Summary

Non-signatory Libya has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but has not taken any steps to join it. Libya participated in a meeting of the convention in September 2021, and voted in favor of the key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2021.

Libya is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has imported them and possesses a stockpile. The last alleged use of cluster munitions was in 2019 by forces affiliated with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF).

Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Libya has expressed interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps to accede to it.[1]

In March 2020, a Government of National Unity was formed as the new interim authority, ahead of national elections scheduled for 2022.

Under the former government of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya participated in three regional conferences held during the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, Libya attended the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 only as an observer, and did not join in the consensus adoption of the convention.[2] Libya did not attend the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.

Libya participated as an observer at the convention’s Second Review Conference, held in November 2020 and September 2021.[3]

In December 2021, Libya voted in favor of a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Libya has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Libya is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Libya is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. It imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile, but has not shared information on the types and quantities stockpiled or where the munitions are stored.During the uprising that led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, abandoned and unsecured stocks of cluster munitions were seized by anti-government forces and civilians, and subjected to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes. There has been no systematic or coordinated stockpile destruction effort by successive interim governments or clearance operators in Libya.

From the use of cluster munitions in recent years, it is apparent that Libya has stockpiled air-dropped bombs (RBK-series bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M submunitions), ground-fired munitions (MAT-120 mortar projectiles containing submunitions), and an unidentified type of submunition contained in Grad-type 122mm surface-to-surface rockets.[5] In 2004, Jane’s Information Group listed Libya as possessing KMGU dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and RBK-500 series cluster bombs.[6] Spain confirmed transferring 1,055 MAT-120 cluster munitions containing 22,155 submunitions to Libya in 2006 and 2008.[7]

Use

There were no allegations or reports of new use of cluster munitions in Libya in 2021 or the first half of 2022.

The last recorded use of cluster munitions in Libya was in 2019, by forces affiliated with LAAF, formerly known as the Libyan National Army (LNA). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), LAAF forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019.[8] LAAF took responsibility for conducting an attack on Zuwarah Airport on 15–16 August 2019 that involved the use of RBK-500 cluster munitions.[9] In June 2019, the Government of National Accord (GNA) released undated photographs showing the remnants of RBK-250 cluster bombs and various submunitions, which it said were “discovered in greater Tripoli and other areas (Ras al-Lufa, al-Sawani, al-Aziziyah, al-Tugar Mosque and Bir al-Ghanem)” following airstrikes by LAAF forces in May 2019.

Between 2015 and 2018, there were allegations and some evidence of use of cluster munitions in Libya, but the Monitor was not able to conclusively attribute responsibility.[10] An aviation blogger documented cluster munitions being loaded onto LNA aircraft which were used to conduct aerial attacks against opposition forces in 2016–2018.[11] Investigations by international human rights organizations found evidence of LNA cluster bomb use in late 2014 and early 2015.[12]

Government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi used at least three different types of cluster munitions in Libya during 2011:

• RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs in Ajdabiya in March;
• MAT-120 cluster munition mortar projectiles in Misrata in April; and
• Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM)-like submunitions, delivered by 122mm cargo rockets, in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan on an unknown date.[13]

At least 14 states and the European Union (EU) expressed concern over or condemned this use of cluster munitions.[14]

In its formal response to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, NATO confirmed that it did not use cluster munitions in Libya in 2011.[15] However, NATO airstrikes on ammunition storage facilities created hazards when munitions stored by Libya, including cluster munitions, were ejected into the surrounding environment.[16]

Libyan forces used air-delivered cluster munitions, likely RBK-series cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions, at various locations during an intervention in Chad amid the 1986–1987 conflict.[17]

The United States (US) Navy used Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs during an attack on Libyan ships on 25 March 1986, while US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina airfield on 14–15 April 1986.[18]

In 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found the remnants of a German World War II-era SD-2 “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb) and destroyed the remnants of another six such cluster bombs.[19]

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

Landmine contamination in Libya is a legacy of World War II, as well as subsequent armed conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980−1987, which resulted in mines being laid on Libya’s borders with these two countries. Libya’s border with Tunisia is also believed to be contaminated. During Muammar Gaddafi’s four decades in power, mines were emplaced around a number of locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.

