© Katherine Harrison/AOAV, 24 March 2011.
Cluster munition stockpiles are destroyed in Hungary.

Introduction

The Convention on Cluster Munitions seeks to put an end to the human suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions. The convention prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions as well as assistance with any of these banned activities. It requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years and clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants within 10 years. The convention affirms the rights of cluster munition victims and establishes a strong framework for their assistance.

Driven by humanitarian imperatives and propelled forward by the CMC through the fast-track diplomatic Oslo Process, the convention was adopted by 107 states on 30 May 2008 in Dublin.^[1] It was opened for signature in Oslo seven months later on 3 December 2008, which is the International Day for Persons with Disabilities. Six months after the 30th ratification was deposited at the UN, the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, becoming binding international law.

As of 25 August 2011, a total of 108 countries had signed the convention; 60 had also ratified the convention; and one state had acceded. A total of 61 States Parties are legally bound by all of the convention’s provisions.

Out of the 86 countries that have used, produced, exported, or stockpiled cluster munitions, 44% (38 countries) have joined the convention and thereby committed to never engage in those activities again.^[2] States Parties include major stockpilers France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK), which are now in the process of destroying their tens of millions of submunitions. Sixteen of the 28 states contaminated by cluster munition remnants (57%) have signed the convention of which eight have ratified, committing to clear their land within 10 years, including the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Lebanon.^[3]

In acknowledgment of the humanitarian rationale for the convention, its First Meeting of States Parties was held in Lao PDR—the country most contaminated by unexploded submunitions—on 9–12 November 2010. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, an ambitious 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention’s First Review Conference is held in 2015.

The convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties on 12–16 September 2011 was held in Lebanon, another highly contaminated country.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 details how States Parties and signatories are demonstrating great determination to implement all aspects of the convention rapidly and thoroughly. At least 14 countries have already completed the destruction of their stockpiles. Two States Parties—Albania and Zambia—have declared the completion of their clearance of cluster munition remnants. At least 14 countries have enacted national legislation to implement the convention. Three-quarters of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports detailing their implementation of the convention. Other States Parties and signatories are far advanced in these and other implementation activities.

This report documents new cluster munition use in 2011 by non-signatories Libya and Thailand, incidents that elicited a strong response and wide media interest. It also provides examples of measures that countries outside the convention are taking as a result of the convention’s stigmatization of cluster munitions. The vast majority of countries that have not yet joined the convention are adhering to its provisions. The convention is beginning to establish a new norm rejecting any use of the weapon and a world free of cluster munitions is no longer an impossible dream, but an eventual reality.

Universalization and Ban Policy Activities

This section looks at the status of universalization of the convention, including countries that have signed and ratified or acceded. It surveys notable developments in the year from August 2010 to August 2011, including key actions, meetings, and universalization efforts. The long-standing, but so far unproductive deliberations on cluster munitions in the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) are also reviewed.

More than half of the countries in the world—109 states—have signed, ratified, or acceded to the convention as of 25 August 2011. Of these states, 40 are from Africa, 33 are from Europe, 21 are from the Americas, 12 are from Asia-Pacific, and three are from the Middle East and North Africa region.

Signature

A total of 108 states have signed the convention. Ninety-four states signed in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008, 10 signed in 2009, and four signed in the first seven months of 2010 before the convention became international law.

Since the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, states can no longer sign, but must instead accede (essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step).^[4]

Of the 108 signatories, 60 have ratified (as of 25 August 2011), leaving 48 signatories that still need to ratify to become States Parties.

Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. Thus, signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have committed to never use, produce, or transfer cluster munitions, even if they have not yet ratified.^[5]

Accession

Only one country acceded to the convention in the year after its entry into force: Grenada on 29 June 2011. Cluster munitions were used in Grenada during the United States (US) invasion in 1983, but it is not yet known if there is still contamination from cluster munition remnants.

The lack of more accessions is regrettable, but a number of non-signatories have indicated their intention to accede in the future, including many of the states that adopted the convention in Dublin, but did not subsequently sign.^[6] Several countries have indicated that accession is being given serious consideration, including Cambodia, Mauritius, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu.

Ratification

A total of 60 signatories had ratified the convention as of 25 August 2011, an increase of 22 ratifications since 1 August 2010. Four signatories ratified during the signing conference on 3 December 2008 (Holy See, Ireland, Norway, and Sierra Leone); 22 ratified in 2009; 23 in 2010; and 11 in 2011, as of 25 August.

Convention on Cluster Munitions ratifications since 1 August 2010

2010			2011
Antigua and Barbuda	23 August 2010		El Salvador	10 January 2011
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	7 September 2010		Ghana	3 February 2011
Monaco	21 September 2010		Netherlands	23 February 2011
Tunisia	28 September 2010		Portugal	9 March 2011
Cape Verde	19 October 2010		Mozambique	14 March 2011
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	29 October 2010		Lithuania	24 March 2011
Guatemala	3 November 2010		Bulgaria	6 April 2011
Lebanon	5 November 2010		Costa Rica	28 April 2011
Guinea-Bissau	29 November 2010		Botswana	27 June 2011
Panama	29 November 2010		Senegal	3 August 2011
Chile	16 December 2010		Cook Islands	23 August 2011

The 22 states to ratify the convention since 1 August 2010 include countries that have been affected by cluster munitions (BiH, Lebanon, and Mozambique), countries that have produced the weapon (BiH, Chile, and the Netherlands), and countries that have stockpiled it (BiH, Bulgaria, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, the Netherlands, and Portugal). Other ratifying states include Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Lithuania, Monaco, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, and Tunisia.

Of the 22 ratifications since 1 August 2010, seven are from the Americas, six are from Europe, six are from Sub-Saharan Africa, two are from the Middle East and North Africa, and one is from Asia-Pacific.

Many signatories are in the process of ratification and have completed or are on the verge of completing domestic ratification measures. At least seven signatories are on track to ratify before the end of 2011: Afghanistan, Australia, Cameroon, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Italy, and Mauritania.

Regional universalization developments

Africa

African states played a key role during the Oslo Process that created the convention and have continued to demonstrate a high level of interest in the convention. Forty of the 49 Sub-Saharan African states signed the convention, of which 15 have ratified, becoming full States Parties.^[7] Since 1 August 2010, five African signatories have ratified the convention: Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Senegal.

Of the nine countries from Sub-Saharan Africa that have not joined the convention, five participated as observers in the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010: Eritrea, Mauritius, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.^[8] At the meeting, Swaziland committed to accede “in not so distant future” and said its national procedures to join the convention were “already at an advanced stage.”^[9] Government officials from Mauritius informed the CMC that accession to the convention was under active consideration.^[10] The new government of South Sudan is apparently prioritizing joining the convention.^[11]

As of 15 August 2011, Cameroon and Mauritania had completed their domestic ratification procedures, but had not yet deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN.

Americas

Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico all played an important role in promoting the convention and are now States Parties. Caribbean states have shown increased interest in the convention. Twenty of the 35 countries of the Americas region have signed the convention of which 11 have ratified and one has acceded, becoming full States Parties.^[12] Since 1 August 2010, six signatories from the Americas have ratified the convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. On 29 June 2011, Grenada became the first state to accede to the convention.

Of the 14 countries from the Americas that have not joined the convention, two participated in the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010 as observers: Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago.^[13] At the meeting, Trinidad and Tobago said that its cabinet had approved the decision to join the convention and significant progress has been made in preparing the legal measures necessary for accession.^[14]

The Dominican Republic was believed to be close to completing ratification of the convention as of 15 August 2011.

Asia-Pacific

On 23 August 2011, the Cook Islands became first to ratify from the region since Fiji in May 2010. Twelve of the 40 states from Asia-Pacific have signed the convention, of which six have ratified, becoming full States Parties: Cook Islands, Fiji, Japan, Lao PDR, New Zealand, and Samoa.

Of the 28 states from the Asia-Pacific region that have not joined the convention, 12 attended the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010 as observers: Brunei, Cambodia, China, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.^[15] In its first engagement in a meeting of the convention, China expressed support for the convention, but said that it was not in a position to accede due to “national defense needs.”^[16] During the meeting, the Solomon Islands representative informed the CMC that the convention would be added to the government’s list of treaty accession priorities.^[17]

In April 2011, the director-general of Vanuatu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor that the government is actively considering accession to the convention.^[18] In June 2011, Cambodia indicated that accession is being considered by “our top leadership,” while Thailand stated that it hopes to accede to the convention in “the near future.”^[19]

Afghanistan and Australia were believed to be close to completing ratification of the convention as of 15 August 2011.

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

European states have shown strong interest in joining the convention, while no state from the Caucasus and Central Asia is on board. Thirty-three of the 54 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia have signed the convention, of which 25 have ratified.^[20] Six signatories have ratified since 1 August 2010: BiH, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Monaco, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

Of the 21 countries from Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia that have not joined the convention, six attended the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010 as observers: Finland, Poland, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Ukraine.^[21] Disappointingly, these states and several others that have not joined the convention, such as Estonia, Greece, and Romania, indicated no change in their positions on accession to the convention.

In May 2011, CMC representatives met with a range of government officials in Dushanbe who all expressed support for Tajikistan’s accession to the convention.^[22] At the opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2010, Andorra expressed its intent to join the convention in order “to show its commitment to disarmament.”^[23]

As of 15 August 2011, the Czech Republic and Italy had completed their domestic ratification procedures, but had not yet deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN.

Middle East and North Africa

From the Middle East and North Africa, Lebanon and Tunisia have signed and ratified the convention, becoming full States Parties. Iraq has signed, but not yet ratified. In June 2011, Iraqi government representatives informed the CMC that ratification was awaiting parliamentary approval amid a range of urgent issues.^[24]

Of the 15 countries from the Middle East and North Africa that have not joined the convention, five participated as observers in the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010: Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.^[25] At the meeting, Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid Al-Hussein informed States Parties that Jordan hopes to join the convention “in the future.”^[26]

As the host of the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2011, Lebanon has prioritized efforts to get other states from the region to join the convention.

