The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.^[1]

Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 155 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 24 acceded.^[2] The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only): three; 1998: 55; 1999: 32 (23 after 1 March); 2000: 19; 2001: 13; 2002: eight; 2003: 11; 2004: three; 2005: four; 2006: four; and 2007 (as of 15 August): three.

Four countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006. After declaring independence from Serbia in June 2006, Montenegro deposited its instrument of succession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 October 2006 and the treaty entered into force on 1 April 2007. Indonesia, which signed the treaty in December 1997, ratified on 20 February 2007, with entry into force on 1 August 2007. Kuwait acceded to the treaty on 30 July 2007, with entry into force on 1 January 2008. Iraq acceded on 15 August, with entry into force on 1 February 2008.

There are two states remaining that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty: Poland and the Marshall Islands. Poland backed away from plans to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future and instead declared that the Ministry of National Defense had determined that Poland should not join before 2015, when it intends to have alternatives to antipersonnel mines in place. The Marshall Islands gave a positive signal by, for the second year in a row, voting in favor of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

With near universalization in Africa, the Americas and Europe, there have been encouraging developments in states not yet party to the treaty in several other regions.

Middle East-North Africa

Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007 and Kuwait acceded on 30 July 2007. Support for accession appears to have intensified in Bahrain. The Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs told an ICBL mission in March 2007 that Bahrain supports the Mine Ban Treaty and that he intends to recommend accession; various legislators expressed similar sentiments.

In April 2007 an Omani military official told the ICBL that Oman already abides by the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty, and that “something will happen” soon regarding accession.

Morocco continued to stress its de facto compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty and for the first time submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

Asia-Pacific

In September 2006 Mongolia reiterated its objective of joining the treaty by 2008. Mongolia amended its State Secrecy Law in December 2006 to allow it to make information on antipersonnel mines publicly available. Mongolia is preparing a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

On several occasions in 2006 and 2007 Laos stated its intention of joining the treaty in the near future.

The government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist agreed under the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to neither use nor transport mines. In March 2007 Nepal declared that it was moving toward joining the treaty, and in April Nepal told States Parties that it was holding consultations on joining.

In April 2007 Palau told States Parties that it intends to join in the near future and already views itself as bound by the treaty. Palau voted for the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the first time.

Tonga attended a Pacific-wide Mine Ban Treaty workshop in Port Vila, Vanuatu in May 2007; this was its first-ever participation in a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting.

During an October 2006 advocacy trip to Vietnam, the ICBL met with government officials who reaffirmed that the country is already in accord with much of the treaty; it is not producing, exporting or using antipersonnel mines, and is providing support for mine action globally. The government expressed a willingness to be more involved in international efforts to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

In December 2006 China voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the second consecutive year; it continued to make statements supporting the Mine Ban Treaty’s purposes and objectives.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Georgia told States Parties in September 2006 and April 2007 that it is continuing to consider the possibility of acceding to the treaty, reiterating that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty. Georgia and Armenia continued their practice of supporting the pro-ban UNGA resolution, and Azerbaijan for the second year in a row voted in favor.

In March 2007 the government of Kazakhstan in cooperation with others convened a regional workshop on mine action. The Deputy Minister of Defense revealed that some 3,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed three years ago, and that there was a plan for further destruction.

But, despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to the treaty. Government forces in Myanmar/Burma and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. There were serious allegations that Israeli and Georgian forces also used antipersonnel mines (both governments denied the charges). Pakistan threatened to mine its border with Afghanistan. Poland backed off its commitment to join the treaty soon. The United States is moving toward production of new landmine systems that appear to be incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea has initiated production of remotely-delivered mine systems. The conflict in Lebanon appears to have stalled progress toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty, as has conflict in Somalia.

UN General Assembly Resolution 61/84

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 61/84 was adopted on 6 December 2006 by a vote of 161 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.^[3] This is the highest number of votes in favor of, and equal to the lowest number of abstentions on this annual resolution since 1997 when it was first introduced.^[4] Twenty states not party to the treaty voted in favor, including three countries that subsequently became States Parties (Indonesia, Kuwait, and Iraq), two signatory countries (Poland, Marshall Islands) and 15 non-signatories (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Palau—for the first time, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, United Arab Emirates).

