Although landmines and explosive remnants of war continue to pose a threat to current and future generations—and improvised explosive devices are an increasing problem—there was a marked decrease in casualties in 2006. Although casualties decreased in 2006, the number of mine survivors—many needing life-long care—continued to increase.

In 2006 a total 5,751 casualties from mines, ERW and victim-activated IEDs were recorded in 68 countries and areas, including 1,367 people killed and 4,296 injured (88 were unknown).^[1] This is 16 percent less than in 2005 (6,873 casualties recorded in 78 countries/areas).^[2] The 2006 casualty total is also less than half the 11,700 new casualties reported in 2002, which can be attributed to positive effects of the Mine Ban Treaty and the efforts of mine action organizations. It is reasonable to assume that the long-standing estimate of 15,000-20,000 new mine/ERW casualties per year no longer holds.

However, the 2006 total of 5,751 refers only to known casualties—that is, casualties recorded in data management systems or identified by Landmine Monitor media analysis. The actual total number of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties is unknown but certainly higher than 5,751, as data collection is inadequate or non-existent in 64 of 68 countries with recorded casualties.^[3] Even in the States Parties selected as the so-called VA24 to receive special assistance in providing for survivors, 22 of the 24 have inadequate casualty data collection mechanisms, making under-reporting certain. From the total 5,751 casualties, 5,279 occurred in countries where surveillance mechanisms are inadequate or non-existent. Ten years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, efforts to improve data collection are needed urgently in order to provide a sound basis for the planning and provision of survivor assistance; see Special Issue of Concern later. Other factors affecting the reliability of casualty totals are noted in the following pages.

Casualty Demographics

As in previous years, in 2006 civilians accounted for three-quarters of recorded casualties and children were 34 percent of civilian casualties, nearly all boys. In some severely affected countries/areas children were the majority of casualties (Afghanistan: 59 percent, Nepal: 53, Somaliland: 66) and boys between five and 14 years were a particularly high-risk group. Males were 89 percent of all casualties where gender details were known; the gender and/or age of 1,454 people (25 percent of all casualties) were unknown.

Some 24 percent of casualties were military; this increase from 2005 (19 percent) is due to one country, Colombia, which accounts for 57 percent of all military casualties. Excluding Colombia, 12 percent of casualties would be military. Other factors leading to recording of a higher military casualty rate are increased conflict (Pakistan) and extensive media reporting focused on foreign troops (Afghanistan and Iraq) at the expense of national civilian casualties.

Deminers carrying out clearance activities remained the smallest casualty group with just over one percent of casualties (69), the same level as 2005, despite increased clearance efforts in 2006 and more difficult tasks such as new ERW contamination in Lebanon.^[4] A small number of countries, notably Iran and Cambodia, have persistently high clearance casualties. Although more clearance personnel were the target of violence in 2006, (for example, in Senegal and Afghanistan), these casualties have not been included in the Landmine Monitor total.

Most casualties appear to occur in rural areas while people are carrying out their daily livelihood and economic activities; this is especially the case in Laos, Vietnam and Yemen. This clearly demonstrates the negative impact of mines and ERW on the livelihoods of people, as fertile land, pasture, village environs and trade routes remain contaminated and dangerous.

In general, more detailed information on casualties is available in States Parties, which recorded 28 percent of casualties where age, gender or status details were unknown, while in states not party to the treaty casualty details were unknown in 72 percent of cases.

Country and Regional Trends

Casualties continued to occur in all parts of the world in 2006, with decreases in recorded casualties in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa:

• 1,205 casualties in 19 countries/areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, up from 1,122 casualties in 21 countries/areas in 2005;
• 2,510 casualties in 13 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, down from 3,031 in 16 countries/areas in 2005;
• 165 casualties in eight countries/areas in Europe, down from 335 in 10 countries/areas in 2005;
• 205 casualties in 11 countries/areas in the Commonwealth of Independent States, down from 228 in 11 countries/areas in 2005;
• 539 casualties in 13 countries/areas in the Middle East-North Africa, down from 990 in 12 countries/areas in 2005; and,
• 1,127 casualties in four countries in the Americas, down from 1,167 in eight countries in 2005.

