Georgia

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 25 August 2022

Summary

Non-signatory Georgia has expressed support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but says that national security concerns prevent it from acceding. Georgia last attended a meeting of the convention in 2012. Georgia abstained from the vote on the key annual United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.

There is no evidence that Georgia has produced or exported cluster munitions, but it inherited stocks after the break-up of the Soviet Union and imported them from Israel in 2007. Georgia last used cluster munitions in 2008 during the conflict with Russia over South Ossetia.

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Georgia has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. It last commented on the matter in a 2010 response to the Monitor which expressed support for the convention’s “spirit” but said that Georgia is “reluctant to join…until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.”[1]

Georgia participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2] It attended an international conference on cluster munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

Georgia attended the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012 as an observer, which marked its first and, to date, only attendance at a meeting of the convention. Georgia was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Review Conference held in November 2020 and September 2021.

In December 2021, Georgia abstained from the vote on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[3] Georgia has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Georgia has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at use of cluster munitions in Syria.[4] It has also voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolutions condemning use of cluster munitions in Syria.[5]

Georgia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Georgia inherited a stockpile of air-dropped cluster bombs from the Soviet Union.[6] It also acquired Mk-4 160mm surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets, each containing 104 M85-type submunitions, from Israel in 2007.[7]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs and 320,375 submunitions in 2013 as part of a project to destroy obsolete weapons, supported by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[8] The last RBK-series bombs were destroyed by open detonation at the Vaziani military firing range outside Tbilisi on 12 July 2013.

Cluster munitions destroyed in Georgia[9]

Type

Quantity of munitions

Quantity of submunitions

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh, each containing 150 submunitions

179

26,850

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M, each containing 30 submunitions

8

240

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5, each containing 565 submunitions

469

264,985

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT, each containing 108 submunitions

99

10,692

RBK-500 PTAB-1, each containing 268 submunitions

61

16,348

RBK-500 PTAB-2.5, each containing 50 submunitions

21

1,050

RBK-500 PTAB-10.5A, each containing 30 submunitions

7

210

Total

844

320,375

 

Use

Georgian forces last used cluster munition rockets during the August 2008 conflict with Russia over the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Georgia’s Ministry of Defense said that it used 24 volleys with 13 Mk-4 cluster munition rockets in each.[10] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Georgian armed forces used cluster munitions against Russian forces near the Roki tunnel.[11] Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers found remnants of Georgian-fired cluster munitions in civilian areas in the north of Gori district, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[12]



[1] Letter No. 8/37-02 from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[2] For details on Georgia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 205–207.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021.

[4]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 75/193, 16 December 2020. Georgia voted in favor of similar UNGA resolutions on Syria in 2013–2020.

[5]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 39/15, 28 September 2018. Georgia voted in favor of similar Human Rights Council resolutions on Syria in 2016–2018.

[6] In 2004 and 2007, Jane’s Information Group reported that the Georgian Air Force possessed KMGU and RBK-500 cluster bombs. The Ministry of Defense told HRW in February 2009 that it still possessed RBK-500 cluster bombs and BKF cartridges of submunitions delivered by KMGU dispensers, but that their shelf-lives had expired and they were slated for destruction. First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia said that Georgian Air Force planes were not fitted to deliver these air-dropped weapons. See, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 207.

[7] Submission of Georgia, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2007, 7 July 2008.

[8] Bombs containing incendiary submunitions and cartridges containing antivehicle mines were also destroyed. Email from the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 3 May 2014.

[9] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014. Other weapons destroyed included 99 RBK-500 ZAB-2.5SM and 35 RBK-250 ZAB-2.5 incendiary bombs, as well as 310 BKF cartridges containing PTM-1G scatterable antivehicle landmines.

[10] “Some Facts,” attachment to email from David Nardaia, Director, Analytical Department, Ministry of Defense, 18 November 2008. The rockets would have carried 32,448 M85 submunitions.

[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Human Rights Watch inquiry about the use of M85 bomblets,” 2 September 2008.