Of the 40 states not party as of 15 August 2007, 17 abstained and 17 voted in favor of the resolution. The six other states not party to the treaty were absent from the vote, three of which have supported the resolution in the past (Nepal, Somalia, Tuvalu), and three of which have been absent from every previous vote (Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia).

Non-State Armed Groups

A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. They have done this through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, and signature of the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call.^[5] NSAGs in four States Parties (Burundi, Philippines, Senegal, Sudan) and one state not party to the treaty (Nepal) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments.

In September 2006 the government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL signed a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement which bans any mine-laying operations. In Nepal the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement committed the government and the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist to forego use of landmines.

Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burma, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Western Sahara. The Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) and its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (HPG), also known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),^[6] signed the Deed of Commitment in July 2006, as did the Chin National Front/Army of Burma. The Kuki National Organization and its armed wings in northeast India signed in August 2006, and the Lahu Democratic Front, the Palaung State Liberation Front, and the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization, all from Burma, signed in April 2007.

Seventh Meeting of States Parties

States Parties, observer states and other participants met for the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Switzerland from 18-22 September 2006. The meeting produced a strong Geneva Progress Report, which in addition to reviewing progress in the past year highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. This built on the Zagreb Progress Report from the previous year, and the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 adopted at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November-December 2004.

Notable announcements at the meeting included: the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia completing its mine clearance obligations; Latvia completing its stockpile destruction obligations; and, Macedonia and Moldova destroying mines previously retained for training. The ICBL welcomed the focus of States Parties on Article 5 mine clearance deadlines and especially the agreement on three proposals related to the deadlines: a standardized method of officially reporting completion of mine clearance obligations; a process to ensure that there are as few extension requests as possible, and that extensions are given for the shortest possible period to those states that have made their best efforts to meet the deadline; and a template for requesting extensions that requires concrete details on past efforts to achieve the deadline and on future plans to complete clearance. Both mine-affected and non-affected states agreed that extensions should not be considered automatic.  

Participation in the meeting was high—over 600 people—with a total of 123 country delegations attending, including 97 States Parties.^[7] More than 180 representatives of non-governmental organizations from 63 countries attended. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

A total of 26 states not party to the treaty participated, including signatories Indonesia (which subsequently ratified) and Poland. This large number indicated the continuing spread of the international norm rejecting antipersonnel mines. Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including Azerbaijan, China, Egypt and India. Notably, nine states not party to the treaty from the Middle East-North Africa region took part, an encouraging development in a region with low adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty. These included Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq (which subsequently acceded), Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.^[8]

One disappointing aspect of the meeting was that, as in previous years, there was very little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty’s prohibition on “assistance” and mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes.

Implementation and Intersessional Work Program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee, contact groups on universalization, resource mobilization, and Articles 7 and 9, the sponsorship program, and the Implementation Support Unit. A new contact group on linking mine action and development was initiated by Canada in May 2006, and had its first meeting in September at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties.

The new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs for the intersessional Standing Committees were selected at the Seventh Meeting in September 2006, for the period to the next annual meeting.^[9] The Standing Committees met for one week in April 2007. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Just 10 of the 87 States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the United States. Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices.

China, Latvia, Pakistan, and Russia deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex. China and Pakistan must be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement. In April 2007 Chinese officials told Landmine Monitor that China will meet its compliance deadline. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia’s deferral is now presumably irrelevant since it has already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes.

Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex.^[10] Their respective nine-year deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, 15 May 2008 for Ukraine, and 2014 for Russia. In November 2006 Russia said that it plans to complete its work to meet the technical requirements of Amended Protocol II by the end of 2007. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.

In December 2003, 91 CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive remnants of war. On 12 May 2006, the 20th State Party ratified the protocol, triggering an entry into force date of 12 November 2006. As of 1 August 2007, 32 states had ratified Protocol V.

