Universalization

Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 151 States Parties, a total of 84 states ratified or acceded to the treaty after its entry into force on 1 March 1999.^{[3 ]}The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55; 1999—32 (23 after 1 March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8; 2003—11; 2004—3; 2005—4; and 2006 (as of July)—3.

Four signatory states have ratified the treaty since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Ukraine (December 2005), Haiti (February 2006), the Cook Islands (March 2006) and Brunei (April 2006). Ukraine possesses a very large stockpile of 6.6 million antipersonnel mines, including 5.9 million difficult-to-destroy PFM-type mines. With Haiti’s ratification, only two countries in the Americas, Cuba and the United States, remain outside of the treaty. The Cook Islands and Brunei provide positive examples for the Asia-Pacific states that are not yet party to the treaty.

There are three states remaining that have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty: Indonesia, Marshall Islands, and Poland. There are positive indications from Indonesia and Poland that they will ratify the treaty in the near-term. The President of Indonesia issued his consent to start the process for ratification of the treaty in October 2005, and in March 2006 a draft law was submitted to the Ministry of Legal and Human Rights Affairs for final revision. Poland continues to work on the national ratification process following elections and a change in government. In addition, in December 2005, the Marshall Islands voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, after it abstained on similar resolutions in past years.

There have also been encouraging developments in many of the non-signatory nations around the world.

In sub-Saharan Africa: Somalia is the only country in the region that is not party to the treaty. In June 2005, the Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) reaffirmed the TFG’s resolve to accede to the treaty and called for assistance, including for stockpile destruction.

In the Asia-Pacific region: At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Palau expressed its hope to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006. The Federated States of Micronesia attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November-December 2005—its first participation in a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting—and told the ICBL that accession legislation was being drafted. In May 2006, Mongolia indicated it has initiated a step-by-step approach to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008; a first step in the plan is to reveal information on its landmine stockpiles. In October 2005, at the UN, Mongolia’s representative declared, “Mongolia denounces the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of all types of anti-personnel landmines and supports the efforts undertaken by the international community to ban this dangerous and indiscriminate weapon.”

In July 2005, Laos confirmed its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the future. In December 2005, China voted for the first time in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution; it continued to make statements supporting the Mine Ban Treaty’s purposes and objectives. India has shown an increasing openness toward the Mine Ban Treaty, and has regularly attended meetings related to the treaty since December 2004; at the Sixth Meeting of State Parties the Indian delegate stated that its participation in these meetings “is a reflection of our commitment to the common vision of a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance.”

During the visit of a Canadian government delegation in November 2005 to promote the Mine Ban Treaty, Vietnamese officials indicated that Vietnam will join the treaty at some point and stressed that it already respects the spirit of the treaty by not producing, selling or using antipersonnel mines. On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. In June 2006, Taiwan enacted legislation that bans production and trade of antipersonnel mines, but not stockpiling and use, and requires clearance of mined areas within seven years.

In the Commonwealth of Independent States: For the first time, Azerbaijan in December 2005 voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution. Armenia has reportedly decided to submit to the UN Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, the annual transparency reports required by the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II. Georgia attended the intersessional meetings in May 2006, where it said that its position on non-accession to the Mine Ban Treaty was being re-considered, and it re-stated its commitment not to use, produce, import or export antipersonnel mines.

In the European Union: Finland is the only EU country that has not signed, ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Finland reiterated its commitment to accede by 2012 and destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2016.

In the Middle East-North Africa region: In Kuwait, a draft accession law was submitted to the National Assembly; Kuwait voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution for the first time since 1998. Senior Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials said in March 2006 that Iraq would join the treaty and that preparations were underway. In Lebanon, an internal review process that could lead to accession began. In June 2006, Lebanon’s Prime Minister and the Army Chief told the ICBL that they were not averse to accession, and the Foreign Minister said that Lebanon was giving serious consideration to accession. For the first time, Lebanon voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution in the First Committee; it was absent from the final vote. Morocco continued to express strong support for the Mine Ban Treaty and stressed its de facto compliance; it voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the second consecutive year, and announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties its intention to submit a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80: One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 60/80 was adopted on 8 December 2005 by a vote of 158 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.^{[4 ]}This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution, and the lowest number of abstentions, since 1997 when it was first introduced.^{[5 ]}Twenty-four states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included three countries that subsequently became States Parties (Ukraine, Haiti and Brunei), three signatory countries (Indonesia, Poland and Marshall Islands), and 18 non-signatories (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Iraq, Kuwait, Micronesia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the United Arab Emirates). Most notable among this latter group are Azerbaijan and China, who voted in favor of the annual resolution for the first time, as well as Kuwait (first time since 1998) and the Marshall Islands (first time since 2002). Lebanon voted in favor for the first time in the First Committee, but was absent for the final vote. It is noteworthy that of the 40 existing non-States Parties, more voted for the resolution (18) than abstained (17); five non-States Parties were absent from the vote.^[6]

Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were also discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to the treaty. Government forces in Burma (Myanmar), Nepal and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. The United States has been developing new landmine systems that may be incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. Some states that were reported to be making progress toward the treaty in Landmine Monitor Report 2005 did not report any further progress, such as Bahrain, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Non-State Armed Groups

There is ever-increasing awareness of the need to involve non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. NSAGs were a prominent topic at the June 2005 and May 2006 Standing Committee meetings, as well as the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.

