Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues | Annex: Timeline of Use

Introduction

This report documents the positive impact that the Convention on Cluster Munitions is making as States Parties conclude their first decade of implementation. Adopted in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008, the convention opened for signature in Oslo, Norway, six months later and entered into force on 1 August 2010.[1] Today it is widely acknowledged as the principal framework for the worldwide effort to eradicate cluster munitions and thereby prevent further human suffering from the weapons.

There were 103 States Parties to the convention as of 1 August 2018. Another 17 states have signed but not yet ratified to become States Parties themselves. The pace of universalizing the convention has continued to slow. Since publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, in September 2017, the only state to ratify or accede was Sri Lanka, which acceded on 1 March 2018.

A decade on, many reasons provided by states for their lack of ratification or accession to the convention increasingly sound like excuses for inaction rather than challenges to be overcome. Israel, Russia, the United States (US), and other major non-signatories to the convention hardened their defense of cluster munitions during the reporting period. This shows how now, more than ever, is the time to defend existing norms prohibiting inhumane weapons, such as cluster munitions.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that the stigma against cluster munitions continues to grow. More than two-dozen non-signatories have voted since 2015 for an annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Most states that stockpile cluster munitions have never themselves used the weapons. Several states outside the convention have destroyed their stocks and companies have stopped producing them. As a recent workshop of Pacific island states concluded, there is a “clear moral and humanitarian rationale for joining” the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2]

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continues its work to promote implementation and universalization of the convention. In his May 2018 “Agenda for Disarmament,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres praised NGOs and campaigners of the CMC for convincing states to stem the unacceptable harm caused by cluster munitions by negotiating the 2008 convention.[3]

The CMC views compliance with core obligations as essential to ensuring the convention makes a positive impact. According to the Monitor’s review of available evidence there have never been any instances, or even allegations, of any State Party using cluster munitions.

In the reporting period, there was new use of cluster munitions in Syria and Yemen, as well as allegations of use in Egypt and Libya. None of these states are party to the convention.

None of the 17 States Parties that produced cluster munitions in the past have violated this core obligation. The Monitor seeks clarification or confirmation on South Africa’s report that cluster munitions were apparently produced until 2012—after it signed, but before it ratified the convention.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions also prohibits the acquisition and stockpiling of cluster munitions and adherence with the requirement that States Parties destroy their stocks within eight years so far remains untarnished. All States Parties facing the first stockpile destruction deadline—1 August 2018—successfully destroyed their stocks in time, including Croatia, Slovenia, and Spain in the past year. New State Party Cuba also completed its stockpile destruction, while Switzerland is expected to announce completion shortly after this report goes to print.

Of the 93 countries that stockpiled cluster munitions when this provision was negotiated, 32 have since completed destruction of their stocks, almost all due to the convention. States Parties have destroyed a collective total of 1.4 million cluster munitions and more than 177 million submunitions, which means that 99% of the total reported global stocks held by States Parties have now been destroyed. During 2017, seven States Parties destroyed a total of 33,551 cluster munitions and 1.7 million submunitions.

A total of 30 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to enforce their implementation of the convention’s provisions, most recently Cameroon in December 2016. Another 20 States Parties are in the process of adopting specific implementation legislation for the convention, while 43 view existing legislation as sufficient to ensure their adherence.

Some 87% of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports detailing the actions they are taking to implement and promote the convention, while compliance with the annual reporting obligation is less impressive.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2017 and the first half of 2018, with some updates through to 1 August. All findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available from the Monitor website.[4]

Universalization

Under Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties must encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[5]

Accessions

Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions became binding international law on 1 August 2010, states can no longer sign, but instead must join through a process known as accession, which is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.[6]

A dozen countries have acceded to the convention, most recently Sri Lanka on 1 March 2018.[7] Sri Lanka joined after years of outreach by local campaigners. According to the government, a 2015 “paradigm shift in…policy” was driven by a desire “to see Sri Lanka again a committed member of the international community to promote disarmament and humanitarian mine action.”[8]

Yet there were few other positive developments regarding possible accessions to the convention in the reporting period. Notably, in August 2017, South Sudan’s executive Council of Ministers unanimously approved the country’s accession to the convention.[9] As of July 2018, its parliament is considering a legislative measure approving the government’s decision to accede to the convention.[10]

