Youth Leader’s Forum representative presents the Youth Declaration to the President of the Second Review Conference.

 

The Mine Ban Treaty, which was negotiated in September 1997 and entered into force in March 1999, has established a new international standard rejecting antipersonnel mines. Eighty percent of the world’s nations are party to the treaty, but its most significant achievement may be the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by anyone has been stigmatized. The treaty has had a strong impact even on those that have not yet joined.

Use of antipersonnel mines has become rare. In 2009 and 2010, the Monitor identified only one government laying antipersonnel mines, and use by non-state armed groups was confirmed in six countries, the smallest numbers since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. The Monitor identified 12 producers of antipersonnel mines, again the smallest total ever, and of those as few as three were actively manufacturing mines. The Monitor did not identify any confirmed government transfers of antipersonnel mines, and for the past decade, global trade has consisted solely of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. Eighty-six States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles, and only five still have stocks to destroy. Together, States Parties have destroyed over 45 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

This chapter has two main parts. The first examines States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. The second provides a global overview focused on mine ban policy, use, production, transfer, and stockpiling by states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from May 2009 to mid-2010.

Global Overview: Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have been respected and when ambiguities have arisen, they have usually been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. The treaty’s compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question.

However, as we enter the second decade of Mine Ban Treaty implementation, there are some serious concerns:

• There are highly disturbing allegations that Turkish armed forces used antipersonnel mines in 2009; these are currently the subject of a legal investigation by Turkey.
• In June 2010, Ukraine missed its stockpile destruction deadline and is in serious violation of the convention, as are Belarus, Greece, and Turkey, which missed their deadlines in March 2008 and have still not finished destruction.
• Many States Parties are retaining antipersonnel mines, but are apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes.
• The rate of compliance with annual transparency reporting obligations is at an all-time low.
• Less than 40% of States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty.

Prohibition on use (Article 1)

In 2010, there were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish armed forces in 2009 in areas near the border with Iraq. In June 2010, the Turkish government informed other States Parties that a “legal investigation” into allegations of use was underway and said that once concluded the results would be shared “in full transparency.”^[1] The ICBL said, “This is a matter of grave concern that all States Parties should be following closely. According to publicly available information, this is the most serious and credible allegation of use by the armed forces of a State Party we have ever encountered.”^[2]

In September 2009, the Royal Thai Army Commander in Chief accused Cambodian troops of laying landmines along disputed border areas. This followed similar allegations in October 2008 and April 2009, when Thai soldiers were injured by mines. Cambodia has strongly denied the allegations. It appears from available evidence that at least some of the incidents involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor has not been able to determine which party was responsible. Cambodia and Thailand have not reached a resolution of this matter, and though the President of the Ninth Meeting of States Parties raised the issue with them informally, other States Parties have apparently not pursued this as a serious compliance concern.

Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)

States Parties’ record of compliance with their obligation to destroy all stocks of antipersonnel mines was exemplary until March 2008.^[3] It appears that 151 of the 156 States Parties do not have stockpiles, including 86 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, 64 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mine stocks (except in some cases for training purposes), and one that has not made an official declaration but is not thought to possess stocks (Equatorial Guinea).

The most recent states to complete destruction were Kuwait (declared in July 2009) and Ethiopia (April 2009).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 45 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. This includes about 1.5 million antipersonnel mines destroyed in this reporting period.

The five States Parties that have not yet destroyed their stocks are Belarus, Greece, Iraq, Turkey, and Ukraine. Iraq’s stockpile status was previously uncertain,^[4] but in its Article 7 report submitted in June 2010, Iraq indicated that there are 690 antipersonnel mines stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, in addition to mines retained for training purposes in the Kurdistan region and elsewhere. Iraq’s deadline for stockpile destruction is 1 February 2012.

The excellent record on stockpile destruction was tarnished when Belarus, Greece, and Turkey failed to meet their 1 March 2008 deadline and Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 deadline. Each of these States Parties was not only unable to meet its deadline, but each still had a very large number of mines left to destroy at the time of its deadline (about 3.4 million for Belarus, 1.6 million for Greece, 2.5 million for Turkey, and 6.1 million for Ukraine).

