Summary

Western Sahara has expressed its support for banning cluster munitions, but cannot accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status. Western Sahara provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention in 2014, which states that it has never produced cluster munitions and does not possess any stocks.

Policy

Western Sahara’s lack of official representation at the United Nations (UN) prevents it from joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Western Sahara’s sovereignty is the subject of a long-standing dispute between the government of Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario).

Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) provided the UN with a voluntary Article 7 transparency measures report for the convention in 2014, which declares that “SADR would like to reaffirm its commitment to a total ban on cluster munitions as well as its willingness to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and be bound by its provisions.”[1] Before that, Polisario Front representatives expressed support on several occasions for the prohibition on cluster munitions.[2]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In 2014, the SADR declared that it has never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stocks.[3] Previously, in 2012, Polisario told the Monitor that it did not possess cluster munitions and has never used them.[4]

The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario in Western Sahara during their conflict from 1975 to 1991. SADR has reported that Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used air-dropped BLU-63 and MK-118 Rockeye, and surface-fired M-42 cluster munitions at multiple locations in Dougaj, Mijek, Bir Lahlu, North Wadis, and Mehariz.[5]

Policy

The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a member of the African Union, but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the United Nations (UN), which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Polisario officials have, since 1999, stated that they would adhere to the Mine Ban Treaty if permitted to do so.

In June 2014, the SADR submitted a voluntary Article 7 report to the Mine Ban Treaty Secretariat at the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in Geneva.[1] A July 2013 Presidential decree obligates the SADR and Polisario to abide by the Mine Ban Treaty.[2] Belgium and the ICBL welcomed the voluntary Article 7 report from Western Sahara at the Third Review Conference.[3] Previously, in November 2005, the Polisario committed to unilaterally ban antipersonnel mines through the NGO Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. The Deed pledges the Polisario to a ban on use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and to cooperation on mine action.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Both the Polisario and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used mines extensively until the 1991 UN-monitored ceasefire. There have been no substantiated allegations of mine use since that time.[4]

The Polisario is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Polisario officials claim they acquired antipersonnel mines in the past by lifting them from Moroccan minefields, especially those around the berms (defensive earthen walls).[5] Based on mines declared and previously destroyed, Polisario stocks have included antipersonnel mines of Belgian, Chinese, French, German, Israeli, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, Soviet, United Kingdom, and Yugoslav manufacture.[6] As of June 2014, the SADR stated that it had a stockpile of 10,485 antipersonnel mines. The SADR reported that all mines in its remaining stockpile were captured from the Moroccan Army during the war.[7]

On 6 January 2019, the Polisario Front announced that it had destroyed 2,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, marking the completion of its destruction obligations under the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.[8] Previously, the Polisario Front destroyed 2,500 antipersonnel mines on 22 May 2018 and 2,500 antipersonnel mines on 4 November 2017.[9]

From 2006 to 2015, the Polisario undertook five public destructions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.[10] On 30 March 2015, the Polisario destroyed 3,000 antipersonnel mines.[11]

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Mine Contamination

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm[1] are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world.[2] The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces.

According to UNMAS, the primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from antivehicle rather than antipersonnel mines; cluster munition remnants are also a major hazard.[3] It stated that, at the start of 2017, only a limited number of areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines remained to the east of the Berm, and the majority of mine contamination identified during ongoing and historical clearance efforts was from antivehicle mines.[4] However, UNMAS reported that during the year, as a result of non-technical survey conducted in the Agwanit Area of Responsibility, a number of large minefields previously thought to contain only antivehicle mines were found to also contain antipersonnel mines.[5]

At the end of 2017, land in Western Sahara to the east of the Berm contained a total of 27 areas confirmed and suspected to contain antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination covering a total of more than 218km², as set out in the table below.[6] This is close to 34km² less than what UNMAS reported as mine contamination remaining at the end of 2016, when it reported that a total of 37 areas with a size of 252km² remained to be addressed.[7]

