Summary

Non-signatory Ukraine has acknowledged the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Ukraine has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.

Ukraine possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the former Soviet Union. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively since its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, while Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least two times during the conflict.

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Ukraine has acknowledged the deadly long-term consequences of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] Ukraine told the Monitor in 2010 and 2012 that it considered cluster munitions to be “legal weapons” and “an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[2]

Ukraine has also expressed concern at its capacity to comply with the convention’s obligations, particularly the eight-year deadline to destroy stockpiled cluster munitions.[3]

Ukraine attended several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and participated as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Ukraine last participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention in 2014.[5] It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Review Conference held in November 2020 and September 2021.

In December 2021, Ukraine abstained from voting on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Ukraine has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Ukraine has voted in favor of UNGA and Human Rights Council resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production and transfer

In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine has not produced cluster munitions and has not imported them.[8]

There is no evidence that cluster munitions have been included in the artillery and rocket systems, or among other weapons, that Ukraine has acquired since Russia began its invasion of the country in February 2022. The lack of cluster munition transfers to Ukraine reflects the growing stigmatization of these weapons and the fact that most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have either banned cluster munitions, or taken steps to align their policy and practice with the convention’s strict prohibition on the transfer of cluster munitions.[9]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions after the break-up of the Soviet Union and shared information on the types stockpiled in 2011, as detailed in the following table.

Cluster munitions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine[10]

At that time, Ukraine reported that cluster munitions constituted 35% of its stocks of conventional weapons, which totaled two million tons of ammunition. Of the cluster munitions, 34% were produced before 1980, while 36% were produced between 1981 and 1992 and were “planned to be stockpiled and might be used.” The remaining 30% comprised of antivehicle landmines.[11]

Ukraine reported in 2011 that it destroyed approximately 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions annually, and stated that it could take up to 60 years for it to destroy all stocks that were slated for destruction.[12]

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine since their invasion of the country began in February 2022.[13]

Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least two times during the conflict:

• Ukrainian forces used Uragan cluster munition rockets in an attack on Husarivka, Kharkiv region, on either 6 or 7 March, when the village was under Russian control;[14] and
• One civilian was injured by a missile carrying a cluster munition warhead in Yenakiieve, Donetsk region, on 22 March, which was under the control of Russian-affiliated armed groups at the time.[15]

Ukraine has not denied using cluster munitions during the 2022 conflict, but says that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”

Hundreds of Russian cluster munition attacks have been documented, reported, or alleged to have occurred in Ukraine in 2022. Many of these attacks have occurred in populated areas, including Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sloviansk, and Vuhledar. At least ten of Ukraine’s 24 provinces (known as oblasts) have been struck by cluster munitions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.[16]

The six types of cluster munitions used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022 were all manufactured in Russia—some as recently as in 2021—or by its predecessor state, the Soviet Union. These include:

• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions.
• The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
• The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
• A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile; and
• The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions.

Ukrainian officials have expressed grave concern over Russia’s use of cluster munitions in the conflict. Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, told a Security Council debate on 27 April 2022 that Russia’s use of cluster munitions in populated areas is proof that it “blatantly disregards international humanitarian law.”[17] Venediktova has described cluster munitions as “one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians.”[18]

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 39 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council, Security Council, and UNGA, as of 1 July 2022.[19] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteurs and Experts on human rights, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the current president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the United Kingdom (UK), expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ambassador Aidan Liddle said he “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[20]

Previous use

Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from July 2014 until ceasefire in February 2015, according to independent investigations conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[21] Both parties used two types of ground-fired cluster munitions: the 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, containing 72 9N235 submunitions; and the 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, containing 30 9N235 or 9N210 submunitions.[22]

Neither party to the conflict accepted responsibility for using cluster munitions. Ukraine repeatedly denied use and attributed the attacks to pro-Russian separatist groups and members of the Russian Armed Forces.[23] Russia repeatedly drew attention to Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions but never acknowledged its role in the cluster munition attacks.[24]

The 2014–2015 cluster munition attacks in Ukraine attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from at least 32 states and the EU.[25]

Previously, in 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that Ukraine did not intend to use cluster munitions, except to defend itself from “outside aggression.”[26]

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

Ukraine is affected by contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remaining from World Wars I and II, and as a result of the ongoing conflict in the east of the country since 2014. Ukraine also reported that unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[1] The extent of contamination is unknown.