As of September 2010, none of the four could commit to a firm date for completion. Turkey has indicated it hopes to finish in 2010, and Greece in early 2011. Belarus and Ukraine appear to be years away from completion.

These failures present a significant challenge to the overall well-being of the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties recognized the urgent need to solve this problem in Actions 7, 8, and 9 of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, which call on these States Parties to comply without delay and to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date.

Belarus, in violation of the treaty since 1 March 2008, completed destruction of its non-PFM antipersonnel mines in 2006, but has not been able to destroy any of its stock of almost 3.4 million PFM mines due to problems in obtaining international cooperation and assistance. Belarus has always made known its need for financial support to destroy these mines, but a first project with the European Commission (EC) to carry out the destruction failed in 2006 and a second tender launched in July 2009 also failed. Another tender was launched in late June 2010.

Greece, in violation of the treaty since 1 March 2008, did not even begin destroying its stockpile of nearly 1.6 million mines until eight months after its deadline. It took several years before deciding to task a private Greek company to destroy the stocks, and it was slow to react to delays with the shipment of the mines to the subcontractor in Bulgaria for destruction. About 590,000 antipersonnel mines were destroyed before operations halted in early 2010 due to an explosion at the facility, and the contract with the Greek company was subsequently cancelled. In June 2010, Greece said that it was in the final stage of signing a contract with a new company and stated that the new contract would require the destruction of all remaining mines within six months. Greece stated it anticipated completion of destruction by early 2011.

Turkey, in violation of the treaty since 1 March 2008, also started its stockpile destruction program too late. It took the positive step of removing all fuzes from its mines by April 2008, rendering them inoperable, but it experienced delays in building a destruction facility and bringing it up to full capacity. In June 2010, Turkey reported that it had reduced its stockpile to 266,143 antipersonnel mines and said that it expected to complete destruction by the end of 2010.

Ukraine, in violation of the treaty as of 1 June 2010, has destroyed all its non-PFM mines and over 100,000 PFM mines. It has made clear its needs for international assistance to destroy the almost 6 million PFM mines still in its stocks. After a project with the EC fell through in 2007, Ukraine has been trying to find funds from donors aside from the EC to boost its capacity to destroy the mines in a facility it says is already capable of destroying PFM mines.

States Parties have an obligation to provide international cooperation and assistance for stockpile destruction under Article 6, and have recommitted to providing support for stockpile destruction in Actions 37 and 42 of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014.

Reporting on and destroying captured, seized, or newly discovered stockpiles

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, and Uganda reported new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in their Article 7 reports.

• Afghanistan reported that 4,392 antipersonnel mines were discovered, seized, or received through turn-ins during calendar year 2009, and destroyed in 103 events in 21 provinces.
• Algeria revealed that from 2006 to early 2010, it has seized a total of 3,119 antipersonnel mines. It stated that “such munitions were picked up from mine fields to be used at the same time for illegal fishing and terrorism” and has provided information on eight cases referred to the courts as a result of these seizures.
• During a civilian disarmament campaign in Burundi from July to October 2009, 28 antipersonnel mines were surrendered by the population and subsequently destroyed by Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Burundi later reported that its police forces recovered another 76 antipersonnel mines during the civilian disarmament campaign. The mines were destroyed with technical assistance from MAG on 16 June 2010.
• In its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2010, Uganda clarified that 120 Type 72 mines reported destroyed in its 2009 report “had not however been stockpiled, they had been abandoned by non state actors.”

There were also government reports of seizures of antipersonnel mines in Niger and Turkey, although these were not included in their transparency reports.

In addition, there were media reports of seizures of antipersonnel mines. In December 2009, the Colombian army reportedly recovered 2,700 antipersonnel mines from a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) camp, one of the biggest number of mines ever reported seized by a State Party. According to a media report in May 2010, the Internal Affairs Department in Iraq seized a weapons cache containing 106 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in southern Wassit governorate. In April 2010, Macedonian police reportedly seized antipersonnel mines and other weapons from five bunkers near the border with Kosovo.