In September 2018, UNMAS reported that following non-technical survey efforts, 10 of the 27 mined areas, were reported to remain covering an estimated total of almost 120km², and are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.[8] Clearance of the buffer strip of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is not foreseen in MINURSO mission agreements, which according to the UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol and verify developments.[9]

 Mine contamination east of the Berm (at end 2017)[10]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known or suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, with 11 areas confirmed or suspected areas with a total size of almost 169.5km² remaining to be addressed at the end of 2017, as set out in the table below.[11] This is compared to the end of the previous year, when a total of 11 areas confirmed or suspected to contain antipersonnel mines were reported to remain with a total size of more than 154.5km².[12] 

Areas containing antipersonnel mines by province east of the Berm (as of end 2017)[13]

The figure of 169.5km² of remaining suspected and confirmed antipersonnel mine contamination is not consistent with the figure reported at the end of 2016, adjusted by release and confirmation reported during the year. This figure would be just under 235km².[14]

Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the 5km-wide buffer strip to the east of the Berm. The extent of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown, and as of 2018, no survey had been carried out there.[15] UNMAS reported in 2018 that there were areas of known contamination in the buffer strip that remained inaccessible for clearance due to military agreements.[16] The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.[17]

The significant mine, submunition, and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Western Sahara continues to pose a daily threat to the local, nomadic, and refugee populations, along with UN personnel and military observers, and humanitarian actors.[18] Contamination from mines and ERW negatively impacts socio-economic growth and development, limiting access to fluctuating and seasonally dependent water sources vital for animal herding and small-scale agriculture on which local populations depend.[19] According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the impact of contamination is primarily socio-economic, although human accidents continued to occur. In 2017, the local mine action authority, the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO), reported 11 victims in 13 incidents.[20] 

In 2017, mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, continued to block access to arable land and critical water sources for the local population and impeded the free movement of UN personnel on patrol routes and in areas of UN operations.[21] Areas near to the Berm are considered the most heavily contaminated, though mines and ERW remain a significant risk along frequently used tracks and in close proximity to traditional settlements. According to UNMAS, a number of incidents have occurred in the vicinity of the Berm in areas rich with river beds, wadis, and water sources, which are fertile for seasonal agricultural cultivation, and a direct threat to the Sahrawi population.[22]

NPA reported that, in 2017, mines and ERW continued to pose a threat to the approximately 12,000 Sahrawi nomads and internally displaced persons in refugee camps who traversed contaminated areas to graze livestock, cultivate land, and visit relatives. Once cleared, the majority of land released is put to use for pasture and grazing of livestock by nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, while released land located close to village centers is used for building.[23]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Western Sahara had approximately 2.6km² of CHA containing cluster munition remnants east of the Berm[24] at the end of 2017. Of the 40 CHAs in total, six cluster munition strike areas, with a total size of 0.5km², are located inside the buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.[25] Confirmed cluster munition contamination was a decrease from the 44 areas totaling 4.5km² recorded by UNMAS at the end of 2016.[26]

Both the north and south of Western Sahara still contain confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas, as set out in the table below.[27]

CMR contamination east of the Berm (at end 2017)[28]

Note: CMR = cluster munition remnants.

The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (RMAF) used both artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario Front forces during their conflict in Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991. According to SADR, BLU-63, M42, and Mk118 submunitions were used by the RMAF at multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Dougaj, Mehaires, Mijek, and North Wadis.[29]

While cluster munition clearance had been projected to be completed by the end of 2012,[30] discovery of previously unknown contaminated areas meant this target date was not met. New contaminated areas continued to be identified in 2017 and new strike areas are expected to be found in the future as mine action activities continue and additional information is received from local populations.[31]