[12] For more information, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 206; and HRW, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 57. The Ministry of Defense of Georgia said in February 2009 that it was investigating the possibility of “failure of the weapons system.” During the conflict, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the upper Kodor Gorge and re-took it from Georgian forces. Abkhazia has asserted that Georgia fired large numbers of cluster munitions with M095 submunitions from LAR-160 rockets in the Kodor Valley. Email from Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, 24 August 2009. The deputy foreign minister provided photographs of submunitions and containers. The M095 is described as an M85-type submunition. The Monitor has not been able to independently investigate and confirm this information.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines, and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the treaty since 1997.

Georgia has not been a frequent participant at Mine Ban Treaty meetings, and did not attend the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, nor the intersessional meetings in May 2019. Its last statement at such a meeting was in 2007, when it told States Parties that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty, that it “is well aware that the negative humanitarian impact of landmines far outweighs their military value,” and that it “tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat.”[1] In the past, Georgia has insisted that its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—prevents it from acceding.[2] In a meeting with the Monitor in June 2011, a Georgian government official stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was beginning to consider the mine issue.[3]

Campaigners in Georgia participated in the Lend Your Leg global action on 18 February 2012 when NGOs and the Ministry of Sport and Tourism organized a backgammon tournament with survivors of landmines.[4]

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and joined CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 22 December 2008. It had previously stated it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons given for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty.[5] Georgia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia does not produce, import, or export mines.[6]

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union.[7] The Ministry of Defense completed an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in 2010, but did not make information on the size and composition of the stockpile publicly available. The ministry does not plan to destroy its stocks, but commits to safeguard them in a way to avoid dissemination or transfer to another state or non-state actors.[8]

Use

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[9] In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”[10]

Despite its repeated denial of past use, it appears that Georgian armed forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006, mostly in the Upper Kodori Gorge area adjoining the breakaway region of Abkhazia.[11] Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007, but the Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations.[12] There were additional allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008. Each side denied the allegations, and investigations by Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines.[13]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia.[14] South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine prohibition and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor mine problem, and there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In May 2009, South Ossetian authorities reportedly recovered mines from a cache in Yeredvi village, which they alleged were from Georgia.[15]



[1] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[2] Statement of Georgia, Mine Ban Treaty Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006. In an April 2010 letter to the Monitor, Georgia stated that it “has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munition Conventions, but the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region did not allow us to adjoin the mentioned conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.” “Updated information from the Government of Georgia for annual publication Landmine Monitor Report 2010,” (No. 8/37-02) provided by email from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[3] Interview with David Kapanadze, Senior Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[5] Statement by George Dolidze, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 25 September 2010, p. 8.

[7] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. In August 2007, Georgia said that it had recovered an undisclosed number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from a former Russian army base in Akhalkalaki. Pavel Belov, “Russians Leave Cesium and Landmines Behind in Georgia,” Kommersant, 17 August 2007.

[8] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 31 March 2010.

[9] The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; and Note Verbale to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 17 January 2001.

[10] Statement by George Dolidze, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia made similar statements previously.

[12] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 826–827.

[14] For background on South Ossetia, see Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 2009, pp. 16–20.

[15] “Terrorist cache with arms found in S. Ossetia – minister,” Interfax (South Ossetia), 21 May 2009.


Mine Action

Last updated: 12 November 2018

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

Not a party

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC)/Humanitarian Demining Division (HDD) under DELTA (the State Military Scientific Technical Center) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority

Mine action standards

Draft National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines

Operators in 2017

National:
Georgian Army Engineers Brigade


International:
HALO Trust

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

2.31km2 reported, full extent not known

Cluster munition remnants

Not contaminated, with the possible exception of South Ossetia

Other ERW contamination

ERW including in former firing ranges. UXO also in South Ossetia, though extent unknown

Land release in 2017

Landmines

9,256m2 cleared;39,568m2 reduced by technical survey
5 antipersonnel mines destroyed

Cluster munition remnants

877m2 cleared; 0.8km2 reduced
3 submunitions destroyed

Other ERW

5 ERW destroyed during cluster munition survey and clearance

Progress

Landmines

In 2017, clearance was completed of the Chognari minefield, part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. HALO Trust does not have access to any of the remaining mined areas due to political and security reasons

Notes: ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordnance.