During the reporting period, certain non-signatories hardened their defense of cluster munitions:

• Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a local journalist with a list of the government’s long-standing criticisms of the convention in early 2018, but also acknowledged “the serious humanitarian problems caused by the use of cluster munitions.”[11]
• China told States Parties in September 2017 that it “cannot join the convention at the moment…due to our national defence needs,” but expressed appreciation for its “humanitarian spirit.”[12]
• Israel’s Haaretz reported in August 2017 on the government’s decision to purchase an artillery system made in Israel rather than Germany, apparently to allow Israeli forces to use cluster munitions in the future.[13]
• Russia repeated its many criticisms of the convention during an October 2017 UN meeting and said its assessment of convention “has not changed.”[14]
• The US issued a 30 November 2017 Department of Defense policy directive, abandoning a long-standing requirement that, after 2018, the US would not use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate.[15]

Ratifications

A total of 53 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2010 and are now States Parties. Benin was the last signatory to ratify the convention, on 10 July 2017.

At the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017:

• Gambia announced its intent to complete ratification shortly, noting “there is strong political will” to do so following a recent change in government.[16]
• Haiti said that a “draft decree of ratification of the convention has been submitted for assessment by the legislature.”[17]
• The Philippines said that after “certificates of concurrence” are collected from four ministries, the ratification proposal will be forwarded to the president for signature and then introduced for Senate approval.[18]

There was otherwise little progress toward ratification by the 14 other signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions during the reporting period.[19]

Namibia again signaled its intent to ratify the convention in September 2016, but still has not completed the process. Liberia’s parliament has not adopted ratification legislation introduced in mid-2015. Uganda’s Cabinet received a ratification package for the convention in May 2016 that has not yet been submitted to parliament for consideration and approval.[20] Angolan officials say they are making a strong case for ratification, but the government still has not referred the convention to parliament for consideration and approval.[21] There were few moves to ratify in the reporting period by the other signatories from Sub-Saharan Africa: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, and Tanzania.

Indonesia has conducted extensive stakeholder consultations over the past decade, but still has not started the parliamentary approval process required to ratify. The status of Jamaica’s ratification is unknown.

The position of the last European Union (EU) signatory Cyprus is perhaps the most disappointing for those seeking to universalize the convention. In June 2018, the foreign minister of Cyprus said the government’s ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions is “still pending…due to the fact that Turkey, which has not joined the convention, is still illegally occupying the northern part of Cyprus.”[22]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Michael Biontino, served as president of the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 4–6 September 2017. A total of 82 countries attended the meeting—59 States Parties, eight signatories, and 15 non-signatories—as well as UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the convention and condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[23]

This was the only international meeting of the convention during the reporting period, but States Parties convened regional and other meetings. New Zealand and Zambia hosted a workshop on national implementing legislation and transparency measures for the convention during the annual session of UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in New York on 17 October 2017.[24]

Representatives from seven non-signatories to the convention from the Pacific region attended a regional workshop on the convention and other humanitarian disarmament treaties convened by New Zealand in Auckland on 12–14 February 2018.[25]

No state proposed to add cluster munitions back on to the program of work of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) during its last annual meeting in Geneva in November 2017.[26] The failure of the CCW’s 2011 Review Conference to adopt a draft protocol on cluster munitions has affirmed the central position of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

The CMC continues its advocacy in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation, including small grants to support national campaign members.[27]

The Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the UN in Geneva has agreed to serve as president of the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 3–5 September 2018.[28] The UN has received sufficient funds to enable the meeting to be held, but states owed the convention $19,415 as of 31 May 2018.[29]

UN General Assembly Resolution 72/54

On 4 December 2017, 142 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 72/54, which urges all states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[30] Non-signatories Russia and Zimbabwe were the only states to vote against the resolution, for the third consecutive year. All of the 36 states that abstained from voting on the resolution were non-signatories to the convention with the exception of signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

A total of 32 non-signatories to the convention voted in favor of Resolution 72/54, including Nepal and Yemen for the first time.[31] Several states and groups of states made detailed statements explaining their vote on the resolution and position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[32] Poland delivered what has become an annual statement on behalf of itself and EU non-signatories Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Romania.[33]

