south to Deir ez-Zor, retreating Islamic State forces left massive contamination by improvised mines and other IEDs.[43] Islamic State militants rigged everyday items and domestic objects to trigger powerful explosions, and many devices operated through tiny crush wires that were extremely hard to identify.[44] The United States (US) has described Raqqa as one of the most heavily contaminated places globally.[45]

In the northwestern governorates of Idleb and Aleppo, it was reported that mines and other types of explosive devices were planted in agricultural fields, villages, beside roads, and around schools and hospitals.[46] Rebel forces that subjected the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are reported to have left hundreds of mines in surrounding fields as well as leaving explosive devices in many homes. Further south in the governorates of Hama and Homs, open-source reports of mine casualties, although unconfirmed, suggest significant contamination left by all sides during years of conflict.[47]

In parts of southern governorates bordering Israel and Jordan, fewer mines are reported than other types of explosive hazards,[48] but Syrian reports point to the presence of Russian PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines.[49] Remotely delivered T-84 antivehicle mines were reportedly used in the Golan Heights in the southwest of Syria, which is already heavily contaminated with antipersonnel mines.[50] There are also reports that T-84 mines have been remotely deployed in the southwestern governorate of Dar’a.[51]

The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along its borders with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012. Turkey reportedly claimed that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines were planted along its border with Syria, while making clear that they had not been emplaced by Turkish forces.[52] Heavy casualties that occurred in Manbij—close to the Turkish border—after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State militants in mid-August 2016, attest to massive contamination by mines and other improvised devices that were still inflicting casualties in 2019.[53]

Cluster munition remnant contamination

Syria has widespread cluster munition remnants contamination resulting from the ongoing armed conflict, which began in 2011. Syrian and Russian government forces have used cluster munitions extensively.[54]

A survey by the HALO Trust in northwest Syria found that the most frequent type of explosive ordnance found were submunitions (36%); with other ordnance consisting of landmines (2%), IEDs (2%), and other ERW (60%). The highest occurrence of cluster munitions was throughout the southern part of northwest Syria, with greater occurrence of landmines and IEDs in the far north.[55]

From the end of April until June 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported attacks against opposition-controlled areas of Idleb, Hama, and Aleppo governorates on a daily basis.[56] Prior to that, cluster munition use, casualties, and contamination were reported in the governorates of Aleppo, Dar’a, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Idleb, and Quneitra, as well as in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta.[57]

In February 2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported “an alarming number of incidents involving cluster munitions,” affirming that their use in densely populated areas such as eastern Aleppo “constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.”[58] Although the number of reported cluster munition attacks in Syria has decreased since mid-2017,[59] cluster munitions remained in use throughout 2019 and into 2020.[60]

ERW contamination

The Syrian Civil War, ongoing since 2011, has resulted in heavy contamination from the use of a wide range of types of explosive ordnance, including landmines, IEDs, air-dropped and artillery-delivered ordnance.

Casualties[61]

Casualties overview

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

*This figure includes casualties from cluster munition remnants. In 2020, the Monitor also recorded 35 casualties due to cluster munition attacks.

Casualties in 2020: details

In 2020, at least 2,729 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Syria, making it the year with the highest number of annual casualties recorded in the country for all time. Although the civilian or military status of 53% of casualties in 2020 was not recorded, of those that were recorded, 70% were civilians. Many civilian casualties, including IDPs, were reported to be herding, farming, or carrying out other livelihood activities, such as picking olives, pistachios, and mushrooms. Children made up 22% of casualties where the age group was known.

Many casualties go unreported or are excluded from the Monitor annual total due to inadequate details. Ambiguity in media reports often leaves it unclear whether the explosive device in each case was command-detonated or victim-activated. While classifying the data, many incidents causing casualties in Syria (including civilians) were reported to be from mines, booby-traps, roadside bombs, and IEDs, but were excluded from the annual casualty dataset wherever the cause of activation was not adequately defined.

