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Contamination | Casualties | COVID-19 Impact on Mine Action | Coordination | Gender mainstreaming | Clearance | Improvised Mines | Risk Education | Victim Assistance

Introduction

This summary highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mines. The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while the second section focuses on land release through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

Reporting in this overview contributes to a baseline for developments under the Oslo Action Plan, the five-year action plan of the Mine Ban Treaty adopted in November 2019. These actions remain consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby States Parties declare that they are:

“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”

There are 33 States Parties that have declared having obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to clear contaminated land. Most of them reported undertaking clearance in areas under their jurisdiction and control in 2019. Three States Parties need to clarify the extent of residual contamination while five States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines. Overall, high numbers of casualties due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to be recorded in 2019, following a sharp rise in casualties due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015. The majority of new casualties were reported in States Parties to the treaty that also experience contamination by mines of an improvised nature. In 2019, 28 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination. At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims—these States Parties have “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.” Many indicated improvements in the accessibility, quality, or quantity of services for victims, but significant challenges remained in all states.

Contamination

Antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty.

In early 2020, Chile became the latest State Party to declare completion of clearance of all mined areas in its territory,[1] an achievement that will be formally announced at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. Jordan, which had originally declared completion in 2012, completed verification and clearance of areas that had not been cleared to a humanitarian standard in 2018.[2]

No State Party declared completion of clearance in 2019. Since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999, of the 63 States Parties that reported mined areas under their jurisdiction and control, 32 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory.

State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

Several States Parties that have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards.[3] Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, and Mozambique all finally declared fulfilment of Article 5 obligations several years after their initial declarations.

Mauritania, which declared itself free of mines in 2018, but reported finding new contamination in 2019 and submitted a request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline in 2020. Nigeria announced it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 in 2011, but indicated newly-mined areas in 2019. It was expected to submit an Article 7 report and an Article 5 extension request in 2020.

States Parties with Article 5 obligations

As of 15 October 2020, a total of 33 States Parties have declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control and therefore have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties suspected of having contamination

Several States Parties that have not declared obligations under Article 5, may have residual or newly discovered mine contamination which needs to be reported and clarified.

Residual contamination

Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines. In 2019, Algeria reported that 4,499 “isolated” mines were cleared and destroyed, a huge increase from the 188 mines found in 2018.[4] In total, 5,150 mines were reported cleared and destroyed during 2016–2019. Given the large number of mines found in 2019, Algeria needs to provide clarification to States Parties on whether the mines being found constitute contaminated areas rather than isolated residual contamination.

There have been several mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines in the country, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.[5] The mines are believed to be present mainly on the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

Nicaragua declared completion of clearance in April 2010, but has since faced a problem of residual mine/ERW contamination throughout the country. During 2018, Nicaragua reported that its contingency operations answered 13 reports made by the population, resulting in the clearance of 2,849m² and removal and destruction of 29 items of unexploded ordnance. Nicaragua confirmed that the contingency operations would continue through 2019, but no updated information has been shared.[6] In May 2020, two landmines exploded in El Bayuncun, San Fernando, in the border region with Honduras, injuring one person in the first incident and four people from a rescue party in the second.[7]

Improvised mine contamination

Several States Parties that have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 or which do not provide regular Article 7 transparency reports, are suspected of having contamination by improvised mines. Improvised devices designed to detonate, or able to be detonated, by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[8] States Parties with improvised mines have obligations under Article 5 to clear these devices and, under Article 7, to provide annual reporting on contamination and clearance.

The following States Parties need to clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 obligations.

In Burkina Faso, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-operated improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018. In 2019, 21 civilians died and 14 were wounded by these devices. Improvised mines using pressure plates have also been recorded, with persistent armed attacks in northern and eastern regions since 2018.[9]

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, and its Article 5 deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, mines of an improvised nature have caused casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s military activities have escalated.[10] The extent of contamination is not known but is believed to be small.

Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017 has experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country.[11] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported to the Monitor that improvised mines in Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap (see section on casualties).[12]

Nigeria declared at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, in November 2011, that it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.[13] However, since 2017, there have been reports of incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from landmines and a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko Haram in the northeast of the country, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.[14] In November 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, Nigeria stated that it intended to submit an Article 7 transparency report and an Article 5 deadline extension request in order to comply with its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has yet to do this as of 15 October 2020.[15]

Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of both civilian and military casualties from landmines and improvised mines in the last five years.[16] The improvised mines causing casualties, particularly to shepherds walking their herds, are predominantly found in the mountainous areas of Tunisia’s northwest and southwest regions,[17] where militants are present and laying mines as an insurgency tactic.[18]

Extent of contamination in States Parties

Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the ICBL-CMC as more than 100km²) is believed to exist in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Large contamination (20–99km²) exists in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Medium contamination (5–19km²) exists in six States Parties: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Less than 5km² of contamination is thought to exist in 11 States Parties: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and in the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina due to their claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have significantly over 100km² of contamination, comprising both legacy contamination and new contamination, including improvised mines.

Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised mines in areas liberated from the Islamic State. Iraq reported 1,239.17km² of antipersonnel mine contamination at the end of 2019, and an additional 627.58km² of contamination by improvised mines.[20]

Yemen currently has no clear understanding of the size of its contamination as the ongoing conflict continues to add to the extent and complexity of contamination.[21] Landmines that were not part of Yemeni stockpiles have reportedly been laid recently,[22] while previously cleared areas, such as Aden, have been re-contaminated.[23] The most recent estimate of contamination, from March 2017, was 323km².[24]

Afghanistan reported contamination of 191km² at the end of 2019, of which 136km² is classified as confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 55km² as suspected hazardous area (SHA).[25] Afghanistan told the Monitor that new contamination resulting from fighting between the government and NSAGs is adding to the extent of contamination to be addressed.[26]

Cambodia and Thailand still need to verify the extent of contamination along border areas where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation.[27] Cambodia estimates 817km², which includes both CHA and SHA which are not yet differentiated on the database of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA).[28] Thailand reports 218.19km², of which 14.55km² are CHA and 203.64km² are SHA.[29]

Turkey’s contamination of 150.41km² is found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.[30] Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its control in Northern Cyprus; although its most recent Article 5 extension request, submitted in 2013, did not include a timeline for clearance of mines there.[31]

BiH has also not defined the full extent of contamination although it has been undertaking a country assessment project since 2018, funded by the European Union (EU).[32] In its revised Article 5 extension request, submitted in August 2020, BiH reports contamination of 966.68km².[33]

At the end of 2019, eight of Croatia’s 21 counties were still mine-affected.[34] Croatia reported to the Monitor that more than 98% of the remaining contaminated land is in forest areas.[35]

Ukraine has reported 7,000km² of contaminated land,[36] but this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

Ethiopia, in its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019, reported that 330.28km² had been released through technical survey and non-technical survey (NTS).[37] It is expected that the current figure of remaining contamination (over 10,000km²) will be significantly reduced through survey.[38]

Sub-Saharan Africa has a number of States Parties with heavy contamination of between 20–99km². These are Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. Sri Lanka also has less than 100km² of reported contamination.

In 2019, Angola completed non-technical survey in all 18 provinces of the country, defining 1,073 confirmed minefields, and 94 suspected minefields which are estimated at 90km² in total.[39]

Chad has about 93.3km² of contamination, of which 93.27km² are CHA and0.05km² SHA.[40] This includes 2.93km² of improvised mine contamination.

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2013, when it was estimated at 33.5km².[41]

Zimbabwe’s minefields on its border with Mozambique, and an inland minefield in Matebeleland North province, were reported to cover a combined total area of 42.69km² at the end of 2019.[42]

Sri Lanka reported 24km² of contaminated land as of April 2019.[43] The majority of this area was confirmed as minefields (22.42 km²).

Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan are each believed to have less than 19km² of mine contamination.

Colombia’s mine contamination comprises 8.2km², of which 3.3km² are in the process of being cleared, and a projected 4.9km² of suspected contamination which has not yet been surveyed.[44] However, this does not include 166 municipalities that are inaccessible due to insecurity, where no survey or clearance has been able to take place. Contamination in Colombia also includes improvised mines.

Mauritania had previously declared clearance of all known contaminated areas in 2018, but has since identified further contaminated areas, approximately 8km², a legacy of the 1976–1978 Western Sahara conflict.[45] However, Mauritania needs to confirm whether this contamination is actually on its territory.

Somalia reported that at the end of 2019 it had 6.09km² of contaminated land,[46] but it has also reported an increase in the use of improvised mines.[47]

South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan all have a relatively clear understanding of the extent of their remaining contamination, at 13.27km², 7.37km², and 11.95km² respectively.[48]

States Parties Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and the UK all have less than 5km² of contamination. However, some of the contamination is in areas that are contentious or difficult to access, as follows.

Cyprus reports no antipersonnel mines remaining in minefields laid by the National Guard that are on territory under its effective control.[49] Remaining contamination is in the buffer zone and areas of Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus.[50]

The contamination in the DRC is small, but partly located in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces which are difficult to access due to the presence of NSAGs and the Ebola epidemic.[51]

In Palestine, clearance in the West Bank is constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations.

Antipersonnel mine contamination in states not party and other areas

In addition to the 33 States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines, there are also 22 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas that have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territories.

State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

Extent of contamination in states not party and other areas

Mines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzebkistan, although the extent of contamination is not known.

The extent of contamination is known in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, and Lebanon; although in Azerbaijan significant contamination also exists in the areas that are not under government control, particularly in the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan.[52] The outbreak of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in late September 2020 had added further complexity to the political dynamics in the region, and is resulting in new ERW contamination, including cluster munitions.[53]

Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

States not party Lao PDR and Lebanon are both party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have prioritized clearance of cluster munition remnants. The mine contamination in Lao PDR has had little human impact, although clearance operators reported mine contamination in their areas of operation in 2019.[54] In Vietnam, the mine problem is also small compared to its ERW problem, although the full extent of mine contamination is not known.

The extent of mine contamination in China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia is unknown.

Five other areas unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status are known to have mine contamination.

In Abkhazia, which had been declared free of landmine contamination in 2011,[55] The HALO Trust identified five previously unknown minefields from June–December 2019, amounting to aproximately 9,600m².[56]

Kosovo, which completed a socioeconomic baseline of the impact of ERW in 2018 to support the prioritization of remaining contamination, has 35 affected areas totaling 1.35km².[57]

The HALO Trust, the only operator in Nagorno-Karabakh, has been undertaking a baseline survey of the territory to establish the extent of contamination. A total of 9km² has been identified.[58] Further progress will be dependent on the outcome of hostilities which erupted in September 2020.

As of August 2020, Somaliland had 6.71km² of CHA across ten districts.[59] In Western Sahara, there are 15 known remaining minefields east of the Berm,[60] covering a total area of 95.8km².[61]

Casualties

Landmines of all types, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised mines, as well as cluster munition remnants[62] and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm.

Mine/ERW casualties in 2019

At least 5,554people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in calendar year 2019. Of that total, at least 2,170were killed, and another 3,357 were injured, while in the case of 27 casualties it was not known if the victim survived.[63] Casualties were recorded in 50 countries and five other areas. The 2019 total represents a decline from 6,897 casualties of mines/ERW in 2018, and a reduction in casualties over the past three years. Previously, a sharp rise in casualties was recorded due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015, peaking in 2016, when 9,439 casualties were recorded.[64] The significant upsurge in recorded casualties since 2014 is primarily due to large numbers of casualties in relatively few countries with intensive armed conflicts, involving the large-scale use of improvised mines.