Since its introduction in 2015, the annual UNGA resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions has become a key barometer for gauging support of non-signatories for the convention’s goals. In 2016, 141 states voted in favor of the resolution, with two against and 39 abstentions.[34] In 2015, 139 states voted in favor the first resolution, with two against and 39 abstentions.[35]

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

At least 21 governments in 40 countries and four disputed territories have used cluster munitions since the end of World War II, as detailed in the following table and longer timeline of cluster munition use included at the end of this chapter. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

Summary of states that have used cluster munitions and locations used[36]

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics.

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[37]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems from cluster munitions, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Several past users of cluster munitions are now States Parties to the convention and have relinquished any use of these weapons under any circumstances such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party to the convention.

Cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011 and 2015), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–present).[38]

New use

In this reporting period (July 2017–July 2018), cluster munitions were used in Syria and Yemen, while allegations of new use in Egypt and Libya could not be conclusively confirmed by the Monitor. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Civilian harm caused by new use of cluster munitions has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations. In September 2017, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[39] Approximately 20 countries and the EU publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions during the meeting, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[40]

New use in Syria

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. The Monitor has documented at least 36 cluster munition attacks between July 2017 and June 2018, but could not verify additional evidence of at least two-dozen more possible cluster munition attacks. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 reported at least 600 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and July 2017, including 238 attacks between August 2016 and July 2017.

This indicates a significant drop in new use in the reporting period, but the number of cluster munition attacks was certainly higher, as many attacks likely went unrecorded. Local residents, journalists, activists, and first responders continue to record and share evidence of cluster munition use in Syria, but such first-hand information has become increasingly scarce. Additionally, videos and photographs showing cluster munition remnants often do not provide information on the date or circumstances of use.

During the reporting period, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorates or provinces of Damascus and Idlib, while there was also new use of cluster munitions in Aleppo, As-Suwayda, Deir ez-Zor, and Rif Dimashq governorates. All of the country’s 14 governorates except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012; As-Suwayda governorate was added to this list after a 22 May 2018 attack using OTR-21 Tochka ballistic missile and 9N24 submunitions.[41]

Various groups have reported new use of cluster munitions in Syria over the past year:

• Siege Watch issued a report on Eastern Ghouta that lists eight cluster munition attacks by Syrian government forces supported by Russia between 2 February and 11 March 2018.[42]
• Human Rights Watch investigated a 21 September 2017 cluster munition attack using ShOAB-0.5 submunitions on Qalaat Al-Madiq in Idlib that killed at least two civilians and injured at least one.[43] It identified at least 12 cluster bomb attacks in Jisr Al-Shughur, Al-Tamaneh, and other parts of Idlib governorate between 19 September and 30 September.

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[44] There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia initiated a joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but the overall number of reported attacks has decreased in the year to July 2018.[45]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[46]

In a December 2016 statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not explicitly deny Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but stated that Russia views cluster munitions as “a legal means of warfare” and claimed the “Russian military unflinchingly adhere[s] to the norms of international humanitarian law.”[47]

There has been no evidence that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[48] In July 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command said, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[49]

Israel has undertaken air strikes and artillery and missile attacks in Syria, particularly over the past year, but there is no evidence to indicate this has involved the use of cluster munitions.

IS used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014 and may have continued to use them since then.[50] As the Syria conflict continues, it is not possible to determine with confidence if other armed groups have used cluster munitions. There is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by their victim, such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[51]

At least 13 types of air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions have been used in Syria as well as an unknown type of rocket-delivered submunition. When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions, and in what quantities, remains unknown, but they were all manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia, with one exception.[52]

New use in Yemen

On 26 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began a military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah, whose military wing is also known as the Houthi armed group (Houthi), that was continuing as of 1 July 2018.[53] None of the states participating in Saudi Arabia’s coalition—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen—are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The coalition however receives support from States Parties such as France and the UK.

The Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015. Most of the recorded cluster munition attacks were documented in 2015, 2016, and up to February 2017, as shown in the following table.[54]

Cluster munitions used in Yemen since April 2015[55]

One review of official Houthi news reports by a group of independent researchers found evidence of four possible cluster munition attacks in Saada and Taizz governorates in 2017—after February—that the media articles attributed to the Saudi-led coalition.[56] International organizations and media have been unable to access the north of Yemen, where these cluster munition attacks were reported.

Cluster Munition Monitor did not find evidence of new cluster munition use in Yemen in the first half of 2018. A representative from a commercial company assisting the Saudi-led coalition to clear landmines and explosive remnants of war in Yemen told the Monitor in June 2018 that the company is not aware of any new cluster munition use in the first half of 2018.[57]

Cluster munition attacks are likely going unrecorded in Yemen in the reporting period as first-hand evidence has become increasingly challenging to collect. Since 2015, seven types of air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions supplied by three countries have been used in Yemen.

Alleged use in Egypt

In February 2018, Amnesty International condemned new use of cluster munitions in the Sinai by the Egyptian Air Force, citing evidence contained in two videos posted by Egyptian military social media accounts, including one released on 9 February that showed US-made CBU-87 Combined Effects Munitions, each containing 202 BLU-97 bomblets, being loaded on to Egyptian aircraft.[58] A 20 February 2018 video posted on Twitter by the Egyptian Army’s official spokesperson shows a US made Mk-118 submunition used in Rockeye cluster bombs lying on the ground that Egyptian armed forces alleged they found and destroyed in northern Sinai.[59]

As of 1 July 2018, Egyptian officials have not responded to requests from The New York Times, the CMC, Amnesty International, and others to confirm or deny that the country’s armed forces has used cluster munitions in northern Sinai. Cluster Munition Monitor has not been able to conclusively confirm new use by Egyptian forces on the basis of available evidence. It will continue to monitor and evaluate the situation in the Sinai regarding possible cluster munition use.

Alleged use in Libya

Cluster Munition Monitor has not been able to independently verify and confirm recent evidence of possible cluster munition use in Libya due in large part to a lack of independent media and local reporting from inside the country.

Evidence collected by an aviation-focused blogger indicates that Libyan National Army (LNA) forces are continuing to mount cluster munitions on their aircraft that they use to conduct air attacks on opposition forces. A photograph published by the blogger in June 2018 shows a Soviet/Russian RBK-250–270 PTAB-2.5M cluster bomb mounted on a MiG-23 aircraft that reportedly flew sorties to southern Sebha.[60] This was the only evidence of possible use in the first half of 2018.

During 2017, there were three sightings of cluster munitions affixed to Libyan aircraft, all in the first half of the year:

• A photograph reportedly taken on 4 February 2017 at Benina airbase shows at least seven RBK-series PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh cluster bombs lying on the tarmac. The “bombing location” is listed as “Benghazi-al-Sabri.”[61]
• Video and photographs reportedly taken on 3 March 2017 show an RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M being mounted on a MiG-23 aircraft of the LNA/Air Force.[62] Reportedly this aircraft then flew sorties to south of Nofaliya and in the Jufrah area.[63]
• Two videos reportedly taken at Benina airbase on 3 March 2017 show LNA technicians mounting two RBK-250 cluster bombs on two LNA aircraft that then allegedly flew sorties to Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Sidra.[64]

The forces of Khalifa Hiftar receive air support from Egypt and the UAE, which both possess cluster munitions and have not acceded to the ban convention. In November 2017, the Egyptian Army released a video of a possible cluster munition attack by the Egyptian Air Force on a convoy of trucks in Libya.[65]

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single strike in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed its cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used them. In the past, NSAG use of cluster munitions has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by IS), and Ukraine (by opposition forces).[66]

Production of Cluster Munitions

A total of 34 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions, of which 18 ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[67]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so, as listed in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and most are located in Asia and Europe.

