Five-Year Review: State Party the United Kingdom (UK) enacted implementation legislation for the convention before it ratified on 4 May 2010. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. The UK promotes universalization of the convention and hosted an event toward this objective in London in March 2015. The UK has condemned the use of cluster munitions, including in Syria. It has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation.

The UK produced, exported, imported, and used cluster munitions prior to joining the convention. In December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of a stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions. The UK initially retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes, but has not done so since 2013.

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 4 May 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2010.

The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 serves as the UK’s implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing penal and financial sanctions for violations of its provisions.[1] The UK has classified cluster munitions in the highest category of prohibited exports under its Export Control Order of 2008.[2]

In March 2015, the UK government published a “Command Paper” prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that provides “post-legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010”  to assess how the legislation has worked in practice. The Command Paper was presented to parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the Committees on Arms Export Controls.[3] It concluded that there are “no outstanding legal issues” regarding the UK’s implementation of the Act.[4]

The UK submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 April 2011 and has provided annual updated reports ever since, most recently on 29 April 2015.[5]

The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster munitions, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.[6]

The UK engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014, where it confirmed the completion of the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in December 2013. The UK has also attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, most recently in June 2015.

Promotion of the convention

The UK promotes universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2014 report on human rights and democracy states that in 2015, the UK “will continue to work diplomatically to pursue the goal of a world free of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, by encouraging all states to refrain from the use of such weapons.”[7]

In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed the Monitor that “the UK has raised the issue of accession to the Convention with a number of States not Party at various points throughout [2014].” It reported that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Defence and International Security, Tobias Ellwood MP, hosted a reception in London on 25 March 2015 to encourage states to join the convention. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a number of non-signatory states attended the reception, during which Ellwood encouraged their accession and “spoke about the UK’s decision to come down on the side of a prohibition, having weighed up the humanitarian and security factors.”[8] The UK has responded to the new use of cluster munitions in 2014 and the first half of 2015.

On 10 February 2015, government spokesperson, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, expressed the UK’s concern at “recent reports of the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine” and affirmed the need to “bring to book those responsible for human rights abuses.”[9] In response to a parliamentary question later that month on the cluster munition rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine, Anelay noted the government of Ukraine’s denial that its armed forces used cluster munitions and affirmed that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used intentionally to target civilians.” Anelay called on the parties to the conflict in Ukraine to abide by international humanitarian law and called on Ukraine and Russia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[10] In April 2015, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office official also cited the Ukraine government’s denial of cluster munition use and repeated in a letter to CMC UK member Article 36 that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used to target civilians.”[11]

The UK has vigorously and repeatedly condemned cluster munition use by the Syrian government since 2012.[12] It has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use.[13] The UK has voted in favor of four Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently a UK-led resolution on 2 July 2015.[14]

The UK also led a resolution adopted unanimously by the that UN Security Council on 29 June 2015, which expresses concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and calls on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.”[15] On 27 May 2014, the UK voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei, South Sudan in February 2014 and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[16]

On 15 March 2015, the UK’s representative to Libya, Ambassador Michael Aron, described evidence of new use of cluster bombs in Libya as “deeply disturbing.”[17]

The UK has not commented on the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in April and May 2015 by the Saudi-led coalition.

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, the UK expressed “concern” at “several reports” of the use of cluster munitions and urged “those states involved to cease the use of the weapons.”[18] Unlike the majority of states that made statements, the UK did not express concern at new use of cluster munitions in any specific country.

Despite these statements and actions, the CMC is concerned at a lack of consistency in the UK’s approach to how states that are part of the Convention on Cluster Munitions collectively respond to new use of cluster munitions. At a preparatory meeting for the convention’s First Review Conference in Geneva on 24 June 2015, the UK proposed watering down language condemning the use of cluster munitions in draft documents prepared for the First Review Conference.[19]

The UK is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

The UK elaborated its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of key provisions in the convention during the process of preparing its national legislation and in the period since with respect to the prohibitions on foreign stockpiling, transit, investment in cluster munition producers, and assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations. A number of ministerial statements are on record clarifying the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues and recognizing the positive obligations under the convention.[20] Additionally,in late 2010, several parliamentary questions were raised in response to reports in the British media based on United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks.

