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Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

Introduction

In 2020, the entire planet faces an array of serious challenges, from the COVID-19 pandemic to worsening climate change to an economic downturn.[1] This is changing, but not replacing, the collaborative work underway to push the Convention on Cluster Munitions onwards to its goal of eradicating the human suffering caused by these explosive weapons.

The convention has come a long way since it was adopted in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008.[2] 2020 marks 10 years since it took effect on 1 August 2010, becoming binding international law. It is also the year of the convention’s milestone Second Review Conference, which Switzerland will convene in Lausanne this November.

Thus, this is an appropriate time for Cluster Munition Monitor to review highlights from the past year and, where appropriate, the past 10 years. This introduction also takes stock of some factors and forces that have contributed to the convention’s successes over the past decade.

First and foremost is the political interest and goodwill that drove the fast-track Oslo Process to create the convention. States still “remain seized” of this concern, driven by a strong desire to tackle humanitarian concerns raised by the unacceptable harm caused by cluster munitions, both at the time of attack and from explosive remnants left behind.

Indeed, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Abdulla Shahid, deposited his country’s accession to the convention at the United Nations (UN) last September, he said he was “proud” to do so and reiterated, “We will support global efforts to ban the use of this horrible weapon, which leaves a lasting legacy of untold human suffering.”[3]

Another example of political will can be seen in the speed at which nations raced to ratify the convention, resulting in its entry into force 19 months after it was opened for signature in December 2008.[4] However, just one signatory ratified in the reporting period— São Tomé and Príncipe in January 2020—and the 13 remaining signatories made little progress towards completing ratification.

There are now 110 States Parties to the convention, including 36 that have destroyed all of their stockpiled cluster munitions, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

A second factor behind the convention’s success is the dedicated support provided by a close-knit community of states, UN agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These actors meet regularly in Geneva between annual meetings of the convention to follow up on activities and are led by a rotating annual president and backed by a small, but productive implementation support unit.

Over the past decade, the convention’s community has created an intricate web of innovative mechanisms and practices aimed at guiding implementation, facilitating coordination, and addressing compliance concerns in a cooperative manner. This work relies heavily on actors working at the national level to help address concerns and follow-up on outstanding obligations.

Such measures include regional awareness-raising workshops, guidance on domestic legislative measures to enforce the convention’s provisions, follow-up to ensure timely transparency reporting, and the provision of financial and technical assistance to states facing challenges in meeting clearance and stockpile destruction obligations.

The end result is an impressive compliance record for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. There have never been any instances, or even allegations, of any State Party using or producing cluster munitions. Such adherence is reinforced by specific implementation legislation that 32 States Parties have enacted to enforce the convention’s provisions with penal and fiscal sanctions. 

More than 90% of States Parties have submitted their initial transparency reports for the convention, detailing actions taken to implement and promote it. However, dedicated efforts are needed to ensure that all States Parties meet their legal obligations under the convention. 

There is disappointment that Bulgaria and Peru are testing the convention’s excellent compliance record for stockpile destruction with their deadline extension requests.

A third and final factor in the convention’s sustained appeal is the growing stigma that it attaches to any use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor in any circumstances. More than half of the 74 non-signatories to the convention possess stockpiled cluster munitions, but virtually all are in de facto compliance with the convention’s prohibition on use, production, and transfer.

However, a handful of states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions oppose the rapidly emerging international norm it is creating, most notably the Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic.

Since 2012, Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions on their own people with devastating consequences for the country. The use of banned weapons has set a poor example across the region as parties to conflicts in other non-signatories Libya, Sudan, and Yemen have harmed civilians by resorting to the use of cluster munitions during the past decade.

Since 2015, Russia has actively supported the use of these internationally-banned weapons by Syrian government forces and has not denied its direct involvement. Indeed, Russian cluster bombs were on full display at a Moscow exhibition in 2019 commemorating the government’s participation in the joint military operation in Syria. 

In 2020, Russian state-owned arms manufacturer NPO Splav displayed its next generation of “advanced” cluster munition rockets during a media event at its refurbished factory south of Moscow and encouraged visitors to handle the newly-made submunitions. Russia was also the only country to vote against the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019, after declining to join China, Israel, the United States (US), and others in abstaining from the vote.