Cluster munition producers

It is unclear if all of these countries produced cluster munitions in 2017 and/or the first half of 2018 because of a lack of transparency and available data. Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the US have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[68]

During the reporting period, Russia began testing the “Drel” PBK-500U gliding cluster bomb, a new cluster munition developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise according to the company.[69]

Israel reportedly rejected an upgrade of artillery systems for the Israel Defense Forces that would have included a system made in Germany because of the German government’s insistence that Israel not use it to deliver cluster munitions. Haaretz published a piece entitled the “Cluster Bomb Nation” that criticized the decision to instead purchase an artillery system made by local company Elbit.[70]

Brazilian company Avibrás Aeroespacial SA in March 2017 did not deny it still produces ASTROS surface-to-surface rockets with submunition warheads, but claimed that since 2001 the rockets are equipped with a “reliable self-destruct device” that it incorrectly said “complies with humanitarian principles and legislation” of the ban convention.[71]

US company Textron Systems Corporation announced in August 2016 it will no longer produce cluster munitions (CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons), which it manufactured for each sales order.[72] Textron was the last US manufacturer of cluster munitions.[73] The US Army awarded a $71 million contract in April 2018 to acquire 1,250 155mm BONUS artillery projectiles from a company in Sweden.[74] These projectiles deliver two sensor-fuzed submunitions and are not prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Singapore Technologies Engineering announced in November 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[75]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. There have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any of the convention’s States Parties since the convention took effect in August 2010.

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[76]

During the reporting period, South Africa submitted its initial transparency report for the convention.[77] Under the section on the decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities, it stated: “None. Production ceased in 2012 at Rheinmetall, denel.” Cluster Munition Monitor has asked Rheinmetall Denel Munition to clarify if the company produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012, when South Africa was a signatory to the convention, as well as asked South Africa for clarification on the report.[78] Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatories to any treaty are required not to engage in acts that would defeat the treaty’s “object and purpose.”

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[79]

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training purposes.[80] At least two states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter because it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[81]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the USSR.[82] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UAE have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

An Indian defense company displayed components for cluster munitions at its booth at the Eurosatory defense trade event in Paris in June 2018.[83] Cluster munition projectiles made by Egyptian company Heliopolis were displayed by Egypt’s Ministry of Military Production for sale at the international arms fair IDEX in Abu Dhabi in February 2017.[84]

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 93 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[85] At least 36 of those countries have now destroyed their stockpiled cluster munitions, while eight States Parties to the convention still have stocks to destroy.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions[86]

Note: Countries in bold no longer possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

A total of 41 States Parties have stockpiled cluster munitions at some point in time, of which 33 have now completed destruction of those stocks.

According to available information, at one point 35 States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Six States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table below due to insufficient information. Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau still have not provided initial Article 7 transparency reports to formally report the status of stockpiled cluster munitions, but Republic of the Congo states that it has completed stockpile destruction. Honduras submitted its transparency report in March 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because the stocks were destroyed long before the convention’s entry into force.[87] Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.

State Party Cameroon is no longer listed as stockpiling after reporting in 2017 that all six of its cluster munitions have been retained for research and training purposes.

States Parties that never stockpiled

More than 53 States Parties have formally confirmed never stockpiling cluster munitions, most through a direct statement in their transparency report for the convention.[88] Since September 2017, Belize, Cook Islands, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Nauru, and Palestine have submitted initial transparency reports confirming they have never possessed cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

• Cyprus transferred 3,760 GRM-20 mortar projectiles and 2,559 M20G submunitions to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of stockpile destruction and, in July 2018, Bulgaria reported the stocks will be destroyed once “the necessary procedure for obtaining license for destruction” is completed.[89]

Cluster munitions declared by States Parties[90]

Note: Bold indicate states that still possess stockpiles to destroy.

• Indonesia has acknowledged that it possesses cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types and quantities stockpiled or its plan to destroy them.
• Nigeria has not disclosed the quantity of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but said in 2012 that its armed forces possess UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[91] Nigeria has made several appeals for “cooperation and assistance” to destroy the stockpile.[92]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

• Angola stated in September 2017 that the process of compiling its draft transparency report allowed it to confirm that stockpiled cluster munitions were all destroyed in or by 2012.
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[93]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as few of these states have publicly shared information on the types and quantities possessed.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[94] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since 2008 in removing cluster munitions from its active inventory and placing them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction. According to US budget materials released in February 2018, “there are approximately 122,083 tons of cluster munitions in the demil stockpile,” plus 188,787 tons in the continental US and another 127,972 tons outside the continental US.[95]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[96] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to the air force in August 2011, including Israeli-made AS TAL-1 cluster bombs.[97] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[98]

Some non-signatories admit to not stockpiling cluster munitions. In July 2017, Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs told the CMC that Latvia “neither produces nor possesses cluster munitions, nor does it store or use them” and claimed the government “currently has no plans to acquire or use them.”[99]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

The convention’s States Parties have collectively destroyed 1.4 million cluster munitions containing more than 177 million submunitions, as shown in the following table. This represents the destruction of 99% of the total reported global stocks of cluster munitions and 99% of the total number of submunitions declared by States Parties.