A significant number of non-state armed groups have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. They have done this through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, and by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.^{[7 ]}NSAGs in three States Parties (Philippines, Senegal and Sudan) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments. In addition, in August 2005, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) signed a cease-fire with the government that included an agreement to clear mines.

Geneva Call has received signatures from 29 NSAGs, many of them in Somalia, since 2001. The signatories are in Burma, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Western Sahara. The Polisario Front in Western Sahara signed the Deed of Commitment in November 2005 and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), also known as the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra-Gel), signed in July 2006.

Sixth Meeting of States Parties

States Parties, observer states and other participants met for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005. It differed from previous annual meetings in that it was conducted in the framework of formally assessing progress in fulfilling the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 that had been adopted at a high political level at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November-December 2004. Thus, the meeting produced the Zagreb Progress Report, which in addition to reviewing progress made in the past year, highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. The Zagreb Progress Report took the place of the President’s Action Programme that emerged from previous annual meetings.

Notable announcements at the meeting included: Guatemala and Suriname completing their mine clearance obligations; Algeria and Guinea-Bissau completing their stockpile destruction obligations; Nigeria destroying mines previously retained for training; and, Australia pledging 75 million Australian dollars for mine action over five years. In the only substantive agreement of the meeting, States Parties agreed to a proposal from Argentina and Chile for a new format for expanded reporting on antipersonnel mines retained for training or development purposes under the Article 3 exception. The ICBL was pleased with the focus of States Parties on Article 5 mine clearance deadlines, and especially Norway’s offer to initiate a process to facilitate fulfillment of these obligations.

Participation in the meeting was high—over 600 people—with a total of 115 country delegations attending, including 94 States Parties. More than 180 representatives of NGOs from 63 countries attended. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners, people from the field, and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

A total of 21 non-States Parties participated, indicating the continuing spread of the international norm rejecting antipersonnel mines. Some of the more notable holdouts attended, including Azerbaijan, China, Egypt and India. India made its first formal statement at a Mine Ban Treaty meeting. Notably, seven non-States Parties from the Middle East/North Africa region took part, an encouraging development in a region with low adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty. These included Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

States Parties made a number of practical decisions at the Sixth Meeting. They decided to hold the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva from 18 to 22 September 2006, with Australia as the President-designate. Jordan offered to host the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in 2007. In addition, new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs were selected for the Standing Committees.

The ICBL identified several disappointing aspects of the meeting, including that Australia was the only State Party to announce a specific new financial commitment for mine action, responses to the victim assistance questionnaire were of varying quality with objectives too vague in many cases, and there was little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty’s prohibition on “assistance,” and mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes.

Implementation and Intersessional Work Program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee, contact groups on universalization, resource mobilization and Articles 7 and 9, the sponsorship program, and an implementation support unit.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in June 2005 and another week in May 2006. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, the new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs were selected for the period until the next annual meeting, as follows: General Status and Operation: Belgium and Guatemala as co-chairs and Argentina and Italy as co-rapporteurs; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Jordan and Slovenia as co-chairs and Chile and Norway as co-rapporteurs; Stockpile Destruction: Japan and Tanzania as co-chairs and Algeria and Estonia as co-rapporteurs; and Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Afghanistan and Switzerland as co-chairs and Austria and Sudan as co-rapporteurs.

Details of Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found in the thematic sections which follow.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

A total of 86 states were party to Amended Protocol II of CCW, as of 1 July 2006.^{[8 ]}Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. It entered into force on 3 December 1998. Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2005, only Tunisia joined Amended Protocol II. Just 10 of the 86 States Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and the United States.

China, Latvia, Pakistan and Russia deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex.^{[9 ]}China and Pakistan are obligated to be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia’s deferral is now presumably irrelevant due to its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibits the use of such mines and requires their destruction.

Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex.^{[10 ]}Their respective nine-year deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, and 2014 for Russia. Ukraine is obliged by the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.

In November 2003, 91 CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive remnants of war (ERW). On 12 May 2006, the 20th State Party ratified the protocol, triggering an entry-into-force date of 12 November 2006. As of 1 July 2006, 23 states had ratified Protocol V.^{[11 ]}

In the CCW, work on mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) and on measures to prevent specific weapons, including cluster munitions, from becoming explosive remnants of war continued in 2005 and 2006.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2005, three governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia. These same governments, as well as Georgia, were identified as using antipersonnel mines in the previous Landmine Monitor reporting period.

Myanmar’s military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was most widespread in Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah) and Shan states. In May 2006, Human Rights Watch reported that civilians seeking refuge in Thailand have been placed at grave risk by landmines planted by the Myanmar Army along the border in Karen state. It said antipersonnel mines were being planted in civilian areas to terrorize the local population, and cited a figure of 2,000 mines laid in one area to block escape routes and deny the civilian population access to food supplies, commodities and other humanitarian assistance. The Myanmar Army has reportedly obtained and is using an increasing number of antipersonnel mines of the US M-14 design; manufacture and source of these non-detectable mines—whether foreign or domestic—is unknown.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields, noting, “Antipersonnel mines are used to protect facilities of high importance.” They indicated mines are used by forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards. While Russia has regularly acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in the past, in August 2005 Russian military officials claimed to Landmine Monitor that Russian Ministry of Defense forces had not used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2004 or 2005.