As yet, other states not party to the convention have refrained from showing such shocking disregard for the convention. A 2017 Trump administration roll-back of US policy restrictions on cluster munitions has yet to result in a return to US use or production of the weapon. Countries continue to join the convention, although the pace of universalization has slowed significantly over the past decade and especially since 2015.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2019 and the first half of 2020, with updates through to September 2020, where possible. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available on the Monitor website.[5]

Universalization

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[6] 

Accessions

During the reporting period, three countries acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Saint Lucia on 15 September 2020, Niue on 6 August 2020, and the Maldives on 27 September 2019.[7]

There were several positive developments concerning accessions to the convention during the reporting period, most notably in the Asia-Pacific region.

Vanuatu’s Department of Foreign Affairs said in April 2020 that a Cabinet paper recommending Vanuatu’s accession to the convention would shortly be shared with the newly-elected government’s Council of Ministers for consideration and approval.[8] Authorities in Papua New Guinea appear to be actively considering the country’s possible accession to the convention.[9] This follows their participation in regional workshops hosted by the Philippines in June 2019 and New Zealand in February 2018.

In September 2019, Bangladesh told States Parties that it is “actively considering signing the ban treaty on cluster munitions following required protocol in due course of time.”[10]

Zimbabwe said in September 2019 that “internal processes are underway” to prepare for its accession to the convention.[11] South Sudan provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention in April 2020 that confirms its parliament is still considering a proposal for South Sudan to ratify the convention.[12]

However, several non-signatories reiterated their largely negative views on the convention. For example, in September 2019, Argentina told States Parties that the convention is “not sufficiently ambitious” and called it “contrary to the objective of the total prohibition and the principle of non-discrimination.”[13]

Ten-year review

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it but must join through a process known as accession.[14] A total of nine states acceded to the convention between August 2010 and the First Review Conference in September 2015, while six more states have acceded in the five years since.[15] Of the 15 states to have acceded to the convention, seven came from Latin America (including five Caribbean states), three from Asia-Pacific, two from Africa, two from Europe and one from the Middle East.

Accessions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Prior to its entry into force, 14 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions after its Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008: five from the Caribbean, six from Sub-Sahran Africa, one from Europe, and two from the Middle East and North Africa region.[16] 

This record shows how nearly two-thirds of United Nations (UN) member states have joined the convention. All except seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have joined it.[17] Of the 27 European Union (EU) member states, all except six have joined the convention.[18] In the Americas region, all except eight countries have signed or ratified the convention, while all except seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have done so.

The 74 states that remain outside the convention include three members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States (US), and 13 more states that also produce cluster munitions.

When it comes to countries joining the convention, the pace of universalization has slowed over the past decade and especially since 2015. 

Ratifications

During the reporting period, one signatory has ratified the convention: São Tomé and Príncipe on 27 January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, while two are from the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific region.[19]

Signatories yet to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Haiti and Nigeria confirmed in September 2019 that their respective parliaments are undertaking processes to approve ratification of the convention.[20] Tanzania told States Parties in September 2019 that its ratification process is “ongoing,” but did not provide further details or an estimated timeframe for completion.[21]

Cyprus remains the last EU state to have signed but not ratified the convention and has not taken any steps to ratify it since 2013, when its parliament put the matter “on hold.”[22] The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has made no progress towards ratifying the convention since 2013, when its Senate passed legislation approving ratification.

The eight other signatories still do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.[23]

Ten-year review

A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, whilst 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference in September 2015. Ten more states have ratified the convention in the five years since then, as of 31 August 2020.

Convention on Cluster Munitions ratifications by year[24]

In total, 88% of the convention’s signatories have ratified and become fully bound by its provisions which shows how the vast majority of signatories ultimately followed through on their pledges to ratify. 

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Aliyar Lebbe Abdul Azeez, served as president of the convention’s Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 2–4 September 2019. A total of 84 countries attended the meeting—58 States Parties, six signatories, and 20 non-signatories—as well as UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the convention and condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[25]

Grenada hosted a regional workshop on the convention in St. George’s on 3–4 March 2020, which representatives from 11 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states attended.[26] The Philippines hosted a regional workshop on the convention, organized jointly with New Zealand, in Manila on 18–19 June 2019, which representatives from seven non-signatories to the convention attended.[27]

Switzerland’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Félix Baumann, is serving as president of the convention’s Second Review Conference to be held in Lausanne on 23–27 November 2020.[28] The UN appears to have received sufficient funds to convene the meeting, but States Parties owed the convention US$135,300 as of 30 April 2020.[29]

On 29 June and 4 September 2020, Ambassador Baumann convened meetings at the UN in Geneva to prepare for the convention’s Second Review Conference.[30] As the first multilateral disarmament meetings to be held during the COVID-19 pandemic, each delegation was restricted to one representative to ensure adequate physical distancing. In a significant “first” for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the meetings were also broadcast live on the UN website. 

