© www.SimpleRegard.org/HI, February 2009
Deminers at work in Casamance, Senegal.

Summary

In 2009, mine action programs cleared at least 198km² of mined areas,^[1] by far the highest total ever recorded by the Monitor. A further 359km² of battle areas^[2] were also cleared in 2009, including 38km² of cluster munition contaminated areas.^[3]

As of September 2010, 66 states, as well as seven areas not internationally recognized, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected. In June 2010, Nicaragua formally declared that it had completed its clearance obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, making it the 16th State Party to do so, in addition to being the first State Party that had been granted an extension to its original deadline to meet its revised deadline.^[4] In 2009, Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Zambia made similar declarations of completion of their Article 5 clearance obligations (see Compliance with Article 5 obligations section below).^[5] In addition, China, a state not party, declared it had cleared all mined areas from its territory.

Significant challenges remain, however, in clearing all mined areas. Mine-affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas on territory under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but within 10 years of joining the treaty. The first clearance deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions.^[6] In 2009, a further three States Parties with 2010 deadlines and one with a 2009 deadline that had already expired (Uganda) formally requested and received extensions, with periods ranging from three to ten years.^[7]

In 2010, as of late September, three States Parties sought extensions of between two months and ten years: Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania.^[8] Thus, as of September 2010, a total of 22 States Parties were already benefiting from additional time for clearance (one of which had reported fulfilling its obligations) or were formally seeking more time. In stark contrast, the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty had pledged that by the Second Review Conference in 2009 “few, if any, States Parties” would require an extension to their treaty deadlines.^[9]

Mine-affected states and other areas as of September 2010^[10]

The Extent of the Problem

More than a decade after the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, a reliable determination of the size of the global landmine problem still does not exist. Early estimates of the numbers of mines laid often proved to be very inaccurate. Similarly, subsequent surveys have often overestimated the size of contaminated areas. Nonetheless, a better understanding has been obtained more recently of the extent of contamination in both mined areas and battle areas, with estimates reduced significantly, largely as a result of enhanced land release procedures, including better survey.

Mine contamination

As of September 2010, 66 states, as well as seven areas not internationally recognized, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected.

Although any estimate should be treated with due caution, the Monitor believes that less than 3,000km² of land remained contaminated with mines as of September 2010. Increasingly, data gathering efforts are—rightly—seeking to define more accurately the perimeters of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)^[11] and to ensure there is sufficient evidence of contamination for these SHAs to be entered into national mine action databases.[12

Mine clearance in 2009

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part due to poor quality of reporting. However, the Monitor believes at least 198km² of mined areas were cleared in 2009 (compared with 158km² in 2008), with the destruction of at least more than 255,000 antipersonnel mines and 37,000 antivehicle mines. This certainly understates the total clearance achieved.^[13] The largest cleared areas were by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, which accounted for more than 80% of the total recorded clearance.^[14]

Mine clearance in 2009

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.
* Very large area clearance reported for the army is not included in these totals as it has not been independently verified and it is not known how much of the reported clearance is either BAC or the result of area reduction or cancellation.
** The figure for clearance includes land released by “mine search techniques,” the term Croatia gives to clearance conducted on land suspected to be contaminated as a result of general survey and for which the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) issues clearance certificates.
*** Clearance was only in Kurdistan region in 2009.
**** Major clearance reported for the Angolan National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem) is not included as it is not known how much of the reported clearance is either BAC or the result of area reduction or cancellation.

Land release

Despite enhanced use of land release procedures in many affected countries, there continues to be far too much clearance of land that is not contaminated with any form of explosive ordnance. For example, reported clearance of 2.63km² in Mozambique in 2009 includes 1km² cleared by the Mozambique National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem) for a commercial company, but no ordnance was found.

In part, land release is a recognition that some surveys have led to excessive estimates of SHAs.^[15] There is also now a better understanding that an array of tools short of full clearance enables SHAs to be addressed efficiently and with a high degree of safety for both program personnel and the intended beneficiaries. These tools and techniques include better information gathering and verification, and greater use of high-quality non-technical^[16] and technical survey.^[17]

Care must be taken however when applying land release to ensure that certain basic principles are followed.^[18] In particular, any land confirmed to be contaminated must be fully cleared to humanitarian standards to meet the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the process of cancellation of SHAs by non-technical survey and release of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) by technical survey must be accountable and follow applicable mine action standards.^[19]

Compliance with Article 5 Obligations

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party destroys all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is one of the greatest challenges facing States Parties to the treaty.