In 2009 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), for the seventh consecutive year, reported an increase of 346 in the total number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines it has destroyed. Presumably these are newly discovered stocks, mines turned in by the population, or illegal mines seized from criminal elements, but BiH has not explained the changes.

It is a State Party’s responsibility to report on newly discovered or seized mines and on their destruction, both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs. Action 12 of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on states to report on such mines and to destroy them “as a matter of urgent priority.”

States Parties agreed at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to modify Article 7 Forms B and G to encourage such reporting. Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Niger, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda have used Expanded Form B to report on newly discovered mines.

Mines retained for training (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.… The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

Seventy-seven States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. Seventy-seven States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines. This includes 24 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past and have chosen not to retain any mines. Botswana has indicated its intention to retain some mines for training but has never made a formal declaration. Equatorial Guinea has never submitted an initial transparency report, so its status is uncertain, but it is not thought to retain any mines.

States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines

Key developments for calendar year 2009

One State Party that once possessed stockpiles chose not to retain any mines:

• Kuwait joined the 78 States Parties that have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines.

Four States Parties declared retaining mines for the first time:

• Cambodia declared mines retained after many years of reporting no retention. Cambodia indicated that it retained 182 mines for training, but did not provide an explanation in its transparency report.
• In March 2010, a DRC government official confirmed for the first time that the DRC retains some live antipersonnel mines for training. The types and numbers have not yet been reported.
• Cape Verde and Gambia both declared retained mines in their overdue initial Article 7 reports that were submitted in 2009.

One State Party reported consuming retained mines for the first time:

• Greece reported that it consumed 1,066 mines in 2009 in training activities, leaving 6,158.

Several states reduced the amount of mines retained after a reevaluation of their requirements:

• Cyprus announced that following the adoption of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 at the Second Review Conference in December 2009, it conducted a review of the number of mines it retains for training and development purposes to ensure it is the “minimum number absolutely necessary.” As a result, Cyprus stated it had decided to reduce the number of mines it retains by destroying 494 mines in 2010, leaving a total of 500.
• Indonesia destroyed 2,524 of its 4,978 mines initially retained.
• Peru destroyed an additional 1,985 retained mines, leaving 2,060.

A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that retain mines, but apparently are not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same year after year, indicating none are consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details are provided about how the mines are being used.

The following States Parties have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Venezuela.

Some States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but have not explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2009 are: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.

Alternatively, other States Parties increased the number of mines they retain without providing an explanation in their transparency reports. Between the calendar years 2008 and 2009, this included the following states: Australia, Canada, Eritrea, Mozambique, and South Africa.

BiH reports that all of its retained mines do not have fuzes. Other States Parties reporting that some mines they retain are inert or fuzeless, include: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Eritrea, Iraq, Portugal, and Serbia.

A total of 28 States Parties have used expanded Form D of annual Article 7 transparency reports to report on retained mines: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, BiH, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UK.

Transparency reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

As of 30 August 2010 only 56% of States Parties had submitted reports for calendar year 2009.^[5] This is the lowest annual compliance rate in the past decade.^[6]

More disturbingly, of the 68 States Parties that have not submitted a report for 2009, most have not submitted an annual transparency report for two or more years.

Equatorial Guinea is the only State Party to have never submitted an initial transparency report. Its report was due more than eleven years ago, on 28 August 1999.

Cape Verde and Gambia submitted long-overdue initial transparency reports in 2009, but have not submitted updates which were due in April 2010.

In 2010, treaty signatory Poland submitted its eighth voluntary transparency report, while non-signatory Morocco submitted its fourth voluntary report. In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Mongolia (2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.^[7] Other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Armenia, China, and, in 2009 and 2010, Lao PDR.

National legislation (Article 9)

Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and that provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Only 61 of the 156 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.^[8] Kiribati was the latest country to pass national legislation to implement the convention. Its Parliament passed the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2008 on 9 December 2008, and the President approved the law on 28 December 2008.