Online workshops and events show how the pandemic is changing practices. In July 2020, the Philippines convened a virtual roundtable on the convention on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting.[31]

The CMC continues its advocacy work in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation. In 2020, the CMC has written letters to every state not party to the convention to urge them to ratify or accede to the convention by the Second Review Conference in November. The CMC has undertaken global actions aimed at condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria and at promoting the universalization of the convention. The CMC continues to work in close collaboration with the convention’s presidency and States Parties as well as the Implementation Support Unit to advance universalization and implementation of the convention.

During the reporting period, the CMC provided small grants to campaigners in 47 countries to support advocacy for the convention’s universalization and implementation. CMC member Mines Action Canada (MAC) provided small grants to youth campaigners to assist with universalization and implementation efforts in 10 countries.[32]

No state formally proposed that cluster munitions be added back on to the program of work of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) at its Meeting of High Contracting Parties in Geneva in November 2019.[33] The 2011 failure to adopt a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

UN General Assembly Resolution 74/62

Since Croatia first introduced the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2015, in its capacity as president of the convention’s First Review Conference, the annual resolution has become a widely accepted barometer for gauging interest in and support for the convention.

The 2019 UNGA resolution highlighted how 2020 is the tenth anniversary of the convention’s entry into force and urged states to make progress on the implementation and universalization of the convention ahead of the Second Review Conference.[34] 

A total of 144 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 74/62 on 12 December 2019, including 29 non-signatories to the convention.[35] Russia was the only country that voted against it, after abstaining in 2018.[36]

All 38 states to abstain from the 2019 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention, except signatory Cyprus, which also did not vote in favour of the resolution in 2015–2018.[37] 

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions[38]

As in previous years, several states not party—including Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Iran, Myanmar, Singapore, South Korea, and the US—explained their vote on the 2019 UNGA resolution, using the occasion to repeat long-held concerns over the convention as well as list their various reasons for not joining it.[39]

Notably, there was no group statement at the 2019 UNGA from Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Romania explaining their vote and lack of accession to the convention, after the group made a joint statement every year from 2015 to 2018.

Use Of Cluster Munitions

 Global overview 

Since the end of World War II, at least 21 governments have used cluster munitions in 40 countries and four other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

 Past Use of Cluster Munitions[40]

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics; USSR= Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the United States (US) are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[41]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Several past users of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK), are States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.[42]

Cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011, 2015, and 2019–2020), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–2017).[43]

New use

Cluster munitions were used in Libya and Syria during the reporting period (July 2019–July 2020).

Use in Syria

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. There have been at least 686 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least 11 cluster munition attacks between 1 August 2019 and 31 July 2020. The Monitor reviewed evidence, but could not independently confirm at least two dozen other possible cluster munition attacks in the same period.

Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2019 recorded 38 attacks between July 2018 and July 2019.

During 2019 and the first half of 2020, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorate of Idlib, while a few were recorded in Aleppo governorate. The Syria Network for Human Rights identified four cluster munition attacks in Hama and Idlib governorates during the first half of 2020.[44] All 14 of the country’s governorates, except Tartus, have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigated a cluster munition attack with a ballistic missile using 9N24 submunitions on 1 January 2020 that hit a school in Sarmin, Idlib that killed civilians, including children.[45] HRW also documented attacks on two schools in Idlib city on 25 February 2020 involving the use of 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan cluster munition rockets.[46] 

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria since October 2015. At a minimum, Russia has directly participated in supporting Syrian government attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[47] is  Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[48]

There is no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the coalition Operation Inherent Resolve against the non-state armed group Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which began in 2014.[49]

With two exceptions, all the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union or its successor Russia.[50]

Types of Cluster Munitions used in Syria[51]