In 2009, five States Parties declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations: Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Zambia.^[20] In June 2010, Nicaragua did the same. This makes a total of 16 States Parties that have declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations. In addition, the situation in Djibouti, with a deadline that expired on 1 March 2009, remains unclear, ostensibly due to an unresolved border conflict with Eritrea.^[21] The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), has not formally reported the presence of mined areas. There is also believed to be contamination in the breakaway Transnistrian Republic in Moldova, over which Moldova (2011 Article 5 deadline) asserts its jurisdiction.

Set against this progress, more than ten years after the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 mine-affected States Parties have either missed their deadlines or have formally declared that they are not in a position to complete clearance operations before the ten-year deadline (see Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests table below). One State Party—Uganda—declared at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that it would meet its 1 August 2009 deadline, only to submit a three-year extension request to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit on 19 August 2009.^[22] One State Party—Venezuela—has yet to begin demining 11 years after joining the treaty, which cannot be considered compliant with Article 5’s requirement to clear mined areas “as soon as possible.”

Extension requests submitted in 2010

Three States Parties formally requested an extension to their Article 5 deadlines in 2010 for the first time.

Under Article 5 of the treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. On 29 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a ten-year extension to its deadline and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and the revised extension request were: a decrease in the forecast number of NGO demining teams from 85 to 49 in 2014–2020, and a decrease of almost US$150 million in the funds required during the same period. However, the operational plan and the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia would contribute $21 million for 14 demining squads.^[23]

Guinea-Bissau’s Article 5 deadline is 1 November 2011. In September 2010, it requested a two-month extension until January 2012, noting “Although Guinea-Bissau is still positive that it will be able to complete its implementation of Article 5 in known areas by its deadline of 1 November 2011, it is unknown what will be discovered by an upcoming survey that will begin in mid-September 2010. Unfortunately the results of this survey will not be available until the first quarter of 2011, the year of Guinea-Bissau’s deadline and after the last formal meeting of the States Parties before Guinea-Bissau’s deadline.”^[24]

Mauritania’s Article 5 deadline is 1 January 2011. On 10 April 2010, Mauritania submitted a request for a five-year extension to the deadline. Mauritania explained that the reasons were a lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining operations, use of only manual demining techniques, and difficult soil and climatic factors.^[25] In presenting the request to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, Mauritania stated that it had a “coherent plan” that combined land release by survey and clearance and that it hoped to involve Handicap International and Norwegian People’s Aid in its demining program.^[26] Only minimal mine clearance occurred in 2009, however.^[27] In September 2010, Mauritania submitted a revised request but did not amend the extension period it was seeking.^[28]

On 18 June 2010, Denmark submitted a second extension request, seeking an additional 18 months through July 2012 to enable it to complete mine clearance operations.^[29] On 22 June 2010, in its presentation of the request to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Denmark stated that a clearance contractor had been identified in a competitive tender process in May 2010 and that mine clearance would commence by 1 July 2010. It further stated that the contractor had been “given until the end of 2011 to complete the clearance. We have then added a six months buffer-period to allow weather-caused delays as well as to complete quality control of the area. Consequentially, Denmark will be able to release the area at latest by 1 of July 2012.”^[30]

At the Second Review Conference, Zimbabwe said that since the beginning of 2009 “no significant progress has been made” due to the lack of both international and national support. As a result, the extension to the deadline for re-surveying approved by States Parties as part of its Article 5 extension request will not be completed until 2012, and only then if sufficient support is made available.^[31] At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2010 Zimbabwe repeated that it would not be able to complete the surveying in the 22-month extension period and noted that it would be requesting another extension.^[32] On 3 August 2010, Zimbabwe submitted a second extension request for a further two years—particularly to enable additional survey, but not with a view to completing clearance—through 1 January 2013.