Cluster munition casualties

In 2020, 182 cluster munition casualties were recorded in Syria, including 147 casualties from cluster munition remnants and 35 casualties that resulted directly from three cluster munition attacks, including two attacks on schools.

In both January and February 2020, schools were hit by cluster munitions shelling, resulting in civilian and child casualties. On 1 January, an attack killed at least 12 civilians, including five children, at Abdo Salama School in the town of Sarmin, in Idleb governorate. The attack injured between 10 to 20 other people.[62] On 25 February 2020, Thawra School, also known as Al Baraem School, in Idleb city, was hit by cluster munition shelling, resulting in the death of three teachers and the injury of five others.[63] Two civilians were also injured during a cluster munition attack in the southern suburbs of Idleb, on 10 January 2020.[64]

As with mines/ERW, due to challenges in data collection amid insecurity and ongoing conflict, the number of cluster munition casualties caused by both attacks and unexploded submunitions in Syria is likely to be under-reported. It is possible that some persons recorded as injured by other mine/ERW types were actually unexploded submunition casualties.

The Monitor has recorded a total of 4,099 cluster munition casualties in Syria, including 2,102 during attacks and 1,997 from cluster munition remnants. This total includes an additional 519 casualties from cluster munition remnants which occurred in the period 2015–2019 and were recorded in data collected by the HALO Trust.

Prior to new use of cluster munitions from 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007. These casualties are included in the total [65]

Addressing the Impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

The operators listed in the clearance and risk education sections of this profile do not represent all humanitarian actors, as several operate anonymously for security reasons.

Clearance operators[66]

Note: NGO=non-governmental organization.

Clearance

The extent of clearance in Syria in 2020 was not reported. Due to the ongoing nature of conflict in Syria, all mine action activities in the country, particularly clearance, are severely inhibited.[67]

In government-held areas, Russian and Syrian military personnel have undertaken some clearance activities, although clearance figures are not publicly reported.[68] Russian deminers also provided training for Syrian Army engineers at training centers established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018, the Russian Armed Forces reported that they had trained 900 Syrian engineers.[69] In 2019, it was reported that Russia allocated US$1 million to support UNMAS mine action activities in Syria.[70]

In February 2019, Armenia sent a demining team to Syria to work in Aleppo governorate.[71] It was reported in August 2019 that the Armenian team had cleared 48,967m².[72] Turkey claimed to have cleared mines and other ERW in areas of northern Syria following its October 2019 cross-border offensive.[73]

Teams from the Syria Civil Defence Force (commonly known as the White Helmets) volunteer organization have conducted clearance and survey in northwestern Syria in the governorates of Aleppo and Idleb.[74] In 2020, the White Helmets reported clearing 333 cluster munition remnants, 312 other types of ERW, and one landmine.[75]

From 2017 until October 2020, 429 contaminated areas were identified by humanitarian mine action operators in northwest, northeast and southern Syria. In August 2020, the first UNMAS explosive ordnance assessments began in the governorate of Rural Damascus, in preparation for clearance activities in 2021.[76] Survey has been carried out in 250 communities across 27 sub-districts in Syria, combined with the marking of hazardous areas where possible.[77] The majority (246) of these communities were in northwestern Syria, with four in southern Syria.

In total, 7,054,432m² of contaminated land has been identified through survey by operators.

In 2020, new antipersonnel mine contamination was identified in five areas, totaling 22,704m². In Al-Hasakeh, two confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) were identified, totaling 3,591m², while an additional three CHAs were identified in Ar-Raqqa, totaling 19,113m².

New cluster munition remnant contamination was also identified in 2020, totaling 3,352,952m² across 183 CHAs in Syria. In Ar-Raqqa, 132 CHAs covering 1,337,818m² were found, while another 43 CHAs covering 1,578,442 were identified in Al-Hasakeh. Another two CHAs in Deir ez-Zor totaled 4,331m². In Darayya, a suburb of Damascus, six CHAs were identified in the period between August 2020 and April 2021: two areas in Najada totaled 189,161m², while four contaminated areas in Shweha totaled 243,200m².