Foreign stockpiling

In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK stated it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention.[21] In December 2009, the government stated that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[22] In 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[23]

The March 2015 Command Paper finds that the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act “allows for the extension of its provisions to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and any British overseas territory” but states that its application has only been extended to include the Isle of Man to date.[24] Therefore the UK has not applied its national legislation to the full extent possible, maintaining the possibility of acts being permitted in certain British overseas territories that would be prohibited on the mainland UK. This could represent a loophole by which foreign stocks of cluster munitions could return to the UK’s overseas territories in the future.

Transit

In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”[25]

In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.”[26] In 2011, a Minister of State clarified that this provision had been used only once, and that was to grant the US a temporary extension to keep cluster munitions on UK territory as it underwent the process of removing all remaining stockpiles.[27]

A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks in 2010 stated that the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Security Policy Group had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted” until 2013, and by temporary exception.[28] In response to a parliamentary question on the cable, the previous Labour government minister responsible for the legislation said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”[29]

According to the Command Paper, the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act has been extended to the overseas territory of the Isle of Man but not other overseas territories. Therefore it is technically possible that authorization by the Foreign Secretary would not be necessary for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions by visiting forces through other UK overseas territories, such as Diego Garcia.[30]

Interoperability

The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability, the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions, are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation.[31] In 2011, the UK stated that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[32]

During the development of the UK’s implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and of the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions.[33] When pushed by members of parliament to clarify just exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[34]

Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military.[35] The government responded that “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged,” and added, “We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.”[36] A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.

While there has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the “Operation Inherent Resolve” military action against forces of Islamic State (IS) (or Islamic State of Iraq the Levant, ISIL) that began last year in Syria and Iraq, the CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions. The Monitor requested information from the UK on how it is engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint operation with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded:

The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law. Furthermore, a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive is issued to all UK personnel embedded with coalition forces explaining the UK legal position and how this affects their individual responsibilities in all matters including targeting.[37]

During the 2011 NATO military operation in Libya, Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the UK parliament that “we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.”[38] NATO confirmed that its forces did not use cluster munitions during the Libya operation in its formal response to a UN Commission of Inquiry.[39]

Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs

The 2010 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act makes it an offense for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition,” “to make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition,” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.

Concerns have been raised in the past about the promotion of cluster munitions by exhibitors at the annual Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibitions (DSEi) in London. In 2009 and 2011, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London displayed promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions.[40] Exhibitor information regarding “compliance” for the exhibition in September 2013 emphasized that it is prohibited to exhibit “non-unitary munitions” except those excluded from prohibition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[41] No advertisement of cluster munitions was reported at the 2013 exhibition.

The 2015 Command Paper does not include any reference to the advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs in 2009 and 2011.[42]

Investment

While direct investment in cluster munitions is considered prohibited by Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed. In 2011, the UK government recognized the need for further work to address “the problem of remote financing” and said that it had set up a working group to look into the matter.[43] The working group is not believed to have met as of July 2015.

In 2011, Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alistair Burt stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.”[44] There have been no parliamentary statements since that would suggest further action by the government to address investment in cluster munition manufacturers.

The 2015 Command Paper specifically highlights that the 2010 implementing legislation “did not prohibit indirect financing of cluster munitions production.”[45]

In March 2015, an opposition member asked the government a series of parliamentary questions about investment in cluster munition producers, including the adequacy of existing legislation, the possibility of enacting specific legislation to ban such investment, the ability of pension schemes to invest indirectly in cluster munition manufacture, and whether guidance could be issued to help pension schemes avoid such investment.[46] The government responded that there were no plans to review this specific area of pensions investments.[47]