Cluster Munitions, the CCW, and the Oslo Process

In contrast to previous CCW meetings, the Third Review Conference held in Geneva from 7-17 November 2006 devoted a significant amount of time to addressing cluster munitions. Nearly 30 states supported a proposal for a mandate to begin negotiations in the CCW on a “legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions.” The proposal was rejected by a number of states, including China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in favor of a weak mandate to continue discussions on explosive remnants of war, with a focus on cluster munitions. The larger group of states in favor of a strong negotiating mandate issued a declaration calling for an agreement that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions “within concentrations of civilians,” prohibit the use of cluster munitions that “pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate,” and require destruction of stockpiles of such cluster munitions.

Norway then announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting in the process in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” by 2008. At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. By this point, a total of 75 states were participating in the “Oslo Process.” Additional sessions to develop the treaty were scheduled for Vienna, Austria in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand in February 2008, with formal negotiations in Dublin, Ireland in May/June 2008.

CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was extremely weak, with a statement that the Group “without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the 2007 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision.”^[11]

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2006, two governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar/Burma and Russia. Nepal, listed as a user last year, stopped laying mines with the cease-fire in May 2006.

Myanmar’s military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was recorded in Karen, Karenni and Shan states and Tenasserim division. Russia has in recent years also used mines on a regular basis, primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan and on the borders with Tajikistan and Georgia. In June 2006 Russian officials acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields.

There were two serious and credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by other government forces, but which Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center in South Lebanon believes Israel laid antipersonnel mines during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. An Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that Israel did not use mines during the conflict. Russian peacekeepers claimed that Georgian military forces laid new landmines in South Ossetia and in the Kodori Gorge in 2006 and 2007. Georgia denied these allegations and stated that it continues to uphold its 1996 moratorium on landmine use.

In December 2006 Pakistan stated its intention to mine parts of its border with Afghanistan, but did not do so after considerable international and domestic criticism.

The ICBL has expressed strong concern that statements made by Venezuela, a State Party, may indicate it is still making active use of emplaced antipersonnel mines. In April 2007 Venezuela stated that it has not removed antipersonnel mines laid around six naval posts because it did not yet have a replacement system for the mines. If Venezuela is using these mines to derive military benefit, this would be an apparent violation of the Article 1 prohibition on use.

The ICBL also noted that this is not a phenomenon limited to Venezuela. There appear to be several cases where States Parties are using antipersonnel mines that they laid in the past to serve an ongoing military purpose. In particular, this is the case with mines laid, and not yet cleared, around military installations and prisons, and in border areas.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines since May 2006

States	Myanmar/Burma, Russia
NSAGs in	Afghanistan, Myanmar/Burma, Colombia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia/Chechnya

Note: Bold = States Parties in 2006

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

Use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups has declined modestly, mainly because some armed conflicts have entered into a negotiated settlement phase (such as in Nepal, Uganda and Burundi). However, NSAG use of antipersonnel mines still takes place in more countries than use by government forces. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was reported in two States Parties—Afghanistan and Colombia—and in six states not party to the treaty—Myanmar/Burma, India, Iraq (which acceded in August 2007), Lebanon, Pakistan, and Russia. Previously, Landmine Monitor cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 10 countries in 2005-2006 and 13 countries in 2004-2005.

Additions to the list of countries with NSAG use in this reporting period are Afghanistan and Lebanon. Countries with use by NSAGs in last year’s Landmine Monitor, but not in this reporting period include Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, and Somalia. In the case of Somalia it may well be that some NSAG use has continued, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to identify any specific instances.

Landmine Monitor also received allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Georgia, Niger, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen which it has not been able to confirm independently.

Insurgent and rebel groups have been using improvised explosive devices in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact, presence or proximity of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries and governments as “landmines.” This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated, or detonated by some other means.

In Afghanistan new use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban and others has been reported. In March 2007 the Taliban commander for Helmand province stated that his forces had laid landmines in anticipation of a NATO offensive. In February 2007 residents of Musa Qala stated that Taliban units were “digging trenches and laying mines” prior to a NATO offensive. In September 2006 Canadian forces operating in Kandahar province reported that retreating Taliban forces left booby-traps and landmines.