UNMAS reported that whilst access for mine action activities had improved, limited access in most areas had restricted its operational reach and adequate mentoring for mine action teams, also hampering quality assurance mechanisms.[78] The expansion of explosive ordnance survey and clearance operations remained a critical priority.

Following hostilities in late 2019, areas in the northeast, notably in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh governorates, remained difficult to access due to contamination and recontamination of areas previously cleared by humanitarian mine action operators.[79]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[80]

Note: NGO=non-governmental organization.

In addition to national operators listed in the table above, there are many local organizations conducting risk education in Syria, including Fouadi NGO; Al-Mawada; Al-Tamayouz; Al-Ihsan Charity; Almabarrat Charity NGO for Golan people; Al-Shaheed foundation; Anis Saadeh; Al-Taalouf NGO; Church of Lady CCFP Committee; Education and Illiteracy Eradication Association; Inaash Al Faqeer Charity in Al-Tal, Nama’a Developmental Association; Misyaf Charity NGO; Souria Al Yamama Association; and the Syrian Society for Social Development (SSSD).

Beneficiary numbers

In total, 1,951,296 beneficiaries were reached through risk education in Syria in 2020, while more than 1,100 humanitarian workers were trained in risk awareness to support humanitarian access.[81] Operators reported that persons with disabilities were reached through risk education in Syria, although participant numbers were not always recorded. UNICEF reported training 1,210 professionals to deliver risk education in 2020.[82] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) reported holding information sessions for some 120,000 people, including schoolchildren, returnees, farmers, and truffle hunters.[83]

Risk education in Syria reached almost one million fewer people in 2020 than in 2019, as the COVID-19 pandemic led to the temporary suspension of in-person activities, movement restrictions, and limits to the number of people who could attend risk education sessions.[84]

Implementation

Target groups[85]

Communities across Syria were reported to be at risk, due to contamination of agricultural land, private housing, and community infrastructure including schools, hospitals, markets, roads, and water and sanitation systems. Identified risk behaviors including moving items of ordnance and clearing rubble from damaged buildings.[86]

Men were reported to be more likely to engage in high-risk livelihood activities such as manual labour, construction work, and agricultural activities. Most of the incidents recorded on or near roads impacted men. This may be related to return, displacement, or travelling to look for work. Men were also reported to be at high-risk of incidents when attempting to move ERW to safer places. Reaching men was often challenging, as risk education was conducted only in daylight hours due to security concerns, a time when most men in the community were out at work.

For children—particularly boys—incidents often occurred when engaging in activities such as playing with items, undertaking farming activities, and caring for livestock.

Women were reported to be at risk from ERW near the home, but were often more difficult for risk education operators to reach in conservative areas.

Other risk groups in Syria include IDPs living in camps and host communities. More than 1.8 million displacement movements were recorded in Syria in 2019.[87] In 2020, a report by REACH on the coping strategies of IDPs and residents in northwest Syria noted that some communities relied on negative strategies to cope with decreased household income. In over half of the communities surveyed, children were sent to work or beg to meet basic needs.[88] In 2020, COVID-19 aggravated an already precarious social and economic crisis in Syria, leading to concern that more people may be forced to adopt unsafe behaviors, increasing their exposure to mines/ERW.[89]

Delivery methods

Risk education is conducted in both rural and urban areas and is reported to be age and gender sensitive. Operators provided risk education messaging related to all types of contamination in Syria, including landmines, cluster munition remnants, and improvised mines.[90]

Risk education in Syria is delivered on an interpersonal basis and is often combined with survey and clearance, and integrated with activities undertaken by other sectors, including education, shelter, food security, and livelihoods.[91] From Damascus, humanitarian partners continued to work in coordination with various Syrian government ministries to deliver risk education.