Financial institutions have responded to public pressure and campaigning actions by NGOs calling for disinvestment from cluster munition manufacturers. A 2014 report on worldwide investment in cluster munitions published by CMC member PAX, identified US$1.4 billion invested by UK financial institutions in companies that manufacture cluster munitions between June 2011 and September 2014.[48] It listed seven UK financial institutions as implicated in investing in companies that produce cluster munitions.[49]

Use

As a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK has foresworn any use of cluster munitions, but in the past the UK used cluster munitions extensively, including in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.[50]

Production and transfer

The UK produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and has declared that it now has no facilities to produce cluster munitions.[51]

The UK produced several variants of the BL-755 bomb with 147 submunitions and also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries.[52]

BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise finally possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[53]

The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.[54]

Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous status of the “Starstreak” high-velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act.[55]

Stockpile destruction

The UK once stockpiled a total of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38,758,898 submunitions, as listed in the following table.[56]

Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by the UK[57]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK was required to declare and destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 November 2018.

On 17 December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of the stockpile, five years in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline.[58] The UK announced the completion at the convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2014 and the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014. It also declared the completion of the stockpile destruction in its April 2014 Article 7 report.

The stockpile was transferred and then destroyed at facilities in Germany, Italy, and Norway.[59] In April 2014, the UK reported that the total cost of the stockpile destruction was “around £40 million,” or US$66 million.[60]

Retention

Since 2013, the UK has reported that it does not have any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or research purposes and “has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[61]

Previously, in 2011 and 2012, the UK reported that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four types.[62] In 2013, it reported that the retained submunitions had been destroyed by demolition “because of concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[63]

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

At the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held virtually in November 2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) announced that as of 14 November 2020, it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5 in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. In total, 122 minefields were cleared, releasing 23km²of land.[1] The UK was also thought to have some residual cluster munition remnants contamination present within mined areas of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. However, the UK has not reported any cluster munition remnants contamination in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency reports.

The UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force the same day. The UK had responsibilities under Article 5 of the treaty, due to its claim of sovereignty over the Falklands Islands/Islas Malvinas.

The UK started clearance in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2009. In November 2008, the UK requested, and was granted, a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to clear mine-affected in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. A further five-year extension was requested in March 2018, and was granted, stipulating a new clearance deadline of 1 March 2024.

No civilians have been reported injured or killed as a result of antipersonnel landmines or cluster munition remnants in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. Risk education was provided as part of normal health and safety measures.[2]

Mine-affected areas in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas were fenced off, while legislation made it illegal for people to enter contaminated areas.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

The UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 and submitted two Article 5 deadline extension requests. The first extension request was submitted in 2008, for 10 years until 2019, and a second five-year extension was later approved, to 1 March 2024.[3] The UK announced completion of its Article 5 obligations in November 2020, ahead of its March 2024 deadline.[4]

The UK is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, although it has not reported any obligations under Article 4.

Management and coordination

Mine Action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[5]

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage and coordinate mine action activities in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The NMAA is chaired by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and comprises representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falklands Islands Government, and a strategic advisor.

The Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight) monitored operational progress and performance in the mine clearance program, and chaired the local land release committee.[6]

The Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC) provided a forum for mine action contractors to discuss project progress and the land release process. SHALARC is based on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas and is composed of local officials and a representative of the UK military.[7]

All demining efforts were conducted in close cooperation with the Falkland Islands Government.[8]

The total cost of the demining program was £44 million (US$56 million), funded in full by the UK Government.[9]

Legislation and standards

The UK approved a Landmines Act in 1998, which came into force in 1999.[10] The Falkland Islands Government has had a Crimes Ordinance in place since 1989, making it a criminal offence for any person to willfully enter a minefield; to cause or attempt to cause a landmine to explode; to cut or remove minefield fencing; to remove, damage or obscure minefield signs or notices; or to drive an animal into a minefield.[11]