Mines were used by both government and opposition forces during the 2011 conflict that resulted in Gaddafi’s overthrow. Since the escalation of conflict in Libya in 2014, there have been reports of the use of both landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by opposition groups.[1] The concentration of violent conflict in urban areas has left densely-populated cities contaminated, complicating survey and clearance efforts.[2] In January 2020, the United Nations (UN) estimated that Libya was contaminated by around 20 million mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[3]

Mine/ERW risk education in Libya is conducted alongside explosive ordnance disposal and battle area clearance, and is integrated with humanitarian assistance. Ongoing hostilities have resulted in large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), whom are a target group for risk education along with children. The humanitarian situation in Libya has deteriorated since the April 2019 offensive by forces aligned to the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar.[4] This led to further displacement and impacted mine action operations, particularly in the Tripoli region near the frontlines.[5]

The UN estimates the number of mine/ERW survivors in Libya to be at least 2,886, with the true number likely to be much higher. The Libyan government provides financial support to survivors, provided they meet eligibility criteria.[6] The government does not run any other victim assistance program and other services are delivered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly Humanity & Inclusion (HI). The conflict has had a debilitating effect on all essential services, and has resulted in an increase in humanitarian needs in the areas affected by violence, particularly in remote regions that were already poorly served. Many municipalities are left to provide essential services, but with limited resources due to weak financial management and distribution systems.[7]

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine Action management and coordination overview[8]

Coordination

LibMAC was established in May 2011 to manage all mine action activities across the country. A management board was appointed by the Ministry of Defence in December 2011.[9] LibMAC holds mine action coordination meetings on a monthly basis.

UNMAS is integrated into the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and provides capacity-building support to LibMAC, including technical training in explosive ordnance disposal, non-technical survey (NTS), and ammunition and chemical safety. UNMAS supports LibMAC accreditation processes for mine action organizations and facilitates coordination with international stakeholders and implementing partners. UNMAS also has an arms and ammunition advisory role. Deployed in March 2011, UNMAS has mainly been operating from Tunis, the capital of neighboring Tunisia, since 2014 due to renewed hostilities in Libya.[10]

ITF Enhancing Human Security has provided capacity-building support to LibMAC since 2014, administering operating costs and salaries.[11] It has also conducted capacity-building in operations, and in internal LibMAC administration processes and procedures.

Information management

LibMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), and planned to transition to IMSMA Core in 2020 with support from GICHD and UNMAS.

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[12]

Coordination

Risk education is included as a topic for discussion in the mine action coordination meetings held monthly by LibMAC, in which operators provide an update on activities and progress, and discuss challenges. Coordination was hampered by the onset of hostilities in April 2019, which resulted in office closures, restricted movement, and downsizing or suspension of funding.[13] While operators reported that coordination resumed several months later, semi-remote management continued to complicate efforts.

National standards and guidelines

Risk education is included within LibMAC’s national mine action standards, which were approved in August 2017 and are published in English and Arabic.[14] The format and content of the standards indicates that they were adapted directly from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim Assistance management and coordination[15]

Laws and policies

The Constitutional Declaration addresses the rights of persons with disabilities by providing for monetary and other types of social assistance for the “protection” of persons with “special needs,” with respect to access to employment, education, healthcare, and provision of other government services. However, it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination.[16]