On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes no use of landmines. Prior to the cease-fire, both sides had continued to use landmines and/or improvised explosive devices. Government forces (the Royal Nepalese Army and other security services) used both factory-made antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

There is no evidence—or even serious allegation—of use of antipersonnel mines by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories in the reporting period. This is notable in that many current States Parties have either admitted using, or there are credible allegations of their using, antipersonnel mines in the recent past, before joining the treaty, some even as signatories.^[12]

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups are using antipersonnel mines in more countries than government forces, but antipersonnel mine use by non-state armed groups is also on the decline. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least 10 countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like IEDs was reported in three States Parties (Burundi, Colombia and Guinea-Bissau) and in seven non-States Parties (Burma, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia/Chechnya and Somalia). Landmine Monitor Report 2005 cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 13 countries. Guinea-Bissau, where Senegalese rebels used mines against the Guinea-Bissau Army, was added to the list, while Georgia, the Philippines, Turkey and Uganda were removed this year.

For the first time in several years, there were no confirmed reports, or even serious allegations, of use of antipersonnel mines by non-state actors in Georgia. There were many instances in 2005 and 2006 where the Ugandan military seized caches of antipersonnel mines belonging to the Lord’s Resistance Army, but Landmine Monitor did not find any reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LRA. The LRA is known to have used mines in the past.

Many media and other reports in the Philippines referred to use of “landmines” by several NSAGs, including the New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group, but Landmine Monitor could only identify use of antivehicle mines and command-detonated mines and IEDs. The NPA stepped up its use of command-detonated improvised antivehicle mines, resulting in more casualties than ever before. NPA and MNLF both have stated that they do not use victim-activated antipersonnel mines.

Similarly, media and official reports in Turkey frequently referred to use of “landmines” by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/Kongra-Gel) but, again, Landmine Monitor could only clearly identify use of antivehicle mines and command-detonated mines and IEDs. Some incidents during the reporting period appear to have been the result of victim-activated antipersonnel mines or IEDs, but the date of their placement was not evident. The Turkish government has reported that in 2005, 39 military personnel were killed and 155 injured by mines laid by the PKK. In December 2005, the Gendarme General Command reportedly recovered 40 DM-11 antipersonnel mines and other weapons that belonged to the PKK. According to Geneva Call, the PKK has admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of explosive devices which can be activated by a victim or a vehicle. In commenting on a draft Landmine Monitor report, the government stated that the PKK’s claim not to use victim-activated mines “does not square with reality.” As noted above, in July 2006, the PKK signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines.

In Burma, the Karen National Liberation Army, Karenni Army, Shan State Army (South), Chin National Army, United Wa State Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and several other non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel mines; it is likely that the Karen National Liberation Army was the NSAG using mines most extensively in this reporting period.

In Burundi, the government continued to accuse the Front National de Libération (FNL) rebels of using antipersonnel mines; the increased number of mine casualties, particularly in Bujumbura Rural province where fighting has been taking place, indicates ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.

Chechen rebels continued to use improvised explosive devices extensively. It was difficult to ascertain the degree to which victim-activated antipersonnel mines or IEDs were being used, but it appears that in most instances, the rebels were using command-detonated IEDs targeting vehicles.

In Colombia, the FARC continued to be the biggest user of landmines in the country, and among the biggest in the world. Landmine Monitor registered new use of antipersonnel mines by FARC forces in several municipalities that had not reported mine incidents previously. Other groups, notably the ELN, also used mines. There were no specific reports of use of antipersonnel mines by AUC in this reporting period, though mines were seized from and turned in by AUC members.^[13]

In March and April 2006, a faction of the Senegal-based Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance led by Salif Sadio fled into northern Guinea-Bissau and laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during fighting with Guinea-Bissau armed forces, causing civilian casualties and significant socioeconomic disruption.

In India, a variety of NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and, most commonly, improvised explosive devices. Communist insurgents in central India used command-detonated IEDs, victim-activated explosive devices, and booby-traps. A number of groups in northeastern India used victim-activated devices. Insurgents in Kashmir used command-detonated IEDs, and the Indian Army recovered antipersonnel landmines from the insurgents.

In Iraq, opposition forces continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as antivehicle mines. The IEDs appeared to be almost exclusively command-detonated, though Coalition forces discovered many caches of antipersonnel mines. In June 2006, insurgent forces reportedly placed numerous victim-activated IEDs in the area surrounding the bodies of two American soldiers who had been kidnapped and killed.

In Nepal, Maoists used large numbers of command-activated explosive devices, as well as victim-activated and time-activated devices, leading to casualties in almost every district of the country.

In Pakistan, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and IEDs extensively in Baluchistan, and to a lesser extent in Waziristan and elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

In Somalia, there is little specific information available, but it appears there has been ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by various factions in different parts of the country.

In Sri Lanka, since December 2005, suspected use by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) of command-detonated Claymore mines has escalated greatly, and the Army has in a few instances alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the rebels.

Militants in Egypt may have used antipersonnel mine-like devices during an August-October 2005 operation against them by Egyptian security forces.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.^{[14 ]}Thirty-eight states have ceased the production of antipersonnel mines.^{[15 ]}This includes five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Israel and Poland. In addition, Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006. A total of 24 treaty members have reported on the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of antipersonnel mine production facilities.^[16]

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 countries as producers of antipersonnel mines. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period. Last year, Egypt and Iraq were removed.^{[17 ]}

Antipersonnel Landmine Producers

Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, Vietnam

Vietnamese officials from both the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry told a visiting Canadian delegation in November 2005 that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has sought confirmation and clarification from the government, including whether there is an official policy, law or regulation prohibiting production.