Environmental protection

The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas contain sensitive flora, fauna, and fragile terrain which created an additional challenge to mine clearance. Environmental standards for clearance were agreed on in coordination with the Environmental Planning Department of the Falkland Islands Government, to minimize damage to the fragile environment, and to aid remediation.[12] The UK also conducted an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2017, in preparation for the most environmentally sensitive minefields to be cleared from 2018 onwards. The EIA identified two particular issues: a) penguins which often breed in burrows in mined areas,[13] and, b) the sensitive beach and sand dune area at Yorke Bay, where the last areas to be cleared were located.[14] The report set down conditions to ensure that the impact on the environment was limited to the minimum practicable impact.[15]

Information management

Fenix Insight ran a detailed operational performance management database, which allowed the Demining Project Office manager to analyze performance, check the validity of future plans, and identify trends and other factors that influenced overall performance.[16]

Gender and diversity

The UK reported that gender policies and procedures were in place to cover mine action activities in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, including at the level of the FCO, the NMAA, the land release contractor, and the demining project.[17]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination (as of November 2020)[18]

Note: ERW=Explosive Remnants of War.

In 2009, 122 mined areas were identified.[19] As of 30 April 2020, it was reported that there were four remaining areas to be cleared in the Yorke Bay area, totaling 0.26km².[20]

In November 2020, the UK announced fulfillment of its clearance obligations, and reported that a total of 23km² was released back to the community through clearance operations.[21]

Landmine Contamination

Landmines were laid in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas during the 1982 conflict between the UK and Argentina. The Argentine Government reported to the United Nations (UN) that 20,000 antipersonnel mines and 5,000 antivehicle mines were transported to the islands by its armed forces during the war. Approximately 1,855 mines have been removed and destroyed following the conflict.[22]

Mined areas covered a wide range of terrain, including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture. However, mined areas accounted for only 0.1% of the land used for farming. Some of the contaminated areas were isolated, with no access tracks.

Cluster munition remnants contamination

The UK has not reported any cluster munition remnants contamination in its Article 7 reports under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, some cluster munition remnants contamination was believed to have existed within the mined areas in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

There are also estimated to be over 2,000 crates of AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 “cluster adapter” type bombs remaining in UK waters in the cargo of a sunken World War II ship, off the east coast of England. The SS Richard Montgomery vessel, carrying a cargo of munitions, was stranded and wrecked off the Thames Estuary, near Sheerness, in August 1944, and remains submerged there. The former UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) has listed best estimates of the munitions remaining aboard the ship, including 2,297 cases of fragmentation cluster bombs, with AN M1A1 and/or AN M4A1 “cluster adapter” submunitions. Surveys from November 2017 and April 2018 have indicated that the wreck is generally stable but was showing accelerated levels of deterioration.[23] In 2002, it was reported that the wreck is monitored constantly by port authorities, and is subject to a 500-metre exclusion zone.[24]

ERW contamination

ERW were also found in some of the contaminated areas on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

Casualties

No casualties caused by mines/ERW, or by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), have been reported in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.[25]

Addressing the impact

Mine Action

Operators and service providers

SafeLane Global was the sole demining contractor in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

Clearance

Land release overview[26]

Note: ERW=Explosive Remnants of War.

Land release: landmines

Some mine clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s immediately following the conflict, during which 1,855 landmines were removed and destroyed from mined area.[27]

Full clearance operations in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas began in 2009 culminating in the clearance of 122 minefields. All mine clearance on the islands was undertaken by SafeLane Global, using Zimbabwean deminers.[28] To demonstrate that all reasonable effort had been made, detailed site implementation plans were developed for each demining site to show what was expected to be found, what was done, what was found, and what was learned.[29]

The clearance was conducted in phases. The first four phases of clearance took place from October 2009 to March 2016, during which 35 mined areas were released, totaling just over 7km².[30] Phase 5(a) was completed at the end of March 2018, with just over 4.8km² cleared. Phase 5(b) commenced in April 2018[31] and was completed in November 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic had temporarily suspended operations in the first part of 2020.[32]

Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice Cove, which had been inaccessible to all persons on the islands since 1982,[33] were released after survey confirmed that neither area had mines.[34]

Clearance was prioritized initially in mined areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, resulting in the release of areas near Port Stanley, and then according to ranking, including factors such as the size and density of a minefield; terrestrial factors (remoteness of location, topography, and difficulty of mine removal); human factors (proximity to life, benefits to the local population of clearance, and political priorities of the UK Government and the Falkland Islands Government); and environmental factors (conservation of wildlife and adherence to local legislation).