Destruction completed

All States Parties that have completed destruction of their cluster munitions stocks did so in advance of the convention’s eight-year deadline. All States Parties facing the first stockpile destruction deadline—1 August 2018—successfully destroyed their stocks in time, including Croatia, Slovenia, and Spain in the past year.

Four States Parties completed destroying their cluster munition stocks during the reporting period:

• Cuba reported in April 2018 that it no longer possesses cluster munitions after destroying its stockpile in 2017 by open detonation, but it has not provided information on the quantity destroyed or detailed the process involved.[100]
• Croatia informed the Monitor on 31 July 2018 that it has completed destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions.[101] The convention’s president welcomed this development in a statement.[102]
• Slovenia reported in June 2018 that 41,825 PAT-794 submunitions transferred years ago for the purpose of destruction were destroyed during 2017.[103]

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties (as of 31 December 2017)[104]

Note: Bold indicates states that still possess stockpiles to destroy.

• Spain informed Cluster Munition Monitor on 9 July 2018 that the destruction has been completed.[105] It reportedly completed “months ahead” of the deadline.[106]

Stockpile destruction by year since entry into force

Destruction underway

During 2017, seven States Parties destroyed 33,551 cluster munitions and nearly 1.8 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2017

During the reporting period, six other States Parties with stockpiled cluster munitions made progress to destroy them:

• Botswana is working to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions by the end of 2018 with technical assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).[107]
• Bulgaria has yet to start physical destruction of the stockpile, but reported in June 2018 that “a national plan” to destroy the cluster munitions is in the “final stage of preparation” and said Bulgarian authorities are “negotiating options” with the NATO Support Agency to ensure destruction of the cluster munitions.[108]
• Peru destroyed a small quantity of cluster munitions during 2017 during research on how to safely destroy its stockpile.[109] It is receiving technical support for its stockpile destruction, including on potential disassembly and destruction techniques, from NPA, which conducted trainings in May and June 2018.[110]
• Slovakia had destroyed one-third of its total declared stocks of cluster munitions and 6% of the submunitions by the end of 2017. The stocks are being destroyed by open detonation.
• South Africa provided an initial transparency report in September 2017 stating that 139 cluster munitions and 78,994 submunitions or components were destroyed in or by September 2012.[111]
• Switzerland had just 60 cluster munitions and 3,920 submunitions left to destroy by the beginning of 2018. It is expected to announce completion of the stockpile destruction during the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in September 2018.

Two States Parties appear to be struggling to destroy their stocks. Guinea is believed to stockpile cluster munitions, but has not provided its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, originally due in September 2015. Guinea-Bissau has requested financial and technical assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but has not submitted a transparency report for the convention.

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

The CMC questioned the need to allow for the retention of cluster munitions during the convention’s negotiations as it sees no compelling reason to retain live cluster munitions. Most States Parties agree there is no need to use live cluster munitions for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. This includes at least 21 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[112]

Nonetheless, 13 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2017)[113]

Germany still retains the largest number of cluster munitions, but it again reduced the total number after consuming retained cluster munitions during explosive ordnance disposal training in 2017. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, and Spain each reduced the number of cluster munitions and/or submunitions retained for training in 2017.

Switzerland reported a slight increase in the number of retained cluster munitions in April 2018.[114]

Italy destroyed all three cluster munitions and 641 submunitions that it initially retained for research and training during 2017.[115] Slovakia said in 2015 that it had decided not to retain cluster munitions, but in September 2017 said that “technical difficulties” meant it has not yet destroyed cluster munition rockets initially retaining for research and training.[116]

BiH, Cameroon, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden have yet to consume any of their retained cluster munitions.[117] France consumed retained cluster munitions in previous years, but not in 2017.

