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Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention  

Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

Introduction

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions seeks to provide the vehicle for a world without cluster munitions following the unacceptable harm caused by these weapons. Collaborative work to advance this international treaty continues apace despite the upheavals brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020.

Adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008, the convention entered into force on 1 August 2010 and is now into its second decade.[1] Its 110 States Parties are adhering to the convention’s comprehensive prohibitions.

Successful implementation can be seen in the 36 States Parties that have destroyed their stocks of cluster munitions, most recently Switzerland in March 2019. Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia destroyed a total of 2,273 cluster munitions and more than 52,000 submunitions from their stockpiles in 2020.

There was good news from the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, which no longer retain cluster munitions for research and development purposes after destroying their respective stocks in 2020. This shows how a vast majority of the convention’s states and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) see no need to retain live cluster munitions for such purposes.

The convention’s work is not without its challenges. The pace of universalization has slowed and no country has joined the convention since Saint Lucia in September 2020. There was little movement towards ratification in the 13 signatories yet to ratify the convention. None of the 10 States Parties with late initial transparency reports managed to turn them in over the past year and some reports are now more than a decade overdue.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new production or use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008. However, a handful of states outside the convention risk their reputation by ignoring this life-saving normative framework.

A total of 16 producers of cluster munitions have yet to commit to never produce them in the future, including China and Russia, which are actively researching and developing new types of cluster munitions at state-owned facilities. Private companies have proven more susceptible to the stigmatization of cluster munitions, largely through sustained disinvestment efforts by the financial sector. After acquiring Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI), Elbit Systems Ltd. confirmed in October 2020 that it has discontinued production, sales, and deliveries of IMI’s cluster munitions. United States (US) defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced in January 2021 that it was ending its participation in a US government stockpile management contract to test the shelf-life of cluster munitions.

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s use of cluster munitions in their 2020 conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was met with strong condemnation and denials from both sides. There are questions over emerging evidence showing that cluster bombs may have been used in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region since the outbreak of hostilities in 2020. Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea have responded to requests to confirm or deny their possible involvement.

Any use of cluster munitions must be met with unequivocal condemnation. To uphold the object and purpose of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties should fulfill their obligations to promote the convention’s norms by discouraging the use of cluster munitions.[2] The strength of the convention’s provisions lie in how they are upheld and defended, particularly at the review conferences, which take place every five years.

The convention’s community of states and Implementation Support Unit, United Nations (UN) agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the CMC are working hard to adapt the convention’s work to the restrictions brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and hold the milestone Second Review Conference. Part one of the review conference took place entirely virtually in November 2020 and was the first meeting of a humanitarian disarmament treaty convention to be broadcast live on UN Web TV. Part two is scheduled for September 2021, again under the president Ambassador Félix Baumann of Switzerland.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available on the Monitor website.[3]

Universalization

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[4]

Accessions

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it but must join through a process known as accession.[5] Saint Lucia was the last country to accede, in September 2020.

There were few notable developments concerning accessions during the reporting period. South Sudan’s voluntary Article 7 transparency report for the convention confirmed in April 2021 that its parliament is still considering a proposal to accede to the convention.[6]

Several non-signatories reiterated their largely negative views on the convention in 2020 and the first half of 2021, some repeating their greviances word for word. For example, in November 2020, Brazil reiterated its criticism of the convention’s alleged “loopholes” and claimed its effectiveness is “undermined” by the interoperability provisions on relations with states not party contained in Article 21.[7]

A total of nine states acceded to the convention between August 2010 and the First Review Conference in September 2015, while six more states acceded between 2015–2021.[8] Nearly two-thirds of UN member states have joined the convention, and all except seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have joined.[9] Of the 27 European Union (EU) member states, all except six have joined the convention.[10] In the Americas region, all except eight countries have signed or ratified the convention, while all except seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have done so.

The 74 states that remain outside the convention include three members of the UN Security Council—China, Russia, and the US—and 13 more states that also produce cluster munitions.