Key Actions and Meetings on Cluster Munitions

Several key actions and meetings took place in the second half of 2010 in the lead-up to the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties. CMC members in 84 countries celebrated the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force and pushed for universalization through a campaign initiative to “beat the drum to ban cluster bombs.” Several governments issued statements upon the convention’s entry into force urging its universalization, in addition to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Pope Benedict XVI.^[27]

A formal Preparatory Meeting was held in Geneva on 6 September to discuss procedural matters and review draft outcome documents for the First Meeting of States Parties.^[28] The leaders of 10 states welcomed the convention during the high-level opening debate at the UNGA in September 2010 including Lao PDR President Choummaly Sayasoune, who invited all nations to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties. Monaco and Tunisia deposited their instruments of ratification during the annual UN Treaty Event held during the opening of the General Assembly.

Representatives from 45 countries attended a UN Special Event on the convention hosted by Lao PDR and Japan at the UN in New York on 19 October 2010, during the UNGA’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.^[29] During the event, Cape Verde deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN.

Lao PDR hosted the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane on 9–12 November 2010. A total of 122 governments including 34 observer states participated in the meeting, in addition to representatives from UN agencies and the ICRC. The CMC delegation was comprised of 492 campaigners from 80 countries including survivors, youth, and 170 participants from Lao PDR.^[30] Hundreds of delegates engaged in field visits to see first-hand communities affected by cluster munition remnants and witness clearance efforts.

At the meeting, governments adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a bold 66-point action plan to turn the legal obligations of the convention into concrete actions. They also issued the Vientiane Declaration, which says that the convention “sets a new standard by which states will be judged. We believe the sea change in the opinion of governments around the world towards this weapon will continue.” A reporting format for transparency measures reports was adopted and a work plan agreed for 2011. Lebanon was named as host and President-Designate of the Second Meeting of States Parties, held in Beirut on 12–16 September 2011.

In cooperation with New Zealand parliamentarians and other country delegations, the CMC promoted the convention at assembly meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in Panama in April 2011 and Geneva in October 2010.^[31]

Campaigners undertook outreach in support of the convention’s universalization during the Mine Ban Treaty’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 29 November–3 December 2010. All but three of the countries that have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions are also States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, while 50 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.^[32]

The first intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions were held on 27–30 June 2011 in Geneva with assistance provided by UNDP, which has acted as an informal secretariat for the convention and hosts an Executive Coordinator appointed by State Parties to support the First Meeting of States Parties President. More than 400 diplomatic representatives from 81 countries participated in the meetings, as well as a CMC delegation of 100 campaigners from 40 countries.^[33] In a series of thematic sessions, states discussed their progress in implementing the convention as well as challenges.

On 1 August 2011, CMC members marked the one-year anniversary of the convention’s entry into force with a series of campaign actions worldwide themed around the call of “Join the team to ban cluster bombs.”^[34] On 12 August 2011, the CMC launched a countdown to the Second Meeting of States Parties to the convention.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Discussions on cluster munitions have been ongoing in some form or another in the 1980 CCW for more than a decade.^[35] NGO concerns over cluster munitions led the CCW to address the larger problem of explosive remnants of war through the 2003 CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.^[36] The failure of the CCW to reach agreement on a substantive mandate for future work on cluster munitions at its Third Review Conference in November 2006 led to Norway’s initiation of the Oslo Process that created the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Largely in reaction to the Oslo Process, a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) has been meeting regularly to discuss cluster munitions since 2007. Since November 2008, the mandate of the GGE has been to “negotiate a proposal” on cluster munitions. In November 2010, CCW States Parties agreed the GGE mandate in 2011 would be “to negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.”

Since 2008, the tone of the debate on cluster munitions in the CCW has shifted markedly, as two-thirds of CCW States Parties have now joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are bound by the higher standards contained in the ban convention.^[37] Yet some of these states have pressed on with CCW deliberations that will result in a lower standard.

Non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions such as Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US have been among the most vocal supporters of continued CCW work. However, these states showed little agreement among themselves on central provisions including the scope of a future agreement, the definition of cluster munitions that would be included in it, or the timeframe in which any provision would take effect.

Two new draft texts—strongly influenced and supported by the US—were circulated by the GGE chair during deliberations held on 30 August–3 September 2010. The texts, however, were strongly criticized by supporters of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, who saw them as far too weak, and by states that saw them as too far-reaching such as India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, Russia, and Turkey.

The Philippines, as chair, combined both texts into one draft text. In November 2010, the CCW meeting of States Parties agreed to again extend the GGE mandate for another year to focus on the chair’s text. Yet GGE meetings held on 21–25 February and on 28 March–1 April 2011 produced little agreement on the scope or provisions of a possible future instrument on cluster munitions. Another version of the chair’s text was circulated prior to the GGE session in August 2011.

Several states, as well as the CMC and ICRC, have described the chair’s draft text as weak and replete with exceptions, loopholes, and deferral periods that concretely undermine any impact of an effective prohibition. The so-called ban elements in the text would not prohibit cluster munitions that have been demonstrated to cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It would instead re-legitimize production, stockpiling, use, and transfer of many of the most dangerous types of cluster munitions, threatening the ban already created by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Moreover, the text contains a lengthy transition period that would enable compliance with the draft protocol to be deferred for at least 12 years.

The CMC has called for states to end their deliberations on cluster munitions at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, regardless of whether an agreement on cluster munitions is reached. To achieve some positive results from the past four years of work on cluster munitions, the CMC has promoted the “optimal outcome” of a humanitarian-inspired political declaration and national measures taken as interim steps towards acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.^[38]

Use of Cluster Munitions

Cluster munitions have been used during armed conflict in 36 countries and four disputed territories since the end of World War II: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Russia (Chechnya), Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia, as well as in the Falklands/Malvinas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. Almost every part of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and the Americas.

New use

There have been two instances of new use of cluster munitions since the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, both by states that have not joined the convention: Thailand and Libya. In February 2011, Thailand fired dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) artillery projectiles containing M42, M46, and M85 submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple. In April 2011, government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi fired MAT-120 mortar projectiles each containing 21 dual-purpose submunitions into residential areas of the Libyan city of Misrata.

Libyan government spokesperson Mussa Ibrahim denied the use of cluster munitions “morally, legally” and said Libya could not use cluster munitions “in our country.”^[39] Thailand initially denied using cluster munitions, then affirmed that it used DPICMs, but denied that these were a type of cluster munition. In June 2011 said it “fully understands the concerns raised” about the incident and said it hopes to accede to the convention in “the near future.”^[40]

Article 21(2) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that each State Party “make its best efforts to discourage States not party…from using cluster munitions.” A significant number of States Parties and signatories condemned or expressed grave concern about the use of cluster munitions by Libya and Thailand and the incidents attracted widespread media coverage and public outcry.^[41] The CMC has welcomed these statements and noted in June 2011, “It is only through widespread and vociferous criticism that a deep stigma will attach to the use of cluster munitions, and that stigma is our most powerful method of ensuring a world free of these weapons.”^[42]

There has been no evidence of use of cluster munitions in Libya by states involved in the NATO military action, including by the US and other states that have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Prior to 2011, there had been one serious allegation of cluster munition use since the Convention on Cluster Munitions was opened for signature in December 2008. In June 2010, Amnesty International (AI) reported that the US appeared to have used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” in Yemen on 17 December 2009. US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks in late 2010 appear to corroborate this report, and neither the US nor the Yemeni government has denied the claim or refuted the substantial photographic evidence of the incident.^[43]

Users of cluster munitions

At least 19 government armed forces have used cluster munitions since the end of World War II, detailed in the following table. This is an increase of one state (Thailand) since the previous reporting period.

Summary of states using cluster munitions and locations used

User state	Locations used
Colombia	Colombia
Eritrea	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrea
France	Chad, Iraq, Kuwait
Georgia	Georgia, possibly Abkhazia
Iraq	Iran, Iraq
Israel	Lebanon, Syria
Libya	Chad, Libya
Morocco	Western Sahara, Mauritania
Netherlands	Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)
Nigeria	Sierra Leone
Russia	Chechnya, Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia
South Africa	Has admitted past use, location unknown
Sudan	South Sudan, Sudan
Thailand	Cambodia
UK	Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)
US	Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)
Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)	Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo

This accounting is incomplete, however, given that in several cases it is unclear which party used cluster munitions, including in Angola, Azerbaijan, the DRC, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh.

Timeline of cluster munition use

Date	Location	Known details
1939–1945	Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, USSR, the UK, possibly other locations	Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II.
1965–1975	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam	According to an analysis of US bombing data by Handicap International (HI), approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia between 1969 and 1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR between 1965 and 1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975.
1970s	Zambia	Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang’ombo.
1973	Syria	Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against non-state armed group (NSAG) training camps near Damascus.
1975–1988	Western Sahara, Mauritania	Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against an NSAG in Western Sahara. Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in Western Sahara have been found in Mauritania.
1978	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in south Lebanon.
1979–1989	Afghanistan	Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.
1982	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.
1982	Falkland Islands/Malvinas	UK forces dropped 107 BL-755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.
1983	Grenada	US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.
1983	Lebanon	US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Rockeye bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut in Lebanon.
1984–1988	Iran, Iraq	It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.
1986	Libya	US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On April 14-15, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.
1986–1987	Chad	French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.
1988	Iran	US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.
1991	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions against Iraqi forces during the battle of Khafji.
1991	Iraq, Kuwait	The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.
1992–1994	Angola	Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.
1992–1994	Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan	Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in Nagorno-Karabakh. Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.
1992–1995	BiH	Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.
1992–1997	Tajikistan	ShOAB and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces in civil war.
1994–1996	Chechnya	Russian forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs.
1995	Croatia	On May 2-3, 1995, an NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers to conduct attacks in the city of Zagreb. Additionally, the Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL-755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.
1996–1999	Sudan	Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.
1997	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.
1998	Afghanistan/Sudan	In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 combined effects bomblets, at a factory target in Khartoum, Sudan, and at NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.
1998	Ethiopia, Eritrea	Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL-755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.
1998–1999	Albania	Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces carried out six aerial cluster munition strikes.
1998–2003	The DRC	Deminers have found BL-755 bombs, BLU 63 cluster munitions, and PM1 munitions.
1999	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.
2001–2002	Afghanistan	The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.
Unknown	Uganda	RBK-250/275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.
2003	Iraq	The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions, in the three weeks of major combat.
2006	Lebanon	Israeli forces used surface-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.
2006	Israel	Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.
2008	Georgia	Both Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions found by deminers include the air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM and the rocket-delivered 9N210 and rocket-delivered M85.
2009	Yemen	AI reported that the US used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack a “training camp” in Yemen on 17 December 2009.
2011	Cambodia	Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions into Cambodia during border clashes near the Preah Vihear temple.
2011	Libya	Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions in residential areas of the city of Misrata.