In 2019, more than two-thirds of all casualties (3,647, or 66%) were reported in States Parties. Thus, the impact in terms of casualties caused by mines/ERW in States Parties alone was still greater in 2019 than in 2013—the year with the lowest annual number of casualties recorded globally since 1999, when 3,457 people were killed and injured in all countries and areas.

Civilians represented the majority of mine/ERW casualties compared to military and security forces,[65] continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 80% of casualties were civilians in 2019, where the status was known.

Child casualties are recorded where the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the mine/ERW explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as media) as being a child. There were at least 1,562 child casualties in 2019, accounting for 35% of all casualties for whom the age group was known (4,508); this made up 43% of civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (3,598). Children were killed (580) or injured (979) by mines/ERW in 34 states and one other area in 2019.[66] As in previous years, in 2019, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (82%).[67] ERW was the device type that caused the most child casualties (758, or 49%), followed by improvised mines (576, or 37%).

In 2019, men and boys made up the majority of casualties, accounting for 85% of all casualties for whom the sex was known (3,190 of 3,759). Women and girls made up 15% of all casualties for whom the sex was known (569).

In 2019, the Monitor identified 23 casualties among deminers in nine countries (including 17 men and two women, and four for whom the sex was not recorded).[68] Another eight casualties were state military, police or other security personnel who were killed or injured while clearing, disarming, or dismantling mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[69] There were two informal village deminer casualties in Cambodia in 2019. These were not included in the annual total of deminer casualties.

Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised mine casualties. For the fourth successive year, in 2019, the highest number of annual casualties was caused by improvised mines (2,994). However, the number of recorded improvised mine casualties declined significantly from 2018, which saw an all-time high of 3,789 improvised mine casualties.

Casualties in States Parties in 2019

Casualties occurred in 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2019.[70] The States Parties with over 100 recorded casualties were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

States Parties with high and increasing numbers of casualties were those with improvised mine casualties. Collectively, States Parties recorded only 26% of the commercially-manufactured antipersonnel mine casualties reported in 2019 (124). States Parties accounted for 62% (1,853) of improvised mine casualties and 74% (316) of casualties from undefined landmine types that, in the context of media reporting terminology, are also likely to be mines of an improvised nature.

There is a clear overall trend of declining annual casualties in most States Parties over the 20 years since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence. This trend is particularly evident in most of the countries which reported the highest casualty figures after the treaty entered into force in 1999.

Declining casualty rates have also been recorded over time in Colombia, from a peak of 1,228 casualties in 2006 to 111 casualties in 2019. However, casualties in 2018 and 2019 increased, having dropped below 100 in the preceding two years after the peace agreement took effect. Relatively new State Party Sri Lanka had 223 mine/ERW casualties in 2000 and two in 2019.

It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, many casualties go unrecorded, meaning the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in those countries.

In Afghanistan, data collection was affected by ongoing conflict. The existing data collection system records only civilians, and the reporting of military casualties was generally rare. Since May 2017, the Afghan military has stopped releasing its conflict casualty figures entirely.

In Iraq, as in previous years, it is certain that there were many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred in 2019 that were not identified. However, United Nations (UN) reporting indicates that there has been a significant overall reduction in conflict-related casualties of all types since 2018 and decided to stop releasing civilian casualty updates on a monthly basis, but rather based on the circumstances.[71] Data collection in Iraq remains a challenge. In 2019 and 2020, the Information Management and Mine Action Program (iMMAP) provided regular updates on explosive hazards.[72] However, mine/ERW incident casualties were almost never reported among the victims recorded.

In 2019, a detailed report on data in Iraq by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) found that “there is limited to no coordination between the actors involved in victim and accident reporting and data management processes.”[73] The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) reportedly suffer from insufficient staff, lack of technical expertise, inconsistent and mismatched reporting forms and a lack of formalized guidelines on roles and responsibilities for the many different actors involved in data collection and management.

In Mali in 2019, as was the case in recent years, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents and no casualty occurred while individuals were on foot. The same was true for Burkina Faso in 2019. Five of the 233 civilian casualties recorded for Mali in 2019 occurred in incidents where they were on an animal-drawn cart, compared to 25 in 2018. Those improvised mines causing casualties in Mali and Burkina Faso were believed to have acted as de facto “antivehicle mines.” However, in some incidents, reporting may be unclear as to whether the improvised device involved was an unused command-detonated IED–and thus in effect an explosive remnant rather than a mine–or if it was a victim-activated improvised mine. The impact in terms of casualties is largely indistinguishable.

The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the effective operation of a national casualty surveillance mechanism. Yemen reported that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) information management system has become outdated and is currently not usable. Furthermore, the conflict has presented new mines and mine technologies (improvised mines), with which YEMAC has had no previous experience. This is compounded by the scale of the conflict and its extensive impact across the country.[74]

In Yemen, the Monitor recorded 248 casualties for 2019. The Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) recorded 233 landmine casualties in Yemen, with just under half due to incidents involving civilian vehicles: “Landmines accounted for highest number of casualties in incidents impacting on civilian vehicles, with 36 landmine incidents resulting in 114 casualties; 41% of the total.”[75] In May 2019, Yemen reported having collected data on 820 victims and injured persons since the beginning of 2019.[76] In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019, Yemen reported 1,050 victims surveyed in 2019. Previous data indicates that aggregate annual casualty figures reported by Yemen include casualties for all time surveyed during that year, rather than casualties which occurred in the calendar year itself.

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded casualty data in Nigeria for calendar year 2019. From 2016–2019, data for Nigeria was initially and regularly recorded by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which significantly heightened understanding and awareness of the extent of the impact of mines/ERW (especially improvised mines) in the country. Subsequently, Nigeria’s acknowledgement of its obligation to clear improvised mines under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty further indicated that the improvised mine casualties included those from antipersonnel types.

Casualties in states not party and other areas

The Monitor identified 1,834 mine/ERW casualties in 2019 in 14 states not party.[77] More than a thousand of the casualties were recorded in Syria (1,125), which represents a continuing decrease from 1,465 in 2018, and 40% less than the 1,906 casualties recorded in 2017.[78] However, since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties in the country are thought to be an undercount. Casualty totals have fluctuated in part due to inconsistent availability of data and sources.

For Syria, ambiguity in the way that casualties and explosive incidents are reported in the media often leaves it unclear whether an explosive device was command-detonated or victim-activated. Many casualties, including civilian casualties in Syria that were reported to be from mines, booby-traps, roadside bombs, or IEDs, and which were not explicitly reported as ‘targeted’, were excluded from the Monitor annual casualty dataset if the cause of activation was not adequately defined.[79] Due to the preference for conflict fatality reporting systems in situations of armed conflict, there are many more people recorded as dead compared to those recorded injured. The Monitor recorded 636 people killed and 489 people injured in Syria in 2019, whereas generally only just over a quarter of all mine/ERW casualties will be fatalities. Therefore, it is certain, based on the probable proportion of fatalities to survivors, that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria was substantially higher than the annual total recorded.

The next highest numbers of casualties among the countries yet to join the Mine Ban Treaty were recorded in Myanmar, with 358 casualties, followed by Pakistan with 136.

Seventy-three casualties were reported in five other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.

Casualty recording

It is certain that numerous casualties go unrecorded each year. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries, especially conflict-affected states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, do not have functional national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate reporting exist.

The need to improve the adequacy and efficacy of data collection in mine action and conflict situations, as well as the demand for progress in related systems and mechanisms, was a key theme during the reporting period. A thematic panel discussion during the May 2019 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings highlighted the need to strengthen injury surveillance systems to monitor “the physical impact of explosive ordnance” and to identify risk groups and factors. This was reflected in the text of the Oslo Action Plan.[80]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook a process to define a set of minimum data requirements for mine action that could accompany the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core Geographic Information System (GIS) data. In March 2020, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) adopted the summary of minimum data requirements, including entries for mine/ERW incidents and casualties.[81]

In September 2020, the first ever joint statement on casualty recording was delivered at the 45^th session of the Human Rights Council, presented by Afghanistan, a country consistently among those with the most mine/ERW casualties in recent years. It was co-signed by 49 other states.

In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released the first UN publication on casualty recording methodology, after several years of the need being highlighted by civil society.[82] The OHCHR Guidance on Casualty Recording notes that “casualty recording has received increasing recognition as an important and effective means of enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict situations and elsewhere.”[83]

However, the new UN casualty reporting system does not differentiate casualties caused by antipersonnel mines or any specific explosive device type as defined by disarmament regulation contexts. According to the OHCHR standards in place to monitor the Sustainable Development Goal indicator on conflict-related deaths (16.1.2), disaggregation for the cause of death includes the broader category of “planted explosives and unexploded ordnance.”[84]

The Monitor’s casualty records include only mine/ERW casualties: people killed or injured in incidents involving explosive items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.[85] Casualties from incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remotely detonated mines or IEDs—those that were not victim-activated—are not included. Mines/ERW therefore differs from the IMAS classification of explosive ordnance.[86] That is because the IMAS definition of explosive ordnance additionally includes devices that are activated manually or by remote control.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has represented an additional challenge to mine action programs activities in most affected countries, including data collection.

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COVID-19 pandemic impacts on clearance, risk education and victim assistance

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was a challenging year for mine action and an unusual reporting period for the Landmine Monitor. Mine clearance in many countries was affected by restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the pandemic. It was reported to the Monitor that clearance operations were temporarily suspended in States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Colombia, Peru, Senegal, and Zimbabwe; states not party Armenia, Lebanon, and Vietnam; and other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.[87]

In Cambodia, clearance teams received COVID-19 prevention training. It was reported that mine clearance programs in Cambodia and Thailand were not greatly affected by the pandemic, at least in part because operations are conducted in remote areas.

Other mine action activities affected by the pandemic included activities related to resources, survey, planning, and training.

BiH reallocated €10 million (US$10.9 million)[88] of European Union (EU) funds for humanitarian demining projects to COVID-19 response and migration issues. Chile anticipated a possible need to reallocate mine action funding to respond to sanitary and social needs. A mission to Mauritania to collect additional information on contamination was delayed. Resource mobilization activities for mine action were suspended in Senegal. In Ukraine, the adoption of amendments to the Law on Mine Action was delayed. In Yemen, the development of national mine action standards was postponed, and the training of information management personnel on the use of IMSMA Core was deferred. Several national mine action centers anticipated delays in their operational calendars, including delays which may impact their clearance completion date.[89] In some countries, mine action and risk education teams were repurposed to deliver hygiene products and COVID-19 prevention messages. The HALO Trust mobilized its vehicle fleet and workforce in 21 countries and four other areas to deliver medical and sanitation supplies.[90]

Risk education programs have been greatly impacted by the pandemic and related restrictions, but have also been an area where efforts to combine mine action and a COVID-19 response are most significant. An important proportion of risk education programs are based on face-to-face sessions, which are often considered the most appropriate way to reach affected communities in remote areas and to promote behavior change.

Face-to-face risk education sessions were suspended in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Eritrea, Senegal, and Yemen, as well as in states not party Armenia, Lebanon, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. In some countries, community-based risk education was generally not impeded by COVID-19 restrictions, for example in Lao PDR and Somalia. In Palestine, UNMAS was able to continue to disseminate risk education messages widely through its “informal street sessions.”[91] In Cambodia and Nigeria, risk education sessions were conducted for much smaller groups. In Thailand, small group sessions continued to be provided in nine refugee camps. In South Sudan, only emergency risk education was permitted.