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. However, it has been conducting research and development on new landmines. The Pentagon is requesting $1.3 billion for research on and production of two new landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between 2005 and 2011; these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. The US Congress ordered a Pentagon study of the possible indiscriminate effects of Spider, thereby deferring the Pentagon’s expected decision in December 2005 whether to produce Spider.

Burma’s Military Heavy Industries reportedly began recruiting technicians for the production of the next generation of mines and other munitions. A former Nepalese government official told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that landmines are produced at the weapons factory at Sunchari south of Kathmandu, but the government has not provided any information on the types of mines produced.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW. In August 2005, India told Landmine Monitor that it is not producing remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines; it had stated in October 2000 that it had designed a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, for trial evaluation and prototype production.

The director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of Defense in 2002 that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have found since 2002 many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.

The South Korean company Hanwha produced about 3,300 Claymore mines (KM18A1) in 2005. Previously, South Korea reported that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2004.

NSAGs in Burma, Colombia, India, Iraq and Nepal are known to produce victim-activated mines or IEDs. Command- or remotely-detonated IEDs were produced by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In Burma, the United Wa State Army is allegedly producing PMN-type antipersonnel mines at an arms factory formerly belonging to the Burma Communist Party.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines. However, a UN panel leveled the most serious and specific allegation ever of a transfer of antipersonnel mines by a Mine Ban Treaty State Party. In May 2006, a UN arms embargo monitoring group reported that the government of Eritrea had delivered 1,000 antipersonnel mines to militant fundamentalists in Somalia in March 2006. Eritrea denied the claims as “baseless and unfounded” and labeled the report as “outrageous and regrettable.” An earlier October 2005 report from the UN monitoring group stated that between 25 March and 10 April 2005, Eritrea twice shipped arms including mines to an opponent of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); it did not specify antipersonnel or antivehicle mines.

The October 2005 and May 2006 UN reports also said that the government of Ethiopia had provided unspecified types of landmines to factions in Somalia. Ethiopia strongly denied the allegations. The October report also said the government of Yemen provided unspecified types of mines to the TFG, apparently in July 2005.

There continued to be reports and allegations that armed groups in Pakistan were smuggling mines into the country from Afghanistan. The May 2006 UN monitoring group report said that in August 2005 traders at the Bakaraaha arms market in Somalia reportedly purchased mines and other arms from a Yemeni arms trading network.

In July 2005, Israel extended for another three years its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines which was first declared in 1994. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended export moratoria in recent years including China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and the United States. South Korea exported 1,050 command-detonated-only Claymore mines to New Zealand in December 2005.

In July 2006, the United States repeated its desire (first announced in July 2004) to pursue negotiations on an international ban on the sale or export of non self-destructing landmines in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Several States Parties have objected to the proposal, noting that banning only one category of antipersonnel mines implies the acceptability of trade in other categories. The CD has not been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, 131 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 50 countries stockpile about 178 million antipersonnel mines. One notable development in this reporting period is that South Korea for the first time disclosed its stockpile total of 407,800 antipersonnel mines; various officials had previously indicated a stockpile of about 2 million antipersonnel mines.

States Parties

It appears that, as of July 2006, 138 of the 151 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. A total 74 States Parties have completed destruction of their stockpiles.^{[18 ]} Another 64 have either formally declared never possessing stocks, or are not believed to possess stocks.

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 39.5 million antipersonnel mines, destroying nearly 700,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Guinea-Bissau (October 2005), Nigeria (November 2005), Algeria (November 2005) and DR Congo (announced in May 2006). Although it had not previously reported any progress in its stockpile destruction program, DR Congo told States Parties in May 2006 that it had completed the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines under its control that it had been able to identify, and thus fulfilled its treaty obligation. It also said it expected to find additional stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the future, which it would then destroy.

Landmine Monitor estimates that upwards of 16 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by 13 States Parties that still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs. A total of 11 States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus (3.7 million), Burundi, Cyprus, Greece (1.6 million), Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Turkey (3 million) and Ukraine (6.7 million).^{[19 ]}While they have not officially declared their stockpiles in Article 7 reports, Ethiopia and Guyana are also thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Latvia, which became a State Party on 1 January 2006, has reported that it will destroy its stockpile of 2,410 mines in 2006. Serbia and Montenegro began destroying its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in August 2005 and by March 2006 had destroyed 649,217 mines, almost half of its stockpile. Cyprus destroyed 11,000 antipersonnel mines in 2005 and another 18,000 are slated for destruction in 2006. In May 2006, Afghanistan assured States Parties that all known stockpiles would be destroyed by its March 2007 deadline, and stated that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed.

After signing a contract with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in February 2006, Belarus began destroying its remaining stockpile of 294,755 antipersonnel mines, other than PFM mines. The Belarus Ministry of Defense signed a “statement of endorsement” to accept technical assistance from the European Commission (EC) for the destruction of 3.37 million PFM mines on 6 May 2006, with the goal of starting the project in January 2007. In February 2006, the EC awarded a €3 million (some $3.7 million) contract for destruction of Ukraine’s 5.95 million PFM-type mines. An EC €1 million ($1.2 million) tender for destruction of an additional, recently identified 716,745 non-PFM-type antipersonnel mines was cancelled. Turkey reported that in December 2005 NAMSA and a company signed an agreement to establish a new facility to destroy stockpiled mines.

