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Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention

Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

Introduction

The Convention on Cluster Munitions seeks to prevent human suffering from cluster munitions, which are indiscriminate explosive weapons that impact a wide area and disperse multiple submunitions, many of which fail to detonate and pose a threat long after conflict ends.

The convention entered into force on 1 August 2010 and is in good standing, with a total of 110 States Parties and 13 signatories.[1] There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use, production or transfers of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008.

Upon adopting the convention, one government found that the strict new standard set by the agreement’s prohibitions would have “an immediate impact on the international cluster munitions market” and directly impact its own acquisition plans.[2] There is increasing evidence that this has happened as cluster munitions are being phased out of service in many of the 47 countries with stocks that have not joined the convention.[3]

The notable exception is Russia, which has used both old stocks of cluster munitions and newly developed ones extensively in Ukraine since its invasion of the country began on 24 February 2022. In a short period this new use has caused hundreds of civilian casualties and is destroying and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools.

There have been some recorded instances of cluster munition use by the government of Ukraine during the 2022 war. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that cluster munitions, as defined by the convention, have been transferred among the artillery, rocket systems, and other weapons that the Ukrainian government has received from third parties in 2022.

The lack of cluster munition transfers to Ukraine reflects how three-quarters of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have banned these weapons.[4] It also shows how other states that have not banned cluster munitions are nonetheless quietly taking significant steps to align their policies and adapt their military practices to adhere with the convention’s prohibitions, including on assisting with any banned activities.

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine was roundly condemned at the May 2022 intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Held for the first time since 2015, the intersessional meetings provided an important opportunity to hear from Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia on their ongoing destruction of cluster munition stocks, which has resulted in the destruction of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions in 2021 and the first half of 2022. South Africa was notably absent from the updates, which is worrisome given that its November 2023 stockpile destruction deadline is fast approaching.

The intersessional meetings held in 2022 helped keep the spotlight on universalization challenges between formal annual meetings of the convention. This is essential, as the convention risks significant loss of momentum as the COVID-19 pandemic continues into its third year. No country has ratified or acceded to the convention since 2020.

The pace of national implementation legislation, required by some states to accede, has also been slow; although during the reporting period, Niue adopted the first such law reported in any state in two years. Compliance with the annual transparency reporting requirement has been sporadic.

The hybrid intersessional meetings showed how the convention’s community of states, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), United Nations (UN) agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) are adapting and continuing their collaborative work to promote implementation and universalization.

The same principles of inclusiveness and partnership have characterized the development of a political declaration, agreed at the UN in Geneva on 17 June 2022, that seeks to prevent civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in towns, cities, and other populated areas.[5] The declaration will help strengthen the emerging norm against cluster munitions and positively shape behavior, if its signatories interpret it as requiring them to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2021 and the first half of 2022. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles, which are available on the Monitor website.[6]

Universalization

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[7]

Pace of universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Accessions

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a process known as accession.[8]

Saint Lucia was the last country to accede to the convention, in September 2020.

In states that remain outside the convention, there was little evidence of movement to acceede to the convention during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. One positive highlight was seen in the participation of South Sudan and Zimbabwe at a regional universalization workshop on the convention held in March 2022 in Abuja, Nigeria, as it signaled an interest from both states in acceding to the convention.

In Argentina, a cross-party group of 13 parliamentary representatives from the Chamber of Deputies recommended in May 2022 that the government accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions without delay. In Brazil, a parliamentary committee rejected a legislative proposal recommending accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in January 2022.[9]

Support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions by regional body

Ratifications

During the reporting period, no signatory has ratified the convention. São Tomé and Príncipe was the last country to ratify it, in January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific.[10]

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council reportedly approved a memo recommending ratification of the convention in June 2021.[11] All African signatories to the convention, except Djibouti, attended the regional workshop on universalization co-hosted by Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK), in Abuja, on 23–24 March 2022.[12]