Key features of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualty incidence in 2006 were:

• 14 countries/areas where casualties had occurred in 2005 had no casualties in 2006;^[5]
• four countries with no casualties in 2005 had new casualties recorded in 2006: Republic of Congo (one), Hungary (one), Indonesia (five) and Tunisia (one);
• 41 percent of all recorded casualties were in three VA24 countries, Colombia, Afghanistan and Cambodia;
• significant casualty decreases were recorded in Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Cambodia, although casualty data collection in Laos and Vietnam is very limited and under-reporting is certain. The most spectacular decrease of nearly 50 percent occurred in Cambodia (down to 450 from 875 in 2005), due to increased economic opportunities and community involvement in mine action; this trend appeared to continue into 2007;
• significant casualty decreases in some countries/areas (for example, Palestine, Iraq, Iran) were solely due to lack of data collection mechanisms and cessation of actors who had provided data in previous years, and cannot be considered representative;
• most countries with annual casualty rates of 50 or less showed little changes from 2005, indicating a relatively low-level but constant threat;
• several countries reported increased casualty rates, almost exclusively due to conflict: Burma, Chad, India, Pakistan and Somalia. Lebanon noted an approximately tenfold casualty increase;
• in a few cases (Ethiopia, Sudan) increases were due in part to improved data collection; and,
• Colombia remains the country with the most mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties, although there are concerns about the accuracy of this data.

Also, by August 2007 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties had been recorded in seven countries where no casualties had been recorded in 2006: Albania, Honduras, Israel, Mongolia, Niger, South Africa and Zambia; four of these had casualties in 2005.

Trends in Types of Devices Causing Casualties

While there is insufficient historical data differentiating among the various devices causing mine/ERW/IED casualties to determine long-term trends, recent data management developments in some countries (for example, Cambodia and Nepal) suggests a gradual decrease in mine casualties compared with ERW and victim-activated IED casualties. In 2006, of casualties where the device type was known, 46 percent were caused by mines (51 percent in 2005), seven percent by cluster submunitions (four percent in 2005), 42 percent by other ERW (43 percent in 2005) and five percent by victim-activated IEDs (two percent in 2005).^[6] The increase in victim-activated IED casualties was due mainly to the establishment of a data collection mechanism in Nepal that distinguished victim-activated incidents, and more generally due to improved media reporting and increased Landmine Monitor analytical capacity. In addition, NSAG use of victim-activated devices was reported in several countries, including Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Russian Federation.

The large increase in cluster submunition casualties was due to the 2006 Lebanon conflict and due to increased differentiation in databases. Cluster submunition casualties were recorded in at least 12 countries in 2006.^[7]

Most IED incidents involve remote-detonated devices or devices where the detonation mechanism is not specified; these cases are excluded from Landmine Monitor casualty reporting. Victim-activated IEDs are de facto antipersonnel mines and are included in the totals. However, identification of the type of IED is often difficult because of incorrect or ambiguous terminology and insufficient detail on the circumstances of the incident. The prevalence and nature of remote-detonated IED incidents, which often cause large numbers of military casualties, lead to underreporting of civilian casualties and of victim-activated IED incidents which generally cause fewer casualties. Remote-detonated IEDs were used extensively in Afghanistan, Chechnya and the northern Caucasus, Iraq, and Turkey during the reporting period. A notable exception was Algeria, where victim-activated IEDs caused the majority of casualties in 2006 (43 of 58) and 2005.

In 2006 Landmine Monitor was able to identify 89 percent of device types (in 2005, 75 percent). Injury patterns, the number of people involved and activities at the time of incidents differ between cluster submunition, IED, ERW and mine casualties. For example, cluster submunitions tend to cause more severe shrapnel injuries and fewer lower limb amputations than do mines. ERW scrap metal collection and trade contributes significantly to casualty rates in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Laos and Vietnam, and is an increasing problem in Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Special Issue of Concern: Inadequate Data Collection and Management

Obtaining comprehensive data on mine/ERW/IED casualties for mine action planning purposes remains challenging. Forty-eight of 68 countries/areas recording new casualties in 2006 used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or another data collection mechanism, but 92 percent of these are considered incomplete. About 20 countries, some severely mine/ERW-affected, do not operate any surveillance mechanism. As a result, Landmine Monitor obtained casualty information from media analysis and other sources; 19 percent of all casualties in 2006 were identified by Landmine Monitor through media monitoring. Only eight percent of casualties were recorded in countries with complete data collection systems, and 73 percent in countries with limited data collection. Under-reporting is certain. Even in countries where data collection is considered complete it is possible that casualties in remote areas are not reported.