However, due to the creativity of mine action centers, service providers, and the broader mine action community, in many countries risk education programs were adapted to constraints and restrictions imposed due to COVID-19. In some countries, risk education operators integrated COVID-19 prevention messages into their usual activities.[92] In Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) temporarily reassigned the risk education workforce to COVID-19 response efforts. In Senegal, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) reallocated unused mine action funding to COVID-19 prevention efforts. In Thailand, village health volunteers, tasked with disseminating COVID-19 messages, worked with the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) to provide mine risk education messages in affected areas.[93]

Risk education programs explored alternative means of disseminating messages electronically and remotely. In Vietnam, text and voice messages were used to pass on messages about risk education and COVID-19.[94] In Afghanistan, TV and radio and vehicles with loudspeakers were used to continue risk education programs.[95] The use of technology and social media was however not as effective in reaching affected communities in some remote areas of Cambodia and Lebanon, where use of social media is relatively low.

Victim assistance activities and services were strongly impacted by COVID-19 restrictions, including in Afghanistan, Armenia, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen. In Yemen, the healthcare system was “on the brink of collapse” in 2019.[96] It “in effect collapsed" with the additional impact of COVID-19.[97] Operators reported that during the pandemic coordination was weak or non-existent in countries that had already experienced organization limitations, including Chad, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Mitigation strategies included assessments of mine victims' needs or the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic,[98] the provision of psychological support and follow-up rehabilitation services remotely, and the provision of hygiene kits and information on COVID-19 prevention measures to beneficiaries and technical personnel. In Colombia, only urgent services continued uninterrupted and follow-up services instead were provided by telephone. Coordination of victim assistance efforts was reportedly maintained in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Libya, and Myanmar.

Responses to Monitor questions on COVID-19 noted that survivors and other persons with disabilities were not able to access services and rights on an equal basis to others during the pandemic in a number of mine-affected countries, including in Cambodia,[99] Lao PDR, Senegal, Sierra Leone,[100] Syria, Tajikistan, and Yemen. This finding is consistent with a United Nations study that found persons with disabilities were at greater risk of discrimination in accessing healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic.[101]

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Addressing the Impact

Coordination

The Oslo Action Plan, agreed by States Parties in November 2019 at the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, highlights a number of best practices agreed by States Parties that contribute to the effective implementation of mine action programs. These include demonstrating high levels of national ownership; developing evidence-based, costed and time-bound national strategies and workplans; and keeping national mine action standards up to date in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Clearance coordination

In 2019, clearance programs in the majority of States Parties with remaining contamination were managed and coordinated through national mine action centers. Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe all had national bodies in place responsible for their national mine action programs.

Croatia, in a move to form an integrated and widely functioning civil protection system, dissolved the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) as a legal entity and integrated it into the Ministry of the Interior as a Civil Protection Directorate on 1 January 2019.[102] The Civil Protection Directorate has taken on all roles previously undertaken by CROMAC.[103]

Cyprus has no national mine action center, as the remaining contamination is reported to be in areas under Turkish control. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) coordinates mine action on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).[104]

Eritrea has provided few updates on its mine action program, although noted in its Article 5 extension request submitted in 2019 that it was in the process of restructuring the Eritrean Demining Authority.[105] It was stated that this restructuring had presented obstacles to Eritrea submitting its extension request and a workplan beyond its deadline of February 2020.[106]

Ethiopia moved responsibility for its mine action program from the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) to the Head Office of the Ministry of Defense. This was reportedly to allow the Defense Minister to manage mine action activities and resources directly, to ensure an adequate level of authority for dealing with the remaining contaminated areas on Ethiopia’s borders, and to better communicate with donors.[107]

Nigeria has no mine action authority, but the UN Humanitarian Response Program includes a mine action sub-sector that takes responsibility for planning, coordination, the mapping and marking of hazardous areas, risk education and referral of survivors.[108] An Inter-Ministerial Committee was formed in 2019 and tasked with developing a national mine action strategy and a workplan for survey and clearance.[109]

Oman’s Article 7 transparency report for 2018 stated that it was working towards establishing a national mine action center.[110]

Ukraine’s mine action program is currently managed by the Ministry of Defense with support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[111] A Law on Mine Action in Ukraine, adopted in January 2019, which would enable the establishment of a mine action center, has not been implemented. An amendment to the law was submitted to parliament in February 2020.[112]

In Yemen, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting the establishment of a Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC) in Aden. It is anticipated that the YMACC will ensure better coordination among mine action entities, and will take the lead on national standards, longer-term plans for survey and clearance, staffing and procurement, and national support plans.[113] The process has advanced significantly in the south of the country, but UNDP has little or no access in the north.[114]

National Mine Action Strategies

Mine Action Strategies and the development of workplans are crucial for strengthening national ownership of a mine action program and to enable greater transparency and accountability through monitoring and reporting. It can also help states align their mine action efforts with broader humanitarian and development efforts and boost their ability to leverage international funding.

Twenty States Parties had national mine action strategies in place in 2019, although Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan all have strategies in place up to 2020 and need to update them. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has plans to support the update of strategies in Afghanistan and Somalia.[115] Afghanistan intends to develop the next strategic plan in 2020–2021 and has a 10-year workplan in place for April 2013–2023.[116]

Chad, the DRC, and Sudan had strategies that expired in 2019 and need updating. Sudan and the DRC have reported that the development of their strategies is in process.

States Parties Cyprus, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Ukraine do not have mine action strategies in place. The GICHD plans to work with Ukraine to develop a mine action strategy, with a workshop due to be held in 2022.[117]

Iraq provided a strategic plan with its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, although this was outdated by the need to address the massive contamination resulting from the conflict with the Islamic State. The plan provides general priorities for implementation. In 2018, Iraq reported that it has formed a committee with the purpose of updating the plan so that it covers the period up to its Article 5 deadline of 2028.[118]

Serbia has a workplan to completion provided in its Article 5 extension request, which was submitted in 2018.[119]

Yemen’s original mine action strategy is now outdated and does not reflect the current situation in Yemen due to the ongoing conflict.[120] UNDP plans to assist Yemen to update its strategy when there is a lasting cessation to hostilities.[121]

Information management

States Parties not yet using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) include BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Niger, Oman, Serbia, and the United Kingdom (UK).

The first goal of BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 is to ensure sound information management standards, tools and processes.[122] Through 2019, the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) was using its own information management system, the BiH Mine Action Information System (BHMAIS).[123] UNDP is supporting a European Union (EU) funded project to improve information management through the development of a web-based database.[124]

Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with IMAS and allows disaggregation of contamination by type and land release method.

It is not clear what information management systems are used by Eritrea, Niger, and Oman.

The UK does not use IMSMA but has an information management system in place.

As of 15 October 2020, five States Parties with clearance obligations had not submitted Article 7 transparency reports for calendar year 2019: the DRC, Eritrea, Niger, Senegal, and Sri Lanka.[125] Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2014.

National Mine Action Standards

In March 2019, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) updated its national standards and introduced new standards for the clearance of improvised mines.[126]

In Iraq, the challenge of contamination by improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly in urban areas such as Mosul, led to the development of new standards on IED disposal, published in February 2019.

During 2019, national standards were being reviewed in Angola, while Sudan’s national standards were awaiting endorsement as of May 2019. UNMAS reported constant review of national technical standards and guidelines for South Sudan.

Turkey reported elaborating its national standards in 2019 with support from UNDP and the GICHD. A land release national mine action standard is under development in Colombia. Somalia’s revision of national standards was due to be completed in 2019. In April 2019, Ukraine adopted Mine Action, Management Processes, and Basic Provisions to IMAS, which were adapted to the specific situation in Ukraine. They are now being tested.[127]

UNDP is planning to work with the GICHD to update and develop the Yemen National Standards, which are out of date and need to be revised.[128]

Chad reported that it will revise its standards on land release, supervision of organizations, and inspection of contaminated land in 2020.[129]

Risk education coordination

In 2019, 23 States Parties had national institutions in place for coordinating risk education. In most cases, risk education is coordinated by the mine action center, although for states with school-based programs, the Ministry of Education takes on a coordination role.

In Croatia, the Civil Protection Directorate was responsible for risk education. [130] UNMAS is responsible for risk education in Cyprus, Palestine, and in Gaza, and UNDP coordinates risk education in Ukraine.

States Parties that did not report risk education coordination included Oman and the UK. Eritrea provided no information.

In 2019, risk education coordination meetings were reported in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen. The main topics discussed at risk education coordination meetings are usually coordination, sharing information and innovation best practices, and developing or updating plans and strategies.

In Chad, Somalia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, risk education may be discussed as part of broader mine action meetings.[131] In the DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it was reported that risk education is discussed during mine action sub-cluster meetings.[132]

No risk education working groups were reported for Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Tajikistan, or Turkey.

In Afghanistan, it was reported that risk education technical working group meetings are led by the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC). The meetings take place every two months and also on an ad hoc basis as required.[133]

In Colombia, coordination meetings for risk education are held three times a year, but there is currently no system for assigning municipalities to risk education operators. Operators must coordinate among themselves to avoid duplication.[134]

In the DRC, the National Risk Education Program of the Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) organizes meetings on a quarterly basis.[135]

In Iraq, coordination meetings for risk education are supposed to be held every month, but only one meeting was reported during 2019.[136] Risk education messages and materials are validated by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).[137]

Yemen has two risk education technical working groups, one based in the north of the country and another based in the south. Topics at group meetings include the signing of memoranda of understanding, aligning materials and messaging, coordination, tasking and advocacy.[138]

In Senegal, there is no regular coordination meeting, although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported meeting every two to three months with the Senegal National Mine Action Centre (CNMAS).[139] Similarly, in BiH, there is no risk education coordination mechanism, but the ICRC reported meeting regularly with the regional offices and upon need with the BHMAC.[140]

Risk education is reported to be included within the national mine action strategies of Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Somalia, and Tajikistan. In addition, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Turkey reported having national risk education workplans.

Not all States Parties have national standards to guide risk education operations at a national level, although operators implementing risk education reported working to IMAS and their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Risk education national standards were reported to be in place in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. In Palestine, it was reported that there were risk education standards that were used in the West Bank, but not in Gaza.[141]

Thailand was updating its risk education standards in 2019. In Angola and Somalia, standards were under review and awaiting approval,[142] while in Cambodia they were under development.[143] Chad reported that it would review its risk education national standards at the end of 2020.[144]

In certain contexts, risk education, by necessity, needs to work across international borders to ensure that populations transiting mine-contaminated border areas are informed of the risks. On the Thailand-Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) is the sole risk education operator in the nine camps in Thailand for refugees from Myanmar, making it challenging to coordinate with risk education actors at a national level in either Thailand or Myanmar. In 2019, HI organized an information sharing workshop with risk education and mine action actors working along the border.[145]

Victim assistance coordination

Participation of victims and their representative organizations[146]

Victims were reported to be included through representation in coordination in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. States Parties rarely reported on the actual process to include input from victims in decision-making or on the outcomes of victim participation. Therefore, there is little direct evidence that the input from victims is considered or acted upon. In some states, victims’ representative organizations and other service providers involved in coordination and planning reported that the concerns and contributions of victims were not genuinely taken into account, despite their attendance at relevant meetings.

