Summary

State Party the United Kingdom (UK) enacted implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions before ratifying it on 4 May 2010. It has participated in all of the convention’s meetings, and served as president of its Tenth Meeting of States Parties held in August–September 2022. The UK has expressed concern at new use of cluster munitions, most recently in Ukraine in 2022. It has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation.

The UK produced, exported, imported, and used cluster munitions prior to joining the convention. It completed the destruction of a stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions in December 2013. The UK has not retained any cluster munitions for research and training purposes since then.

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified it on 4 May 2010. The convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2010.

The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 serves as the UK’s implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing penal and financial sanctions for violations of its provisions.[1] A 2015 “Command Paper” by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which reviewed the Act, found “no outstanding legal issues” regarding the UK’s implementation of the convention.[2] The UK has classified cluster munitions in the highest category of prohibited exports under its Export Control Order of 2008.[3]

The UK submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 April 2011 and has provided updated annual reports ever since, most recently in April 2022.

The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster munitions, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.[4]

The UK engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every meeting of the convention.[5] During the first part of the Second Review Conference in November 2020, the UK provided an update on previously unknown stocks of cluster munitions.[6] The UK also attended the second part of the conference in Geneva in September 2021, where Ambassador Aidan Liddle was approved as President of the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties to be held in August–September 2022. Ambassador Liddle also chaired the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2022.

Promotion of the convention

The UK has promoted universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, most recently in its capacity as President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.[7] In February 2022, the UK said that “under our Presidency, we are intensifying work to achieve universal ratification of this important and vital Treaty.”[8] The UK co-hosted a regional workshop on the convention in Abjua, Nigeria on 23–24 March 2022, which was attended by eight signatories to the convention and two states not party.[9]

In December 2021, the UK voted in favor of a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[10] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

In March 2022, the UK said that “as the President of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” it “is gravely concerned by reports of the use of cluster munitions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.”[11] Previously, in 2015, government spokesperson Baroness Anelay expressed the UK’s concern over “recent reports of the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine” and called on Ukraine and Russia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[12]

The UK has vigorously and repeatedly condemned cluster munition use by the Syrian government since 2012.[13] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning use of cluster munitions in Syria.[14]

The UK led a resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 29 June 2015, which expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[15] It voted in favor of a Security Council resolution on 27 May 2014 that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei, South Sudan in February 2014, and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[16]

On 15 March 2015, the UK’s ambassador to Libya, Michael Aron, described evidence of new use of cluster bombs in the country as “deeply disturbing.”[17]

In December 2016, the UK condemned use of cluster munitions in Yemen by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition.[18]

The UK is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Interpretive issues

The UK has elaborated its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of the convention’s key provisions, including the prohibitions on foreign stockpiling, transit, investment in cluster munition producers, and assistance with prohibited acts during joint military operations.

Several ministerial statements have clarified the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues, and recognize its obligations under the convention.[19] In 2010, several parliamentary questions were raised in response to reports in the British media, based on United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks which related to cluster munitions.

Foreign stockpiling

In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK stated that it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction.[20] In December 2009, the UK stated that the United States (US) had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[21] In 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[22]

The March 2015 Command Paper found that the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 “allows for the extension of its provisions to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and any British overseas territory,” but stated that its application has only been extended to include the Isle of Man.[23] Therefore the UK has not applied its national legislation to the fullest extent possible, maintaining the possibility of acts being permitted in certain British overseas territories that would be prohibited on the UK mainland. This could represent a loophole via which foreign stocks of cluster munitions could return to the UK’s overseas territories in the future.