A total of 14 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.^[9] Mozambique joined this group this year when a proposed law was submitted to Parliament.

A total of 40 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.^[10] Angola and Chile joined this category in the past year. Angola’s new constitution, which the National Assembly approved on 21 January 2010 and the President promulgated on 5 February 2010, makes any international law approved and ratified by Angola an integral part of Angolan law. Chile, which has indicated at times that it is considering new legislation, stated in June 2010 that Law no. 17.798 is sufficient to implement the treaty.

The Monitor is unaware of any progress in 41 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the treaty.^[11] This includes some states that have been reporting that legislation has been underway for a number of years without any specific updates on progress.

Special issues of concern

Since the inception of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assistance with prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with states not party; foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines; the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices; and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes (see Mines retained for training section above).

However, too few states have expressed their views in recent years, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2. For detailed information on States Parties’ policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation, which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty, see previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

Article 1: Joint military operations and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Initially, there was a lack of clarity regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance, particularly with respect to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty. States Parties recognized the need to address ambiguities about the prohibition and over the years have shared views on policy and practice. A general, albeit informal, understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has emerged during the years of discussion.

A total of 44 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty that may use antipersonnel mines.^[12] Eight States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” assistance with use or other banned acts is prohibited: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Article 1: Foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines

With a few exceptions, States Parties have agreed that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits “transit” and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. With respect to transit, the main issue is whether a state not party’s aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, and restock in) the territory of a State Party, including on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. Nearly all states that have addressed the issue, as well as the ICBL and ICRC, believe that if a State Party permits transit of antipersonnel mines, it is violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer.

A total of 33 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.^[13] Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least in certain circumstances. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in its Article 7 report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party.

Article 2: Mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine—even if it is labeled as an antivehicle mine—equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited.

At least 29 States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited.^[14] Five States Parties (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Japan, and the UK) have said that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

In its first statement on the issue, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official told the Monitor in June 2010 that Indonesia believes that “any mines, even anti-vehicle ones, which are fitted with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices which can be triggered by the presence or proximity of human activity qualify as antipersonnel mines according to Article 2, [and] should be banned.”^[15]

There appears to be agreement, with some exceptions, that a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or a tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine.^[16] However, the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[17] Sweden has antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Article 2: Claymore and OZM-72 command-detonated mines

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In the past, options for both means of utilization have often been packaged with the mine.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions.^[18] Several States Parties have extended this command and target activation distinction to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations. States reporting on Claymore mines and OZM-72 mines and steps taken to ensure only command-detonation include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, and Zimbabwe

Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty

The Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty (also known as the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World) was held in Cartagena, Colombia from 30 November to 4 December 2009. The first three days were devoted to a review and future planning, followed by a two-day “high-level segment” with statements from high-level officials.

The main outcomes of the Second Review Conference were the adoption of a five-year review document on the operation and status of the convention from 2005–2009, a strong political declaration of ongoing commitment, and, most importantly, the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014.

Also notable were the declarations of four states (Albania, Greece, Rwanda, and Zambia) that they were now mine-free and the prominence placed on victim assistance during the week. It was positive also that the mine clearance deadline extension requests made during the week were not rubber-stamped by States Parties, lending credibility to the extension process.

There were some serious disappointments, however. Ukraine stated it would miss its stockpile destruction deadline in June 2010, and the three states (Belarus, Greece, and Turkey) that had already missed their stockpile destruction deadlines could not set firm deadlines for completion. Too many states said they were in danger of failing to clear contaminated areas by their deadlines and many that received extensions just one year prior were not on track to meet their planned demining targets.

The ICBL considered the Second Review Conference a great success, with a very encouraging recommitment and rededication to the work of the treaty from governments and NGOs alike. It laid a strong foundation for progress over the next five years, with an ambitious but flexible road map.