The size of the six cluster munition strike areas located inside the buffer strip, with an estimated total area of 520,609m², may increase if restrictions on access to the buffer strip are lifted, allowing survey and clearance to be conducted.[32] However, clearance of the buffer strip of mines and ERW is not foreseen in MINURSO mission agreements, which according to the UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol and verify developments.[33] In 2017, four previously recorded areas of cluster munition contamination in Mijek covering a total estimated size of 0.4km² were not made accessible for clearance due to security concerns on the part of the Polisario Front.[34]

Program Management

In 2013–2014, the Polisario Front, with UN support, established SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm and for land release activities.[35]

In Western Sahara, MINURSO manages a Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC). UNMAS contracted a survey/clearance capacity through Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) in 2017, with quality assurance (QA) performed externally by UNMAS staff in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Survey and clearance were also implemented by NPA in 2017.[36]

In 2017, UNMAS implemented an ongoing capacity development project with SMACO, funded for 28 months, which was due to end in October 2018.[37] It contracted a technical advisor for capacity development to work with SMACO to improve operations and coordination with the MACC and operators. Individual training was provided to SMACO staff on all aspects of mine action program management, including information management and support services. Training on operational skills such as prioritization, tasking, marking, accreditation, the development of mine action standards, and survey and clearance methodology were also conducted. Emphasis was placed on building the program’s capacity to translate local mine action requirements into proposals and budgets with the aim of ensuring that SMACO can independently seek funds and report on progress in the future.[38]

UNMAS stated that efforts were also aimed at regularly raising the profile of SMACO within the local and wider communities and internationally.[39] The construction of an office building for SMACO in 2017 with German funding was another significant contributor to increasing its capacity and effectiveness.[40]

Strategic planning

MINURSO MACC’s activities are conducted in accordance with the Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action 2013–2018, the Local Mine Action Standards (LMAS), and the IMAS. UNMAS planned to develop a mine action strategy specific to Western Sahara in the second half of 2015.[41] According to UNMAS, the strategy was finalized in 2017, yet still was considered an internal document and had not been made publicly available as of September 2018.[42] According to UNMAS, the strategy foresees completion of non-technical survey in 2017–2018; release of all recorded cluster munition strike areas east of the Berm by the end of 2019; and a 50% reduction in the total number of recorded SHAs and CHAs remaining in Western Sahara by the end of 2022.[43]

In 2017, NPA reported that the development of the strategy had brought about a significant improvement in the management of mine action in Western Sahara and increased coordination between the MACC, SMACO, and the operators. Meetings were convened every two months. where all mine action stakeholders provided updates on their progress against the plan and future activities.[44]

Legislation and standards

There is no mine action legislation in Western Sahara but mine action standards were in place and implemented in 2017. The standards were developed and finalized in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine action partners, and were planned to be translated into Arabic.[45] NPA reported that operators had updated their standing operating procedures (SOPs) accordingly, and that the local mine action standards set realistic benchmarks for efficient operations.[46] A first annual review of the standards was set to be held in 2018 with a review board consisting of representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing partners.[47] 

The MACC identifies priorities for minefield clearance to the east of the Berm in conjunction with SMACO and MINURSO. SMACO identifies priorities based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, while the MACC ensures that observation patrol routes are safe for military observers and the transport of logistical supplies.[48] NPA confirmed that operators were always consulted in priority setting to ensure sufficient resources and equipment were available to conduct operations in a given area.[49] 

In 2017, UNMAS reported that gender policies were implemented in accordance with UNMAS, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario.[50] NPA stated that gender mainstreaming considerations were included in its Memorandum of Understanding with SMACO, in NPA’s internal strategy documents, and taken into account during recruitment processes. Additionally, during survey efforts are made to ensure the needs of men, women, girls, and boys are taken into consideration for more effective and efficient operations.[51] 

Quality management

An external quality management system was in place in 2017 and implemented by MINURSO MACC, consisting of a series of QA inspection visits for organizational and operational accreditation and periodic monitoring of clearance operations. UNMAS reported that 78 QA visits were conducted in 2017 to assess mine clearance activities.[52]