The contamination in Ukraine is yet to be surveyed although estimates have suggested that about 8% of the lands, covering about 7,000 km², contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW. With the support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Ukraine was in the process of establishing a national humanitarian mine action program (not established as of April 2020).

The Law on Mine Action, adopted in January 2019, was not implemented and neither the national mine action authority nor the national mine action center had been established. An amendment to the law was submitted to parliament in February 2020.[2]

Despite efforts to inform populations living along the line of contact, children have continued to be particularly vulnerable to ERW and more widespread risk education campaigns were needed.

There is no centralized victim surveillance system. Despite a decrease in new reported mine/ERW casualties since 2017, the number of new casualties has remained high in eastern Ukraine and available data is likely an underestimation.

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine has been suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment. Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation and functional prosthetics. Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline

Ukraine’s initial Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 June 2016. In November 2018, Ukraine submitted late its first extension request. In granting the five-year extension, until 1 June 2021, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Ukraine had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the submission of extension requests.[3]

In its first extension request, Ukraine stated that its ability to comply with its Article 5 obligations was impeded by the lack of access to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[4]

Ukraine submitted a second extension request in June 2020, which was approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2020, setting a new deadline of 1 December 2023. In its second extension request, Ukraine noted that the ongoing conflict in the country’s eastern regions resulted in further contamination of areas along the contact line. Ukraine also reported that the irregularity and non-selectivity of the use of antipersonnel mines by the armed groups hampered efforts to estimate the scale of contamination.[5]

The OSCE Project-Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) estimated that Ukraine was unlikely to meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline due to the ongoing conflict.[6] In June 2020, Ukraine stated that it did not have control over territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories, and that the hostilities were causing further contamination along the contact line.[7]

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[8]

In 2013, the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining at the national level and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[9] Several other institutions are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Services, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Defence, the National Police, and the State Border Service.[10]

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) is responsible for clearance and it established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center coordinates the pyrotechnical teams—similar to rapid-response Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams—involved in technical and non-technical survey (NTS), demining, internal quality control of SESU units, information management, handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, and risk education.[11]

The demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for EOD.[12]

Strategies and policies

There is no strategic plan for mine action. The Ministry of Defence develops annual operational plans.[13]

Announced by the Ministry of Defence in February 2016,[14] the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021 was on hold due to the pending process with the mine action law.[15]

Resolution 1071 of 13 December 2017, issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved the State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine for 2017–2021. One section of the program foresees the implementation of humanitarian demining of territories and water areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, comprising of survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and ERW.[16]

Legislation and standards

Ukraine’s mine action legislation entered into force on 22January 2019, but it has not been implemented and the mine action authority and center have not been established. The law was amended and submitted to Parliament for adoption in February 2020. Until the adoption of the amended law, the Ministry of Defence coordinates demining activities, while the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster coordinates the overall mine action program.[17]

National Mine Action Standards were published in April 2019. They will become binding after the adoption of the amended Law on Mine Action and the establishment of a national mine action authority.[18]

Information management

There are two functioning Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defence. The databases collect and analyze contamination and land release data from national operators and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[19] Consolidation of both databases to create a central national IMSMA database is planned once Ukraine adopts its mine action legislation.[20] Data on mine/ERW accidents and casualties, and victim assistance were not being collected.[21] Data on risk education was collected by the Protection Cluster.

Gender and diversity

The OSCE PCU integrated gender and diversity considerations into their activities, in cooperation with the GICHD’s Gender and Mine Action Program (GMAP).[22]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[23]

Coordination

Risk education is coordinated through the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster, chaired by UNDP.[24]

National Standards and guidelines

There is no national risk education strategy. As of April 2020, Ukraine was in the process of developing national standards for risk education. There was no accreditation process for risk education operators.[25]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[26]

Laws and policies

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of other state services. These provisions were not effectively applied. Legislation requires that public buildings are accessible to persons with disabilities. Despite the legal requirements, most public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Access to employment, education, healthcare, transportation, and financial services remained difficult.[27]

By law, employers must set aside a quota of 4% of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. It was reported that many people employed to fill the quota requirement received minimal salaries but did not work at the companies of employment. Legislation also requires employers to take into account the individual needs of employees with disabilities. However, generally these laws were not enforced.[28]

The Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced People came into effect on 19 November 2014. The law provides UAH880 (approximately US$30) per month for persons with disabilities.[29] In September 2016, the Parliament adopted legislation to harmonize the law with international standards with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities.[30] Under the 2005 Law “On Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities in Ukraine,” every person with a disability is entitled to receive physical rehabilitation services.[31]

Persons with disabilities in eastern Ukraine did not receive appropriate care.[32]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview[33]

* A further 14,000km² suspected to be contaminated in non-government-controlled territory. The exact size of contaminated areas could not be determined due to the ongoing conflict.