Mine Contamination

Georgia has more than 2.3km2 of mined areas across nine minefields, as set out in the table below. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The problem includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri municipality, and Vaziani village, in Gardabani municipality, both of which are in military zones. Khojali mountain, in Mestia municipality, is on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with Abkhazia, where the size of mined areas is not known.[1]

Mine contamination (at end 2017)[2]

Region

District/Municipality

Village

Contamination

Mined areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli

Marneuli

Kachagani (Red Bridge)

AP and AV mines

1

2,282,852

Gardabani

Vaziani (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2

AP mines

2

4,275

Dusheti

Kadoeti

AP mines

1

23,783

Shida Kartli

Kashuri

Osiauri (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Gori

Zemo Nikozi

AP mines and UXO

1

3,233

Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti

Mestia

Khojali

AP mines

1

N/K

Total

     

8

2,314,143

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle UXO = unexploded ordnance; N/K = not known.

Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the threat has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 mined areas were suspected at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3]

The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia, laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. It is Georgia’s largest minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.[4]

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent 2008 conflict with Russia. HALO Trust has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO demining operators.

Antipersonnel mines have a social, economic, and humanitarian impact in Georgia. At the Red Bridge minefield, for example, the land is used for grazing cattle.[5] The main income of the local population is animal husbandry and therefore safe use of the grazing land is very important. Other remaining minefields are located in remote locations and as they are not guarded, fenced, or marked, locals who use the land for hunting and forging are vulnerable to accidents.[6]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Following clearance of a cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was believed to be free of cluster munition contamination, with the possible exception of South Ossetia.

In 2016, however, Georgia reported the discovery of two submunitions, which were destroyed by the State Security Agency, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs in the Shida Kartli region.[7] In April and July 2016, local communities in this region of Georgia reported finding several submunitions since clearance was completed.[8]

During 2017, HALO conducted non-technical and technical survey in the Shida Kartli region to investigate each of the call-outs.[9] During survey, a total of three submunitions were found, which were identified as residual contamination and destroyed.[10] Two of the submunitions were found in the village of Kvemo Khviti. After investigation, it was determined that they had been moved from the nearby village of Zemo Nikozi, which was affected by cluster munition contamination in 2008.[11] The third submunition, an AO-2.5, was uncovered by a villager in Variani while he was cultivating his field.[12] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had previously conducted subsurface clearance of this area and upon further investigation by HALO it was found that the submunition was below the effective clearance depth achieved by its detectors.[13]

Prior to those recently identified submunitions, the last cluster munition remnant was discovered and cleared in 2014, during HALO operations along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), also in the Shida Kartli region.[14] Furthermore, Georgia has reported that its National Mine Action Authority has not been able to conduct quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (in South Ossetia), and that a conclusion as to whether these regions are indeed free of cluster munition remnants depends on the quality of earlier clearance.[15]

Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through December 2009, HALO cleared some 37km2 of Georgian-controlled territory of submunitions and other ERW.[16] In May 2010, NPA completed clearance of its tasked areas.[17]

HALO believes that the August 2008 conflict was likely to have resulted in some cluster munition remnants in South Ossetia, but it has no way of determining the level of possible contamination, or what, if any, clearance may have been conducted.[18]

Program Management

The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under the State Military Scientific Technical Center—known as “DELTA”—an entity within the Ministry of Defense. It is tasked with coordinating and executing actions to address the ERW threat.[19] In 2013, ERWCC became the Humanitarian Demining Division (HDD) under DELTA.[20] The primary task of the HDD/ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including QA/QC, and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[21] The HDD/ERWCC was established with the support of the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[22]

As of April 2018, there were seven personnel working in theHDD, including a GIS and IMSMA specialist.[23]

Strategic planning

Georgia has identified clearance of the Red Bridge minefield as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[24] Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.[25] Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,[26] but only survey was permitted. HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. The following month, however, the Azerbaijani military demanded that technical survey operations be halted.[27] As of May 2018, all of HALO Trust’s requests to restart clearance in Red Bridge have been refused.[28] According to DELTA, there have been no changes in the accessibility of the Red Bridge minefield and it had no additional information about the current situation.[29]