In addition to use by the armed forces of states, NSAGs have used cluster munitions in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by a Serb militia), Croatia (by a Serb militia), and Israel (by Hezbollah). Cluster munitions have also been employed in conflicts in disputed territories against NSAGs. During armed conflict in August 2008, the government of the separatist territory of Abkhazia asserted that Georgian forces fired large numbers of cluster munitions in the Kodor Valley. Cluster munitions were used in Nagorno-Karabakh sometime between 1992 and 1994 during conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory, but it is not known which armed forces used cluster munitions. Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario) in Western Sahara during their conflict in 1975–1988.

Paragraph 4 of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states that a State Party that in the past used cluster munitions that became remnants on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party prior to entry into force of the convention for both of States Parties is “strongly encouraged” to provide assistance to the other State Party. This should include, “where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.”

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions. According to a June 2008 policy directive issued by the US Department of Defense, until 2018 any US use of cluster munitions that results in a 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate—which includes all but a tiny fraction of the US arsenal—must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a very high-ranking military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO.

Romania has said it restricts the use of cluster munitions to exclusively on its own territory. Poland has said it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia have made similar declarations.

A majority of states not party toA majority the Convention on Cluster Munitions are believed to have never used cluster munitions. In early August 2011, Turkey said that it “has never used cluster munitions in the past.”

Production of Cluster Munitions

A total of 34 states have developed or produced^[44] more than 200 types of cluster munitions.^[45]

Producers

Seventeen countries are believed to produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so. None of these states have joined the convention.

In April 2011, Romania’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that “Romania is not a producer of cluster munition[s].”^[46] In August 2011, Turkey said it has not produced cluster munitions since 2005.^[47] However, the Monitor continues to list both Romania and Turkey as producers since it is unclear if they have adopted a new policy forswearing any future production of cluster munitions.

Cluster munition producers

Brazil	Pakistan
China	Poland
Egypt	Romania
Greece	Russia
India	Singapore
Iran	Slovakia
Israel	Turkey
North Korea	US
South Korea

At least three of the countries still producing cluster munitions have established reliability standards for submunitions. In 2001, the US instituted a policy that all submunitions reaching a production decision in fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a dud rate of less than 1%.^[48] Poland stated in 2005, “The Ministry of Defense requires during acceptance tests less than 2.5% failure rate for the purchased submunitions.”^[49] South Korea issued a directive in 2008 requiring that in the future it only acquire cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms and a 1% or lower failure rate.^[50]

Former producers

Seventeen states have stopped the production of cluster munitions. All these states have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions except Argentina, which has indicated that it does not intend to produce cluster munitions in the future. Croatia was added to this list in 2011 after it acknowledged that a Croatian company produced cluster munitions until 1999.^[51]

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina	Italy
Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
BiH	South Africa
Chile	Spain
Croatia	Sweden
France	Switzerland
Germany	UK
Iraq

Note: Italics indicate states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Of the 16 former producers that have joined the convention and foresworn any future production, 10 are States Parties and six are signatories. France and Japan have reported detailed information on the status and progress of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities.^[52]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to lack of official information, but the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.^[53]

The 2011 conflict in Libya has shed some light on recent transfers. In June 2011, Spain confirmed the transfer of 1,055 MAT-120 cluster munitions containing 22,155 submunitions to Libya in 2006 and 2008.^[54] In addition, Patria, a Finnish company, imported 305 “live” MAT-120 mortar projectiles and 230 inert MAT-120 projectiles from Spain into Finland in 2005–2007.^[55]

Thailand’s use of NR269 and M85 cluster munitions in the February 2011 border conflict with Cambodia may indicate recent transfer, as these cluster munition types were not previously known to be stockpiled by Thailand. It is not known who supplied them or when.

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in public information available, the US has probably been the world leader in exports having transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions to at least 30 countries.^[56] Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of 33 states. Many of them inherited stockpiles after the dissolution of the USSR.^[57]

Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Slovakia, and Turkey have exported cluster munitions in recent years. States Parties France, Germany, and Spain exported cluster munitions prior to their adoption of the convention. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Pakistan, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are among the recipients of cluster munitions exports since 2005.

While the full extent of Chinese exports of cluster munitions is not known, unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel,^[58] Lebanon, and Sudan.

At least two states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US and Singapore, have enacted an export moratorium.

In June 2011, the US announced the sale of 404 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons to Saudi Arabia.^[59] This followed a sale of 510 CBU-105s to India that was announced in 2008. The date of delivery of these weapons to the recipient countries is not publicly known. These weapons are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but are not covered by the US export ban because they have a reported failure rate of less than 1%.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and Their Destruction

Global stockpiles

A total of 86 countries possessed stockpiles of cluster munitions at some point in time. This figure has changed in recent years as new information has become available and governments have clarified whether or not they currently have or previously possessed stockpiles of cluster munitions.^[60] The Monitor added Ecuador to this list in 2011 as it disclosed that it possessed a stockpile in the past, which has been destroyed. Australia has been removed as it has stated that it does not have and has never had an operational stockpile of prohibited cluster munitions.^[61]

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions

States Parties	Signatories	Non-Signatories
Austria	Afghanistan	Algeria	Libya
Belgium	Angola	Argentina	Mongolia
BiH	Canada	Azerbaijan	Morocco
Bulgaria	Colombia	Bahrain	Oman
Chile	Congo, Rep. of	Belarus	Pakistan
Croatia	Czech Republic	Brazil	Poland
Denmark	Guinea	Cambodia	Qatar
Ecuador	Honduras	China	Romania
France	Hungary	Cuba	Russia
Germany	Indonesia	Egypt	Saudi Arabia
Guinea-Bissau	Iraq	Eritrea	Serbia
Japan	Italy	Estonia	Singapore
Moldova	Nigeria	Ethiopia	Slovakia
Montenegro	Peru	Finland	Sudan
Netherlands	South Africa	Georgia	Syria
Norway	Sweden	Greece	Thailand
Portugal	Switzerland	India	Turkey
Slovenia		Iran	Turkmenistan
Spain		Israel	Ukraine
UK		Jordan	UAE
		Kazakhstan	US
		North Korea	Uzbekistan
		South Korea	Yemen
		Kuwait	Zimbabwe
20 (12 current)	17 (10 current)	48 (47 current)

Note: Italics indicate states that no longer possess stockpiles.

The vast majority of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that stockpile the weapon have not disclosed detailed information on the quantities and types they hold. Thus it is not possible, given what is known, to make a valid global estimate of quantities in stockpiles.

Only one country that has not joined the convention, the US, has disclosed the size of its stockpile of cluster munitions. As reported to its legislature in 2004, the US stockpile consisted of nearly 5.5 million cluster munitions containing nearly 730 million submunitions.

In this reporting period, Ukraine stated that of its stockpile of conventional weapons totaling two million tons of ammunition, 35% are cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

As of August 2011, 20 States Parties have reported stockpiling at least 1,196,441 cluster munitions containing approximately 166 million explosive submunitions. Sixteen of these States Parties have formally declared in Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports stockpiling a total of 1.02 million cluster munitions containing over 140 million explosive submunitions, as described in the following table.^[62] Many of these stockpiles have been partially or fully destroyed already.

Cluster Munitions and explosive submunitions declared by States Parties

State	Quantity of cluster munitions	Quantity of explosive submunitions
Austria	12,672	798,336
Belgium	115,210	10,138,480
BiH	429	143,152
Croatia	7,380	190,868
Denmark	42,020	2,440,940
Ecuador	117	17,199
France	34,937	14,923,621
Germany	544,549	67,305,417
Japan	14,011	2,029,469
Moldova	1,385	27,050
Montenegro	353	51,891
Norway	52,190	3,087,910
Portugal	11	1,617
Slovenia	1,080	52,920
Spain	4,762	232,647
UK	191,128	38,758,898
Total	1,022,234	140,200,415

Note: Italics indicate states that no longer possess stockpiles.

Two other States Parties that had not yet submitted Article 7 reports have indicated that they have stockpiled a total of at least 201,302 clusters munitions containing more than 26 million explosive submunitions:

• Bulgaria has stated that its Air Force has a total of 9,802 cluster munitions; and
• the Netherlands has destroyed much of its former stockpile of more than 191,500 cluster munitions containing some 26 million submunitions.

The composition and quantity of Chile and Guinea-Bissau’s stockpiles of cluster munitions are not yet known.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

Of the 17 signatories that have stockpiles, four have reported possessing at some point a total of 14,054 cluster munitions and 1.33 million explosive submunitions:

• Canada submitted a voluntary transparency report in 2011 that declared possession of 13,626 cluster munitions containing 1.3 million explosive submunitions (it has destroyed some of these weapons already);
• Colombia in November 2009 announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 72 cluster munitions containing 10,832 submunitions;
• the Czech Republic announced in November 2010 that its entire stockpile of 67 cluster munitions and 15,000 submunitions has been destroyed; and
• Hungary on 27 June 2011 announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 289 cluster munitions containing nearly 4,000 submunitions.