In May 2006, Angola for the second time indicated the country may require an extension of its 1 January 2007 deadline for completion of antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction; however, the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow extensions for stockpile destruction. Burundi and Sudan are still determining the number and location of all their stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Guyana, which has not submitted its initial Article 7 report due July 2004, has never provided any information on its stockpile or its destruction plans and progress. Landmine Monitor has estimated Guyana’s stockpile at 20,000 antipersonnel mines.

Pending Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

Angola	1 Jan 2007
Afghanistan	1 Mar 2007
Cyprus	1 July 2007
Guyana	1 Feb 2008
Belarus	1 Mar 2008
Greece	1 Mar 2008
Serbia & Montenegro	1 Mar 2008
Turkey	1 Mar 2008
Burundi	1 Apr 2008
Sudan	1 Apr 2008
Ethiopia	1 Jun 2009
Latvia	1 Jan 2010
Ukraine	1 June 2010

A total of 55 States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.^{[20 ]} In addition, there are nine states that have not yet submitted Article 7 reports formally declaring the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Vanuatu.

Signatories

The three remaining signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile approximately one million antipersonnel mines. Poland declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005; it dismantled 12,990 expired stockpiled mines in 2005. Indonesia has estimated its stockpile at 16,000 antipersonnel mines. The Marshall Islands is not thought to stockpile any antipersonnel mines.

Non-Signatories

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (26.5 million) and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million), India (estimated 4-5 million) and South Korea (407,800). Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam.

Non-signatories have destroyed significant numbers of antipersonnel mines, more than 25 million, primarily because they had expired or to be compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. Israel for the first time reported that it destroyed 15,510 outdated stockpiled mines in 2005. In November 2005, a Chinese official stated that over the past three years China had destroyed nearly 500,000 landmines that did not comply with Amended Protocol II. It appears that from the late 1990s through 2005, China destroyed some 2.2 million antipersonnel mines that were either obsolete or not compliant with Amended Protocol II. Russia has reported destroying more than 19.5 million antipersonnel mines since 2000.

Non-State Armed Groups

During this reporting period, NSAGs were reported to possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Uganda. Most often, these stockpiles were reported as part of seizures by government forces. Landmines were seized from or turned in by NSAGs, or unidentified sources, in eight States Parties: Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, the Philippines, Turkey and Uganda. Only DR Congo reported such seizures in its Article 7 report; none of the other states have reported on the acquisition or destruction of seized antipersonnel mines.

Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 151 States Parties, 69 retain over 227,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least 71 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the recent additions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Moldova.^{[21 ]}In July 2006, FYR Macedonia destroyed its entire stockpile of 4,000 mines retained for training. During the May 2006 intersessional meetings, Moldova stated that it will destroy all 249 of its retained mines between 17 May and 31 July 2006. Hungary destroyed all of its 1,500 retained mines in October 2005.

Eleven States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.^{[22 ]}

Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Brazil (16,125), Turkey (15,150), Algeria (15,030), Bangladesh (14,999) and Sweden (14,402).

A total of eight States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sudan (10,000), Australia (7,266), Greece (7,224), Croatia (6,236), Belarus (6,030), Japan (5,350), Serbia and Montenegro (5,000) and Tunisia (5,000). Sudan reported in February 2006 that in addition to the 5,000 mines it had previously indicated would be retained by its armed forces, another 5,000 mines will be kept by the Government of Southern Sudan People’s Army.

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.^{[23 ]} During the May 2006 Standing Committee meetings, Chile, which previously retained 5,866 mines, announced that it had undertaken a review of its training program and the number of mines required, and had decided, in addition to the 300 mines to be consumed during training in 2006, to destroy another 1,292 antipersonnel mines that are no longer needed for training.

Another 17 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.^{[24 ]}Botswana has not reported the number of mines it retains.

A total of 14 States Parties reported consuming 3,702 mines for training and research purposes in 2005.^{[25 ]}In 2004, 24 States Parties reported consuming 6,761 mines. In 2003, 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines.

At least 51 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2005: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Namibia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Five of the 51 countries did not specifically report consuming any mines retained for training, but reported lower numbers than previous years’ Article 7 reports: Australia, France, Namibia, Netherlands and Uganda.

A total of 36 States Parties did not report consuming any mines in 2004; 26 did not consume any in 2003; 29 did not consume any in 2002.

At least 15 States Parties that retain over 1,000 mines have not reported consuming any mines for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years, including Algeria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Mozambique, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia. Some states have indicated that the purposes for which they utilize the mines do not require the consumption (destruction) of the mines.

The ICBL believes that states that retain antipersonnel mines and apparently do not use any of these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception permitted by Article 3.

The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties agreed to adopt a new voluntary expanded reporting format for Form D on retained mines at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005. Initially proposed jointly by Argentina and Chile, this modified format allows States Parties to report on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines retained under Article 3. Eleven States Parties made use of the new format for calendar year 2005.^{[26 ]}

Seventeen States Parties made statements on their retained mines during the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, with Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Germany, the Netherlands, Tanzania, Tajikistan and Yemen in particular providing details on their national practice.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the Convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 96 percent. This compares to 96 percent in 2005, 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.