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; and IED=improvised explosive device.

Landmine contamination

Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other explosive ordnance, mostly as a result of World Wars I and II. Ministry of Defence engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, but 32 former firing ranges covering 1,500km² remain contaminated with ERW.[34]

Ukraine is also contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014 in the Crimean Peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts.[35] Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and antipersonnel mines were reported to be planted in populated areas and near civilian infrastructure.[36] IEDs used included booby-traps and devices, especially hand grenades, with tripwires.[37]

Preliminary estimates showed that about 8% of the lands, totaling up to 7,000km², in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW, including IEDs.[38] In addition, 14,000km² in non-government-controlled areas were also suspected to be mine-contaminated.[39] It is further indicated that 15–20% of the contamination was from mines, while the rest was from ERW.[40] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the belligerent parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations has been severely limited.[41]

The explosive hazard contamination in eastern Ukraine was estimated to impact around two million people.[42] Civilians living along the contact line were unable to engage in agricultural activities and access to some villages was restricted. The contamination, or suspicion of contamination also poses a threat to people crossing the contact line. Maintenance and repair of vital civilian infrastructure facilities has been impeded by the presence of mines and ERW.[43] The collection of firewood was reported to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[44] Access to farmlands, hospitals, and schools was also impeded.[45] Explosive ordnance poses a humanitarian risk to internally displaced people (IDPs) and returning refugees.[46]

Cluster munitions remnant contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Cluster munitions used in the conflict have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which contain 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions.[47] (See Ukraine’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for details.)

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[48] The most intensive use of cluster munitions was in and around the city of Debalcevo, in Donetsk region.[49]

Casualties

Casualties overview[50]

Note: ERW=explosive remnant of war.

Casualties in 2019: details

The 324 casualties identified in 2019 was similar to the 325 casualties identified in 2018, which was a significant decrease from previous years.[51] Casualty data peaked in 2015 and 2016 with 706 and 785 new casualties respectively. The Monitor recorded 2,727 mine casualties (941 killed and 1,786 injured) from 2014 through 2019.

There is no centralized database for the collection of casualty data.[52] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) collects only conflict-related civilian casualty data. Through its pilot project on data collection, the Ministry of Defence also collects data on civilian casualties in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including mine/ERW casualties. The database was however poorly populated. In 2019, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories was developing a mine accident and casualty database and collecting data on civilians killed or injured by mines/ERW.[53]

The Monitor has recorded at least 4,714 mine/ERW casualties (2,719 killed and 1,995 injured)in Ukraine to the end of 2019. The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[54]

The then named Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES, since December 2012 operating as the State Emergency Service of Ukraine) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed and 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[55]

The OHCHR has recorded over 1,000 civilian mine/ERW casualties between April 2014 and December 2019.[56] The Danish Demining Group (DDG) recorded 1,582 mine/ERW casualties from open sources between June 2014 and October 2018,[57] and the HALO Trust recorded 2,103 casualties between 2014 and 2019, based on open sources and security reports. The HALO Trust however noted that “due to a lack of reliable information from the non-government-controlled areas, the available data is likely an underestimation of the scale of the problem.”[58]

Cluster munition casualties[59]

The Monitor has recorded 76 cluster munition casualties in Ukraine; 72 casualties during attacks and four due to the detonation of unexploded submunitions.[60]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

Note: IED=improvised explosive device.

Clearance

Land release overview (as of December 2019)[61]

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Land release: landmines

Humanitarian demining operations in the safely accessible areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are conducted according to the annual plan developed by the Ministry of Defence and interested authorities, which details clearance and survey priorities for each operator.[62] In addition to NTS and technical survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), the main goals of the plan remained the demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, clearance of agricultural areas and of critical infrastructures (power lines, water and gas pipe infrastructure, thermal power plants, roads and railways).[63]

The overall extent of mine contamination in Ukraine cannot be reliably estimated until surveys will be completed. In its 2019 Article 7 report, Ukraine noted that NTS conducted by NGOs have identified mined areas in Bakhmut, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Volnovakha districts in Donestsk region, and in Popasna and Stanichno-Luhansk districts in Luhansk region.[64]

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[65] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun clearance in government-controlled areas.