Global Overview: States not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Although no additional countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 2009 or the first half of 2010, the power of the international standard rejecting the weapon continued to be evident. Only one government (Myanmar) newly laid antipersonnel mines, no state transfers of mines were recorded, and as few as three states were actively producing mines. The Monitor removed Russia from its list of those actively using antipersonnel mines, and removed Nepal from its list of those producing.

Universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.^[19] Outreach by States Parties to the treaty, the ICBL, and others has helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to many countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 156 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 25 acceded.^[20] Thirty-nine countries are not yet States Parties, including two that signed long ago but have not yet ratified (Marshall Islands and Poland).

No state has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Palau acceded on 18 November 2007.

Significant developments during the reporting period regarding the universalization of the treaty include:

• Finland confirmed its intention to accede in 2012. In May 2010, an official told the Monitor that the accession process was underway, and that a working group with representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense would prepare a document for consideration by the Parliament and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy.
• Lao PDR told States Parties at the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings that it was “in the process of consultation with all Ministries concerned to verify [our] readiness to meet all obligations” of the treaty. “We are confident that, with all the efforts we are undertaking and the support from the international community, the Lao PDR would be able to become party [to the Mine Ban Treaty] in the coming years.”^[21]
• Lebanon participated as an observer in the Second Review Conference where its representative told States Parties that Lebanon “hopes to sign…in the future,” and it “looks forward to joining the Mine Ban Treaty.”^[22]
• A Marshall Islands representative said in October 2009 that the country’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would help clear the way for the government to tackle ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.
• Poland confirmed its intention to ratify in 2012. In February 2009, Poland’s Council of Ministers formally accepted a policy that sets 2012 as the date for its ratification.
• The Sri Lanka Army commander said in October 2009 that since the end of the conflict, the government had reviewed Sri Lanka’s position on the Mine Ban Treaty, stating, “In the current post-conflict phase in Sri Lanka, it is timely that we focus our attention on the international legal instruments that limit or ban certain weapons based on humanitarian grounds.”^[23]
• Tonga’s ambassador to the UN in New York told the ICBL in October 2009 that the question of Mine Ban Treaty accession has been reviewed by several government departments and must now receive final approval from Cabinet and then the Privy Council. This was the first time that Tonga had indicated a process is underway to join the Mine Ban Treaty.
• The United States has been carrying out a comprehensive review of its national landmine policy and its position on the Mine Ban Treaty since late 2009. The US attended as an observer the Second Review Conference, its first ever participation in a formal Mine Ban Treaty meeting.

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines is their vote on the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 64/56 was adopted on 2 December 2009 by a vote of 160 in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions.^[24] Of the 39 states not party to the treaty, 19 voted in favor,^[25] 18 abstained, and two were absent.^[26]

Since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, the number of states voting in favor has ranged from a low of 139 in 1999 to a high of 164 in 2007. The number of states abstaining has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2005 and 2006.^[27] Several states that used to consistently abstain or be absent now vote in favor, including Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, and Morocco.

Use of antipersonnel mines

Government forces

The Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines in numerous areas of the country every year since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. It appears that the army’s use of mines decreased significantly in 2009 and 2010, as the level of conflict with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) waned, and the army withdrew from many frontline bases where it previously laid mines.

In this edition, the Monitor for the first time is not identifying Russia as an ongoing, active user of antipersonnel mines. There have been no confirmed instances—or even serious allegations—of new use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces in 2009 or 2010 in Chechnya or elsewhere. In December 2009, Russia said that during the previous few years it has not planted new antipersonnel mines on the territory of Russia including the Northern Caucasus republics. During interviews with the Monitor, military engineers and officers in the Northern Caucasus also denied use in recent years.

There were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in 2009 by the armed forces of Turkey and Cambodia, both States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (see Prohibition on use section above).

Non-state armed groups

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continued to use both antipersonnel landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). An IED that is victim-activated (it explodes from the contact, presence, or proximity of a person) is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated (the user decides when to detonate it) is not prohibited by the treaty.^[28] Both types of IEDs are often referred to by the media, militaries, and governments as “landmines,” and the Monitor consistently attempts to determine if an IED was victim-activated or command-detonated. In the vast majority of instances around the world in recent years, IEDs were employed in command-detonated mode.