Cameroon is the first and, to date, only State Party from Africa retaining cluster munitions after reporting its decision to retain all six of its stockpiled cluster munitions for research and training purposes.[118]

After previously indicating it would not retain any stocks for research and training, Bulgaria reported in June 2018 that is retaining eight 9N123K cluster munitions containing 400 9N24 submunitions that were previously listed as stockpiled.[119]

BiH, Czech Republic, Denmark, and Sweden are retaining individual submunitions only.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations, which would indicate that the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is still unclear if current holdings by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

States Parties Australia, Italy, and the UK initially retained cluster munitions that they subsequently decided to destroy and not replace. States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, and Moldova declared retaining inert items rendered free from explosives that no longer qualify as cluster munitions under the convention.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous calendar year. The CMC encourages states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[120]

According to the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs website, a total of 89 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention as of 4 July 2018.[121] This represents 87%, which is a slight increase in compliance rate of States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is a similar compliance rate compared to previous years.[122] Belize, Cook Islands, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Nauru, Palestine, and South Africa have submitted initial transparency reports since September 2017.

However, 13 States Parties are late in providing their initial transparency reports, as listed in the following table. New State Party Sri Lanka’s initial transparency report is due by 28 February 2019.

Overdue initial Article 7 reports (as of 4 July 2018)

After submitting the initial transparency report, the convention requires that States Parties provide an annual upated report by 30 April. A total of 56 States Parties have submitted their annual updated transparency report that was due by 30 April 2018, covering activities in 2017.[123]

Canada and Palau provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention. The DRC shared voluntary reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014, but still has not ratified.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage use of cluster munitions, list cooperation and assistance support, or report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[124]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.”[125] The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 30 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention’s provisions, as listed in the table below.[126] Since Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, States Parties Cameroon, Colombia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis have been added to this list.

States with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The last country to enact implementing legislation for the convention was Cameroon in December 2016. No States Parties are known to have adopted implementing legislation for the convention in 2017 or first half of 2018.

At total of 43 States Parties have indicated their existing laws and regulations will suffice to enforce their adherence to the convention.[127] Another 20 States Parties indicate they are planning or in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[128] The status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear in another dozen States Parties, including several that have yet to provide an initial transparency report.[129]

Developments during the reporting period included:

• Afghanistan reported in April 2018 that implementation legislation “has recently been processed by the Ministry of Justice and has been sent to the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers for their review and approval.”[130]
• Belize reported in November 2017 that national implementation measures for the convention are “pending.”[131]
• Botswana reported in May 2018 that it “is in the process of making a draft law in order to start the domestication process of the convention.”[132]
• Cameroon announced in September 2017 that its National Assembly adopted legislation on 14 December 2016 that prohibits the use, development, manufacturing, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions.[133]
• Côte d’Ivoire listed three laws under national implementation measures in its transparency report, indicating it may view existing legislation as sufficient.[134]
• Lao PDR reported in April 2018 that initial draft implementation legislation for the convention has been prepared.[135]
• Malawi reported in June 2018 that it has established an inter-ministerial taskforce to finalize draft legislation, which will then be submitted to Cabinet for consideration.[136]
• Palestine listed a 1998 law on arms and explosives under national implementation measures in March 2018 and said a consultative committee is considering if specific implementing legislation is needed for the convention.[137]
• Saint Kitts and Nevis shared information in September 2017 on its implementing legislation—the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act—that was enacted on 27 August 2014.[138]
• South Africa reported in September 2017 that it does not plan to enact specific implementing legislation for the convention, as it regards the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act as sufficient to enforce both treaties.[139]
• Swaziland reported in March 2018 that its implementing legislation is “in process.”[140]
• Zambia is working to incorporate the convention into domestic law, but in January 2018 reported a backlog of bills to be drafted by the Ministry of Justice.[141]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 1 July 2018, more than three-dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were few new statements during the reporting period.[142]

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, and US stocks and foreign stockpiling.[143]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[144]