Factors in the inadequacy of data collection and management include the following:

• data collection is not prioritized; this is reflected in its poor quality and incompleteness (for example, in Ethiopia);
• lack of capacity impedes proactive data collection (Colombia);
• geographic and demographic coverage is limited―not nationwide or excludes some groups (Laos);
• mine/ERW/IED casualties occurring during conflicts are generally under-reported (Myanmar/Burma);
• lack of differentiation between device types, recording of personal details, numbers of casualties involved per incident and injury types (Burundi);
• lack of standard methodology, terminology and types of information collected (Georgia);
• poor quality control and verification resulting in duplications or fields containing the wrong information (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
• data may be censored, embargoed or not used transparently for political or conflict reasons (Iraq);
• multiple actors collecting data leads to competing databases, overlapping and contradictory information (Lebanon);
• few data collection mechanisms provide socioeconomic or survivor assistance information, or it is collected inconsistently (nearly all countries);
• casualty data is insufficiently linked to contamination data (nearly all countries);
• data is not shared for planning purposes, contains insufficient information for planning, or data collectors have insufficient analytical capacity (DR Congo); and,
• casualty data is not linked to referral mechanisms, resulting in data collection for compilation purposes rather than assistance (Sudan).

In 2006-2007 progress in data collection and management was made in some cases: separate databases were consolidated in Jordan; standard terminology was applied in Nepal; increased device type differentiation was achieved in Tajikistan and Cambodia; a standard casualty data form was developed in Iraq; survivor assistance and socioeconomic indicators were included in the surveillance mechanism in Uganda; a Landmine Impact Survey was started in Sudan; and, the LIS results for Iraq were released after long delay.

Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives 2005-2009

At the first Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, in Nairobi in 2004, 24 States Parties were identified as having significant numbers of survivors and needs for assistance but also the greatest responsibility to act: Albania, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen.

VA24 States Parties with Most Casualties

Country	2006 Casualties	2005 Casualties
Colombia	1,106	1,112
Afghanistan	796	996
Cambodia	450	875
Chad	139	35
Sudan	135	99

 

The VA24 agreed to identify survivor assistance objectives, produce plans to achieve these objectives within a timeframe (by the next Review Conference in 2009), to ensure the objectives were SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound), and to report regularly on progress. Support was provided by the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU).^[8]

In total, the VA24 submitted 408 objectives; Afghanistan submitted 67 of them. Two countries (Burundi and Chad) had not formally submitted any objectives as of August 2007. Incomplete objectives were submitted by three countries (Mozambique; Nicaragua; and Colombia which had the most casualties in both 2005 and 2006 but only submitted four not-SMART objectives and partially achieved one of them).

Forty-five percent of the VA24 objectives cannot be considered to be SMART as they lack timeframes. Other objectives are too unrealistic or generic; for example, the creation of service directories appears as an objective for several countries—something that should have been achieved long ago.

These countries were invited to refine their objectives, with support from the ISU, to make them SMART. Only seven countries had formally presented revised objectives as of April 2007.^[9] Significantly improved objectives were presented by some countries; in other cases revised objectives were less ambitious or postponed, or became workplans for day-to-day operations.

Of the 408 objectives, 106 (26 percent) had annual deadlines or were to be achieved before mid-2007. As of August 2007, only 13 of them (three percent) had been fully achieved, 60 have been partially achieved and on 33 objectives no progress was reported.

Plans to achieve their objectives were submitted only by four of the VA24 States Parties; seven others presented informal plans during the reporting period.^[10] The only country rigorously reporting on plans and progress was Albania.

By the halfway point reached in 2007, there was little evidence of substantial progress made by many of the VA24 countries. In overall terms, adequate advances were made in 46 percent of VA24 countries in 2006-2007, with most progess reported by Albania and Tajikistan.