Several signatories have provided information on their cluster munition stockpiles, but not the quantities. In October 2010, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs listed the various types of cluster munitions stockpiled by the Swiss Army, but not their quantities.^[63] Sweden has stated that it has a stockpile of BK-90 cluster munitions, but has not yet indicated the quantity.^[64] In July 2011, Italy adopted national implementation legislation that requires the destruction of Italy’s stockpile of cluster munitions and budgets for the expenditure of funds for the destruction process.^[65]

No stockpiles

Confirmation by States Parties in their transparency reports that they do not possess stockpiles is as important as a declaration of stockpiles. Albania, the Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have included a definitive statement that they do not possess stockpiles in their Article 7 reports.^[66] Other States Parties that have indicated that they do not stockpile cluster munitions include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, San Marino, and Uruguay.^[67]

Stockpile destruction

Destruction of stockpiles by States Parties

A total of 12 States Parties have reported that 589,737 cluster munitions containing over 64.5 million submunitions have been destroyed.^[68]

Eight States Parties have completed destruction of their stocks as of August 2011: Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Ecuador destroyed its stockpile in 2004, before the convention was created, while Spain completed its stockpile destruction in March 2009. Five States Parties destroyed their stockpiles during 2010 (Moldova and Norway in July, Belgium in August, Montenegro in October, Austria in November) and one completed destruction in the first eight months of 2011 (Portugal in April).^[69]

The quantities of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions reported destroyed by States Parties are detailed in the following table.

Quantities of cluster munitions and submunitions destroyed by States Parties

	Cluster munitions destroyed	Explosive submunitions destroyed
Austria	12,672	798,336
Belgium	115,210	10,138,480
BiH	12	78,641
Ecuador	117	17,199
France	9	721
Germany	306,503	27,956,812
Moldova	1,385	27,050
Montenegro	353	51,891
Norway	52,190	3,087,910
Portugal	11	1,617
Spain	4,762	232,647
UK	96,513	22,153,148
Total	589,737	64,544,452

Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction.

All 12 States Parties with cluster munitions to destroy have indicated their intention to complete the task by their treaty-mandated eight-year deadline if not sooner: BiH, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the UK. France is the only country that has so far stated it will need the full eight years for destruction.

Several States Parties with stockpiles have begun the physical destruction of stockpiles, including BiH, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. In June 2011, Germany announced that it had destroyed 57.4% of its stockpiled cluster munitions, while the UK reported the destruction of 60% of its stockpile.^[70] Other States Parties that possess stockpiles are in the process of taking concrete action to verify their stockpiles and prepare destruction plans, including Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, and Japan.

Several states have reported on their expenditure of funds to initiate, continue, or complete destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions. Transparency reporting and other information shows that approximately €150 million (US$199 million)^[71] has been allocated to stockpile destruction since 2008 by states including Austria, Belgium, France,^[72] Germany,^[73] Japan,^[74] Moldova, Norway, Spain,^[75] and the UK.^[76]

Destruction of stockpiles by signatories

The destruction of stockpiles has also been reported by seven signatories. Hungary (May 2011), Colombia (2010), and the Czech Republic (2010) have reported completion of the destruction of their stockpiles. Afghanistan and Angola stated in 2010 that their stockpiles had been destroyed in recent years during broader post-conflict disarmament programs. Honduras has stated that it once had stockpiles, but destroyed them long before the start of the Oslo Process in 2007. The Republic of the Congo has also begun to destroy stocks.

Several of the 10 signatories with stockpiles to destroy have indicated that they are taking measures to verify their stockpiled cluster munitions and prepare destruction plans. In 2011, the DRC provided a voluntary report stating that the verification of its stocks was in progress. In June 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative stated that Indonesia was in the process of undertaking an inventory of its stockpile of cluster munitions. In June 2011, Nigeria acknowledged that it has a stockpile of cluster munitions that will be destroyed once it ratifies the convention. Peru has acknowledged a stockpile of cluster munitions and in June 2011 said that it was working on plans for their destruction.

By the convention’s definition, abandoned stockpiles are cluster munitions that are “no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them” and are treated as remnants to be destroyed within the convention’s 10-year clearance deadline. Often it is unclear who abandoned the munitions. For example, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense said in August 2010 that it has no cluster munitions in its depots, but stated “about 113,196 items containing 29,559 kilograms” of old Soviet munitions had been destroyed. In Angola, the HALO Trust has reported the destruction of 7,267 submunitions (likely from cluster bombs numbering in the hundreds) and 506 submunition dispensers between 2006 and 2011.

Cluster munition stockpile destruction is sometimes part of broader conventional weapons destruction and post-conflict stabilization programs supported by donors and implemented by NGOs and commercial companies, such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Montenegro.

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions allows for the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for development of and training in detection, clearance and destruction techniques, and development of counter-measures, such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons. This provision was opposed by the CMC and a number of states during the negotiation of the convention as none of the purposes advanced for retaining cluster munitions and submunitions were essential enough to justify an exception to the prohibition on stockpiling. For example, to the CMC’s knowledge, no clearance organization accredited to the UN is believed to use live submunitions for training.

Retention by states parties

Only six of the 15 States Parties that have formally declared possessing stockpiles of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions have stated their intent to retain cluster munitions.^[77] Belgium, France, Spain, and the UK have declared the types and quantities retained, while Denmark and Germany have indicated their intent to retain but have not declared the types and quantities.

In contrast, Austria, Ecuador, Japan, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia have indicated that they are not retaining any cluster munitions or explosive submunitions, while Croatia and Moldova have stated they are retaining only inert items that have been rendered free from explosives and no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

Cluster munitions and submunitions retained by States Parties

State	Quantity and type of cluster munitions (quantity of submunitions) retained	Quantity and type of individual submunitions retained	Total quantity of submunitions retained
Belgium	300 M483 projectiles (26,400) [24 consumed]	0	26,400 [24,328 remain]
France	3 OGR F1 projectiles (189) 10 M26 rockets (6,440) 1 EXPL 122mm rocket (98) 1 Orkan rocket warhead (288) 6 SAKR rocket warheads (588) 25 120mm OGR projectiles (500) 3 Rayé projectiles (60) 3 M26 rockets without DSA (1,932) 3 OGR projectiles (189)	14 OGR 28 KB-1/KB-2 16 9N22	10,342
Spain	366 MAT-120 projectiles (7,686) 331 ESPIN-21 projectiles (6,951) 7 BME-330 bombs (196) 7 CBU-100 bombs (1,729)	0	16,562
UK	1 CB-470 bomb (40) 2 Orkan rockets (576)	244 M42 96 M46	956

Another four States Parties that have stockpiled have not yet provided Article 7 reports. Of these, the Netherlands has stated its intention to retain a “limited number” of cluster munitions, while BiH, Bulgaria, and Chile have not yet indicated if they will retain cluster munitions for training or research purposes.

There is already a wide range emerging in the number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions being retained. In June 2011, the CMC asked if Belgium, France, and Spain, which have each decided to retain more than 10,000 submunitions, have the large training and counter-measures programs in place to consume such high quantities.^[78]

According to the convention, States Parties should limit the number of retained cluster munitions to “the minimum number absolutely necessary” for research and training, but few states have attempted to define this. The CMC has called on states retaining cluster munitions and explosive submunitions “to keep the number retained under constant review and to destroy any found to be in excess of the minimum number strictly required.”^[79]

The convention requires detailed annual reporting on past and planned use of retained cluster munitions to ensure they are being kept only for permitted purposes. Three States Parties have reported using (i.e., consuming, destroying) cluster munitions and explosive submunitions during the period covered by their initial transparency reports. Belgium used 24 retained M483 projectiles (containing 2,112 submunitions) for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training and apparently intends to use 25 projectiles a year for training. The UK destroyed 12 M42 submunitions (eight in a student project and four on a “defeat of armour” demonstration), while Germany destroyed 10 cluster munitions containing 958 submunitions during EOD training.

Fifteen States Parties that have declared no stockpiled cluster munitions have also confirmed that they do not retain any cluster munitions or explosive submunitions.^[80] Other States Parties have not yet submitted an Article 7 report, but have expressed their views on retention. Malawi has stated that the retention of cluster munitions for training and development “should be the exception and not the rule,” and those that do retain should only keep a “very limited number.” Ecuador has stated that the number of units retained for training should not be bigger than 1,000 and should decrease over time. Ghana expressed the view that states should retain only the minimum number of cluster munitions required for training purposes, which could be in the hundreds or thousands but not the tens of thousands.

Retention by signatories

Italy, which had not yet ratified as of 15 August 2011, has a national implementation law that permits the retention of a “limited quantity” of cluster munitions not exceeding “1,000 units,” apparently referring to individual submunitions.^[81] In June 2011, Australia confirmed its intent to retain a combination of submunitions and dispensers of which only two bombs are “live” and noted these are not part of operational stocks and not suitable for use.^[82]

Other signatories that had stockpiles of cluster munitions have indicated that they intend to retain no cluster munitions or submunitions for research and training, including Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, and Honduras.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report no later than 180 days after entry into force for that State Party. Transparency is essential for building confidence and making needs for assistance known.

As of 25 August 2011, 34 States Parties had submitted an initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of the convention, which represents three-quarters of States Parties for which the obligation applied at that time. This strong start is an impressive indication of the political will existing to implement the convention.