Implementing legislation adopted by the Saint Kitts and Nevis does not permit assistance in prohibited conduct, but allows members of the Defence Force of Saint Kitts and Nevis to participate in military activities with armed forces of states that are not party to the convention.[145]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21:

• Australia’s Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 has been heavily criticized for allowing Australian military personnel to assist with cluster munition use by states not party. Section 72.41 of Australia’s implementing legislation “provides a defence to the offence provisions where prohibited conduct takes place in the course of military cooperation or operations with a foreign country that is not a party to the Convention.”[146] During joint or coalition military operations, Australian Defence Force personnel could help plan operations or provide intelligence for, and/or contribute logistical support to coalition members during which a state not party uses cluster munitions.[147]
• Canada’s Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act 2014 has elicited similar criticism for its provisions allowing Canadian Armed Forces and public officials to “direct or authorize” an act that “may involve” a state not party performing activities prohibited under the convention during joint military operations.[148] In March 2015, the Chief of Defence Staff issued a directive to “provide direction on prohibited and permitted activities to [Canadian Armed Forces] personnel who might become involved in cluster munition related activities.”[149]
• Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its interpretation of Article 21.[150] However, in a June 2008 State Department cable, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.[151]
• The UK’s 2010 implementation law permits assistance with a number of acts prohibited under the convention if the assistance occurs during joint military operations.[152] In addition, the UK stated in 2011 that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[153]

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed. Spain’s 2015 implementation law establishes that military cooperation and participation in military operations by Spain, its military personnel, or its nationals with states that are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and that use cluster munitions is not prohibited.[154] After Spain’s opposition parties called for the draft legislation to prohibit Spain’s involvement at all times in military operations with other states that use cluster munitions, the draft legislation was adjusted to incorporate the positive obligations of Article 21(2) of the convention, requiring Spain to work for universalization and to discourage the use of cluster munitions.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[155]

During the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017:

• The Philippines told States Parties that as a signatory, it “continues to defend its position to prohibit the use, local and foreign stockpiling, investment, production and transit of cluster munitions in the country.”[156]
• Saint Kitts and Nevis stated its commitment to ensuring its territory is never used as a transit or shipment point for cluster munitions.[157]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories after 2008. The UK announced in 2010 that there were “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[158] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[159]

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

• A US cable dated December 2008 states, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[160]
• Germany has not expressed clear views on the convention’s prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, but according to a December 2008 cable, it has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.[161]
• Italy, Spain, and Qatar were identified by the US in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[162] In its initial report for the convention Spain reported that it was informing non-signatories which it cooperates with in joint military operations of its international obligations prohibiting stockpiling of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.[163]
• Japan apparently does not view cluster munitions on US military bases in Japan as falling under Japan’s jurisdiction and control or violate the national law or the convention. A December 2008 cable found that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”[164]
• According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title.”[165]

• According to a May 2007 cable, the US may store cluster munitions in Kuwait.[166]

Disinvestment

Several States Parties as well as the CMC view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[167]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[168]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

Four States Parties enacted legislation on cluster munitions containing provisions on disinvestment prior to the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force, while seven have adopted disinvestment laws in the period since.

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2017 or the first half of 2018. The Monitor has added Saint Kitts and Nevis to the list of states with disinvestment laws after reviewing its 2014 implementing law for the convention, which prohibits investments of funds in the development and production of cluster munitions.[169]

At least 31 States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their view that investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, France, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad & Tobago, the UK, and Zambia.[170]

In September 2017, Peru stated that it interprets Article 1 as prohibiting investments in the production of cluster munitions, that is to say, it bans the provision of financial assistance to producers of cluster munitions.[171]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

At least three companies in non-signatories have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from numerous investors: US company Textron Systems announced in 2016 it is stopping cluster munition production, while US company Orbital ATK issued a similar statement in August 2017. Singapore Technologies Engineering announced in 2015 that it no longer manufactures cluster munitions.

Former US cluster munition producer Orbital ATK commissioned a March 2018 report that criticized the US policy adopted November 2017 for backing away from long-standing plans to end the use of nearly all cluster munitions after 2018. According to the report, “continuing to rely on cluster weapons exposes the US military to international backlash and hampers America’s ability to remain on the cutting edge of defense technology.”[172]

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[173]

Timeline of cluster munition use[174]

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