VA24 States Parties Making Adequate or Inadequate Progress

Adequate progress	Inadequate progress
Afghanistan	Angola
Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cambodia
Croatia	Burundi
El Salvador	Chad
Nicaragua	Colombia
Peru	DR Congo
Senegal	Eritrea
Sudan	Ethiopia
Tajikistan	Guinea-Bissau
Uganda	Mozambique
Serbia
Thailand
Yemen

 

Adequacy of Survivor Assistance in VA24 States Parties in 2006-2007

Emergency medical care	Continuing medical care	Physical rehabilitation	Psychological support and social reintegration	Economic reintegration	Laws and public policy
total adequate	21%	21%	17%	16%	4%	13%
unchanged- inadequate	58%	62%	42%	71%	63%	54%
unchanged- adequate	13%	21%	13%	16%	0%	0%
increased- inadequate	21%	13%	33%	13%	25%	33%
increased- adequate	8%	0%	4%	0%	4%	13%
decreased- inadequate	0%	4%	8%	0%	8%	0%

 

Changes since the VA24 countries were identified in late 2004 call into question whether these remain the 24 countries with the most “significant numbers of survivors and needs for assistance but also the greatest responsibility to act.” Several VA24 countries have seen their casualty rates reduced to levels similar to other States Parties, with whom they share similar development and survivor levels. About half of the VA24 continue to report high annual casualty rates, large numbers of survivors, poor development indicators, paired with insufficient capacity.^[11]

The ISU prioritized support to five of the 12 VA24 countries with significant problems (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Tajikistan) and to six others with lesser problems (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Yemen). This selection seems unrelated to the need for assistance. Some of the priority countries operate the oldest mine action programs in the world and have considerable national or international survivor assistance expertise (for example, Afghanistan, Cambodia) while other non-priority countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia) have negligible expertise and resources. Some of the six with lesser problems selected for ISU support have significant resources and a limited problem.

The accession of Iraq to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007 also calls for reconsideration of the VA24, as Iraq is one of the most severely mine/ERW affected countries in the world, with a high annual casualty rate and significant numbers of survivors.

Other Progress in Survivor Assistance

The humanitarian impact of mines, ERW and IEDs is not restricted to States Parties. Several states not party to the treaty and non-state areas have to deal with issues of a comparable scale, notably Laos, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Lebanon.

States not Party to the Treaty with the Most Casualties

Country	2006 casualties	2005 casualties
Pakistan	488	214
Somalia	401	276
Myanmar/Burma	243	231
Lebanon	207	22
Nepal	169	197

Some of these countries made significant progress in survivor assistance during the reporting period. In Laos a victim assistance unit and technical working group was established to coordinate all survivor assistance activities; this is the only country to set mine action standards for survivor assistance. Nepal acknowledged that its new mine action authority should work on survivor assistance. In Sri Lanka coordination meetings to implement the integrated and emergency survivor assistance plan continued despite conflict. In Vietnam the government-supported community-based rehabilitation program continued to expand and a national action plan for people with disabilities was approved. In Lebanon service provision was strained to its limits in the aftermath of the July-August 2006 war, but it did not collapse and the needs of the country’s newly disabled are prominently featured in the media and awareness-raising campaigns.

In other, lesser affected countries significant advances were made in reducing casualties, creating strategic frameworks, and improved coordination and capacity of survivor assistance. For example, Azerbaijan’s survivor assistance projects continued to operate on priorities and needs identified by survivors, their families and communities. Egypt signed a strategic framework that will include a substantial survivor assistance component.

However, service provision remains largely inadequate among 28 states not party to the treaty and other areas recording casualties in 2006-2007. The general development level of this group can be considered reasonably similar to that of the VA24. Remarkably enough they appear to score better than the VA24 countries, but with marked differences. Whereas VA24 countries saw very few decreases in services, there were decreases for every component of survivor assistance in this second group of countries/areas. This is mainly due to conflict, capacity and financial constraints and, in some cases, lack of continued international support. Hardly any improvements in already adequate services were noted and significantly fewer increases were also noted in inadequate services as compared to the VA24.

Adequacy of Survivor Assistance in States not Party to the Treaty in 2006-2007

Emergency medical care	Continuing medical care	Physical rehabilitation	Psychological support and social reintegration	Economic reintegration	Laws and public policy
total adequate	29%	25%	29%	18%	14%	11%
unchanged- inadequate	39%	47%	39%	64%	54%	64%
unchanged- adequate	29%	25%	25%	18%	14%	11%
increased- inadequate	18%	14%	21%	4%	14%	21%
increased- adequate	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%
decreased- inadequate	14%	14%	11%	14%	18%	4%

