Summary

Non-signatory Russia says it cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons, despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It was the only country to vote against a key United Nations (UN) resolution in December 2021, which urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively during its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including newly developed models of cluster munitions.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1]

In 2017, Russia said its assessment of the convention “has not changed” and called it “a politicized document that tailors the very definition” of cluster munitions “to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[2] Russia has reiterated this position several times since. In November 2021, it called cluster munitions “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”[3]

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer in meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. Russia has been invited to, but has not attended, any of the convention’s meetings since then.

In December 2021, Russia voted against a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Russia has previously abstained or voted against this annual resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.[7]

Previously, in 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[8] Yet Russia has never acknowledged the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine.

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[9] It also voted in favor of a 2014 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[10]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[11] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions.

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[12]

According to international technical reference materials and corporate marketing, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022. Since invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces have used at least two new types of cluster munitions for the first time:

• The 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions.
• A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed the new generation of 300mm multi-barrel rocket launchers at its rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow, in July 2020.[13] Photographs from the event showed 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, as well as 9M54-series cluster munition guided missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.[14]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb, developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise.[15]

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[16]

At least 10 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks and listed types and quantities, as outlined in the following table:

Stockpiled Russian/Soviet cluster munitions declared by States Parties[17]

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions which are “stored throughout the state.” It said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[18] In November 2011, Russia stated that its cluster munition stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[19]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[20] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Russia[21]

Note: FAE=Fuel Air Explosive; HE/AT=High Explosive/Antitank; SFW=Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions in attacks which have caused hundreds of civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022.[22] Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions at least three times.[23]

The exact number of Russian cluster munition attacks is not known, though hundreds have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred, many in populated areas. At least ten of Ukraine’s 24 oblasts have been struck by cluster munitions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine since February 2022; all launched from the ground using missiles and rockets, except for air-delivered RBK-series cluster bombs. These cluster munitions were all either manufactured in Russia, some as recently as in 2021, or by its predecessor state, the Soviet Union.

Types of cluster munitions confirmed to be in use by Russia include:

• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
• The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
• A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile; and
• The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions.

Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine, but has sought to draw attention elsewhere. It has criticized past use of cluster munitions by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the former Yugoslavia in 1999.[24] Russia accused Ukraine of using cluster munitions in the city of Donetsk on 14 March 2022, in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[25] In June 2022, France issued a statement denying “allegations circulating in the Russian media and amplified by social media asserting that France is supplying Ukraine with cluster munitions,” describing the reports as “totally false.”[26]

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine been condemned by 39 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies including the Human Rights Council, Security Council, and the UNGA, as of 1 July 2022.[27] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the current president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the United Kingdom (UK), expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The UK said that it “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[28]

Previously, in 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[29] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[30] Russia expressed concern at this Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by pro-Russian separatist forces.[31]

Previous use in Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also strong evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participated with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons, and frequently carry out operations together.[32] There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, but no attacks were reported between 1 August 2021 and 31 July 2022. Previously, the Monitor reported at least a dozen cluster munition attacks in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operations with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[33] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by Russia or the Soviet Union.[34]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[35] In December 2016, Russia issued a position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which concluded “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[36] In December 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[37]

The civilian harm caused by use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread global media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[38]

Previous use

During the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and 9M27K-series Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[39] Russia denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[40]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[41]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were used by various forces in conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had first used cluster munitions in 1943, against German forces during World War II.[42]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.  

Russia said in November 2020 that it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but regards antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[1]

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines repeatedly in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

Russia has also said that it cannot join due its “serious doubts” over the treaty’s “reliability” because, in its view, the treaty lacks “the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.”[2] Russia has only ever alleged Mine Ban Treaty violations by one State Party, Ukraine.

Russia participated as an observer in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not adopt or sign the treaty. It attended the treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties in 1999 and the Second Review Conference in 2009 as an observer. Russia last participated in a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in 2010.

Russia has consistently abstained from voting on the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting universalization and full implementation of the treaty. Russia most recently abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 76/26 on 6 December 2021.[3]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). Russia last submitted annual transparency reports for both protocols in April 2022. Russia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production                        

Russia has produced at least 12 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POM-2, POM-3, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines halted in 1997.[4]

Russia has been conducting research on new landmines, modifications to existing mine types, and alternatives to mines since at least 1997.[5] Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during annual military exercises in 2021, including the POM-3 “Medallion” self-destructing bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine, which is equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability and had been in development since at least 2015.[6] It also tested several types of newly developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.[7]

Ukrainian forces displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which had been captured from Russian forces.[8]

Russia’s landmine production is illustrated by its use of newly manufactured MOB, POM-3, and PTKM-1R mines in Ukraine during 2022.