Note: USSR= Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on new use of cluster munitions.[52] Russia has not explicitly denied its stockpiling of cluster munitions in Syria nor its involvement in use.[53]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 countries.[54] At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, in September 2019, States Parties to the convention “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.” [55] During the course of the meeting, at least nine countries and the European Union (EU) publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[56] 

Since May 2013, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted eight resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 74/169 on 18 December 2019, which received 106 votes in favor, 15 against and 57 abstentions.[57] Since 2014, states have adopted more than 15 Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, while the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks.[58] 

Use in Libya

During 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use in Libya by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA). According to HRW, LNA forces used cluster munitions in an airstrike on Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019.[59]

An investigation by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) into a 15–16 August 2019 attack on Zuwarah Airport, that caused two casualties, found RBK-500 cluster munition remnants at the site. LNA forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar took responsibility for conducting the strike and possess RBK-500 cluster bombs.[60] 

Previously, LNA forces were accused of using cluster bombs in May 2019 in attacks in and around Tripoli.[61] In 2015–2018, there were allegations and some evidence of new use of cluster munitions in Libya but the Monitor was not able to conclusively attribute responsibility to LNA forces.[62]

Allegations of use

There were two allegations of new use during the reporting period, one involving the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen in June 2020 and the other regarding the contested region of Kashmir on the India-Pakistan border. Cluster Munition Monitor could not conclusively determine if cluster munitions were used in either case. None of these countries have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Pakistan alleged that India used cluster munitions in the contested region of Kashmir on 30–31 July 2019 during an attack that reportedly killed two civilians, including a four-year-old boy, and wounded 11 others.[63] The Pakistan army released photographs showing DPICM-type submunitions from artillery-delivered cluster munitions, while Pakistan’s president, foreign minister, and other high-ranking officials condemned the alleged cluster munition use for violating international law.[64]

India denied using cluster munitions in the attack. The Indian army issued a statement asserting that “Allegations of firing of cluster bombs by India is yet another Pakistan's lie and deception.”[65]

Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights issued a statement condemning a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition for allegedly using cluster bombs in Sana’a governorate in June 2020, reportedly injuring civilians.[66] Previously, in 2015–2017, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition conducting a military operation against Ansar Allah forces, known as the Houthi armed group in Yemen, used air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions, causing civilian harm.[67] There is no evidence that the Saudi coalition has used cluster munitions in Yemen since then, but, additional cluster munition attacks may have gone unrecorded.

Such allegations and denials demonstrate the growing power of the stigma against cluster munitions, which the convention is creating. The 2019 UNGA resolution 74/62 expressed strong concern regarding the number of allegations, reports, or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world, related civilian casualties, and other consequences that impede the achievement of sustainable development. 

Use by non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups have used them. In the past, use of cluster munitions by non-state armed groups has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by Islamic State), and Ukraine (by Russian-backed separatists). 

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018. 

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Production of Cluster Munitions

Historically, at least 34 states developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions, of which 18 countries ceased manufacturing them prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[68] 

Producers 

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future, as listed in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

It is unclear if all these countries produced cluster munitions in 2019 and/or the first half of 2020 because of a lack of transparency and available data. However, evidence shows that China and Russia are actively researching and developing new types of cluster munitions in 2020:

• On 17 August 2020, China's state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), reported on the latest cluster munition in development.[69] Tianlei 500, which translates as Sky Thunder, is a 500kg air-to-surface cluster munition capable of dispensing 240 submunitions at a range of 60km from the launching point. The China North Industries Group (Norinco) has reportedly “designed and made” the Tianlei 500, which a senior engineer at the company told CCTV can carry six different types of submunitions “to attack different targets.”
• In July 2020, NPO Splav, which is part of Russian state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed a new generation of multi-barrel rocket launchers at its refurbished rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow.[70] Photographs from the event show 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets as well as dignitaries handling 9N235 fragmentation submunitions made for the Tornado-S system, a modernized version of the BM-30 Smerch rocket.[71]

Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[72]

Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States (US) have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[73]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party. 

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in the future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[74]

In South Africa, Rheinmetall Denel Munition has not responded to Cluster Munition Monitor’s 2018 request to clarify if it produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012.[75] The Monitor sought comment after South Africa’s initial transparency report stated in regard to the decommissioning of production facilities: “None. Production ceased in 2012 at Rheinmetall, denel.”[76]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for the purposes of research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[77]

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any states during the reporting period.