Progress in States Parties granted extensions in 2008 and 2009

Many of the States Parties granted extensions in 2008 and 2009 have since made disappointing progress. Of greatest concern is Venezuela, which has not taken any meaningful steps to implement its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations either before or following the granting of a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline in 2008. Venezuela is the only mine-affected State Party that has yet to initiate formal clearance operations, more than 10 years after adhering to the treaty. Four-year clearance operations at the six contaminated naval bases were planned to begin in October 2010, but in June 2010, at the Standing Committee meetings, Venezuela claimed a severe drought as one of the reasons demining could not begin as planned,^[33] as well as a fall in its Gross National Product and new priorities for the government. In response, the ICBL stated that “the time for excuses is over; the time for clearance is now.”^[34]

BiH has so far failed to meet the targets set in the BiH Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 which provides for completing clearance within BiH’s revised Article 5 deadline. Demining organizations manually cleared 1.94km² in 2009, barely one-fifth of planned clearance for the year and 1.22km² (63%) less than the amount cleared in 2008.^[35] In 2010, BiH planned manual clearance of 9.27km² but in June it reported it had completed clearance of only 1km².^[36] The BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) has continued to assert that it could achieve the targets set for that period by 2012, and then continue working as planned in its extension request, if it received adequate external financing.^[37]

In Cambodia, which received a 10-year extension in 2009, the extent of contamination is still not known with any precision, although the first phase of a baseline survey of the country’s 21 most mine-affected districts (in the northwest of the country along the border with Thailand) was due for completion by the end of 2010 and is expected to provide a more precise definition of the residual mine problem.^[38] Contamination includes the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s to block insurgent infiltration, which constitutes the densest contamination in the country with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.^[39]

In December 2009, Chad urged UNDP “to reduce the administrative burdens” that had delayed the implementation of the planned contamination survey, the conduct of which was the aim of its initial extension request. In March 2009, Japan had made a grant of almost $5.6 million through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), managed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). After prolonged delays by the UN in processing the funds,^[40] a contract was signed with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in April 2010. The delays caused MAG to leave Chad in January 2010, but it returned under the new contract to conduct the survey and further demining later in the year, beginning work in September 2010 after a period of re-accreditation and retraining, and the arrival of equipment.^[41]

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Chad announced that it would be submitting a second, short extension request to enable the survey to be conducted.^[42] The ICBL expressed deep disappointment that the UN’s internal processes in managing the funds had prevented the survey from being conducted during the existing extension period, as had been planned.^[43] Chad’s first extension was due to expire in January 2011. In September 2010, Chad submitted a request for an additional three years to conduct both survey and clearance, but without an expectation to finish clearance.

Croatia plans to reduce 688km² of suspected mined area by the end of its extension period, including 311km² through clearance and 377km² through “mine search.”^[44] However, it has failed to achieve the targets set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request in the two years since it was approved. In 2008, it released 42.5km² compared with the target of 53km² and in 2009 it released 62.59km², significantly less than the 73km² projected in the extension request. As a result, Croatia still had 887.8km² of suspected mined area at the start of 2010 compared with the 871km² projected in the extension request.^[45]

At the Second Review Conference of the treaty, Ecuador said it had made “a conscious commitment” to the international community through its Article 5 deadline extension request to clear all its mines as soon as possible.^[46] In the past decade, however, Ecuador has cleared a total of only 133,316m² of mined areas, including only 8,191m² in 2009, leaving 463,006m² of mined areas to be released.^[47]

In Jordan, mine clearance dropped significantly in 2009, primarily as a result of funding shortfalls. At the Second Review Conference, Jordan said it planned to complete clearance of its northern border with Syria by the end of 2011 but that the project faced a financial gap, and if it could not raise the required funds for 2010 and 2011, “the deadline for completing the project will in all probability have to be revisited.” Jordan also said it needed to mobilize additional financial, technical, and human resources in order to complete clearance of mines in the Jordan Valley within its Article 5 deadline.^[48] At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, Jordan said it had attracted funding for 2010 and the first half of 2011 and, although it still needed to raise $1.5 million to ensure completion, it expressed confidence it would meet its extended clearance deadline.^[49]