In Libya, persons with disabilities face “multiple barriers and discrimination.” Article 1 of Law 4 of 2013, related to persons with disabilities “from the liberation battle,” created a new category of “persons with disability” for persons who sustained permanent impairments while fighting in the 2011 uprising against the former Gaddafi government, and also for civilians who sustained injuries during attacks by Gaddafi forces. Claimants in this category receive greater benefits in comparison to other persons with disabilities. Lawyers for Justice in Libya, an NGO, notes that this disparity “highlights inequality in the treatment of people with disabilities as well as discriminating between them on the basis of political association.”[17] In July 2020, representatives from organizations of persons with disabilities presented the Speaker of the House of Representatives with a proposal for measures to improve the quality of life of persons with disabilities in Libya.[18]

The draft constitution of July 2017 includes a specific provision, Article 60, on the rights of persons with disabilities. The article commits Libya to guarantee the health, social, educational, economic, political, sporting, and entertainment rights of persons with disabilities on an equal basis to others, and to make facilities accessible.[19] On 24 September 2018, the House of Representatives passed the constitution referendum law, bringing these measures into effect.[20]

Impact

Contamination

As of the end of 2019, the extent of landmine contamination in Libya was unknown, but included new contamination and improvised mines. New cluster munition remnant contamination was also reported in 2019, but the total extent was unknown. The extent of contamination from ERW in Libya is also unknown, but thought to be massive in scale.

Landmine contamination

There is no accurate estimate of antipersonnel mine contamination in Libya, as many suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have not been surveyed. Improvised mines are thought to have been laid in 2016 by the Islamic State in areas which they controlled, such as Sirte.[21] As of February 2017, data from LibMAC’s IMSMA database reported six confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs)—four in Sirte and two in Misrata, totaling almost 41.5km²—contaminated by antipersonnel landmines. A seventh CHA of 7.5km², in Sirte, was contaminated by antivehicle landmines. Additionally, a large area classified as a single SHA, totaling 223km², was suspected to contain antivehicle mines.[22]

Hostilities since April 2019 have seen the LNA, led by Khalifa Haftar, gain and then subsequently relinquish urban territory around Tripoli. As LNA forces withdrew, they laid landmines and IEDs, meaning the area of contamination will have increased substantially since 2017.[23] It was reported in 2020 that Russian mercenaries in Libya had also planted landmines and IEDs.[24] In May 2020, the Government of National Accord reported significant mine contamination in areas of Tripoli vacated by rebels that month. Landmines and IEDs were emplaced in residential areas and public buildings such as schools and hospitals,[25] placing civilians at great risk and in many instances preventing the return of IDPs.[26]

At the Eighteenth Meeting to State Parties to Mine Ban Treaty in November 2020, Libya reported that the Presidential Council of National Accord had established a working group to investigate the means for acceding to the treaty, noting that mines have caused “excessive damage and pain.” Libya reiterated that it is still suffering from the consequences of World War II-era contamination and new contamination since 2011, including from new mine types used in 2020 in Tripoli.[27]

Cluster munition remnants contamination

Cluster munition contamination in Libya is the consequence of armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, but the full extent is unknown. In 2011, armed forces loyal to Gaddafi used at least three different types of cluster munitions, including the Chinese dual-purpose Type 84, which also functions as an antivehicle mine, and the Spanish MAT-120, which holds 21 submunitions. (See Libya cluster ban policy profile for further information).

In 2012, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported tackling Russian PTAB cluster bombs,[28] while media reports have suggested the presence of a fourth type of cluster munition in Libya, which has not yet been identified.[29] Additional contamination occurred as a result of cluster munitions being ejected from ammunition storage areas bombed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in 2011. An investigation by UNSMIL into a 15–16 August 2019 attack on Zuwarah Airport, that caused two casualties, found RBK-500 cluster munition remnants at the site.[30]

ERW contamination

Ongoing conflict has resulted in significant ERW contamination in many cities and urban areas. The presence of ERW not only poses a significant risk to civilians but impedes humanitarian access and obstructs IDPs from returning home. Exacerbating the problem of ERW is the presence in Libya of the world’s largest uncontrolled ammunition stockpile. UNMAS reports that there are between 150,000–200,000 tons of uncontrolled munitions across the country.[31]

Casualties

Casualties overview[32]

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Casualties in 2019: details[33]

In 2019, 25 casualties were recorded in Libya. The casualty total for 2019 includes five casualties —three people killed and two injured—from an explosion caused when a military vehicle carrying ERW was hit by a civilian car in Qawarisha, southern Benghazi, on 10 April 2019.