Legislation and standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS. Georgia does not currently have a timeframe for the establishment of these standards.[30] Once finalized, the NTSGs will be translated and sent to parliament for approval.[31]

Operators

HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military and, as of May 2018, HALO has not been granted access to any of Georgia’s remaining mined areas.[32] In 2017, HALO had 12 operational staff working at the Chognari minefield.[33]

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[34] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, battle area clearance, and EOD.[35] Since March 2015, these engineers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.[36]

Land Release (mines)

In 2017, HALO Trust cleared 9,256m2 of mined area, destroying five antipersonnel mines in the process, and reduced a further 39,568m2 by technical survey. In 2016, HALO cleared 7,288m2 of mined area, and reduced 70,052m2 by technical survey.[37]

Survey in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, HALO confirmed 48,824m2 as contaminated with mines at the Chognari minefield and reduced 39,568m2 of this through technical survey.[38]

The Chognari minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.[39] Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.[40]

The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more
than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area
for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.[41] In addition, certain areas at Chognari will be used to build a water reservoir to supply drinking water to the city of Kutaisi, which has a population of 300,000.[42]

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, HALO only had access to one mine contaminated area, Chognari village in the Imereti region. HALO cleared 9,256m2 of mined area and destroyed five antipersonnel mines at the Chognari minefield. Clearance was completed in September 2017.[43]

In addition, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2017. The mine was found by HALO deminers during technical survey in Shida Kartli region, the mine was not armed and was considered to be abandoned.[44]

Progress in 2018 (mines)

In 2018, HALO planned to conduct non-technical survey in Kadoeti and Khojali, as these areas may be accessible for non-technical survey only.[45] As of April 2018, DELTA was working with the Georgian Ministries, State Security Service and HALO Trust to plan the surveys of these areas.[46]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)


Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2017, HALO reduced 0.8km2 by technical survey in the Shida Kartli region.[47] During the survey, three submunitions were destroyed as spot tasks by the Georgian State Security Service EOD Team.[48]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2017, HALO cleared 877m2 in the Shida Kartli region.[49] During clearance no submunitions were found but five items of other UXO were destroyed.[50]

Progress in 2018 (cluster munition remnants)

The survey of the Shida Kartli region revealed that several areas were contaminated with other types of ERW, such as hand grenades and signal mines.[51] There are plans to conduct clearance of this contamination in the villages of Dvani and Dzevera.[52] Clearance is also planned in the village of Chonto where 24 aircraft bombs were found by a survey team in August 2017.[53] HALO will also undertake one EOD task in the Samegrelo Zemo-Svaneti region to remove an unexploded aircraft bomb, believed to be from a 2008 aircraft attack on the village of Anaklia.[54]

Progress towards completion of mine clearance

Between 2009 and the end of 2012, using international funding HALO cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.[55] In 2013 and 2014, HALO focused on clearing former firing ranges. In 2015, HALO briefly focused on technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield before the survey was forced to halt, and did not undertake any mine clearance. In 2016, in a positive development, HALO began survey and clearance of the Chognari minefield, which it finished clearing in September 2017. HALO does not have access to any of the remaining mined areas due to political and security reasons. If access is not granted to HALO to clear remaining minefields it will consider winding down all operations in Georgia in mid-2019. It is not known if any of the restricted military areas has been cleared of mines.[56]

Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance

It is believed that, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, Georgia is now free from cluster munition contamination following the investigation of contamination in the Shida Kartli region. Georgia has reported that, in the areas outside of its control, it cannot confirm whether or not earlier clearance in these areas was conducted to international humanitarian standards, and with the required quality management.[57]

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[4] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[5] Email from Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[6] Ibid., 25 May 2018.

[7] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 25 April 2018; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 25 May 2018.

[10] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 9 July 2015.

[15] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[16] Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17.

[17] Email from Jonathon “Gus” Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 27 May 2010.

[18] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 11 March 2016.