Two State Parties have submitted initial reports since Landmine Monitor Report 2005, Cameroon and Latvia. For Cameroon, the deadline for submission was August 2003.

Six States Parties have a pending deadline: Bhutan (31 July 2006), Vanuatu (28 August 2006), Ukraine (28 November 2006), Haiti (28 January 2007), Cook Islands (28 February 2007) and Brunei (30 March 2007).

A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Gambia (28 August 2003), São Tomé e Príncipe (28 February 2004), Guyana (31 July 2004) and Ethiopia (28 November 2005).

For the second year, there was a decrease in the rate of annual updates submitted for the previous calendar year, which were due by 30 April 2006. As of 1 July 2006, a total of 90 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2005; 55 States Parties had not submitted updates.^{[27 ]}This equates to a compliance rate of 62 percent. The rate of compliance for annual reports for calendar year 2004 was 65 percent, for calendar year 2003 was 78 percent, and for calendar year 2002 was 62 percent.

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001, Gambia in 2002 and Lithuania in 2002, when they were signatories. Then non-State Party Latvia submitted voluntary reports in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports each year since 2003. In June 2005, non-State Party Sri Lanka submitted its first voluntary Article 7 report. It is quite detailed in many areas, but does not report on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Several other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, most recently Armenia and Morocco, joining Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.

Natioanl Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 49 of 151 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.^{[28 ]}This is an increase of five State Parties since publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Albania, Djibouti, Niger, Serbia and Montenegro, and Lithuania. A total of 23 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.^{[29 ]}Bolivia and Tanzania initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland and Uganda.

A total of 40 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.^{[30 ]}Argentina, Cyprus and Greece joined this category in the past year. Argentina and Guinea-Bissau said they are exploring the possibility of adopting new legislation even though they have deemed existing legislation sufficient. Although Qatar has not considered new legislation necessary because it has never produced, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines and is not mine affected, it has established a national committee to provide advice on the need for national legislation. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 41 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.^{[31 ]}

The ICRC has produced an Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. This kit is available from the ICRC in English, French, Russian and Spanish and is also available on the internet.^{[32 ]}

Special Issues of Concern

Assisting in Any Activity Prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1)

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances ... assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance. Many States Parties have recognized the need to address this issue and to share views on policy and practice.

The Final Report and President’s Action Program agreed at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003 states that “the meeting called upon States parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference.” The co-chairs of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention (Mexico and the Netherlands) at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings undertook significant consultations on reaching understandings or conclusions on issues related to Article 1, but a number of States Parties remained opposed.

The Nairobi Action Plan for 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”

Joint Military Operations

An understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 42 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty which may use antipersonnel mines.^{[33 ]}Several States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor since May 2005:

• Albania stated that “during joint military operations with State and Non-State Parties, Albania does not use and is not engaged in the use or transport of the antipersonnel mines.”
• Chad stated that “we will reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines and will refuse to order them as well. We will also reject participation in any joint operation if our military forces derive any military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines and we will not provide security or transportation of antipersonnel mines.”
• Cyprus stated that Article 1 “prohibits common military exercises of states parties to the Convention with the armed forces of states that have not ratified the Convention.”
• Estonia stated, “Almost two years ago the Netherlands circulated a non-paper, which lists the activities that could be regarded as assistance. The suggestions listed in the non-paper were acceptable for Estonia. On 21 June 2004 the chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention also introduced a non-paper on this particular topic on the basis of the Netherlands non-paper, which was acceptable for Estonia as well.”
• FYR Macedonia stated that it “reserves the right to reject any rules of engagement permitting use of APM and refuse orders to use them.”
• Moldova said, “It is our firm belief that States Parties engaging in military operations with other states of groups of states should not: participate in planning for use of anti-personnel mines; train others to use anti-personnel mines; participate in operations wherein direct military benefit is known by the State Party to be derived from the use of anti-personnel mines; agree to rules of engagement permitting the use of anti-personnel mines; or request others to use anti-personnel mines.”
• Slovenia stated that its “Armed Forces will under no circumstances take any action that would lead to the use of antipersonnel mines or contribute to such use in joint operations with other States.”
• Yemen stated that “one cannot participate in any activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines and should reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines and refuse orders to use them, and reject participation in any joint operation if their military forces derive any military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines, and should not provide security or transportation for AP mines.”

Some States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited; each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies.^{[34 ]}Australia has formally declared that it is permissible to provide “indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” presumably including the laying of antipersonnel mines.

Transit and Foreign Stockpiling

A total of 31 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing of foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.^{[35 ]}Several States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor since May 2005:

• Albania stated that it “prohibits transfer of antipersonnel mines in its territory and foreign stockpiling in Albania of the antipersonnel mines.”
• Cyprus stated, “The meaning of the term ‘assist’, which is included in Article 1 of the Convention, should be interpreted thus: (a) It prohibits the storage of anti-personnel mines in the territory of another state, in which that state exercises its jurisdiction; (b) It prohibits the transshipment of anti-personnel mines by states not parties to the Convention, through the territory of states that have ratified the Convention....”
• Estonia stated, “On 21 June 2004 the chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention also introduced a non-paper on this particular topic on the basis of the Netherlands non-paper, which was acceptable for Estonia as well.”
• FYR Macedonia stated that the treaty “prohibits the transit of foreign APM on, across, or through territory under the jurisdiction or control of a state party; and prohibits foreign stockpiling of APM on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”
• Moldova stated, “We are strongly behind the view that Article 1 prohibits the transit of antipersonnel mines across, or the foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on, territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”
• Yemen said it supports the view that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the transit “of antipersonnel mines across, or the foreign stockpiling of anti-personnel mines on, territory under jurisdiction or control of a State Party.”

Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in an Article 7 transparency measures report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan. Germany, Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom have stated that US antipersonnel mine stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control.

Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL and ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine—even if it is labeled as an antivehicle mine—equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. However, for a small number of States Parties this remains a contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what mines are banned may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

The following 26 States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Yemen and Zambia. Four States Parties (Denmark, France, Japan and United Kingdom) have said that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

A growing number of States Parties have made their views known to Landmine Monitor in communications since May 2005:

• Albania stated that it “possesses stockpiles of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuses (break wires) and there are actually plans for their destruction and these mines are also currently used during the disposal of the old ammunition.”
• Croatia informed States Parties that it has removed the tilt rods from its TMRP-6 antivehicle mines. It said that it “fully subscribes” to the statement in a Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet that “a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine.”
• Estonia stated that “mines equipped with a tripwire, breakwire, or tilt rod fuse should not be used.”
• Germany stated that “antivehicle mines which can be actuated accidentally by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, have to be treated as antipersonnel mines, regardless of the question whether the detonation is caused by a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device. From our point of view, such mines are thus prohibited.”
• A Guatemalan official told Landmine Monitor that Guatemala supports the interpretations of the ICBL and many States Parties regarding Article 2.
• Kenya stated that “any mine that functions or has the capacity to function as an antipersonnel mine, or can be modified to function as such, should be considered as an antipersonnel mine and is therefore banned within the meaning of a mine and within the letter and spirit of the Convention. We therefore consider mines with sensitive fuzes and all anti-vehicle mines with antihandling devices to be covered under Article 2 and therefore prohibited under the Convention. We lend our support to the interpretation provided by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Committee of the Red Cross in this regard.”
• FYR Macedonia stated that “antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuses are effectively APM banned under the Ottawa Convention.”
• Moldova stated, “It is our firm belief that all mines, including anti-vehicle ones, designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons, do fall within the scope of the Ottawa Convention and are thus prohibited by the Convention. We fully share the view that a mine equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device, capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, should be considered an anti-personnel mine and banned under the Convention, regardless of an attached label possibly calling it an anti-vehicle mine, and of the respective amount of explosives going with it.”
• Slovenia stated that “antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices, which activate when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb antivehicle mines, and antivehicle mines with fusing devices, which cause mines to function as anti-personnel mines, fall under Article 2 of the Ottawa Convention and are thus prohibited by the Convention.”
• Yemen stated that it supports the view that “any mine even if it is called an antivehicle mine equipped with a sensitive fuse or sensitive antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited.”

There appears to be agreement, with some notable exceptions, that a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or a tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However, the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and a Czech company has offered for sale mines with a tripwire fuze. The Czech Republic has also acknowledged possessing tilt rod fuzes, but has stated that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired within 15 years. Slovenia has TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes, and is considering how to deal with them. Sweden has antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. France has destroyed a number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. Germany and Slovakia have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines. Slovakia has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling device. Belarus has committed to destroying MUV-type fuzes used as antihandling devices and booby-traps.

Claymore and OZM-72 Command-Detonated Mines

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In the past, options for both means of utilization have often been packaged with the mine.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation are permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions. The M18A1 (produced originally by the United States but also widely copied or license-produced by other countries), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries) and the MRUD (produced in the former Yugoslavia) are the most well known and widely held examples of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.

Several States Parties have extended this command and target activation distinction to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities. Lithuania and Moldova have reported modifying small numbers of OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them antipersonnel mines, and do not count them as mines to be destroyed or mines retained for training. Belarus decided to convert over 200,000 OZM-72 mines into command-detonated munitions.

A total of 30 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.^{[36 ]} A number of States Parties have clarified their positions since May 2005:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina included 15,343 MRUD directional fragmentation mines held by the armed forces in its total of mines retained for training.
• Denmark stated in March 2006, “Tripwires and tripwire devices have been removed from Danish Claymore Mines and have been replaced by electric detonators. Hereby the mines can only be activated on command.”
• Latvia disclosed possessing command-detonated MON series mines in its initial transparency report as a State Party, and committed itself “to not use them as antipersonnel mines.”
• Nicaragua reported in 2005 that a total of 121 MON series mines previously reported as mines retained for training have been excluded from the list as these mines are “not included in the restrictions established by the Ottawa Convention.”
• The head of Thailand’s mine action center reiterated in 2005 that all units have been briefed that Claymore mines are to be used only in command-detonated mode. However, no physical modifications have been undertaken to ensure use in command-detonated mode.
• Turkey stated in May 2006 that “the victim activation components of M18 Claymore mines have recently been added to the list of mines to be destroyed and the necessary steps have been taken to stock only command detonated M18 Claymore mines.” It initially declared possessing 18,236 M18 Claymore mines.

Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap. Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand and Sweden have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their Article 7 reports. With regard to the victim-activated components of the OZM-72, Belarus states, “This type of munition is currently revised: all subparts designed for uncontrolled detonation are to be extracted and destroyed.”