In January 2019, UNSMIL reported that three civilians were injured by an ERW whilst collecting scrap metal in Sabha. In February 2019, three boys—aged between nine and 15—were injured by a grenade which exploded as they were collecting scrap metal in Kuweifiya, Benghazi.[34] UNSMIL did not report on civilian conflict casualties after March 2019, but resumed their regular reporting in 2020. Casualty data in Libya was not complete or comprehensive, and lacked key details. Some data for 2019 has reportedly not been entered into the national information management system.[35]

An overall lack of reliable data collection, and inconsistent availability of data, has hampered the possibility of establishing reliable trends related to mine/ERW casualties in Libya. The number of recorded annual casualties has fallen from 184 in 2017, to 74 in 2018 and 25 in 2019; representing a substantial drop from 1,610 casualties reported for 2016 and 1,004 casualties reported for 2015.

However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which reported most of the data for 2016 (1,465 casualties), has not reported information on mine/ERW casualties among the war wounded people treated at ICRC-supported medical centers since then. Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which provided most of the data for 2015 (935 casualties), was unable to collect data from the same hospital sources in 2016. The 2015 and 2016 figures represented drastic increases on the 10 casualties reported for 2014, when data was limited and incomplete. In 2014, many operators were forced to leave Libya amid a deteriorating security situation, and many mine/ERW casualties went unrecorded.[36]

Mine/ERW casualties in Libya continued to be reported throughout 2020, with at least 138 civilian casualties noted in mid-year media reports, including 55 people killed by newly laid mine types.[37]

The total number of casualties over time in Libya is unknown, as many estimates predate the 2011 conflict. The Monitor has recorded 3,351 mine/ERW casualties in Libya from various sources since 2008, with all but 32 of these occurring after 2011. The Libyan Demining Association (LDA) and Libyan Civil Defense Department (LCDD) had registered 1,852 mine casualties by the end of 2006.[38] Previous estimates indicated around 12,000 casualties, with the Libyan police reporting 11,845 casualties between 1940 and 1995 (6,749 killed, 5,096 injured) and the Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies reporting 12,258 (3,874 killed, 8,384 injured) between 1952 and 1975.[39]

Cluster munition casualties

The total number of cluster munition casualties in Libya is not known.

There were two cluster munition casualties reported in Libya in 2019, resulting from an attack on Zuwarah Airport in August.[40]

Previous to this attack, the last cluster munition casualties reported were from cluster munition remnants. Three casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions were reported in 2016. No casualties from unexploded submunitions or cluster munition attacks were reported in 2015, and one casualty from a submunition was identified in 2014. There were unconfirmed reports of unexploded submunition casualties in 2011.

It is possible that some unexploded submunition casualties were reported as mine/ERW casualties, either due to a lack of disaggregated data, or because it was not possible to distinguish the specific type of explosive remnants that caused those casualties.

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators[41]

Clearance

No clearance of antipersonnel landmines or cluster munition remnants was reported in Libya in 2019. In 2018, operators were reported to have destroyed 26,144 items of ERW totaling 203 tons, releasing 674,087km² of land back to communities for use. [42]

More than one million items of ERW, and approximately 54 tons of small arms ammunition, have been cleared in Libya since 2011.[43] Until a systematic nationwide survey is completed, the extent of mine/ERW contamination in the country will remain unknown.