In Burma the Karen National Liberation Army, Karenni Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Shan State Army-South, United Wa State Army and several other non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel mines. It is likely that the Karen National Liberation Army was the NSAG using mines most extensively in this reporting period. Two armed groups not previously identified as users of antipersonnel mines were alleged to have used mines in this reporting period: the National Democratic Alliance Army, and remnants of the Mong Tai Army.

In Colombia the FARC continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The ELN also used mines. The Colombian government claims that there is a close correlation between the location of mine-related events and the location of coca routes.^[12]

In many parts of India, particularly Manipur, Assam, Tripura and Nagaland states, NSAGs have continued to make widespread use of command-detonated IEDs but only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs.

In Iraq insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively but made only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs, despite many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines. However, in August 2007 the US military reported that the number of incidents involving “house bombs,” including those with tripwires and pressure plates, had risen dramatically in recent months, and attributed this to al-Qaeda forces.

In Lebanon Fatah al-Islam is reported to have booby-trapped buildings throughout a Palestinian refugee camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines during fighting with the Lebanese army. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops on at least two occasions in late 2006 encountered antipersonnel mines used in ambushes, apparently ordered by a local Hezbollah commander.

In Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan and in the Waziristan agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines and IEDs, against Pakistani armed forces and state administration agencies, and in inter-tribal conflict.

In the Russian Federation, rebels in Chechnya continued to use command-detonated IEDs but there was only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. There were also two reports of victim-activated explosive booby-traps recorded in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in July 2007.

In Georgia there were allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in South Ossetia.

In Niger there were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice rebels.

In the Philippines two incidents involving victim-activated improvised mines took place on the islands of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, attributed to either Abu Sayyaf or rival clans. The Armed Forces of the Philippines identified one incident of use by the New People’s Army.

In Somalia most, if not all, reports of landmine use appear to refer to antivehicle mines, command-detonated antipersonnel mines or command-detonated improvised explosive devices. It is likely that some factions have continued sporadic use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor was not able to verify any specific instances.

In Sri Lanka the army in May 2006 accused the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of planting antipersonnel mines for the first time since the 2002 cease-fire, and it has continued to make occasional allegations since that time.

In Thailand there was one case of use by a non-state armed group in April 2007, when a deputy police chief stepped on a improvised mine and was severely injured while inspecting the scene of a bomb explosion in Narathiwat province.

The government of Turkey reported ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK—noting that 35 antipersonnel mines laid by the PKK were destroyed from January to July 2007—though most if not all incidents reported by the media and other sources appear to refer to command-detonated devices.

In Yemen there were reports of new use of antipersonnel mines when conflict broke out between government troops and rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in April 2007.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, the Temporary Security Zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Lebanon, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal and Somalia. NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Russia/Chechnya, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.^[13] Thirty-eight states have ceased the production of antipersonnel mines. This includes four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel and Poland.^[14] In addition, Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006.

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 countries as producers of antipersonnel mines: Myanmar/Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period, though consideration was given to removal of Vietnam and Nepal.^[15]

Vietnamese officials from both the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry told an ICBL delegation in October 2006 that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines, echoing comments made to a Canadian government delegation in November 2005. However, until Vietnam makes an official public statement that it no longer produces antipersonnel mines and will not do so in the future, Landmine Monitor will keep Vietnam on its list of producers.

In April 2007 a Nepali Brigadier General denied previous reports that Nepal has produced antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging that soldiers have frequently made command-detonated IEDs. Landmine Monitor has not received any official declaration from the Nepalese government denying antipersonnel landmine production, or foreswearing future production, so continues to identify the country as a producer.

The director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines and earlier, in 2002, the Ministry of Defense asserted that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, since 2002 mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have found many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.

In the United States, the Pentagon requested US$1.66 billion for research on and production of two new landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between fiscal years 2006 and 2013. Both of these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. In June 2006 the US decided to begin low-rate initial production of Spider—the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997. Legislation has been introduced in Congress that would block production of the systems.