Ratifications

In total, 88% of the convention’s signatories have ratified and become fully bound by its provisions, demonstrating that the vast majority of signatories ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify. A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference in September 2015.[11] Ten more states have ratified the convention in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, which demonstrates a significant slowing of the pace of ratification.

During the reporting period, no signatory has ratified the convention. São Tomé and Príncipe was the last country to ratify the convention, in January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific.[12]

Signatories yet to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council reportedly approved a memo recommending ratification of the convention in June 2021.[13]

The other signatories still do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. Cyprus remains the last EU state to have signed but not ratified the convention, after its parliament put the ratification “on hold” in 2013.[14]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Félix Baumann, is serving as president of the convention’s Second Review Conference, the first part of which was held virtually on 25–27 November 2020. The second part of the review conference was delayed until September 2021 due to public health requirements brought about by the pandemic.

A total of 76 countries attended the first part of the Second Review Conference in November 2020: 60 States Parties, three signatories, and 13 non-signatories, in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.

The CMC continues its advocacy work in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation, cooperating closely with the convention’s presidency, States Parties, the ICRC, and the Implementation Support Unit. During the reporting period, the CMC engaged virtually in bilateral meetings with states not party. It started promoting universalization of the convention through the Human Rights Council process of Universal Periodic Review, resulting in recommendations to Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, and Oman to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions without delay.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. During the reporting period there were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom (UK) to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Ambassador Aidan Liddle, will serve as president of the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties, scheduled to be held in 2022.

UN General Assembly Resolution 75/62

The annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is an indispensable barometer for gauging interest in and support for the convention, particularly from states that have not joined. Since its introduction in 2015, interest in the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown steadily.

A total of 147 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 75/62 on implementation of the convention on 7 December 2020, including 33 non-signatories.[15] As the table below shows, this was the highest number of votes in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the convention to date. For the first time, no country voted against the resolution, while non-signatories Armenia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Tonga joined the votes in favor.[16]

All except three of the 38 states to abstain from voting on the 2020 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention.[17] Madagascar was the only State Party to abstain from the resolution, along with signatories Cyprus and Uganda.[18]

Previously, a total of 144 states voted in favor of the 2019 UNGA resolution on the convention, including 29 non-signatories, while Russia was the only country to vote against it.[19]

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions[20]

Several states not party—including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Iran, Russia, and South Korea—explained their vote on the 2020 UNGA resolution.[21] Notably, there was no group statement at the 2019 or 2020 UNGA from Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Romania explaining their vote and lack of accession to the convention, after the group made a joint statement every year from 2015 to 2018.

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

Since the end of World War II, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 41 countries and five other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Past use of cluster munitions[22]

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[23]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.[24] Several past users of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Cluster munitions have been used in eight non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Azerbaijan (2020), Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011, 2015, and 2019), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–2017).

New use

Cluster munitions were used in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Syria, during the reporting period (August 2020–July 2021).

Use by Armenia and Azerbaijan

Armenia and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in September–October 2020.

There is compelling evidence that Armenian forces used 300mm Smerch cluster munition rockets or supplied them to Nagorno-Karabakh forces who used them in attacks on at least five locations in Azerbaijan.[25] Azerbaijan used Israeli-produced LAR-160 cluster munition rockets, each containing 104 M095 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions, in attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh’s Stepanakert, Hadrut, and Martakert.[26]

There is no complete accounting of the use of cluster munitions by Azerbaijan and Armenian forces during the 2020 conflict as it has not been possible to investigate every reported or alleged attack.[27]

Armenia and Azerbaijan have both denied using cluster munitions in the 2020 conflict, with each blaming the other side for this use.[28]

Use in Syria

Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, causing immense human suffering both directly from attacks and from explosive remnants left behind. There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least one attack during the reporting period of 1 August 2020–31 July 2021.[29] The extent of cluster munition use may be higher, as attacks have often gone unrecorded. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2020 reported at least 11 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2019 and July 2020.

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country, but Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out operations together. There has been no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in Syria.