This compared to 2016, when no external QA/QC was carried out on demining activities in April–September owing to the expulsion of UNMAS and MINURSO staff from Western Sahara by Morocco.[53]

Information management

According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara improved appreciably as a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015, a process that continued throughout 2017.[54] UNMAS reported that a revised standard operating procedure for data management was introduced, putting a stronger emphasis on verification of information.[55] In 2017, UNMAS reported regular support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to correct database errors.[56]

NPA noted significant improvements in information management during the year, with better coordination and monthly updates from the database sent to operators, and easier access for SMACO to receive trainings at the MACC’s relocated office in Tindouf.[57] 

Operators 

DML and NPA were the implementing operators conducting survey and clearance in Western Sahara in 2017. UNMAS reported that the overall mine action capacity in Western Sahara in 2017 consisted of nine multi-task teams (MTTs) and one community liaison/survey team, with a total of 116 operational staff in the field, 18 support staff, and eight senior staff.[58] This included six DML teams and one community liaison/survey team.[59] NPA continued its operations in Bir Lahlou and deployed two MTTs to conduct non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance with a total of two team leaders and 15 deminers. At the end of 2017, a new team was trained to bolster NPA’s demining capacity and deployed at the start of 2018.[60] No mechanical assets or mine detection dogs were deployed in Western Sahara for mine clearance activities in 2017.[61]

This is an increase from 2016, when in January–November, there were a total of five MTTs (three DML teams and two NPA teams), with two NPA teams deployed to conduct mine clearance along with two of the three teams contracted from DML.[62]

Land Release (mines)

There was a significant increase in the cancellation and reduction of areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines through survey in 2017 with a total of close to 8.3km² released through survey compared to just under 1km² in 2016, along with just under 89km² confirmed as antipersonnel mine-affected, compared to 0.5km² in 2016.[63]

While UNMAS reported that a total of just under 284,200m² of area thought to contain antipersonnel mine contamination was cleared, no antipersonnel mines were found. In 2016, no areas containing antipersonnel mines were cleared.[64] 

Survey in 2017 (mines)

According to UNMAS and NPA, four areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mine contamination with a size of just under 7km² were cancelled by non-technical survey in 2017, with a further 1.3km² of areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines reduced by technical survey. A total of six areas were confirmed as containing antipersonnel mines, with a total size of nearly 89km².[65] According to UNMAS, these were areas previously thought to contain only antivehicle contamination, which were instead found to have mixed antipersonnel and antivehicle contamination.[66]

NPA reported releasing more than 3.5km² of suspected antipersonnel mine contamination by cancellation in 2017. It reported that technical survey was also conducted to avoid the use of full clearance methodology in areas where mines were not found, resulting in the further reduction of over 1km² of suspected antipersonnel mine contamination in its areas of operations during the year.[67] NPA did not conduct survey in any areas suspected or confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines in 2016.[68]

DML was reported to have cancelled one SHA where antipersonnel mines were suspected with a size of over 3.4km² in 2017, and reducing a further 284,000m² through technical survey. It confirmed five areas with a total size of close to 85.5km² as contaminated with antipersonnel mines.[69] This was a sizeable increase in cancellation and confirmation of antipersonnel contaminated areas from 2016, when DML was reported to have cancelled two SHAs where antipersonnel mines had been suspected, covering nearly 0.46km², and confirmed two SHAs with a size of 0.53km² as containing antipersonnel mines.[70]

Antipersonnel mine area survey in 2017[71]

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, according to UNMAS, a total of just under 284,200m² of areas thought to contain antipersonnel contamination was cleared by DML. However, no antipersonnel mines were found or destroyed. Thirty-two antivehicle mines and 10 items of UXO were destroyed.[72] No areas containing antipersonnel mines were cleared in 2016, and no antipersonnel mines were destroyed during the year.[73]

