Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardousarea; EOD = explosive ordnance disposal; ERW = explosive remnants of war; BAC = battle area clearance.

Contamination

At the end of 2017, the Republic of South Sudan had a total of 143 areas suspected and confirmed to contain cluster munition remnants, with a total size estimated at just over 4.5km².[3] This is a small reduction on the total of 142 areas that remained at the end of 2016 over nearly 4.6km².[4] Areas of cluster munition contamination resulting from decades of pre-independence conflict continued to be identified in 2017, and the threat was compounded by ongoing fighting which broke out in December 2013.[5] In March 2018, UNMAS stated that the actual size of cluster munition contamination is likely to be greater than recorded estimates, as in many of the strike areas multiple cluster munition canisters are found with the consequence that the overall contaminated area extends well beyond an expected standard footprint.[6]

Despite the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, UNMAS reported that sporadic fighting continued across the country in 2017, which it said,“continues to litter vast swathes of land, roads and buildings with explosive hazards.”[7] Ongoing insecurity, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), persisted in preventing access to confirm or address cluster munition contamination.[8]

Seven of South Sudan’s former 10states have areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants (see table below), with Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria remaining the most heavily contaminated.[9] Clearance of the last known remaining cluster munition-contaminated area in Lakes state (with a size of 525m²) was completed in 2017.[10]

From 1995 to 2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have used air-dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan. Many types of submunitions have been found, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeyes), Chilean-made PM-1, and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1SCh submunitions.[11]

In February 2014, evidence of new cluster munition contamination was discovered south of Bor, in Jonglei state.[12] Evidence indicated the cluster munitions had been used in previous weeks during the conflict between opposition forces supporting South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, which received air support from Uganda.In September 2014, South Sudan reported that a joint government-UNMAS team had investigated and established that cluster munitions had been used, but could not determine the user.[13]

Cluster munition contamination by Sudanese state (as ofend 2017)[14]

In 2017, 14 cluster munition-contaminated areas were newly identified, of which five were cleared during the year.[15]

Cluster munition remnants have been found in residential areas, farmland, pastures, rivers,and streams, on hillsides, in desert areas, in and around former military barracks, on roads, in minefields, and in ammunition storage areas.[16] Cluster munition contamination in South Sudan continues to pose a physical threat to local populations, curtails freedom of movement, and significantly impedes development.[17] In 2017, due to the ongoing violence, internally displaced populations remained particularly vulnerable to cluster munition remnants and other ERW as they moved across unfamiliar territory.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), reported that in its areas of operations in Central Equatoria state, cluster munition contamination continued to have a humanitarian as well as socio-economic impact, but clearance in and around Tindalo, Terekeka, and Yei counties during the year allowed food aid to be delivered by agencies such as the World Food Programme and released land was used for growing crops and by cattle farmers.[18]

Other explosive remnants of war and landmines

South Sudan has a significant problem with mines and especially ERW, resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons during armed conflicts in 1955–1972 and 1983–2005 (see the 2017 South Sudan Mine Action profile for details).

At the start of 2018, almost six million people in South Sudan were living with the threat of ERW, including more than 1.8 million South Sudanese internally displaced since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. According to UNMAS, surveys of internally displaced persons identified a fear of ERW as among the most significant reasons for their inability to return home.[19] UNMAS has claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement is “incalculable.”[20] In 2017, agricultural production in South Sudan dropped compared with the previous year, attributed in large part to the mass migration of populations and inability to access safe land to cultivate crops.[21]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is responsible for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[22]

The UN Security Council Resolution 1996 of 2011 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing mine action across the country through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau.[23] UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, drafting national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the national database, and tasking operators.[24] The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.[25]

While it is planned that eventually the NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to UNMAS, the NMAA continued to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively in 2017. It requires substantial resources and capacity-building assistance if it is to operate effectively.[26]

UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorized UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.[27] In May 2014, UN Security Council 
Resolution 2155, adopted in response to the conflict that brokeout in December 2013, effectively ended the mission’s mandate to support capacity development of government institutions. In 2018, UNMAS reported that reversing this change in the mission mandate to support the capacity-building of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS’ ability to support the NMAA.[28]

Strategic planning

In 2017, the NMAA, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and funding from Japan, developed the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022. As ofMarch 2018, it had been finalized but not yet published.[29] According to UNMAS, the strategy, which does not contain significant provisions relating to cluster munition contamination, has three primary objectives and related targets:[30]

• Strategic Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national and international awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine/ERW-free South Sudan.
• Strategic Goal 2: The size of the mine/ERW contamination area is clarified and confirmed and the problem is addressed through appropriate survey and clearance methods; ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.
• Strategic Goal 3: Safe behavior is promoted among women, girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe livelihoods activities.