South Korea acknowledged for the first time that it has begun production of self-destructing antipersonnel mines. In 2006 the Hanwha Corporation, a private enterprise, produced about 8,900 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, designated KM 74. South Korea clarified that it only produces Claymore mines in command-detonated mode. Previously, South Korea reported that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2004.

Landmine Monitor has learned that blast mines based on the US M-14 design are being manufactured by Myanmar Defense Products Industries at Ngyaung Chay Dauk, in western Bago division.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW.

In September 2006 the New Zealand Superannuation Fund divested from Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE) due to its involvement in the production of antipersonnel mines. In April 2007 the Netherlands’ biggest pension fund, ABP, announced that it had stopped investing in landmine producing companies, including STE.

Production by NSAGs

Compared to a decade ago, most non-state armed groups today have limited access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the arsenals of previous regimes (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), but most armed groups today produce their own improvised mines. The sophistication of mines produced by armed groups varies greatly. Some manufacture mines that can last for years, with many types of fuzing mechanisms, utilizing explosives such as TNT, ANFO, Urea Nitrate, and C4/RDX. Detonators are frequently purchased from commercial companies, although a few groups have manufactured detonators.

Non-state armed groups in Burma, Colombia, India, and the Philippines are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines.

In Burma, the United Wa State Army is allegedly producing PMN-type antipersonnel mines at an arms factory formerly belonging to the Burma Communist Party. In December 2006 the Sri Lankan Army claimed to have destroyed landmine production facilities of the LTTE. In October 2006 Colombian authorities recovered 1.5 tons of explosives, as well as assembled antipersonnel mines, from an area under FARC control. In January 2007, in Andhra Pradesh, Indian authorities recovered landmine production materials, reportedly of the Communist Party of India/Maoist, at a clandestine storage site in Koyyuru.

Non-state armed groups in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have also acquired mines by lifting them from the ground, capturing them, stealing them from arsenals, and purchasing them from corrupt officials. In Burma state-made antipersonnel mines have both been lifted and captured. In Iraq and Somaliland mines have been lifted from former battlefields.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines. Most notably and disturbingly, a UN arms embargo monitoring group alleged transfers of antipersonnel mines to groups in Somalia by Eritrea and Ethiopia, both States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In November 2006 the UN monitoring group reported transfers of antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines, from Eritrea to Mogadishu on 28 July 2006. The report added that the government of Ethiopia provided antipersonnel mines to Puntland and Qeybdiid militias in September 2006. Iran was also listed as having transferred “an unknown quantity of mines.” All three governments strongly denied the charges.

In earlier reports released in October 2005 and May 2006 the UN monitoring group alleged that the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia delivered mines to factions in Somalia, although only the May 2006 report specifically listed transfer of antipersonnel mines, by Eritrea. In April 2007, during the Standing Committee meetings, the president of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia, expressed concern over the UN reports and said that she had written to the chair of the Monitoring Group to seek further information. The ICBL lamented the fact that States Parties have not vigorously pursued these serious and specific allegations as potential violations of the Mine Ban Treaty and strongly encouraged States Parties to seek further information and clarification on this matter from both the UN Monitoring Group and the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

In 2007 Pakistani authorities acknowledged that some landmines continue to arrive in Pakistan from sources in Afghanistan. Tribal elders in Baluchistan province of Pakistan maintain that landmines are smuggled from clandestine sources in Afghanistan to some districts in Baluchistan.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended formal export moratoria in recent years including China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

In August 2006 Russia told the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that it wanted to pursue “a universal international agreement on banning the transfer of the most dangerous antipersonnel mines” within the CD framework.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction (Article 4)

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 130 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 46 countries stockpile about 176 million antipersonnel mines.

States Parties

As of 15 August 2007, 145 of the 155 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Eighty States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles.^[16] Sixty States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.^[17] An additional five states have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, Kuwait, and São Tomé e Principe.

States Parties collectively have destroyed about 41.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 2.3 million since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Cyprus, Serbia, Montenegro, Angola, Latvia, and Cape Verde.

Serbia, Montenegro and Latvia completed stockpile destruction well in advance of their deadlines under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Cyprus and Angola completed right on their deadlines. Cape Verde missed its November 2005 deadline by some eight months, becoming one of the very few States Parties to do so. It was joined by Afghanistan which did not meet its 1 March 2007 deadline.