In 2017, over 32.3km² of antivehicle mine contamination was released by DML, of which 471,696m² was by clearance and nearly 31.9km² cancellation by non-technical survey.[74] NPA reported completing clearance of two CHAs reportedly containing antivehicle mines, though no antivehicle mines were actually found in 2017.[75] This is compared to 2016, when nearly 4.5km² of area containing antivehicle mines and ERW was released: of which 328,355m² was by clearance and 4,037,993m² that was cancelled by non-technical survey.[76] As was the case in 2016, all tasked areas were believed to be contaminated with antivehicle mines and no antipersonnel mines were located during clearance.[77]

In 2017, NPA reported that 66 items of UXO were found and destroyed as spot tasks, including an aircraft bomb.[78]

To the west of the Berm, according to a UN Secretary-General report, the RMA reported, highly improbably, that it had cleared nearly 145km² in territory under its control between April 2017 and March 2018. Clearance operations destroyed more than 1,000 items of UXO, 57 antivehicle mines, and 56 antipersonnel mines.[79]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance was just over 6.1km² in 2017.[80] This was a near five-fold increase compared with 2016, when just over 1.21km² was cleared, hampered by the political suspension of mine action activities in March–September.[81] The return to full freedom of movement for all civilian MINURSO and UNMAS staff to implement mine action operations, along with an increase in resources and capacity, accounted for the substantial rise in productivity to address cluster munition contamination in 2017.[82]

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

Cluster munitions remnants survey in 2017[83]

In 2017, 57 areas with a size of just over 1.45km² of cluster munition contamination were confirmed through survey, including nearly 0.69km² by DML and 0.77km² by NPA.[84] This is a significant increase in the size of cluster munition-contaminated area identified in 2016, when DML confirmed five previously unrecorded strike areas with a size of 0.25km² through its survey activities.[85] 

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated-areas in 2017[86]

* UXO = unexploded ordnance other than unexploded submunitions.

In 2017, there was a near five-fold increase compared to the previous year in the area of cluster munition contamination cleared, with the clearance of 62 cluster munition strike areas with a size of just over 6.1km² and the destruction of 688 submunitions and 27 items of other UXO.[87] This compares to the clearance of 17 cluster munition-contaminated areas with a total size of 1.2km² in 2016.[88]

Additionally, in 2017, DML conducted a total of 27 EOD spot tasks, locating and destroying 33 items of UXO, while NPA carried out 22 EOD spot tasks destroying 81 items of UXO.[89]

Progress towards completion of antipersonnel mine clearance

Western Sahara cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to its political status. In June 2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty.”[90] 

Under Western Sahara’s draft mine action strategic plan, non-technical survey was planned to be completed before the end of 2018 and the number of recorded SHAs and CHAs are sought to be reduced by half by the end of 2022.[91] 

Despite the significant increase in survey output in 2017, UNMAS reported that delays to clearing areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines continued as a result of restrictions on accessing certain areas of the buffer strip established by various MINURSO and other party agreements.[92] NPA cited other challenges to operations, including working in a remote desert environment allied to serious difficulties with the procurement of certain equipment and materials.[93] Temperatures of up to 60 degrees Celsius in July and August, strong winds, sandstorms, and heavy rain during the wet season can also cause mine action activities to be suspended.[94]

According to UNMAS, clearance of all mined areas containing antipersonnel mines in the three northern districts of Western Sahara, Bir Lahlou, Tifiariti, and Mehaires, is planned to be completed in 2018. After this, clearance operations will commence in the southern sector, in Agwanit district, following the completion of non-technical survey and the confirmation of all hazardous areas identified in re-survey in 2017. It did not expect significant changes in clearance capacity, funding, or output in 2018.[95]

In keeping with previous estimates, UNMAS has estimated that all high and medium hazardous areas in Western Sahara east of the Berm could be released by 2025.[96] Specifically, UNMAS maintained that survey and clearance of all antipersonnel mine contamination in Western Sahara could be completed within three to seven years, between 2021 and 2025, depending on financial support and a stable political and security environment.[97]