UNICEF implemented risk education alongside immunization, water, sanitation, hygiene, and polio campaigns; and provided risk education to adolescent boys and girls through temporary learning centers, with a program of life skills, psychosocial support, and protection. In Deir ez-Zor governorate, children who had dropped out of school were referred to relevant health or education services and received mine/ERW risk education and awareness on health, nutrition, education, hygiene, and sanitation. The initiative also included house-to-house visits, sessions in schools and mosques, meetings with key influencers and community leaders, and the distribution of educational materials.[92]

UNICEF supported the Ministry of Education to integrate mine/ERW risk education into the national school curriculum in 2018–2019.[93] Lessons were included across different subject areas in the official curriculum for grades two to eleven.[94] The Damascus-level Risk Education Working Group plans to look at officially integrating risk education into the curriculum, as part of their new terms of reference.[95]

Risk education messages in Syria were disseminated via the use of small, printed media; as well as being displayed on billboards. In 2020, UNMAS and UNICEF produced a risk education video for children, which featured a sign language interpreter.[96]

Major developments in 2020

COVID-19 had a significant impact on risk education activities in Syria in 2020. From March–June, risk education activities were suspended until safer delivery approaches were developed. Organizations updated standard operating procedures to incorporate safety measures related to COVID-19. Some funding meant for risk education was reduced or diverted for use as part of the COVID-19 response, at the request of donors.[97]

COVID-19 and hygiene promotion messages were incorporated into the risk education sessions of some operators, and remote risk education methods were also adopted. UNMAS, ICRC, and the Syrian Red Cross deployed indirect methods for messaging; including mobile messaging, and messaging via social media, news websites, radio, television, and billboards.[98] The HALO Trust conducted a risk education campaign by radio in northern Aleppo, and its messages were communicated using loudspeakers on vehicles.[99] The distribution of printed materials was suspended to prevent the transmission of COVID-19.[100]

The HALO Trust and Shafak conducted baseline and endline surveys to inform the tailoring of messages for risk education and COVID-19 in northwest Syria, focusing on children, teenagers, women, IDPs, agricultural workers, and rubble removers.[101]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[102]

Note: IDP=internally displaced person.

Needs assessment

A disability assessment using the Washington Group questions,[103] conducted in June 2019, found that 3.7 million (27%) of the total Syrian population over 12-years-old had a disability. Rural Damascus had the highest disability rate, explained in part by its protracted exposure to high-intensity conflict.[104] The impact of disabilities was compounded due to ongoing conflict, and limited access to income-generating activities and medical assistance. The survey found that 62% of people with disabilities were unemployed, compared to 48% of those surveyed with no disability.[105] Household income-generation opportunities were likely further compromised, as 56% of people over 40-years-old, and 33% of household heads, had a disability.[106]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Ongoing conflict and insecurity restricted access to essential medical services for mine/ERW victims. Emergency response and first aid is limited, while Syria faces shortages of trained medical personnel and health facilities, and has suffered damage to transport infrastructure.[107] According to a study carried out by Hand in Hand for Aid and Development (HIHFAD), some sub-districts such as Raju and Sheikh El-Hadid in Afrin, and Ma’batli in Aleppo, were in need of almost all basic health services.[108]

The COVID-19 pandemic made it increasingly difficult for persons with disabilities to receive medical care. The Syrian government did not provide assistance for persons with disabilities in terms of access to information, communications, buildings, or transportation.[109]

The ICRC supported 29 hospitals and three physical rehabilitation programs in 2020.[110] The ICRC also provided assistance to IDPs, returnees, and those affected by conflict, including support to the Al-Hol IDP camp.[111]