Cyprus destroyed about 48,000 mines, finishing on its 1 July 2007 deadline. Serbia destroyed its 1.2 million mines, as well as nearly 200,000 held in Montenegro, finishing on 16 May 2007, long before Serbia’s deadline of 1 March 2008 and Montenegro’s of 1 April 2011. Angola destroyed about 88,000 mines, finishing four days ahead of its 1 January 2007 deadline, despite the discovery of new stockpiles late in the process and other complicating factors. Latvia destroyed 2,490 stockpiled mines in August 2006, just eight months after entry into force of the treaty for it.

Cape Verde was not known to possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines as it has never submitted an Article 7 transparency report, and a government official had previously told Landmine Monitor there were no stocks. However, NATO announced that on 26 June 2006 it helped destroy the last of Cape Verde’s stockpile of 1,471 antipersonnel mines, thereby bringing Cape Verde into compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. Cape Verde’s treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction was 1 November 2005. Cape Verde did not officially inform States Parties about its stockpile destruction.

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 14 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by 10 States Parties that still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs. A total of eight States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Afghanistan, Belarus (3.37 million remaining), Burundi (610), Greece (1.6 million), Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey (2.87 million), and Ukraine (6.3 million).^[18] While they have not yet officially declared stockpiles in Article 7 reports, Ethiopia and Iraq are also thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Afghanistan was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction. In April 2007 it told States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines (including 463,807 in 2006), two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjsheer province. The provincial authorities apparently did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. Afghanistan has indicated it expects to finish by November 2007.

Belarus destroyed its remaining stockpile of 294,775 antipersonnel mines, except for PFM mines, and also destroyed the victim-activated components of 5,536 MON-type and 200,826 OZM-72 mines. However, a project funded by the European Commission (EC) to provide technical and financial resources to Belarus to destroy 3.37 million PFM antipersonnel mines was abruptly cancelled. The collapse of this program will most likely result in Belarus being unable to destroy all its stockpiled mines by its 1 March 2008 deadline.

A similar regrettable situation also occurred in Ukraine. In April 2007 the EC-funded project to destroy 5.95 million PFM mines was terminated by the contractor. Ukraine’s ability to destroy its stockpiles of all types of mines by its deadline of 1 June 2010 appears to be in serious jeopardy. Ukraine’s most recent Article 7 report indicated a stock of 6.3 million mines, not 6.66 million as previously cited.

Turkey initiated its destruction program, destroying 94,111 of its stockpiled (2.96 million) antipersonnel mines in 2006, and has stated that it is confident of meeting its 1 March 2008 deadline.

Sudan also started destruction, announcing that it destroyed 4,488 mines, nearly half of its stockpile, in 2006; it announced that the remaining mines will be destroyed prior to its 1 April 2008 deadline. Burundi declared a revised stockpile total of 610 antipersonnel mines, just half the 1,212 originally declared, and committed to fulfilling its 1 April 2008 deadline. As of August 2007, Greece had not yet destroyed any of its approximately 1.6 million stockpiled mines, but has given assurances it will meet its 1 March 2008 deadline.

Indonesia told States Parties it would conduct an inventory of its stockpiled mines in mid-2007. Kuwait is not thought to have a stockpile, but must formally notify other States Parties of its status. The size of Iraq’s mine stockpile is not known, and will likely be difficult for the government to determine, given the dispersal of weapons stores around the country.

Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

Afghanistan	1 March 2007
Belarus	1 March 2008
Greece	1 March 2008
Turkey	1 March 2008
Burundi	1 April 2008
Sudan	1 April 2008
Ethiopia	1 June 2009
Ukraine	1 June 2010
Indonesia	1 August 2011
Kuwait	1 January 2012
Iraq	1 February 2012

States Not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (26.5 million), and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with very large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million) and India (estimated 4-5 million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2006. In 2007 Poland stated that it plans to destroy most of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines within nine or ten years, while putting self-destruct or self-neutralization mechanisms in some mines. However, antipersonnel mines with such mechanisms are clearly prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Marshall Islands, also a signatory, is not thought to stockpile any antipersonnel mines.