Despite finding new suspected hazardous areas through community liaison and from the HALO survey on the Zimbabwe border, and receiving almost $2 million less overall than it had hoped for from donors, it was claimed that Mozambique was still on schedule as of the end of 2009 to meet its extended Article 5 deadline by 2014.^[50]

Peru’s revised deadline is 1 March 2017. Peru appears to be on track with its extension request for clearing national infrastructure that is contaminated (three prisons and two police bases), though falling slightly behind on clearance of the border area with Ecuador. In order to complete clearance faster than the extension period, as encouraged by the decision by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties on Peru’s request, the ICBL has suggested to Peru that it redeploy police demining personnel to the border once it has finished clearing the mined infrastructure.

Senegal, which received a seven-year extension to its deadline in 2008, has not reported in detail on its progress in demining in 2009 and has still to determine the extent of remaining contamination. At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed its hope that it would fulfill its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continues.^[51] Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period, except for “truly exceptional circumstances.”^[52] In the past five years, demining has cleared only a very small extent of mine contamination, and the total estimate for mined areas to be released has almost doubled, leading to concerns that Senegal will not even meet its revised Article 5 deadline. In June 2010, Senegal stated that if additional funding were secured, it expected to meet its obligations in time.^[53]

Thailand has not made much progress during its extension period. Thailand’s extension request said it would increase the area cleared in a single year to 43km² in 2009—it actually cleared only 2.54km²—and to achieve this target the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) envisaged increasing its human resource capacity to 800 deminers by the end of April 2009.^[54] TMAC, however, has not had access to the financial or human resources it needs to fulfill the objectives set out in its extension request. The inadequate army and government support for TMAC calls into question the relevance of the plans for tackling its remaining contamination set out in its Article 5 extension request and signals the probable need to submit an amended extension request taking realistic account of available resources.

The UK is not complying with part of the terms of its 10-year extension request, granted in 2008. Although it finished clearance of the three mined areas, as committed to as part of the decision on its request, the UK did not, however, announce any further clearance plans for the 113 remaining mined areas. The UK had committed to providing “as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010 a detailed explanation of … the implications for future demining” in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.^[55] At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the UK stated that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office “will now analyse the data gathered from this project and make recommendations for future work based on this analysis to the new Government. We intend to report the findings of our analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.”^[56] In a statement to the meeting, the ICBL regretted the failure of the UK to meet its commitment by the stated deadline, noting that detailed plans for completing clearance had been expected by 30 June.

In granting Yemen’s five-year extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties had noted the “value of further clarity regarding the extent of Yemen’s remaining challenge and on steps taken by Yemen to overcome the technical challenges that have posed as impeding circumstances in the past.” Nonetheless, despite significant concerns about the reliability of its data, Yemen has made significant progress in mine clearance since becoming a State Party to the treaty.^[57] Yemen did not update the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in June 2010 on its progress in implementing its Article 5 obligations, despite the undertaking of States Parties under Action Point 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan to report at such meetings.

In certain cases, there has been a lack of progress in demining contested borders (particularly in the case of Thailand/Cambodia, and Tajikistan and its neighbors). This is partly a result of a lack of clear delineation or demarcation of the border. Jordan, however, informed the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that although a dispute over the border with Syria had not been fully resolved, the two countries had agreed that demining could proceed unhindered.^[58]

Compliance with Article 5 among States Parties with later deadlines

Without enhanced efforts, future compliance with Article 5 deadlines seems likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, the Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on track to comply with their treaty obligations by their deadlines, indicated below in parentheses: Afghanistan (2013); Algeria (2012); Angola (2013); Chile (2012); Cyprus (2013); DRC (2012); Eritrea (2012); Sudan (2014); and Turkey (2014). In some cases, the problem is inadequate funding; more often, delays in initiating a program, poor management, and insufficient political will are the root causes. Regrettably, Article 5 clearance deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the exception.