A specific IMAS on victim assistance was developed in 2018–2019, and in May 2020, it was approved by the IMAS Review Board with the rationale that the mine action sector, under the governance of national mine action authorities, “is well placed, through its direct links with [explosive ordnance] EO-affected communities, to gather information about victims and their needs, to provide information on relevant services and to refer them to the government body.” The ICBL engaged in the process to facilitate groups of survivors to define by themselves what they may contribute, given their specific expertise. Although contributions from survivor organizations were not included in the final document, in responding to the Monitor, they have raised the following points about their work:

• Assess the needs of network members, disaggregated by sex, age, and disability, in order to inform the development of victim assistance national action plans and other policies relevant to the sectors that victim assistance is part of;
• Contribute to the development of relevant national strategic plans in other sectors;
• Enable survivors and other persons with disabilities at the community level to facilitate efforts for their rehabilitation and socioeconomic inclusion;
• Conduct peer support and serve as a role model for other organizations and institutions;
• Link and refer to services;
• Support the participation of survivors during initial data collection to identify victims, including survival outcomes, types of injuries, age, gender, pre-existing impairments, civilian or military status, and specific needs;
• Develop partnerships and facilitate networking;
• Collaborate with relevant government sectors, including national mine action offices and actors;
• Represent victims at national and international meetings, conferences and other events relevant to victims;
• Share experiences and good practice with other organizations;
• Map and compile detailed profiles of service providers and disseminate to the relevant sectors;
• Facilitate mine risk education sessions while raising awareness of the rights of victims at the local community level; and
• Conduct rights advocacy at the national level.

In 2020, the Monitor began a rolling survivor survey, engaging active survivors to ask other survivors about what has happened in relation to victim assistance over the last five years, the current situation, and what needs to happen next. The questions are based on the victim assistance actions of the Mine Ban Treaty action plans and the ICBL-CMC strategic plan. A snowballing format is applied, whereby survivors engage other mine-affected members of the population for the survey.

A relevant government agency to coordinate victim assistance[147]

Of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 21 reported victim assistance coordination linked to disability coordination mechanisms that considered issues related to the needs of mine/ERW victims. The States Parties with coordination mechanisms in 2019–2020 were: Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angola’s coordination mechanism is not interconnected with disability rights coordination. While Croatia has designated several ministries, which include those responsible for disability rights, they do not have inter-ministerial coordination nor demonstrate awareness of victim assistance. Serbia’s victim assistance coordination had also stalled.

Multi-sectoral efforts in line with the CRPD[148]

Adopting, and implementing, a comprehensive inter-ministerial plan of action that identifies gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims and, or among, other persons with disabilities, is a key step toward ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of mine victims in each State Party.

Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand, all have a current plan that addresses national victim assistance activities, while Zimbabwe has a set of measurable objectives.

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen need to revise, finalize, or adopt a draft and implement their national disability plan, policy, or strategy that includes objectives responding to the needs of victims and recognizing its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring structure. Mozambique still has to implement the Action Plan for Assistance to Victims through relevant government departments and ministries.

States Parties that need to develop a plan or strategy include the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey. In the meantime, the DRC requires a sustainable planning and coordination mechanism, working at both national and local levels, to increase efforts to implement the victim assistance objectives of its national mine action strategy. Turkey, which now has coordination, must develop a plan for implementation of victim assistance. Newer States Parties, Palestine and Sri Lanka, are yet to create a strategic framework for victim assistance.

National referral mechanisms[149]

States Parties can improve accessibility to services for mine victims by ensuring that existing data collection, needs assessments, and service providers have the capacity to make referrals to the appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Some victims may require referral to specialized services, referral from one health facility to another, or referrals for travel and treatment abroad. Referral mechanisms can involve national level mechanisms as well as local referral networks, including through community-based rehabilitation systems.

National governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both mine action centers and government ministries, such as: Albania’s Mines and Munitions Coordination Office; Algeria’s Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola’s Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority’s data department; Colombia’s Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Descontamina Colombia) and the broader government-run reparations program at the Victims’ Unit; the Rehabilitation and Integration Division within Eritrea’s Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare; Iraq’s Directorate for Mine Action; and the Tajikistan Mine Action Center. In Thailand, although victim assistance is primarily implemented by the social security and health ministries, the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) conducted follow-up trips to visit mine victims in clearance operation areas. Yemen reported referrals as part of an ongoing victim survey and referral mechanism.

Many more non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided referrals at a national or local level in the States Parties with victims, including a range of survivor networks, national NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and international NGOs—notably HI—as well as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.

However, in States Parties where survivors are not aware of their rights due to a lack of survivor assistance coordination, as reported in the DRC, existing measures benefiting mine/ERW survivors, such as free medical care and prostheses, may remain inaccessible.[150]

Centralized database with needs and challenges[151]

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty commit to assess the needs of victims. This commitment includes assessing availability and gaps in services and support, and assessing existing or new activities that are required to meet the needs of victims in the frameworks of disability, health, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. Assessment also provides an initial opportunity to refer victims to existing services.

The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties to use a centralized database that includes information on persons killed and injured, and the needs and challenges of mine survivors.[152] In 2013, new updates to the IMSMA NG (Next Generation) included a victim assistance module, which will facilitate the monitoring and tracking of victims’ access to their rights and the accountability of victim assistance processes.[153] However, some data management systems based on more modern technologies may not be centralized.

Survey activities and assessments were often ongoing. Afghanistan’s National Disability Database was under development and planned to be installed in 2020. These statistics on persons with disabilities and the families of those killed will be used to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance, Pension Department, and Population Registration Department to provide the necessary services. In Cambodia, village level quality of life assessments for victims and other persons with disabilities continued through 2019. Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing in Colombia and new data management systems were put into use during the period.

Croatia’s development of a unified database on the needs of mine/ERW victims has stalled since 2017. Thailand reported that mine survivors are included in disability assessments. In Ukraine, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Danish Demining Group (DDG) conducted a joint needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019 in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with support from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).[154] In Yemen, mine/ERW victims were registered with the national mine action center through ongoing survey. Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen needed to significantly improve the collection of data and create a usable database of victims’ needs. Iraq needed to establish a unified and coordinated system of data collection and analysis for survivors and other persons with disabilities.

According to Action #35 of the Oslo Action Plan, data should be disaggregated by gender, age and disability, and this information should be made available to relevant stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive response.

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Gender mainstreaming

The Oslo Action Plan highlights the importance of gender and ensuring that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, men, and boys are considered and inform all areas of Mine Ban Treaty implementation and national mine action programs, in order to deliver an inclusive approach. States Parties are encouraged to remove barriers to full, equal and gender-balanced participation in mine action and treaty meetings. The Oslo Action Plan has some 37 references to gender.[155] Moreover, after significant input on the theme, each committee of the Mine Ban Treaty, including those for Article 5 and Victim Assistance, adopted a gender focal point.[156]

The previous five-year plan of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action Plan adopted in 2014, had just seven references about gender. However, under that previous plan States Parties did already commit to implementation in an inclusive and gender-sensitive manner.

The increased focus on gender in mine action coincides with the 20-year anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), which was adopted unanimously in October 2000. Resolution 1325 emphasizes a gender-based approach to mine action among its provisions, specifying “the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls.” Resolution 1325 provided a basis for future developments.[157]

In 2019, the third revision of the UN’s Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes was produced.[158] The guidelines were first released in February 2005, with a second revision in 2010. In March 2019, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) integrated into the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), gaining a stronger institutional placement although no longer having an advocacy role as it did previously. That role was taken up by ICBL members and other civil society organizations and is reflected in the Oslo Review Conference Working Group on Gender, which was established in the lead up to the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Intersectionality became a strong contextual focus of gender considerations in mine action as the Oslo Action Plan period commenced.[159] This was concurrent with a broader trend in international law and policy. For example, UN Women also highlighted the need for this approach: “Injustices must not go unnamed or unchallenged now different communities are battling various, interconnected issues, all at once. Standing in solidarity with one another, questioning power structures, and speaking out against the root causes of inequalities are critical actions for building a future that leaves no one behind.”[160]

States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe have all included gender as a component of their national mine action strategies. GMAP has supported several States Parties to integrate gender into their strategies and workplans.

In Afghanistan, gender and diversity mainstreaming is one of the goals of their national mine action strategy, and the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan has a gender and diversity strategy.[161] Within the framework of this strategy, proposals to conduct mine action activities are evaluated based on their technical approach, budget and consideration of gender.

The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 sets five key strategic goals, including gender-sensitive awareness raising.[162]

Cambodia is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan for 2018–2022, which includes the development of gender mainstreaming guidelines.[163] Cambodia also reports promotion of the equal participation of women in mine action processes, services for survivors, risk education, and advocacy activities by updating report formats through inclusion of age, sex, and disability.

In Chad, government policy exists to ensure the integration of gender-based considerations at all levels of mine action. In 2020, the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) reported that its staff included women, while it is noted that the Deputy Coordinator of the HCND is a woman.[164]

Croatia also has national legislation on gender, which is mainstreamed through the mine action sector, and in particular in its risk education activities.[165]

Colombia continued to receive technical support from the GICHD for the development of Gender Guidelines for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA).[166]

In the DRC, the Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM) reported that its gender unit sits within the advocacy department and aims to ensure the mobilization and inclusion of women in mine action.[167] The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in Iraq has also had a Gender Unit in place since 2017.[168]

Many states now have greater numbers of women working in the sector, including in mine clearance teams. Mixed or all-women clearance teams have been reported in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, as well as other area Nagorno-Karabakh.

Serbia reported that there is equal access to employment in the fields of survey and clearance for qualified women and men.[169] Sudan reported that women are included in all aspects of mine action, from key departments at the national mine action center, to field operations.[170] In Ukraine, around 20% of deminers are women,[171] while Zimbabwe reported that 30% of the staff at its national mine action center are women.[172]

In both Thailand and Turkey, military regulations are reported to prevent women from working in demining teams.[173] In 2019, the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported that 40% of its staff were women, although they were mainly in administrative positions. The Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) reported that 45% of its staff were women.[174]

While men and boys represent the majority of reported mine casualties, women and girls are likely to be disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents. They often suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. Gender is a key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries.

In Cambodia in 2019, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, with the support of the Australia-Cambodia Cooperation for Equitable Sustainable Services (ACCESS) Program, conducted the first consultative workshop involving women with disabilities under the National Action Plan to Prevent Violence Against Women.[175]

Guidance on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was published by GMAP in 2019. The publication consultation process, with partners both in Geneva and in mine-affected countries, was conducted by the GICHD in collaboration with the Monitor’s victim assistance gender focal point from the ICBL-CMC, with financial support and leadership from Canada.[176]

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Antipersonnel Mine Clearance

Mine Clearance in 2019

The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

Among States Parties, total clearance of landmines in 2019 was at least 156km².[177] This represents an increase from the estimated 146km² cleared in 2018. At least 123,375 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2019.

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2018–2019[178]

Note: N/R=not reported; APM=antipersonnel mines.

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

Based on the reported data, Iraq has cleared the most land in 2019 at 46.56km². Of this, 40.24km² was clearance of improvised mines in Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) managed areas and 3.17km² in areas managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).[179] In the past, reporting of clearance of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has not been consistently included in clearance figures, but in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, Iraq recorded all abandoned IED areas as antipersonnel mine contamination until cleared.