South Korea has told Landmine Monitor that it has a stockpile of 407,800 antipersonnel mines. Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Myanmar, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Syria. In 2007 Nepal reported that it has a stockpile of about 3,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD mines. The Vietnamese Ministry of Defense told the ICBL in October 2006 that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines consists solely of mines cleared from minefields, and indicated its willingness to provide information on the size of the stockpile.

States not party to the treaty have destroyed significant numbers of antipersonnel mines, more than 25 million, primarily because the mines had expired or to be complaint with CCW Amended Protocol II.

Non-State Armed Groups

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Egypt, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Possession is most often determined as a result of seizures by government forces.

Several NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment revealed information on or destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Polisario Front destroyed 3,181 antipersonnel mines and 140 antivehicle mines in a public event on 27 February 2007 in Western Sahara. Two recent signatories in Burma declared possessing between 300 and 450 antipersonnel mines.

Reporting on and Destroying Captured or Newly Discovered Stockpiles

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan declares that States Parties should, “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.”

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, DR Congo, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan and Yemen have provided some official information on such discoveries. Other States Parties have not reported on discoveries that have been cited in the media or other sources: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Peru, Philippines, and Uganda.

Since mid-2006 there have been reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan (by national and coalition forces), Algeria, Bangladesh, BiH (by EUFOR), Colombia, DR Congo, and the Philippines.

It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines. States Parties should reveal in Article 7 reports the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines, depending on whether they are maintained for a period as stockpiled mines (Form B), transferred for destruction or training purposes (Form D), actually destroyed (Form G) or retained for training purposes (Form D). This reporting should occur for discoveries and seizures made both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs.

This responsibility to report is reflected in both Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan and the Final Report of the September 2006 Seventh Meeting of States Parties. The Final Report suggested that Form G of the Article 7 reporting format could be amended to facilitate reporting, a suggestion that originated with the ICBL.

Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 155 States Parties, 69 retain almost 228,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. In addition, Indonesia has said it will retain mines. Botswana has also expressed its intention to retain mines, but has not provided any information.

At least 77 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the recent additions of Brunei, Burkina Faso, the Cook Islands, Guyana, Montenegro and Vanuatu.^[19] Moldova destroyed all of its 249 antipersonnel mines previously retained for training in May/June 2006. In July 2006 FYR Macedonia destroyed all 4,000 mines previously retained. Ecuador told Landmine Monitor that it intends to destroy 1,001 of its 2,001 mines retained for training in August 2007.

Seven States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.^[20]

Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Turkey (15,150), Algeria (15,030), Brazil (13,550), Bangladesh (12,500), and Sweden (10,498). In two encouraging developments, Sweden destroyed nearly 4,000 of its retained mines and Brazil destroyed almost 1,500. Brazil told States Parties in September 2006 that the mines would be utilized in training until 2019. A further seven States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sudan (10,000), Greece (7,224), Australia (7,133), Croatia (6,179), Belarus (6,030), Serbia (5,565), and Tunisia (5,000).

These 12 States Parties together possess some 75 percent (170,089) of the total of mines (228,000) retained by all States Parties. 

The majority (37) of States Parties that retain mines are keeping between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.^[21] Another 20 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.^[22]

Antipersonnel Mines Retained by States Parties under Article 3

States Parties
77	have chosen not to retain any mines
20	retain less than 1,000 mines
37	retain 1,000 to 5,000 mines
7	retain 5,000 to 10,000 mines
5	retain over 10,000 mines (nearly one-third of all retained mines)

 

A total of 25 States Parties reported consuming 12,416 mines for training and research purposes in 2006. In 2005, 14 States Parties reported consuming 3,702 mines. In 2004, 24 States Parties reported consuming 6,761 mines.