Algeria’s latest Article 7 report notes that they have “deferred” clearance from their plan to complete demining operations in 2007 of mines they laid in the north as a result of the “continuing threat from terrorist groups.”^[59] It is not lawful to maintain minefields for the purpose of protecting infrastructure against unlawful infiltration, which, in the view of the ICBL, would constitute prohibited use under the Mine Ban Treaty.^[60]

At the end of 2009, Serbia (2014 Article 5 deadline) reported it had completed clearance of the border with Croatia and its most recent Article 7 report for calendar year 2009 does not report any mined areas. However, Serbia has stated repeatedly that it has not completed mine clearance and that it needed to survey areas on the border with Kosovo, where it had received information that there might be some remaining mined areas.

Among States Parties with later deadlines, Iraq (2018 Article 5 deadline) is a particular concern. Less than a year after it became party to the treaty as one of the world’s worst affected countries, Iraq had made scant effort to mobilize resources needed to address its contamination—indeed, no national contributions were reported for 2009. Worse, it had even suspended all clearance by demining operators outside Kurdish areas, raising serious concerns about the extent to which political leaders understood the severity and socio-economic significance of the problem, or their treaty obligations.

Clearance operations in the center and south of Iraq were halted by a suspension of operations order imposed by the Ministry of Defense on 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and in order to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.^[61] The Ministry of Defense partially lifted the suspension in May 2009 to allow operators to conduct non-technical survey and risk education, but the ban on clearance and demolitions of cleared items remained in place until August 2009. Even then, however, accrediting organizations for operations was slow, and no demolitions of cleared items by any organization except the military were possible until May 2010.^[62] Despite these problems, some positive steps have been recorded. For example, the Iraq Mine Action Strategy, 2010 to 2012 was approved and launched on 21 February 2010.^[63]

Montenegro (2017 Article 5 deadline) reported to the media in November 2007 that it had completed clearance of mines on its territory.^[64] Its Article 7 report for 2008 stated, “There are no areas under Montenegro’s jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.”^[65] However, Montenegro still had to survey a mountainous area on its borders with BiH and Croatia to clarify if the contamination that affects the Croatian side of the border also affects Montenegro.^[66] By September 2010, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations.

In addition, certain States Parties have still to acknowledge that they are legally obliged by the treaty to clear areas they either control or over which they assert jurisdiction.^[67] As of September 2010, Turkey had not yet formally acknowledged its responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus, which is controlled by Turkish forces. Should Turkey fail to fulfill its legal obligations, the ICBL believes that in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty, the Republic of Cyprus, as the State Party asserting jurisdiction over the whole territory of the island of Cyprus, including the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces, will be obliged to seek an extension to its deadline. The government of Cyprus has not yet declared whether it will seek an extension. In July 2010, Cyprus stated that “[T]he government of Cyprus considers Turkey responsible under the Convention for the clearance of mines in areas north of the buffer zone, since the government of the Republic of Cyprus is prevented from exercising effective control in the occupied areas of Cyprus due to the illegal presence of the Turkish occupation forces, and since the mines were laid by the Turkish occupation forces in 1974.”^[68]

In the case of Moldova, which has a 1 March 2011 Article 5 deadline, a statement in June 2008 by a government official had raised hopes that it had acknowledged its responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. This statement was, however, later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Clearance by states not party

There has also been significant progress in demining in certain states not party to the treaty to the Mine Ban Treaty, notably in China, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, as well as in Taiwan. In 2009, at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, China said its completion of demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam “represents the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s territory.”^[69] Mine clearance operations were initiated by HALO Trust in Georgia in 2009, and Israel and Libya have been considering engaging in further mine clearance operations on their territory.

Explosive Remnants of War Contamination

There are certainly tens and probably hundreds of millions of items of explosive remnants of war (ERW) contaminating countries affected by armed conflict.^[70] For example, Lao PDR and Vietnam are still massively contaminated as a result of United States bombing campaigns four decades earlier, although no credible estimates of the full extent of contamination currently exist. Afghanistan and Cambodia, two of the world’s most mine-affected nations, are today suffering more casualties from ERW than from mines.

The entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 1 August 2010 highlighted a specific threat that the Monitor has reported on for many years—that of cluster munition remnants, especially unexploded submunitions.^[71] Although the full extent of contamination is still to be determined, the Monitor identified at least 23 states and three areas with some degree of unexploded submunition contamination on their territory.^[72] It is hoped that reporting under the convention will clarify further the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants.