Challenges for clearance included the environmentally sensitive nature of mined areas, [35] remote locations, adverse weather conditions, incomplete Argentine minefield records, and the limits on the capacity of the islands to provide certain facilities for demining.[36]

Residual risk

The UK believes that the likelihood of further clearance tasks arising, or of landmines being found after program completion, is very low. Any mines found following the conclusion of the demining program will be cleared by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, of the Royal Air Force’s Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.[37]

Risk Education

Implementation

While the humanitarian impact of mine-affected areas was reported to be negligible, risk education was conducted for both military and civilian personnel, to ensure that mine awareness remained a key part of normal health and safety considerations.[38] The civilian population has been instructed to follow a “mark, leave, report” process, in relation to finding landmines or other UXO.[39]

Marking

All 122 mined areas were perimeter-marked, and were regularly monitored and protected by stock proof fencing to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force the same day.

The UK served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 1999–2000, and as coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme for many years. More recently, the UK served on the Committee on Cooperative Compliance from 2016–2018 and the Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance since 2018. The UK was also Vice President of the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.

The UK has attended most meetings of the treaty, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in December 2014. More recently, the UK attended the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it reported on its clearance efforts in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and requested a clearance deadline extension request until 2024, which was granted. It also highlighted its support for mine action in nine countries from 2014–2018.[1] The UK also attended the treaty’s intersessional meetings in May 2019, where it again provided an update on clearance activities.[2]

The UK is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. The UK is not party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The UK completed destruction of its stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines on 19 October 1999.

Initially, the UK retained close to 5,000 mines for training purposes, but decided in 2003 that the number was excessive and reduced it to less than 2,000. In 2018, the UK announced that its previously reported 724 antipersonnel mines retained for training were inert munitions not subject to the convention, and thus has zero mines retained for training or research.[3]

Production of antipersonnel mines in the UK was not prohibited until entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999, although some manufacturers had ceased production earlier. The UK’s first Article 7 report stated that production facilities had been converted or decommissioned.[4] The partial export moratoria of 1994 and 1995 were made comprehensive in 1996. Imports were banned in May 1997.

The UK was previously a major producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, with at least four major manufacturers producing five types of antipersonnel mines.[5] The UK was described in 1993 as one of the “top 10” exporters of antipersonnel mines and a primary source of advanced mine technology. British antipersonnel mines have been found in many mine-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, and Somalia, and were also exported to other countries. Mines were also imported from Canada, France, and the United States.

In 2019, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) contributed £56.2 million (US$71.7 million)[1] in mine action funding to 17 countries. Compared to 2018, the UK’s funding increased by almost one-quarter, or $13.6 million, in US dollar terms; in national currency terms, it rose by 30%, an increase of £12.7 million.

The largest contribution went to Afghanistan, which received the equivalent of more than $18 million, representing one-quarter of the UK’s total mine action funding. Cambodia and Lao PDR received the second and third largest contributions, each receiving more than $5 million.

Contributions by recipient: 2019[2]

In 2015–2019, the UK’s cumulative contribution to mine action totaled £148.9 million (approximately $197 million). In comparison, in the previous five-year period from 2010–2014, the UK’s support to mine action amounted to £58.2 million ($92.2 million).

In September 2018, the UK announced the provision of an additional £46 million (some $58 million) towards projects for demining, risk education, and capacity development in Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Vietnam.[3]

In April 2017, the UK announced a £100 million ($126 million) aid package to support landmine clearance and risk education projects over the next three years, which represents a tripling in its contribution to mine action[4] compared to its 2014–2016 contribution of £36.4 million ($53.4 million). This new funding would focus on countries “where the greatest numbers of people continue to suffer from landmine contamination…and where continued insecurity and instability pose an ongoing threat to UK interests.” The countries to benefit from this support were: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.[5]

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[6]

Note: N/A=not applicable.