The strategy includes a section on gender and diversity, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in South Sudan were also incorporated in the strategy.[31]

Standards

According to UNMAS, the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan are organic documents subject to constant review. In 2017, the medical and quality management chapters were revised.[32] The NTSGs, which contain provisions specific to cluster munition remnants survey and clearance, are monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.[33]

Quality management

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016 UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC)on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.[34] In 2017, external QA continued to be conducted by Janus as a subcontractor to UNMAS, though QA/QC procedures were updated towards the end of the year.[35]

Operators

Three international demining NGOs operated in South Sudan in 2017: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and MAG. Three commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organizations were involved in clearance in 2017.[36]

According to UNMAS, almost 1,000 people were working in mine action operations in South Sudan in 2017. Mine action capacity deployed included two road assessment and clearance teams with four mine detection dogs (MDDs) each; five mechanical clearance teams with integrated manual deminer support (deploying two MineWolf 240, one MineWolf 330; one Bozena, and one PT300 demining machine); 16 eight-person multi-task teams (MTTs); eight nine-person quick reaction teams; four 15-person mine action teams; and 12 EOD/survey teams. According to UNMAS, all teams are equipped to conduct cluster munition clearance, but teams are primarily tasked on a geographical basis, and as such, their deployment to clear cluster munition strikes is determined by local prioritization.[37]

UNMAS reported that conflict and ongoing insecurity in 2017 undermined the ability of all operators to conduct sustained clearance operations in many parts of the country. This restricted the deployment of mine clearance teams leading to a reconfiguration of resources to field more mobile and smaller teams. Focus shifted to the prioritization of reactive EOD spot tasks over area clearance and re-survey of previously suspected areas thought to have overstated estimates of contamination.[38]

UNMAS assigns cluster munition tasks to operators. In 2017, only three operators, MAG, G4S, and TDI, carried out cluster munition-related tasks, in contrast to 2016, when cluster munition survey and clearance activities were undertaken by eight operators (DCA, DDG, MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), G4S, Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech International (DML), and TDI).

Land Release

Less than 1.1km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was released in 2017, a huge decrease from the nearly 3.5km² of cluster munition-contaminated area released in 2016.[39] This was due in large part to the shift in overall mine action activities from area clearance tasks to reactive EOD spot tasks due to security constraints.[40] In contrast, in 2016, the bulk of mine action capacity was redeployed to address cluster munition tasks in response to humanitarian priorities and UN-mission directed activities.[41]

Survey in 2017

The UNMAS database indicates that one cluster munition-contaminated SHA of just under 61,000m² was cancelled by survey in 2017, while 14 SHAs with a total size of 0.7km² were confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants (see table below).[42] This compares to 2016, when 55 SHAs of nearly 0.92km² of land were confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants.[43]

Cluster munition survey in 2017[44]

Clearance in 2017

Just over 1km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2017, with the destruction of 629 submunitions, as shown in the table below.[45] As noted above, this is a significant decrease from 2016, when close to 3.5km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared, with the destruction of more than 3,000 submunitions.[46]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2017[47]

Note: AP mine = antipersonnel mine; AV mine = antivehicle mine.

In addition, in 2017, five operators (DCA, DDG, MAG, G4S, and TDI) conducted battle area clearance (BAC) of just over 8.2km² and closed 1,295 spot tasks, and destroyed a total of 34,600 items of UXO.[48] This is an increase compared to an output of almost 8km² of BAC and 1,947 EOD spot tasks carried out in 2016, and the destruction of close to 20,200 items of UXO.[49]

Deminer safety

Mine action operators continued to face serious threats to the security of their operations and personnel due to the ongoing conflict. In 2017, there was an ambush on a demining contractor in which four personnel were seriously injured. In June 2018, UNMAS reported that an investigation into the incident found it to have been ethnically motivated. There were also several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups during the year.[50]

Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance

Due to the ongoing conflict, it is not possible to predict when South Sudan might complete clearance of cluster munition remnants on its territory, nor estimate the true extent of contamination.[51] According to UNMAS, in 2018 the national mine action program would prioritize re-survey of large SHAs thatremained in the database, recorded as far back as 2003, for which there was little evidence to support the recording, in order to better define the extent of contamination. It expected that significant cancellation of previously recorded SHAs would occur as a result, with the effectiveness of the re-survey process dependent on access restrictions posed by ongoing fighting.[52]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.