[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[20] Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 21 March 2017 to 31 March 2018), Form A.

[21] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[22] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009; E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3 (Fall 2011); and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016.

[23] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[24] Ibid., 3 April 2017.

[25] Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.

[26] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[27] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[28] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[29] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[32] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[33] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[34] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015, and 20 June 2016.

[35] Estonia CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 2 April 2012; NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia Fact Sheet, January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[36] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[37] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[38] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[39] Interview with Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016.

[40] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016.

[41] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[42] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[43] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[44] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[45] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[46] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 25 May 2018.

[52] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 30 August 2012.

[56] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 25 May 2018.

[57] Ibid., 3 April 2017.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2020

In 2019, two donors contributed US$0.8million toward clearance operations and victim assistance in Georgia.[1] Georgia has never reported contributions to its own mine action operations.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount (US$)

United States

Victim assistance

US$501,802

501,802

United Kingdom

Clearance

£213,091

272,075

Total

   

773,877

Note: N/A=not applicable.

In the five-year period from 2015–2019, international contributions to mine action activities in Georgia totaled some $6.2 million. Annual contributions varied from a low of about $400,000 in 2016 to a high of $2.5 million in 2017.

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[3]

Year

Total contributions (US$)

2019

773,877

2018

1,544,760

2017

2,531,610

2016

394,717

2015

957,792

Total

6,202,756

 



[1] United Kingdom Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2020; and US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2019,” 2 April 2020.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2019: £1=US$1.2768. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020.

[3] See previous Monitor reports.


Casualties

Last updated: 10 October 2018

Casualties[1] 

All known casualties (through 2017)

1,307 mine/unexploded explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties: 226 killed and 1,081 injured*

 

No mine/ERW casualties were identified in Georgia in 2017 or 2016.[2] The Monitor identified two new civilian antivehicle mine casualties in South Ossetia in 2015.[3] 

In April 2018, two people were injured as they entered a marked mine field in Rustavi.[4] 

ICRC/Georgian Red Cross Society (GRCS) data identified mine/ERW casualties, or victims, in 10 regions of Georgia: Tbilisi, Kvemo Kartli, Shida Kartli, Imereti, Samegrelo, Svaneti, Samtskhe, Javakheti, Kakheti, and Achara. The data indicated that males made up 85% of mine/ERW casualties, while 15% were female.[5] Civilians made up 57% of the casualties with 43% military—combatants at the time of their incident or engaged in police/law enforcement duties. Casualties were caused by mines, ERW, and improvised mines (victim-activated improvised explosive devices).[6] 

GRCS volunteers, supported by the ICRC, collected data on 1,307 mine/ERW victims as of the end of 2017 (226 killed; 1,081 injured).[7] 

Cluster munition casualties

In Georgia, there have been at least 70 casualties due to cluster munitions; all were reported in 2008, including 61 casualties during strikes and nine due to unexploded submunitions.[8] 



[1] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2017 is based on Georgia Red Cross Society (GRCS) data, and on Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nino Burtikashvili, Deputy Secretary General, GRCS, 6 June 2018.

[4] David Qashiashvili, “Explosion at the MIA training base - there are injured,” Rustavi 2, 29 April 2018.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nino Burtikashvili, GRCS, 6 June 2018.

[6] Email from Nino Burtikashvili, GRCS, 29 August 2017.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nino Burtikashvili, GRCS, 6 June 2018.

[8] Human Rights Watch (HRW), A dying practice: use of cluster munitions by Georgia and Russia in August 2008 (New York: HRW, April 2009), pp. 40 and 57. Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46. Georgian cluster munitions killed at least one civilian and injured at least two more when they landed on or near the towns of Tirdznisi and Shindisi.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 04 December 2017

Georgia is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other types of explosive remnants of war (ERW). Georgia has made a commitment to provide victim assistance through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[1] The total number of survivors in Georgia is unknown, though it is estimated to be more than 700.[2]