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on allegations of new use of cluster munitions.[30] Russia has not explicitly denied stockpiling cluster munitions in Syria or its involvement in their use.[31]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnation from more than 145 countries.[32] Since May 2013, the UNGA has adopted eight resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 75/193 on 16 December 2020, which received 101 votes in favor, 13 against, and 62 abstentions.[33] Since 2014, states have adopted more than 18 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, while the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks.[34]

Allegations of use

Ethiopia

There have been indications that cluster munitions may have been used in the Tigray region of Ethiopia during the reporting period. However, the evidence is insufficient to conclusively determine whether cluster munitions were used and to determine who was responsible.

Media reports, and accounts and images shared on social media, indicate that air-dropped cluster bombs may have been used in attacks on Samre and Gijet, southwest of the city of Mekelle, on 20–25 February 2021; and on Menji and Guyya, near the town of Abi-Adi Tembien, on 13 June 2021.[35] The cluster munitions reportedly used include RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M and RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh bombs.[36]

The Ethiopian Air Force and Eritrean Air Force both possess aircraft capable of delivering Soviet or Russian-made RBK-series cluster bombs. Eritrean and Ethiopian forces have both used cluster munitions in the past, including during their 1998–2000 war. As of 31 July 2021, neither country has responded to Monitor requests to confirm or deny their possible use of cluster munitions during the outbreak of hostilities in Tigray in 2020–2021.[37]

Use by non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used them. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Libya (by the Libyan National Army, LNA), Syria (by Islamic State), and Ukraine (by Russian-backed separatists).

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Production of Cluster Munitions

Historically, at least 34 states developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. Eighteen of these countries ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[38]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future, as shown in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

It is unclear how many of these countries produced cluster munitions in 2020 and/or the first half of 2021 due to a lack of transparency and available data. However, China and Russia were actively researching and developing new types of cluster munitions in 2020, and that activity likely continues.[39]

Financial institutions have sought to uphold the convention’s object and purpose by undertaking disinvestment measures, which in turn has impacted cluster munition producers, as shown by the following examples:

• After acquiring Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI) in late 2018, Elbit Systems Ltd. announced it would discontinue the production of cluster munitions.[40] In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. confirmed that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[41]
• Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating that “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[42]
• The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, announced in 2016 that it was ending its production.[43]
• US defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced in January 2021 that it was ending participation in a US government stockpile management contract to test the shelf-life of cluster munitions.[44]

Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the US have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[45]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party.

Eighteen states have ceased production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in the future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[46]

In South Africa, Rheinmetall Denel Munition has not responded to the Monitor’s 2018 request to clarify whether it produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012.[47]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[48]

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any state during the reporting period.

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[49]

While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[50]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[51] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

At least two non-signatories—Singapore and the US—have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 95 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[52]

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions[53]

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 39 countries—36 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munitions stocks have now destroyed them, as detailed in the following section on stockpile destruction.

Four States Parties have reported a collective total of 11,274 stockpiled cluster munitions and 733,243 submunitions that they are in the process of destroying, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction (as of 31 December 2020)[54]

In addition, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau must clarify if they knowingly possess cluster munitions, as the status of their respective stocks remains unclear:

• Guinea imported cluster munitions in the past and may possess them, but still has not provided its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was due in April 2015.[55] Its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 April 2023.
• Guinea-Bissau has reported that it possesses cluster munitions, but a January 2020 review of storage facilities by technical experts did not identify any stocks.[56] Its stockpile destruction deadline was 1 May 2019.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

• Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles containing 2,559 M20G submunitions to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of destruction and private company EXPAL Bulgaria completed destruction of the cluster munitions in August 2019.[57] Yet Cyprus has never made a public statement on the matter or provided a transparency report to confirm whether it has destroyed all of its stockpiled cluster munitions.
• Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared any information on the types and quantities stockpiled or indicated if it has a plan to destroy them.
• Nigeria has appealed for cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions, which includes UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[58]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

• Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions had been destroyed in or by 2012.[59]
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[60]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”[61] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction.