In this reporting period, since May 2009, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated IEDs in at least six countries, including three States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, and Yemen) and three states not party to the treaty (India, Myanmar, and Pakistan). This is one fewer country than cited in the previous edition of the Monitor, with the removal of Peru and Sri Lanka, and the addition of Yemen.

Additionally, some NSAG use of landmines and victim-activated IEDs may have taken place in Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, but the Monitor has been unable to independently confirm from available information.

In Afghanistan, most Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) mine/IED attacks involved use of command-detonated IEDs, but there were a growing number of reports and allegations of new Taliban use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. In September 2009, US forces in northwest Kandahar province said that widespread use by the Taliban of victim-activated IEDs was leading to one of the highest US casualty rates of any area in Afghanistan.

In Colombia, FARC and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. In December 2009, the Colombian army reported recovering 2,700 antipersonnel mines from a FARC camp in Tolima.

In India, an army official stated in April 2010 that NSAGs had used IEDs against the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir and that government forces had recovered unspecified types of mines. Media reports identified several recoveries of antivehicle mines in Jammu and Kashmir.

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999 including the KNLA, the Karenni Army, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. The Monitor received information that the Kachin Independence Organization/Army, which has a non-hostility pact with the government, has started laying antipersonnel mines for the first time since 1991.

In Pakistan, the government alleged that “terrorists had on several occasions used mines and IEDs against army personnel and civilians.”^[29] An army representative said in May 2009 that the army had encountered victim-activated IEDs and factory-made antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province, which it attributed to the Pakistani Taliban and “foreign elements.” It appears that Baloch and Taliban groups continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and IEDs in 2009 and 2010.

In Yemen, following the February 2010 cease-fire and the opening up of the conflict region, it has become evident that the rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in Sa’daa governorate used antipersonnel mines during the conflict, mostly if not exclusively homemade mines (victim-activated IEDs).

With respect to the cases where the Monitor has been unable to confirm new use:

• In Peru, remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” since early 2007; however, in this reporting period there was only one incident reported, which generated controversy.^[30]
• In its Article 7 report submitted in 2010, the Philippines reported that its armed forces investigated “various instances of use of Anti-Personnel Mines by Armed Non-State Actors” in 2009, but the report does not comment on any findings.
• In Thailand, the insurgency in the south has made extensive use of command-detonated IEDs and there may have been isolated instances of use of victim-activated IEDs. In May and October 2009 officials investigating other acts of armed violence in Yala province were injured reportedly after stepping on explosive devices.
• Officials in Turkey have continued to accuse the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK)/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.

While there has been no further use of antipersonnel mines in Sri Lanka since the May 2009 cease-fire, it is noteworthy that the Sri Lanka Army is now claiming that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) laid millions of mines during the conflict, mostly antipersonnel mines.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, and Yemen.

Production of antipersonnel mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.^[31] Thirty-nine of these states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, Nepal, and Poland.^[32] Among those who have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty are a majority of the major producers from the 1970s to 1990s.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam.

In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. For example, China, Iran, the US, and Vietnam have all said they are not currently producing. It is unclear if Cuba, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and Singapore were actively producing in 2009–2010. India and Pakistan acknowledge ongoing production, and it seems certain Myanmar is actively producing.

Nepal was removed from the Monitor’s list of producers in this reporting period, following two official declarations that Nepal does not produce antipersonnel mines. In December 2009, the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction told States Parties at the Second Review Conference that Nepal does not produce landmines, and in June 2010, Nepal wrote to the Monitor that “Nepal does not produce any kind of antipersonnel landmines.”^[33]

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, and Myanmar produce antipersonnel mines, mostly of the improvised variety. The sophistication of such mines varies greatly. Prior to its defeat in 2009, the LTTE in Sri Lanka probably produced the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs.