Afghanistan cleared 28.01km² despite ongoing conflict in some areas. This is a reduction from the 30.04km² cleared in 2018. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported to the Monitor that it had only been able to secure about 50% of the funding required, and thus could only achieve half of the planned clearance.[180]

Yemen was able to clear 3.1 km² and destroy 1,536 antipersonnel mines in 2019, despite the ongoing conflict and insecurity. A total of 66,701 explosive remnants of war (ERW) were cleared and destroyed in 2019.[181] Clearance operations in Yemen are focused on high-threat and high-impact spot tasks with the aim to allocate resources where they will have a more significant impact for local communities.[182]

Zimbabwe cleared and destroyed the largest number of landmines in 2019, reporting 39,031 devices cleared from 2.75km².

Chile announced the completion of its clearance obligations in March 2020, with the last mines removed on 27 February 2020. Chile reports having cleared 159 areas over the last 18 years, clearing and destroying a total of 177,725 mines.[183] During 2019, Chile reported the release of 1.74km² of land (0.55km² through clearance), and the clearance of 4,093 antipersonnel mines and 1,187 antivehicle mines. In the first two months of 2020, Chile released a further 2.69 km² of land, including 0.60km² which was cleared. A total of 12,526 antipersonnel mines and 10,170 antivehicle mines were reportedly cleared during this two-month period.[184]

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Turkey all cleared under 1km² in 2019. However, despite clearing only 0.67km², Turkey cleared and destroyed 25,959 landmines.

Three States Parties reported no clearance in 2019. Senegal has not reported any clearance since 2017. Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.[185] Argentina reports that it is mine-affected as a result of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, but that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the islands due to the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom (UK).[186]

Niger reported clearance of 0.01km² in 2019 and the destruction of 323 antipersonnel mines. This is the first time that Niger has reported clearance since 2017.[187]

Oman, which has reported no clearance in recent years, reported 0.13km² cleared in Al Mughsail in 2019, but no landmines were cleared and destroyed while one 81mm mortar was found and destroyed.[188] Oman reported that this related to clearance of seven zones of suspected mined areas, which had been identified based on historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions and incident reports.[189]

Sri Lanka has not provided an annual update for clearance in 2019, but in 2018 projected that by the end of 2020, 271 areas totaling 22.42km² would be cleared of antipersonnel mines, and that nine areas totaling 1.39km² suspected to contain antipersonnel mines would be released in Northern, Eastern and North Central provinces.[190] Sri Lanka had an “ambitious plan to return mine contaminated lands to its people by 2020.”[191] However, this goal has not been realized. Media reporting highlighted the lack of available information and data sharing in 2019, noting that “[t]he National Mine Action Center, the operational body that executes the policies of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action and the focal point for coordinating all mine action activities on the ground, could not be reached for comment.”[192]

Cross-border clearance activities

Areas with antipersonnel mine contamination are suspected along Croatia’s borders with BiH, Hungary, and Serbia. Croatia reported that mutual cooperation and exchange with BiH on hazardous border areas, as well as the exchange of technology and equipment, continued in 2019.[193]

Afghanistan has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Tajikistan, requiring Tajikistan’s government to provide support to Afghanistan for cross-border mine action activities in the border area of Badakhshan province, which is more easily accessible from the Tajikistan side. In 2019, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) continued demining operations and risk education activities in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, accessing the area from Tajikistan.[194]

Cambodia and Thailand have extensive mine contamination along their shared border. Both countries are working towards the completion of a baseline survey to provide a more accurate picture of contamination,[195] although lack of agreement regarding demarcation of the border between the two countries has delayed survey and clearance of those areas. In its 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Cambodia indicated that the Cambodia-Thailand General Border Committee meeting held in March 2017 agreed to support demining cooperation between the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in border areas.[196] It was reported in September 2019 that an agreement was signed between CMAC and TMAC regarding survey and clearance along the border.[197]

Article 5 deadlines and extension requests

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines contaminating its territory within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for the State Party, it is able to request an extension for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines, for a period of up to 10 years.

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of 15 October 2020, 25 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before and no later than 2025. Seven States Parties have, or have requested, deadlines after 2025: BiH (2027), Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), Senegal (2026), South Sudan (2026) and Sri Lanka (2028).

Palestine and Sri Lanka became States Parties in 2018 and are within their first 10-year deadline for completion of their Article 5 obligations. Oman is also within its first 10-year deadline. While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative and paperwork issues to be settled at the beginning of 2026.[198]

Afghanistan reported to the Monitor that it will not be able to meet its deadline of 2023 due to decreased funding, which has meant that it has only been able to achieve about 50% of the planned clearance in 2019.[199] Afghanistan noted that ongoing survey of legacy contamination and new contamination by improvised mines has added to the contamination. It is expecting to have to submit an extension request for at least five additional years, from 2024–2028.

In response to a Monitor questionnaire, Chad reported that it felt uncertain whether it would meet its deadline of 1 January 2024 due to not being able to mobilize resources until September 2021. Chad also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had compromised its progress.[200]

It is unlikely that Iraq will meet its deadline of 2028 due to the extent of existing and new contamination in the country.

Yemen, which has a current deadline of March 2023, requested an interim extension in 2019 to enable it to better define the extent of contamination through the re-survey of areas where the security situation allows. This would allow Yemen to establish a new baseline and a realistic plan to address new contamination as a result of the conflict.[201] It is expected that Yemen will submit a further extension request in March 2022.

Ethiopia, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, reported that it is likely to complete clearance by its deadline of 31 December 2025.[202] Oman, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2018, provided a workplan for the release of all remaining suspected mined areas before its Article 5 deadline in 2025.[203]

Zimbabwe, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999, has requested the most extensions to its Article 5 deadlines. Its fifth extension request has a deadline of 31 December 2025. In the past, Zimbabwe’s demining program was constrained by economic sanctions, a shortage of equipment, and a lack of international assistance.[204] However, Zimbabwe is now likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations.

Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of October 2020)[205]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

Extension requests in 2019 and 2020

In 2019, seven countries submitted extension requests: Argentina (until 2023); Cambodia (until 2025); Chad (until 2025); Ethiopia (until 2025); Eritrea (an interim extension until December 2020 to prepare a comprehensive request); Tajikistan (until 2025); and Yemen (an interim extension until March 2023).

In 2020, 10 countries were expected to request extensions to their Article 5 deadlines: BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Eritrea, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, and Ukraine. However, by 15 October 2020, Eritrea and Nigeria were yet to submit their requests.

The decision on approval of these extension requests will take place at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.

BiH has requested a third extension, following an interim extension from March 2018 to March 2021. The request is for a period of six years up until March 2027.[206] The interim period was intended to gain a better understanding of contamination, but due to delays, the projected targets for cancellation and clearance were only partially met.[207]

Colombia’s second request for an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline asks for four years and 10 months, until 31 December 2025.[208] The extension request presents a plan based on 156 municipalities that are currently accessible and where demining operations are ongoing. However, a further 166 municipalities with contamination are in areas that are currently not accessible due to insecurity. No survey or clearance has taken place in these municipalities and the extension request reports that in 2024–2025, efforts will be made to establish an estimate of contamination in these areas, suggesting that any clearance in the additional municipalities will not take place until after the current requested deadline.[209]

The DRC has submitted an extension request for a period of 18 months until July 2022 to clear 33 remaining mined areas, totaling 0.13km².[210] This includes 0.019km² left from the previous nationwide survey, and 22 newly discovered areas covering 0.1km². The DRC reported to the Monitor that it will be on track to meet this deadline if sufficient funding is available, and if security issues and the situation in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic improves.[211]

Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 31 December 2020, but as of 15 October 2020, it has yet to submit an extension request.

In November 2018, Mauritania declared it had completed clearance of all known mined areas.[212] However, in its Article 7 report for the calendar year 2019, it reported the discovery of previously unknown mined areas and requested in 2020 a year-long extension until 31 January 2022 to clarify the situation regarding the contaminated areas and whether these areas are in the territory of Mauritania.[213]

Niger submitted its fourth Article 5 extension request in May 2020, despite having done little clearance in the last few years. It is requesting four years until 31 December 2024.[214] Niger’s remaining contamination is relatively small, totaling 0.17km²,[215] but the request lacks a detailed workplan or annual clearance projections.

At the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019, Nigeria stated it had been experiencing “the tragic consequences of the production and use of antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature,” declaring newly mined areas in the northeastern region of the country.[216] It noted that it would prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report and an Article 5 extension request with the aim to meet the 2025 deadline. Yet by 15 October 2020, neither had been submitted.

Senegal has requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until 2026, although the estimated remaining contamination is relatively small at 0.49km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and an estimated 1.1km² requiring non-technical survey (NTS).[217] Senegal has asserted that clearance activities must be approved by the non-state armed group (NSAG) Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, MFDC), and that this approval is closely tied to the overall peace negotiations.[218] Senegal also has landmines placed around active national military installations. According to Senegal’s own Article 7 transparency reporting, the last clearance operations took place in 2017.

South Sudan has submitted a request for a five-year extension to 9 July 2026.[219] While it will not have completed clearance by 2025, it hopes to have cleared all contamination, including landmines, antivehicle mines, cluster munitions and other ERW by the 2026 deadline.[220]

Ukraine is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until December 2023.[221] The request suggests that clearance can be completed within this timeframe, but notes that this is dependent on the cessation of hostilities in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has not provided information in its extension request regarding any progress since the original estimate of 7,000km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHA). The request also does not give a clear understanding of the workplan for the requested extension period.

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Improvised mines

In Monitor reporting, the term “improvised mines” is synonymous with victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs) and booby-traps. They are also sometimes described by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) or crush wire IEDs. Improvised antipersonnel mines—being those types that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person—are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty and must be addressed accordingly by States Parties, in fulfillment of treaty obligations and commitments. For the entire period since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, the greatest number of improvised mine casualties have been recorded in Colombia (10,532), closely followed by Afghanistan (9,272).

Improvised mines have been used well before the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence. They were used in Cambodia during the 1990s, with the Khmer Rouge deploying “primitive mines using sticks of T.N.T.” among other booby-trap devices.[222] In BiH, a wide variety of mines were also used, “from high tech mines all the way to crude, hastily fabricated mines.”[223]

Yet, while not a new issue, the scale of use of improvised mines has increased the scale of mine contamination and the number of casualties dramatically. Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan addresses this issue, committing that “States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations.”

Improvised mines are being found in the Americas, South and Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. States Parties with extensive antipersonnel mine contamination, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, are seeing the scale of their overall contamination increase. Other States Parties suspected or known to have contamination by improvised mines include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

States not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria also have contamination by improvised mines.

Clearance and the provision of risk education about improvised mines can be sensitive in some contexts, such as Afghanistan, because they are used by parties actively engaged in conflict.

Improvised mines are also frequently found in urban and peri-urban areas in addition to rural areas. In urban areas, the threat can be more complex, and the boundaries between safe and unsafe areas are often less clear. Improvised devices can be found above ground in buildings, and in and around homes, and device types may vary from area to area. In risk education, this creates challenges in terms of developing clear messaging regarding recognition of devices and unsafe areas. An International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) technical note (12.10/1) for IED risk education was drafted in 2018 to help address these challenges.

States Parties that have reported to the Monitor risk education messaging including improvised mines are Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, Thailand (on the Thai-Myanmar border), Ukraine, and Yemen. Risk education including improvised mines has also been conducted in states not party Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

In 2019, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) contributed to protecting civilians from the effects of IEDs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Chad, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, through integrated programs that included risk education, child-focused victim assistance and injury surveillance.[224]

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Risk Education

Risk education is a core pillar of mine action,[225] but one that has received little attention or acknowledgement by the broader mine action community in the last decade and, as a result, has frequently been under-funded. However, 2019 marked a turning point for risk education, also known as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).