NPA reported that as of 31December 2017, only three minefields remained to be addressed in its area of operations, in the remote region of Bir Lahlou, which it planned to complete by mid-2018. However, as of September 2018, clearance was still ongoing in the last remaining minefield, where NPA reported that teams were finding and clearing antipersonnel mines, which was scheduled to be completed at the end of October 2018.[98]

On 27 April 2018, the UN Security Council voted to extend MINURSO’s mandate in Western Sahara for six months until 31 October 2018, a change from prior resolutions, which extended MINURSO’s mandate for one year.[99] In 2017–2018, UNMAS reported no restrictions on movement in UNMAS’s areas of operations east of the Berm.[100]

Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance 

Western Sahara cannot accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status, and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4.

Despite the significant increase in clearance output in 2017, UNMAS reported that delays to clearing confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas continued as a result of restrictions on accessing certain areas of the buffer strip established by various MINURSO mission agreements.[101] NPA cited other challenges to operations, including working in a remote desert environment allied to serious difficulties with the procurement of certain equipment and materials.[102] Extremely high temperatures, strong winds, sandstorms, and heavy rain during the wet season can also cause mine action activities to be suspended.[103]

Under Western Sahara’s draft mine action strategic plan, all recorded cluster munition strike areas to the east of the Berm, outside of the buffer strip, should be released by 2019.[104] UNMAS expected to complete clearance of all cluster munition contamination in the Northern Sector (Bir Lahlou, Mehaires, and Tifariti districts) east of the Berm by the end of 2018.[105] It did not expect a change in funding in 2018.[106]

Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Note: CMR = cluster munition remnants.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2019, international assistance to mine action activities in the territory of Western Sahara amounted to some US$178,000 from two donors, Norway and Spain.[1]

Additionally, Switzerland provided in-kind assistance valued at CHF475,000 ($478,011) in support of clearance operations in Western Sahara.[2]

International contributions: 2019[3]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Since 2015, annual international contributions to mine action in Western Sahara have fluctuated between $2.9 million in 2017 and just $0.2 million in 2019. International contributions totaled almost $8.1 million over the five-year period from 2015–2019.

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[4]

Casualties in 2017—details

The majority of casualties, 19, were in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara (west of the berm[2]), and five occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara (east of the berm, also known as the Liberated Territories). The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported confidence that almost all casualties in 2017 were recorded.[3]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Western Sahara is not known. As of May 2018, UNMAS and the Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Center (SMACO) are in the process of cleaning up the casualty database. Sources of casualty data include a casualty survey conducted by the Saharawi Association of Landmine Victims (Asociación Saharaui de Víctimas de Minas, ASAVIM) with the support of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in 2012, and ongoing casualty surveillance.[4] ASAVIM had collected detailed information on 1,006 victims of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW who are living in and around the Rabouni refugee camps on the Algerian border with Western Sahara.[5] The Polisario authorities reported a total of 1,413 people killed and injured by mines/ERW through April 2014.[6] UNMAS data included 1,427 casualties east and west of the berm in total. This total contains 1,213 adults, 18 children, and 196 of unknown age. Out of all casualties, 311 victims were recorded with a military/police status and 41 victims were deminers.[7] Morocco reported a total of 2,536 mine/ERW casualties (831 killed; 1,705 injured) from 1975 to the end of 2012; it was not reported how many of these occurredin Morocco versus Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.[8]

Cluster munition casualties

In total, 184 cluster munition casualties have been identified in Western Sahara. Two unexploded cluster submunition casualties were reported in 2017, an increase on 2016 when none were reported. There were four unexploded cluster submunition casualties in 2015, including at least one child.[9] Prior to that, in September 2013, a boy was injured by an unexploded submunition.[10] ASAVIM identified 177 casualties of unexploded submunitions occurring between 1975 and 2012.[11]