Transit

In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”[24]

In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.”[25] In 2011, a Minister of State clarified that this provision had been used only once, and that was to grant the US a temporary extension to keep cluster munitions on UK territory as it underwent the process of removing all remaining stockpiles.[26]

A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks in 2010 stated that the head of the FCO’s Security Policy Group had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted” until 2013, and by temporary exception.[27] In response to a parliamentary question on the cable, the previous Labour government minister responsible for the legislation said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”[28]

According to the Command Paper, the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 has been extended to the overseas territory of the Isle of Man but not other overseas territories. Therefore it is technically possible that authorization by the Foreign Secretary would not be necessary for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions by visiting forces through other UK overseas territories, such as Diego Garcia.[29]

Interoperability

The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability—the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions—are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation.[30] In 2011, the UK stated that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[31]

During the development of the UK’s national implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and of the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions.[32] When pushed by members of parliament to clarify exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control,” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[33]

Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military.[34] The government responded that “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged,” and added, “We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.”[35] A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.

The Monitor requested information from the UK in 2015 on how it was engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint “Operation Inherent Resolve” against Islamic State militants, with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the FCO responded:

The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law. Furthermore, a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive is issued to all UK personnel embedded with coalition forces explaining the UK legal position and how this affects their individual responsibilities in all matters including targeting.[36]

During the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation in Libya, Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the UK parliament that “we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.”[37] NATO confirmed that its forces did not use cluster munitions during the Libya operation in its formal response to a UN Commission of Inquiry.[38]

Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs

The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 makes it an offense for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition,” to “make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition,” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.

Concerns have been raised in the past about the promotion of cluster munitions by exhibitors at the annual Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibitions (DSEi) in London. In 2009 and 2011, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London displayed promotional materials advertising cluster munitions.[39]

Investment

While direct investment in cluster munitions is prohibited by the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed.

In 2011, the Under Secretary of State in the FCO, Alistair Burt, stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.”[40] There have been no parliamentary statements since then that would suggest further action by the government to address investment in cluster munition manufacturers.

The 2015 Command Paper specifically highlights that the 2010 implementing legislation “did not prohibit indirect financing of cluster munitions production.”[41]

Use

As a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK has foresworn any use of cluster munitions, but in the past the UK used cluster munitions extensively, including in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in 1982; in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991; in the former Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999; and in Iraq in 2003.[42]

Production and transfer

The UK produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and declared in its first Article 7 transparency report that it no longer had facilities to produce cluster munitions.[43]

The UK produced several variants of the BL-755 cluster bomb, which contains 147 submunitions, and also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries (IMI).[44]

BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise eventually possessed by Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the former Yugoslavia.[45]

In 2015–2016, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen used BL755 cluster munitions made by the UK.[46] In December 2016, Saudi Arabia committed to stop using UK-produced cluster munitions.[47] According to the UK, it last transferred BL755 cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia in 1989.[48]

The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.[49]

Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous status of the “Starstreak” high-velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010.[50]

Stockpile destruction

The UK once stockpiled a total of 190,828 cluster munitions and more than 38.7 million submunitions, as listed in the following table.[51]

Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by the UK[52]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK was required to declare and destroy, or ensure the destruction of, all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 November 2018.

On 17 December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of the stockpiled cluster munitions, five years in advance of its deadline.[53] The UK formally declared completion on stockpile destruction in its Article 7 report submitted in April 2014, and made an announcement at the convention’s Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014.

The UK’s cluster munition stockpile was transferred to facilities in Germany, Italy, and Norway, where it was destroyed.[54] In April 2014, the UK reported that the total cost of stockpile destruction was “around £40 million” (US$66 million).[55]

On 15 December 2020, the UK reported the destruction of 44 submunitions from previously unknown cluster munition stocks.[56] However, the reported munitions were comprised of four cluster munitions and 136 submunitions.[57]

In November 2020, the UK told States Parties that it had discovered the previously unknown stocks comprised of “four 120mm High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) Mortar bombs, each containing 24 bomblets, as well as two boxes each containing 40 BL755 Warheads, which were formerly used in the UK’s 600 lb Cluster Bomb.”[58] According to the statement, a “private British organization” alerted the Ministry of Defence in June 2020, after it discovered the munitions at an unspecified location.

Retention

Since 2013, the UK has reported that it does not retain any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or research purposes and “has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[59]

Previously, in 2011 and 2012, the UK reported that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four types.[60] In 2013, the UK reported that the retained submunitions had been destroyed by demolition “because of concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[61]