Battle area clearance

Battle area clearance (BAC) seeks to clean up former combat areas of ERW.^[73] BAC tends to be far quicker than mine clearance for two main reasons. First, in certain circumstances visual inspection of an area may be sufficient without the need to conduct instrument-assisted search. Second, even when sub-surface clearance is deemed necessary, as BAC is seeking to detect far greater quantities of metal than occur in common antipersonnel mines and as it does not normally have to leave an area metal free, it does not need such sensitive detectors as are used for mine clearance. Accordingly, operations endure far fewer false positive signals from harmless metal fragments and coverage of a SHA tends to be far quicker than mine clearance.

Battle area clearance in 2009

Despite problems in ensuring that BAC is not double reported (i.e. sub-surface clearance is repeated in surface clearance figures), the Monitor believes at least 359km² of battle areas (other than those containing cluster munition remnants) were cleared in 2009, with the destruction of 2.2 million other items of ERW. This total includes clearance of at least 38km² of cluster munition-contaminated land, with the destruction of 55,156 submunitions.^[74] Among affected states and areas, the largest amount of BAC was reported by only four mine action programs—in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Lao PDR—which together accounted for 90% of the total recorded clearance (see Battle area clearance in 2009 table below).

Battle area clearance in 2009

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.

Information Management

Reliable land release—and efficient mine clearance and BAC—is dependent on an effective information management system.^[75] This begins with systematic, high-quality data gathering, a fundamental pre-requisite that has too often been lacking in mine action, despite the huge sums of money that donors have contributed to the sector. It also befits a sector receiving half a billion dollars annually to report accurately and promptly on its achievements.

The quality of reporting on the precise amount of contaminated areas and land released through clearance or survey is uneven but is generally poor. Strictly, the Mine Ban Treaty only requires reporting on locations of areas cleared and the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed, but at the Second Review Conference States Parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, which requires that each affected State Party:

• “Identify, if they have not yet done so, the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced, report this information as required by Article 7, no later than the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, and incorporate the information into national action plans and relevant broader development and reconstruction plans.”^[76]
• “Provide annually, in accordance with Article 7, precise information on the number, location and size of mined areas, anticipated particular technical or operational challenges, plans to clear or otherwise release these areas and information on the areas already released, disaggregated by release through clearance, technical survey and non-technical survey.”^[77]

In 2010, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Turkey, among others, all failed to report appropriately on their clearance during the previous calendar year.

To look at one example, the lack of a functioning national mine action database is one of the most protracted problems in the mine action program in Angola. Despite years of international technical assistance, huge quantities of data from surveys, trained data entry personnel, the provision of computer equipment, and the establishment of provincial mine action center offices to facilitate data management, Angola is unable to accurately report its annual achievements or to state its remaining problem in quantifiable terms such as the number of SHAs, the number of impacted communities, or the estimated size of the contaminated area. In May 2009, Angola appealed for international assistance under Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty to help it solve its data management problem.^[78] The coordinator of the national mine action center told the Monitor in April 2010 that Angola would not submit an Article 7 report until the database problems were sorted out.^[79]

Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups

NSAGs have sometimes carried out limited mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal operations. In India, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation, has reported to the NGO Geneva Call that it has marked a number of dangerous areas that have not been cleared by the Indian Army in the northeast of the country.^[80]

In Senegal, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) is not known to have carried out any humanitarian demining. In May 2010, however, Geneva Call and a local Senegalese NGO, the Association for the Promotion of the Rural Borough of Nyassia–Solidarity, Development, Peace (Association pour la Promotion Rurale de l’Arrondissement de Nyassia–Solidarité, Développement, Paix), met with senior commanders of the MFDC “Kassolol” faction, who reiterated their agreement in principle with progressive humanitarian demining of the Casamance region. Previously, the MFDC had categorically refused demining until a final settlement of the conflict was reached with the government.^[81]

Deminer Security

Deminers continue to be the targets or victims of armed violence in a number of countries. In Afghanistan, Danish Demining Group (DDG) experienced two attacks in 2009, the first on 15 July and the second five days later on 20 July in Balkh province, which resulted in the death of a group supervisor.^[82] Seven people working for MineTech International were killed in armed violence in 2009, including three armed security guards killed in an ambush in April. Four other MineTech staff were killed in an ambush the next month as they transported equipment. In addition, a total of 30 deminers were abducted in six separate incidents in 2009, although all were subsequently released. A total of 18 other attacks on deminers resulted in loss of or damage to equipment and/or vehicles.^[83] Attacks continued in 2010. In April, a targeted Taliban attack on the Demining Agency for Afghanistan involved two command-detonated improvised explosive device blasts in quick succession resulting in five deminers being killed and another 15 injured—probably the worst attack on deminers anywhere in recent years.