States Parties that have submitted transparency reports

Albania	Luxembourg
Austria	Malawi
Belgium	Malta
BiH	Mexico
Burkina Faso	Moldova
Burundi	Montenegro
Croatia	New Zealand
Denmark	Nicaragua
Ecuador	Norway
France	Portugal
Germany	San Marino
Holy See	Sierra Leone
Ireland	Slovenia
Japan	Spain
Lao PDR	UK
Lebanon	Uruguay
Lithuania	Zambia

State Parties with pending Article 7 report deadlines

Tunisia	28 August 2011
Monaco	28 August 2011
Cape Verde	28 September 2011
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	28 September 2011
Panama	28 October 2011
Guinea-Bissau	28 October 2011
Chile	28 November 2011
El Salvador	28 December 2011
Netherlands	28 January 2012
Ghana	28 January 2012
Mozambique	28 February 2012
Costa Rica	29 March 2012
Bulgaria	29 March 2012
Botswana	30 May 2012
Grenada	30 May 2012
Senegal	30 July 2012
Cook Islands	30 July 2012

One State Party, Norway, has submitted both an initial transparency report and an annual transparency report covering 2010. Two signatories, Canada and the DRC, have submitted voluntary initial transparency reports.

Ten States Parties are late in submitting their initial transparency reports: Antigua and Barbuda, Comoros, Fiji, Guatemala, Lesotho, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Mali, Niger, Samoa, and the Seychelles. Another 17 States Parties have reporting obligations as detailed in the following table.

The CMC has expressed concern at the wide variation in quality among the reports submitted.^[83] Too many states are submitting “not applicable” throughout the report and not providing definitive statements.^[84] Several states that stockpile cluster munitions did not clearly indicate if they intend to retain cluster munitions or submunitions.^[85] Few States Parties that indicated they will retain cluster munitions or submunitions have provided details on planned and actual uses, as required by Article 3. Very few States Parties used voluntary Form J to report voluntary measures, such as actions to promote universalization or positions on interpretative issues.^[86]

National Implementation Legislation

Article 9 of the convention requires States Parties to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions….”^[87] Comprehensive national legislation is the strongest means of fulfilling this obligation as it enshrines the convention’s provisions at the domestic level and provides binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules that leave less room for interpretation.

States that have enacted national legislation

State	Year enacted
Austria	2008
Belgium	2006
Cook Islands	2011
Czech Republic	2011
France	2010
Germany	2009
Ireland	2008
Italy	2011
Japan	2009
Luxembourg	2009
New Zealand	2009
Norway	2008
Spain	2010
UK	2010

As of 25 August 2011, 14 states had enacted legislation to implement the convention. Three states adopted national implementing legislation in July 2011, prior to their ratification of the convention: Cook Islands,^[88] Czech Republic,^[89] and Italy.^[90] Spain reported that the Penal Code was amended on 22 June 2010 to include penal sanctions related to cluster munitions and mines.^[91]

At least nine other countries (Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Malawi, Mali, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland) have said that they are in the process of drafting, considering, or adopting national legislation. In Australia, the Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010 had reached its final legislative stages as of early August 2011, but had not yet been adopted. In Canada, internal disagreement over draft implementing legislation is apparently a reason for the ratification delay.

Others states that have indicated they intend to prepare national legislation include BiH, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Lao PDR, Liechtenstein, Niger, the Republic of the Congo, Samoa, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. States that have indicated that they are reviewing whether existing legislation meets the requirements of the convention or if a new law is necessary include Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mozambique.

At least 13 states have indicated that their existing laws are sufficient to implement the convention: Denmark, Holy See, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, San Marino, Slovenia, and Tunisia.

Interpretative Issues

During the Oslo Process to develop the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the final negotiations in Dublin, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on some important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, including the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, the prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, and the prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Since the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010, an increasing number of States Parties and signatories to the convention have made their views known on these issues, including through their transparency reports, statements at the First Meeting of States Parties and intersessional meetings, and in direct communication with the Monitor. The CMC has urged all parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to engage in open discussions on these special issues of concern so that common understandings can be reached. The strength and credibility of the convention is undermined when States Parties do not have a uniform understanding of what acts are banned and what acts are not.^[92]

Prohibition on assistance and interoperability

One of the convention’s most basic and important provisions is the prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts. Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. Article 21 was strongly criticized by the CMC for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 says that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, encourage it.

In late 2010 and the first half of 2011, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks have shown the extent to which the US worked to influence the outcome of the Oslo Process on interoperability issues, despite not itself participating in the Oslo Process.^[93] The US diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks also show how the US has sought to interpret key provisions of the convention since the adoption of the convention in May 2008, particularly Article 21. For example, in a December 2008 diplomatic demarche to Afghanistan, the State Department affirmed, “The United States reads the phrase ‘military cooperation and operations’ in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party.”^[94]

The CMC has said, “States must make it clear that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under this treaty—including use, transfer or stockpiling of cluster munitions—when engaging in joint operations with non-States Parties.”^[95]

More than 20 States Parties and signatories to the convention have indicated their agreement with this position. State policy and practice to date indicates a predominate view that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.^[96] In the second half of 2010 and first half of 2011, several more states shared their views:

• BiH’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in July 2011 that “under Article 21, para 3, we may engage in joint military operations with non-states Parties that might engage in activities prohibited by the Convention, however our personnel or nationals should not provide assistance with activities prohibited by the Convention.”^[97]
• France’s national implementation law allows for participation in military operations with states not party that might engage in activities prohibited by the convention, but prohibits any French person acting in a joint military operation to use, develop, manufacture, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or transfer cluster munitions, or to use or request the use of cluster munitions, where the choice of ammunition is under their exclusive control.^[98]
• Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in relation to the issue of the prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations, Hungary “believes that the Convention prohibits assistance of acts prohibited by the Convention to non-State Parties.”^[99]
• Lao PDR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in June 2011, “For us it is clear that we strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including those activities during the joint military operations….”^[100]
• Nicaragua informed the Monitor in May 2011 that it “considers that assistance in prohibited acts performed in joint military operations is not permitted to the States Parties.”^[101]
• Sweden’s Article 7 report submitted in January 2011 states, “Article 21.3 makes clear that States Parties can participate in military cooperation and military operations with states not party to the Convention and which may engage in activities that are prohibited for a State Party. This does not imply any right of States Parties in these situations to violate the obligations of Article 1 of the convention or to explicitly request that cluster munitions shall be used in situations where the State Party has exclusive control over the selection of the munition used.”^[102]
• Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs’ report on the convention issued in October 2010 states that Switzerland cannot ask its allies to use cluster munitions in the framework of joint military operations, provided that the choice of munitions used is under its exclusive control.^[103]

Some states have indicated their view that the Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts can be overridden by the Article 21 interoperability provisions, most notably Australia and Canada.

• In Australia, the convention’s “interoperability” provisions have been widely debated as national implementing legislation made its way through parliament in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The CMC’s view is that the Australian Department of Defence has openly enumerated several activities banned by the convention that, under Australia’s proposed implementing legislation, would be allowed in joint military operations.^[104] For example, during joint military operations, Australian military personnel could help plan, provide intelligence for, and/or contribute logistical support to an operation, which may involve a cluster munition attack.^[105]
• In Canada, internal disagreement over how draft implementing legislation seeks to interpret Article 21 has apparently delayed Canada’s ratification of the convention and resulted in the resignation of the Canadian foreign affairs official who led Canada’s negotiating team during the Oslo Process.^[106] Canada stated in June 2011 that its adoption of the convention text in Dublin was based on the understanding that “Article 21, paragraph 4, expressly and fully delineates activities prohibited” in the context of joint operations with states not party.^[107]

In addition, while Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its views on Article 21,^[108] in a June 2008 State Department cable made public by Wikileaks in June 2011, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.^[109]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance to prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as a ban on the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. It has also said that it should be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

In previous years, at least 15 states have unambiguously stated that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention: Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Slovenia, and Zambia.^[110]

At least 12 more states have expressed their views during this reporting period:

• Belgium’s Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in April 2011 that the convention “covers the notion of transfer as involving, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from a national, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions.” Belgian authorities are prohibited from granting import, export, or transit licenses for cluster munitions as they are prohibited under Belgium’s national implementing legislation, enacted in 2006.^[111]
• BiH’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in July 2011 that the “transit of cluster munitions across, or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, the national territory of States Parties is prohibited by the Convention.”^[112]
• Comoros stated in April 2011 that “we cannot tolerate any form of transit, even from states which have not signed the convention.”^[113]
• Croatia informed the Monitor in March 2011 that it considers that transit of cluster munitions across, or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, the national territory of States Parties is prohibited by the convention.^[114]
• France has stated that it will endeavor to prevent any state transit of cluster munitions on its territory, and will make its obligations and commitments known through diplomatic channels and urge other countries to respect them.^[115]The Holy See stated in November 2010 that it considers foreign stockpiling and transit of cluster munitions banned by the convention and said that “a careful reading of the Convention brings us to support the prohibition against a State Party stockpiling or helping to transport cluster bombs within its national territory, taking into account paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of Article 3 of the Convention.”^[116]
• Ireland said in July 2011, with respect to the prohibition on the transit of cluster munitions across, and the foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, the territory of States Parties to the convention, that it “recognizes that in any case in which these issues might arise it will be necessary to consider to what extent at all, the provisions of Article 21 of the Convention apply,” adding that “inevitably this may be different in each case.”^[117]
• Lao PDR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in June 2011 that “we strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including…transiting, foreign stockpiling.”^[118]
• FYR Macedonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor in March 2011 that in the event of the location of foreign military forces on its territory the government will inform them that it will not be possible to stockpile cluster munitions in FYR Macedonia.^[119] In February 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the Monitor that FYR Macedonia prohibits the transit of cluster munitions across its national territory.^[120]
• New Zealand’s national implementing legislation does not explicitly include “transit” in its definition of “transfer,” but in April 2011 the Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control said that New Zealand accepts that the prohibitions on assistance and transfer that are contained in the law include the prohibition of the transit of cluster munitions across, above, or through national territory.^[121]
• Senegal stated in February 2011 that foreign stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions constitutes a violation of the convention.^[122]
• Spain stated in its Article 7 report that it is in the process of informing non-States Parties with which it cooperates in joint military operations of its obligations and adherence to international agreements on both cluster munitions and mines, including its commitments with respect to the prohibition of storage of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.^[123]