In 2020, the ICRC supported physical rehabilitation centers in Damascus and Aleppo through SARC. Physical rehabilitation was also provided to individuals being held in detention, particularly in Aleppo, through SARC. About 1,300 persons with disabilities, including 741 victims of mines/ERW, received prostheses or orthoses, and physiotherapy, at the ICRC physical rehabilitation center in Aleppo and the ICRC-supported National Society Center in Damascus. Shuttle services organized with National Society branches transported patients from surrounding governorates to the center in Damascus, and a similar service was being set up in Aleppo.[112] However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the centers received fewer patients than planned, and none from mid-March to mid-June. The National Society Center in Damascus was set move to an ICRC-renovated building in 2021.[113]

Within the framework of the Global Protection Cluster, UNMAS supported first response and rehabilitation services to assist survivors of mine/ERW incidents. These efforts continued during the pandemic in compliance with COVID-19 prevention and mitigation measures. This proved to be crucial as densely populated areas faced heightened vulnerability to COVID-19 alongside exposure to explosive ordnance contamination.[114]

Through a project funded by the European Union (EU), the HALO Trust supported three rehabilitation clinics, four prosthetic centers, and five mobile outreach units in northwest Syria. From mid-2019 to the end of 2020, the HALO Trust provided 219 prosthetics and reached over 3,000 survivors with a combination of physiotherapy sessions, psychosocial support, peer support counselling, and multipurpose assistance for 300 households.[115]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

A study conducted by HIHFAD in 2018 found that “in all subdistricts, mental health and psychosocial support services are either not available or not accessible.”[116] The WHO supported mental health mobile clinics for IDPs in northern Syria, funded by Japan.[117] Many organizations deliver psychosocial and socio-economic programs, but there is no coordinated nationwide provision.

The ICRC made psychosocial services available at its physical rehabilitation center in Aleppo, the field hospital at the al-Hol camp, and at the National Society’s physical rehabilitation center in Damascus, and made referrals to social integration projects.[118]

One association held a wheelchair-basketball tournament in December 2020, with the ICRC’s financial support.[119]

Conflict and emergencies

Attacks on medical facilities by the Syrian and Russian armed forces continued to be reported in 2019, with 82% of these attacks occurring in the northwest of the country.[120] Attacks on health care facilities were reported to have dropped by 67% in 2020, compared to 2019.[121] However, the detrimental effects of these attacks were ongoing. A survey by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) published in 2021 found that the vast majority of health workers in the northwest (84%) reported that attacks on health care directly affected them, their team or their patients, and a similar percentage (81%) personally knew of patients or colleagues who had been killed in the attacks.[122]

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 70% of the health workforce had fled the country.[123] PHR reported that medical personnel have also been arrested, imprisoned, disappeared, tortured, or executed.[124]

The rising number of casualties caused by explosive ordnance in Syria is further exacerbating demand on the country’s overwhelmed health services.[125] In 2020, only 58% of hospitals and 53% of primary health care centers were fully functional.[126]

In 2020, UNMAS and its humanitarian mine action partners provided victim assistance services to more than 13,000 people, but resources remain limited and insufficient to meet needs.[127]

Health facilities in Syria came under further pressure in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. iMMAP assisted the Northeast Syria Health Cluster, and the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster, to implement an infection prevention and control survey, to rapidly assess the capacity of healthcare facilities to adequately respond to a surge in COVID-19 cases.[128]

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Syria attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020 as an observer, and made a public statement.[1] It stated that “The Syrian Arab Republic participates as an observer in this meeting due to its interest in the issue of landmines, explosive ordinances [sic], and improvised explosive devices [IEDs] and considering their use by terrorist organizations, both created and obtained, in their terrorist operations on Syrian territories.”[2] Additionally, it stated that “The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that achieving global agreement and freeing the world of landmines requires addressing existing concerns and challenges. First and foremost, translating political commitments into financial resources to support the achievement of these goals.”[3]

Previously, Syria’s attendance at the Fourth Review Conference, held in Oslo in November 2019, marked the first time since 2006 that it had participated in a meeting of the treaty.[4] Most recently, Syria attended the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021 as an observer, but did not make a statement. Since 1996, Syria has abstained from voting on every annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including UNGA Resolution 76/26, on 6 December 2021.[5]