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[62] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.[63] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[64]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 36 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction[65]

* Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

** Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

Four States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table above due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

• Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.
• The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.[66]
• Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because it destroyed the stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[67]

Destruction underway

During 2020, four States Parties destroyed a total of 2,277 cluster munitions and more than 52,000 submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2020

Slovakia has committed to destroying its stockpiled cluster munitions by its deadline of 1 January 2024, “using its own capacities.”[68]

In March 2021, Bulgaria’s stockpile destruction deadline was extended for a second time, to 1 October 2022.[69] Peru’s stockpile destruction deadline was also increased by three years to 1 April 2024.[70]

The UK completed the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in 2013, but recently discovered some previously unknown stocks, which it destroyed in December 2020.[71]

South Africa destroyed 139 cluster munitions and 78,994 submunitions before September 2012. It has not destroyed any cluster munitions since then and its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 November 2023.

Additionally, Guinea-Bissau may have missed its 1 May 2019 stockpile destruction deadline, and must clarify whether it still knowingly possesses cluster munition stocks.

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

Most States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for such purposes, including 29 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[72] However, 10 States Parties have chosen to retain cluster munitions for training and research.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2020)[73]

Three States Parties have been removed from the list of States Parties retaining cluster munitions after destroying their respective stocks in 2020. The Netherlands destroyed 75 retained cluster munitions and 4,262 submunitions, while the Czech Republic destroyed its six remaining submunitions. A Slovakian Ministry of Defence official told the Monitor in July 2021 that “we can declare that Slovakia is NOT retaining cluster munitions for research and training purposes anymore,” after it destroyed five cluster munitions and 3,220 submunitions in 2020.[74]

Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland reduced their number of retained cluster munitions during 2020.

BiH and Cameroon have not destroyed any of their cluster munitions and/or submunitions, more than five years after reporting that they needed to retain them for research and training purposes.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have destroyed their stocks or significantly reduced them since making their initial declarations, indicating that the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is unclear if current stocks retained by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

Some States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, Moldova, the Netherlands have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country.

As of 1 August 2021, 100 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report.[75] This represents 93% of States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is the highest compliance rate recorded to date. However, none of the 10 States Parties with outstanding initial transparency reports submitted them during the reporting period.

States Parties with initial Article 7 reporting deadlines

Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.[76] The initial reports from Cape Verde and Comoros are now a decade overdue.

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year. Compliance with the annual reporting requirement is not impressive.[77] Of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, only 60 provided the annual updated report due by 30 April 2021, covering activities in 2020.[78] This 60% reporting rate is similar to previous years.

Some States Parties have never submitted an updated annual report. Cluster munition stockpiler South Africa submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention on 8 September 2017, but has not provided an updated annual report since then.

In 2021, non-signatory South Sudan provided a voluntary transparency report; while previously, signatory the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) turned in voluntary transparency reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014, and signatory Brunei submitted a voluntary transparency report in 2020. Canada and Palau also provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage the use of cluster munitions, to provide details on cooperation and assistance support, or to report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[79]

The CMC continues to encourage states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[80]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 32 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 21 states have done so since.

States Parties with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

No State Party adopted specific implementing legislation for the convention in 2020 or the first half of 2021. The last State Party to do so was Namibia, which amended its Arms and Ammunition Act in March 2019.[81]

Another 20 States Parties have indicated that they are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[82] In January 2020, Guinea-Bissau reported that it is drafting implementing legislation for the convention.[83]

Another 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing legislation and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the convention.[84]

At least eight States Parties are still considering if specific implementation legislation for the convention is needed. In seven States Parties, the status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear.[85]

There are several models to guide the preparation of strong laws, including model legislation prepared by the CMC in 2020.[86] Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.[87] The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.[88] New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.[89]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[90] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.[91]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[92]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties and Lithuania have argued forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[93]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

Disinvestment

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[94]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[95]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2020 or the first half of 2021.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[96]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to numerous inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons: Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[97]