Georgia
Mine Action
Treaty status |
|
Mine Ban Treaty |
Not a party |
Convention on Cluster Munitions |
Non-signatory |
Mine action management |
|
National mine action management actors |
The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC)/Humanitarian Demining Division (HDD) under DELTA (the State Military Scientific Technical Center) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority |
Mine action standards |
Draft National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines |
Operators in 2017 |
National:
|
Extent of contamination as of end 2017 |
|
Landmines |
2.31km2 reported, full extent not known |
Cluster munition remnants |
Not contaminated, with the possible exception of South Ossetia |
Other ERW contamination |
ERW including in former firing ranges. UXO also in South Ossetia, though extent unknown |
Land release in 2017 |
|
Landmines |
9,256m2 cleared;39,568m2 reduced by technical survey |
Cluster munition remnants |
877m2 cleared; 0.8km2 reduced |
Other ERW |
5 ERW destroyed during cluster munition survey and clearance |
Progress |
|
Landmines |
In 2017, clearance was completed of the Chognari minefield, part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. HALO Trust does not have access to any of the remaining mined areas due to political and security reasons |
Notes: ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordnance.
Mine Contamination
Georgia has more than 2.3km2 of mined areas across nine minefields, as set out in the table below. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The problem includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri municipality, and Vaziani village, in Gardabani municipality, both of which are in military zones. Khojali mountain, in Mestia municipality, is on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with Abkhazia, where the size of mined areas is not known.[1]
Mine contamination (at end 2017)[2]
Region |
District/Municipality |
Village |
Contamination |
Mined areas |
Area (m2) |
Kvemo Kartli |
Marneuli |
Kachagani (Red Bridge) |
AP and AV mines |
1 |
2,282,852 |
Gardabani |
Vaziani (Military zone) |
AP mines |
1 |
N/K |
|
Mtskheta-Mtianeti |
Dusheti |
Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2 |
AP mines |
2 |
4,275 |
Dusheti |
Kadoeti |
AP mines |
1 |
23,783 |
|
Shida Kartli |
Kashuri |
Osiauri (Military zone) |
AP mines |
1 |
N/K |
Gori |
Zemo Nikozi |
AP mines and UXO |
1 |
3,233 |
|
Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti |
Mestia |
Khojali |
AP mines |
1 |
N/K |
Total |
8 |
2,314,143 |
Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle UXO = unexploded ordnance; N/K = not known.
Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the threat has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 mined areas were suspected at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3]
The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia, laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. It is Georgia’s largest minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.[4]
There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent 2008 conflict with Russia. HALO Trust has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO demining operators.
Antipersonnel mines have a social, economic, and humanitarian impact in Georgia. At the Red Bridge minefield, for example, the land is used for grazing cattle.[5] The main income of the local population is animal husbandry and therefore safe use of the grazing land is very important. Other remaining minefields are located in remote locations and as they are not guarded, fenced, or marked, locals who use the land for hunting and forging are vulnerable to accidents.[6]
Cluster Munition Contamination
Following clearance of a cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was believed to be free of cluster munition contamination, with the possible exception of South Ossetia.
In 2016, however, Georgia reported the discovery of two submunitions, which were destroyed by the State Security Agency, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs in the Shida Kartli region.[7] In April and July 2016, local communities in this region of Georgia reported finding several submunitions since clearance was completed.[8]
During 2017, HALO conducted non-technical and technical survey in the Shida Kartli region to investigate each of the call-outs.[9] During survey, a total of three submunitions were found, which were identified as residual contamination and destroyed.[10] Two of the submunitions were found in the village of Kvemo Khviti. After investigation, it was determined that they had been moved from the nearby village of Zemo Nikozi, which was affected by cluster munition contamination in 2008.[11] The third submunition, an AO-2.5, was uncovered by a villager in Variani while he was cultivating his field.[12] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had previously conducted subsurface clearance of this area and upon further investigation by HALO it was found that the submunition was below the effective clearance depth achieved by its detectors.[13]
Prior to those recently identified submunitions, the last cluster munition remnant was discovered and cleared in 2014, during HALO operations along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), also in the Shida Kartli region.[14] Furthermore, Georgia has reported that its National Mine Action Authority has not been able to conduct quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (in South Ossetia), and that a conclusion as to whether these regions are indeed free of cluster munition remnants depends on the quality of earlier clearance.[15]
Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through December 2009, HALO cleared some 37km2 of Georgian-controlled territory of submunitions and other ERW.[16] In May 2010, NPA completed clearance of its tasked areas.[17]
HALO believes that the August 2008 conflict was likely to have resulted in some cluster munition remnants in South Ossetia, but it has no way of determining the level of possible contamination, or what, if any, clearance may have been conducted.[18]
Program Management
The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under the State Military Scientific Technical Center—known as “DELTA”—an entity within the Ministry of Defense. It is tasked with coordinating and executing actions to address the ERW threat.[19] In 2013, ERWCC became the Humanitarian Demining Division (HDD) under DELTA.[20] The primary task of the HDD/ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including QA/QC, and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[21] The HDD/ERWCC was established with the support of the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[22]
As of April 2018, there were seven personnel working in theHDD, including a GIS and IMSMA specialist.[23]
Strategic planning
Georgia has identified clearance of the Red Bridge minefield as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[24] Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.[25] Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,[26] but only survey was permitted. HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. The following month, however, the Azerbaijani military demanded that technical survey operations be halted.[27] As of May 2018, all of HALO Trust’s requests to restart clearance in Red Bridge have been refused.[28] According to DELTA, there have been no changes in the accessibility of the Red Bridge minefield and it had no additional information about the current situation.[29]