Thirty States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have destroyed Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.^{[37 ]}Albania, Chad, Cyprus, FYR Macedonia and Moldova are the most recent additions to the list of States Parties declaring that they do not possess Claymore-type mines. In May 2006, Moldova stated that it would destroy the 249 OZM-72 and MON series mines it previously retained for training purposes. It noted that “in the immediate future non-conventional training (like antipersonnel mine simulators and other relevant computer programmes) will be used instead....”

The vast majority of States Parties, a total of 91, have not declared whether their forces possess these types of mines. While the majority of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.

Reporting on and Destroying Captured or Newly Discovered Stockpiles (Article 4)

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. Burundi, DR Congo, Cambodia, Sudan and Turkey have provided some official information on such discoveries. Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Kenya, the Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Uganda and Yemen have not so far reported. Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.”

States Parties are largely failing to report these finds or any resulting actions. When States Parties fail to report captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel mines, there is no information on whether or not the mines were placed into a stockpile, retained for training purposes, or destroyed. It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines after the completion of its stockpile destruction program. To guarantee complete information, States Parties should reveal in Article 7 reports the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines.^[38]

[3 ] Of the 84, 65 were signatories who ratified and 19 were non-signatories who acceded.

[4] Seventeen states abstained from voting for UNGA Resolution 60/80 in December 2005: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

[5] Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)―142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)―147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)—139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V)―143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)―138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)―143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)―153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; and 2005 (Resolution 59/84)—157 in favor, none against, 22 abstentions.

[6] The five states not party who were absent were Lebanon (which voted in favor in the First Committee), Mongolia (which voted in favor of every previous annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution since 1998), and Laos, North Korea and Saudi Arabia (all absent from every previous vote).

[7] Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment, a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action.

[8] The full name is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.

[9] In a June 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, India confirmed that it “has not sought any deferral for any provision” of Amended Protocol II. There has been confusion on this point because India has on occasion referred to modifying its non-detectable mines “well before the stipulated period” of Amended Protocol II.

[10] Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by CCW Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. India has explored development of such systems. The Mine Ban Treaty requires Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, and Ukraine by 1 June 2010. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan and the United Kingdom have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

[11] Since publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2005, 10 states ratified Protocol V in this order: Bulgaria, Norway, Holy See, El Salvador, Slovakia, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Albania, Tajikistan, and most recently on 6 June 2006, the Czech Republic. Sweden was the first to ratify Protocol V, in June 2004, followed by Lithuania, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Nicaragua and Liberia.

[12] See past editions of Landmine Monitor Report for details. Angola, Ecuador and Ethiopia have admitted using antipersonnel mines as signatories. Landmine Monitor has cited credible allegations of use while a signatory by Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. Other current States Parties who used antipersonnel mines since the early 1990s as non-signatories include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Eritrea, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

[13] FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional; AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. See report on Colombia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[14] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

[15] Thirty-three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

[16] Nine States Parties have not officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in Article 7 reports: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. For many of these states the production of antipersonnel mines ceased prior to entry into force of the treaty.

[17] Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor also removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (which became Serbia and Montenegro) from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.

[18] As of 1 July 2006, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Rep. of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[19] In the cases of Burundi, Greece and Sudan, the actual physical destruction of mines had not begun as of mid-2006. Landmine Monitor considers states to be “in progress” if they have reported they are formulating destruction plans, seeking international financial assistance, conducting national inventories, or constructing destruction facilities.

[20] The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Togo, and Trinidad & Tobago. A number of these apparently had stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including Eritrea, Rwanda and Senegal.

[21] Of the 71 choosing not to retain antipersonnel mines, 20 once possessed stockpiles.

[22] Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, São Tomé e Príncipe, Ukraine and Vanuatu have not indicated whether they intend to retain antipersonnel mines; most have not yet submitted an Article 7 report. Of these eleven, only Ethiopia, Guyana and Ukraine are thought to possess mines.

[23] Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.

[24] Seventeen States Parties retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Colombia, Republic of Congo, Denmark, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.

[25] The following 14 States Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2005: Belgium (356), Canada (50), Chile (29), Croatia (164), Germany (41), Honduras (11), Ireland (8), Japan (1,596), Mozambique (151), Nicaragua (19), Slovenia (1), Sweden (396), Tajikistan (30) and Turkey (850).
[26] The 11 States Parties which made use of the expanded Form D are: Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, Moldova, Nicaragua, Romania, Tunisia and Turkey.

[27] The 55 States Parties not submitting updates were: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay. This number does not include the six States Parties with pending deadlines: Bhutan, Brunei, Cook Islands, Haiti, Ukraine and Vanuatu.

[28] A total of 49 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[29] A total of 23 States Parties are in the process of enacting legislation: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda.

[30] A total of 40 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new legislation is necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Central African Rep., Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Estonia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Jordan, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela.

[31] Those without progress toward national implementation measures include: Angola, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Latvia, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

[32] www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JR2C?OpenDocument.

[33] Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[34] Australia, Czech Rep., New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[35] Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yemen and Zambia.

[36] States Parties that acknowledge possessing Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines include: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brunei, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Honduras, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

[37] States Parties that declare not possessing or having destroyed Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines included as part of their stockpile destruction programs include: Albania, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, Czech Rep., El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Yemen.

[38] Article 7.1 of the Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General...on: g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4.”