Syria is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Use

The Monitor has not independently documented or confirmed any new use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria during the reporting period (November 2021–September 2022).[6]

In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel landmines in the country’s border areas.[7] A Syrian official acknowledged that the government had “undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”[8]

Syria’s statement at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2020 alleged that:

“The illegal foreign military presence on Syrian territories, the use of mines and improvised explosive devices by armed terrorist groups in these areas, and the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan where Syrian residents risk injury and death due to the landmines planted between their homes, fields, and villages by the occupation forces, all pose as obstacles to fully identifying and clearing the areas contaminated with landmines.

These organizations have randomly planted landmines and explosive ordinances [sic] in large tracts of lands without any map indicating their locations. The Syrian Arab Army has taken upon itself the task of securing, diffusing, and clearing the areas of landmines to ensure the safe return of Syrians to these areas and to restore normalcy in their daily lives.”[9]

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used landmines in Syria in previous years, but a lack of access by independent sources to territory that remains under NSAG control made it impossible to confirm new use during the reporting period.[10]

In August 2022, Syrian media reported that Iranian militia groups in Syria were planting landmines around their military bases in the countryside east of Homs. It was also indicated that the previous month, Iraqi Hezbollah militia groups had planted more than 700 landmines around their base near the town of Khirbat Tiyas.[11]

According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), a non-governmental organization (NGO) that tracks casualties in Syria, “[T]here is great difficulty in determining which party was responsible for planting landmines, due to the multiplicity of forces controlling the areas in which these explosions occur, and therefore we do not attribute the vast majority of deaths caused by landmines to a specific party. None of the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria have revealed maps of the places where they planted landmines.”[12]

From September 2015 to January 2017, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) cleared 7,500 improvised antipersonnel landmines and other IEDs from Iraq and Syria.[13]

Prior to the current armed conflict, which began in 2011, Syria was last believed to have used landmines in 1982, during the conflict with Israel in Lebanon. Little was known about the extent of Syria’s landmine problem, but the most significantly mined areas were in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights, in the southwest of Syria, and along its borders.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Syria is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines.

The size and origin of Syria’s landmine stockpile is not known, but it is believed to be significant and comprised mainly of Soviet/Russian-manufactured landmines including PMN-2, PMN-4, and OZM-72 antipersonnel mines, as well as TMN-46 and TM-62 antivehicle mines. Photographs and a video posted online by the Syrian Center for Demining Rehabilitation (SCDR) on 28 September 2015, allegedly filmed west of Daraa in southern Syria, showed up to 20 PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being removed from the ground.[14] This was the first evidence of use of PMN-4 mines during the Syrian Civil War, but it is unclear who laid them and when. Markings on the mines indicated that they were manufactured in Russia in 1995.

Antipersonnel landmines appear to have been systematically produced and emplaced in conflict-affected areas of Syria and Iraq by Islamic State-affiliated groups since 2014, but little information or detail regarding this activity has been made public. Images of antipersonnel mines produced by the Islamic State were taken in Syria near the village of Miqtaa, southwest of Manbij, in 2019.[15]

In 2019, 17 donors reported contributing a total of US$42.5 million to mine action activities in the Syrian Arab Republic; $24.2 million less than in 2018 when international funding totaled $66.7 million.[1] Syria was the fifth largest recipient of international support to mine action in 2019.

The European Union provided the largest contribution with $16 million, to support mine action activities. This represented 38% of the total international mine action assistance in Syria for 2019. In addition, Australia, Germany, and Norway also provided substantial assistance to mine action activities in Syria and contributed a combined total of almost $11.4 million.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

International contributions to mine action in Syria fluctuated from $11.3 million in 2015 to more than $92 million in 2017, totaling approximately $232 million in the five-year period from 2015–2019 (more than two-fifths of which was provided in 2017).

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[3]