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[78]

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the United States (US) was probably the world’s leading exporter because it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[79]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[80] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan. 

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

At least two non-signatories have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction 

Global stockpiles 

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 94 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[81]

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions[82]

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

The Monitor has added the Philippines to its list of former stockpilers after the country reported in October 2019 that its small stockpile of cluster munitions was destroyed in 2011.[83]

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties 

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 39 countries—36 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munitions stocks have now destroyed them, as detailed in the following section on stockpile destruction.

Four States Parties have reported a collective total of 11,274 stockpiled cluster munitions and 733,243 submunitions that they are in the process of destroying, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction (as of 31 December 2019)[84]

The status of cluster munition stocks held by Guinea and Guinea-Bissau is unclear:

• Guinea has imported cluster munitions in the past and may possess them, but still has not provided its transparency report for the convention, which was due in September 2015.[85] Its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 April 2023.
• Guinea-Bissau has reported that it possesses cluster munitions, but a January 2020 review of storage facilities by technical experts did not identify any stocks.[86] Its stockpile destruction deadline was 1 May 2019.

Guinea and Guinea-Bissau must clarify if they knowingly possess cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories 

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

• Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF projectiles containing 2,559 M20G submunitions to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of destruction, according to Bulgaria’s 2017 transparency report for the convention.[87] In 2018, private company EXPAL Bulgaria destroyed 2,416 of the projectiles, while the rest (1,344 4.2-inch OF projectiles) were destroyed in August 2019.[88] It is unclear if this means Cyprus has completed the destruction of all its stockpiled cluster munitions as it has never made a public statement on the matter nor provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention.
• Indonesia has acknowledged that it possesses cluster munitions, but has not shared any information on the types and quantities stockpiled or indicated if it has a plan to destroy them.
• Nigeria has not disclosed the quantity of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but said in 2012 that its armed forces possess UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[89] Nigeria has made several appeals for “cooperation and assistance” to destroy the stockpile.[90]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

• Angola stated in 2017 that the process of compiling its draft transparency report allowed it to confirm that stockpiled cluster munitions were all destroyed in or by 2012.[91]
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[92]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[93] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction.

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[94] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011, including Israeli-made AS TAL-1 cluster bombs.[95] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[96]

Stockpile destruction 

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party. 

No State Party with the first stockpile destruction deadline of 1 August 2018 failed to destroy its stocks in time. 

However, two States Parties have requested extensions to their destruction deadlines:

• In April 2020, Bulgaria provided a request to extend its stockpile destruction deadline to 1 October 2022.[97] Previously, in September 2019, States Parties approved Bulgaria’s first request to extend its stockpile destruction deadline to 1 April 2021 from the original date of 1 October 2019.
• In March and June 2020, Peru requested an extension to its stockpile destruction deadline from 1 March 2021 to April 2024.[98] Peru had previously pledged to destroy its stocks by the deadline.[99]

Additionally, Guinea-Bissau may have missed its 1 May 2019 stockpile destruction deadline, but must clarify if it still knowingly possesses cluster munition stocks.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 41 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 36 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019. 

No State Party completed the destruction of their cluster munition stocks in the second half of 2019 or first half of 2020. However, the Monitor added the Philippines to its list of States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction after the Philippines reported in October 2019 that it destroyed its cluster munitions in 2011.[100]

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction[101]

Four States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table above due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

• Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.
• The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.[102]
• Honduras provided its transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because it destroyed the stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[103]

Destruction underway

During 2019, three States Parties destroyed a total of 212 cluster munitions and more than 14,954 submunitions, as shown in the following table. 

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2019

Slovakia has committed to destroy its stockpile by the 1 January 2024 deadline “using its own capacities.”[104] It had destroyed 65% of its total declared stocks of cluster munitions and 11% of the submunitions by the end of 2019.

South Africa destroyed 139 cluster munitions and 78,994 submunitions before September 2012, but has not destroyed any cluster munitions since then and its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 November 2023.

The total number of cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties each year has fallen steadily since 2011, as those with this obligation to complete stockpile destruction.

Stockpile destruction by year since entry into force

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons. 