During 2019, LibMAC’s operations section opened 84 tasks mostly for non-technical survey (NTS), risk education and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, performed by international and local NGOs, military engineers and the police in Tripoli, Sirte and Benghazi. LibMAC personnel conducted 52 quality assurance and quality control missions and 23 accreditation procedures.[44]

In 2019–2020, UNMAS supported EOD response, risk education, and NTS activities in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, and Tawergha, in order to facilitate humanitarian activities, early recovery, and prepare for the safe return of IDPs to those areas.[45]

Since 2015, UNMAS has been training civil defense and military engineers in advanced EOD. UNMAS has also provided technical support to the police force with respect to tackling IED contamination and the forensic response required.[46]

DanChurchAid (DCA) has been operational in Libya since 2011, working in Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte to undertake NTS, EOD spot tasks and clearance.[47] Danish Demining Group (DDG) has also been active in Libya since 2011, working in Al Shati and Benghazi on EOD and in partnership with Free Fields Foundation (3F).[48]

The HALO Trust has been active in Libya since 2018 and is currently working in Sirte, conducting mechanical rubble clearance in areas of the city worst affected by conflict. The HALO Trust also has offices in Tripoli and Misrata.[49]

Humanity & Inclusion (HI) conducted a large-scale mine action program in Misrata, Tripoli, and Sirte from 2011–2014. HI re-established an office in Benghazi at the end of 2018 and was conducting risk education and EOD in Tawergha, but these activities ceased in mid-2019 and have not yet resumed.[50]

International operators have been impacted by the ongoing hostilities in Libya, particularly since the April 2019 LNA offensive, which has resulted in technical staff being outside of the country for extended periods. Ongoing conflict and insecurity have also posed a challenge to procurement and supply chains, affecting the import of goods and equipment necessary for mine action.[51]

In November 2020, Libya stated that demining operators in the country faced extreme challenges given the exceptional circumstances, and a lack of logistical means and personnel, techniques, and equipment. However, Libya reported that limited progress was made in 2020 during talks on mine clearance under UN auspices. Libya also confirmed the importance of mine clearance for stability and security, and in its contribution to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular those related to the environment, safe cities, agriculture, economy and infrastructure.[52]

Risk Education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[53]

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiary numbers 2019[54]

In addition to the three organizations whose disaggregated figures are listed in the table above, HI delivered risk education to 5,979 beneficiaries in 2019. Of these, 3,704 were children, while 2,275 were adults. Of the total number of HI beneficiaries, 62% were girls and women.[55]

Between 2016 and August 2020, UNMAS delivered risk education to more than 166,000 people in Libya, including 122,794 children and 43,457 adults. UNMAS provided risk education training to 217 UN staff during 2019 and in the first half of 2020.[56]

Implementation

Risk education is an integrated part of EOD and clearance operations by DCA, DDG, HI and The HALO Trust, and is largely conducted in urban areas. Hotline numbers are provided through risk education, enabling people to report ordnance. Due to the diversity of ERW present in Libya, providing clear messaging on ERW recognition can be challenging.[57]

The HALO Trust specifically conducts risk education as part of its community liaison strategy, to explain its mechanical clearance operations in Sirte. This includes door-to-door leafleting ahead of clearance, and ad hoc risk education at the task site. In addition to informing communities of the operations, awareness is raised regarding the presence of ERW in rubble and damaged buildings.[58]

Risk education is also provided in conjunction with health and protection activities. HI conducted risk education alongside physical and functional rehabilitation, mental health, and psychosocial support services, with risk education also identifying and referring victims to services.[59] DCA projects combine risk education, EOD and battle area clearance (BAC) with non-food items distribution, armed violence reduction, and psychosocial support.[60]

Risk education briefings and safety training are also provided by some operators to humanitarian workers. In 2019, HI teams trained 22 field staff from other organizations working in contaminated areas.[61]

Target groups

Children were reported to be most at risk of being killed or injured by explosive hazards due to their natural curiosity, mobility and lesser awareness and knowledge of the threat. When surviving accidents, children usually need continuous care and follow-up as their needs change often while they grow, which is challenging in Libya due to limited access to healthcare.[62]