A new international advisory group was formed in 2019 to steer efforts related to risk education. The EORE Advisory Group, consisting of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) bodies based in Europe and North America, has a mandate to ensure standards, guidelines, methods and approaches are relevant, effective and adapted to emerging threats and requirements; that risk education is well integrated in mine action programs; that synergies are increased with other humanitarian and development sectors; that guidance on priority setting is provided to support the prioritizing of resources for groups of highest risk and need; and that donors are aware of gaps and mechanisms to address them.[226]

During 2019, the advisory group has supported the review and update of the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 12.10 on risk education, which was expected to be approved by the IMAS review board during the final quarter of 2020.[227] The EORE Advisory Group also commissioned a number of studies in 2019 to provide models and methodological guidance to the sector. This included a study on the use of new technologies and methodologies for EORE,[228] and a desk review of good practices for measuring the effectiveness and impact of EORE in diverse contexts, which was ongoing at the end of September 2020.

The international Mine Risk Education Working Group (MREWG), hosted by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), continued to actively provide information and a platform to share methodologies and materials among over 400 registered members. In 2020, the group instigated some in-depth discussion on COVID-19 and risk education messaging.

Of particular relevance to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Oslo Action Plan, adopted by States Parties in November 2019, included a dedicated section with five concrete action points on risk education and risk reduction. The Monitor also took on the responsibility to report again on risk education for the first time since 2008.

Obligations regarding risk education

The Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in relation to all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The Oslo Action Plan further recognizes the importance of mine risk education in helping to prevent mine incidents and save lives, providing five actions for States Parties with regard to risk education. These are to integrate risk education with wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with mine action activities; to provide context-specific risk education to all affected populations and groups at risk; to prioritize people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data and an understanding of people’s behavior and movements; to build national capacity to deliver risk education that can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and to report on risk education in annual Article 7 reports.[229]

Reporting

Action #32 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to report on mine risk education and other risk reduction programs in their Article 7 reports, including the methodologies used, the challenges faced and the results achieved, with information disaggregated by gender and age.

Of the 28 mine-affected States Parties that submitted Article 7 reports for 2019, reporting on risk education was provided by 20 states, although the extent of detail was varied. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen provided risk education beneficiary data that was disaggregated by age and sex. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Thailand provided detailed narrative information regarding risk education activities conducted in 2019. Afghanistan also included challenges faced and how they were addressed. Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Mauritania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe provided no disaggregated beneficiary data and only a brief description of risk education activities.

Argentina, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided no information on risk education.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka did not submit Article 7 transparency reports for 2019, as of 15 October 2020.[230]

Including a plan for risk education in Article 5 deadline extension requests is important from the perspective of ensuring that risk education programs are planned, budgeted for, and integrated within the overall obligations of States Parties.

In 2019, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen all included risk education within their Article 5 deadline extension requests. In 2020, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, Senegal, and South Sudan included risk education within their extension requests. Niger and Ukraine did not.

However, the extent to which risk education is included in extension requests is often lacking, with only a description of activities rather than a costed and detailed multi-year plan. While South Sudan provided a clear explanation of risk education plans and budget, Mauritania and Senegal only provided brief statements about risk education conducted in previous years rather than for the extension period.

Provision of risk education

In 2019, 28 States Parties are known to have provided risk education to populations who may be at risk due to antipersonnel mine contamination.

The DRC, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka did not submit Article 7 reports in 2019 and so did not report on risk education activities. Palestine and Peru did submit an updated Article 7 report, but did not report on risk education. However, it is known that risk education took place in most of these countries. UNICEF supported risk education activities in Eritrea (training 100 community-based rehabilitation volunteers), Niger, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka,[231] while other operators reported to the Monitor on risk education activities in the DRC and Senegal. Ecuador, in its Article 7 report, provided information on a cross-border risk education activity with Peru.[232] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported on risk education activities in Gaza.[233]

Argentina, Cyprus, Oman, and the UK are not believed to have conducted any risk education in 2019.

Of the 22 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines, the majority had some risk education conducted during 2019. Only China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan did not conduct any risk education.

Risk education prioritization

The Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to prioritize people most at risk by linking mine risk education and risk reduction programs and messages to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data. In 2019, it was reported that national level Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data is used to inform the prioritization and planning of risk education in all States Parties where IMSMA data is available.

Afghanistan conducted a nationwide knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in 2018 and maintains a priority scoring matrix to enable it to prioritize the most affected populations in terms of their proximity to the hazards, the number of recent casualties, and incidences of armed conflict.[234]

The Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)—which incorporates information related to all types of explosive remnants of war (ERW)—operated by the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), is used by risk education operators to plan and target their activities in Cambodia.[235] Cambodia also reported that an evaluation of the risk education program in the country, coordinated by the CMAA and supported by UNICEF, started in 2019, with the evaluation report expected to be released in December 2020.[236]

In Chad, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted a situational analysis carried out with local authorities, community and opinion leaders, leaders of civil society associations, young people and women, to determine more closely the risks at the local level and those most exposed.[237]

In Turkey, the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) conducted analysis through its database to target and prioritize villages for risk education, while South Sudan reported the conduct of a needs analysis survey to better understand and respond to at-risk groups.

In several States Parties, victim information is not comprehensive or publicly available. In BiH and Iraq, it was reported that victim databases are incomplete, and in the case of Iraq, not openly available for interrogation.[238] In Ukraine, victim casualty data was available but was not considered to be comprehensive. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that it follows open source media, news websites and reports from other organizations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to collect information on risk behaviors and mine incidents across eastern Ukraine.[239] In Yemen, it was reported to the Monitor that the lack of a functioning IMSMA database makes it difficult to identify risk groups, highly contaminated areas or risk-taking behaviors.[240] In Zimbabwe, it was reported that there is data available for both human and animal related mine casualties, and a national database on civilian accidents, although it is not routinely updated.[241]

Target areas and risk groups

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific risk education that is tailored to the threat encountered by the population; sensitive to gender, age and disability; and takes the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account. Consideration of target areas, risk groups and the activities and behaviors that put people at risk is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

Target areas

During 2019, risk education was conducted in both rural and urban areas in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. In Croatia, risk education was conducted in 2019 through public campaigns at city and municipal level concerning contamination in remote areas. Risk education was conducted only in rural areas in States Parties Cambodia, Chad, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and on the Thailand-Myanmar border, risk education was conducted in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In some situations, IDPs were also reached in host communities. BiH reported conducting risk education in camps for migrants.

Both Afghanistan and BiH reported risk education targeted at people on the move, with Afghanistan targeting drivers at bus stations, and BiH targeting migrants as they travelled.

Risk education was also reported to have been conducted across borders in 2019. The Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS) and Ecuador ‘s National Center for Humanitarian Demining (Centro de Desminado del Ecuador, CENDESMI) have collaborated in the development of cross-national risk education campaigns to ensure communities along the Ecuador-Peru border are aware of the danger posed by antipersonnel mines. The campaigns are bilingual and multisectoral, involving ministries of health, education, defense and interior. Five campaigns have been conducted, with the sixth campaign carried out in 2019.[242] In Afghanistan, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) provides risk education to communities who undertake livelihood activities in the Panji valley—a past confrontation line between the former Soviet Union and the Mujahedeen. The area is accessed from across the border in Tajikistan.[243]

Risk groups

Children are a key risk group with regard to antipersonnel mines in many States Parties because they are often growing up in contaminated areas, lack knowledge of the risks, and are prone to picking up and playing with items.

In Angola, it was reported that children are at greater risk of accidents due to their lack of exposure to the war, which ended 18 years ago.[244] In BiH, children are seen as a major risk group because of their lack of awareness of the threat and their curiosity.[245] In Croatia, schoolchildren and college students were the primary risk education target group in 2019.[246] In some countries, such as Angola, children are often responsible for looking after animals and undertaking household chores, such as collecting firewood, which may take them into mined areas.

However, in several countries it was noted that children are often more at risk from ERW rather than from landmines. In Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it was reported that children are more affected by ERW because they pick up and play with items. In Angola, it was also reported that children were at more risk of finding ERW when going out to collect natural resources.[247] In Palestine, most of the accidents recorded among children were the result of curiosity, a lack of awareness of the dangers, and the tendency to play in open and contaminated areas.[248]

Adult men were cited by the majority of States Parties and risk education operators to be the primary risk group in relation to antipersonnel mines. BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, among others, all noted men as a high-risk group. Adult men are seen to be most at risk because of their roles and responsibilities, which often involve partaking in higher risk activities such as agriculture, fishing, hunting and animal herding. Men are more likely to move further away from home in search of work and livelihood opportunities, increasing their chance of exposure to mine risk.

In Afghanistan, BIH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Ukraine, men were at risk from mines due to their work in rural areas, including cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending animals. In BiH, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that men often entered mined areas consciously out of economic necessity. This included farmers, hunters, fishermen and firemen.[249] In Croatia, target groups included members of hunting associations, the Croatian Mountain Rescue Service, firefighters, forestry workers, hikers, farmers and tourists.[250] In Ukraine, working age men are the largest affected group due to their traditional gender roles working in farming, cattle herding, fishing and firewood collection.[251] It was also reported that farmers and people in isolated villages who had to use unpaved roads were at high risk from antivehicle mines.

Fewer reported mine incidents involve women and girls, and risk education operators noted that they were often less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from the home as men. However, women and girls are often an important group to target in risk education as they can help promote safer behavior among men and among children and peers.[252] In contexts where female social and economic roles are limited, women and girls are sometimes harder to reach for risk education.[253]

Poverty and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives often force people to take risks on contaminated land. Risk education operators reported to the Monitor that it is often the rural poor and economically disadvantaged that are at greatest risk from landmines.

In Cambodia, significant numbers of villagers will knowingly access contaminated land due to a lack of viable livelihood options. Landless farmers were forced to access vacant or forest land which has a higher likelihood of being contaminated.[254] In eastern Ukraine, the 15km buffer zone from the “line of contact” had disproportionally affected a large number of elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW.[255] FSD in Ukraine reported providing risk education sessions at employment centers along the contact line.[256]

Equally, economic development can also increase pressure on the land and the risk from mines. In Cambodia, one of Southeast Asia’s fastest growing economies,[257] economic development and population in-migration to the northwest and northeast has increased the demand for land and the threat from contamination in these formerly remote areas.[258] The greater mechanization of farming has also led to an increased incidence of accidents caused by antivehicle mines.[259]

Migrant and itinerant workers are a high-risk group in BiH, Cambodia, and Thailand.[260] In Cambodia, internal and cross-border migration into Thailand in search of employment in agriculture or construction is common, and these itinerant workers are at risk due to working in unfamiliar areas and crossing the border, often at informal crossing points. The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported that mobile risk education teams are dispatched to mine-affected areas along the commuting routes during the long holidays to ensure people use safe paths.[261] In BiH, due to in-migration, the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) organized a number of meetings in 2019 with actors such as the border police, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Red Cross Society, and the ICRC, to ensure that migrants are warned about the threats of contamination.[262]

Drivers were a key target group due to the danger of contamination on roads, including from improvised mines, in Afghanistan, Mali, and Ukraine. Drivers are sensitized to the dangers of overtaking and using short-cuts on roads in Afghanistan.[263] In Mali, UNMAS developed an improvised explosive device (IED) risk awareness course on devices planted on main roads for drivers from humanitarian organizations and private sector companies.