On 12 April 2010, two HALO national staff were killed and two others injured in Somaliland when a HALO vehicle detonated a PRBM-3 antivehicle mine on a track the organization often used in Dabagorayaale in Togdheer region. The incident occurred while staff were returning to base camp from demining operations. There was no information to suggest the track was mined. This was the first death from a mine accident in HALO’s ten years of operation in Somaliland.^[84] An internal investigation concluded HALO had been deliberately targeted as a result of employment issues with national staff. As of mid-2010, the Somaliland authorities were continuing their own investigation into the incident.^[85]

Mine/ERW Risk Education

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) continues to be conducted in affected states and other areas, with some new programs or projects being initiated in 2009, although globally the extent of RE appears to be reducing in line with the threat.

In Algeria in 2009, on the basis of an earlier needs assessment, Handicap International (HI) initiated a two-year RE and victim assistance capacity-building project in partnership with the authorities and 10 local disability associations.^[86] The project is focused on three affected regions in the east of the country (El Tarf, Souk-Ahras, and Tebessa) and three in the west (Bechar, Naama, and Tlemcen).^[87]

In 2009, Chad continued to provide RE in refugee camps, at sites with internally displaced persons (IDPs), schools, and high-risk areas. Following new hazards emerging from actions by NSAGs in central and eastern Chad, the National Demining Center (Centre National de Déminage, CND) deployed RE teams to affected areas to warn of the dangers of ERW.^[88] As of July 2010, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), had developed an RE strategy, which they were hoping to implement during the remainder of the year. Linked to this initiative has been the setting up of an ERW “Hot Line” reporting system. As of mid-2010 the system had only been tested within Abéché, but “due to its success” it was planned to conduct the initiative in all major towns across eastern Chad.^[89]

In Iraq, UNICEF was working with the regional mine action centers on finalizing a national strategy for RE in 2010, holding a workshop on strategy, standards, and guidelines in June 2010 that involved implementing partners and representatives of government ministries. However, the program was said to face an array of major challenges from poor funding (and decreasing government allocations) for RE, limited local human and other resources, slow accreditation procedures, lack of government policy enforcing the roles of concerned ministries, and continuous changes at the policy-making level.^[90]

In Pakistan, since July 2009, UNICEF has supported a Pakistani NGO, the Sustainable Peace and Development Organisation (SPADO), and other NGOs in developing and implementing RE activities in Malakand division and other conflict-affected areas in the northwest. After an initial training jointly conducted by UNICEF and HI, NGOs received technical assistance through a coordination mechanism that meets monthly.^[91]

Also in Pakistan, HI started an emergency RE program for IDPs in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in August 2009, funded by the European Commission initially for six months, but this funding was later extended. The program, comprising a manager and eight agents, delivered RE to 1.5 million IDPs in camps and temporary schools, mainly in Mardi and Swabi districts but also in Swat and Buner. The program distributed RE materials and prepared radio spots and messages broadcast on local radio and cable television.^[92]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) started community-based RE in March 2009 in partnership with SPADO and as of June 2010 was operating 15 four-person teams, including three all-women teams, in four districts of Buner, Dir, Shangla, and Swat.^[93] In five months (through June 2010), FSD reported that the program had conducted 3,869 RE sessions, reaching some 419,271 people. As a result of its RE, 228 items of UXO had been reported to the military for destruction.^[94]

MAG started an RE project in Pakistan in March 2010, also in partnership with SPADO. MAG provided RE training for SPADO staff as a first step towards training community personnel in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the NWFP. The initial project was due to run for five months up to August 2010, but MAG planned to apply for an extension.^[95]