The Survivor Assistance Toolbox

Despite numerous programs for mine/ERW survivors and people with disabilities, far too few people are reached. The ICBL put forward basic principles to make sure that the needs of survivors, their families and affected communities are at the forefront of survivor assistance and that survivor assistance is integrated into poverty alleviation and development programs. In April 2007 the ICBL presented its Guiding Principles for Victim Assistance.^[12] Based on these principles, as well as its field and research experience, Landmine Monitor identified the following:

• assistance is the prime responsibility of the affected state, but consistent and long-term support by the international community is needed;
• assistance should not be limited to the directly affected individual, but should extend to the family and affected communities;
• assistance includes six equal and interlinked components: data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies;
• assistance is a basic human rights issue about equal access for those affected, implemented through national legislation as well as adherence to international conventions;
• assistance programming must be long-term and based on needs and rights identified by the survivors, families and communities themselves who should be able to provide direct input into policy-making and planning at local, national and international levels;
• assistance should build on national ownership and systematic coordination between stakeholders, in order to be sustainable and effective;
• assistance cannot be carried out in isolation, but should, as much as possible, be part of existing disability and mine action programs, as well as cross-cutting public health, development and poverty reduction initiatives; and,
• assistance and disability should be priority issues, linked to and not in competition with emergency issues such as HIV/AIDS, millennium development goals or ongoing conflict.

Practical requirements for survivor assistance programs to be inclusive and comprehensive include:

• assistance must be physically and economically accessible, and information about available services should be freely available;
• assistance must be varied and effective; this includes the reinforcement of referral mechanisms, culturally appropriate psychosocial support, inclusive and specialized education, and equal job opportunities that meet market demand;
• center-based services should be complemented by community-based programs to improve service delivery and referral for people who have limited access to services due to their cost, uneven distribution and staff shortages;
• national and local services should gradually replace international services; states should seek ways to improve infrastructure and human resource capacity through training and increased staff retention; states should also increase national funding and seek increasingly diversified funding; and,
• progress in assistance must be monitored through more systematic and qualitative reporting, in for example Form J of the Article 7 report, but also by including services provided and socioeconomic indicators in casualty and injury surveillance mechanisms, which should be used proactively for planning purposes.

National Ownership of Survivor Assistance

Most countries with mine survivors still depend on technical advice, funding and project implementation by international NGOs and organizations such as the ICRC. Close cooperation and coordination between national and international agencies is necessary to make more effective use of limited resources, avoid duplications and decrease gaps in services.

However, increasing importance is being accorded to national ownership of survivor assistance. A growing number of organizations are being placed under national management, government bodies are increasingly involved and national financial support appears to be expanding slowly. National ownership is underpinned by the development and implementation of legislation on disability, equal employment, education and social matters, as well as strategies adapted to local realities. It is reinforced by increased funding from the national budget and increased ability to mobilize resources.

Landmine Monitor has noted that survivor assistance strategies and programs became more effective when there was an ongoing and active involvement of relevant ministries and national coordination bodies such as disability councils or war veterans unions. Coordination mechanisms such as interministerial committees or mixed government/non-government task forces help the government take ownership of survivor assistance and ensure participation of key stakeholders, more balanced priority-setting, better defined responsibilities and accountability—although, in 2006-2007, many strategies and day-to-day monitoring were still developed and conducted by mine action centers.

While interministerial coordination was a priority in 2006 and progress was achieved, disability issues remain part of large ministerial portfolios in many countries; there are very few disability ministers; line ministries frequently have overlapping or competing portfolios; NGO stakeholders are not invited to provide input; and survivors, their families and communities remain under-represented in policy-making.

10 Lessons from 10 years of Survivor Assistance

1. Prioritization of data collection is needed to understand the humanitarian problem caused by mines and ERW, and better plan mine action and survivor assistance. In the last 10 years casualty data collection has not been a priority, is still inadequate in most cases, lacks relevant service and socioeconomic detail and is not fully shared; where detailed data is available, it is underused.

2. Involvement of mine survivors, their families and communities in policy-making is needed. Currently they are under-represented; assistance is still provided mainly as charity rather than on a rights basis; disability legislation remains largely unimplemented.

3. Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound survivor assistance strategies are needed. Currently there are very few countries with solid survivor assistance plans containing SMART objectives adjusted to the needs identified by those directly affected and to each country’s context; VA24 States Parties have done this little better than states not party to the treaty.

4. National ownership and sustainability must be ensured. While there has been some progress in the last 10 years, national staff are not sufficiently trained to develop long-term strategies which are still made mainly by international experts; coordination between governments and NGOs remains weak, resulting in gaps and overlapping services.