Nomadic and pastoral communities were target groups for risk education in States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In South Sudan, cattle herders, particularly from the two main tribes, the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya, constantly move looking for grazing areas and water for their cattle, which puts them at risk from landmines.[264]

Pastoralists in Somalia and nomadic communities and shepherds in Iraq are also at risk because of their movement patterns across contaminated areas.[265] Iraq conducted intensive awareness campaigns during the grazing season due to increased mine casualties.[266] Nomads, travelers, traditional guides and trackers were at risk from mines in contaminated desert areas in Chad. Guides and trackers were trained to pass on risk education messages to those they guide across the desert, supported by MAG.[267] A memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Independent Directorate of Kuchie [Nomad] Affairs in Afghanistan was signed with the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) to support the risk education program.[268] In Zimbabwe, due to high numbers of mine accidents involving animals, animal herders are targeted for risk education.[269]

Indigenous reserves in high mountainous areas of Colombia were often mined as strategic posts by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), exposing the most vulnerable indigenous ethnic groups to the risk of mines. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that providing risk education to indigenous populations can pose a significant challenge based on their semi-autonomous nature and cultural sensitivities. Separate permissions must be secured with each of the indigenous authorities to access the areas. Messages and delivery methodology must also comply with the cultural complexities of indigenous populations.[270]

In urban areas, particularly in Iraq, high-risk activities include construction work and street cleaning. Afghanistan also cited scrap metal collection as a high-risk activity. Ukraine targets workers who are exposed to risk from day-to-day activities such as repairing electrical lines.[271]

IDPs, refugees and returnees are often particularly vulnerable to the threat posed by mines due to being displaced by war and living or returning to areas where they may be unfamiliar with the contamination. A lack of occupation and livelihood security may also force them to engage in intentional risk-taking activities.

Risk education for IDPs and returnees was undertaken in 2019 in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, Afghans returning from Iran and Pakistan were provided risk education on the border. Risk education campaigns were also provided in Iraq in liberated areas for communities who, following the cessation of hostilities, were keen to return home.[272] In Angola, MAG reported providing risk education to refugees in Luanda Norte as part of the response to a refugee crisis.[273] On the Thailand-Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) provided risk education in nine refugee camps during 2019.[274] In South Sudan, UNMAS provided risk education to IDPs and refugees being hosted in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) ‘Protection of Civilians’ sites as an integrated part of the humanitarian intervention.[275]

Reaching people with disabilities has not always been well addressed by risk education, but in 2019 there were some positive examples of risk education involving people with disabilities.

HI conducted risk education projects targeting people with disabilities, or risk education was integrated into victim assistance projects.[276] In Afghanistan, since mid-2018, the HI Mobile Team Project incorporated physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and risk education for IDPs, returnees and host communities. Risk education teams provided sessions in rehabilitation centers for victims of explosive ordnance and other people with disabilities.[277] MAG in Angola and HI in Thailand both recruited landmine survivors to support risk education efforts. In Iraq, risk education campaigns were combined with sports activities for people with disabilities.[278] FSD in Ukraine implemented a small project in specialized education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a sign language trainer.[279] HI in Iraq produced risk education videos with sign language and subtitles, and plans to produce a risk education “talking book” for children in Afghanistan. HI in Colombia used braille for risk education messages;[280] while in Yemen, UNICEF supported a risk education program for hearing impaired children.[281]

Emergency risk education was reported by most operators as being delivered in response to landmine/ERW accidents. The HALO Trust in Somalia reported providing risk education to communities displaced by flash floods in Hirshabelle State in October 2019.[282] In Yemen, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) continued to conduct risk education sessions as part of its emergency response.[283]

Several organizations in States Parties Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, and Ukraine, reported providing risk education to the staff of NGOs or service providers. In Afghanistan, a landmine safety program was implemented for aid workers, while in Iraq, risk education was provided to international NGOs, local NGOs and staff of commercial organizations working in contaminated areas. This included factory staff, quarry and construction workers, municipality cleaners and journalists.[284] In Somalia, UNMAS provided risk education to partners working to implement humanitarian and stabilization activities in the country. Risk education was also integrated into other humanitarian activities such as through support to IDPs and returnees.[285] In Cambodia, risk education was provided to NGOs working in contaminated areas and to companies and construction workers. UNMAS in South Sudan provided risk education to UN peacekeepers.[286]

Risk education delivery methods

Action #28 of the Oslo Action Plan recommends integrating risk education activities with wider humanitarian, development and protection efforts, and as part of survey, clearance and victim assistance activities. Action #31 refers to the need to build national capacity to deliver risk education.

Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported that risk education was carried out as an integrated part of survey and clearance activities in 2019. This was often crucial to generating reports of potentially contaminated areas and landmine or ERW accidents. Several countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq, have hotline numbers for communities to report ordnance, and this is disseminated through risk education sessions.

In 2019, in States Parties Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe, NPA undertook risk education in support of land release, either integrated within non-technical survey or technical survey operations, or by trained deminers while clearance was taking place.[287] UNMAS in Afghanistan reported that deminers provide risk education to community members when conducting clearance, and quick response teams conduct risk education alongside explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[288]

The vast majority of risk education reported in States Parties is delivered through the primary means of face-to-face risk education sessions, often with specialized risk education or community liaison teams, and the distribution of small, printed materials such as leaflets and posters. Many of the organizations delivering risk education used mixed gender teams to ensure that all age and gender groups in the population were adequately reached.

However, despite this being the most popular means of risk education delivery, some States Parties reported challenges in delivery. In South Sudan and Colombia, the range of languages and dialects spoken poses a challenge for both team deployment and the development of risk education materials.[289] In South Sudan, the remote and dispersed nature of populations combined with poor road infrastructure makes it challenging for teams to reach people. Limited literacy in South Sudan also reduces the effectiveness of written materials, and it was reported that leaflets are often thrown away.[290]

In both Somalia and South Sudan, local communities often mistrust people from international organizations, and messages are better delivered by people from the community.[291] Face-to-face delivery by mobile risk education teams was also challenging due to insecurity or ongoing conflict in States Parties Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Despite being most at risk, men are regarded as the most difficult group to reach as they are often away when risk education teams visit communities. This suggests that more effort is required to prioritize and better target risk education for men. In Palestine (Gaza), risk education includes “street sessions” which are shorter face-to-face sessions held on the street with the aim of targeting men who are hard to reach via regular risk education sessions.[292]

The use of mass media, including TV, radio and billboards, is commonly used for risk education, including in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, and Thailand. Afghanistan aired two one-minute videos on popular TV channels in the national languages; one geared toward adults and the other specifically aimed at men.[293] Afghanistan also used radio public service announcements in five provinces, with messages concerning travelling, protecting children from the risk of mines, and what to do after a conflict.[294] The DRC also employed radio for the delivery of risk education, while BiH used billboards. Thailand used local press and community radio to deliver risk education.[295]

The HALO Trust in Colombia implemented a ‘Creating Safer Environments’ campaign in 2019 in the Chaparral, Planadas and Rio Blanco municipalities in the Tolima department. The campaign focused on disseminating risk education information to the largest audience possible through the distribution of printed materials and public service announcements on local radio stations and on TV.[296] The campaign ensured that cultural diversity was reflected, having local people record the messages to ensure that regional dialects and accents were captured.

Delivery through interactive means such as theatre, puppet shows, and mobile cinema were reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine.

In the risk education sector, there has been increasing interest in the use of digital media and mobile phone applications for the delivery of risk education messages, particularly in more remote or challenging contexts where traditional risk education delivery methods are not feasible.[297]

MAG in Iraq piloted a risk education project with Facebook, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the United States (US) government in 2019 and had plans to roll this out on a larger scale in 2020.[298] UNMAS in Iraq also developed mass media campaigns through radio, TV and social media platforms.[299] Facebook is used by UNMAS in Afghanistan and HI in Iraq. Croatia developed an application, Minefields.info, for Android and IOS smartphones, which warns people if they are approaching a dangerous area. The application also includes a “call for help” option and allows reporting of ERW.[300]

In Nigeria, UNMAS is exploring the use of a risk education technical device to disseminate risk education messages to hard-to-reach and inaccessible at-risk populations. It was hoped that the application might be used to deliver risk education messages and basic COVID-19 prevention awareness messages.[301]

Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all reported limited communication infrastructure such as mobile networks, and access to and use of social media.

Risk education in Afghanistan, BiH, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan has been integrated into the humanitarian and protection sectors. In BiH, this is done through the work of the Red Cross, and in Afghanistan, risk education has been provided for returnees through the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and at International Organization for Migration (IOM) encashment and transit centers.[302] In South Sudan, UNICEF funded partners integrate risk education with other thematic components such as psychosocial support, family tracing and reunification activities, and with other humanitarian activities such as water, sanitation, hygiene, health, nutrition and food security programs.[303]

In Senegal and other countries where the ICRC works, the approach is to link risk education to the provision of community infrastructure, to avoid communities being exposed to mine contamination, in line with the ICRC ‘Risk Awareness and Safer Behavior’ approach.[304]

Risk education was implemented into the school curriculum in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, key risk education messages are included in the curriculum for children in grades 2 to 12, while in Cambodia risk education is included in the curriculum for primary and lower secondary schools. In Sudan, mine risk education features in the curriculum for primary and secondary levels in Darfur state.

In BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Mauritania, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe risk education is provided in schools, but not as part of the formal curriculum.[305] Iraq is currently coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Education on curriculum development for primary school level.[306] South Sudan also reported the development of a risk education curriculum, [307] and reported building the national capacity of nursery and primary level teachers to deliver risk education.[308] Also in South Sudan, UNICEF worked with the Ministry of General Education and Instruction and the national mine action authority to ensure risk education is implemented through life skills subjects in schools.[309] Zimbabwe introduced a pilot literacy and mine action program in four primary schools, led by MAG and the Ministry of Education.[310]

In Afghanistan, DMAC has introduced child-focused risk education materials that have been piloted and will be used in field operations. DMAC sees this as a significant step towards employing content that will help to engage and change the behavior of children and young adults.[311]

Training community volunteers or networks to provide risk education was reported in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This mainly involved training representatives of affected communities to deliver basic risk education messages. This is seen as advantageous in terms of maintaining risk education in hard-to-reach areas, ensuring risk education is delivered through somebody who is trusted by the community, and in supporting sustainability. MAG and HI trained community focal points in many of the countries where they work to reinforce safety messages and to report items.

In some States Parties, risk education is being conducted in partnership with the national police. In Cambodia, a Village and Commune Safety policy, launched in 2010, includes a program to train the Cambodian National Police to implement risk education and awareness regarding the Law on Weapons, Explosives and Ammunitions Management.[312] In Croatia, as part of the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” campaign, the Croatian police educate civilians to hand in ERW.[313]

In Turkey, as part of its national mine risk education plan implementation, a protocol was planned to be signed with the Turkish Gendarmerie in 15 provinces to train them on risk education between 2020–2022.[314] In Somalia, NPA also planned to implement a project in 2020 focusing on training the Puntland police in risk education and non-technical survey. In Zimbabwe, The HALO Trust partnered with local police stations in 2019 to provide safety advice.[315] UNICEF planned to undertake risk education training with army officers in Chad in 2019, but the training was halted due to the deteriorating security situation.[316]

Victim assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties have committed to provide assistance for those people harmed by a specific type of weapon.[317] The ICBL pushed vigorously to have language related to assistance to mine victims included in the text of the treaty. The preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties “to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.” Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party “in a position to do so” should provide such assistance. Article 6 also affirms the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance to the extent required for victims. Since the entry into force of the treaty, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with limited resources.