A number of states have expressed the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling is not prohibited by the convention, including Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK:

• The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade informed the Monitor in March 2011 of its view that that Article 21(3) permits States Parties to undertake military cooperation and operations with states not party to the Convention that “may extend to hosting foreign bases, aircraft, or ships and, in this context, to the stockpiling, retention and/or transfer of cluster munitions by military personnel of States not party to the Convention.”^[124]
• Japan maintains that US military bases in Japan are under US jurisdiction and control, thus not on Japanese territory, so the possession of cluster munitions by US forces does not violate the national law or the convention. Also, according to the government, Clause 4.4 of Law no. 85 allows Japanese nationals, both civilians and members of the Self-Defense Forces, to transport cluster munitions that are owned by the US.^[125] In a 2008 US diplomatic cable made public by Wikileaks in June 2011, a senior Japanese official apparently said the convention allows the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions, including, but not limited to: “Transportation and storage of U.S.-owned CM [cluster munitions] by Japan Self Defense Forces or Japanese civilian personnel; Movement of additional CM into U.S. military facilities and JSDF bases; and Stockpiling and handling of CM at civilian ports during contingencies.”^[126] In the cable, the US also reported the Japanese official as confirming that “Japanese civilian and Self Defense Forces personnel can transport CM in Japan as long as they do not take legal ownership of the CM,” and “the United States can move CM into and out of Japan, and within Japan, as long as Japanese entities and personnel are not taking title to the CM.”^[127]
• The Netherlands’ Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Parliament on 2 May 2011 that a de facto prohibition on transit existed, but an exception would be made specifically for NATO allies based on the obligations of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and its codification in the national transport regulation of strategic goods. On the question of whether or not the obligation to allow NATO allies to transit their own material through Dutch territory conflicted with the prohibition on transfer in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Minister stated that this is not the case, as transit is not explicitly forbidden by the Convention.^[128] The Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development in June 2011 said that the Netherlands had a broader commitment and policy to make known through diplomatic channels that it does not “appreciate” the transport of cluster munitions through Dutch territory by NATO allies.^[129]
• Portugal stated in July 2010 that the convention “does not unequivocally exclude the possibility of foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, or the transit of this type of armament across, the national territory of a State Party. In the latter case, the transit could be authorized once it does not represent a transfer under the definition established in Article 2 of the Convention; in other words, only in the circumstance when the cluster munitions in transit are to remain under the control of the same non State Party that requested the passage.”^[130]
• The UK stated in June 2008 that it does not view the prohibition on foreign stockpiling as a legal requirement under the treaty, but said it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year stockpile destruction deadline.^[131] At the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”^[132]
• The UK government in March 2010 informed Parliament that transit of cluster munitions through UK territory is not prohibited by the UK’s national implementing legislation enacted in 2010, but said that “a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it [transit] could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”^[133]

Disinvestment

The CMC believes that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts constitutes a prohibition on investment, both direct and indirect, in the production of cluster munitions. It calls on governments to legislate against cluster munition financing and to rein in financial institutions and investors on the issue of investment in cluster munition production.

NGOs and national stakeholders have continued to raise awareness with governments and investors on the question of cluster munition financing, including through the Stop Explosive Investments campaign initiative launched by the CMC in 2009.^[134] On 25 May 2011, campaigners in 14 countries took part in a Global Day of Action on Disinvestment including IKV Pax Christi and Netwerk Vlaanderen who issued an update of their October 2009 report, Worldwide investments in cluster munitions: a shared responsibility.^[135] According to the updated report, a total of 166 financial institutions have invested $39 billion in eight producers of cluster munitions since the May 2008 adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.^[136]

Financial institutions have taken action to stop investment in cluster munition production and promote socially responsible investment in: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.Five states have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and, in July 2011, Italy.^[137] In the first half of 2011 here were various legislative initiatives on disinvestment in Belgium,^[138] Germany,^[139] Italy,^[140] and the Netherlands.^[141] Government pension funds in Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have withdrawn and/or banned investments in cluster munition producers.

In previous years, 11 States Parties and signatories to the convention have stated their view that investment in cluster munitions production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Colombia, France, Guatemala, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Rwanda, the UK, and Zambia.

Another eight states offered views in 2010 and 2011 confirming this position:

• Australia said in March 2011, “While the Convention does not explicitly prohibit investment in companies that produce or manufacture cluster munitions, some acts of investment will fall within the scope of the conduct prohibited by Article 1” of the convention.^[142]
• BiH’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in July 2011 that it considers “investment in the production of cluster munitions to be prohibited.”^[143]
• Cameroon in May 2011, the Ministry of External Relations stated that Cameroon views investment in cluster munitions producers prohibited by the convention.^[144]
• Croatia informed the Monitor in March 2011 that it views investment in production of cluster munitions as prohibited by the convention.^[145]
• The Holy See has stated, “It is important for the integrity of the Convention and for its application to include these investments in the list of prohibitions.”^[146]
• Lao PDR said in June 2011, “We strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including those activities during the joint military operations, transiting, foreign stockpiling and investment in the production of cluster munitions.”^[147]
• The Netherlands stated in March 2011 that it considers direct investment to be prohibited under Article 1(c) of the convention on the prohibition on assistance. The Minister of Finance said the Council of State would consider whether Article 1(c) applies to States Parties only or to individuals and private institutions as well.^[148]
• Senegal stated in February 2011 that investment in cluster munitions would constitute a violation of the convention.^[149]

Several states expressed the contrary view, however, that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Denmark, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland:

• Denmark published a “Guide on Responsible Investment” in September 2010 that argues against the prohibition of certain investments and instead promotes social responsibility and sustainability in investments through the exclusive relationship between investors and company management.^[150]
• Germany stated in October 2010 that it does not agree that the convention prohibits investment in companies that produce cluster munitions and said that an investment ban would be imposed in exceptional cases only.^[151]
• Japan stated in June 2011 that “there is no clear agreement on financing of cluster munition production” and that “it is up to each state party to determine with their private sector” whether investment in cluster munitions should be prohibited.^[152]
• Sweden has said, “The dominant interpretation seems to be that the convention does not oblige State Parties to adopt such an investment ban.”^[153]
• Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a report in October 2010 that stated that it is not possible to conclude a ban on investment in cluster munitions production under the convention.^[154]

  ---

  [1] The convention text was adopted by consensus by the 107 governments that were full participants in the negotiations. However, adoption does not have any legal obligation attached.

  [2] This includes seven former users (Colombia, France, Iraq, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, and the UK); five former exporters (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, and the UK); 15 former producers (Australia, Belgium, BiH, Chile, France, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK); and 38 former and current stockpilers (see table in Global stockpiles section).

  [3] Other States Parties where cluster munitions have been used in armed conflict include Albania, BiH, Croatia, Grenada, Montenegro, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas), and Zambia. In addition, cluster munitions have been used in armed conflict in the following signatory states: Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mauritania, and Uganda. Some of these states are no longer affected. Twelve contaminated states remain outside the convention: Argentina (Falkland Islands/Malvinas), Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Libya, Russia, Serbia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

  [4] A state must deposit an instrument of accession with the UN in New York. The convention enters into force for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after their deposit of the instrument of accession.

  [5] The Vienna Convention is considered customary international law binding on all countries.

  [6] The 19 nations that adopted the convention but did not sign include: Argentina, Bahrain, Belize, Brunei, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Slovakia, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Seven other states adopted the convention and did not sign during the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, but signed later in 2009 or 2010: Cameroon, the DRC, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Seychelles.

  [7] The Monitor identifies 49 states in Africa with the creation of the Republic of South Sudan as an independent state on 9 July 2011. There are 15 States Parties: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

  [8] The nine non-signatories from Africa are: Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritius, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Sudan and Swaziland adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008.

  [9] Statement of Swaziland, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

  [10] CMC meeting with Mauritius delegation, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

  [11] CMC meeting with Tim Horner, Program Manager, South Sudan Mine Action Office, UN Mission in Sudan, in Geneva, 23 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.

  [12] There are 12 States Parties from the Americas: Antigua and Barbuda, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay.

  [13] There are 14 non-signatories from the Americas: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Cuba, Dominica, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the US, and Venezuela. Argentina, Belize, and Venezuela adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008.

  [14] Statement of Trinidad and Tobago, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 12 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

  [15] There are 19 non-signatories from Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. There are nine non-signatories from the Pacific: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Six of these states adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008: Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu. During the Oslo Process, the Marshall Islands, Nepal, and Niue subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming their intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

  [16] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

  [17] CMC meeting with George Hoa’au, Assistant Secretary for UN and Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Solomon Islands, in Vientiane, 9 November 2010.

  [18] Letter to Human Rights Watch, from Jean Sese, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vanuatu, 6 April 2011.

  [19] Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 27 June 2011, www.clusterconvention.org; and statement of Thailand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 27 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.

  [20] There are 25 States Parties from Europe: Albania, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Holy See, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK.

  [21] There are 13 non-signatories from Europe: Andorra, Belarus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. None of the eight states from the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have joined the convention. Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Slovakia joined in the consensus adoption of the convention on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, while Tajikistan subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming its intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

  [22] ICBL-CMC, “Report on Advocacy Mission to Tajikistan: 23–27 May 2011.”

  [23] Statement by Jaume Bartumeu Cassany, Head, Government of Andorra, UNGA General Debate, 27 September 2010, www.un.org.

  [24] Meeting with Iraqi delegation, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.

  [25] The 15 non-signatories from the Middle East and North Africa are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. Bahrain, Morocco, and Qatar joined in the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the negotiations in May 2008.