Trade in antipersonnel mines

A de facto ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

In February 2010, a Greek news agency reported that US Special Forces seized a vessel heading for Sudan or Somalia carrying a cargo of weapons, including antipersonnel mines. According to the report, the serial numbers of the mines indicated they were US-manufactured mines purchased by the Greek Army, then transferred to Bulgaria for destruction.^[34] Greece stated that it considered the allegation unfounded, and Bulgarian officials undertook an investigation which concluded that the allegation was groundless.

In May 2009, Egyptian authorities seized 48 antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, allegedly destined for Palestinian groups in Gaza. Pakistan has alleged that mines and IEDs used by “terrorists…had foreign imprints, confirming the link between terrorists and actors beyond the borders of Pakistan.”^[35] Algerian authorities provided documentation on mines being harvested from minefields in order to be sold for other purposes from 2006 to early 2010, a period during which it intercepted 3,119 antipersonnel mines.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have formal moratoria on the export of antipersonnel mines, including: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including: Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that as many as 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile more than 160 million antipersonnel mines. Of the 39 states not party, four have said that they do not stockpile any antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga, and Tuvalu.

States not party that stockpile antipersonnel mines

Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain China Cuba Egypt Finland Georgia India Iran Israel Kazakhstan North Korea South Korea Kyrgyzstan Lao PDR Lebanon Libya

Mongolia Morocco Myanmar Nepal Oman Pakistan Poland Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Somalia Sri Lanka Syria United Arab Emirates (UAE) US Uzbekistan Vietnam

There is however some ambiguity as to whether some states not party to the treaty possess stocks. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks. A Libyan defense official said in 2004 that Libya no longer stockpiles, but that information has not been confirmed. Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they only have small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to just two states: China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Poland, a state that has signed but not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, declared a stockpile of 1.05 million mines at the end of 2002 but has since reduced it to 200,013 mines, destroying 133,000 mines in 2009.

Destruction of stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Five States Parties still possess stockpiles: Belarus, Greece, Iraq, Turkey, and Ukraine. As of mid-2010, they collectively held about 10.7 million antipersonnel mines (see Destruction of stockpiles section above).

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to the mine stocks of previous regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia). Others produce their own improvised mines, or acquire mines by lifting them from minefields. In states not party they have also been known to capture them, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Most often, the Monitor identifies whether an NSAG possesses stocks through reports of seizures by government forces.

In June 2009, the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) informed the NGO Geneva Call that it had handed over its stockpiles to the African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu in early 2007, and AMISOM then destroyed them. The USC/SNA, which signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning use of antipersonnel mines in 2002, previously stated it possessed 1,800 antipersonnel mines.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer, and use of landmines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. It entered into force on 3 December 1998. The inadequacy of the 1996 protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 94 states were party to Amended Protocol II as of September 2010. The Dominican Republic (21 June 2010) joined during this reporting period.

Just 11 of the 94 States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, Georgia, India, Israel, South Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and the US.^[36] Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 11 countries as the remainder are bound by the higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The 11th Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II took place in November 2009, with an informal meeting of experts in April 2010. Only 52% of States Parties to the protocol have submitted national annual reports for calendar year 2009 as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II.

CCW Protocol II on landmines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still twelve states that are party to it but have not joined the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Serbia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.^[37] During informal meetings in 2010, CCW States Parties began discussions on mechanisms to terminate Protocol II at the CCW Review Conference in late 2011.

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols on landmines

Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Egypt Iran Kazakhstan North Korea

Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Myanmar Nepal Oman

Saudi Arabia Singapore Somalia Syria UAE Vietnam

Note: States denoted in italics also produce antipersonnel mines.

 

[1] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 21 June 2010. Notes by HRW. Similarly, Turkey wrote to the ICBL in June, stating, “Legal investigation concerning the allegations of use of mines in the Sirnak province of Turkey is underway. Once concluded, results of the investigation will be shared in full transparency with the international community.” Letter from Volkan Oskiper, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Sylvie Brigot, Executive Director, ICBL, 17 June 2010.