The HALO Trust cited the lack of an explosives license as the main limiting factor for its program in Ukraine, it had to rely on states institutions to destroy all mine/ERW found.[66]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de déminage, FSD) stopped its survey and clearance activities in Ukraine in 2019 due to a lack of funding.[67] In 2020, FSD started a new two-year clearance and survey project which will end on 30 June 2022.[68]

It was reported that national operators lacked up-to-date technical equipment for mine clearance.[69]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided training courses to demining and EOD specialists on surveying and clearing contaminated areas.[70]

In 2019, about 1.7km² was released through clearance.[71] Additional land was cleared and awaiting quality control before it could be released.[72] In addition, 70km² of battle area were reportedly reduced through technical survey. Data on land cancelled through NTS in 2019 could not be provided as there was no firm data on the size of confirmed and SHAs.[73]

Land release: cluster munition remnants

During clearance and EOD spot tasks operations in 2019, the HALO Trust removed five cluster munitions (9N210).[74]

Deminer safety

There were reports of shooting at deminers of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine who were operating near the line of contact in the east of Ukraine.[75]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[76]

In addition to these risk education operators, a number of Ukrainian NGOs also conducted risk education.[77] As the entity coordinating risk education in Ukraine, the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster organized risk education activities around the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action in April 2019.[78] In 2020, the UNDP launched a mine awareness project aiming at enhancing mine risk prevention.[79]

There was no evaluation of risk education efforts in Ukraine.[80] Risk education operators reported quarterly on their activities to the Protection Cluster.[81] The HALO Trust conducted knowledge, attitudes and practices survey before and after its risk education sessions.[82]

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiaries of risk education in 2019[83]

The ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross reported a total of 30,940 beneficiaries in both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas, 60% of whom were children.[84]

The number of risk education beneficiaries totaled 167,698 in 2019.[85] Almost 60% of beneficiaries were children.[86]

Despite current efforts by mine action actors to provide risk education, a study by DDG suggested that “there is a need for more widespread risk education campaigns.” According to this study, there is a higher proportion of incidents caused by the handling of ERW than by encounters with mines, especially among children casualties.[87]

Implementation

Target groups

Risk education target groups are school children and internally displaced persons. Individuals who cross the contact line at official crossing points are also informed about the risk posed by explosive ordnance.[88]

In 2020, FSD was planning to target specifically persons traveling from non-government-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.[89] The HALO Trust primarily targeted working age men as they constituted the majority of mine/ERW casualties, as well as women who represented a high proportion of victims of mine/ERW incidents while crossing the contact line. Other groups targeted by the HALO Trust’s risk education activities included: children, due to their natural curiosity; motorists, due to the high level of contamination with antivehicle mines in Ukraine; and elderly and persons with disabilities.[90] The ICRC reported targeting populations in areas most impacted by mine/ERW contamination, in particular adult men. Children, as the second most affected group, were also targeted by the ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross risk education activities.[91]

In eastern Ukraine, the 15km buffer zone from the contact line disproportionately affected elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms, and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW.[92]

In Ukraine, risk education targets mostly populations living within 5km of the line of contact in government-controlled areas, leaving other affected communities without such critical information.[93] In particular, risk education operators do not have access to persons leaving on the eastern side of the line of contact, many of whom have to regularly cross it to collect pensions or access other public goods.[94]

Delivery methods

Most risk education was delivered using small printed media. The HALO Trust used pamphlets, booklets, and other materials and placed posters in visible places in schools and villages. Games, puzzles and coloring materials were used during school sessions with younger children.[95] The HALO Trust also transferred risk education materials including leaflets, posters, and stickers to police departments in Donetsk and Luhansk for further dissemination.[96]

DDG had a pilot project to use web and mobile phone platforms to collect information about hazards caused by unexploded ordnance.[97]

FSD implemented a small project in specialized education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a sign language trainer.[98]

Marking

In April 2019, the government of Ukraine approved regulations that standardized the marking of hazardous areas.[99]

Victim Assistance

Providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[100]

Note: IDPs=Internally displaced people.