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.[13] Most signatories do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. Cyprus remains the last European Union (EU) member state to have signed but not ratified the convention, after its parliament put the ratification “on hold” in 2013.[14]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The final part of the convention’s Second Review Conference took place in a hybrid format in Geneva on 20–21 September 2021, under the presidency of Ambassador Félix Baumann, the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN in Geneva. A total of 87 countries attended either the first part of the conference on 25–27 November 2020 and/or the second part in September 2021.[15]

At the conclusion of the Second Review Conference, States Parties adopted the 50-point Lausanne Action Plan, which lays out actions for them to undertake over the period 2021–2026.[16] They also adopted the Lausanne Declaration, which states:

“We underscore our obligation never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions and, in accordance with the object and provisions of the Convention, we condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor, remaining steadfast in our determination to achieve a world entirely free of any use of these weapons.”[17]

The Permanent Representative of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Ambassador Aidan Liddle, is serving as president of the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties, which will be held in Geneva from 30 August to 2 September 2022.

Ambassador Liddle chaired the convention’s first intersessional meetings since 2015, which were held in a hybrid format in Geneva on 16–17 May 2022. A total of 74 countries attended: 59 States Parties, eight signatories, and seven non-signatories.

Ambassador Abdul-Karim Hashim Mostafa, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN in Geneva, has been designated as president of the convention’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, scheduled for 11–14 September 2023.

The CMC continues its advocacy work in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation, cooperating closely with the convention’s presidency, States Parties, the ICRC, and the ISU. During the reporting period, the CMC’s Investing in Action capacity development program supported advocacy outreach initiatives by national campaigns in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Nepal, and Serbia. On 8 April 2022, the CMC organized a meeting hosted by the Permanent Mission of the UK to the UN in New York, to promote universalization of the convention among Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. During the reporting period there were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 76/47

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful tracker to gauge interest in and support for the convention, particularly from states that have not joined. Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown steadily.

A total of 146 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/47, on the implementation of the convention, on 6 December 2021, including 36 non-signatories.[18] This was the second-highest number of votes in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the convention to date.

After abstaining from the vote in 2020, Russia returned to its original practice of voting against the resolution, making it the only country to do so in 2021.[19] In stark contrast, China voted for the resolution for the first time, as did Lao PDR and Lebanon.

All except three of the 37 states to abstain from voting on the 2021 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention.[20] Zambia was the only State Party to abstain from the resolution, along with signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions[21]

Several states not party explained their vote on the 2021 UNGA resolution.[22] Russia repeated its argument that cluster munitions are “legitimate weapons” that are “only harmful when misused.” Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, as well as other non-signatories, reiterated their long-held objections over how the convention was negotiated and adopted outside of UN auspices, due to their firm opposition to creating new international law.

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 41 countries and five other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Past use of cluster munitions[23]

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.[24] Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[25]

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used in eight non-signatories: Azerbaijan in 2020; Cambodia in 2011; Libya in 2011, 2015, and 2019; South Sudan in 2014; Sudan in 2012–2015; Syria in 2012–2021; Ukraine in 2014–2015 and 2022; and Yemen in 2015–2017.

New use

Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine during the reporting period (August 2021–July 2022). Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022.

Use in Ukraine

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, causing civilian casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools. Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least three times during the conflict.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine during 2022:

• 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 10–35km and deliver 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
• 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 20–70km and deliver 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
• 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missiles, which deliver 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions (9M544 model) or 72 antipersonnel submunitions (9M549 model);
• 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missiles, which are equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
• A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile;
• RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bombs, which contain 268 PTAB-1M high explosive antitank submunitions.

As of 1 July 2022, hundreds of cluster munition attacks by Russian forces have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred in at least ten of Ukraine’s 24 provinces (or oblasts): Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and has sought to draw attention elsewhere, alleging that Ukrainian forces were responsible for several possible cluster munition attacks.

Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions, including Uragan cluster munition rockets, in at least three locations that were under the control of Russia’s armed forces or affiliated armed groups at the time. Such use was reported in Husarivka, in Kharkiv oblast, on either 6 or 7 March; in Yenakiieve, in Donetsk oblast, on 22 March; and in Kherson on 14 June.[26] Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces previously used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire. Ukraine has not denied using cluster munitions in the 2022 conflict, but says that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”[27]

Russia has stated that it regards cluster munitions as “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”[28] Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine and has accused Ukraine of using the weapons, for example in the city of Donetsk on 14 March in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[29]

Ukrainian officials have expressed grave concern over Russia’s use of cluster munitions during the 2022 conflict. Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova told a UN Security Council debate on 27 April that Russia’s use of cluster munitions in populated areas is proof that it “blatantly disregards international humanitarian law.”[30] In March 2022, she had described cluster munitions as “one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians.”[31]

The new use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council, the Security Council, and the General Assembly.[32] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the EU, the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.

Allegations of use

Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, but the Monitor is not aware of any credible evidence of cluster munition attacks in Syria during the reporting period. The last recorded cluster munition attacks were by government forces near Aleppo on 14 March 2021.[33] Subsequent use may have gone unreported, and the Monitor has not been able to independently verify allegations, such as one alleging that a Turkish-backed armed group used cluster munitions when shelling the village of Um Kef, near Tal Tamir in al-Hasakah governorate, on 4 June 2022.[34]

Previously, Armenia (or forces backed by Armenia) and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, in September–October 2020. There have been no reports or allegations of new cluster munition use in the region since then.

Use by non-state armed groups

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions—due in part to the relative complexity of these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by ethnic Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by an ethnic Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatist rebels.

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The United States (US) maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a Department of Defense directive, which had required the US to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside their own territories. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Production of Cluster Munitions

Since World War II, at least 34 states have collectively developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[35]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

In 2022, Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions, while Russian forces used at least two newly developed cluster munitions during the conflict in Ukraine. Russian forces have used the 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions. The same company is producing guided 9M54-series cluster munition missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.[36] Russia has also used a cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Iranian state-owned media reported in August 2021 that the domestically produced Qadr S ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000km, carries a cluster munition warhead.[37] The exact type of submunition has not been publicly disclosed.

Few of the remaining producer countries are known to have manufactured cluster munitions either during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. This is largely due to a lack of transparency and available data as well as disinvestment measures aimed at financial institutions. For example:

• After acquiring Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer—Israel Military Industries (IMI)—in late 2018, Elbit Systems Ltd. announced that it would discontinue the production of cluster munitions.[38] In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. confirmed that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[39]
• Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating, “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[40]
• In South Korea, Hanwha Corporation shareholders approved a proposal in September 2020 to end the company’s production of cluster munitions by shifting this activity to the Korea Defense Industry Corporation, a new company affiliated with Hanwha.[41]
• The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, announced in 2016 that it was ending production.[42] In January 2021, US defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced that it was ending participation in a US government stockpile management contract to test the shelf-life of cluster munitions.[43]

Greece, Poland, Romania, and Türkiye have also indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[44] States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrine have changed in this regard, and detail any measures in place to deter and prevent such activities in future.

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party.

Eighteen states have ceased production of cluster munitions. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, except non-signatory Argentina.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[45]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[46]

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any state during the reporting period.

A handful of mainly state-owned companies still promote their cluster munitions at various defense industry arms fairs. In June 2022, Munitions India Ltd. displayed the cluster munition variant of the Pinaka missile system at the Eurosatory arms fair, in violation of Eurosatory rules.[47]

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[48]

While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.[49]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[50] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 95 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[51]

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions[52]

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 40 countries—37 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them.

Four States Parties have cluster munition stocks still to destroy, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction[53]

Questions remain over whether Guinea knowingly possesses cluster munitions, as it apparently imported them in the past and may still possess them. Guinea must report any stocks in its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was due in April 2015 but still has not been submitted.[54]

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

• Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.[55] Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all its stockpiled cluster munitions.
• Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.[56]
• Nigeria has appealed for cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions, which includes UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[57]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

• Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions had been destroyed in or by 2012.[58]
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[59]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”[60] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in its demilitarization inventory for destruction. In April 2022, Expal USA was awarded a contract for the demilitarization and disposal of US cluster munition stocks.[61]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2013.[62] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.[63] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[64]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 37 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction[65]

Note: N/R=not reported.

*Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

Five States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table, due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

• Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
• The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.[66]
• Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011, but did not provide information on the types or quantities.[67] It subsequently clarified in May 2022 and reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.[68]
• Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions as it had destroyed its stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[69]

Destruction underway

During 2021 and the first half of 2022, three States Parties destroyed a total of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions from their stocks, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2021–mid-2022

Peru and Slovakia destroyed a total of 355 cluster munitions and 5,238 submunitions during 2021. Bulgaria did not destroy any cluster munitions in 2021, but has destroyed 1,303 cluster munitions and 41,495 submunitions in February–May 2022. Previously, in 2020, four States Parties destroyed a total of 2,277 cluster munitions and more than 52,000 submunitions.

Bulgaria had destroyed 48% of its overall cluster munition stocks and 44% of its submunitions by May 2022. An accidental explosion at a contractor’s stockpile destruction facility in December 2020 put the project on hold until February 2022, but since then the destruction of cluster munitions has scaled up considerably.[70] Due to the delay, Bulgaria has requested a third extension of its stockpile destruction deadline, which will be considered at the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties in August–September 2022.[71]

Slovakia reiterated at the convention’s intersessional meetings in May 2022 that it has “an ongoing plan and is doing its best to fulfil its Article 3 obligation” by the end-of-year deadline.[72] Peru also reported that it was on track to meet its April 2024 deadline despite the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a lower number of cluster munitions destroyed than planned in 2021.[73]

South Africa did not provide an update at the May 2022 intersessional meetings, which the CMC said was “highly disturbing” since its stockpile destruction deadline is in 2023 and the convention has received no updates from South Africa for the past five years.[74]

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

A total of 11 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2021)[75]

Belgium retains the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party and reported consuming 14 cluster munitions in 2020.[76] Germany comes second and consumed 36 cluster munitions and 2,909 submunitions in 2021.[77] Bulgaria also consumed cluster munitions while training explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel in 2021.

Spain increased its stockpile of retained cluster munitions, from three in 2020 to seven in 2021.[78]

BiH, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland did not consume any retained cluster munitions in 2021. Cameroon has not provided a transparency report detailing the status of its retained cluster munitions since 2017.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks significantly since making their first declarations, indicating that the initial amounts retained were not the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Some States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, Moldova, and the Netherlands have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

A majority of States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for training purposes, including 28 States Parties that once possessed stocks.[79] Guinea-Bissau reported in July 2022 that it has no stockpiled cluster munitions, including for research and training purposes.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.[80]

As of 1 August 2022, 102 States Parties had submitted an initial transparency report.[81] Of the eight States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade overdue.

States Parties with initial Article 7 deadlines

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year.

Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide Article 7 reports annually. A total of 12 States Parties have not provided an annual update since submitting their initial Article 7 report.[82] South Africa’s lack of annual reports is concerning given its stockpile destruction obligations.

During 2022, signatory the DRC submitted its fourth voluntary transparency report since 2011, while non-signatory South Sudan provided its third such report since 2020. Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying the convention.

The CMC continues to encourage states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[83]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The pace of the adoption of new legislation has slowed. However, on 17 March 2021, Niue enacted specific legislation to govern its implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty.[84] Niue’s Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act enforces the two conventions with penal sanctions and fines.[85]

Another 20 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[86]

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[87]

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.[88] Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.[89] The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.[90] New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.[91]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[92] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.[93]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate States Parties’ obligation under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[94]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties and Lithuania used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[95]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

Disinvestment

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention’s Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.[96]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

Italy enacted legislation in December 2021 to prohibit companies from funding manufacturers of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.[97] Law No. 220 applies to all companies, regardless of whether they are registered in Italy or abroad.[98]

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[99]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.