Most States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for such purposes, including 27 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[105] However, 13 States Parties have chosen to retain cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2019)[106]

Germany still retains the largest number of cluster munitions, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. However, Germany and the Netherlands both significantly reduced the number of cluster munitions retained for research and training purposes during 2019, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Switzerland also reduced the number of retained cluster munitions. The number of cluster munitions retained by Denmark increased by 100 DM1348 submunitions in 2019.[107] 

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Cameroon have not destroyed any cluster munitions and/or submunitions since reporting they would retain them for research and training purposes.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations. This shows how the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is still unclear if current holdings by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

States Parties Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK) initially retained cluster munitions that they subsequently destroyed and did not replace. States Parties Chile, Croatia, and Moldova have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous calendar year. 

As of 31 August 2020, 100 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention, including eight States Parties that have turned in initial reports during the reporting period (since July 2019): the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, the Maldives, Namibia, the Philippines, and Somalia.[108]

This represents 93% of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is the highest compliance rate recorded to date, while compliance with the annual reporting requirement is far less impressive.[109]

States Parties with initial Article 7 reporting deadlines

As of 16 September 2020, 10 States Parties still had to provide an initial transparency report, of which seven have missed their submission deadline. Cape Verde and Comoros are nearly a decade late in submitting their initial reports. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.[110]

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated report by 30 April each year. Of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, only 63 provided the annual updated report due by 30 April 2020, covering activities in 2019.[111] This 60% reporting rate is similar to previous years.

Some States Parties have never turned in an annual updated report. Cluster munition stockpiler South Africa submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention on 8 September 2017, but has not provided an annual updated report since then. South Africa told States Parties in September 2019 that it was preparing the outstanding transparency reports.[112]

In April 2020, non-signatories Brunei and South Sudan each provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention. Previously, signatory Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) turned in voluntary transparency reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Canada and Palau also provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage the use of cluster munitions, to provide details on cooperation and assistance support, or to report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[113]

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) continues to encourage states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[114]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 32 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s August 2010 entry into force, 11 states enacted implementing legislation, while 21 states have done so since then.

States Parties with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Namibia reported in August 2019 that it had amended the Arms and Ammunition Act to account for its obligations under the convention and said it was in the process of repealing the Explosives Act.[115]

No State Party adopted specific implementing legislation for the convention in the first half of 2020.

Another 20 States Parties have indicated they are planning or in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[116] Guinea-Bissau reported in January 2020 that it is drafting implementing legislation for the convention.[117] Somalia reported in October 2019 that it plans to enact national implementing legislation to guide and enforce the convention’s provisions.[118]

Another 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing legislation and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the convention.[119] Benin reported in June 2019 that it has not enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention.[120] Guyana reported in January 2020 that it does not intend to enact implementing legislation for the convention as the provisions requiring penal sanctions are already covered by the Criminal Law (Offenses) Act of Guyana.”[121]

At least eight States Parties are considering if they need specific implementation legislation for the convention. In 2019, Palestine, the Gambia, and Sri Lanka reported that they were respectively reviewing their existing laws and regulations to determine if implementing legislation is needed.[122] The Philippines reported in October 2019 that its armed forces have issued a directive prohibiting cluster munitions from being included in operational planning requirements.”[123] New States Parties Niue, the Maldives, Saint Lucia, and São Tomé and Príncipe have yet to indicate if they plan to enact implementing legislation for the convention. 

In seven States Parties the status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear.[124]

While progress on national implementation legislation has slowed, there are now several models to guide the preparation of strong laws. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic have identified key components of comprehensive legislation, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has proposed a model law for common law states and New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.[125]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 20 August 2020, more than three dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[126] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues. 

More than 400 United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks and foreign stockpiling.[127]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[128]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[129]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait. 

Disinvestment

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[130] 

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[131]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2019 or the first half of 2020.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories to the convention have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[132] Chile and Ecuador were added to this list since publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2019. In September 2019, Chile stated that “we join the call to not invest nor finance production of cluster munitions, because it is contrary to the convention and its humanitarian aims.”[133] Ecuador said in October 2019 that “We reiterate our firm commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and…call for a definitive stop to financing and investing in companies that produce cluster munitions, as it is a weapon of particular cruelty that especially affects the most vulnerable groups.”[134]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

At least three companies in non-signatories have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from numerous investors: Singapore Technologies Engineering and US companies Lockheed Martin, Textron Systems and Orbital ATK.

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[135]