5. Improved service provision is needed. Only 25 percent of services are adequate at present; the various components of survivor assistance are seldom linked or given equal attention; services are not physically, economically and bureaucratically accessible, and still depend on extensive international support; referral systems are weak; information about services is inadequate.

6. Equal services for civilian and military survivors. Military survivors continue to receive better survivor assistance than civilians.

7. Greater human resources and infrastructure capacity are needed to provide more complex and comprehensive services to survivors. Insufficient training has been provided to national stakeholders to develop sufficient human resource capacity and expertise.

8. Better reporting on survivor assistance. Reporting survivor assistance efforts is voluntary under the Mine Ban Treaty; there has been too little transparency, non- standardized reporting and incomplete information on resource allocation.

9. A twin-track approach to survivor assistance is needed. Ten years after entry into force of the treaty, survivor assistance is seldom linked with poverty alleviation and national development programs, and vice versa.

10. Behavioral change, institutionally and individually, is needed, to ensure that survivors and other people with disabilities are seen as productive contributors to society. Despite 10 years of advocacy and treaty implementation, survivors are still too often seen as a burden.

Other International Developments^[13]

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol were adopted during the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly on 13 December 2006 and opened for signature on 30 March 2007. As of 20 August 2007, 102 countries and regional organizations had signed the Convention and 57 also signed the Optional Protocol; four of the countries had ratified the Convention. Thirteen of the VA24 countries signed the Convention, seven signed the Optional Protocol and one (Croatia) ratified on 15 August 2007.^[14] Of 15 states not party to the treaty identified as severely mine-affected, only India and Sri Lanka signed, and Lebanon signed both the Convention and Optional Protocol.

Adoption and implementation of the Convention require inclusion of disability rights into mainstream policy agendas, commitment of resources, awareness-raising, capacity-building, comprehensive data collection and services, as well as monitoring. These requirements are consistent with the survivor assistance actions established at the First Review Conference and the ICBL guiding principles to create a barrier-free environment for people with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.

The Optional Protocol allows for people or organizations from States Parties to the Convention to file “communications” to an independent committee when they are “victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention.” The claim will be investigated and a suitable solution will be examined with the State Party in question in order to improve the rights of people with disabilities.

On 3 December 2006 the International Day of People with a Disability focused on “e-accessibility” or accessibility to information technology and communications for people with disabilities.

Funding and Resources

Precise, comprehensive and comparable information on resources allocated to survivor assistance is difficult to obtain.^[15] Contributions made by mine-affected states themselves are key to the provision of sustainable assistance. Only a small percentage of these contributions are traceable and cannot be seen as representative of the situation. Mine-affected States Parties should be encouraged to report, in Form J of the Article 7 report, full details of national funding allocated to assist mine survivors.

Mine-affected states are often dependent on international donor funding to sustain survivor assistance. In 2006-2007 many funding shortages affecting survivor assistance were identified among some VA24 States Parties, including Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Tajikistan and Yemen. The overall level of funding for survivor assistance has failed to keep up with needs of the growing number of survivors. The UN reported a 25 percent decrease in survivor assistance funding through the 2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects (US$3.5 million compared to $4.7 million in 2005). Survivor assistance programs received just one percent of total Portfolio funds ($240 million) in 2006 (2 percent in 2005).^[16]

The ICBL and many States Parties favor a twin-track approach: allocation of funding to specific survivor assistance programs while incorporating survivor assistance into broader development programs and the health sector. The Geneva Progress Report emerging from the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006 noted that, “Very little [reporting] has been provided to indicate efforts that will ultimately benefit landmine survivors are being undertaken through integrated development cooperation.”^[17] A notable exception is Albania where national and international funding was directed to existing services by improving the capacity of state-run healthcare facilities and maintaining NGO-managed services.

Resource Mobilization Contact Group consultations in 2006 noted that “for high levels of funding to be maintained,” stakeholders will demand evidence of concrete progress, including “more effective victim assistance.”^[18] However, Landmine Monitor found that the effectiveness of survivor assistance programs was compromised by lack of substantial long-term funding, which impedes long-term planning, forces implementers to reduce activities and reduces accountability. Donor countries should recall the Nairobi Action Plan commitment to multi-year funding; survivor assistance “investments need to be measured in the life spans of the survivors.”^[19]

 

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