Legislation and standards
Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS. Georgia does not currently have a timeframe for the establishment of these standards.[30] Once finalized, the NTSGs will be translated and sent to parliament for approval.[31]
Operators
HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military and, as of May 2018, HALO has not been granted access to any of Georgia’s remaining mined areas.[32] In 2017, HALO had 12 operational staff working at the Chognari minefield.[33]
At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[34] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, battle area clearance, and EOD.[35] Since March 2015, these engineers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.[36]
Land Release (mines)
In 2017, HALO Trust cleared 9,256m2 of mined area, destroying five antipersonnel mines in the process, and reduced a further 39,568m2 by technical survey. In 2016, HALO cleared 7,288m2 of mined area, and reduced 70,052m2 by technical survey.[37]
Survey in 2017 (mines)
In 2017, HALO confirmed 48,824m2 as contaminated with mines at the Chognari minefield and reduced 39,568m2 of this through technical survey.[38]
The Chognari minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.[39] Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.[40]
The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.[41] In addition, certain areas at Chognari will be used to build a water reservoir to supply drinking water to the city of Kutaisi, which has a population of 300,000.[42]
Clearance in 2017 (mines)
In 2017, HALO only had access to one mine contaminated area, Chognari village in the Imereti region. HALO cleared 9,256m2 of mined area and destroyed five antipersonnel mines at the Chognari minefield. Clearance was completed in September 2017.[43]
In addition, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2017. The mine was found by HALO deminers during technical survey in Shida Kartli region, the mine was not armed and was considered to be abandoned.[44]
Progress in 2018 (mines)
In 2018, HALO planned to conduct non-technical survey in Kadoeti and Khojali, as these areas may be accessible for non-technical survey only.[45] As of April 2018, DELTA was working with the Georgian Ministries, State Security Service and HALO Trust to plan the surveys of these areas.[46]
Land Release (cluster munition remnants)
Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)
In 2017, HALO reduced 0.8km2 by technical survey in the Shida Kartli region.[47] During the survey, three submunitions were destroyed as spot tasks by the Georgian State Security Service EOD Team.[48]
Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)
In 2017, HALO cleared 877m2 in the Shida Kartli region.[49] During clearance no submunitions were found but five items of other UXO were destroyed.[50]
Progress in 2018 (cluster munition remnants)
The survey of the Shida Kartli region revealed that several areas were contaminated with other types of ERW, such as hand grenades and signal mines.[51] There are plans to conduct clearance of this contamination in the villages of Dvani and Dzevera.[52] Clearance is also planned in the village of Chonto where 24 aircraft bombs were found by a survey team in August 2017.[53] HALO will also undertake one EOD task in the Samegrelo Zemo-Svaneti region to remove an unexploded aircraft bomb, believed to be from a 2008 aircraft attack on the village of Anaklia.[54]
Progress towards completion of mine clearance
Between 2009 and the end of 2012, using international funding HALO cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.[55] In 2013 and 2014, HALO focused on clearing former firing ranges. In 2015, HALO briefly focused on technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield before the survey was forced to halt, and did not undertake any mine clearance. In 2016, in a positive development, HALO began survey and clearance of the Chognari minefield, which it finished clearing in September 2017. HALO does not have access to any of the remaining mined areas due to political and security reasons. If access is not granted to HALO to clear remaining minefields it will consider winding down all operations in Georgia in mid-2019. It is not known if any of the restricted military areas has been cleared of mines.[56]
Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance
It is believed that, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, Georgia is now free from cluster munition contamination following the investigation of contamination in the Shida Kartli region. Georgia has reported that, in the areas outside of its control, it cannot confirm whether or not earlier clearance in these areas was conducted to international humanitarian standards, and with the required quality management.[57]
The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
[1] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.
[4] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
[5] Email from Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.
[6] Ibid., 25 May 2018.
[7] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 25 April 2018; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 25 May 2018.
[10] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 9 July 2015.
[15] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
[16] Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17.
[17] Email from Jonathon “Gus” Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 27 May 2010.
[18] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 11 March 2016.
[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
[20] Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 21 March 2017 to 31 March 2018), Form A.
[21] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
[22] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009; E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3 (Fall 2011); and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016.
[23] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[24] Ibid., 3 April 2017.
[25] Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.
[26] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
[27] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
[28] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[29] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.
[32] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
[33] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[34] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015, and 20 June 2016.
[35] Estonia CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 2 April 2012; NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia Fact Sheet, January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
[36] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.
[37] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.
[38] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[39] Interview with Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016.
[40] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016.
[41] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
[42] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
[43] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[44] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[45] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[46] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 25 May 2018.
[52] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 30 August 2012.
[56] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.
[57] Ibid., 3 April 2017.