Major Developments in 2019

Needs assessment

DRC-DDG, with the support of UNICEF, conducted a needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019, in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Due to the limited timeframe of the project, it was not an in-depth needs assessment and it recommended the conduct of a more thorough needs analysis.[101]

Medical care and rehabilitation

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine is suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment.[102]

Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and functional prosthetics. Access to medical care was particularly difficult for survivors living in rural areas, where most mine/ERW incidents occurred, and they often could not afford to travel to urban centers.[103]

The ICRC provided first-aid training, ambulances repair, surgical supplies, medical equipment to hospitals on both sides of the line of contact. It also gave cash assistance to cover hospital expenses as well as repairs or upgrades of 30 health facilities along the line of contact.[104]

As public health facilities in Ukraine’s conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system.[105]

A cohesive and coordinated rehabilitation system was lacking. Physical rehabilitation facilities were located in districts and cities, and access for mine/ERW survivors living in conflict-affected rural areas was limited. No assistance was provided for transportation.[106] Child mine/ERW survivors often received cosmetic rather than functional prostheses.[107] UNICEF reported that “families often lack the means or ability to provide children with the assistive devices they need.”[108] The Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered from a lack of qualified specialists and equipment to assist mine/ERW survivors.[109]

The ICRC provided mobility aids, physical rehabilitation equipment, and supplies, and supported the training of four orthopedic technicians.[110]

The USAID’s Leahy War Victims Fund continued to support the UCP Wheels for Humanity, which provided training for rehabilitation personnel, assistive technologies, and medical and physical rehabilitation for persons with disabilities—many of whom were injured in the ongoing conflict.[111] The UPC Wheels for Humanity project launched in 2019, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in Ukraine. The SRSHS project aligned with the World Health Organization Rehabilitation 2030 Agenda.[112]

The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross. ITF also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty.[113] The ITF provided equipment to the Ukrainian Research Institute for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation.[114]

The NATO Trust Fund provided for physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and vocational rehabilitation for injured soldiers; support to the rehabilitation sector through the provision of equipment, training of physical rehabilitation and psychological professionals, support to the development of academic curricula for prosthetists, and provision of psychological support to former military personnel, it also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty at the University Rehabilitation Institute of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana.[115]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.[116] Local and international NGOs provided psychological and psychosocial support on request to survivors.

Efforts have been made in Ukraine to make education more inclusive of persons with disabilities. The Concept of Inclusive Schools was adopted in 2010. Social and financial assistance to survivors was lacking.[117] ICRC supported social inclusion through sporting events.[118] The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross.[119]

Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified it on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

Ukraine does not have specific legislation in place to enforce its implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty with fiscal and penal sanctions. It has reported existing laws and regulations under national implementation measures for the Mine Ban Treaty, including a 2012 law which approved an agreement with an agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to destroy Ukraine’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[1] A 2019 law on mine action “defines the legal and organization[al] foundations for the implementation of anti-mine activities in Ukraine.”[2]

Ukraine has provided sixteen Article 7 transparency reports under the Mine Ban Treaty since 2006. Its last annual updated report was submitted on 1 April 2021 and covered activities during calendar year 2020.[3] Ukraine has not submitted a report covering calendar year 2021, as of October 2022.

Since 2009, Ukraine has participated in the treaty’s meetings, most recently the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually in November 2021, and intersessional meetings held in Geneva in June 2022.[4]

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). However, its obligations on antipersonnel landmines are superseded by the stricter prohibitions contained in the Mine Ban Treaty. Ukraine last submitted an annual updated transparency report for CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V in April 2021.

Ukraine is not party to the åConvention on Cluster Munitions.

Production and transfer

Ukraine declared in 2009 that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[5]

Ukraine has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence in 1991 and is not known to have exported them.[6] A moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines was put in place in 1999 and stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

New use

There is no credible information that Ukrainian government forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2014 and into 2022. Yet the apparent scale of PFM-series remotely-delivered mines in territory formerly under the control of the Russian military poses serious questions about the status of PFM-series antipersonnel mines awaiting destruction by Ukraine (see section below).