States Parties which have reported a responsibility for victims

The Oslo Action Plan confirms the continuing commitment of States Parties to “ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.” It also reaffirms that States Parties “recognize the need to integrate assistance to victims and survivors into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction.”[318]

The Monitor reporting on victim assistance, in the context of the Oslo Action Plan, focuses primarily on the following States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims and needs: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.[319]

At the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, held in Nairobi in 2004, an initial group of 24 States Parties “themselves have indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors” and that they had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance. However, it is also recognized that this list does not encompass all States Parties with responsibility for survivors. More such states can be found in the table below, which identifies States Parties where the number of survivors reported or estimated is more than 100 survivors.

States Parties with significant numbers of survivors

In September 2015, United Nations (UN) Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are designed to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. Therefore, the SDGs are generally complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer exceptional opportunities for bridging the relevant frameworks.

The CRPD is legally binding, providing an overarching mechanism for the amendment of national laws and policies related to persons with disabilities. The CRPD does not provide for new rights but frames the existing rights catalogue in an accessible way. The CRPD pertains also to victims of indiscriminate weapons.Although not all injuries result in long-term physical impairment, the impact of indiscriminate weapons frequently results in survivors of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) becoming persons with disabilities and therefore protected by the CRPD.

Similarly, over time it has become more widely recognized that, just as efforts to respond to the needs of victims should benefit all persons with similar needs, including other persons with disabilities, without discrimination, so should the rights of victims be considered by disability rights actors.This interconnectivity allows for solution-oriented approaches to implementing international legal commitments and legal obligations that arise from the CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Mine Ban Treaty.

August 2020 saw the end of the mandate of the first UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas Aguilar of Costa Rica.[320] In 2014, the Special Rapporteur first met with the Mine Ban Treaty ISU staff on the same day as her appointment was made public.[321] She attended many events and meetings related to victim assistance. Reporting from her office included addressing the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, to which the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor submitted relevant information.[322] The Special Rapporteur’s mandate includes maintaining regular dialogue with states and other relevant stakeholders. One of the key recommendations of a report on disability in Iraq by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was for the Special Rapporteur to visit the country. However, this did not happen during the initial mandate period.[323] The benefit of such a visit was also discussed with the Special Rapporteur by the Iraqi Alliance of Disability Organizations (IADO), which is also the national mine/ERW survivors’ representative organization.

In 2017, María Soledad Cisternas Reyes of Chile was appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Disability and Accessibility.[324] In 2019 and 2020, the Special Envoy was active in meetings and events of the Mine Ban Treaty related to victim assistance.

Actions to address the impact of mines/ERW in relation to victim assistance in the Oslo Action Plan include activities and services to implement the following:[325]

• Effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care;[326]
• Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services, and psychological and psychosocial support services;[327]
• Social and economic inclusion;[328]
• Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters.[329]

Effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care[330]

Timely first aid response for casualties and adequate pre-hospital trauma care includes interventions such as first aid and field trauma response, emergency evacuation, availability of transport, and immediate medical care that involves assessment and pre-hospital communication of critical information for patient handover. The provision of appropriate emergency medical services can considerably affect the chance of the survival and the speed of recovery of mine victims, as well as outcomes of injuries and the severity of impairments.

Improvements in medical care services to strengthen emergency response capacities for people injured by mines/ERWand others in affected communities were reported in Afghanistan, where immediate care packages are also distributed to civilian conflict causalities through the Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) Programme, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Croatia, all mine/ERW survivors are entitled to healthcare and social protection measures.[331] In Nigeria, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mobile surgical team operated on patients free of charge. Wounded people were referred, when necessary, for specialized care, physical rehabilitation and/or mental health and psycho­social support provided by ICRC-trained volunteers. There is a drastic problem of accessibility to immediate healthcare across the DRC, where in most cases people injured cannot receive appropriate assistance, resulting in death.

In South Sudan, incidents often occurred in remote areas far from access to health services. In eastern Ukraine, along the line of contact, primary healthcare centers and satellite services received the required equipment and medicines. As public health facilities in Ukraine’s conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system.[332]

International organizations continued to provide much-needed assistance in conflict-affected areas. In Iraq, healthcare services for all persons with disabilities have decreased over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, many medical facilities have been damaged, and ongoing conflict has further undermined the struggling health system, which has been in a precarious state for several years due to ongoing conflict.[333] In late 2019, Yemen’s healthcare system was reported to be “on the brink of collapse” (see section on COVID-19 Response).[334]

Rehabilitation support services, and psychological and psychosocial support services[335]

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help the person regain or improve mobility, and to engage in everyday activities. Effective rehabilitation is aimed at improving personal autonomy and empowering people to have mobility and independence. Rehabilitation services with a comprehensive or multidisciplinary approach involve a team including a medical doctor, physiotherapist, prosthetist, and social worker, as well as other specialists as required. Psychosocial support is often also an integral aspect of rehabilitation, while it can also be a standalone service or combined with social integration, for example through peer support.

During the reporting period, all of the ICRC’s MoveAbility Foundation activities were being integrated into the ICRC’s Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), established in 1979. The MoveAbility Foundation was formerly called the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The SFD was created in 1983 from a resolution at the 1981 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference, which recommended that “a special fund be formed for the benefit of the disabled and to promote the implementation of durable projects to aid disabled persons.” It has been an independent foundation under Swiss law since 2001. The SFD marked a strategic shift from humanitarian assistance to development, to ensure continuity of the ICRC-PRP’s work. The 2017 change from the SFD to the MoveAbility Foundation was an ambitiousstrategy shift, planning activities for growth and development over five years, however integration of the SFD into the ICRC-PRP occurred before the plan ended.

States Parties can increase the sustainability of rehabilitation activities by allocating a specific budget line for the physical and functional rehabilitation needs of all persons with disabilities, including victims. In Afghanistan, authorities have acknowledged that it is unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces of Afghanistan, however at least seven more centers are still needed. Access to rehabilitation centers is also extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda.

In Iraq, the entire rehabilitation system lacked capacity to deliver enough services and devices to meet increased needs. In Cambodia, progress was made in the handover of rehabilitation centers to government management, while resources were secured for their sustainability. In Nigeria, construction began in August 2019 for a new physical rehabili­tation center, under the ICRC’s Programme for Humanitarian Impact Investment and in partnership with a university teaching hospital.[336] The government of Uganda has identified human resources for health as one of the core causes of financial inefficiency in the health system. The two main problems are significant rates of work absenteeism and the existence of “ghost workers” on the public payroll, which are attributed to weak personnel management and demotivation.[337]

In Palestine, the main prosthetic unit in Gaza, the Artificial Limb and Polio Centre (ALPC), continued to face significant pressure on its limited resources while addressing an increase in patients with amputations, many of whom had been shot in the legs. A new prosthetic hospital and disability rehabilitation center—the Limb Reconstruction Center in Khan Younis, Gaza, built by the WHO—and a Hamas-run Health Ministry opened in 2020.[338] A new Rehabilitation Center also opened in Bethlehem in October 2019.[339] In 2019, mine/ERW victims from Senegal continued to receive prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an agreement between the ICRC, the Senegalese Survivor Network, and the mine action center, ongoing since 2015.

Improvement of the rehabilitation facility at the Ukrainian Research Institute for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation was reported.[340] A USAID-funded project launched in 2019 in Ukraine and Tajikistan, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in the two countries.[341]

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based peer support groups, networks of survivors and associations of persons with disabilities, as well as some types of sports and recreational activities.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), there was a program in 2019 to develop structured peer-to-peer psychological support, by victims for victims, in healthcare and rehabilitation facilities supported by the European Commission. In Eritrea, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) supports the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare to provide mental health and psychosocial support to families and children with disabilities. In Senegal, mine victims supported other victims who received assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Mine/ERW victims in Kinshasa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), hold monthly peer-to-peer support meetings. Survivor networks, which often provide peer-to-peer and collective psychosocial support, struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available.

Many countries had improved sports and recreational activities for persons with disabilities, including families, such as wheelchair sports. However, access to cultural activities for victims and persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others was often lacking.

The following continuing needs for psychological and psychosocial support were identified in:

• Afghanistan: provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support, in particular to new victims as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation;
• Cambodia: improve the quality and availability of existing psychological support services;
• Colombia: include peer support services under the health insurance system;
• The DRC: improve the availability of psychosocial services significantly, especially outside Kinshasa;
• Mozambique: prioritize assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs;
• Nicaragua: dedicate resources to the implementation of psychosocial support programs; and
• Senegal: ensure the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region.

Social and economic inclusion

Socio-economic inclusion projects for mine victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit, income generation, and employment was a reported priority need in all affected states. Employment, work training, livelihood incentives, and other economic opportunities continued to be areas with the greatest need for improvement.

There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities, as well as to develop education and training that are appropriate for victims and persons with disabilities who lack education and literacy, and have no work or land from which to make a living.

One of the last remaining vocational training centers in Cambodia—the long-established Banteay Prieb Center near Phnom Penh, run by Jesuit Service Cambodia, which served an increasing range of persons with disabilities—stopped running due to the premises being reconstructed without consultation by the relevant authorities.

A lack of awareness of disability rights and inclusion principles among teachers and fellow pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and prevent child victims from participating fully in educational activities. National programs to promote inclusive education at all levels, as part of national education plans, policies and programs can contribute to the inclusion of child survivors and indirect child victims. In Afghanistan, an inclusive education policy was drafted, translated into national languages, and shared with the Ministry of Education for review and approval by its scientific and academic council. However, a government-run national inclusive education program that increased the enrollment of children with disabilities in the country since 2008 lost core international funding in 2016, and Afghanistan reported that there were no continuing activities in 2019.

Protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters[342]

During times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing adequate and appropriate services. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims of these weapons, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance with relevant human rights laws. Those which are States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

In 2019–2020, several States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with new casualties and mine/ERW victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. In June 2019, the UN Security Council adopted its first text on the protection of persons with disabilities in conflict, Resolution 2475.[343] Armed conflict and attacks on healthcare providers were increasingly concerning and impacted the availability of services in the affected countries.[344] The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016.

In November 2019, just prior to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released guidelines on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action, which include actions that humanitarian actors can take to effectively identify and respond to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities within humanitarian settings.[345] The IASC Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt implementation guidelines by the end of 2018. The deadline was later extended to the end of 2019. Some mine survivors and their representative organizations were involved in pilot testing and regional feedback discussions during the development process.

Armed violence and conflict also directly impact victim assistance efforts. The CRPD committee experts reviewing Iraq’s reporting in September 2019 found that the challenges and consequences of “18 years of war, armed conflict and terrorism…had ravaged Iraq and…had had a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.”[346] The conflict in Syria has caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons fleeing Syria. Natural disasters during the period were also devastating. In 2019, floods in Mozambique severely affected persons with disabilities in remote and rural areas.

A number of international actors sought to improve the situation for children in humanitarian settings, citing Landmine Monitor casualty data and other sources on high numbers of child casualties resulting from mines/ERW.[347] In 2019, the UN’s interagency Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) launched a deployment in response to the impact of mines/ERW on children. The objectives were to improve interagency collaboration; reduce the rate and number of children killed and injured; increase the survival rates of child casualties, especially those seriously injured and in a critical state after the incident; and provide medium-term healthcare services to improve physical and mental health for child survivors, as well as social inclusion, including access to education.[348]