The ongoing conflict in Libya has led to a large number of IDPs. In 2017, over 60,000 IDPs were reported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to have returned to Sirte following the defeat of the Islamic State.[63] IDPs are considered particularly vulnerable to the threat from mines/ERW due to their unfamiliarity with hazardous areas, and their increased economic and social vulnerability following displacement.[64] LibMAC reported that since the end of May 2020, the number of civilian accidents related to ERW increased as a result of IDPs returning to their homes in southern Tripoli. Risk education efforts were scaled up in response.[65]

Operators noted that women were often difficult to reach through risk education. They tend to have lower levels of access to information than men, and are harder to reach due to social and cultural norms. The HALO Trust reported conducting separate risk education events for women in women-only spaces, and integrated them with other awareness-raising campaigns. In Sirte, The HALO Trust reached out to 90 women at an event informing women about breast cancer screening.[66]

New developments in 2019 and 2020

LibMAC, in collaboration with UNICEF, reached child IDPs and their caregivers through its local partners, 3F, and the Libyan Red Crescent Society (LRCS), including during emergency relief distributions, and provided risk education through two local radio stations.[67]

In 2019, DCA conducted a mass media campaign in Libya, providing risk education messages through billboards, radio, text messages, and public distribution of awareness-raising materials to reach at-risk communities, including IDP households.[68]

In 2019, UNICEF was in consultation with LibMAC and the Ministry of Education with a view to introducing key risk education messaging into the national school curriculum.[69]

As part of The HALO Trust’s support to the national COVID-19 response in Libya, their risk education leaflet was redesigned to include messaging on good hygiene practices. These leaflets were distributed in Sirte.[70]

From March 2020, COVID-19 hygiene messages and key risk education messages were combined on posters and stickers used by LibMAC, UNICEF, and 3F, which were approved by the National Centre for Disease Control. The dissemination of risk education messages through social media, radio, and TV and the installation of billboards was also scaled up in 2020.[71]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[72]

Needs assessment

According to LibMAC and UNMAS, there is a general lack of casualty data collection, but overall, they report that only 12% of households that include persons with disabilities have adequate access to healthcare, while only 15% could access adequate physical rehabilitation services. Only 5% of these households were able to access the mental health services required. Mine/ERW survivors in Libya face significant barriers to their full socio-economic inclusion.[73]

Medical care and rehabilitation

The primary barriers preventing mine/ERW survivors from accessing health services in 2019 were the lack of medical staff, limited medical supplies and inadequate financial support to pay for care. According to UNOCHA’s 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan, 17.5% of hospitals, 20% of primary healthcare facilities, and 18 specialized hospitals were either partially or completely damaged due to conflict.[74] Persons with disabilities without access to healthcare are the most vulnerable group, and comprise the priority target group for the national health sector response.[75]

In 2019, the primary unmet needs were identified as physical therapy and rehabilitation, especially in Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Misrata, Sabha, Tripoli, and Ubari; the provision of wheelchairs, especially in Al Jufra, Sabha, Sirt, and Tripoli; and the provision of other assistive devices, especially in Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Al Jufra, Al Kufra, Al Marj, Sabha, and Ubari.[76]

No significant change was recorded since a 2016 HI report found that Libya’s rehabilitation system was underdeveloped, and did not have the level of capacity required to address the needs of people with injuries and persons with disabilities.[77] Libya’s rehabilitation sector lacks the raw materials needed for prosthetics, also suffering from a lack of qualified staff, lack of high-quality prosthetics, orthotics and mobility devices, and limited inpatient/outpatient capacity.[78]

Persons with disabilities who needed assistive devices and wheelchairs were generally required to purchase them with private funds, and either had to approach local charities for support or become registered with the Social Solidarity Fund, under the Ministry of Social Affairs, to be eligible for a device. However, eligibility criteria for the Social Solidarity Fund remained unclear, and not all persons with the same impairments qualify.