Russia has used several different types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022.[7] This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

At least eight types of antipersonnel mines have been used or are alleged to have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is also significant evidence that Russian forces have laid victim-activated booby-traps and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Ukraine since February 2022.[8]

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All of the antipersonnel mine types used were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). Some mines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021. This includes the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, which is delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from a distance of 5–15km.[9] The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze which makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another mine used by Russia in Ukraine, the PMN-4, was developed by Russia in the early 1990s.[10]

Other mine types used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including MON-series and OZM-72 mines.[11] The POM-2 mine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be emplaced by hand.[12]If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, such munitions are considered antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[13]

Use of PFM-series mines

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets.[14] The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.[15] Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.[16]

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[17] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[18] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.[19] Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[20]

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.[21] Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.[22] The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[23]

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.[24] This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center. These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;[25] of individual PFM mines in isolation;[26] of civilians handling presumably live mines;[27] and claims of civilian casualties.[28] Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.[29]

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.[30] Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.[31]

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.[32] Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.[33] There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.

International reaction

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the US. The new use of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, as well as by US congressional representatives such as Senator Patrick Leahy.[34] 

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) called on all parties to the armed conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines were used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[35]

Antivehicle mines

Antivehicle mines are often used in a manner which violates the laws of war. This typically occurs when they are deployed indiscriminately; meaning that their effects are not limited to only military vehicles and that they can harm military or civilian vehicles without distinction. Unlawful use also includes taking inadequate precautions to avoid civilian casualties.

Antivehicle mines (also called antitank mines) have been used during the war in Ukraine by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.[36] These mines are designed to damage or destroy vehicles including tanks and armored fighting vehicles. The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits antipersonnel mines, but not antivehicle mines or command-detonated (remote-controlled) mines. Amended Protocol II of the CCW on landmines provides weak restrictions on the use of antivehicle mines.

Antivehicle landmines used in Ukraine in 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Ukrainian forces have also received, and are apparently using, antivehicle mines provided by their military allies. Western designed or produced antivehicle landmines reported to have been used in Ukraine include the rocket-delivered AT-DM1399 mine,[37] the off-route DM-22, the pressure DM-31,[38] the magnetic influence HPD-2A2,[39] the magnetic influence FFV-028,[40] and the off-route PK-14 mine.[41]

Previous use

Previously, antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in early 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[42]

There is significant evidence, at different locations, that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s, and antipersonnel mines with production markings from the 2000s (indicating Russian origin), have been stockpiled and used by Russian-supported separatists in eastern Ukraine since 2014, including MON-series mines, PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines, OZM-72 mines, and POM-2 mines.

Stockpiling and destruction

The types and quantities of antipersonnel landmines that Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest reported total—6,664,342 mines of nine different types—was detailed in Landmine Monitor 2006.[43]

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks. However, it missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines and is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[44]

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2020, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.[45] Ukraine said that a small number of PFM-type mines that were considered to be unstable and unsafe for further storage were destroyed in 2020.

Stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by Ukraine, 2011–2021[46]

Between 1999 and 2018, Ukraine completed the destruction of all its stocks of antipersonnel mines except for the PFM-1 type.[47] The OZM-4 mines were taken from storage facilities in Crimea seized by Russian forces in 2014.[48]

At the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fourth Review Conference, in November 2019, Ukraine reaffirmed its determination to destroy the “existing antipersonnel landmines inherited from pre-independence time” and said that the destruction process would continue to be funded from the state budget.[49] Ukraine has often pledged to destroy its remaining stocks, but has not provided a timeline for when it plans to do so.[50]

The process for the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines has been overseen by a 2013 agreement between the Ministry of Defense, NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. However, that agreement expired at the beginning of 2020 and has not since been renewed.[51]

To revitalize stockpile destruction efforts, Ukraine said in November 2021 that the NATO Support and Procurement Agency would open an international tender process to find bidders from Ukraine and NATO member states to destroy the remaining stocks.

In 2019, 11 donors contributed US$22.3 million toward mine action in Ukraine; this represents a $10.4 million increase from the amount contributed in 2018.[1]

The largest contribution was from the United States (US), which provided $8.5 million to support capacity-building and clearance activities. Two additional donors—the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK)—provided a combined total of $9.2 million.

Of the total contribution in 2019, nearly half ($10 million, or 45%) went toward clearance and risk education activities, while 10% ($2.3 million) was for victim assistance and the remaining 45% ($10 million) went toward capacity-building or other mine action activities that were not disaggregated by the donors.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

International contributions to mine action in Ukraine have totaled some $62 million since 2015, representing an average of $12.4 million per year.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[3]