Assessing victim assistance needs

The Georgia Red Cross Society (GRCS) continued to collect data on the needs of mine/ERW casualties and their families with the aim of “gaining a comprehensive picture of those needs and formulating an effective response.” With ICRC support, data collection by the National Red Cross Society continued in Georgia, including in Abkhazia, to assess the socio-economic needs of mine/ERW victims and formulate an appropriate response. An additional GRCS staff member was trained to update and maintain the mine-action database.[3]

During 2016 and through 2017, the United States (US) provided ongoing support for the development of prosthetic rehabilitation capabilities in Georgia.[4]

Victim assistance coordination

There is no victim assistance coordination mechanism in Georgia. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs coordinates disability issues, including those related to the mine/ERW survivors who have official disability status.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Rehabilitation Center for Persons with Disabilities

Government

Prosthetics services

ORTHOGEORGIA

Private

Prosthetics services

Georgian Foundation For Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR)

National NGO

Prosthetics services

Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (DEA)

National NGO

Educational support for children and adults with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, socio-economic inclusion, legal advice, and awareness-raising

ICBL-GC

National NGO

Assistance to survivors and their families, awareness-raising

ICRC

International organization

Data collection; economic inclusion, emergency assistance, awareness-raising, support to persons with disabilities

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

International organizations

Socio-economic support, including microloans; awareness-raising

 

The ICRC continued to assist survivors through micro-economic initiatives in Georgia.[5] This assistance was supplemented by business training, provided with help from the GRCS.[6]

In South Ossetia, 19 disabled persons accessed physical rehabilitation services and/or obtained assistive devices with ICRC financial assistance. The ICRC also supported awareness-raising activities on the hazardousness of mine/ERW. These activities included a football match for mine/ERW victims featured on television, an ICRC film, and a radio interview with a representative of the ICRC.[7]

In 2016, the ICBL-GC conducted a joint economic inclusion project for persons with disabilities with two other NGOs operating in Georgia. The project was funded by the European Union. Through this project, the ICBL-GC and its partners registered over 500 persons with disabilities in their job seekers database, including some mine/ERW survivors.[8]

GEFPOR fitted prostheses to 61 new patients, three of whom were mine/ERW victims.[9] In September 2015, the construction of a new premises for GEFPOR was completed, having been initiated in 2013. The center was officially opened in November 2016.[10]

The ITF focused on raising the awareness of Georgian representatives about mine action, and in particular mine victim assistance, in order to encourage the creation of national capacities.[11] Established in 2009, the joint IOM and ITF economic inclusion project for mine/ERW was implemented as a pilot program until 2012. The second phase of this program concluded in 2015.[12] The project aimed to improve the standard of living of mine/ERW victims and their families through enhanced employability, greater access to seed funding for starting/expanding their own business, and through improved socio-economic support.[13]

There was a continuing lack of psychological support and social reintegration activities in Georgia.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities; however, these provisions were not effectively enforced and social, educational, and employment discrimination against persons with disabilities remained a problem.[14] In 2014, Georgia adopted a law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination.[15] Legislation required access to buildings for persons with disabilities and stipulated fines for noncompliance. However, very few public facilities or buildings were accessible.[16] Local councils focused on addressing disability-related problems were established in 22 municipalities as part of the government’s 2014–2016 Action Plan on Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.[17]

Georgia signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009 and ratified it on 13 March 2014.



[2] Email from Narine Berikashvili, Monitor Researcher, 17 June 2010; and interview with Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 12 September 2013.

[3] Email from Nino Burtikashvili, Deputy Secretary General, GRCS, 25 July 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 376.

[4] Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons National Annual Report (for calendar year 2016).

[5] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 408.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 410.

[8] Email from Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 20 June 2017.

[9] GEFPOR, “Statistics,” undated.

[10] GEFPOR, “Home,” undated; and ICRC, “Georgia on my mind (and back on its feet),” 2 December 2015.

[11] ITF, “Georgia,” undated.

[12] International Organization for Migration (IOM) Georgia, “Assistance for mine victims,” undated.

[13] ITF, “Annual Report 2013,” Ljubljana, 2014, pp. 60–62.

[14] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Georgia,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 39.

[15] Email from Madonna Kharebava, DEA, 8 July 2014.

[16] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Georgia,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 40.

[17] Ibid., p. 41.