  [26] Statement of Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

  [27] The following states issued statements welcoming the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK. CMC, “Entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Report: 1 August 2010,” November 2010.

  [28] CMC, “Report on CCM Preparatory Meeting: Geneva, 6 September 2010,” 14 October 2011, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [29] CMC, “Report on UN Special Event on the Convention on Cluster Munitions: New York, 19 October 2010,” 22 October 2010, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [30] UN, “Final Report, First Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Vientiane, 30 November–4 December 2009, Advance copy, undated, www.clusterconvention.org.

  [31] CMC, “Report on 124th General Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU): Panama City, April 2011,” www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [32] As of 25 August 2011, there were 156 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, while Poland and the Marshall Islands had signed, but not yet ratified. Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but not the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 50 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guyana, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

  [33] CMC, “Landmark meeting held on Convention on Cluster Munitions: Geneva, June 2011,” www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [34] See CMC, www.august1.org.

  [35] As of 25 August 2011, there were a total of 114 States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, while five countries have signed, but not ratified the CCW (Afghanistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, and Vietnam).

  [36] As of 25 August 2011, there were a total of 66 States Parties to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. In 2010, seven CCW States Parties ratified Protocol V (Belgium, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Honduras, Italy, and Saudi Arabia). There were no ratifications in 2011, as of 25 August.

  [37] All but 39 CCW States Parties have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, India, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

  [38] Statement by the CMC, Convention on Conventional Weapons GGE meeting, Geneva, 22 August 2011, www.hrw.org.

  [39] “Tripoli denies use of cluster bombs,” Reuters (Tripoli), Video report, 16 April 2011, www.reuters.com.

  [40] Statement of Thailand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 27 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.

  [41] At least seven States Parties (Austria, Lao PDR, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and the UK), one signatory (Australia), and the European Union have condemned or expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions in Libya in April 2011. Thailand’s use of cluster munitions in Cambodia in February 2011 was condemned by at least six States Parties (Austria, Lao PDR, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK).

  [42] Statement by the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Compliance, Geneva, 29 June 2011, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [43] “General Petraeus’ Meeting with Saleh on Security Assistance, AQAP Strikes,” US Department of State, Cable, 4 January 2010, released by Wikileaks. See Robert Booth and Ian Black, “WikiLeaks cables: Yemen offered US ‘open door’ to attack al-Qaida on its soil,” The Guardian, 3 December 2010, www.guardian.co.uk.

  [44] The loading, assembling and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

  [45] As new information has become available, the list of producers has changed over time. A total of 33 states were identified in 2002 by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as having developed or produced cluster munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org.

  [46] Letter # C1-3/3782 from Doru Costea, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2011.

  [47] In early August 2011, a government official informed the Monitor that, “Turkey no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions” and “has not produced cluster munitions since 2005.” Email from Ramazan Ercan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2011.

  [48] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. Submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2005 and afterward must meet the new standard. However, a waiver was granted for M30 GMRLS rocket submunitions, allowing a 2%–4% dud rate.

  [49] Communication from the Polish Ministry of National Defense, to Pax Christi Netherlands, 14 February 2005. The information was provided to Pax Christi with the proviso that the “content of the paper does not necessarily reflect the official position of Poland.”

  [50] Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008. During 2008, South Korea included a representative of the Hanwha Company, a Korean company that produces cluster munitions, in its official delegation to the CCW.

  [51] Croatian company SUIS d.o.o. in Kumrovec produced a cluster munition called the M93 120mm mortar projectile until 1999. The last batch, series SUK-0298, was delivered to the Ministry of Defence in 1999. The company went bankrupt in 2006 and the owners established a new company Novi SUIS d.o.o. that produces fire extinguishers. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hrvoje Debač, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 23 March 2011.

  [52] Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Spain, and the UK did not report on the status and progress of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention.

  [53] Information about transfers of cluster munitions has increased over the years. In 2002, HRW estimated that at least nine countries have transferred 30 different types of cluster munitions to at least 45 other countries. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002.

  [54] Five MAT-120 cluster munitions were transferred in October 2006 and another 1,050 in March 2008. Statement of Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011.

  [55] Patria Corporation press release, “Patria’s mortar systems have not been used to fire cluster ammunition in Libya.” 7 July 2011.

  [56] Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK.

  [57] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

  [58] Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese Type-81 122mm submunition rockets into northern Israel in 2006.

  [59] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Saudi Arabia: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, Washington, DC, 13 June 2011, www.dsca.mil.

  [60] HRW has been documenting the global production, stockpiling, use, and transfer of cluster munitions for many years. In 2002, it identified 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions.

  [61] Email from Philip Kimpton, First Secretary/Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN in Geneva, 10 August 2011. In November 2010, Australia stated that it does not possess an operational stockpile of cluster munitions and does not intend to acquire one. Statement of Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 11 November 2010.

  [62] This total includes information voluntarily provided by States Parties on stockpiles and destruction activities that occurred prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for that State Party.

  [63] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ratification de la Convention du 30 mai 2008 sur les armes à sous-munitions et modification de la loi du 13 décembre 1996 sur la materiel de guerre: Rapport explicatif (projet) pour la procédure de consultation” (“Ratification of the Convention of 30 May 2008 on Cluster Munitions and the Amendment of the Law of 13 December 1996 on War Materials, Explanatory Report (Draft) for the Consultation Procedure”), October 2010, Section 1.4.1.

  [64] Statements by Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in response to parliamentary question 2009/10:130 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Swedish Parliamentary Debate, 19 January 2010, www.riksdagen.se.

  [65] Article 3 requires destruction and Article 8(1) specifies funding, Law No. 95 of 14 June 2011. See www.altalex.com.

  [66] States Parties Fiji, Guatemala, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Mali, Niger, Samoa, and the Seychelles are late in submitting their initial transparency reports, but none of these states is believed currently to stockpile cluster munitions. Transparency reports for the remaining States Parties are not yet due as of 25 August 2011.

  [67] In their Article 7 reports, these States Parties simply indicated that the form was “not applicable” or “none” or left the form blank. The CMC has urged states to clearly indicate in their next reports that there are no cluster munitions stockpiled under their jurisdiction and control, including by stating a more unequivocal response would be “zero.”

  [68] This includes the information submitted by States Parties on a voluntary basis for those cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed before entry into force.

  [69] The convention did not enter into force for Portugal until 1 September 2011.

  [70] Presentation of the Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement, “Disposal/destruction of German cluster munition stockpiles,” Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011; and statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

  [71] Average exchange rate for 2010: €1=US$1.3261. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2011.

  [72] France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, Part II, 31 January 2011.

  [73] Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 January 2011.

  [74] Japan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 January 2011.

  [75] Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 January 2011.

  [76] UK Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 April 2011.

  [77] This list includes those states that destroyed their stockpiles prior to entry into force of the convention.

  [78] Statement by the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011, www.hrw.org.

  [79] Ibid.

  [80] Albania, Burkina Faso, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Uruguay, and Zambia.

  [81] Article 3 (3), Law No. 95 of 14 June 2011. See www.altalex.com.

  [82] Statement of Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

  [83] Statement by the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 28 June 2011, www.hrw.org.

  [84] For example, states should include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions” instead of simply putting “N/A” in the form.

  [85] For example, Norway did not fill in Form C, while Denmark and Germany both indicated that the information is still “to be determined.”

  [86] Ireland, New Zealand, and Norway.

  [87] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010; and ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” www.icrc.org.

  [88] “An Act to implement the Convention on Cluster munitions in the Cook Islands and related matters,” Law No. 8, 2011. Email from Myra Patai, Director, International Organizations and Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of the Cook Islands, 25 August 2011.

  [89] Law 213 of 21 June 2011 on the Prohibition of the Use, Development, Production, and Transfer of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction, No. 213/2011, www.sbirka.cz; Official Gazette 76/2011, 19 July 2011, www.psp.cz; and Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, “Parliamentary Journal 214, Government Bill on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions,” www.psp.cz.

  [90] Law on the Ratification and Implementation of the Oslo Convention on the ban on cluster munitions (Law No. 95) was published in the Official Gazette on 4 July 2011 and took effect the following day Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Republica Italiana), No. 153, 4 July 2011, www.altalex.com.

  [91] According to the amended Penal Code, violations relating to the use, development, manufacturing, sale, stockpiling, and trafficking of cluster munitions are punishable by a penal term of five to 10 years or three to five years for violations of the prohibition on assistance. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 January 2011. Spain has amended paragraphs one and two of Article 566 of Organic Law [Ley Orgánica] 2/2000 of its penal code to include cluster munitions, mines, chemical and biological weapons. See Organic Law 5/2010 of 22 June 2010, amending Organic Law 10/1995 of 23 November 1995, Penal Code, noticias.juridicas.com.

  [92] Statement by the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011, www.hrw.org.

  [93] As of 1 August 2011, Wikileaks had made public a total of 57 US diplomatic cables originating from 24 locations, all relating to US concerns over the Oslo Process initiative. See www.cablegatesearch.net.

  [94] US Department of State, “DEMARCHE TO AFGHANISTAN ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS,” Cable 08STATE134777, 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

  [95] CMC, “CMC Briefing Paper on the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [96] At least 20 States Parties and signatories have previously provided their view: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia. See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

  [97] Email from Anesa Kundurovic, Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2011. Kundurovic noted that the views expressed to the Monitor “represent the position of MFA and may or may not differ from the interpretation of other relevant institutions, including but not limiting to the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, etc.”

  [98] This was not the case under France’s implementation law for the Mine Ban Treaty. National Assembly, “Projet de loi tendant à l’élimination des armes à sous-munitions, Texte Adopté no. 508” (“Bill on the elimination of cluster munitions, Adopted text no. 508”), XIII Legislature, Extraordinary session of 2009–2010, 6 July 2010, Art. L. 2344-3, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

  [99] Letter from János Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2011, KÜM/6777/2011/ADM.