LibMAC has a dedicated victim assistance department. However, the department has undertaken few activities since 2015 due to a lack of specific funding for victim assistance, limited technical capacity and difficulty coordinating with relevant ministries on data collection and coordination.[79]

HI is the only mine action operator that conducts activities integrating victim assistance in Libya. HI runs a broad program supporting vulnerable persons with disabilities—including mine/ERW survivors—to access health, rehabilitation and psychosocial support services in Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli. HI relies on outreach teams of social workers who identify people in need of support, based on vulnerability criteria. HI has established a referral system to help ensure beneficiaries’ access to services. HI also operates a hotline in Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as a Facebook page in order to receive direct requests for support and self-referrals.[80]

HI donated assistive devices directly to persons with disabilities and injuries, and also to the Social Solidarity Fund for their own distribution, as their stocks have been limited for several years. The health system lacks capacity in physiotherapy, prosthetics, and orthotics. Mobility aids were of low quality and many centers lacked the equipment and materials necessary to provide services. As of August 2017, the Swani Rehabilitation Center, located near Tripoli, was no longer functioning. In 2018, another rehabilitation center closed in Misrata.[81]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

The Ministry of Social Affairs provides basic financial assistance of LYD450 (US$330) per month to mine/ERW survivors through the Social Solidarity Fund. As of December 2018, 1,460 eligible mine/ERW survivors were receiving financial assistance through this fund. The Ministry of Social Affairs also provides access to physical rehabilitation services.[82]

Psychological and psychosocial support for mine/ERW victims is neglected in Libya, and service providers were scarce.[83] There was no official budget for mental health care. Health professionals identified psychosocial support training as a priority for capacity-building. Strong stigma toward psychosocial disabilities and their treatment prevented some war-injured persons from accessing psychosocial support and mental health care.[84] Mental health services were available in only eight districts in Libya.[85]

Cross-cutting

HI trained community focal points, tasked with identifying IDPs with disabilities and those in need of psychosocial support.[86]

While there was a good safety net for vulnerable people in Libya, including persons with disabilities and mine/ERW survivors, this did not apply to foreigners, including migrants.[87]

Policy

The State of Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2020, Libya began to undertake the domestic procedures necessary for its accession to the treaty. A representative of Libya told States Parties in November 2020 that, “We seize this opportunity to convey to you the declaration by the Chair of the Presidential Council of the National Accord government of Libya is willing to join the Mine Ban Treaty,” and that Libya found “this treaty has extraordinary importance to Libya.”[1] He said that a working group had been formed to study and evaluate the necessary steps to complete accession.

The announcement marks a turnaround in Libya’s stance toward the Mine Ban Treaty. Previously, Libyan officials had expressed interest in the treaty, but criticized certain provisions.[2] For example, in October 2017, Libya told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that it accepted the humanitarian concerns raised by antipersonnel landmines and “the fact that they hinder sustainable development.” However, the official criticized the treaty’s lack of reference to “the responsibility that occupying States bear for repairing the damage they have caused and assisting the countries they have colonized.”[3]

On 28 April 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), then the opposition authority in Libya, issued a statement that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”[4] It formally pledged that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.”

On 6 December 2021, Libya voted in favor of annual UNGA Resolution 76/26, which supports the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Libya has voted in favor of the annual resolution every year since 2012.[5]

Despite not joining the Mine Ban Treaty, Libya has participated as an observer at many Meetings of States Parties, as well as at the treaty’s First Review Conference in 2004 and the Third Review Conference in 2014.[6] Libya attended the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually in November 2021, as an observer. Libya did not attend the intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2022.

Libya is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Libya has consistently stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[7]

However, antipersonnel landmines have been acquired and imported, or otherwise transferred into Libya. Under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya accumulated a stockpile of hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines that were later abandoned in unsecure weapons storage depots during 2011.[8] It is unclear how many landmines have been removed from Libyan stocks by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), civilians, and others.