At least 44 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2006.^[23] Eighteen countries have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry into force for that country.^[24] The ICBL told States Parties in April 2007 that it “is increasingly convinced that there is widespread abuse of the exception in Article 3 allowing retention of antipersonnel mines for training and development. It appears that many States Parties are retaining more antipersonnel mines than ‘absolutely necessary’ and are not using mines retained under Article 3 for the permitted purposes. It is time for States Parties to think about this as a serious compliance issue, and not just a reporting or transparency issue…. Unless a State Party is clearly retaining the minimum number of antipersonnel mines, is actively utilizing the mines for the permitted purposes, and is being fully transparent about the process, there may rightly be concerns that the mines are in essence still being stockpiled and could be used for war fighting purposes.”^[25]

The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan (Action #54) that emerged from the First Review Conference in November-December 2004 to report in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005, States Parties agreed to adopt a new voluntary expanded reporting format for Article 7 Form D, to encourage and facilitate reporting on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines. Only 11 States Parties made use of the new format for calendar year 2006, the same number as in 2005.^[26]

Nine States Parties made statements on their retained mines during the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that, “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the Convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

In 2007 States Parties maintained an impressive 96 percent compliance rate in submitting initial transparency reports, as in 2006 and 2005. This compares with 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.

Six State Parties have submitted initial reports since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Bhutan, Brunei, Cook Islands, Guyana, Ukraine, and Vanuatu. Guyana submitted its first Article 7 report, which was due 29 July 2004, on 26 October 2006.

Four States Parties have a pending deadline for initial reports: Montenegro (28 September 2007), Indonesia (28 January 2008), Kuwait (29 June 2008), and Iraq (30 July 2008).

A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Gambia (28 August 2003), São Tomé e Principe (28 February 2004), Ethiopia (28 November 2005), and Haiti (28 January 2007).

In contrast with the impressive compliance rate for initial Article 7 reports, there was a decrease for the third successive year in the number of annual updates submitted, which were due by 30 April 2007. As of 15 August 2007, a total of 81 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2006. Seventy States Parties had not submitted updates which is, disappointingly, 15 more than the previous year.^[27] The 2006 compliance rate of almost 54 percent is less than in previous years (2005: 62 percent, 2004: 65 percent, 2003: 78 percent, and 2002: 62 percent).

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports.^[28] In August 2006 Morocco submitted its first voluntary Article 7 transparency report, for the period from September 2005 to September 2006. It did not report on stockpiled mines. Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports each year since 2003, most recently on 6 April 2007. At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, Sri Lanka announced that it intended to submit a second Article 7 report; its June 2005 report did not include information on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Several other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, and Mongolia.

National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 53 of 155 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9. This is an increase of three State Parties since publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Chad, Peru and Tanzania. A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. Brunei, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Haiti, Jordan and Montenegro initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been reported to be in process for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda.

A total of 37 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty. Bhutan joined this category in the past year, declaring that the treaty is “self-enacting” under domestic law. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 38 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.^[29]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has produced an information kit on the development of national implementing legislation, which is available in English, French, Russian, and Spanish, and on the ICRC website.^[30]

Special Issues of Concern

For many years the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assisting prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes.

Ever since the treaty entered force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the Standing Committee meetings and annual Meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and ICRC.^[31] States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan in 2004, the Zagreb Progress Report in 2005 and the Geneva Progress Report in 2006 that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters.^[32]

However, few states have expressed their views in the past year, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2.^[33] In one exception, Ecuador stated in a July 2007 response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire that it has never participated in a joint military operation with states not party to the treaty, has never received a request for the transit of antipersonnel mines, has not produced antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and that it views 1,000 as the acceptable limit for the number of mines retained for training.

There were several notable developments related to Claymore and OZM-72 mines, which are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

In 2006 Belarus destroyed the victim-activated components of its 5,536 MON (Claymore-type) mines and 200,826 OZM-72 mines. At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that it had discovered more than 15,000 MRUD Claymore-type mines during inspections of weapon storage sites. It said that “since they are not adapted to ensure command-detonation, MRUD mines can be technically considered as anti-personnel mines.” BiH thus made a decision to destroy the mines. It said that “the mines should be destroyed for humanitarian reasons….”^[34]

For detailed information on States Parties’ policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3–which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty–see past editions of Landmine Monitor Report.

 

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