Transfer

On 1 December 1994, Russia put in place a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that are either not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russia reported in 2022 that was still being observed.[9]

Antipersonnel landmines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[10] In recent years, antipersonnel mines of Russian manufacture—distinct from versions produced in the former Soviet Union—have appeared in Syria[11] and Ukraine.[12]

In Libya, six types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines, and two types of antivehicle mines that had not been seen before in Libya, were used in and around Tripoli in 2019 and 2020.[13] In March 2021, a United Nations (UN) Security Council Panel of Experts on Libya reported evidence that private military contractors from the Wagner Group had brought the antipersonnel mines to Libya to use in their operations.[14]

Stockpiling and destruction

In 2004, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that Russia stockpiled 26.5 million antipersonnel mines.[15] This marked the first time that Russia had released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stocks.

The defense minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. In 2010, Russia told a Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it had destroyed a total of 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[16] In 2010 alone, more than 464,000 antipersonnel landmines that did not meet international requirements were destroyed.[17]

Since 2010, Russia has not shared any public information on its stockpile or destruction efforts.

Russian military units have maintained landmine stocks in other countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as 18,200 mines in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.[18]

Use

New use

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion of the country began on 24 February 2022.[19] There were also numerous allegations from Russian media sources in 2022 that Ukrainian forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least eight types of antipersonnel mines have been used, or are alleged to have been used, by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is confirmed evidence that Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since February 2022, at numerous locations prior to retreating and abandoning their positions.[20]

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All the mine types listed above were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). Some of the landmines used in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021. This includes the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, which is delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from between 5–15km away.[21] The POM-3  mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine developed by Russia in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.[22]

Other types of landmines used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.^[23] The POM-2 landmine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means such as vehicles, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be emplaced by hand.[24]If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then such munitions are considered to be antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[25]

Use of PFM-series mines

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets.[26] The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.[27] Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.[28]

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[29] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[30] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.[31] Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[32]

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.[33] Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.[34] The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[35]

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.[36] This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center. These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;[37] of individual PFM mines in isolation;[38] of civilians handling presumably live mines;[39] and claims of civilian casualties.[40] Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.[41]

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.[42] Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.[43]

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.[44] Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.[45] There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.

International reaction

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the US. The new use of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, as well as by US congressional representatives such as Senator Patrick Leahy.[46] 

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) called on all parties to the armed conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines were used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[47]

Previous use

Antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in early 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[48]

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on Russia’s border with Georgia.[49] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop the flow of weapons, drugs, and terrorists; and maintains that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[50]

In Libya, significant new mine contamination was discovered in Tripoli in May 2020 after Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) fighters withdrew from the city. Credible evidence indicated that the Wagner Group, a private Russian military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government,[51] was responsible for transferring and using antipersonnel mines as part of its support to the LAAF.

Several types of Russian or Soviet-made antipersonnel landmines were laid in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli in 2019–2020, according to the Government of National Accord (GNA), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) and mine clearance operators. This included Russian-made MON-50, MON-200, and OZM-72 mines, which had not been used in Libya previously. Various explosive charges were also used to booby-trap homes, including antivehicle mines.

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[52] Mine clearance operators subsequently confirmed to Human Rights Watch (HRW) in May 2022 that all 35 locations listed in the tablet were indeed contaminated by landmines, and that the Wagner Group was likely responsible given its presence in those areas at the time.[53]

Contamination

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

In January 2017, a commander in the Russian armed forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km² of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km² in neighboring Ingushetia.[4] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[5]

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES, through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[6]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[7]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2017 was reportedly undertaken by 7,050 military personnel, including 846 officers, 97 demining teams, 978 vehicles, and 51 pieces of demining machinery.[8]

Land Release

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency reports for 2017, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the “territories of the Russian Federation,” including the western, southern, central, and eastern military districts, and the northern navy district.In total, more than 331,607 explosive devices were destroyed, including 30,292 IEDs.[9]

In 2016, the Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, had reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018.[10] However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In September 2017, online media reported that combat engineers had been working since April 2017 to clear forests in mountainous areas and foothills in Chechnya.[11]

Progress in 2018

For 2018, Russia planned to clear more than 53km² of ERW: 14.7km² in the western military district, 14.2km² in the southern military district, 13.9km² in the central military district, 6.2km² in the eastern military district, and 4.1km² in the northern navy district.[12]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Casualties Overview

In 2016, four mine/ERW casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2016 were adult male civilians. No child casualties were recorded among civilians.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown.

A total of 3,187 civilian mine/ERW casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown) have been recorded since 1994, including in UNICEF data for casualties in Chechnya.[2]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[3]