Evidence has emerged showing eight types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines, and two types of antivehicle mines, not seen before in Libya that were used in and around Tripoli in 2019–2020, indicating that the mines had recently been transferred into the country. A March 2021 report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council Panel of Experts on Libya found that private military contractors from Russia brought in the antipersonnel mines to use in their operations.[9]

Landmine types identified in Libya (2011–present)

Several types of antivehicle mines used or found in stocks in Libya contain antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that can cause them to explode due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. When victim-activated, such mines meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine under the Mine Ban Treaty.[10] The characteristics of certain antivehicle mines, including low-metal content mines, seriously complicate clearance efforts.[11]

The post-Gaddafi era government in Libya destroyed some landmine stocks in early 2012, but no information is available on the numbers or types of landmines destroyed.[12]

Use

In May 2020, the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) discovered significant mine contamination in areas of Tripoli vacated by opposing forces that month. The departing rebels were from a Russian government-linked military company, the Wagner Group, which was fighting on behalf of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA). In June 2020, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that “GNA-aligned forces shared photographs on Twitter on May 29 showing four types of antipersonnel landmines manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia and claiming they were ‘laid by the Wagner mercenaries’ in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli. Other photographs shared on social media show mines equipped with tripwires and mines used as triggers to detonate larger improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Video footage shows various explosive charges used to booby-trap homes, including antivehicle mines, paired with various types of fuzes and a mix of electronic timers, circuit boards, and modified cell phones.”[13]

In July 2020, the United States (US) Armed Forces’ Africa Command (AFRICOM) posted photos of an antipersonnel mine allegedly found in a residential area of Tripoli, that it said was brought into Libya by Russian mercenaries. AFRICOM’s Rear Admiral Heidi Berg criticized the “Wagner Group’s reckless use of landmines and booby traps” in Libya, which she said were “harming innocent civilians.”[14]

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[15] During a March 2022 visit to Libya, HRW confirmed that all 35 locations found on the tablet were in fact mined, and that the Wagner Group was present in those areas at the time. These landmines included Soviet era MON-100 and MON-200 directional fragmentation antipersonnel mines, which had not been identified in Libya prior to the 2019–2020 conflict [16] In mid-2020, clearance teams reportedly cleared at least 400 mines and other explosive devices from more than 200 homes in Tripoli’s southern enclave of Salahideen, which they said had been laid by Russian mercenaries.[17]

The new landmine use has been condemned by various governments, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the president of the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty H.E. Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed, the ICBL, and others.[18] Most recently, this mine use was condemned by the Panel of Experts on Libya in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council in May 2022.[19] The mines, both standard and improvised, caused casualties among civilians returning to the contaminated area.

Previous use

There were sporadic reports and allegations of mine use by militias in Libya during 2011–2019.[20] The Shura Council of the Mujahideen in Darna was alleged to have laid landmines in May 2018.[21]

Pro-Gaddafi forces used at least three types of antipersonnel mines during the 2011 conflict; first in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west.

Libya also used antipersonnel mines during its 1980–1987 war with Chad. Libya is contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II, as well as from wars with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980–1987. The perimeter of some facilities in Libya contain minefields, such as an ammunition storage area outside of Ajdabiya that was partially surrounded by a minefield and marked only by a deteriorating fence.[22]

In 2019, Libya received US$24.1 million in international assistance to mine action from eight donors; this was similar to the annual level of funding received in 2017–2018.[1]

The European Union provided the largest contribution with $16.8 million for clearance, risk education activities, as well as other mine action operations that were not disaggregated by sector. This contribution represented 70% of the total international mine action assistance in Libya for 2019.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Note: N/A = not applicable.

In the five-year period from 2015–2019, Libya received more than $92 million in international assistance for mine action. International funding has jumped from less than $7 million in 2015 to more than $20 million each year between 2017 and 2019.

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[3]