  [100] Email from Maytong Thammavongsa, Director of UN, Political, and Security Affairs Division, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 2011.

  [101] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Alvaro Miguel Padilla Lacayo, Legal Advisor, Department of Democratic Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2011.

  [102] “Sveriges tillräde till konventionen om klusterammunition” (“Accession of Sweden to the Convention on Cluster Munitions”), Regeringskansliet Utrikesdepartementet (Government Offices of Sweden), Ds 2010:46, 2010, p. 27, www.svenskafreds.se.

  [103] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ratification de la Convention du 30 mai 2008 sur les armes à sous-munitions et modification de la loi du 13 décembre 1996 sur la materiel de guerre: Rapport explicatif (projet) pour la procédure de consultation” (“Ratification of the Convention of 30 May 2008 on Cluster Munitions and the Amendment of the Law of 13 December 1996 on War Materials, Explanatory Report (Draft) for the Consultation Procedure”), October 2010, Section 6.2.

  [104] CMC, “Australia: Fix the Bill,” 10 May 2011, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [105] Department of Defence, “Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010,” March 2011, senate.aph.gov.au.

  [106] Ibid.

  [107] Statement of Canada, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Other Implementation Measures, Geneva, 30 June 2011.

  [108] In June 2011, Japan stated that the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations is “totally under control” and warned the meeting that, “we should not discuss Article 21 here while the appropriate military officials are absent.” Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by the CMC and HRW.

  [109] US Department of State, “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” Cable, 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net.

  [110] See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

  [111] Document provided by email from Henri Vantiegham, Human Security and Conventional Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, to HI-Belgium, 13 April 2011.

  [112] In addition, the Ministry noted, “in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Convention transfer is allowed only in exceptional cases” such as “for the purpose of destruction or for example, for the purpose of development of cluster munition counter measures.” Email from Anesa Kundurovic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2011.

  [113] Email from Bourhane Mirhane, Ministry of External Affairs, 18 April 2011.

  [114] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hrvoje Debač, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 23 March 2011.

  [115] Statements by Hubert Falco, Secretary of State for Defense, Committee on National Defense and the Armed Forces, National Assembly, “Compte rendu no. 37” (“Record no. 37”), Five pm session, 22 June 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr. Falco has also said, “The Government considers without restriction that the scope of the ban as it is now covers the prohibition of commercial activities related to cluster munitions, and therefore transit made in this framework…. State transit concerns the transit of cluster munitions carried aboard government aircraft or vessels belonging to the armies of countries not party to the Oslo Convention.” He added, “It will be much more useful to work backwards through diplomatic channels at the highest level to inform our partners and non-signatories of our obligations and our requirements.” Statement by Hubert Falco, National Assembly, “Élimination des armes à sous-munitions: Discussion d’un projet de loi adopté par le Sénat” (“Elimination of cluster munitions: Discussion of a bill passed by the Senate”), XIII Legislature, Extraordinary session of 2009–2010, 6 July 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

  [116] Statement by Khamse Vithavong, Vicar Apostolic, Holy See, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 9 November 2010. Notes by the CMC/Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

  [117] Email from Alison Kelly, Director, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 July 2011.

  [118] Email from Maytong Thammavongsa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 2011.

  [119] Interview with Edward Mitevski, Head of Department, Directorate of Political Security Cooperation and Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 23 March 2011.

  [120] Telephone interview with Majkl Sibinovski, Head, Arms Control Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2010.

  [121] Letter to Mary Wareham, ANZCMC Coordinator from Hon. Georgina te Heuheu, Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, 29 April 2011. According to the letter, “Under New Zealand’s Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act 2009 the transit of cluster munitions through New Zealand is an offence but…not all states share that position.” According to the Act (Part 1. Preliminary Provisions, 5. Interpretation), New Zealand’s definition of transfer includes (i) importation into, and exportation from, New Zealand; and (ii) the transfer of title to, and control over, cluster munitions.

  [122] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Colonel Meïssa Niang, Director, Control Research and Legislation of the Ministry of Armed Forces of Senegal, 3 February 2011.

  [123] Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 27 January 2011.

  [124] Letter from Peter Hooton, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 March 2011.

  [125] Response to questions in the Diet by Tetsuhiro Hosono, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minute No. 20, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009.

  [126] US Department of State, “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” Cable, 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net.

  [127] Ibid.

  [128] Uri Rosenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Parliamentary letter regarding the relation between the obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the NATO Status of Forces agreement and the national transport regulation of strategic goods of strategic goods with regard to the transit of cluster munitions,” Parliamentary letter, 32187-(R1902) K, 2 May 2011.

  [129] Letter Reference 147812.07u from the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Development to Uri Rosenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2011, www.eerstekamer.nl.

  [130] Letter No. 42 from Paula Silva Cepeda, Charge d’Affaires, Embassy of Portugal, Washington, DC, 29 July 2010.

  [131] Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79.

  [132] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2011.

  [133] Statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

  [134] See www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.

  [135] CMC statement, “Cluster Munition Coalition calls on governments to ban investments in cluster munition producers,” 25 May 2011, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

  [136] For the period from 1 May 2008 to 31 March 2011. IKV Pax Christi (Netherlands) and Netwerk Vlaanderen (Belgium), “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: A shared responsibility.” The report was first published on 29 October 2009, updated on 14 April 2010, and for a second time on 25 May 2011. See www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.

  [137] Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

  [138] On 25 February 2011, a bill to promote socially responsible investments and prevent investments in cluster munitions producers from receiving the certification of “Socially Responsible Investment” (SRI) was introduced in the Belgian Senate. “Proposition de loi visant la promotion des investissements socialement responsables, déposée par M. Philippe Mahoux et Mme Marie Arena et consorts” (“Draft law in order to promote socially responsible investments, introduced by Philippe Mahoux and Marie Arena and Co.”), Legislative document 5-808/1, Session 2010-2011, 25 February 2011.

  [139] A disinvestment motion was put forward by the Alliance 90/Greens called for an amendment to the War Weapons Control Act of 2009 and the Act Governing the Certification of Contracts for Retirement Provision. Motion tabled by Members of the Bundestag Agnes Malczak, Dr. Gerhard Schick, and Co., and the Alliance 90/Greens parliamentary group, “Enacting legislation to ban investments in anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, and removing tax incentives for such investments,” 9 February 2011.

  [140] On 18 May 2011, the House of Deputies voted in favor of a motion calling for increased controls on financial institutions on activities prohibited by the convention. Motion (L’ordine del giorno) submitted by Augusto Di Stansilao, No. 9/04193/004, 18 May 2011, www.camera.it; and email from Giuseppe Schiavello, Director, Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines, 23 May 2011. The motion was approved by a vote after it was initially rejected as a recommendation by the government.

  [141] On 29 March 2011, the Senate adopted a motion to prohibit “demonstrable” direct investments in the production, sale, and distribution of cluster munitions. Motion by Haubrich-Gooskens (Labour Party), Kamerstuk 32 187-(R1902), letter F, adopted on 29 March 2011. On 12 July 2011, the Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Senate that the government was in the process of deliberating a response to the motion, but did not give a timeframe for its completion. C. (Jan Kees) De Jager, Minister of Finance and on behalf of Uri Rosenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Response to parliamentary question about the Royal Bank of Scotland and cluster munitions,” Parliamentary letter to the Senate, FM/2011/8962 U, 12 July 2011, www.rijksoverheid.nl.

  [142] Letter from Peter Hooton, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 March 2011.

  [143] Email from Anesa Kundurovic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2011.

  [144] Email from the Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon to HI France, May 2011. See www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.

  [145] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hrvoje Debač, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 23 March 2011.

  [146] Statement by Khamse Vithavong, Holy See, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 9 November 2010. Notes by the CMC/AOAV.

  [147] Email from Maytong Thammavongsa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 2011.

  [148] Summary of the plenary debate on “The Haubrich-Gooskens motion regarding a prohibition on investments in producers of cluster munitions, 32187-(R1902), letter F,” and “The Haubrich-Gooskens motion regarding the reassessment of the government’s position on the transit of cluster munitions through Dutch territory, 32187-(R1902), letter G,” 22 March 2011. For the record of the debate on 22 March 2011, see www.eerstekamer.nl.

  [149] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Colonel Meïssa Niang, Armed Forces of Senegal, 3 February 2011.

  [150] “Vejledning om ansvarlige investeringer” (“Guide on Responsible Investments”), September 2010, forward by Brian Mikkelsen, Minister of Economics and Business Affairs, pp. 3–4, www.samfundsansvar.dk.

  [151] Response by the Federal Government to questions by Agnes Malczak, Dr. Gerhard Shick, Marie Luise Beck, other Bundestag members (MPs), and the Alliance 90/Greens parliamentary group, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 17/2972, 5 October 2010.

  [152] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by HRW.

  [153] “Sveriges tillräde till konventionen om klusterammunition” (“Accession of Sweden to the Convention on Cluster Munitions”), Regeringskansliet Utrikesdepartementet (Government Offices of Sweden), Ds 2010:46, 2010, p. 18, www.svenskafreds.se. The report notes that the question of the application of a ban on investment did not arise during Sweden’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. The report notes the suggestion that the ban on cluster munitions under the convention would lead to legislation on investments in companies that develop or produce cluster munitions and that some states had also introduced such legislation.

  [154] According to the report, amendments to the law are unnecessary as direct financing of banned activities is already prohibited by the Federal Law on War Material. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ratification de la Convention du 30 mai 2008 sur les armes à sous-munitions et modification de la loi du 13 décembre 1996 sur la materiel de guerre: Rapport explicatif (projet) pour la procédure de consultation,” (“Ratification of the Convention of 30 May 2008 on Cluster Munitions and the Amendment of the Law of 13 December 1996 on War Materials, Explanatory Report (Draft) for the Consultation Procedure”), October 2010, Section 9.2.2.